Chapter XXXV: "sirs, All Is Well with the Fleet"

TWO THOUSAND VESSELS IN SERVICE--200,000 MEN OVERSEAS OR
TRANSPORTING TROOPS AND SUPPLIES ACROSS ATLANTIC--373 SHIPS, 81,000
OFFICERS AND MEN IN EUROPEAN FORCES--VISITS OF ROOSEVELT, BENSON,
MAYO AND CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE--PERSHING'S TRIBUTE.

With more than two thousand vessels in service and 533,000 officers and men, the largest personnel ever possessed by any Navy, our naval operations in the World War literally belted the globe. Operating with the Allies from the Arctic to the Adriatic, from Corfu to the Azores, we manned and operated the vast fleet of American transports carrying troops, munitions and supplies across the Atlantic, and furnished man-of-war escort to protect them.

Patrolling our own coasts and the Western Atlantic, the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea, our vessels also kept watch in South American waters and guarded the approaches to the Panama Canal. Our ships in South American waters, commanded by Admiral W. B. Caperton, coöperated with the naval forces of our sister republics and gave insurance against possible raiders and submarines. Ships under Caperton, the squadron under Anderson in the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico, and Mayo's ships further north maintained the patrol throughout the war on this side of the Atlantic.

Guarding against raiders and German activities in the Pacific, our operations extended from our west coast to Hawaii, Guam and the Philippines, and our vessels in the Orient coöperated with the Japanese and other Allied naval forces from Manila to Vladivostok. The destroyers sent from Cavite, which voyaged twelve thousand miles through the Straits, the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea and the Mediterranean, met at Gibraltar the forces from the other side of the world.

Eight hundred and thirty-four vessels and two hundred thousand men of the United States Navy were either serving in European waters or engaged in transporting troops and supplies to Europe, before hostilities ended. This was more than twice as many ships and nearly three times as many officers and men as were in naval service before the war.

Four hundred vessels were assigned to the Naval Forces Operating in European Waters, 373 being present at the time of the armistice--70 destroyers, 5 gunboats, 5 Coast Guard cutters, 120 submarine chasers, 27 yachts, 12 submarines, 13 mine sweepers, 10 mine planters, 8 battleships, 3 cruisers, 16 tugs, 4 cross-channel transports, 55 vessels carrying coal for the army, 18 tenders and repair ships, and 7 vessels of miscellaneous types. In addition three Russian destroyers were manned by United States naval personnel. Eighty-one thousand officers and men of the Navy were in service in Europe. Thirty thousand Marines were sent overseas for service with the Army and 1,600 for naval duty ashore.

But that by no means covers all the service performed for the Allies and our own forces in Europe. The entire Cruiser and Transport Force, with its 83 vessels, 3,000 officers and 41,000 men; and the Naval Overseas Transportation Service, with 378 vessels in operation, manned by 4,692 officers and 29,175 men, were in trans-Atlantic service, carrying troops and supplies. Practically all the 384 merchant ships which had naval armed guards and navy guns were carrying food, materials and other articles to allied armies and peoples. Thirty thousand of the naval personnel were, at one time or another, engaged in this service. Thus, a total of 834 vessels and more than 200,000 officers and men of the Navy and Marine Corps were engaged either in European service or in trans-Atlantic service to and from Europe.

Our forces in Europe operated in forty-seven different localities, extending from the Arctic Ocean all the way around to the Adriatic Sea. The extent of our operations is seen from this list of the principal naval bases, and the United States naval vessels on duty at each of them on November 11, 1918:

Queenstown (2 tenders, 24 destroyers, 30 chasers, 3 tugs) 59

Berehaven (3 battleships, 1 tender, 7 submarines, 1 tug,
1 oiler) 13

Brest (1 gunboat, 16 yachts, 3 tenders, 38 destroyers,
9 tugs, 1 station ship, 4 steam barges, 4 barges,
9 mine sweepers) 85

Cardiff (1 tender, 1 refrigerator hulk, 55 colliers) 57

Gibraltar (2 cruisers, 4 gunboats, 5 Coast Guard cutters,
9 yachts, 1 tender, 6 destroyers, 18 chasers) 45

Genoa (2 tugs) 2

Azores (2 yachts, 1 tender, 1 oiler, 2 mine sweepers,
5 submarines, 1 tug) 12

Grand Fleet (5 battleships) 5

Murmansk (1 cruiser, also 3 Russian destroyers) 1

Mine Force (1 tender, 10 mine layers, 2 mine sweepers) 13

Southampton (4 transports) 4

Plymouth (1 tender, 2 destroyers, 36 chasers) 39

Corfu (1 tender, 36 chasers) 37

Liverpool (1 oiler) 1

Naval aviation activities were almost as extensive as those of our ships, extending from England, Ireland and Northern France to eastern Italy. There were thirty aviation bases, the Northern Bombing Group considered as one base:

Ireland--Queenstown (2 stations, seaplane, and assembly and
repair); Whiddy Island, Wexford, Lough Foyle, Berehaven.

England--Killingholme, Eastleigh.

France--Dunkirk, Northern Bombing Group; Treguier, L' Aber Vrach,
Fromentine, St. Trojan, Arcachon, Pauillac, La Trinite, La Pallice,
Moutchic, Paimboeuf, Rochefort, Gujan, Brest, Guipivas, Le Croisic,
and Ile Tudy.

Italy--Lake Bolseno, Porto Corsini, Pescara.

Azores--Marine Corps aviators.

Two divisions of our submarines operated in European waters--seven at Berehaven, Ireland, with the _Bushnell_ as tender, and five at the Azores. Twenty-one sightings of enemy submarines and four torpedo attacks were reported by the Berehaven division. The AL-2 (Lieutenant P. F. Foster, commanding) had a remarkable encounter on July 10, 1918. Shaken by a terrific explosion, evidently that of a torpedo, the AL-2 discovered the periscope of a submarine apparently injured and attempting to get to the surface. The only chance to get the U-boat was to ram it submerged, and the AL-2 executed a crash dive, which carried it down a hundred feet. It barely missed the German, who was trying to slip under the American submarine. Swinging around, the AL-2 started again after the enemy, which was trying to rise. But it never came to the surface. Radio calls from another U-boat were unanswered. The lost submarine was the German U-B-65, known to be operating in that vicinity. "Known sunk," was the verdict of the British Admiralty, and for this the AL-2 was given the major part of the credit. Our submarines did excellent and faithful service, and proved their usefulness in that new and strange phase of undersea warfare where "sub hunts sub."

Our vessels in European waters were employed in so many regions that they did not operate together as one fleet, but constituted a "task force" of the Atlantic Fleet. In British waters our ships usually operated with British forces under the direction of British officers. Elsewhere they remained under the direction of American officers, always coöperating freely with Allied naval forces. At the United States Naval Headquarters at London there was a force of 1,200. The 200 commissioned personnel included a number of the ablest officers in the Navy, with Captain (later Rear Admiral) N. C. Twining as chief of staff, and Captain W. R. Sexton as assistant chief of staff. It embraced experts whose daily association with officers in the Admiralty, under the leadership of Admiral Sims, brought about complete understanding and perfect team-work. Those at the head of important divisions were:

Intelligence Department, Commander J. V. Babcock, who also acted
as aid; Convoy Operations, Captain Byron A. Long; Anti-Submarine
Section, Captain R. H. Leigh; Aviation, Captain H. I. Cone, and
afterward, Lieutenant Commander W. A. Edwards; Personnel, Commander
H. R. Stark; Communications, Lieutenant Commander E. G. Blakeslee;
Material, Captain E. C. Tobey; Repairs, Captain S. F. Smith, and
afterward, Naval Constructor L. B. McBride; Ordnance, Commander
G. L. Schuyler, and afterward Commander T. A. Thomson; Medical
Section, Captain F. L. Pleadwell, and afterward, Commander Edgar
Thompson; Legal Section, Commander W. H. McGrann; Scientific
Section, Professor H. A. Bumstead, Ph. D.

This large establishment in Grosvenor Gardens had been built up from the small beginning in 1917 when Admiral Sims, accompanied by his aid, arrived just after war was declared. Entrusted first with the duty of conferring with the British Admiralty and reporting the naval situation with his recommendations, Admiral Sims was soon designated as commander of our forces in European waters with the rank of vice admiral, and before the armistice was promoted to admiral. Keeping in constant touch with the British and other Admiralties, representing our Navy upon the Allied Naval Council, the information he secured, with that furnished us by Allied naval officers stationed in Washington, enabled the Navy Department to keep pace with all naval activities, and his recommendations were taken into consideration in important decisions that were made. Serving with zeal and ability, he won the regard and confidence of his associates of the allied navies, and received high honors from European governments.

In addition to the daily exchange of messages between London headquarters and Washington, information from special Government missions, and the intimate intercourse of officers of all the Allied navies, high ranking officials of our Navy from time to time went to Europe for conferences and inspection of our forces and activities, among them Assistant Secretary Roosevelt and Admirals Benson, Mayo and Gleaves. The Assistant Secretary, going over in the destroyer _Dyer_, spent six weeks abroad in the summer of 1918. He had conferences with the Allied naval authorities in London, Paris and Rome, and inspected our bases and mine depots, and witnessed the work of laying the North Sea barrage. Reporting that our personnel there had done well under hazardous and difficult circumstances, he advised a like mine barrage across the strait of Otranto.

Admiral Benson, going abroad in 1917, took part in the organization of the Allied Naval Council, and urged a more vigorous offensive, which we had favored from our entrance into the war. Months before, Admiral Benson had prepared, and I had approved and sent to the British Admiralty, "proposed measures to prevent German submarines from operating against Allied commerce in the Atlantic," which pointed out the following courses which were open to us:

We may attempt to--

(a) Reduce the Heligoland region and close exits for submarines.

(b) Reduce the Zeebrugge region and close exits for submarines.

(c) Enter the Baltic and close exits for submarines from the
Baltic bases.

(d) Prevent Danish and Dutch territory being used for submarine
bases.

(e) Construct and maintain mine barriers about the Heligoland
area.

(f) Construct and maintain a mine barrier in the Skagerrack or
Kattegat.

(g) Construct and maintain mine barriers in the Zeebrugge region.

(h) Construct and maintain a mine barrier across the North Sea.

(i) Close Dover straits to submarines by a mine barrier and
surface patrol.

These matters were discussed by Benson with officers of the British Admiralty, and the methods and the difficulties of carrying them out were considered. Speaking, sometime after the war, of the offensive plans he advocated, Benson said:

I think that the bases of the German submarines should have been
attacked, and I so urged when the war was in progress; and one of
my conferences with the British Admiralty in London in 1917 was to
urge more active operations against the bases of the submarines.
But it was an operation that had to be not only a concerted action,
but the principal part of it would have been necessary to be taken
by the Allies, we simply to add our part to it; and all during the
summer of 1917, I urged active operations of that kind and could
never understand why we did not get definite plans from the other
side as to how such operation should be carried out.

While in London I agreed with Admiral Jellicoe on a plan, a very
confidential plan, that was to be carried out later on, in which I
not only volunteered to place our ships but insisted that our ships
should be placed there.

During Benson's absence from Washington, Captain (later Admiral) W. V. Pratt in both 1917 and 1918 acted as Chief of Operations. In the discharge of that duty, as well as Assistant Chief of Operations, succeeding Captain Volney Chase, who died in the summer of 1917, Admiral Pratt demonstrated ability unsurpassed by any officer serving in any important position during the World war. When Captain Pratt later was ordered to sea, Admiral Josiah S. McKean, who had served with marked ability as Chief of Material during the war, became Acting Chief of Operations and added to his well-earned reputation.

Admiral Mayo, in his capacity of commander-in-chief of our ships in European as well as home waters, made an official visit to Europe in September, 1917, inspecting bases and forces, and conferring with naval leaders of Great Britain, France and Italy. He was on duty again in Europe in 1918. Attending the Allied Naval Conference in London, he urged the construction of the North Sea Barrage, which was shortly afterwards approved.

Visiting the famous Dover Patrol, he witnessed a bombardment of Ostend by British monitors, and had the experience of being under enemy fire. The flotilla leader _Broke_, in which he embarked with Sir John Jellicoe, First Sea Lord of the Admiralty, and other British officers of high rank, flew the flags of both Mayo and Jellicoe.

The monitors, armed with 15-inch naval guns, were accompanied on these expeditions by spotting aircraft and destroyers. The party accompanied the _Terror_. Soon after she began to fire, the German shore batteries got the range. Firing with precision and accuracy, some of the German shells fell within a short distance of the _Broke_. Admiral Reginald Bacon gives this interesting account of the incident:

On Tuesday, September 25th [1917], Sir John Jellicoe, Admiral Sir
Henry Oliver, and Admiral Philpotts arrived at Dover and came
with Admiral Mayo and his staff up the patrol line. It was a
quaint experience for them. Half an hour after leaving Dunkirk in
the _Broke_ we lost sight of the shore. After an hour's steaming
we sighted the _Terror_ and destroyers in the open sea, and the
motor-launches just starting their smoke-screen. Nothing else was
in sight except a small monitor five miles away right out at sea,
burning her searchlight for an aiming mark. Really our visitors
must have thought we were humbugging when the _Terror_ opened fire
and fired single rounds at fixed intervals.

A few seconds afterwards while steaming about in the _Broke_--we
had altered course three points--a splash came from a Tirpitz shell
about 300 yards off. It fell very near the spot where we would have
been if we had kept on our original course. I apologized to the
American Chief of the Staff for not having kept on and brought the
shell nearer. His reply was quaintly American in humor:

"Don't mention it, Admiral; by the time we get to New York that
shell will have been close alongside right enough!"

The result of the _Terror's_ shooting was most successful, as
all the rebuilding in the dockyard done by the Germans was again
demolished. On October 19th, the _Terror_ was torpedoed, and had
to be docked. On the following day the _Soult_ fired at Ostend and
destroyed a high explosive magazine. One German craft was sunk, and
two more damaged.

Upon his return, Admiral Mayo made detailed reports covering the entire naval situation, with important recommendations as to plans and measures. When war began it was expected that the time would come when the entire Atlantic Fleet would be sent abroad, and Admiral Mayo would command all our forces in the looked-for great naval battle with the German fleet. Our vessels in Europe were, therefore, considered our advance forces, a "task force" assigned to special duties until the whole fleet should be united for action. But the character of the war called for wide dispersion of its units, and it was not until after hostilities ended that they were reunited under the commander-in-chief, who was in command when the dreadnaughts sailed from Brest in December, 1918.

No navies in all history ever worked together in such close coöperation as did ours with the British, French and Italians. The cordial relations between the civilian populations, as well as the naval personnel, will be a lasting tie. I wish it were possible to put on record the sentiments expressed, the appreciation felt by all Americans in the Navy for the gracious courtesies and friendly offices shown to our men serving a common cause far from their homes. The one regrettable incident at Cork, where an unruly element attacked some of our sailors, was recognized as an exception. It was confined to the few engaged in the trouble, the people of that city and country having no relation to it and not affected by it in their feeling of friendship for our sailors and our country. It left no resentment towards the great Irish people, who received us with open arms and showed hospitality and cordiality towards our forces domiciled in that country.

One of the services which the people of Lille, France, will long remember is the voluntary act of men of the Navy in turning carpenters for the time, and building with their own hands scores of houses for the homeless people. That act, together with the generous gift by American sailors of their own rations to needy peoples, illustrates the spirit that actuated our men. At one place, so moved were they by the lack of food for women and children, the sailors denied themselves to such an extent that the captain was forced to issue an order limiting their generosity to prevent a shortage of food for the sustenance of the crew.

Cardiff does not bulk large on the war maps. Mention of it recalls no such adventure as at Zeebrugge, no such achievement as laying the mine-barrage in the North Sea, or sinking of submarines at Durazzo or on the high seas. But it spelled coal for our forces, and meant hard work and called for efficient management. The limited number of colliers, the time for making voyages to American coal fields, and the hazard from U-boats suggested obtaining coal from Wales for the needs of the army in France. The Army requested the Navy to release colliers for that service, and at first to operate twenty "lake" and other chartered boats and undertake the carrying of coal from Great Britain to supplement the steady flow from America. Admiral Philip Andrews, with headquarters at Cardiff, directed this work, which required a naval personnel of 4,101, operated 65 ships, and delivered 30,000 to 45,000 tons of coal each month.

There is no glamour about the work of repairing ships. Even in peace times it is a hard overalls job, but our nine European bases with eleven repair ships and tenders, kept our ships in condition. If I were a poet I would immortalize the skilled men, working in the dark, often flat on their backs, to keep our ships fit and to repair the ravages of U-boat attacks. Not counting the 500 ships going and coming from the United States to Europe, often calling for first aid, we had nearly 400 ships on duty in European waters. Though taxed by their own needs, the facilities of our Allies were freely at our disposal, but the fact that it was possible to make our forces so nearly self-sustaining is a high tribute to the officers and men charged with that duty. Allied navies expressed admiration for the ability of a ship's force to do much of their own repairing, and marvelled at the efficiency of the repair ships--the _Melville_, _Dixie_, _Panther_, _Prometheus_, _Bridgeport_, _Black Hawk_.

Our own Shipping Board voiced its thanks for naval assistance abroad as well as at home. In fact, in all ship construction and repair work as well as plans for operation and navigation undertaken by that organization the Navy furnished constructors and other experts, and was ready upon call with its entire facilities.

Little has been heard of the _Scorpion_, which was interned in Turkish waters during the war. The crew of that ship, whose base had long been at Constantinople, protected the American and British embassies, one regular duty of the vessel being to act as despatch boat to our Ambassador to Turkey. After America entered the war, some of them, eager to get into the fray, made their escape over land and joined the American forces in France.

From the outbreak of the European conflict the _Scorpion's_ men had a "front seat at the show," and witnessed many interesting sights. From the deck of their ship they saw the thrilling finish of the race of the German cruisers _Goeben_ and _Breslau_, which made their sensational escape from British pursuers and then interned in the harbor of Constantinople. They saw the Teutonic crews of the erstwhile ships of the Germany Navy, hastily doffing their German caps and donning Moslem fezzes to camouflage their nationality, as the Turkish flag was hoisted to the mastheads. They observed, from their point of vantage, the gallant sweep of the harbor by a British submarine which bobbed up in the Bosporus as the Turks were preparing to send reinforcements to Gallipoli, torpedoed a Turkish vessel at its dock, and caused such consternation that the Turks, at the quays ready to sail with 40,000 troops, did not dare venture out with their transports. One single daring British submarine caused all the troops to be disembarked, and the sea expedition to the Dardanelles was abandoned.

The "Scorpions," as they called themselves, brought one story home with them which, if verified, is worthy of the best French epic. The Turks, as the story was told in Constantinople, captured a French submarine, the _Turquoise_. Not one of the captors who boarded the ship understood how to operate its delicate mechanism. Therefore, the French engineers were ordered to start the engines. Nothing loath, the orders were obeyed. The sub dived, carrying with it Turkish captors and French engineers, never to return. Whether or not that particular act can be confirmed, the war produced many men of the navies with the spirit which the incident illustrates.

The _Scorpion_ was truly a ship of mercy. First, under the direction of Ambassador Morgenthau and afterwards of Ambassador Elkus, it carried hundreds of refugees to places of safety, was the almoner of many in distress and gave asylum to Americans, who were heartened in that harbor, crowded with ships carrying the flags of many nations, to see the glorious Stars and Stripes floating from the mainmast.

No story of the Navy's preparedness and efficiency would be complete without recognition of the wisdom of the Council of National Defense, authorized by Congress and appointed by the President in 1916. That Council had large responsibility, and measured up to its great duties before and during the war. The Council was thus constituted: Secretary of War Newton D. Baker, Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels, Secretary of the Interior Franklin K. Lane, Secretary of Agriculture David F. Houston, Secretary of Commerce William C. Redfield, Secretary of Labor William B. Wilson.

The Advisory Commission of the Council was composed of these men: Daniel Willard, Howard E. Coffin, Julius Rosenwald, Bernard M. Baruch, Dr. Hollis Godfrey, Samuel Gompers, Dr. Franklin Martin, Walter S. Gifford, director, Grosvenor B. Clarkson, secretary.

Eight months before the Armistice, March 11, 1918, the House Sub-Committee, composed of men of both parties--W. B. Oliver, chairman, W. W. Venable, Adam B. Littlepage, James C. Wilson, Fred A. Britten, John A. Peters and Frederick C. Hicks--which had made a thorough investigation of the Navy and naval administration, unanimously reported:

First. All appropriations have been expended or obligated with
judgment, caution and economy, when you consider that haste was
necessary to bring results and abnormal conditions obtained in
reference to all problems of production or operations.

Second. The Navy, with limited personnel and material, was suddenly
called to face many difficult and untried problems in sea warfare,
and has met the situation with rare skill, ingenuity, and dispatch
and a high degree of success.

Third. The efficiency of the Navy's pre-war organization, the
readiness and fitness of its men and ships for the difficult and
arduous tasks imposed by war were early put to the acid test and
thus far in no way have they been found wanting, and we feel that
the past twelve months presents for the Navy a remarkable record
of achievement, of steadily increasing power in both personnel and
material, of rapidly expanding resources, and of well-matured plans
for the future, whether the war be of long or short duration.

They could say at the close of hostilities, as they said then: "Sirs, all is well with the fleet."

The immense scope and signal success of our operations in Europe surprised even those familiar with the Navy, and the great work of the war. Leading members of the House Committee on Naval Affairs--Chairman Lemuel P. Padgett, Representative Thomas S. Butler, the present Chairman, and Representatives Daniel J. Riordan, Walter L. Hensley, John R. Connelly, William B. Oliver, William W. Venable, James C. Wilson, William J. Browning, John R. Farr, John A. Peters, Frederick C. Hicks and Sydney A. Mudd--in July and August, 1918, made an inspection of our naval activities in Europe. Chairman Padgett, for the committee, on his return, said:

The magnitude of our naval operations overseas, on the water and in
the air, reflects credit upon the American people, and commands the
respect and admiration of our Allies. When the war is over and the
full history of our naval operations abroad may be given in detail,
it will be a source of pride and honor to the American people, and
the fidelity, patriotism and devotion of our naval officers and
enlisted men, embracing as a part of the Navy the Marine Corps
officers and men, will form a bright part in the world's history. *
* *

The record speaks for itself. "Hindsight is better than foresight," and if it was to be done over again, the Navy, with its war experience, might do it better. But when all is said as to errors and achievements, this is the imperishable record:

_The Navy performed successfully every task with which it was entrusted. In not one did it fail._

_If it made mistakes--(and some were made)--not one of them had any serious or disastrous result._

_If there were delays--(and there were some unavoidable ones)--not one of them had any material effect upon the trend or duration of the war._

_If all the criticisms, of whatever kind or character, that have been made be lumped together, they would not tilt the scales one degree, if balanced against the Navy's achievements._

After the war was all over and the men were returning home, with time and opportunity to assess the value of the service rendered, General John J. Pershing, in command of the American Expeditionary Forces, wrote on April 21, 1919:

We fully realize that had it not been for the Navy, who kept watch
and guard night and day over our transport fleet, the American
effort in France would never have been successful. The Navy's
assistance was whole-hearted and arduous, and was always given in a
most generous spirit of coöperation.