Chapter IV

Is Religion a Special Virtue Distinct From Others?

Religion is regarded as a part of Justice, and is distinct from the other parts of Justice.

Since virtue is ordained to what is good, where there exists some special ratio of good there must be some special corresponding virtue. But the particular good towards which religion is ordained is the showing due honour to God. Honour, however, is due by reason of some excellency. And to God belongs pre-eminent excellence, since He in every possible way infinitely transcends all things. Hence special honour is due to Him; just as we note that in human concerns varying honours are due to the varying excellencies of persons; one is the honour of a father, another that of a king, and so on. Hence it is manifest that religion is a special virtue.

Some, however, maintain that religion is not a special virtue distinct from others, thus:

1. S. Augustine says[54]: "True sacrifice is every work undertaken in order that we may be joined to God in holy fellowship." But sacrifice comes under religion. Every work of virtue therefore comes under religion. And consequently it is not a special virtue.

But every work of virtue is said to be a sacrifice in so far as
it is directed to showing God reverence. It does not thence
follow that religion is a general virtue, but that it commands
all the other virtues.

2. The Apostle says to the Corinthians[55]: _Do all to the glory of God._ But it belongs to religion to do some things for the glory of God. Hence religion is not a special virtue.

But all kinds of acts, in so far as they are done for the glory
of God, come under religion; not, however, as though it elicited
them, but inasmuch as it controls them. Those acts, however,
come under religion as eliciting them which, by their own
specific character, pertain to the service of God.

3. Lastly, the charity whereby we love God is not distinct from the charity by which we love our neighbour. But in the _Ethics_[56] it is said: "To be honoured is akin to being loved." Hence religion by which God is honoured is not a specifically distinct virtue from those observances, whether _dulia_ or piety, whereby we honour our neighbour. Hence it is not a special virtue.

But the object of love is a _good_ thing; whereas the object of
honour or reverence is what is _excellent_. But it is God's
Goodness that is communicated to His creatures, not the
excellence of His Goodness. Hence while the charity wherewith we
love God is not a distinct virtue from the charity wherewith we
love our neighbour, yet the religion whereby we honour God is
distinct from the virtues whereby we honour our neighbour.