Chapter XIII: Part 13

Indeed, as it was not possible to determine the time itself of the Soul, and to measure within themselves the parts of an invisible and uncognizable duration, especially for men who did not know how to count, the (world) Soul created day and night so that their succession might be the basis of counting as far as two, by the aid of this variety. Plato[464] indicates that as the source of the notion of number. Later, observing the space of time which elapses from one dawn to another, we were able to discover an interval of time determined by an uniform movement, so far as we direct our gaze thereupon, and as we use it as a measure by which to measure time. The expression "to measure time" is premeditated, because time, considered in itself, is not a measure. How indeed could time measure, and what would time, while measuring, say? Would time say of anything, "Here is an extension as large as myself?" What indeed could be the nature of the entity that would speak of "myself"? Would it be that according to which quantity is measured? In this case, time would have to be something by itself, to measure without itself being a measure. The movement of the universe is measured according to time, but it is not the nature of time to be the measure of movement; it is such only accidentally; it indicates the quantity of movement, because it is prior to it, and differs from it. On the other hand, in the case of a movement produced within a determinate time, and if a number be added thereto frequently enough, we succeed in reaching the knowledge of how much time has elapsed. It is therefore correct to say that the movement of the revolution operated by the universal Sphere measures time so far as possible, by its quantity indicating the corresponding quantity of time, since it can neither be grasped nor conceived otherwise. Thus what is measured, that is, what is indicated by the revolution of the universal Sphere, is time. It is not begotten, but only indicated by movement.

MOVEMENT IS SAID TO BE MEASURED BY SPACE, BECAUSE OF ITS INDETERMINATION.

The measure of movement, therefore, seems to be what is measured by a definite movement, but which is other than this movement. There is a difference, indeed, between that which is measured, and that which measures; but that which is measured is measured only by accident. That would amount to saying that what is measured by a foot-rule is an extension, without defining what extension in itself is. In the same way, because of the inability to define movement more clearly because of its indeterminate nature, we say that movement is that which is measured by space; for, by observation of the space traversed by movement, we can judge of the quantity of the movement.

TIME IS MEASURED BY MOVEMENT, AND IN THAT SENSE IT IS THE MEASURE OF MOVEMENT.

12. (13). The revolution of the universal Sphere leads us therefore to the recognition of time, within which it occurs. Not only is time that in which (all things "become," that is, grow), but time has to be what it is even before all things, being that within which everything moves, or rests with order and uniformity. This is discovered and manifested to our intelligence, but not produced by regular movement and rest, especially by movement. Better than rest, indeed, does movement lead us to a conception of time, and it is either to appreciate the duration of movement than that of rest. That is what led philosophers to define time as the measure "of" movement, instead of saying, what probably lay within their intention, that time is measured "by" movement. Above all, we must not consider that definition as adequate, adding to it that which the measured entity is in itself, not limiting ourselves to express what applies to it only incidentally. Neither did we ever discern that such was their meaning, and we were unable to understand their teachings as they evidently posited the measure in the measured entity. No doubt that which hindered us from understanding them was that they were addressing their teachings to learned (thinkers), or well prepared listeners, and therefore, in their writings, they failed to explain the nature of time considered in itself, whether it be measure or something measured.

PLATO DOES MAKE SOME STATEMENTS THAT ALLOW OF BEING JUSTIFIED.

Plato himself, indeed, does say, not that the nature of time is to be a measure or something measured, but that to make it known there is, in the circular movement of the universe, a very short element (the interval of a day), whose object is to demonstrate the smallest portion of time, through which we are enabled to discover the nature and quantity of time. In order to indicate to us its nature ("being"), (Plato[438]) says that it was born with the heavens, and that it is the mobile image of eternity. Time is mobile because it has no more permanence than the life of the universal Soul, because it passes on and flows away therewith; it is born with the heavens, because it is one and the same life that simultaneously produces the heavens and time. If, granting its possibility, the life of the Soul were reduced to the unity (of the Intelligence), there would be an immediate cessation of time, which exists only in this life, and the heavens, which exist only through this life.

TIME AS THE PRIOR AND POSTERIOR OF THE MOVEMENT OF THIS LIFE WOULD BE ABSURD.

The theory that time is the priority and posteriority of this (earthly) movement, and of this inferior life, is ridiculous in that it would imply on one hand that (the priority and posteriority of this sense-life) are something; and on the other, refusing to recognize as something real a truer movement, which includes both priority and posteriority. It would, indeed, amount to attributing to an inanimate movement the privilege of containing within itself priority with posteriority, that is, time; while refusing it to the movement (of the Soul), whose movement of the universal Sphere is no more than an image. Still it is from the movement (of the Soul) that originally emanated priority and posteriority, because this movement is efficient by itself. By producing all its actualizations it begets succession, and, at the same time that it begets succession, it produces the passing from one actualization to another.

THE PRIMARY MOVEMENT OF INTELLIGENCE THE INFORMING POWER OF TIME.

(Some objector might ask) why we reduce the movement of the universe to the movement of the containing Soul, and admit that she is within time, while we exclude from time the (universal) Soul's movement, which subsists within her, and perpetually passes from one actualization to another? The reason is that above the activity of the Soul there exists nothing but eternity, which shares neither her movement nor her extension. Thus the primary movement (of Intelligence) finds its goal in time, begets it, and by its activity informs its duration.

WHY TIME IS PRESENT EVERYWHERE; POLEMIC AGAINST ANTIPHANES AND CRITOLAUS.

How then is time present everywhere? The life of the Soul is present in all parts of the world, as the life of our soul is present in all parts of our body. It may indeed be objected,[465] that time constitutes neither a hypostatic substance, nor a real existence, being, in respect to existence, a deception, just as we usually say that the expressions "He was" and "He will be" are a deception in respect to the divinity; for then He will be and was just as is that, in which, according to his assertion, he is going to be.

To answer these objections, we shall have to follow a different method. Here it suffices to recall what was said above, namely, that by seeing how far a man in motion has advanced, we can ascertain the quantity of the movement; and that, when we discern movement by walking, we simultaneously concede that, before the walking, movement in that man was indicated by a definite quantity, since it caused his body to progress by some particular quantity. As the body was moved during a definite quantity of time, its quantity can be expressed by some particular quantity of movement--for this is the movement that causes it--and to its suitable quantity of time. Then this movement will be applied to the movement of the soul, which, by her uniform action, produces the interval of time.

THE MOVEMENT OF THE SOUL IS ATTRIBUTED TO THE PRIMARY MOVEMENT.

To what shall the movement of the (universal) Soul be attributed? To whatever we may choose to attribute it. This will always be some indivisible principle, such as primary Motion, which within its duration contains all the others, and is contained by none other;[466] for it cannot be contained by anything; it is therefore genuinely primary. The same obtains with the universal Soul.

APPROVAL OF ARISTOTLE: TIME IS ALSO WITHIN US.

Is time also within us?[467] It is uniformly present in the universal Soul, and in the individual souls that are all united together.[468] Time, therefore, is not parcelled out among the souls, any more than eternity is parcelled out among the (Entities in the intelligible world) which, in this respect, are all mutually uniform.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] Arist. Physics, iii. 7.

[2] Or, the finished, the boundary, the Gnostic Horos.

[3] Plato, Philebus, 24; Cary, 37.

[4] Plato, Timaeus, p. 52; Cary, 26.

[5] See vi. 3.13.

[6] See Plato, Philebus, Cary, 40; see ii. 4.11.

[7] See vi. 3.27.

[8] See ii. 4.10.

[9] Timaeus, 39; Cary, 14; see iii. 7.11.

[10] Parmenides, 144; Cary, 37.

[11] Possibly a reference to Numenius' book thereon.

[12] Aristotle, Met. i. 5; Jamblichus, de Vita. Pyth. 28.150; and 29.162; found in their oath; also Numenius, 60.

[13] See vi. 2.7.

[14] See vi. 6.5.

[15] As thought Plato and Aristotle combined, see Ravaisson, Essay, ii. 407.

[16] Atheneus, xii. 546; see i. 6.4.

[17] Plato, Timaeus, 39e, Cary, 15.

[18] See iii. 8.7.

[19] As thought the Pythagoreans; see Sextus Empiricus, Hypotyposes Pyrrh. 3.18, p. 165.

[20] Olympiodorus, Comm. I Alcibiades, x. p. 95; Arist. Met., i. 5; Sextus Emp., H. P., iii. 152; Porphyry; Vit. Pyth., 48.

[21] As said Theon of Smyrna, of the Pythagoreans, ii. p. 23; Jamblichus, Vit. Porph. 28.150; 29.162.

[22] See i. 8.2.

[23] Met. x. 2; iv. 2; v.

[24] Peripatetic commentators on Aristotle's Metaphysics, which was used as a text-book in Plotinos's school.

[25] See end of Sec. 13.

[26] See vi. 1.6.

[27] See Aristotle, Categories, ii. 6.

[28] As Aristotle thought, Met. x. 2.

[29] See vi. 9.2.

[30] Met. x. 1.

[31] The Numenian secret name of the divinity, fr. 20.

[32] Met. xiii. 7.

[33] Aristotle, Met. x. 2.

[34] Aristotle, Metaph. xiii. 7.

[35] See iv. 8.3.

[36] See iv. 4.5.

[37] See v. 7.3.

[38] See vi. 3.13.

[39] See vi. 9.1.

[40] See Timaeus, 35; Cary, 12. Jamblichus, On the Soul, 2; Macrobius, Dream of Scipio, i. 5.

[41] See Jamblichus, About Common Knowledge of Mathematics.

[42] See Sec. 2.

[43] Macrobius, Dream of Scipio, 1.5.

[44] Parmenides quoted in Plato's Theataetus, 180 E. Jowett, iii. 383.

[45] Plato, Timaeus, 56; Cary, 30.

[46] In the Timaeus, 39; Cary, 14.

[47] Parmenides, quoted by Plato, in the Sophists, 244; Cary, 61.

[48] In Plato's Theataetus, 180; Jowett Tr. iii. 383.

[49] Evidently Porphyry had advanced new objections that demanded an addition to the former book on the theory of vision; see iv. 5.

[50] As thought the Stoics.

[51] Like Aristotle, de Sensu et Sensili, 2.

[52] iv. 5.

[53] These ten disjointed reflections on happiness remind us of Porphyry's questioning habit, without which, Plotinos said, he might have had nothing to write; see Biography, 13.

[54] As Epicurus thought the divinities alone enjoyed perfect happiness, Diog. Laert. x. 121.

[55] See Aristotle, Nic. Ethics, 1.10.

[56] See Cicero, de Finibus, ii. 27-29.

[57] See iii. 7.

[58] Plutarch, Dogm. Philos. i. 17; Stob. Eclog. i. 18.

[59] Arist. Topic. iv. 2; de Gener. et Cor. i. 10; Ravaisson, EMA, i. 422.

[60] As did Alexander of Aphrodisias, in his treatise on "Mixture;" Ravaisson, EMA, ii. 297.

[61] Stob. Eclog. i. 18.

[62] See Plutarch, "Whether Wickedness Renders One Unhappy."

[63] As said Numenius, 44.

[64] See vi. 7. This is another proof of the chronological order, as vi. 7 follows this book.

[65] Bouillet explains that in this book Plotinos summated all that Plato had to say of the Ideas and of their dependence on the Good, in the Timaeus, Philebus, Phaedrus, the Republic, the Banquet, and the Alcibiades; correcting this summary by the reflections of Aristotle, in Met. xii. But Plotinos advances beyond both Plato and Aristotle in going beyond Intelligence to the supreme Good. (See Sec. 37.) This treatise might well have been written at the instigation of Porphyry, who desired to understand Plotinos's views on this great subject.

[66] The famous Philonic distinction between "ho theos," and "theos."

[67] Plato, Timaeus, p. 45, Cary, 19.

[68] See iii. 2.

[69] See iii. 2.1.

[70] Plato's Timaeus, pp. 30-40, Cary, 10-15.

[71] An Aristotelian idea, from Met. vii. 1.

[72] Aristotle, Met. vii. 17.

[73] Met. vii. 1.

[74] Met. vii. 7.

[75] Aristotle, Met. v. 8.

[76] Met. 1.3.

[77] See ii. 9.3.

[78] Aristotle, de Anima, ii. 2; Met. vii. 17.

[79] Porphyry, Of the Faculties of the Soul, fr. 5.

[80] See ii. 5.3.

[81] Aristotle, de Anima, i. 3; ii. 2-4.

[82] Plato, I Alcibiades, p. 130, Cary, 52.

[83] See i. 1.3.

[84] Bouillet explains this as follows: Discursive reason, which constitutes the real man, begets sensibility, which constitutes the animal; see i. 1.7.

[85] See iii. 4.3-6.

[86] See iii. 4.6.

[87] These demons are higher powers of the human soul.

[88] See iv. 3.18.

[89] Plato, Timaeus, p. 76, Cary, 54.

[90] p. 39, Cary, 15.

[91] Plato, Timaeus, p. 77, Cary, 55.

[92] See iv. 4.22.

[93] Lucretius, v. 1095.

[94] Diogenes Laertes, iii. 74.

[95] Plato, Timaeus, p. 80, Cary, 61.

[96] See iv. 3.18.

[97] Plato, Phaedrus, p. 248, Cary, 60; see i. 3.4.

[98] See v. 7.

[99] See v. 1.9.

[100] See i. 8.6, 7.

[101] Rep. vi. p. 509, Cary, 19.

[102] See v. 1.7.

[103] See v. 1.5.

[104] See v. 1.7.

[105] Plato, Rep. vi. p. 509, Cary, 19.

[106] See v. 1.6.

[107] See iv. 8.3.

[108] See v. 1.4.

[109] See v. 1.6.

[110] Arist. Nic. Eth. 1.1.

[111] See Arist., Met. i. 5.

[112] According to Plato's Banquet, p. 206, Cary, 31.

[113] See iv. 5.7.

[114] See 1.6.

[115] Plato, Phaedrus, p. 249, Cary, 63.

[116] See v. 1.2.

[117] See vi. 7.25.

[118] Plato, Philebus, p. 60, Cary, 141; Gorgias, p. 474, Cary, 66.

[119] p. 61, Cary, 144.

[120] See Met. xii.

[121] Met xii. 7.

[122] Plato, Rep. vi., p. 505, Cary, 17.

[123] According to the proverb, like seeks its like, mentioned by Plato, in his Banquet; p. 195, Cary, 21.

[124] Plato, Gorgias, p. 507, Cary, 136.

[125] See i. 8.5.

[126] Plato, Timaeus, p. 52, Cary, 26.

[127] See below, Sec. 32.

[128] Plato, Rep. vi., p. 506, Cary 17.

[129] As said Plato, Republic vi., p. 508, Cary, 19.

[130] See iii. 5.9.

[131] In his Philebus, p. 65, Cary, 155.

[132] As Plato said, in his Banquet, p. 184, Cary, 12.

[133] See i. 6.5.

[134] See i. 6.7.

[135] As says Plato, in his Banquet, p. 210, Cary, 35.

[136] As Plato says, in his Phaedrus, p. 250, Cary, 65.

[137] As Plato says, in his Banquet, p. 183, Cary, 11.

[138] See i. 6.9.

[139] See i. 6.8.

[140] As Plato said, in his Banquet, p. 211, Cary, 35.

[141] See iii. 5.9.

[142] Rep. vi., p. 505, Cary, 16.

[143] See iii. 3.6.

[144] As thought Plato, in the Banquet, p. 210, Cary, 35.

[145] Arist. Met. xii. 9; see v. 1.9.

[146] Met. xii. 7.

[147] Met. xii. 9.

[148] See iv. 6.3.

[149] Met. xii. 8.

[150] Plato, Rep. vi. p. 509, Cary, 19.

[151] Met. xii. 7.

[152] See v. 3.10.

[153] See vi. 2.7.

[154] See v. 3.11.

[155] See iii. 9.6.

[156] See vi. 5.11.

[157] See v. 3.13.

[158] Arist. Met. xii. 7.

[159] As thought Plato, Rep. vi., p. 508, Cary, 19.

[160] See iv. 3.1.

[161] Letter ii. 312; Cary, p. 482.

[162] See i. 6, end.

[163] Numenius, fr. 32.

[164] See Numenius, fr. 48.

[165] Banquet, p. 211, Cary, 35.

[166] As Aristotle asks, Eth. Nic. iii.

[167] Arist. Nic. Eth. iii. 1.

[168] Eud. Eth. ii. 6.

[169] Nic. Eth. iii. 2.

[170] Eud. Mor. ii. 9.

[171] Nic. Eth. iii. 2.

[172] Nic. Eth. iii. 6.

[173] Plato, Alcinous, 31; this is opposed by Aristotle, Nic. Eth. iii. 2.6.

[174] Aristotle, Eud. Eth. ii. 10.

[175] Aristotle, Mor. Magn. i. 32; Nic. Eth. iii. 6.

[176] Aristotle, Nic. Eth. iii. 4.

[177] Arist. de Anim. iii. 10.

[178] de Anim. iii. 9.

[179] Magn. Mor. i. 17.

[180] de Anim. iii. 9.

[181] This Stoic term had already been noticed and ridiculed by Numenius, 2.8, 13; 3.4, 5; Guthrie, Numenius, p. 141. He taught that it was a casual consequence of the synthetic power of the soul (52). Its relation to free-will and responsibility, here considered, had been with Numenius the foundation of the ridicule heaped on Lacydes.

[182] Nic. Eth. x. 8.

[183] Nic. Eth. x. 7.

[184] Plato, Republic, x. p. 617; Cary, 15.

[185] In his Phaedo, p. 83; Cary, 74.

[186] Such as Strato the Peripatetic, and the Epicureans.

[187] Plato, Rep. x. p. 596c; Cary, 1.

[188] See Jamblichus's Letter to Macedonius, on Destiny, 5.

[189] See iii. 9, end.

[190] Numenius, 32.

[191] See vi. 7.2.

[192] Aris. Met. ix. 1; xii. 9; Nic. Eth. x. 8; Plato Timaeus, p. 52; Cary, 26; Plotinos, Enn. ii. 5.3.

[193] This etymology of "providence" applies in English as well as in Greek; see iii. 2.1.

[194] Plato, Laws, iv., p. 716; Cary, 8.

[195] Arist. Met. xii. 7.

[196] See iii. 8.9.

[197] In his Cratylos, p. 419; Cary, 76.

[198] See iii. 9, end.

[199] As said Plato in the Timaeus, p. 42; Cary, 18; see Numenius, 10, 32.

[200] In this book Plotinos uses synonymously the "Heaven," the "World," the "Universal Organism or Animal," the "All" (or universe), and the "Whole" (or Totality). This book as it were completes the former one on the Ideas and the Divinity, thus studying the three principles (Soul, Intelligence and Good) cosmologically. We thus have here another proof of the chronological order. In it Plotinos defends Plato's doctrine against Aristotle's objection in de Anima i. 3.

[201] As thought Heraclitus, Diog. Laert. ix. 8; Plato, Timaeus, p. 31; Cary, 11; Arist. Heaven, 1, 8, 9.

[202] Such as Heraclitus.

[203] In the Cratylus, p. 402; Cary, 41.

[204] Rep. vi., p. 498; Cary, 11.

[205] See Apuleius, de Mundo, p. 708; Ravaisson, E.M.A. ii. 150; Plato, Epinomis, c. 5.

[206] Which would render it unfit for fusion with the Soul, Arist., Meteorology, i. 4; Plato, Tim., p. 58; Cary, 33.

[207] See ii. 9.3; iii. 2.1; iv. 3.9.

[208] Phaedo, p. 109; Cary, 134; that is, the universal Soul is here distinguished into the celestial Soul, and the inferior Soul, which is nature, the generative power.

[209] The inferior soul, or nature.

[210] See ii. 3.9-15.

[211] See i. 1.7-10.

[212] As is the vegetative soul, which makes only the animal part of us; see i. 1.7-10.

[213] In his Timaeus, p. 31; Cary, 11.

[214] Timaeus, p. 56; Cary, 30.

[215] See i. 8.9.

[216] Plato, Epinomis, p. 984; Cary, 8.

[217] In the Timaeus, p. 31, 51; Cary 11, 24, 25.

[218] See ii. 7.

[219] Who in his Timaeus says, p. 39; Cary, 14.

[220] See ii. 2.

[221] As thought Heraclitus and the Stoics, who thought that the stars fed themselves from the exhalations of the earth and the waters; see Seneca, Nat. Quest. vi. 16.

[222] See ii. 1.5.

[223] See iii. 7; Plotinos may have already sketched the outline of this book (number 45), and amplified it only later.

[224] See ii. 9.6, or 33; another proof of the chronological order.

[225] In his Timaeus, p. 69; Cary, 44.

[226] As the Stoics think, Plutarch, Plac. Phil. iv. 11.

[227] As Aristotle would say, de Anima, iii. 3.

[228] Aristotle, de Sensu, 6.

[229] v. 3.

[230] Porphyry, Principles, 24.

[231] Arist., Mem. et Rec., 2.

[232] Porphyry, Principles, 25.

[233] Aristotle, Mem. et Rec., 2.

[234] Porphyry, Treatise, Psych.

[235] Locke's famous "tabula rasa."

[236] Substance, Quantity, Quality, Relation, When, Where, Action-and-Reaction, to Have, and Location. Aristotle's treatment thereof in his Categories, and Metaphysics.

[237] Met. v. 7.

[238] Or, substance, "ousia."

[239] Cat. i. 1, 2; or, mere label in common.

[240] Aristotle, Met. vii. 3, distinguished many different senses of Being; at least four principal ones: what it seems, or the universal, the kind, or the subject. The subject is that of which all the rest is an attribute, but which is not the attribute of anything. Being must be the first subject. In one sense this is matter; in another, form; and in the third place, the concretion of form and matter.

[241] See ii. 4.6-16, for intelligible matter, and ii. 4.2-5 for sense-matter.

[242] Arist., Met. vii. 3.

[243] Arist., Cat. 2.5.25.

[244] Arist., Cat. ii. 5.15.

[245] Arist., Met. vii. 1; Cat. ii. 5.

[246] Categ. ii. 5.1, 2.

[247] Cat. ii. 5.16, 17.

[248] Cat. ii. 6.1, 2.

[249] Met. v. 13.

[250] Met. xiii. 6.

[251] Met. xiii. 3.

[252] Categ. ii. 6.18-23.

[253] See vi. 6.

[254] Categ. ii. 6.4.

[255] Arist., Hermeneia, 4.

[256] See iii. 7.8.

[257] Categ. ii. 6.26.

[258] Categ. ii. 7.1; Met. v. 15.

[259] Categ. ii. 7.17-19.

[260] See Categ. viii.

[261] Arist., Categ. ii. 8.3, 7, 8, 13, 14.

[262] See ii. 6.3.

[263] See ii. 6.3.

[264] See ii. 6.1.

[265] These are: 1, capacity and disposition; 2, physical power or impotence; 3, affective qualities; 4, the figure and exterior form.

[266] Met. v. 14.

[267] Categ. ii. 8.

[268] See i. 6.2.

[269] Categ. ii. 8.15.

[270] Among whom Plotinos is not; see vi. 1.10.

[271] The reader is warned that the single Greek word "paschein" is continually played upon in meanings "experiencing," "suffering," "reacting," or "passion."

[272] Met. xi. 9.

[273] That is, "to move" and "to cut" express an action as perfect as "having moved" and "having cut."

[274] As Aristotle says, Categ. ii. 7.1.

[275] Plotinos proposes to divide verbs not as transitive and intransitive, but as verbs expressing a completed action or state, (as to think), and those expressing successive action, (as, to walk). The French language makes this distinction by using with these latter the auxiliary "être." Each of these two classes are subdivided into some verbs expressing an absolute action, by which the subject alone is modified; and into other verbs expressing relative action, referring to, or modifying an exterior object. These alone are used to form the passive voice, and Plotinos does not want them classified apart.

[276] In Greek the three words are derived from the same root.

[277] See i. v.

[278] See iii. 6.1.

[279] Categ. iii. 14.

[280] For this movement did not constitute reaction in the mover.

[281] That is, the Greek word for "suffering."

[282] A Greek pun, "kathexis."

[283] A Greek pun, "hexis" also translated "habit," and "habitude."

[284] See Chaignet, Hist. of Greek Psychology, and Simplicius, Commentary on Categories.

[285] See iv. 7.14. This is an Aristotelian distinction.

[286] See ii. 4.1.

[287] By verbal similarity, or homonymy, a pun.

[288] See ii. 4.1.

[289] See ii. 5.5.

[290] For Plato placed all reality in the Ideas.

[291] Logically, their conception of matter breaks down.

[292] Cicero, Academics, i. 11.

[293] See ii. 4.10.

[294] See Enn. ii. 4, 5; iii. 6. Another proof of the chronological order.

[295] Plotinos was here in error; Aristotle ignored them, because he did not admit existence.

[296] This refers to the Hylicists, who considered the universe as founded on earth, water, air or fire; or, Anaxagoras, who introduced the category of mind.

[297] Plotinos's own categories are developed from the thought of Plato, found in his "Sophists," for the intelligible being; and yet he harks back to Aristotle's Categories and Metaphysics, for his classification of the sense-world.

[298] See vi. 4, 6, 9.

[299] In his "Sophist." p. 248 e-250; Cary, 72-76.

[300] In vi. 3.

[301] See vi. 3.6.

[302] See vi. 3.3.

[303] See iii. 2.16.

[304] That is, the higher part, the principal power of the soul; see ii. 3.17, 18.

[305] Here "being" and "essence" have had to be inverted.

[306] Verbal similarity, homonymy, or pun.

[307] See Plato's Sophists, p. 250 c; Cary, 75.

[308] Sophists, p. 254 d; Cary, 86.

[309] As said Aristotle, Met. iv. 2.

[310] Plato, Sophist, p. 245; Cary, 63.

[311] See vi. 9.1.

[312] See vi. 4.

[313] Arist., Met. xiv. 6.

[314] Aristotle. Met. xiv. 6.

[315] See ii. 6.2.

[316] See vi. 7.3-6.

[317] As said Aristotle. Eth. Nic. i. 6.2.

[318] Against Aristotle.

[319] See vi. 1.14.

[320] See iii. 7.11.

[321] To ti ên einai.

[322] See i. 6.

[323] See v. 8.

[324] Counting identity and difference as a composite one? See note 11.

[325] See iv. 9.5.

[326] See iv. 8.3.

[327] See iii. 2.16.

[328] See iv. 8.8.

[329] See iii. 8.7.

[330] See iii. 8.2.

[331] See iii. 2.2.

[332] See iii. 9.1.

[333] See 3.9.1; Timaeus, p. 39; Cary, 14.

[334] See ii. 9.1.

[335] See v. 3.4.

[336] Plato, Philebus, p. 18; Cary, 23.

[337] Plato, Philebus, p. 17 e; Cary, 21.

[338] See iii. 4.1.

[339] See iv. 8.3-7.

[340] See iv. 8.8.

[341] See iv. 4.29.

[342] Here Plotinos purposely mentions Numenius's name for the divinity (fr. 20.6), and disagrees with it, erecting above it a supreme Unity. This, however, was only Platonic, Rep. vi. 19, 509 b., so that Plotinos should not be credited with it as is done by the various histories of philosophy. Even Numenius held the unity, fr. 14.

[343] This means, by mere verbal similarity, "homonymy," or, punning.

[344] As said Plato, in his Philebus, p. 18, Cary, 23.

[345] See i. 1.7.

[346] See Bouillet, vol. 1, p. 380.

[347] See iii. 6.1-5.

[348] See sect. 16.

[349] See ii. 1.2.

[350] Or, mortal nature, or, decay; see i. 8.4; ii. 4.5-6.

[351] See vi. 2.7, 8.

[352] See ii. 4.6.

[353] See vi. 1.13, 14.

[354] In vi. 3.11, and vi. 1.13, 14, he however subsumes time and place under relation.

[355] According to Aristotle, Met. vii. 3.

[356] Aristotle, Met. viii. 5.6.

[357] Aristotle, Categ. ii. 5.

[358] See ii. 5.4.

[359] Met. vii. 11.

[360] Met. vii. 17.

[361] See ii. 4.3-5.

[362] See iii. 6.

[363] Categ. ii. 5.

[364] See iii. 7.8.

[365] See sect. 11.

[366] Arist. Met. vii. 1.

[367] See vi. 1.26.

[368] See ii. 4.10.

[369] See Met. vii. 3.

[370] See vi. 1.2, 3.

[371] See iii. 8.7.

[372] Matter is begotten by nature, which is the inferior power of the universal Soul, iii. 4.1.; and the form derives from Reason, which is the superior power of the same Soul, ii. 3.17.

[373] Met. v. 8.

[374] Being an accident, Met. v. 30, see[434].

[375] See iii. 6.12.

[376] See Categ. ii. 5.1-2.

[377] Plotinos is here defending Plato's valuation of the universal, against Aristotle, in Met. vii. 13.

[378] Arist. de Anima, ii. 1.

[379] See sect. 8.

[380] Plotinos follows Aristotle in his definition of quantity, but subsumes time and place under relation. Plot., vi. 1.4; Arist. Categ. ii. 6.1, 2.

[381] Arist. Met. v. 13.

[382] See vi. 3.5; iii. 6.17.

[383] Categ. ii. 6.

[384] Quoted by Plato in his Hippias, p. 289, Cary, 20.

[385] See Categ. 2.6.

[386] See vi. 1.5.

[387] See sect. 11.

[388] See vi. 6.

[389] Met. v. 6.

[390] Categ. iii. 6.26.

[391] Met. v. 14.

[392] Categ. ii. 6.26.

[393] In speaking of quality, Categ. ii. 8.30.

[394] Following the Latin version of Ficinus.

[395] Bouillet remarks that Plotinos intends to demonstrate this by explaining the term "similarity" not only of identical quality, but also of two beings of which one is the image of the other, as the portrait is the image of the corporeal form, the former that of the "seminal reason," and the latter that of the Idea.

[396] By this Plotinos means the essence, or intelligible form, vi. 7.2.

[397] See vi. 7.3-6.

[398] See iii. 6.4.

[399] In his Banquet, p. 186-188; Cary, 14, 15.

[400] See v. 9.11.

[401] See i. 2.1.

[402] See vi. 7.5.

[403] See iii. 6.4.

[404] Categ. ii. 8.3, 7, 8, 13, 14.

[405] See i. 1.2.

[406] Arist. Categ. ii. 8.8-13.

[407] Met. v. 14.

[408] Met. vii. 12.

[409] Met. v. 14.

[410] Categ. ii. 8.

[411] Arist. Categ. iii. 10.

[412] See vi. 1.17.

[413] Met. v. 10.

[414] Categ. iii. 11.

[415] Categ. iii. 14.

[416] Categ. ii. 7.

[417] By a pun, this "change" is used as synonymous with the "alteration" used further on.

[418] Arist. de Gen. i. 4.

[419] Alteration is change in the category of quality, Arist. de Gen. i. 4; Physics, vii. 2.

[420] Arist. Metaph. ix. 6; xi. 9.

[421] Met. xi. 9.

[422] See ii. 5.1, 2.

[423] See ii. 5.2.

[424] See ii. 5.2.

[425] Categ. iii. 14.

[426] Arist. Met. xi. 9.

[427] See ii. 7.

[428] Arist. de Gen. i. 5.

[429] Arist. de Gen. i. 10.

[430] Here we have Numenius's innate motion of the intelligible, fr. 30.21.

[431] See vi. 1.15-22.

[432] Namely, time, vi. 1.13; place, vi. 1.14; possession, vi. 1.23; location, vi. 1.24.

[433] For relation, see vi. 1.6-9.

[434] For Aristotle says that an accident is something which exists in an object without being one of the distinctive characteristics of its essence.

[435] In this book Plotinos studies time and eternity comparatively; first considering Plato's views in the Timaeus, and then the views of Pythagoras (1), Epicurus (9), the Stoics (7), and Aristotle (4, 8, 12).

[436] The bracketed numbers are those of the Teubner edition; the unbracketed, those of the Didot edition.

[437] See ii. 9.6.

[438] As thought Plato, in his Timaeus, p. 37, Cary, 14.

[439] Stobaeus. Ecl. Phys. i. 248.

[440] A category, see vi. 2.7.

[441] See vi. 2.7.

[442] Or, with Mueller, "therefore, in a permanent future."

[443] De Caelo, i. 9.

[444] That is, with this divinity that intelligible existence is.

[445] Arist. Met. iii. 2.

[446] In the Timaeus, p. 29, Cary 10.

[447] Stob. Ecl. Physic. ix. 40.

[448] Porphyry, Principles, 32, end.

[449] Especially Archytas, Simplicius, Comm. in Phys. Aristot. 165; Stob. Ecl. Physic. Heeren, 248-250.

[450] Stobaeus, 254.

[451] See Stobaeus, 250.

[452] Aristotle, Physica, iv. 12.

[453] Mueller: "Whether this may be predicated of the totality of the movement."

[454] See vi. 6.4-10.

[455] As Aristotle, Phys. iv. 11, claimed.

[456] In Physica, iii. 7.

[457] Stobaeus, Ecl. Phys. ix. 40.

[458] When collectively considered as "A-pollo," following Numenius, 42, 67, Plotinos, v. 5.6.

[459] See ii. 9.3.

[460] See iii. 7.1, Introd.

[461] See iii. 6.16, 17.

[462] Porphyry, Principles, 32.

[463] In the Timaeus, p. 38, Cary, 14.

[464] In his Timaeus, p. 39, Cary, 14, 15.

[465] As by Antiphanes and Critolaus, Stobaeus, Eclog. Phys. ix. 40, p. 252, Heeren.

[466] See iii. 7.2.

[467] As thought Aristotle, de Mem. et Remin. ii. 12.

[468] See iv. 9.

Transcriber's Notes:

Punctuation and spelling were made consistent when a predominant preference was found in this four-volume set; otherwise they were not changed.

Simple typographical errors were corrected. Inconsistent capitalization has not been changed.

Ambiguous hyphens at the ends of lines were retained.

Infrequent spelling of "Plotinus" changed to the predominant "Plotinos."

Several opening or closing parentheses and quotation marks are unmatched; Transcriber has not attempted to determine where they belong.

Page 678: A line containing "How then could one," appears to have been partly duplicated in the original. The duplicate text, which has been removed here, was: "Essence sence possess self-existence. How then could".

Page 690, footnote 53 (originally 1): "he might have had noth-" does not complete on the next line and has been changed here to "he might have had nothing".

Page 700: The two opening parentheses in '(from its "whatness" (or, essence[72]).' share the one closing parenthesis; unchanged.

Page 744: unmatched closing quotation mark removed after "a being is suited by its like".

Page 804: Closing parenthesis added after "single (unitary".

Page 823: "resistance corporeal nature[15])." has no matching opening parenthesis; unchanged here.

Page 930: Phrase beginning "(each constituting a particular intelligence" appears to share its closing parenthesis with the phrase "(and thus exists in itself)."

Page 935: Closing parenthesis in phrase "composite as mixtures)," does not have a matching opening parenthesis; unchanged.

Page 984: Footnote 395 (originally 53), "corporeal form, the former that of" originally was "corporeal form, the latter that of".

Footnote Issues:

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