Chapter XI: Gibraltar and the Convoy

AMERICAN VESSELS ESCORTED NINETY PER CENT OF SHIPPING BETWEEN
ENGLAND AND MEDITERRANEAN--GREAT WORK ACCOMPLISHED BY SHIPS UNDER
COMMAND OF ADMIRAL NIBLACK--U. S. NAVAL FORCES MADE POSSIBLE
OPERATION OF CONVOY SYSTEM, ONE OF THE MOST EFFECTIVE MEASURES OF
THE WAR.

Gibraltar was the gateway through which passed one-fourth of all the shipping of the Allies. When the convoy system was applied to the Mediterranean, July, 1917, it became the principal convoy port of the world.

United States naval vessels furnished ocean escort both going and returning for 90 per cent of all convoys between Gibraltar and Great Britain--200 of the 225 groups which sailed, 4,269 ships, representing 12,000,000 gross tons. The Mediterranean escort protected 5,120 vessels; our destroyers in that region, 1004; our Marseilles escort 73; and our men-of-war accompanied 12 other special ships, transports, cable layers and submarines. Thus the United States vessels of this force escorted a total of 10,478 ships.

Realizing the strategic importance of Gibraltar, the Navy Department, on July 5, 1917, decided to establish a base there, and on July 14th, directed 11 vessels, including gunboats and light cruisers, under command of Admiral Wilson, to prepare for distant service, and sail for Gibraltar at the earliest possible date. This base, one of the most important in Europe, was established by the Navy Department on its own initiative, as had been the bases at Brest and Bordeaux and the Azores. By the time our vessels arrived it became, for protection of Allied shipping, a point of prime importance.

The convoy system was inaugurated in the Mediterranean, by British Admiralty order, on July 22, 1917. Five days afterwards the first regular convoy of 14 ships sailed for England. August 6th the vanguard of the United States naval vessels, the cruiser _Sacramento_ (Captain T. T. Craven) reached Gibraltar. On the 17th Admiral Wilson arrived in the _Birmingham_ (Captain C. L. Hussey), followed next day by the _Nashville_ (Captain H. E. Yarnell). Other ships followed--the gunboats _Castine_ (Captain W. C. Asserson), _Machias_ (Commander Austin Kautz), _Wheeling_ (Commander H. W. Osterhaus), _Paducah_ (Commander H. H. Royall), the cruiser _Chester_ (Captain Philip Williams), the Coast Guard cutters _Seneca_ (Captain W. J. Wheeler), _Manning_ (Lieutenant Commander A. J. Henderson), _Tampa_ (Lieutenant Commander Charles C. Satterlee), _Ossipee_ (Lieutenant Commander W. H. Munter), _Yamacraw_ (Lieutenant Commander Randolph Ridgely), _Algonquin_ (Lieutenant Commander G. C. Carmine), the converted yachts _Yankton_ (Lieutenant G. E. Lake), _Nahma_ (Lieutenant Commander E. Friedrick), _Druid_ (Lieutenant Commander J. F. Connor), _Wenonah_ (Lieutenant Commander P. E. Speicher), _Arcturus_ (Lieutenant Commander C. F. Howell), _Lydonia_ (Lieutenant Commander R. P. McCullough), _Cythera_ (Lieutenant Commander W. G. Roper), _Wadena_ (Lieutenant Commander W. M. Falconer), and _Venetia_ (Commander L. B. Porterfield), the Coast and Geodetic Survey vessel _Surveyor_ (Commander R. E. Pope), the destroyers _Bainbridge_ (Lieutenant T. A. Thomson, Jr.), _Barry_ (Lieutenant H. P. Sampson), _Chauncey_ (Lieutenant Commander W. E. Reno), _Dale_ (Lieutenant Roy Pfaff), _Decatur_ (Lieutenant Ralph R. Stewart), _Gregory_ (Commander A. P. Fairfield), _Dyer_ (Commander F. H. Poteet), _Stribling_ (Commander G. C. Logan), _Luce_ (Commander R. C. Parker), _Israel_ (Lieutenant Commander G. N. Barker), _Maury_ (Commander J. H. Newton), _Lansdale_ (Lieutenant Commander C. W. Magruder), and _Schley_ (Lieutenant Commander R. C. Giffen), and the destroyer tender _Buffalo_ (Captain C. M. Tozer).

American vessels took a prominent part in escort duty practically from the beginning of convoy in that region, becoming in a short time, the largest factor in the system. In the latter part of October, Admiral Wilson was ordered to command our forces on the French coast, and was succeeded by Admiral A. P. Niblack, who directed our forces at Gibraltar to the end of the war, with fine judgment and ability. He and his force became a tower of strength in that region, to the Allies as well as our own Navy.

As the American vessels arrived, they were immediately placed on duty with convoys and as danger-zone escorts. The ships of the Allies were employed almost exclusively in the Mediterranean, with headquarters at Malta, and our naval vessels did nearly all the escort duty between Gibraltar and the United Kingdom. They also convoyed over 4,000 vessels in local Mediterranean traffic, or bound for Mediterranean and Far Eastern ports; ships supplying the American army through Marseilles, the French forces in North Africa; the Allied armies at Salonika; the British in Egypt and Palestine; and the forces of Italy.

Soon after our vessels arrived in August, 1917, Rear Admiral H. S. Grant, British Royal Navy, senior naval officer in command at Gibraltar, drew up the plans by which the "H. G." (Home-Gibraltar) and "G. H." (Gibraltar-Home) convoys were organized between the United Kingdom and the Mediterranean. These also included ships bound to and from French ports in the Bay of Biscay and ships bound to the United States. Destroyers, sloops and special service vessels accompanied each convoy as a danger-zone escort through the Straits of Gibraltar to 10 degrees west longitude and there waited for, or met, an incoming convoy from England. Men-of-war acted as ocean escort to the convoys from that point to British waters, where they were met by a danger-zone escort at the end of the route.

At the beginning of October, 1917, a system of fast convoys, sailing every sixteen days, between the United Kingdom and Port Said, and vice versa, was organized. These were met at a rendezvous in approximately longitude 10 degrees west by naval vessels which escorted them to Gibraltar, where they were relieved usually by ships from the Malta command, to take them through the Mediterranean. These convoys were joined at Gibraltar by ships of over 10-1/2 knots speed, which were taken out by relief escorts and joined the convoy off Europa Point. The first of the through outward-bound convoys, _O. E. 1_ (outward eastward) passed Gibraltar October 11th, and the first through homeward bound convoy, _H. E. 1_, passed on November 26th.

By December most merchantmen which arrived at Gibraltar had been in convoy at one time or another, and it was possible to sail ships bound for North and South American ports in separate small convoys, with one master and commodore, escorted through the danger zone to longitude 10 degrees west. Between that time and the middle of February, 1918, 207 ships were thus sailed to the Americas.

More escort ships being available, and enemy submarine cruisers becoming active, ships for United States and South American ports were, beginning February 27, formed into convoys, two, a fast and a slow one, sailing on the same day, each accompanied by the danger-zone escort to longitude 30 degrees west, then proceeding "on their own" to longitude 70 degrees west to be dispersed to their proper destinations. Under this revised system there were sailed to American ports 1,013 ships, totalling 4,371,063 gross tons. These were called W. A. Convoys (Western Atlantic).

The main artery for supply of the Allied armies operating in Egypt, Palestine, Greece, Italy, Northern Africa and Southern France ran through the Gibraltar area, requiring a great amount of offensive work against enemy submarines, in addition to escorting convoys. Patrol of the Straits was carried on by torpedo boats, motor launches, sub-chasers and vessels of small displacement, entailing hardships and exposure in every kind of weather.

Numerous attacks on U-boats were reported in this region. The British Admiralty credited the _U. S. S. Lydonia_ (Lieutenant Commander R. P. McCullough) and _H. M. S. Basilisk_ with sinking a submarine while escorting a Mediterranean convoy, May 8, 1918. In latitude 38 degrees 06´ north, longitude 3 degrees 3´ east, the _Lydonia_ sighted the wake of a torpedo which sank the British steamship _Ingleside_. The British and American ships immediately attacked, dropping a barrage of depth-charges, which destroyed the enemy. The submarine was the German UB-70, and the British Admiralty awarded these vessels the credit, rarely given, of "known sunk."

Commander Richard P. McCullough, commanding the _Lydonia_, was officially commended by the British Admiralty and the British senior naval officer at Gibraltar, as well as by our own authorities. Lieutenant Claud F. Reynaud, the executive officer, was also given special commendation. Sighting the torpedo at the instant it was fired, Reynaud started his stop-watch, timed the run of the torpedo, made immediate change of course to the position of the submarine and noted its bearings. This enabled the commanding officer to track the probable movements of the submarine, which was destroyed by depth-charges from the _Lydonia_ and the _Basilisk_.

Credit was also given for the sinking of a submarine by the _Wheeling_, _Surveyor_ and _Venetia_. While on escort duty, May 15, 1918, in latitude 36-03 N., longitude 1-47 W., these vessels sighted the track of a torpedo which struck a merchant ship of the convoy. They dashed down the wake made by the U-boat's periscope, dropping depth-charges which soon put the submarine out of business.

The notable record of the _Venetia_ is recited in Admiral Niblack's recommendation of its commanding officer, Commander L. B. Porterfield, for special commendation:

While escorting Gibraltar-Bizerta convoy, on May 11, 1918, an enemy
submarine, which was not seen, torpedoed the French steamship
_Susette Fraisenette_ at 3:39 a. m. With excellent judgment he
assumed that submarine had dived under the convoy, and in following
out the theory sighted the submarine on the surface at daylight,
compelling it to submerge. This submarine was subsequently sunk in
the Adriatic, and the survivors testified that the attack of the
_Venetia_ on this occasion drove them off, and saved the convoy
from further attack. Commended in British Senior Naval Officer's
letter 78-14 of 24th May, 1918, and British Commander-Chief's
Mediterranean letter No. 2089-93 of 23 June, 1918.

While escort to Gibraltar-Bizerta convoy on May 17, 1918, the
British steamship _Sculptor_ was torpedoed at 6:48 p. m. Submarine
was not seen, but the _Venetia_, having been previously detailed
to attack with depth-charges, and remain behind four hours to keep
down submarine, did so. At 7:02 p. m. wake of submarine was sighted
and depth-charges dropped. On May 18th an enemy submarine interned
at Cartagena, Spain, and was officially assumed to have been
damaged by the _Venetia_.

While on escort duty, Gibraltar-Genoa, the British steamship
_Messidor_ was torpedoed at 7:24 p. m., July 23, 1918, and the
_Venetia_ instantly made attack, dropping thirteen depth-charges on
pre-arranged plan.

The cruiser _Chester_ had two encounters with submarines. While on convoy duty November 9, 1917, it attacked with gunfire a submarine which had sunk one of the vessels of the convoy, compelling the U-boat to submerge. On September 5, 1918, at 1:04 a. m., the _Chester_, on ocean escort, sighted a submarine close aboard on the starboard bow. First the cruiser attempted to ram the enemy, then attacked the undersea craft with depth-charges, which apparently damaged the U-boat.

Four days later a submarine attacked Convoy GGA-54, torpedoing and sinking the British steamship _Arabis_. The _Paducah_ attacked with depth-bombs and, according to reports, damaged the submarine. The _Seneca_ on September 16th drove off a submarine which attacked Convoy OM-99. The _U. S. S. Druid_ and _H. M. S. Gilia_ repulsed an attack on Convoy BG-65, on September 22nd. Escorting Convoy BG-67, on September 30th, the _Seneca_ sighted a periscope and attacked with depth-charges and gunfire.

Convoy BG-68, escorted by the _Cythera_, was attacked the night of October 3rd, and two steamships, the British _Ariel_ and the French _St. Luc_, were torpedoed. The _Cythera_ went for the submarine, laying a pattern of depth-charges. While being escorted through the Straits of Gibraltar by _H. M. S. Defender_ and the _U. S. S. Decatur_, _H. M. S. Britannia_ was torpedoed and sunk at 7 a. m., November 9, 1918. The _Decatur_ attacked with depth-charges. The same day a torpedo was fired at the _Parker_, which was on temporary duty on the western barrage line, in the Straits. But the torpedo missed, and the _Parker_ went after the U-boat, dropping depth-bombs around her.

German submarine activity around Gibraltar continued up to the very end of hostilities. On November 10, 1918, the day before the armistice, the _Israel_, which was operating on the barrage line with a sub-chaser, discovered and attacked a U-boat, and the same day Sub-chaser Unit C, while patrolling off Point Boassa, also made contact with a submarine.

Two vessels of the Gibraltar force were lost--the destroyer _Chauncey_, sunk in collision with the British steamship _Rose_, November 19, 1917, and the Coast Guard cutter _Tampa_, sunk in British waters September 30, 1918.

The six little destroyers sent from the Philippines to Gibraltar made the long voyage of 12,000 miles under their own steam, arriving in October. The work they did was amazing, when their small size and age are considered. One of them, the _Decatur_, 420 tons displacement, which had been condemned as not seaworthy enough to venture out of sight of land, successfully negotiated the long voyage from Manila, and in service at Gibraltar steamed over 48,000 miles, making a total of 60,000 miles steaming before her departure for the United States.

The _Wenonah_, an armed yacht of hardly more than 200 tons, steamed in escort work 29,979 miles. The U. S. Coast Guard cutter _Seneca_, which arrived at Gibraltar September 4, 1917, escorted 600 ships in convoys, carrying total cargoes of 2,100,000 tons. These are only a few of the phenomenal records made.

United States naval vessels based on Gibraltar assisted in escorting 562 convoys, and 79 single ships, furnishing an average of fifty per cent of all escorts. Under way 46 per cent of the time and 68 per cent available at all times for operation, our vessels were, in addition to the Gibraltar-England service and danger zone escort, employed in escorting ships to Bizerta, Genoa, Oran and Marseilles. They maintained a monthly service to the Azores, escorted cable ships, and also did other odd jobs.

No vessels performed more convoy duty than these, and Admiral Niblack, who commanded them, thus states what was expected of the system:

(a) That a relatively small number of escort vessels could protect
more ships if they were in convoy than in any other way.

(b) That ships in convoy could not be visited and sunk by bombs, as
were single ships.

(c) That ships in convoy would not be attacked by gunfire by
submarines.

(d) That convoys, being few in number, would be difficult to find
and consequently fewer attacks could be made by torpedo.

(e) That in the danger zones near ports where submarines would lay
for convoys the escort by anti-submarine craft could be made so
strong as to make the risk to submarines very hazardous.

"The great advantage of the convoy," said he, "was that the ships arrived in the danger zone collectively and at a definite time, where an adequate danger zone escort could be assembled, which was fitted with depth-charges and was in such numbers as to make the chances of submarines extremely small if it attempted to attack the convoy."

But, in considering the effect of convoy in lessening sinkings, Admiral Niblack said:

I think we should take into consideration, as Admiral Mayo points
out, the employment of new and offensive measures through the use
of the depth-charges, mystery ships, airships, kite balloons,
the laying of mine barrages, the firing of torpedoes from Allied
submarines, combined with the use of organized patrols fitted with
listening devices and hunting the submarine systematically. * * * *

One very important phase of the discussion of the convoy system
which has been entirely overlooked is that during the entire
war only one escorted convoy crossed from the United States to
Gibraltar. * * * All the rest of the million tons of shipping which
crossed from the United States to Gibraltar went across as single
ships, going "on their own," as it were. These ships depended on
their armed guard gun crews, and were independent of the convoy
system. They actually encountered submarines, but they relied on
their guns for protection.

The convoy system, however, accomplished all that was expected of it, and was markedly successful.

It was our destroyers at Queenstown, our forces on the French coast and at Gibraltar, our cruisers escorting convoys crossing the Atlantic, that made it the success it was--and it was one of the most successful measures of the war.

President Wilson, as I have said, favored its adoption from the beginning; in fact, wondered why the Allies had not adopted it upon the outbreak of war in Europe. It was one of the first measures recommended by the General Board. But at the time this country entered the war, the Allies were pursuing exactly the opposite method; that is, dispersion of shipping.

When troop transportation was first determined upon, in May, 1917, we adopted the convoy system for troop-ships. It was in that month that the British decided to try out the plan for merchant ships, to see whether it would work. The first experimental convoy arrived in England from Gibraltar, May 20. A few convoys were despatched in June, and on June 22 Sims cabled me: "The British Admiralty have now adopted the convoy system and will put it into effect as fast as ships can be obtained for high sea convoy against raiders, and destroyers for escort duty in submarine zone." He reported two routes in operation, stated that eight convoys a week were planned, and recommended that we furnish one cruiser or battleship a week for high sea escort. On June 30, I informed him that the Department would assign seven cruisers for this duty. Our destroyers were engaged in the danger-zone from the time the first trans-Atlantic convoys were started.

Putting the convoy system into effect was a big job, involving the larger part of the world's shipping--a reversal of method that necessitated a radical change in the naval scheme. Concerning the part the United States Navy played in this great task, Admiral Sims wrote in the _World's Work_:

I do not wish to say that the convoy would not have been
established had we not sent the destroyers for that purpose, yet
I do not see how it could have been established in any complete
and systematic way at such an early date. And we furnished other
ships than destroyers, for, besides providing what I have called
the modern convoy--protecting the compact mass of vessels from
submarines--it was necessary also to furnish escorts after the old
Napoleonic plan. It was the business of the destroyers to conduct
merchantmen only through the submarine zone. They did not take them
the whole distance across the ocean, for there was little danger of
submarine attack until the ships reached the infested waters. This
would have been impossible in any case with the limited number of
destroyers.

But, from the time the convoys left the home port, say New York or
Hampton Roads, there was the possibility of the same kind of attack
as that to which convoys were subjected in Nelsonian days--that is,
from raiders or cruisers. We always feared that German cruisers or
raiders of the Moewe type might escape into the ocean and attack
these merchant ships, and we therefore had to escort them across
the ocean with battleships and cruisers just as they did a century
ago. The British did not have ships enough available for this
purpose, and here again the American Navy was able to supply the
lack; for we had a number of pre-dreadnaughts and cruisers that
were ideally adapted to this kind of work.

Above: U. S. S. Buffalo, Schley and Jupiter.

Inset: Rear Admiral Albert P. Niblack, commanding American naval forces in the Mediterranean.

Below: The signal tower and American sub-chasers.]

This map shows the location of the mine barrage across the North Sea as well as the smaller one across the English Channel. The dangers of this barrage, more than any other single factor, destroyed the morale of the German submarine crews.]