Chapter XIX: Letter IV: October 12th, 1787 (6)

(21) Essay on the Roman government.

(22) Livy, 2.33.

(23) Livy, 3.54.

(24) Livy, 3.33.

(25) Livy, 4.6.

(26) Livy, 6. 35. 42. “Ne quis plus quingenta jugera agri possideret.”

(27) Montesquieu supposed _virtue_ to be the principle of a republic. He derived his notions of this form of government, from the astonishing firmness, courage and patriotism which distinguished the republics of Greece and Rome. But this _virtue_ consisted in pride, contempt of strangers and a martial enthusiasm which sometimes displayed itself in defence of their country. These principles are never permanent—they decay with refinement, intercourse with other nations and increase of wealth. No wonder then that these republics declined, for they were not founded on fixed principles; and hence authors imagine that republics cannot be durable. None of the celebrated writers on government seems to have laid sufficient stress on a general possession of real property in fee-simple. Even the authors of the _Political Sketches_, in the _Museum_ for the month of September, seems to have passed it over in silence; although he combats Montesquieu’s system, and to prove it false, enumerates some of the principles which distinguish our governments from others, and which he supposes constitutes the support of republics.

The English writers on law and government consider Magna Charta, trial by juries, the Habeas Corpus act, and the liberty of the press, as the bulwarks of freedom. All this is well. But in no government of consequence in Europe, is freedom established on its true and immoveable foundation. The property is too much accumulated, and the accumulations too well guarded, to admit the _true principle of republics_. But few centuries have elapsed, since the body of the people were vassals. To such men, the smallest extension of popular privileges, was deemed an invaluable blessing. Hence the encomiums upon trial by juries, and the articles just mentioned. But these people have never been able to mount to the source of _liberty_, _estates in fee_, or at least but partially; they are yet obliged to drink at the streams. Hence the English jealousy of certain rights, which are guaranteed by acts of parliament. But in America, and here alone, we have gone at once to the _fountain of liberty_, and raised the people to their true dignity. Let the lands be possessed by the people in fee-simple, let the fountain be kept pure, and the streams will be pure of course. Our jealousy of _trial by jury_, _the liberty of the press_, &c., is totally groundless. Such rights are inseparably connected with the _power_ and _dignity_ of the people, which rest on their _property_. They cannot be abridged. All _other_ [free] nations have wrested _property_ and _freedom_ from _barons_ and _tyrants_; _we_ begin our empire with full possession of property and all its attending rights.

(28) [Last three sentences struck out in author’s copy.—P. L. F.]

(29) [Revise to “The constitution is generally good.”—P. L. F.]

(30) [“utterly” struck out.—P. L. F.]

(31) The state debt of Connecticut is about 3,500,000 dollars, its proportion of the federal debt about the same sum. The annual interest of the whole 420,000 dollars.

(32) [Last three sentences, the following paragraph and foot note struck out in author’s copy.—P. L. F.]

(33) [“The convention was composed of,” added after “that,” by author.—P. L. F.]

(34) [“This proves how little dependence can be placed on theory. Twelve years experience, or four elections demonstrates the contrary.”—Note in author’s copy.—P. L. F.]

(35) This is the case with that British Borough.

(36) Trials between a state and its own Citizens, and between Citizens of the same state, involving questions concerning state laws that infringe this constitution, may be carried by appeal, it is presumed, into a fœderal court.

(37) There is one grand operation of the new fœderal constitution, favorable to general liberty, which I do not remember to have heard from any of its friends. It is well known, that in most of the states the members of their Houses of Representatives are chosen in equal numbers from each county, and in the eastern states, in equal numbers from each town, without any regard to the number of taxable inhabitants, or the number of souls. Hence it is very frequent for a county, with ten thousand souls, to send only the same number of members to the state house of representatives, as a county with two thousand souls, by which each person in the least populous county has five times as great a voice in electing representatives, as his fellow citizen of the most populous county. This is clearly a departure from the principles of equal liberty, and ought to be altered in the several states. I speak the more plainly because our state constitution is free from that fault in the formation of our house of Assembly. Now the new constitution expressly declares, that the fœderal Representatives shall be in the proportion of one to every thirty thousand, which accords with reason and the true principles of liberty. This house, therefore, so far as national matters go, will remedy the evil spoken of in the several states, and is one more great step towards the perfection of equal liberty and genuine republicanism in America. It must strongly recommend the fœderal constitution to the serious reflecting patriot, even though he may formerly have had doubts, and it will suggest to the several states the propriety of reconsidering that point in their respective constitutions. Pennsylvania, though right in the principles on which her legislative elections are and will be held, is less safe from the existence of this fault in the adjoining sister states of Virginia, Maryland, Jersey, Delaware and New York, and in others more remote.

(38) The candid Reader will suppose Mr. WILSON here means, that it is the best form of fœderal government, which has ever been offered to the world—and it is surely true that the fœderal constitution, considered in due connexion with the state constitutions, is the best form of government that has ever been communicated to mankind.

(39) See some late publications.

(40) See late publications.

(41) “The error of those who reason by precedent, drawn from antiquity, respecting the rights of man, is, that they do not go far enough into antiquity. They do not go the whole way. They stop in some of the intermediate stages of an hundred or a thousand years, and produce what was then done, as a rule for the present day. This is no authority at all. If we travel still further into antiquity, we shall find a direct contrary opinion and practice prevailing; and if antiquity is to be authority, a thousand such authorities may be produced, successively contradicting each other: but if we proceed on, at last we shall come out right: We shall then come to the time when man came from the hand of his Maker. What was he then? _Man._ Man was his high and only title, and a higher cannot be given him——We are now got at the origin of man, and at the origin of his rights.——Every history of the creation, and every traditionary account, whether from the lettered or unlettered world, however they may vary in their opinion or belief of certain particulars, all agree in establishing one point, the _unity_ of man; by which I mean that man is all of one degree, and consequently that all men are born equal, and with equal natural rights. By considering man in this light, it places him in a close connection with all his duties, whether to his _Creator_, or to the creation, of which he is a part; and it is only where he forgets his _origin_, or, to use a more fashionable phrase, his birth and family, that he becomes dissolute.

“Hitherto we have spoken only (and that but in part) of the natural rights of man. We have now to consider the civil rights of man, and to shew how the one _originates_ out of the other.—Man did not enter into society, to become worse than he was before, nor to have less rights than he had before, but to have those rights _better secured_. His natural rights are the foundation of all his civil rights. But in order to pursue this distinction with more precision, it will be necessary to mark the different qualities of natural and civil rights.

“A few words will explain this. Natural rights are those which appertain to man in the right of his existence—civil rights are those which appertain to man in right of his being a member of society. Every civil right has for its foundation some natural right pre-existing in the individual, but to unite his individual power is not, in all cases, sufficiently competent. Of this kind are all those which relate to _security_ and _protection_.

“From this short review it will be easy to distinguish between that class of natural rights which man retains after entering into society, and those which he throws into _common stock_ as a member of society. The natural rights which he retains, are all those in which the power to execute is as perfect in the individual as the right itself.—The natural rights which are not retained, are all those in which, though the right is perfect in the individual, the power to execute them is defective: _they answer not his purpose_—those he _deposits_ in the _common stock_ of society, and takes the arm of society, of which he is a part, in preference and in addition to his own. Society grants him nothing. Every man is a proprietor in society, and draws on the capital as a matter of right.”—“_Rights of Man_,” 1791, page 30, 31.

(42) “We have now traced Man from a natural individual to a member of society——Civil power, properly considered as such is made up of the _aggregate_ of that class of the natural rights, which become defective in the individual in point of power, and _answers not his purpose_; but when collected into a focus, becomes competent to the purpose of every one.——Let us now apply those principles to government.——

“Individuals themselves, each in his own personal and sovereign right, entered into a compact with each other, to produce a government; and this is the only mode in which governments have a right to arise, and the only principle on which they have a right to exist.

“A _constitution_ is not a thing in name only, but in fact.—It has not an ideal but a real existence, and wherever it cannot be produced in a visible form, there is none. A _constitution_ is a thing antecedent to a _government_; and a government is only the creature of a constitution.—A constitution of a country is not the act of its government, but of the people constituting a government. It is the body of elements to which you can refer, and quote article by article; and which contains the principles on which the government shall be established, the manner in which it shall be organized, the powers it shall have, the mode of election, the duration of parliaments, or by what other name such bodies may be called, the powers which the executive part of the government shall have; and, in fine, every thing that relates to the complete _organization_ of a civil government, and the principles on which it shall act, and by which it shall be bound.”—“_Rights of Man_,” page 35, 36.

“What is a constitution? it is the form of government, delineated by the mighty hand of the people, in which certain first principles or fundamental laws are established. The constitution is certain and fixed; it contains the permanent will of the people, and is the supreme law of the land; it is paramount to the power of the legislature, and can be revoked or altered only by the authority that made it.—What are legislatures? creatures of the constitution, they owe their existence to the constitution—they derive their powers from the constitution.—It is their commission, and therefore all their acts must be conformable to it, or else void. The _constitution_ is the work or will of the _people themselves_, in their original, sovereign, and unlimited capacity. Law is the work or will of the legislature in their derivative capacity.”

Judge Patterson’s charge to the Jury in the Wioming case of Vanhorne’s lessee against Dorrance; tried at the circuit-court for the United States, held at Philadelphia, April term, 1795.

(43} Constitutional properties are only, as has been observed at the beginning of this letter, parts in the organization of the contributed rights. As long as those parts preserve the orders assigned to them respectively by the constitution, they may so far be said to be balanced: but, when one part, without being sufficiently checked by the rest, abuses its power to the manifest danger of public happiness, or when the several parts abuse their respective powers so as to involve the commonwealth in the like peril, _the people_ must restore things to that order, from which their functionaries have departed. If _the people_ suffer this living principle of watchfulness and controul to be extinguished among them, they will assuredly not long afterwards experience that of their “temple,” “there shall not be left one stone upon another, that shall not be thrown down.”

(44) When the _controuling power_ is in a constitution, it has the _nation_ for its support, and the _natural_ and the political controuling powers are together. The laws which are enacted by the governments, controul men only as individuals, but the _nation_, thro’ its constitution controuls _the whole government,_ and has a _natural ability_ to do so. The _final controuling_ power, therefore, and the _original constituting_ power, _are one and the same power_.—“_Rights of Man_,” 1792. part 2d, b. 4, page 42.

(45) See late publications against the Federal Constitution.

(46) Blackstone, III. 279

(47) Idem, IV. 350.

(48) Idem, III. 381.

(49) Instead of referring to musty records and mouldy parchments to prove that the rights of the living are lost, “renounced, and abdicated for ever,” by those who are now no more.—M. de la Fayette, in his address to the national assembly, applies to the living world, and says—“Call to mind the sentiments which nature has engraved in the heart of every citizen, and which take a new face when they are solemnly recognized by all. For a nation to love liberty, it is sufficient that she knows it; and to be free, it is sufficient that she wills it,”—“_Rights of Man_,” page 11.

(50) See an enumeration of defects in trials by jury. Blackstone, III. 381.

(51) Idem, IV. 350.

(52) He who reverses the constitution, liberties and laws of his country.——

(53) The great Bacon, in enumerating the art by which Cæsar enslaved his country, says—“His first artifice was to break the strength of the _senate_, for while that remained safe, there was no opening for any person to immoderate or extraordinary power.——‘_Nam initio sibi erani frangendæ senatus opes et autoritas qua salva nemini ad, immodica et extra ordinaria imperia aditus erat._’ Bossuet, bishop of Meaux, takes notice in his universal history, that the infamous Herod, to engross authority, attacked the Sanhedrim, which was in a manner the senate, where the supreme jurisdiction was exercised.”

(54) “If we consider what the principles are that first condense man into society, and what the motive is that regulates their mutual intercourse afterwards, we shall find, by the time we arrive at what is called government, that nearly the whole of the business is performed by the natural operation of the parts upon each other.”—_Rights of Man._

(55) When Xerxes invaded Greece with the largest host and the greatest fleet that ever were collected, events occurred, which being preserved in history, convey to us a very affecting and instructive information.

While the danger was at some distance, the states of Greece looked to remote friends for assistance. Disappointed in these speculations, tho’ the vast armaments of their enemies were constantly rolling towards them, still there was no firmness in their union, no vigor in their resolutions.

The Persian army passed the Hellespont, and directed its march westward. It was then decided, that Thessaly was the frontier to be first attacked.

The Thessalians, than whom no people had been more forward in the common cause, hastened a remonstrance to Corinth, urging that unless they were immediately and powerfully supported, necessity would oblige them to make terms with the invaders.

This reasonable remonstrance roused the sluggish and hesitating councils of the confederacy. A body of foot was dispatched who soon occupied the valley of Tempe, the only pass from Lower Macedonia, into Thessaly.

In a few days, these troops being informed that there was another pass from Upper Macedonia, returned to the Corinthian Isthmus.

The Thessalians thus deserted made their submission.

“This retreat from Tempe appears to have been a precipate measure, rendered necessary by nothing so much as by _the want of some powers_ of government extending over the several states which composed the confederacy.”—Mitford’s _History of Greece_.

With diminished forces, the defence of the confederates was now to be contracted. But in the conduct even of this business daily becoming more urgent, we find them laboring under the defects of their confederation.

“Destitute of any sufficient power extending over the whole, no part could confide in the protection of the whole, while the naval superiority of their enemy put it in his choice, where, when, and how to make his attacks; and therefore each republic seems to have been anxious to reserve its own strength for future contingencies.

Their generous hearts all beat at the call of freedom; but their efforts were embarrassed and enfeebled by the vices of their political constitution, to their prodigious detriment, and almost to their total destruction. For these vices, the ardor of heroism united with love of country could not compensate. These very vices therefore, may truly be said to have wasted the blood of patriots, and to have betrayed their country into the severest calamities.

If we shall hereafter by experience discover any vices in our constitution, let us _hasten_ with prudence and a fraternal affection for each other, to correct them. We are all embarked in the same vessel, and equally concerned in repairing any defects.

(56) See objections against the Federal constitution, very similar to those made in Scotland.

(57) Justice Blackstone argues in like manner, after admitting the “expediency” of titles of nobility. “It is also expedient that their owners should form an independent and separate branch of the legislature”—otherwise “their privileges would soon be borne down and overwhelmed.”—Comment. 2. 157.

(58) No member of parliament ought to be elected by fewer than the majority of 800, upon the most moderate calculation, according to Doctor Price.

(59) By the constitution proposed to us, a majority of the house of representatives, and of the senate, makes a quorum to do business: but, if the writer is not mistaken, about a fourteenth part of the members of the house of commons, makes a quorum for that purpose.

(60) If to the union of England and Scotland, a just connection with Ireland be added, ecclesiastical establishments duly amended; additions to the peerage regulated, and representation of the commons properly improved, it is to be expected, that the tranquility, strength, reputation, and prosperity of the empire will be greatly promoted, the monarchy will probably change into a republic, if representation in the house of commons is not encreased by additions from the counties and great trading cities and towns, without this precaution, an increase of the peerage seems likely to accelerate an alteration. These two measures should have, it is apprehended, in such a government and in such a progress of human affairs, a well-tempered co-operation. The power of the crown might thereby become more dignified, moderated, and secured.

The discussion of this subject would embrace a very great number of considerations; but the conclusion seems to approach as near to demonstration, as an investigation of this kind can do.

(61) Against what is called equality in representation, the great Montesquieu seems to have declared by the strongest implication. In his Spirit of Laws, b. ch. 2, he says, that the confederate republic of Lycia contained twenty-three associated towns: that, in the common council, the larger towns had three votes, the middling towns two, and the lesser only one; that they contributed to the common expence according to the proportion of suffrages; and, that were he to give the model of an excellent confederate republic, it should be that of Lycia. Could the immortal spirit of Montesquieu revisit the earth, and behold the model now offered to America, how quickly would his favorite republic sink in his estimation. In a new quarter of the globe scarcely heard of by the greater part of Europeans in his day, and since the commencement of the present century, he would see men who have attained a perfection in the science most conducive to human happiness, in that study which was the principal occupation of his life, in which his predecessors had acquired only a few glimmering lights, and of which it was reserved for him to develope most of the true first principles.

(62) Whether the state of Maryland shall be divided into six districts, for each to choose one man, or the people at large give their suffrage for the whole six, is hereafter to be settled by the assembly. The latter mode, on a variety of occasions, would be preferable.

(63) The importance of having the western territory determined a common stock, needs only to be mentioned, to excite attention.

As the articles of confederation contain no provision, for adjusting the dispute between the United States, and particular states, Maryland, for a long time, refused her ratification. An adequate provision is made by the proposed plan. That the United States will assuredly institute actions against two of the states, setting up claims equally wild and extensive, may appear from the following statement.

New Hampshire, Rhode Island, New Jersey, Delaware and Maryland, have been always interested in making good the common claim; as they never laid any particular claim to the territory in question.

Massachusetts, if the province of Maine be separate, is likewise become interested in the common claim.

Connecticut, and New York, have both made cessions, which congress has accepted. These two are therefore become interested.

Pennsylvania, although very extensive, has her limits ascertained. She likewise is interested.

Virginia, having made a cession to congress, has since relinquished a part of the reserved lands, or at least offered independence, to Kentucky.

North Carolina, having once made a cession, thought proper, in the omnipotence of her destined sovereignty, to repeal the act. Will not the cession be determined valid, and the repeal void?

South Carolina also, it is said, has ceded part of that territory, which lately she disputed with Georgia. In this case the United States have their claim fortified.

But Georgia, the weakest of all, lays claim to an immense tract of country. In this territory there are warlike and independent tribes of the aborigines, now carrying terror and desolation towards the heart of the country occupied by the whites. It is expected, that this circumstance, with a consciousness of the weak foundation of her claims, will dispose Georgia to give up without a suit, and consent to be circumscribed within narrower limits, so soon as a proper tribunal shall have power to enter upon a rational investigation.

N. B.—For the above statement I am principally indebted to a member of the late continental convention, and who for a considerable time, was a member of congress, a gentleman of established honour and accuracy.

(65) The advantage derived from this to the southern states, is easily perceived. Have not serious apprehensions been entertained on account of the vast superiority of the eastern states by sea?

(65) Is it possible to reflect, without indignation, on the fate of the five per cent. impost scheme?

(66) This objection has been in some degree lessened, by an amendment, often before refused, and at last made by an erasure, after the engrossment upon parchment, of the word forty, and inserting thirty, in the third clause of the second section of the first article.

(67) It appears to me a very just remark of Mr. Wilson’s, in his celebrated speech, that a bill of rights would have been dangerous, as implying that without such a reservation the Congress would have had authority in the cases enumerated, so that if any had been omitted (and who would undertake to recite all the State and individual rights not relinquished by the new Constitution?) they might have been considered at the mercy of the general legislature.

(68) I have understood it was considered at the Convention, that the proportion of one Representative to 30,000 constituents, would produce at the very first nearly the number that would be satisfactory to Mr. Mason. So that I presume this reason was wrote before the material alteration was made from 40,000 to 30,000, which is said to have taken place the very last day just before the signature.

(69) It seems by the letter which has been published of Mr. Elsworth and Mr. Sherman, as if one reason of giving a share in these appointments to the Senate was, that persons in what are called the lesser States might have an equal chance for such appointments, in proportion to their merit, with those in the larger, an advantage that could only be expected from a body in which the States were equally represented.

(70) When I wrote the above, I had not seen Governor Randolph’s letter. Otherwise, I have so great a respect for that gentleman’s character I should have treated with more deference an idea in some measure countenanced by him. One of his objections relates to the Congress fixing their own salaries. I am persuaded, upon a little reflection, that gentleman must think this is one of those cases where a trust must unavoidably be reposed. No salaries could certainly be fixed now so as to answer the various changes in the value of money that in the course of time must take place. And in what condition would the supreme authority be if their very existence depended on an inferior power! An abuse in this case too would be so gross that it is very unlikely to happen, but if it should it would probably prove much more fatal to the authors than injurious to the people.

(71) See Coke’s Commentary upon Littleton, 110. 1. Blackstone’s Commentary, 227 and seq.

(72) 1. Blackstone’s Commentaries, 232.

(73) I have since found that in the constitutions of some of the States there are much stronger restrictions on the Executive authority in this particular than I was aware of. In others the restriction only extends to prosecutions carried on by the General Assembly, or the most numerous branch of legislature, or a contrary provision by law; Virginia is in the latter class. But when we consider how necessary it is in many cases to make use of accomplices to convict their associates, and what little regard ought in general to be paid to a guilty man swearing to save his own life, we shall probably think that the jealousies which (by prohibiting pardons before convictions) even disabled the Executive authority from procuring unexceptionable testimony of this sort, may more fairly be ascribed to the natural irritation of the public mind at the time when the constitutions were formed, than to an enlarged and full consideration of the subject. Indeed, it could scarcely be avoided, that when arms were first taken up in the cause of liberty, to save us from the immediate crush of arbitrary power, we should lean too much rather to the extreme of weakening than of strengthening the Executive power in our own government. In England, the only restriction upon this power in the King, in case of Crown prosecutions (one or two slight cases excepted) is, that his pardon is not pleadable in bar of an impeachment. But he may pardon after conviction, even on an impeachment; which is an authority not given to our President, who in case of impeachments has no power either of pardoning or reprieving.

(74) The evidence of a man confessing himself guilty of the same crime is undoubtedly admissable, but it is generally, and ought to be always received with great suspicion, and other circumstances should be required to corroborate it.

(75) One of the powers given to Congress is, “To promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.” I am convinced Mr. Mason did not mean to refer to this clause. He is a gentleman of too much taste and knowledge himself to wish to have our government established upon such principles of barbarism as to be able to afford no encouragement to genius.

(76) Some might apprehend, that in this case as New England would at first have the greatest share of the carrying trade, the vessels of that country might demand an unreasonable freight. But no attempt could be more injurious to them as it would immediately set the Southern States to building, which they could easily do, and thus a temporary loss would be compensated with a lasting advantage to us; the very reverse would be the case with them. Besides, that from that country alone there would probably be competition enough for freight to keep it on reasonable terms.

(77) If this provision had not been made in the new constitution no author could have enjoyed such an advantage in all the United States, unless a similar law had constantly subsisted in each of the States separately.

(78) Those gentlemen who gravely tell us that the militia will be sufficient for this purpose, do not recollect that they themselves do not desire we should rely solely on a militia in case of actual war, and therefore in the case I have supposed they cannot be deemed sufficient even by themselves, for when the enemy landed it would undoubtedly be a time of war, but the misfortune would be, that they would be prepared; we not. Certainly all possible encouragement should be given to the training of our militia, but no man can really believe that they will be sufficient, without the aid of any regular troops, in time of foreign hostility. A powerful militia may make fewer regulars necessary, but will not make it safe to dispense with them altogether.

[79] I presume we are not to be deemed in a state of war whenever any Indian hostilities are committed on our frontiers. If that is the case I don’t suppose we have had six years of peace since the first settlement of the country, or shall have for fifty years to come. A distinction between peace and war would be idle indeed, if it can be frittered away by such pretences as those.

INDEX.

Adams, Charles Francis, 413.

Adams, John, cited, 316.

Adams. J. Q., 406; 411.

Address to the people of the State of New York, 67; 87; 111.

Agriculture, diminished values of products of, 73.

Albany, committee of, 1;
address to the citizens of, 409.

Algerines, method of obtaining peace with the, 112.

Amendments, _see Constitution_.

American Citizen, An, pseudonym of T. Coxe, 134; 391.

Appointment, powers of, 311; 339.

Appointing power, necessity of check on President’s, 341.

Aristides, pseudonym of A. C. Hanson, 217; 408.

Aristocracy, (_see also Monarchy._) 17; 285; 332;
natural, in the U. S., 295;
party of, in the U. S., 321;
rarity of, genuine, 256.

Army, Standing, dangers of, 10; 150;
discussion of, 363;
impossibility of in America, 56;
lack of restrictions on, 51; 103; 365;
necessity of, 157; 235;
powers of congress over, 150; 303;
restriction of, by North Carolina, 365;
restriction of, by Pennsylvania, 365;
unnecessary fear of, 234.

Arnold, Benedict, 352.

Articles of Confederation, _see Confederation_.

Attainder, Bills of, forbidden, 314.

Austin, James T., 1.

Baldwin, Abraham, biographies of, 432.

Baldwin, Simeon, Oration of, 386.

Bancroft, George, History by, 386.

Bankrupt laws, necessity of uniform, 306.

Belhaven, Lord, quotation from speech of, 195.

Bills of Rights, 73; 114; 229; 329;
adoption of, 359;
necessity of, 75; 315;
unnecessary in constitution, 241; 335.

Blackstone, Judge, cited, 10.

Blair, John, biographies of, 432.

Brearly, David, 390;
biographies of, 432.

Brutus, pseudonym to newspaper essay, 118; 424.

Bryan, Samuel, 418.

Butler, Pierce, biographies of, 432.

Byng, admiral, 354.

Cabinet, dangers of, 330.

Carolinas, the, importance of their decision on the constitution, 21.

Carroll, Daniel, biographies of, 432.

Caucus, dangers from, 300.

Centinel, cited, 248;
pseudonym of Samuel Bryan, 418.

Citizen of America, pseudonym of N. Webster, 25; 423

Citizen of New York, pseudonym of John Jay, 67; 410.

Citizen of Philadelphia, pseudonym of P. Webster, 118; 424.

Civil list, 7.

Civil service, 189;
want of rotation in, 11.

Civis, pseudonym of Jonathan Jackson, 410;
pseudonym of David Ramsay, 380; 420.

Clinton, George, 418.

Clymer, George, biographies of, 432.

Columbian Patriot, pseudonym of E. Gerry, 1; 407.

Commerce, (_see also, Navigation, Shipping, Treaties._) 73; 265; 357;
condition of, 358;
control of, by a few states, 62;
impositions on, 264;
improper power to enact laws relating to, 331;
powers of congress over, 357;
right of English parliament over colonial, 136;
should not be submitted to a mere majority of congress, 275;
wretched condition of, 265.

Confederation (_see also, Congress, Continental, United States
government._)
compared with constitution, 148; 379;
defective nature of, 136; 228; 261;
dissolution of, 268; feebleness of, 272;
government under the, 72;
history of, 262; 283;
impossibility of suitably amending, 267;
necessity of amending, 96; 136;
positions of the states under, in reference to the new constitution,
97; 267.

Confederacies, separate, 120; 127; 204; 247; 269;
southern, 270;
evils of, 278.

Congress, Continental (_see also Confederation, Impost, Paper Money._)
156;
absurd measures of, 32;
bad constitution of, 267;
lack of power of, 78;
merging of powers in, 268;
misrepresentation in, 267;
omitted in consideration of new government, 14;
origin of, 70;
powers of, 70; 72; 374;
power to amend constitution, 284;
proposition to vest with impost, 283;
requisitions of, 263;
unsuitable to lodge powers in, 267.

Congress, (_see also, Armies, Commerce, Constitution, Election,
Judiciary, Jury, Impost, Paper Money, Press, Representation,
Representatives, Senate, Treaties, United States government._)
33; 107;
abuse of powers of, 122;
attendance in, 376;
binding effects of acts of on its own members, 124;
checks on, 125;
definition of necessary powers, 45;
delegates to, 40;
division into two branches, 30;
extensive powers of, 45; 122; 233;
formed of the best men, 123;
great expense of, 47;
interference of with states, 46;
length of term, 170;
limited powers of, to deal with common law, 336;
members of, remarks on, 123;
method of passing laws, 44;
necessary powers only given to, 173; 374;
necessity of a line between states and, 273;
objection to two branches in, 47;
powers conceded by anti-federalists to, 126;
powers of, limited to what the people allow, 127;
powers of taxation of, 49; 303;
powers over elections, 44;
powers over printing, 316;
powers to define and punish crime, 359;
powers to grant monopolies, 357;
power to provide for the general interest and welfare, 121;
probable misuse of their power, 123;
representation in, 12; 289;
right of the people to control delegates to, 6;
to determine their own salaries, 11;
unnecessary power over elections, 61.

Connecticut, adopted from local causes, 104;
adoption of the constitution by, 98;
and the constitution, 439;
construction of Senate of, 41;
disagreement in legislature of, 33;
hostile feelings towards New York, 84; 96;
imports of, from New York, 62;
legislative action on act of Congress, 33;
probable refusal to attend second convention, 81;
reasons for her ratification, 21;
representation in House of Representatives, 293.

Constitution, (_see also Army, Bills of Rights, Congress, Continental
Congress, Conventions, Elections, Judiciary, Jury, Militia, Navy,
Press, Ratification, Representation, Representatives, Senate, United
States government._)

——Adoption of, danger of delay in, 93;
necessity of 62;
should not be precipitate in, 280.

——Advantages of, 61; 64; 319;
control over states clearly defined, 121;
diverse representation in, 204;
increase of values if adopted, 47;
mutual checks in the departments of government as, 222;
no qualification in wealth or birth under, 146;
plan of accommodation, 80; 285;
security in, from federal servants, 189.

——Amendments to, 15; 34; 103;
adoption before making, 93;
agreement in, 102;
dangers of, 226;
difficulty of agreeing to, prior to adoption, 99; 245;
methods for obtaining, 111; 317;
necessity of, prior to adoption, 99; 101; 274;
necessity of, 93; 106; 273; 324;
power of making, 209;
state conventions should make, 322;
unreasonableness of, 104.

——Compared with other constitutions, compared with articles of
confederation, 148; 379;
compared with Roman and English, 35;
compared with Great Britain, 137;
difference between the state constitutions and the, 155.

——Defects of, 318;
a consolidated fabric of aristocratic tyranny, 17;
agreement in, 93;
a heterogeneous phantom, 7;
complicated nature of, 7;
contains no feature of democracy or republicanism, 8;
designed for the rich, 254;
executive and legislative powers dangerously blended in, 9;
ignorance of the people in its formation, 284;
impracticable over so vast a territory, 13;
impossibility of suiting all, 63;
lack of declaration of rights in, 73; 329;
neither federal nor national, 279;
unequal advantages enjoyed by different localities, 298;
want of title, 8.

——Powers of, 156;
amount delegated by, 313;
divisions of, 75;
fundamental rights of, 313;
general clauses of, 233; 312; 331;
general, 356;
guarantee against ex post facto laws, 147; 314; 332; 368.

——Ratification of, _see ratification_.

——Tendencies of; consolidating, 14; 102; 121; 127; 129; 282; 286;
289; 294; 299; 320;
dangers of corruption of, 129;
construction with reference to state constitutions, 159; 314;
founded on monarchy and aristocracy, 7;
guarded against excesses, 184;
liable to result in monarchy, 195;
partly federal but tending towards consolidation, 286;
possibility of ending in tyranny, 169;
probable encroachments under, 122;
will end in monarchy or aristocracy, 254; 285.

——Absurd prospects in case of adoption, 106;
character of the supporters of, 5;
classes interested in, 283;
division of legislature into two branches, 30;
documentary sources of the history of the adoption of, 428;
editions of, 386;
general histories of the, 427;
partizan pamphlets pro and con, 437;
possibility of obtaining a better, 78;
sources of objections to, 166.

Conventions, ease in obtaining, 317.

Convention, Annapolis, 284.

Convention, Federal, (_see also Constitution, States._) 271; 285;
biographies of attending members of, 432;
character of members, 114;
composition of, 74;
compromises in, 76; 158;
dangers of discord in, 222;
debates and proceedings of, 431;
diverse interests in, 166;
drafts and plans of constitutions in, 431;
histories of, improper secrecy of, 15; 18;
journal of, 410;
list of members of, 406;
local interest in, 75;
members of, 221;
non-attendance of members, 285;
not limited, 224;
opinion of, 74;
origin of, 284;
quality of the delegates of, 285;
secrecy in proceedings, 101;
unauthorized powers assumed by, 14; 16; 224;
want of authority, 101.

Convention, Second, 21; 210; 272;
evils of, 166;
great delay in obtaining, 83;
impossible to agree upon a better plan, 82;
necessity of, 19; 274;
possibility of a successful, 80; 246;
probability that the states which have already ratified will refuse
to attend, 81.

Conventions, State, (_see also each State and Ratification._) 17; 274;
ratifications against the wish of the people, 19;
should be allowed to amend constitution, 272; 322;
value of, 322.

Council, (_see also Executive._)
necessity of, 230;
objections to, 341.

Courts, _see Judiciary_.

Coxe, Tench, pamphlet by, 134; 391.

Curtis, G. T., History by, 391.

Dallas, A. J., 425.

Davie, W. R., biographies of, 433;
pamphlet by, 333; 391.

Dawson, H. B., editor of The Federalist, 404;
correspondence about The Federalist, 404.

Debt, federal, change of system for paying, 378;
condition of, 95;
equalization of, 147;
failure to meet, 73;
probable treatment of, 105;
responsibility of, 317.

Decius, pseudonym of J. Montgomery, 415; 417.

Declaration of Rights _see Bill of Rights_.

De Costa, B. F., review by. 386.

Delaware and the constitution, 433;
probable refusal to attend second convention, 81;
representation of, 223;
selfish motives in adopting the constitution, 21.

Democracy, disapproval of, 319.

Despotism, methods of, 9.

Dickinson, John, biographies of, 433;
cited, 318;
pamphlet by, 163; 392.

Duties, _see Export, Import, Taxation_.

Eastern States, _see States, Eastern_.

Elections, (_see also Constitution, Congress, Representatives, House
of, Senate._)
biennial found by Massachusetts, 8;
control of, by congress, 103; 151; 227; 295;
frequency of, 8; 11; 13;
great barrier to corruption, 61;
probable misuse of the power granted over, 103.

Elliot, Jonathan, debates of, 392.

Ellsworth, Oliver, biographies of, 433;
cited, 341.

English Constitution, _see Great Britain_.

Entail, dangerous to liberty, 60.

Executive, (_see also Appointment, Constitution, Impeachment, Pardon,
Treaty, Vice President._)

——Council, 230; 330;
lack of, 333;
objections to, 345;
unnecessary, 346.

——National, 64;
advantage of single, 352;
American compared with English, 137;
composition of, 225;
election of, 35; 171; 298;
entailment of, 233;
exclusion of the people in the choice of, 12;
nominating power of, 228;
pardoning power of, 275; 338; 351;
powers of, 36; 171; 225; 232;
requisite age of, 36;
should be ineligible after a certain time, 275;
should not fill vacancies, 275;
should not nominate judiciary offices, 275;
small probability of treason of, 352;
term of, 231; tool of the Senate, 330;
veto power of, 45.

——State, (_see also State_,) restrictions on, 351.

Export duties, restraint on, 331;
restriction of states from, 366.

Ex post facto laws, desirability of restrictions on, 368;
guarantee against, 147; 314; 336;
restraint from, 332.

Fabius, pseudonym of John Dickinson, 163; 392.

Federal administration, 394.

Federal city, advantage to middle states, 319;
jurisdiction of, improperly used, 18;
resolution for, by the continental congress, 32.

Federal convention, see _Convention, Federal_.

Federal Constitution, pseudonym, 385. _see Constitution, Federal_.

Federal Farmer; pseudonym of Richard Henry Lee, 277; 411.

Federalist, The, authorship of, 395;
list of editions, 394;
opinions concerning, 395;
original publication of, 395.

Federal Republican, A, 420.

Federal Republic, title invented by James Wilson, 8.

Federal requisitions, 105.

Few, William, biographies of, 433.

Fitzsimons, Thomas, 25; biographies of, 433.

Ford, P. L., list of editions of The Federalist, 395;
list of members of federal convention, 406.

Foreign affairs, indifference to, 72.

Foreign goods, excessive importation of, 95.

Franklin, Benjamin, 27; 64;
biographies of, 433.

Fur trade, loss of, 73.

Georgia, accession of, to insure protection, 20;
amendment of constitution of, 34;
and the constitution, 441;
probable refusal to attend second convention, 81.

Gerry, Elbridge, biographies of, 433;
failure to sign constitution, 271;
pamphlet by, 1; 407.

Gilman, Nicholas, biographies of, 433.

Gorham, Nathaniel, biographies of, 433.

Greenleaf, T., 1.

Great Britain, House of Commons, 42; 143; 211;
constitution of, compared with the American, 35; 137;
House of Peers of, 42;
paper money would destroy the credit of, 243;
Privy Council of, 345;
right of the colonists to constitution of, 135;
standing army of, 235;
union of, 195; 213.

Government, (_see also under each country_,)
dangers of all strong, 131;
effect on character and manners, 5;
elements of, 263;
instituted for protection and happiness, 6;
must not be lodged in a single body, 182;
nature of, 92;
origin of, 174;
primary principles of, 373;
the result of fraud or violence, 18.

Hale, Charles, 415.

Hale, Sir Mathew, cited, 10.

Hall, Aaron, 408.

Hamilton, Alexander, biographies of, 433;
The Federalist, 395;
proposition in convention, 408.

Hamilton. J. A., correspondence about The Federalist, 404.

Hamilton, J. C., editor of The Federalist, 405.

Hanson, Alexander Contee, pamphlet by, 217; 408.

Helvetius, cited, 5.

Henry, Patrick, attack on, 415; 417.

Hillsborough, Lord, 8.

Hitchcock, Enos, 408.

Hopkinson, Francis, 409.

Hutchinson, Gov. T., recommends triennial elections, 8; 13.

Impeachment, (_see also Constitution, Executive, Senate_), 342;
improperly lodged with senate, 300.

Imports, 62; foreign, 95.

Impost, (_see also Congress, Taxation_), 104; 283;
Connecticut and New Jersey share of, 319;
general acceptance of the five per cent., 253;
the great source of revenue in the U. S., 160.

Imprimatur, danger of, 9.

Ingersoll, Jared, biographies of, 433.

Insurgents, party of, in the U. S., 321.

Iredell, James, pamphlet by, 327; 333; 392; 410.

Jackson, Jonathan, 410.

Jay, John, pamphlet by, 67; 410;
reply to his pamphlet, 111;
The Federalist, 395.

Jay, John, (Jr.) correspondence about The Federalist, 404.

Johnson, W. S., 390;
biographies of, 433.

Judiciary, National (_see also Appointment, Executive, Jury, Senate_,)
275;
analysis of, 343;
appellate jurisdiction of, 12; 236; 308; 311;
coersive powers of, 343;
dangers from jurisdiction as to both law and fact, 308;
discussion of, 236;
impossibility of trial by jury in, 310;
necessity of national, 122;
power to decide law and fact, 114;
powers of, 53; 149; 236; 298; 306;
want of limitation in, 9; 102.

Judiciary, State, (_see also Jury, State_,) 289; 307;
absorption of by national, 53; 329;
position under constitution, 343.

Jury, Trial by, absence in state courts, 361;
discussion of, 157;
impracticable in national courts, 289;
necessity of, 184; 315;
not altered by constitution, 148;
not a universal practice, 361;
not secured in civil cases, 9; 103; 114; 307;
reply to insinuations concerning, 52;
should be left to wisdom of congress, 362;
the birthright of Americans, 241;
under Pennsylvania constitution, 148.

King, Rufus, biographies of, 434;
on Elbridge Gerry, 1.

Land, (_see also Western Territory_),
decline in the price of, 74.

Langdon, John, biographies of, 434.

Lansing, John, 425; biographies of, 434.

Law, (_see also Congress, Constitution, Judiciary, Ex post facto,
Treaties_),
multiplication of, 302;
necessity of supreme, 312;
people entitled to common, 336.

Lee, Richard Henry, pamphlet by, 277; 411.

Legislature, _see Congress and State Legislatures_.

Livingston, William, biographies of, 434.

Lloyd, Thomas, 412; 418.

Lodge, H. C., editor of The Federalist, 406.

Mablé, Ablé, cited, 4.

M’Henry, James, biographies of, 434.

McClurg, James, biographies of, 434.

M’Kean, Thomas, speeches of, 412.

Maclaine, Archibald, pamphlet by, 333; 392; 412;
opinion of The Federalist, 395.

MacMaster, John Bach, 412.

Madison, James, 327; 390;
biographies of, 434;
debate of, 394; 413;
quotation from, 259;
The Federalist, 395.

Marcus, pseudonym of James Iredell, 333; 391; 410.

Martin, Luther, biographies of, 434;
cited, 18;
Genuine Information of, 413; 425.

Maryland and the constitution, 440;
construction of senate of, 41;
declaration of rights, 229;
delay in appointing convention, 250;
local actions in courts of, 239;
method of electing federal representatives, 225;
omnipotence of legislature of, 226;
position toward Europe, 251;
position under new constitution, 251;
probable rejection of the constitution by, 28;
proposed emission of paper money, 33;
representation of, 223;
resistance of the people to paper money, 244.

Mason, George, 390;
biographies of, 434;
failure to sign constitution, 271;
pamphlet by, 327; 413;
reply to, 255; 333; 391.

Massachusetts, 13;
adoption of the constitution by, 98;
ambiguous expressions in ratification of, 6;
amendments of the convention of, 15; 103;
and the constitution, 438;
debates in the convention, 414;
hostile feeling towards New York, 96;
means used to obtain ratification of, 19;
ratification by, 6.

Mediterranean, exclusion of Americans from, 73.

Mercer, J. F., biographies of, 435.

Mifflin, Thomas, biographies of, 435.

Militia, congressional power over, 52; 305;
necessary general powers over, 122; 306;
no longer under civil control, 11;
subject to president and senate, 11.

Minot, G. R., 410.

Monarchy, (_see also Aristocracy_), 7;
advocates for, 19;
dangers of, 195; 254; 285;
partisans of, in the state conventions, 17;
spirit of, in America, 5.

Money, (s_ee also Paper Money, Representatives, Senate, Taxation_),
power to raise, necessary to general government, 122;
scarcity of, 73; 113.

Monopolies, congressional power to grant. 357.

Montesquien, cited, 59.

Montgomery, J., pamphlet by, 415; 417.

Morris, Robert, biographies of, 435.

Morris, Gouverneur, biographies of, 435.

Native of Boston, pseudonym of J. Jackson, 410.

Navigation laws, necessity of, 377.

Navy, power of congress to form, 374;
will be obtained by constitution, 379.

New England, commerce of, 357.

New Hampshire and the constitution, 438.

New Jersey, adopted from local causes, 104;
and the constitution, 439;
hostile feelings towards New York, 84; 96;
imports of, from New York, 62;
journal of the convention of, 416;
probable refusal to attend second convention, 81;
selfish motives in adopting the constitution, 21.

New York, address to the people of, 67; 87; 111;
and the constitution, 439;
anti-federal committee of, 1;
constitution of, 114;
dangers from contiguous states, 96;
debates of the convention of, 416;
failure to guarantee liberty of the press in constitution of, 76;
ill feeling towards, of New Jersey and Connecticut, 84;
imports for other states, 62;
imports, 104;
journal of the convention of, 416;
lack of bill of rights, 114;
position, in case nine states ratify, 86;
undoubted rejection of constitution by, 21.

North Carolina and the constitution, 441;
debates in the convention of, 417;
forbids standing army in time of peace, 51; 365.

Nicholas, J., 415; 417.

Paine, Thomas, The Rights of Man, 164.

Paper money, 33;
baneful effects of, 243;
conduct of the state legislatures concerning, 244; 284;
congress not restricted from issuing, 374;
only the states restricted in issuing, 374;
renunciation of the right to issue, 243;
the secret reason of opposition to the constitution, 243.

Pardon, (_see also Executive_,)
power of executive to, 351.

Parker, J., review of The Federalist, 402.

Paterson, William, biographies of, 435.

Peabody, A. P., review by, 391.

Pennsylvania, 33;
address to the citizens of, 385;
and the constitution, 412;
advantages from new constitution, 161;
aristocratic delegates in Federal convention from, 285;
debates in convention of, 418;
dissent of minority of convention, 102: 385;
forbids standing army in time of peace, 51; 365;
general assembly under her constitution 152;
hasty conduct due to construction of legislature, 33;
hostile feeling towards New York, 96;
journal of the convention of, 419;
legislature of, 34;
opposition to division of congress, 30;
ratification by, 20;
trial by jury under constitution of, 148.

People, desire for union of the, 17;
equal representation necessary in free government, 168; 288;
position in adoption of constitution, 311;
real power with the, 6; 57; 147;
true influence of, 60; 168; 316.

Pickering, Timothy, Life of, cited, 277.

Pierce, B. K., 415.

Pinckney, Charles, biographies of, 435;
pamphlet by, 419.

Pinckney, Charles C., biographies of, 435.

Plebeian, pseudonym of Melancthon Smith, 67; 87; 421.

Police, internal, 292.

President, _see Executive_.

Press, Liberty of, 9; 76;
congress without power over, 361;
failure to guarantee liberty of, 9; 48; 76; 113;
needless to guarantee, 156;
powers of congress over, 316;
power to tax, 114.

Printers, refusal of, to print against the constitution, 323.

Production, difficulty in disposing of surplus, 73.

Property, equal distribution of, the foundation of a republic, 61;
the basis of freedom, 60;
the real power, 57.

Publicola, pseudonym of W. R. Davie, 391.

Quakers, influenced by slave trade, 54.

Ramsay, David, pamphlet by, 371; 421.

Randolph, Edmund, biographies of, 435;
cited, 343;
failure to sign constitution, 261; 271;
independence of, 20; 271;
motion of, 272;
pamphlet by, 259; 418; 420.

Ratification of the constitution, (_see also Conventions, and each
state_.) 420;
celebrations of the ratifications of, 441;
improperly hurried, 18;
influences that cause opposition to, 165;
methods used to aid acceptance, 7;
of nine states improper, 14;
probability of, by each state, 20;
probability of nine states agreeing to, 104;
submittal to state legislatures and conventions, 272.

Read, George, biographies of, 436.

Religion, free exercise of, should be guaranteed, 315.

Religious sentiment of America, 135.

Religious test, none required, 146.

Representation (_see also Congress, Constitution_,) 8; 12; 289;
and taxation inseparable, 148;
advantages of eastern states in, 375;
basis for, 263;
by wealth or population, 39;
direct taxation apportioned by, 310;
equality of the states in, 206;
inadequacy of, 12; 300; 303;
inequality in, 223;
improvement of, in constitution, 206;
origin of, 30;
possibilities of equal, 296;
in the constitution a compromise, 206;
superior in state governments, 293;
too small to secure liberty, 102;
treble method in, 178.

Representatives, House of (_see Congress, Constitution, Representation,
Senate, Treaties,_) 293;
comparison with house of commons, 42; 143;
composition and powers of, 143; 170; 225; 295;
difficulties in formation of, 297;
election of members of federal convention to, 221;
expense of, 299;
money bills in, 340;
no state to have less than one member in, 143;
proportion of members to population, 143;
qualifications of, 144;
reply to Mason’s opinion of, 255;
representation in, 12; 337;
shadow of representation in, 329;
share in treaties, 355; 376;
term of, 43;
the seat of local interests and parties, 41;
the voice of the separate states, 41.

Republics, constitution of ancient, 189.

Revenue (_see also Impost, Taxation_,)
all sources of, subject to general government, 11;
necessity of equalizing, 62.

Revolutionary war caused by a difference concerning rights, 136.

Rhode Island and the constitution, 438;
failure to choose representatives, 151;
senate of, 32.

Robertson, David, 418; 422.

Rome, colonies of, 208;
constitution compared with proposed constitution, 35;
senate of, 42.

Rowland, Kate M., 390.

Russell, Benjamin, report of debates, 414.

Rutledge, John, biographies of, 436.

Sablière, T. de la, editor of The Federalist, 396.

Sarum, English borough of, 143.