Chapter CL: Section VI: Paper Money—A Curse Or A Blessing? (1)

Considering the double-edged-sword character of this mighty instrument,(946) and the frightful consequences which its abuse produces, it is easy to conceive why so many political economists have expressed such serious doubts as to whether, on the whole, the invention of paper money has been more of a curse or of a blessing to mankind. The controversy is an idle one to a certain extent, since no mature nation (or individual), and no nation which considers itself mature will renounce the possibility of a brilliant growth simply because it fears that it may not be able to withstand the temptations to dangerous abuse connected therewith. Politically, the best safeguard against such temptation is a so-called moderate constitution, which compels the supreme power in the state by wise and appropriate counterweights, to allow all rightful interests to assert themselves, or at least to find expression; and itself to make use not only of the most skillful but also of the most highly esteemed instruments and measures. Such a constitution, indeed, cannot be made; it must be the ripe fruit of a long continued and well conducted national life.(947) Of the extremes of forms of government, unlimited monarchy and democracy are about equally exposed to the paper-money disease.(948) Aristocracies are less exposed to it, for the reason that from their very nature they eschew centralization; and the paper-money system is intimately connected with the latter. Nothing so strengthens the central authority as the paper-prerogative with an unlimited power over the prices of all commodities; and, on the other hand, whenever paper money is to have a wide field for action, there is supposed(949) a far-reaching and intimate interwearing of the different members of the nation’s economy with one another. And in what concerns the various economic stages, paper money is far removed from all medieval times; and for the same reasons that make external commerce here preponderant and condense all commerce into caravans, staple-towns, fairs, and recommend the collection of treasure etc.(950) Later, on the other hand, we find two stages especially adapted to paper money. We have first, as yet undeveloped but intellectually active (and therefore desirous of progress) colonial countries, possessed in abundance of natural means of production without however being able to concentrate them into the hands of an undertaker (_Unternehmer_) for want of money.(951) Here both the saving of the precious metals and the facilitation of transportation effected by means of paper money are of greatest utility. And then we have very highly developed and rich countries; not only because their economic popular education may protect them against the dangers of paper money, but because the rich man has relatively least need of money and may dispense with stores of specie most readily, because of his influence over the supply of others.(952)

FOOTNOTES

1 The author’s preface to the twelfth edition is confined to pointing
out the improvements etc., made in the eleventh. There is no new
preface to the thirteenth edition of the original, which appeared in
1877.—TRANSLATOR.

2 “We shall never thoroughly understand the reason of customary law
unless we also have a knowledge of that which is not customary. The
one is connected and bound to the other. We have no slaves; why vex
ourselves with questions about slaves?—Words worthy of a novice.”

3 “I am a man; I think nothing foreign to me that pertains to man.”

4 “That excellent and glorious philosophy.”

5 Introduction to the Civilistisches Magazin.

_ 6 Dunoyer_, De la Liberté du Travail.

_ 7 Cicero_, De Leg., I.

8 Discours Préliminaire du Code Civil.

_ 9 Cicero_, De Leg., II, 4. “Legem neque hominum ingeniis excogitatam,
nec scitum aliquod esse populorum, sed æternum quiddam quod
universum mundum regeret, imperandi, prohibendique sapientia.”
_Ibid._

10 Revue de Législ. et de Jurispr. (1841, XIII, p. 39.) _Montesquieu_
says: “The relations of justice and equity are anterior to all
positive laws.”

11 Mr. Wolowski translated the second edition of Roscher’s Principles
into French, and prefixed the present essay thereto as a preface.
Since Wolowski’s translation appeared, the original work has gone
through eleven editions, been largely increased in size, and
enriched with new notes, the result of nearly twenty additional
years of research and thought. The thirteenth German edition, from
which the present translation is made, is larger than the first by
one hundred and seventy pages.—_Translator’s note._

12 And he adds: “Animals which yield only to an impulse or blind
instinct, come together only fortuitously or periodically and in a
manner destitute of all morality. But in the case of men, reason is
mixed up more or less with every act of their lives. Sentiment is
found side by side with desire, and right succeeds instinct. I
discover a real contract in the union of the two sexes.”

It would be impossible to present a more complete or eloquent
refutation of the definition of the Roman jurisconsults which
debases marriage to the level of the promiscuous coming together of
animals, and which limits the natural law to the law common to man
and beast. “Jus naturale est quod natura omnia animalia docuit; nam
jus istud non humani generis proprium, sed omnium animalium quæ in
terra, quæ in mare nascuntur, avium quoque commune est. Hinc
descendit maris atque feminæ conjunctio, quam nos matrimonium
appellamus, hinc liberorum procreatio, hinc educatio; videmus etenim
cætera quoque animalia, feras etiam, istius juris peritia censeri.”
D. L. I. De Just. et Jure.

13 Comment. in tit. Dig., De Just. et Jure, VII, 11th Naples edition.
The ingenious argument of the great jurisconsult falls to the ground
under the beautiful words of Cicero: “Ut justitia, ita jus sine
ratione non consistit; soli ratione utentes jure ac lege vivunt.” De
Natura Deorum, II, 62. “Virtus ratione constat, brutæ ratione non
utuntur, cujus sunt expertia, ergo jure non vivunt, et ut rationis,
sic jures sunt expertia.” Besides, Cujas himself recognizes how
faulty and incomplete was the definition he was defending: “At ne
jus quidem naturale, de quo agimus, est commune omnium animalium
quatenus rationale, est, sed quatenus sensible est, sensui congruit.
Tullius participare hominem cum brutis eo quod sentit, sed ratione
ab eo differre. Et alio loco: jus naturale esse commune omnium
Quiritium, veluti ut se velint tueri: sed hoc distare hominem a
bellua, quod bellua sensu moveatur, homo etiam ratione.”

_ 14 Rossi._

15 Politics, I, ch. I, II.

16 Ueber die Nothwendigkeit eines Allgemeinen burgerlichen Rechts fur
Deutschland.

17 Vom Beruf unserer Zeit für Gesetzgebung etc.

18 In one of his latest productions (Ueber die sogennante historische
und nicht historische Rechtsschule, Archives du Droit Civil,
Heidelberg, XXI 1838) the veteran of the philosophical school,
resuming a debate begun a quarter of a century before, energetically
defends himself against the erroneous interpretations which it was
sought to give to his thoughts. “Does it follow,” he inquires, “that
because a man is desirous of reform, he must surrender the study of
the past? And if there be new laws to construe, how could his evil
genius deter him from the necessary knowledge of ancient laws? Is
there a single jurisconsult, who, in the hope of a better future,
despises the meaning and spirit of that which still exists? I do not
know even one.... And when I am accused of passing by the
institutions of the past with coldness and hatred in my heart,
because I was one of the first to express the hope of a better
future, a charge is laid at my door which is perfectly
incomprehensible ... I am reproached with despising the history of
law. It is a slander on me. Although I have only laughed at these
reports, one man’s mistake grieved me; for that man’s name was
Niebuhr.... When he [Niebuhr] returned from Italy to devote himself
entirely to science, in his retreat at Bonn, he passed through
Heidelberg, where he remained five or six days. During a great part
of that time we came frequently together. He was at first a little
cold; but Cicero made us friends. After a happy word let drop
concerning that writer, he asked me what I thought of him. I
answered laconically: ‘If they were burning all the Latin authors,
and I were permitted to grant a pardon to one of them, I should say,
without hesitation: Spare the works of Cicero.’ He joyfully
exclaimed: ‘I have at last found a man who judges rightly of Cicero.
I share your admiration for him, and that is the reason I have given
my boy the name of Marcus.’ The ice was now broken, and he frankly
told me that he could not understand how I could be an inveterate
enemy of Roman law and of the history of law. I gave him to
understand that I had simply been slandered, and I added, that, in
order to live entirely with the classics, I had always refused to
give legal advice, or act as a counsellor, although I might have
made a fortune in that way. I told him that I owed my gayety and
vigor, in great part, to my love for the classics of all ages, even
those outside the domain of jurisprudence; but that I held, above
all things, to the good qualities of the German nation, and that I
did not hesitate to say with Facciolatus: ‘Expedit omnes gentes
Romanis legibus operam dare, suis vivere.’

“When he heard those words of mine, he exclaimed with his usual
energy and vivacity: ‘Habes me consentientem, labes me
consentientem.’ From that moment all coldness between us was at an
end, and we approached, without any embarrassment, a host of
questions in one conversation in which I endeavored, as I had
before, to learn from him.

“Thus I receive with sincere gratitude, all the works, both useful
and profound, which have appeared in our day on the history of law.
It would be folly in me to deny the impetus which the study of
positive law has received. New sources have been discovered. Their
newness and importance have excited the zeal of many scholars who
have studied them profoundly; a fact which made a review of the
older sources, still by far the most important, necessary. These two
circumstances soon rendered it imperative to proceed to the making
of scrupulous dogmatic researches. Thus there now is a new life
among jurisconsults, and a great activity, which, it is my hope, may
continue long.”

19 Revue de Législ. et de Jurisprudence, 1834-35.

_ 20 Rossi._

_ 21 M. de Bonald._

_ 22 M. Cousin_ has brought this out in an admirable manner in his
lectures on Adam Smith. Cours de Philosophie Moderne.

_ 23 Channing._

_ 24 Knies._ Die politische Œkonomie vom Standpunkte der geschichtlichen
Methode, Braunschweig, 1853.

25 Cours Complet d’ Economie politique, II, 540, éd. Guillaumin.

_ 26 Cousin._

27 We here append an extract from _Heinrich Contzen’s_ Geschichte,
Literatur, und Bedeutung der Nationalökonomie, Cassel und Leipzig,
1876, p. 7: “Roscher ... is rightfully considered the real founder
and the principal representative of the historical school. This
school is continually gaining in extent, and has found, both in
Germany and in France, the most distinguished disciples—men who
honor Roscher as their teacher and master, the leader whose beacon
light they follow. Roscher combines the richest positive learning
with rare clearness and plastic beauty in the presentation of his
thought. These are conceded to him on every hand; and it does not
detract from him, or alter the fact that he possesses them, that,
here and there, an ill-humored or maliciously snappish critic calls
them in question.” It should be borne in mind here that Wolowski
wrote in 1857; Contzen, like Wolowski, a politico-economical writer
of mark, in 1876.—_Translator’s note._

28 Leben, Werk und Zeitalter des Thukydides.

_ 29 Rau’s_ Archiv., Heidelberg. This remarkable essay has since
appeared in Roscher’s Ansichten der Volkswirthschalt vom
geschichtlichen Standpunkte, 1861.—_Translator’s note._

30 Grundriss zu Vorlesungen über die Staatswirthschaft nach
geschichtlichen Methode.

31 Berliner Zeitschrift für allgem Geschichte.

32 Ueber Kornhandel und Theuerungspolitik, 3d ed., 1852.

33 Untersuchungen über das Kolonialwesen.

34 Umrisse zur Naturlehre der drei Staatsformen (Berliner Zeitschrift,
1847-1848).

35 Ueber das Verhältniss der Nationalökonomie zum klassischen
Alterthume (K. Sachs Akademie der Wissenschaft, 1849). Also to be
found in Roscher’s Ansichten etc.—_Translator._

36 Zur Geschichte der englischen Volkswirthschaftslehre im 16 und 17
Jahrh.

37 Ein nationalökonom. Princep der Forstwirthschaft.

_ 38 Roscher’s_ complete work he calls “A System of Political Economy.”
It embraces the four parts above referred to; but each of these
parts constitutes an independent work. The first part, or the
Principles of Political Economy, covers the ground generally covered
by English treatises on Political Economy.

Besides the works above mentioned, _Professor Roscher_ has written
Ansichten der Volkswirthschaft aus dem geschichtlichen Standpunkte,
2d ed., Leipzig, 1861; Die deutche Nationalökonomik an der
Grenzscheide des sechszehnten und siebenzehnten Jahrhunderts,
Leipzig, 1862; Gründungsgeschichte des Zollvereins, Berlin, 1870;
Betrachtungen über die geographische Lage der grossen Städte,
Leipzig, 1871; Bertrachtungen über die Währungsfrage der deutschen
Münzreform, Berlin, 1872; Geschichte der Nationalökonomik in
Deutschland, Munich, 1874; Nationalökonomik des Ackerbaues, 8th ed.,
Stuttgart, 1875.—_Translator’s note._

39 Die politische Œkonomie vom Standpunkte der geschichtlichen Methode.

40 Die National Œkonomie der Gegenwart und Zukunft.

41 Recherches sur les Finances de France.

_ 42 Frédéric Passy_, de la Contrainte et de la Liberté.

43 Poor peasantry, poor kingdom; poor kingdom, poor sovereign.

44 Cours d’ Econ. polit., 2e., Leçon I, p. 33.

45 This would be: Propter vitiam, vitæ perdere causas.

_ 46 Cousin_, loc. cit., p. 276.

_ 47 Ibid._, 274.

_ 48 Frédéric Passy_: De la Contrainte et de la Liberté.

_ 49 Schäffle_, Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift (1861), emphasizes this.
_Adam Smith_, Wealth of Nations (1776), very characteristically,
begins with the yearly labor of the nation; _J. B. Say_ (Traité
d’Economie Politique, 1802), with _richesses_; _Ricardo_ (Principles
of Political Economy and Taxation, 1817), with the idea of value.

50 The sum total of the wants (_Bedarf_) of the Bavarian people, for a
whole year, is estimated by _Hermann_, Staatswirthschaftliche
Untersuchungen (2d ed., 1870, p. 81), at 177,000,000 florins for
food (77 millions for wheat and potatoes, 69 millions for meat, 15
millions for milk etc., 16 millions for eggs, vegetables, salt and
spices); 50 millions for clothing, 45 millions for shelter, 37.5
millions for fuel, 60 millions for beverages.

51 The original adds: _deren Gesammtheit sein Bedarf heisst_; the
aggregate of which is called his [man’s] Requisite (_Bedarf_). There
being no exact equivalent in English for the word _Bedarf_ in this
connection, this note is appended.—_Translator._

52 According to _Boisguillebert_ (ob. 1714) Traité des Grains, I., c.
4, the wants _nécessaire_, _commode_, _délicat_, _superflu_,
_magnifique_, arise in successive order with increasing welfare or
prosperity, and are surrendered in a reverse order, with increasing
need. _Tucker_ distinguishes necessaries, comforts, and conveniences
of the respective conditions, elegancies and refinements, and
lastly, “grand and magnificent.” (Two Sermons, 1774, 29 ff.); _F. B.
W. Hermann_, loc. cit, 1st, ed., 1832, 68; necessary goods (Güter
der Nothdurft), goods that contribute to pleasure and recuperation,
to culture and splendor.

53 Compare _Tucker_, On the Naturalization Bill (1751 seq.), IV, note.

54 No people without fire (Prometheus!); and it seems that broiling was
the earliest mode of preparing food; then followed baking in heated
cavities, and lastly came boiling in vessels. (_Klemm_, Allgemeine
Kulturgeschichte, I, 180, 343.)

55 There is an interesting attempt by _Faucher_, in the
Vierteljahrsschrift für Volkswirthschaft und Kulturgeschichte, 1868,
III, 148 ff., to determine the relative place of our various wants
according to their capacity for extension or contraction.

56 The qualification “true,” excludes from the circle of goods, not
only all those things which might satisfy only irrational or immoral
wants (compare _Mischler_, Grundsätze der Nationalökonomie, 1856, I,
187), but also vindicates the fundamental idea of the whole system
of Political Economy, as a subject of moral as well as of
psychological investigation.

57 Even _Aristotle_ (Eth. nicom. V, 8), considers that all things
intended to enter into commerce, should be susceptible of comparison
with one another, and that the measure of this comparison is _want_,
which is the foundation of all association among men.

58 An Arab helped pillage a caravan, and carried away, as his share of
the booty, a chest of pearls. He thought it a box of rice, and gave
them to his wife to cook, but finding they did not boil tender, he
threw them away. (_Niebuhr_, Beschreibung von Arabien, 383). See a
similar anecdote in _Ammian. Marcell._, _XXII_. Compare _Strabo_,
_VIII_, 381.

59 As soon as the Persians renounce the superstition that the daily
contemplation of a turquoise is a talisman against the "evil eye"
(_K. Ritter_, Erdkunde, VIII, 327), that precious stone will lose
much of its value. On the other hand, the amulets of antiquity,
although they have long lost the quality of goods as objects of
superstition, have now a real value for the archæologist.

60 Since observation shows, that, as time runs on, matter tends more
and more to become _goods_, the blind forms of motion in nature to
become useful labor and useful sustenance, impersonal and objectless
existence to be transformed into personal property and personal
culture, _Schäffle_ inclines to the belief that the whole mechanism
of unconsciously governing nature is destined ultimately to aid in
the realization of moral good, which alone is really valuable. Das
gesellschaftliche System der menschlichen Wirthschaft, III, Auff.,
1873, I, 3.

_ 61 Hermann_, loc. cit, 1st ed., I, calls internal goods whatever each
of us finds in himself, the free gift of nature; also that which we
develop in ourselves by our own free action; and external, whatever
we create or obtain, through the external world, as a means of
satisfying our wants. The internal goods of one man may be external
goods to another, as, for instance, when the former conveys them
directly to the latter to be enjoyed, by words, demeanor, etc., or
indirectly, in combination with other external goods.

62 The exclusion of all else, has, indeed, been called one-sidedness
and materialism. But, as _Senior_ says, no one blames the writer on
tactics, because he confines his attention to military subjects; nor
is the objection raised, that by so doing, he is encouraging eternal
war. On the other hand, _J. B. Storch_ (1815) devoted a special
division of his work to the consideration of “internal goods”
(health, knowledge, morality, security, leisure,.etc.). See _Rau’s_
translation of his Manual, II, 337 ff. Compare _Gioja_, Nuovo
Prospetto delle Scienze economiche, 1815 ff. VIII.

63 The inclination to exchange is, according to _Adam Smith_, one of
the most important marks which distinguish man from the brute.
(Wealth of Nations, I, ch. 2). But see _Büsch_, Geldumlanf (1780),
I, § 29, on exchange among the lower animals.

64 Observed by _Aristot._ Polit. I, ch. 6.

65 The efforts of political economists to select from among the
infinite number of goods, those which should constitute the subject
of their investigations, have taken two directions in recent times.
_Bastiat_ here confines himself too exclusively to commerce. The
political economist should concern himself only with wants and
satisfactions, where the labor, which is the connecting link between
them, is undertaken by some other person for a consideration. Thus
the ordinary act of respiration lies outside the circle, that of the
diver, which is paid for, does not. (Harmonies économiques, 1850, 68
ff.) But even Robinson Crusoe had his own system of economy. Are the
products which the farmer consumes in his own home, the work he does
himself, any the less matters of economic moment than the products
he sells, or the labors of his servants? _Schäffle_ is right when he
says that ordinary respiration is no economic function, because it
is an unconscious necessity of nature. But his definition is too
broad, inasmuch as he places the essence of the economic character
of goods or of an act, in the conscious adaptation of means to human
ends. (Tübinger Progr. z. 27 Sept. 1862, 9, 24 seq.) To take a walk
is no economic operation, although it may be the best means to a
very important end,—health. The same goods or the same act may have,
frequently, according to the end proposed, an economic or
non-economic character. The beauty of the human body, for instance,
however systematically made use of for purposes of vanity, is not
economic _goods_. But it is an economic speculation, base though it
be, when a man relies on his handsome figure to secure a wealthy
wife, or, for purposes of gain, allows her to pose as a model to
artists or to take part in _tableaux vivants_. According to _C.
Menger_, Grundsätze der Volkswirthschaftslehre (1871) I, 51 ff.,
there are no economic goods, but those the disposable supply of
which is, at most, equal to the quantity that is required. But is
not the largest navigable stream, even in the most thinly populated
country, an economic good?

_ 66 Hegel_, Rechtsphilosophie, § 67. Even the use of a corpse as
manure, or for any mercantile purpose, is repugnant to our feelings,
“because of the dignity of personality.” (_Schäffle_, National
Œkonomie, 1860, 28.) In this respect, prostitution is a remnant of
slavery. _Schäffle_ is right, when he says that to repay personal
services with material commodities which do not afford as much food
etc., as the former have cost in expenditure of vital energy, is a
slow and frequently a very cruel kind of cannibalism. (Kapitalismus
und Socialismus, 1870, 18).

_ 67 Bornitz_, De rerum Sufficientia in Republica procuranda, 1625,
gives in this encyclopædia of political science, together with a
dissertation on agriculture, commerce and manufactures, a complete
survey of the _ministeria_. Several modern writers refuse to look
upon personal services, or the ability to render such services, as
elements of wealth: compare _Kaufmann_, Untersuchungen im Gebiete
der politischen Œkonomie, 1830, II, Heft I. They demonstrate,
however, no more than this, that that class of goods has something
very peculiar. Thus _Malthus_, Principles of Political Economy
(1820), chap. I, sect. I, objects that they cannot be inventoried or
taxed; but can material goods be so completely? Can all the parts of
the wealth of a nation be so inventoried and taxed? _Rau_, Lehrbuch
der pol. Œkonomie (1826) I, § 46, remarks that the personal aptitude
to perform services dies with the person, and that personal services
cannot be stored up (?), etc. I appeal simply to the definition I
have given above of economic goods, and which applies equally to
services of every kind which can be performed for other people.
Besides, those who oppose this view are unable to give a
satisfactory explanation of all the phenomena of commerce. Of
course, the qualification “recognized as useful” is of the utmost
importance as a mark to determine what is goods. But a prima donna,
or a world-renowned physician, cast naked by shipwreck on the shores
of North America, is certainly, better off than a blind beggar, his
fellow sufferer. Compare _Storch_, Handbuch II, 335 ff. and his
Considérations sur la Nature du Revenu National.

_ 68 Ad. Müller_ compares persons, so far as they render any kind of
service, to things, and, so far as they are required to be preserved
in their individuality, to persons. The children in the “status” of
a country gentleman, for instance, are treated more as persons, and
domestics, more like things; the land partakes of a species of
personality, but not the implements of labor. (Nothwendigkeit einer
theolog. Grundlage der Staatswissenschaft, 1819, 48.)

69 The privilege of selling refreshments in the garden of the Palais
Royal was formerly let for 38,000 francs a year.

70 See the cases cited by _Hermann_, Staatswirtsch. Untersuchungen, 6
ff. and by _Bernoulli_, Schweiz. Archiv. für Statistik und N. Œkon.
II, 55. Think of the firm of J. M. Farina! In Athens, good stands
were leased at a very high rent, even where there was no investment
of the lessee’s capital. (_Demosthenes_, pro. Phorm., 948; adv.
Steph. I, iiii.) There is, again, the sale of inventions, while they
are still “mere ideas.” According to _Schäffle_, Theorie der
ausschliessendnen Verhältnisse, 1857, II ff., the value in exchange
of these relations depends on the extra income which is assured in
fact, or in law, against diminution, by the exclusion of
competition. He, therefore, recommends, instead of the word
“relations,” “custom,” or “publicum.” But these words, by no means,
exhaust the meaning expressed by “relation.” Thus, the good
administration of public affairs, although it has no value in
exchange, is one of the most valuable economic goods which a people
can possess.

71 The relation mentioned above of a general to an army may even have
great value in exchange. Instance, the Italian condottieri in the
fifteenth century!

72 Relations which take from one man, as much as they afford to their
possessor, are of value as components of a man’s private fortune,
but not of the wealth of the nation. To this class belong debts due
from persons or from things, compulsory custom or good-will of every
description; as for instance, the seventy-two places of the _agents
de change_ in Paris, each of which was worth more than a million of
francs; or the right of navigating the Elbe as far as Magdeburg,
which, about the beginning of this century, was worth in every
instance about 10,000 thalers. (_Krug_, Abriss. der St. Œkonomie,
62.)

_ 73 Schäffle_, N. Œkonomie, 10. In the German language, this same word
is used to designate utility, and sometimes useful objects (so
called values). A clear distinction, however, should be made between
utility and value in use. Utility is a quality of things themselves,
in relation, it is true, to human wants. Value in use is a quality
imputed to them, the result of man’s thought, or of his view of
them. Thus, for instance, in a beleagured city, the stores of food
do not increase in utility, but their value in use does. Compare
_Schäffle_, System, III, I, 170.

_ 74 Genovesi_, Economia civile (1869), II, I, 7. _L. Say_, De la
Richesse individuelle et de la Richesse publique (1827), 29,
estimates the value of goods according to the degree of discomfort
attendant on the privation of them.

_ 75 Friedländer_ has, however, made a general attempt in this
direction. Theorie des Werthes (Dorpat, 1852). But says _Th. Fix_
(Journal des Economistes, 1844, IX, 12): “It is as impossible to
establish a scale of values, as it is to find an exact mathematical
and permanent measure of our wants, passions, desires, tastes and
fancies.”

76 Compare _Knies_, Geld und Credit, 1873, I, 126 ff. The very
respectable attempt made by _A. Samter_, Sociallehre (1875), with
the idea society-value (_Gesellschaftswerth_) covers too nearly the
idea of value in exchange. Further research will here have to be
made, with the idea of “impotent need,” inasmuch as, from a high
ethical, national-dietetical point of view, the question is asked
whether, to what extent, and how, “impotent need” may be made a
potent one.

_ 77 Friedländer_, loc. cit, 50. If too many copies of the very best
book be published, there is a certainty that a number of them will
remain little better than waste paper.

_ 78 Schäffle_, System, II, aufl., 55. See also his Kapitalismus und
Socialismus, 1870, 31, 35, 43.

79 Thus _Kleinwächter_ (Hildebrand’s Jahrbücher für N. Oek. und
Statistik, 1867, II, 318), defines value in exchange=value in use +
costliness. According to Schäffle, it is “a covert comparison
between the cost-value and the value in use of the two kinds of
goods to be exchanged.” (Kapitalismus und Socialismus, 35.)

80 An intermediate dealer can, so far as he is himself concerned,
attribute value in exchange to goods only to the extent that they
have use for the last person who has acquired them. Hence, _Storch_
calls _value in use_ immediate, and _value in exchange_, mediate
value. As the English are always wont to express the immediate in
words of Germanic origin, and the mediate in words borrowed from the
Latin, _Locke_ calls value in use “worth,” and value in exchange,
simply “value.” (_K. Marx_, Das Kapital. Kritik der politischen
Œkonomie, 1867, I, 2.)

81 It is, of course, otherwise when, for instance, a beautiful sea
view, or a desirable position as regards air and sunshine, is
connected with a piece of land.

82 In Ravenna a cistern had greater value in exchange than a vineyard:
_Martial_, III, 56. In Paris, too, drinking water, which is
transported only with considerable trouble, costs 1-1/3 thalers per
cubic meter. We may also mention snow and ice in summer, which last
sells in the capitals of southern Europe at 0.34, silber groschens
per pound. According to _Carey_, “utility” is the measure of man’s
power over nature, “value,” the measure of nature’s power over man.
He very inaccurately adds, that both are always in an opposite
direction. (Principles of Social Science, 1861, VI, ch. 9.)

83 Hence _Ad. Müller_ calls value in use, individual value, and value
in exchange, social value. The Germans call the value of goods whose
value in use is recognized by only one person, _Affectionswerth_,
(affection-value) a value which influences its value in exchange
only when the individual who holds it in high esteem is not himself
the possessor of the goods. An instance of this latter is a piece of
paper covered with notes, intelligible only to the maker of them.

84 The very important difference between value in use and value in
exchange was recognized oven by Aristotle. _Aristot._ Pol. I, 9.
_Hutchinson_, System of Moral Philosophy (1755), II, 53 ff. The
Physiocrates speak very frequently of _valeur usuelle_ and _vénale_,
on which, according to _Dupont_, Physiocratie, CXVIII, the
difference between _biens_ and _richesses_ is based. _La valeur d’un
septicr de blé, considéré comme richesse ne consiste que dans son
prix._ (_Quesnay_, éd. Daire, 300.) _Turgot_ distinguishes between
“_valeur estimative_” and “_échangeable_ or _appréciative_;” the
former designating the relation between the amount of energy,
physical and mental, which one is willing to spend in order to
obtain the goods, to the sum total of his energies, physical and
mental; the latter the relation between the aggregate like energy of
two persons which they are willing to spend in order to procure each
of the goods to be exchanged, and the sum total of their energies in
general. (Valeurs et Monnaies, p. 87, seq., éd. Daire.) _Ad. Smith_,
in his Wealth of Nations, I, ch. 4, shows that he knew the
difference between value in use and value in exchange; but he
afterwards drops the consideration of the former, altogether. In
this respect he has had only too faithful and one-sided followers
among his countrymen, so that _Ricardo_, Principles, ch. 28, asks
what value in exchange can have in common with the capacity of
commodities to serve as food or clothing. (See, however, ch. XIX
seq.) Many “free traders” would have no objection to interpose, if a
people should abandon the cultivation of wheat, etc., to devote
themselves exclusively to the manufacture of point lace, provided
the latter had a greater value in exchange. The two degrees of the
idea of value have been examined with much thoroughness by
_Hufeland_ in his Neue Grundlegung der Staatswirthschaftskunst
(1807), I, 118 ff.; _Lotz_, Revision der Grundbegriffe (1811 ff.),
I, 31, ff.; _Storch_, Handbuch, I; _Rau_, Lehrbuch, I, 56, ff.;
_Thomas_, Theorie des Verkehrs, I, p. 11; _Knies_, Tübing. Zeitschr.
1855; _Bastiat’s_ declaration (Harmonies, p. 171 ff.): that
“_valeur_” (by which Bastiat means only value in exchange), = _le
raport de deux services échangés_, contains a two-fold error: the
ambiguity of the word _services_, which applies equally to a
yielding or affording of utility, as to useful labor, and the error
that the labor necessary to produce a commodity, and of which the
purchaser is relieved, alone determines its value in exchange.
Compare _infra_ §§ 47, 107, 110, 115 ff., and _Knies_, loc. cit., p.
644 ff.

_ 85 Proudhon_, Système des Contradictions économiques, 1846, ch. 2.

86 In France, according to _Cordier_ (Mémoire sur l’Agriculture de la
Flandre Française), the wheat harvest yielded, in

1817, forty-eight million hectolitres, with a value in exchange of
two thousand and forty-six million francs; in

1818, fifty-three million hectolitres, with a value in exchange of
one thousand and four hundred and forty-two million francs; in

1819, sixty-four million hectolitres, with a value in exchange of
one thousand and one hundred and seventy million francs.

A rise in the value in exchange of wheat, such as was witnessed in
1817, is synonymous with a decline in the value in exchange of
money, and of all those goods whose money price has not risen. It is
no objection to the views here advocated, that when the necessaries
of life are very scarce, the want of clothing, furniture, articles
of luxury etc., is not felt so keenly as at other times, and that
the value in use of these commodities really falls; and _vice
versa_.

87 Compare _B. Hildebrand_, N. Œkonomie der Gegenwart und Zukunft,
1848, I, p. 316 ff. _Knies_, loc. cit.

88 The greater importance attached, in our days, to value in exchange,
than to value in use, is seen especially in the attitude which the
buyer, who is possessed of the more current commodity (money),
assumes toward the seller,—an attitude not unlike that of a patron
towards his client. In the interior of Africa, the possessor of
money, as such, would scarcely look down on the possessor of the
means of subsistence. The South American Indians are ready to render
an amount of service for a little brandy, which it would be in vain
to ask them to perform for ten times its value in gold. (Ausland,
Jan. 15, 1870.) The miser estimates the possibility of being able to
procure for himself, for one dollar, a hundred different articles
worth a dollar each, to be worth one hundred dollars.

89 When the wants of a person or of a people change, it is possible for
the value in use of one kind of goods, which had the greater
prominence before, to take the place occupied previously by its
value in exchange; and _vice versa_. Thus, the youth sells the
plaything he used in childhood; the man, the educational apparatus
of his earlier years; the old man, the implements that enabled him
to acquire wealth, and which he can no longer use except with great
effort. (_Menger_, Grundsätze, I, 220 ff.)

_ 90 Rau_ (Lehrbuch, I, § 61 ff.) distinguishes between the concrete or
quantitative value which a certain kind of goods may have for a
certain person, under certain circumstances, and the abstract or
species-value which a whole class of commodities may have for men in
general.

But _F. J. Neumann_, (Tübinger Zeitschrift, 1872, p. 288 ff.)
objects, that even the abstract value of a commodity always suggests
the relation of a definite number of concrete men to a definite
quantity of goods; else, by the expression, value of goods, is to be
understood not what it is generally meant to signify, but only the
capacity to satisfy a single want.

_ 91 Storch_, Ueber die Natur des Nationaleinkommens (1824, 1825), 5,
defines (_Vermögen_) thus: a source of income, permanent in its
nature, and capable of being transmitted, the possessor of which
does not need to work, on its account. Hence he does not approve of
the expression “the people’s resources” (_Volksvermögen_).

92 See especially _Lord Lauderdale_, Inquiry into the Nature and Origin
of Public Wealth, 1804, ch. 2. _Storch_, loc. cit.

_ 93 Moreau de Jonnès_, Le Commerce au 19. Siècle (1825) I, 114 ff.,
says that the United States imported from abroad 9.6, France 6, and
Great Britain 5.8 per cent. of their annual consumption; and
exported respectively 10.4, 6.2, 9.8 per cent. of their annual
production. The recent free trade tendencies, and the improvement in
the international means of transportation, have certainly increased
the relative importance of foreign commerce. In the kingdom of
Saxony (1853), _Engel_ estimates that 10/47 of the whole production
of the country was destined for foreign countries, and that 10/47 of
the consumption was imported.

94 When the land of a country becomes dearer, simply on account of the
increase of population, or goods, the quantity of which is
susceptible of increase, because the cost of production has been
increased, this cannot be considered an increase in the wealth of
the people, (_v. Mangoldt._)

95 Neither is value in exchange a quality inherent in goods, but only a
relation between them and other goods. Hence it is absurd to speak
of a rise or fall of all values in exchange. If the goods A lose in
capacity to be exchanged against goods B, goods B of course increase
in exchange power as compared with A, and _vice versa_. It is
necessary to guard against being misled here by the intervention of
money, that is, by the custom universal among men of employing a
definite kind of goods as a medium of exchange for all others. Yet
there are many writers who have been thus misled. Thus _Galiani_,
Delia Moneta (1750), II, p. 2, who regards the lasting increase of
the prices of all commodities as an infallible sign of national
prosperity. To the same effect is the motto of the Physiocrates:
_Abondance et cherté c’est opulence_. In its coarsest form, in
_Saint Chamans_, Nouv. Essai sur la Richesse des Nations (1824),
456, who would have that which is now the free gift of nature, to
come to us or be produced only as the reward of toil. _Verri_, on
the other hand, Meditazioni sull. econ. pol. (1771), ch. V, thinks
that the number of buyers in a country should be as small as
possible, and that of sellers as great as possible, in order that
thus prices might be low; (as if every buyer was not, _eo ipso_,
also a seller.)

_ 96 Kaufmann_, Untersuchungen, I, p. 165 seq. Also, _Verri_,
Meditazioni, XVII, 2.

97 The differences characteristic of poverty, indigence, managing to
live, fortune and wealth, cleverly treated by _von Justi_,
Staatswirthschaft, I, p. 449, seq. _Rau_, Lehrbuch I, § 76, seq.,
establishes the following gradation: privation and wretchedness,
poverty, indigence, “getting on,” comfort, wealth, superfluity. _L.
Say_ calls those who can satisfy the wants of luxury rich;
well-to-do, those who can command the comforts of life; and
wretched, those who cannot obtain a sufficiency of the objects of
prime necessity. In France, the limits of these situations are
marked by an income of respectively 60,000, 6,000 and 900 francs per
family, so that a family with an income of only 300 francs per year
is in a condition of wretchedness. (Traité de la Richesse, 1827, I
ff., 71 ff.)

_ 98 Palmieri_, Ricchezza nazionale, Introd. The greater number of the
definitions of wealth are rather onesided than false. _Socrates_,
for instance, looks only at the relation existing between means and
their owner’s wants. (_Xenoph._ Memor., IV, 2, 37, seq. Œconom. II,
2 ff.). _Plato_, on the other hand, as the socialists are wont to
do, looks to the excess over that possessed by others. (Legg. V,
742, seq.). _Xenophon’s_ observations, Hiero, 4, on the nature of
wealth, are many-sided and beautiful. _Aristotle_ distinguishes
between natural and artificial wealth: πλῆθος ὀργάνων οἰκονομακῶν
καὶ πολιτικῶν—πλῆθος νομίσματος. (Polit, I, 3, 9, 16.) Compare
_Cicero_, Parad. VI. The dominant idea of the so-called Mercantile
System is thus expressed in a Saxon pamphlet of 1530
(Müntzbelangende Antwort, etc.): “Money is the real watchword; where
there is much money, there is wealth, it is clear.” Compare
_Luther_, Werke, Irmisch edition, XXII, p. 200 seq. See some
excellent remarks in opposition hereto, in the Saxon pamphlet,
Gemeyne Stimmen von der Müntz, 1530. _Schröder_, Fürstliche
Schatz-und Rentkammer, 1686, ch XXIX. “A country grows rich in
proportion as it draws gold or money, either from the earth or from
other countries; poor, in proportion as money leaves it. The wealth
of a country must be estimated by the quantity of gold and silver in
it.” See a very passionate argument against this view in
_Boisguillebert_, Dissertation sur la Nature des Richesses, written
sometime between 1697 and 1714. _Berkeley_, Querist (1735), Nos.
562, 542. Among Englishmen, the correct view was prevalent much
earlier, especially among the founders of the American colonial
empire. See _Hachluyt_, Voyages (1600) III, 22 ff. 45 ff. 152 ff.
165 ff. 182 ff. 266 ff; but especially the work “Virginia’s Verger”
in “Purchas Pilgrims” (1625), IV, p. 809 ff. However, several
Spaniards were led by hard experience to adopt a view opposed to the
Midas-view (compare _Aristotle_, Polit. I, ch. 3, 16), by which the
first American explorers were carried away: _Garcilasso de la Vega_
(1609), Comment. reales II, ch. 6; _Saavedra Faxardo_, Idea
Principis christiani (1640) Symb. 69: _potissimæ divitiæ ac opes
terræ fructus sunt, nec ditiores in regnis fodinæ, quam agricultura;
plus emolumenti, acclivia montis Vesuvii latera adverunt, quam
Potosus mons_. Contemporary with those Englishmen, was the Italian,
_Giov. Botero_, who called attention to the fact, that France and
Italy were the countries of Europe richest in gold, although they
possessed no mines of the precious metal themselves: Della Ragion di
Stato (1591) p. 88 ff. Also _Sully_, who called agriculture and
cattle-breeding the breasts of the state, the real mines and pearls
of Peru. (Economies royales I, ch. 81. See however, II, p. 381).
_Montchrêtien_, Traité d’Économie politique (1615) 81, 172 seq.
According to _Sir D. North’s_ Discourses upon Trade, 1691, wealth is
synonymous with freedom from want, and the ability to procure many
comforts, while _Temple_ (ob. 1700, Works I, 140 seq.) looks
entirely at the subjective side of wealth. _Pollexfen_, “England and
East India inconsistent in their Manufactures” (1697), considers
gold and silver as the only real wealth. To this definition Davenant
(ob. 1714), opposes another. Wealth, according to him, is whatever
places prince or people in a condition of superabundance, peace and
security. See his Works, I, p. 381 seq. He even reckons intellectual
powers, alliances etc., among the national wealth. Compare _W.
Roscher_, Zur Geschichte der englischen Volkswirthschaftslehre 1851,
in the acts of the royal Saxon Academy of Sciences, vol. III.
_Vauban_ (Dime royale 1707), Daire’s edition, says: “The real wealth
of a people consists in an abundance of those things, the use of
which is so necessary to sustain the life of man, that they cannot
at all be dispensed with.” By the wealth of a people _Galiani_,
Della Moneta II, c. 2, understands the aggregate of all lands,
houses, movable property, money, etc. which belong to them, but,
that the chief element of wealth, and the condition precedent of all
others, is men themselves. Hence, the process of the impoverishment
of a people in their decline, takes the following course: money
first emigrates, next, population diminishes, afterwards, the houses
fall in ruin, finally, the land itself becomes a waste. According to
_Broggia_, wealth is _un avanzo osia valore di tutto cio che avanza
al proprio consumo e bisogno_, Delle Monete, 1743, IV, 307, 314;
Cust. _Palmieri_ (ob. 1794), also says: _il superfluo constituisce
la richezza_. (Publica Felicità.) According to _Turgot_, Sur la
Formation et Distribution des Richesses 1771, § 90, the wealth of a
nation consists in the net proceeds of landed property capitalized
at the ordinary price of land, and then of the aggregate of all the
movable property of the country. _Büsch_, Geluumlauf III, § 27,
considers a certain duration of the produce or revenue as an
essential element in the idea of wealth. _Lauderdale_, Inquiry, ch.
II, distinguishes national wealth and private wealth; the former
embracing all that man covets as agreeable or desirable; while it is
one of the marks of the latter, that there should be no general
superfluity of it on hand. Several modern English economists call
wealth only that, the production of which cost human labor. Thus,
_Malthus_, Definitions (1827) p. 234. _Torrens_, Production of
Wealth, 1821, ch. I. When _Rossi_, Cours d’Economie politique, 1835,
L. 2, says: _tout chose propre à satisfaire aux besoins de l’homme
est richesse_, he demonstrates how the frequent inaccuracy of the
French language stands in the way of a close analysis. The greater
number of more recent definitions are true of resources rather than
of wealth. _Bastiat_ distinguishes between _richesse effective_ and
_relative_, the former being based on _utilité_, the latter on
_valeur_. (Harmonies, ch. 6.)

99 The national wealth of Athens, at the time of the hundredth
Olympiad, is estimated by _Böckh_ (Staatshaushalt der Athen, I, p.
636, 2d ed.) to have been from thirty to forty thousand talents,
besides the non-taxable property of the state. That of Great Britain
is estimated at about 8,000 million pounds sterling. (Athenæum 5
March, 1853.) _Wolowski_ estimated that of France at, at least, 116
milliards of francs, with an annual increase of 1-½ milliards, (L’or
et l’Argent, 1870. Enquête, 59.) _David A. Wells_ estimated that of
the United States, in 1860, slaves not included, at 14,183 million
dollars, or $451.20 per capita, whereas in England, the per capita
wealth was about $1,000. (_Hildebrand’s_ Jahib., 1870, I, 431.) The
national wealth of the kingdom of Saxony is equal to 600 million
thalers immovable, and 600 million movable, property. (_Engel_,
Statist. Zeitschr. August, 1856). That of Würtemberg=2,710 million
florins, of which 700 millions represent movable goods, and 100
million, claims on foreign countries. (Statistisches Handbuch,
1863.) Of course all these estimates are very inexact.

_ 100 Ch. Dupin_, Forces productives, p. 82. See _infra_, § 230.

101 Compare _Meidinger_, Das britische Reich in Europa, pp. 79, 238,
261.

_ 102 Davenant_ considers an increase in the number of houses, ships and
stocks of goods, as the surest sign of an increase in the national
wealth; and on the other hand, a high rate of interest, a low price
of land, small wages, a decrease of population, and an increase of
uncultivated land, as the signs of national impoverishment. (Works,
I, pp. 354, seq. II, p. 283.) _Sir M. Decker_, Essay on the Causes
of Decline of Foreign Trade (1744), 3, gives as the signs of
impoverishment, the following: a wretched condition of the poor and
of manufactures, a low price of wool, long credit to retail dealers,
frequent cases of bankruptcy, exportation of the metals, unfavorable
exchange, few new coins, many cases of unpaid rent of leased land,
and high poor rates.

_ 103 Storch_, Handbuch, I, 45. Compare _infra_, § 187.

104 On the difference between human and animal economy, see _Schön_,
Neue Untersuchungen der N. Œkonomie, (1835), 4.

105 Compare _Schäffle_, System, III, Aufl. I, 2, 28.

_ 106 Knies_, in his Polit. Œkonomie vom geschichtl. Standpunkte, 1853,
p. 160 ff., shows, very happily, how the love of one’s self,—which
must, indeed, be distinguished from self-seeking—is not in conflict
with the love of one’s neighbor; but that, in healthy natures, it is
found allied with a feeling of equity, and of the common good. See,
also, _F. Fuoco_, Saggi economici, Pisa, 1825, Nr. 7. _Schutz_, Das
sittliche Element in der Volswirthschaft: Tübinger Zeitschrift für
Staatswissensch. 1844, p. 132, ff.

107 “That they should seek the Lord if haply they might feel after him.”
(Acts, 17, 27. Compare Matthew, 6:33, also I. Timothy, 5:8.) _Adam
Müller_ in his Nothwendigkeit einer theolog. Grundlage, 49 seq., is
a strong advocate of all this, but a rather narrow one. The farmer,
he says, should first work for the love of God, then for the fruit,
that is, for the gross product, and lastly for the net product. His
work is a trust. _Müller_ considers the business relations of men,
as they exist at present, as “the comfortless mutual slavery of
all.” (Nothwendigkeit einer theolog. Grundlage, 49 ff.) The
economist, _Ch. Perin_, who writes from the Catholic
politico-economical standpoint, substitutes for conscience,
_renoncement_, as the force antagonistic to _intérêt_, an expression
inappropriate, because merely negative, although in perfect harmony
with the ascetic religiousness of the middle ages. (De la Richesse
dans les Sociétiés chrêtiennes, 1861, II vol., passim) Compare
_Roscher_ in _Gelzer’s_ Protestant. Monatsblättern, Jan. 1863.
_Puchta_, Institutionen, I, f. 8, opposes to individualism—or the
impulse to distinguish ourselves from others, and which, when
uncontrolled, leads to egotism, pride and hate—love and right, which
are controlling powers over the former.

108 Even the ancients conceived Eros as a world-building principle.
According to _Schön’s_ expression, loc. cit., which it is not
difficult to misconstrue, the feeling of the common interest
manifests itself, both as law and force. And, in reality, it is
necessary that, in order not to permit the drowsy conscience to fall
too far behind self-interest, which is always awake, it should
create lasting institutions and regulations above and beyond the
caprice of the individual or of the moment; for instance, in the
family, marriage, education etc.

109 The more private interest ceases to be momentary, and becomes
life-long and even hereditary, the better does it harmonize with the
feeling of the common interest.

_ 110 Perin_ says (1, 93), that the conflict of interest is reconciled in
the seeking for the attainment of the supreme good, that is God,
“who gives himself to all in equal measure, and yet always remains
the same, and out of whose fulness all may draw, and yet no one’s
share grows less.” But the same is true of all ideal goods, and of
every form of the feeling for the common interest, the highest of
which is, indeed, religiousness.

111 According to _Kant_, Anthropologie, p. 239, the desire of comfort
and well-being, and the inclination to virtue, when the former is
properly restrained by the latter, produce the highest degree of
moral, united to the highest degree of physical, good. It is well
known, that during the middle ages, in all countries except Italy
and, even up to the seventeenth century, the moral sciences were
under a one-sided theological influence, whose ascetic condemnation
of self-interest may have been well enough during a period of
violence. By virtue of a very natural reaction, and as a protest of
individualism against the constraint of absolute monarchy, the
materialists of the eighteenth century endeavored to discover, even
in the most exalted phenomena of human society, only the expression
of an enlightened self-interest. See _Mandeville’s_ Fable of the
Bees, or private Vices public Virtues (1723), but especially,
_Helvétius_, De l’Esprit (1758). _Voltaire_ says, that, in all the
celebrated maxims of _De Rochefoucauld_ (1665) there is but one
truth contained, _que l’amour propre est le mobile de toutes nos
actions_. (But see, per contra, _Pufendorf_, Jus Naturæ et Gentium,
1672, II, 3, 15.) This tendency was opposed, especially by the
English, who could not be blind to the influence exerted in public
life by the feeling for the common good. _David Hume_, Treatise on
Human Nature (1739), III, 54, is of opinion that the interests of
others are, on the whole, in the case of nearly every man stronger
than even his own self interest. _Hutcheson_, System of Moral
Philosophy (1755), speaks of the innate principle of benevolence.
Man is not a perfect whole; a part belongs to his own person, part
to his family, part to the nation, part even to all humanity.
_Burke_, Inquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and
Beautiful (1756), distinguishes two fundamental principles of
action, that of self-preservation and that of society. On the former
is based the sense of the sublime; on the latter, of the beautiful.
According to _Ferguson_, History of Civil Society, (1767), I, 3, 4,
the “sense of union” is frequently strongest where the advantage
drawn from the connection is smallest; for instance, it is weakest
in highly cultured commercial countries. _Adam Smith_, Theory of
Moral Sentiments (1768), has been as one-sided in reducing
everything to “sympathy,” as he has been in his Wealth of Nations in
reducing everything to “self-interest;” but not without the
consciousness, that to explain the reality, it is necessary to take
both into consideration (_Buckle_). It would, indeed, be just as
preposterous to base economy on self-interest alone, as to base
marriage merely on the sexual appetite. Recently, _Hermann_,
Staatswirthschaftliche Untersuchungen, 1st ed., part 1st, discovers
in self-interest, and in the feeling for the common good, the two
springs of all economy. He would even base the so-called theoretic
Political Economy, on the study of self-interest, its practice in
that of the common good. _M. Chevalier_, Cours d’Economie politique,
1844, II, 412 ff., understands something very like this by the
contrast between liberty and centralization. The _antagonisme_ and
_association_ of _Bazard_, Exposition de la Doctrine de Saint Simon
(1829), p. 144 ff. Closer investigation will show, however, that
self-interest, which must not be confounded with egotism, and the
common interest, are neither coördinate nor exhaustive opposites.
Compare the beautiful contrast drawn by _Goethe_ (Pocket edition of
1833, vol. 46, 97), between “Pietät” and “Egoisterei.”

_ 112 Paul_, I. Corinth. 12, gives the most beautiful model description
of a social organism. Compare, however, the fable of Menenius
Agrippa in _Livy_, II, 32.

113 Excellent beginnings of a general theory of economies in common in
_Schäffle_, N. Œkonomie, II, Aufl., 62 ff., 331 ff.

114 The French and English, with their strong political bias, use the
expressions respectively _economie politique_ and Political Economy.
In Germany, where the terms the people (_Volk_) and the state
(_Staat_) are much less nearly coextensive, the words
_Volkswirthschaft_ and _Nationalökonomie_ are preferred. But even
_Hufeland_, who first gave currency to the term _Volkswirthschaft_
(Grundlegung, I, 14), called attention to the peculiarity “that the
term economy suggests that there is one who economizes and guides,
an economist in chief, and that such a one is, even according to the
most correct opinion, wanting in the public economy of a people.”