Chapter II: Front Matter (2)

In January, 1814, the territorial legislature treated the town of Mobile as an existing municipality, the section of the country surrounding it, acquired from West Florida, was added to the territory in 1812, and restricted suffrage to the "landholders, freeholders and householders within the town," and followed this with a section in the very language of the one quoted above from the charters of Woodville and Port Gibson, but this was amended in 1816 so as to limit suffrage as written in the following section, viz: "No person shall vote at any election for president and commissioners, assessor and collector for the said town, unless he be twenty-one years of age, and shall have been a freeholder in said town, or the tenant of a house or separate roof at least six months previous to any election and shall have paid a county, territorial or corporation tax, nor unless he be a citizen of the United States, or shall have resided within that part of West Florida now in the possession of the United States, at the time of the change of government in that province." The next legislation pertinent was the act of Congress, approved April 25th, 1814, amending the organic law of the territory. This provided "Each and every free white male person, being a citizen of the United States, who shall have attained the age of twenty-one years, and who shall also have resided one year in said territory previous to any general election, and be at the time of any such election a resident thereof, shall be entitled to vote for members of the house of representatives, and a delegate to Congress for the territory aforesaid." The only effect of this act was to dispense with the property qualification previously prescribed and to substitute in its place the payment of a county or territorial tax. In 1815 an election was authorized for the purpose of locating the county seat of Jackson County by act providing simply that such persons as were authorized to vote for representatives might cast their ballots thereat, but in 1816 a like act for Adams County was passed providing "every free male white person, being a citizen of the county of Adams who shall have arrived at the age of twenty-one years and resided in the said county twelve months previous to the said election, shall be admitted to vote thereat and none other." This brings us to the end of territorial legislation and from it we learn that ownership of or anchorage to the soil was a prominent conception of the times; all else as a necessary qualification for voting, even age, color and sex, seems to have been subordinate, or accidental or exceptional. There was certainly no prejudice then in the good old days because of color; the color idea came from without, from Congress.

UNDER THE FIRST CONSTITUTION.

The constitution under which Mississippi came into the Union as a state was adopted on the 15th August, 1817, and by the first section of Article three thereof, the following provision is made: "Every free white male person of the age of twenty-one years or upwards, who shall be a citizen of the United States and shall have resided in this state one year, next preceding an election, and the last six months within the county, city or town in which he offers to vote and shall be enrolled in the militia thereof except exempted by law from military service; or having the aforesaid qualifications of citizenship and residence, shall have paid a state or county tax, shall be deemed a qualified elector; but no elector shall be entitled to vote, except in the county, city or town (entitled to separate representation) in which he may reside at the time of election."

An analysis of this section shows that in order for a person to be a qualified state and county voter thereunder he must have been,

(1) Free,
(2) White,
(3) Male,
(4) Twenty-one years of age or upward,
(5) A citizen of the United States,
(6) A resident of the state for at least one year,
(7) A resident of the county, city or town at least six months,
(8) Enrolled in the militia unless exempt therefrom, or he
must have had the "aforesaid qualifications of citizenship and
residence" and have paid a state or county tax.

What our forefathers meant by alternate qualifications is hard at this day to find out. A literal construction would have authorized a free white male person having the qualifications of citizenship and residence to have voted irrespective of age, but there is no record of infants having exercised the right, nor is there in our books a judicial interpretation of the constitutional provision. It is notable, too, in respect to this section of the fundamental law that crimes did not disfranchise under the terms of the constitution itself and that the murderer, the thief _et id omne genus_ are relegated to the legislature so far as voting was concerned by the 5th section of the sixth article which provides, "laws shall be made to exclude from office, and from suffrage, those who shall hereafter be convicted of bribery, perjury, forgery or other high crimes or misdemeanors." We find, however, that the legislature in 1822 undertook to perform its duty in this regard by providing that "no person shall vote at any election whatever in this state who shall have been convicted by the verdict of a jury, and the final judgment or sentence of a court of competent jurisdiction, of bribery, perjury, forgery, or other high crime or misdemeanor, unless the person so convicted shall receive a full pardon for such offense."

On the subject of pardons and its effect on the right of suffrage it may be stated here that the doctrine in this state until the adoption of the constitution of 1890 was in favor of the restoration of the right to vote; the constitution just named having made provision for a legislative restoration of the right to vote leaves the matter now an open question as concerns executive pardons.

It is worthy of note that by legislative act, approved February 10th, 1821, elections in this state were held _viva voce_, but this act remained in force only until June 13th, 1822, the date of the act repealing it, since which time they have been by ballot; since 1869 the constitutions have required them to be so. In truth there is no record of an election held _viva voce_ under the law of 1821, though the election held on the 1st Monday of August, 1821, under Sec. 6, Art. 3 of the first constitution must have been so held. Of course the laws passed under the constitution of 1817 on the subject of state and county elections conformed their provisions, defining who should have the right of franchise to the terms fundamental law on the subject and, as we have seen, the legislature excluded criminals from the right to vote, but the lawmakers of that day by no means confined themselves to the constitutional qualifications when they came to prescribe who should be entitled to vote in municipal elections; for instance, we see that "citizens of the town" were made voters in Shieldsborough (Now Bay St. Louis) in 1818, in Greenville (Jefferson county) in 1819, and in Holmesville in 1820; and "citizens of one month's residence" were allowed to vote on the subject of the location of the Madison County court house by act approved 1829, and "free white male citizens of the town above the age of twenty-one years" were made voters by act incorporating Pearlington, passed in 1822, and in the same year "free citizens resident in the town" were made voters in Columbus. In 1821 "free white male inhabitants, resident of the town, twenty-one years of age and upwards" were authorized to vote in Monticello, and in 1831 in Warrenton; and in 1824 such residents of the county were authorized to vote on the location of the county seat of Warren County.

By act of 1821 "every free white male person, twenty-one years old or upwards, an inhabitant of the town for six months and who had been assessed and paid a town tax within a year," were allowed to vote in municipal election at Port Gibson, and so too were the owners of land in that town, if the land had been assessed and taxes paid on it, whether the owner resided in the corporate limits or elsewhere; and I am advised the law of that town so remained until after the war; the idea has been adopted by several municipalities of the state in later days. By the early charters of Vicksburg, approved 1825, and Rodney, approved 1828, suffrage was conferred on "landholders, householders, freeholders and such as shall have paid a town tax, being inhabitants and residents for three months in the town."

In 1830 "freeholders and householders" were made voters in Shieldsborough (now Bay St. Louis) and Raymond, and in 1825 "freeholders and householders," whether resident or not, were given the right to vote in the town of Washington, and in 1831 the right to elect a constable was given "actual citizens of Vicksburg, over twenty-one years of age," and in 1830 the "freeholders and householders" of the town of Washington were required to be males in order to vote after that date, and the only qualification of voters in the town of Liberty, according to the act of 1819, were that they should be "free white males, resident citizens of the town," and this is true under the first charter of Warrenton, approved in 1820. In all these instances the constitution of 1817 was not regarded as establishing a rule to be applied to municipal suffrage. By several acts passed while this constitution was operative the constitutional rule was, however, adopted in defining who should vote in municipal elections. Thus in 1821, in respect to the town of Washington the language is "persons entitled to vote for members of the general assembly," and the same language is used in the charter of Clinton, passed in 1830, and to the same language is added the words, "and who shall have resided in the town three months" in the charters of Meadville and Brandon passed in 1830 and 1831 respectively. In the amendment to the charter of Liberty, passed in 1828, suffrage is limited to "inhabitants of the town under the restrictions prescribed by the constitution of the state," and the same language substantially is to be found in the act incorporating Gallatin approved in 1829.

"The qualified electors" of Jackson county voted on the subject of the location of their court house under the provisions of an act passed in December, 1830. The "free white male inhabitants, residing within the town entitled to vote for members of the general assembly" were made the electors of the city of Jackson by the first act of incorporation passed in 1823, and by legislative grant approved in 1830 incorporating Manchester (now Yazoo City) the "inhabitants entitled to vote according to the constitution and laws of the state" were given the right to participate in municipal elections, and the same language is used in the charter of Athens, approved in the same year.

An analysis of all this will show that under the constitution of 1817 "color" was not a qualification or a disqualification in eight of the towns of the state legislated upon, viz: Shieldsborough (now Bay St. Louis), Greenville (Jefferson County), Holmesville, Columbus, Vicksburg, Rodney, Raymond and Washington. Of course slaves were not freeholders or citizens, but free men of color were frequently freeholders and before the Dred Scott decision were regarded by many as citizens. It will be noted, too, that sex was not made a qualification or a disqualification for voting in seven of the towns whose charters were passed or amended during the period in which the first state constitution was operative, viz: those, except Washington, just enumerated. There is no evidence, however, that women ever voted in any of these towns, and all that can be learned on the subject leads to the belief that they not only never did but the right seems never to have been claimed for or by them. Free persons of color, however, as I learn, did claim the right in some of these towns and it was generally conceded by those of the white men whose interest was on the side of the claimant's political preference, but was generally denied by the opposition, and it is doubtful if a negro ever voted in any of them until after the war. On the whole it is not so clear but that the failure to exclude women and free persons of color in the early legislation on the subject of voting in municipalities was but the result of legislative awkwardness and a want of exactness in statutory exclusion and inclusion.

UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF 1832.

The exact period in Mississippi legal history extends from 1832 to 1869, and embraces the period during which the constitution adopted in 1832 remained in force. This, the second state constitution, was adopted October 26, 1832; its provisions on the subject of suffrage are as follows: "Every free white male person of the age of twenty-one years or upwards, who shall be a citizen of the United States, and shall have resided in this state one year next preceding an election, and the last four months within the county, city or town in which he offers to vote, shall be deemed a qualified elector." * * * * * "Every person shall be disqualified from holding an office or place of honor or profit under the authority of this state, who shall be convicted of having given or offered any bribe to procure his election. Laws shall be made to exclude from office and from suffrage those who shall hereafter be convicted of bribery, perjury, forgery, or other high crimes or misdemeanors." * * The second of the sections above quoted was acted upon by the law-making power March 2, 1833, and the following piece of legislation then became operative:

"No person shall vote at any election whatever in this state, who shall have been convicted by the verdict of a jury and the final judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction, of bribery, perjury, forgery, or other high crimes or misdemeanors, unless the person so convicted shall have received a full pardon for such offense."

It will be noted that the conviction must have been by the verdict of a jury and the judgment of the court both conjunctively. What was the effect if the criminal plead guilty does not seem to have been considered. Of course the general legislation of the state on the subject of state and county elections, conformed to the constitution, and we are again led to examine the acts incorporating municipalities within the period, and providing who should be voters therein, in order to obtain light on the thought of the times relative to our subject.

A great many cities and towns were incorporated during this period; in a large majority of charters it was simply provided that the "qualified voters" should exercise the right of suffrage, thus recognizing the constitutional rule. In many instances additional qualifications to those named in the constitution were imposed, thus, residence for a specified time within the corporate limits was required in 1833 for Columbus, Amsterdam, Manchester (now Yazoo City), Jackson, Sartartia, Liberty, Woodville, and in 1836 for Plymouth. But by no means did the legislatures of the period conceive that they were bound to require all the constitutional qualifications as essential for municipal suffrage. A favorite idea was to authorize "every free white male inhabitant of the town" who had resided therein for a specified time, to vote in municipal elections. This was the case in Raymond, by act passed in 1833; Salem, Starkville and Sharon, 1837; Cotton Gin Port, Farmington and Philadelphia, 1838; Cooksville and Emory in 1839; Hernando, 1840; Gainesville, 1846; Shongole and Camargo, 1850; Sarepta, Hermans, Eastport and Benela, 1852; Columbus and Aberdeen, 1854 (in the latter, however, non-resident freeholders were allowed to vote by the act); Bonner, 1860; Wesson, Beauregard, Hickory and Hazlehurst, 1865; Lodi, Batesville and Sardis, 1866; Crystal Springs and Winona, 1867. In addition to the ordinary qualifications the payment of a town tax was required for Grand Gulf, 1833; Vicksburg, 1833 and 1839; Rodney, 1844; Yazoo City, 1846; Natchez, 1865. During this period, too, a few municipal charters pursued the language which was so frequently used at an earlier day--"freeholders, landowners and householders." This was the case in the acts for Shieldsborough (now Bay St. Louis), 1838 and 1850; Pass Christian and Biloxi, 1838, and Rodney, 1844. In a few instances every adult resident person was allowed to vote, without reference to race, color, sex or anything else if the laws were administered as they are written. This was the case in Macon, 1836; Paulding, 1837, and Raleigh, 1838, and in Brandon, by act of 1833, resident persons were not excluded by law because of infancy. For liberality of sentiment on the subject of universal suffrage, Brandon's charter of 1833 is without an equal, but whether this liberality of expression proceeded from a liberality of feeling or from ignorance in the forms of expression doth not appear. Registration of voters was first required in this state by act passed in 1839, and it applied to municipal elections at Vicksburg only; in 1861 a similar provision was enacted for Canton, and in 1865 for Natchez. Of late years a municipal registration is quite common, as we shall see hereafter.

UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF 1869

By the second section of article seventh, constitution of 1869, the following qualifications of voters were prescribed; in order to be a voter a person must have been,

1. Male,
2. Inhabitant of the state; idiots, insane persons and Indians
not taxed excepted,
3. Citizen of the United States, or naturalized,
4. Twenty-one years old or upwards,
5. Resident of the state six months and in county one month,
6. Duly registered.

And by section two, article twelfth thereof, the legislature was required to pass laws to exclude from suffrage "those who shall hereafter be convicted of bribery, perjury, forgery or other high crime or misdemeanor."

The public laws of the state, on the subject of state and county elections, of course conformed to the constitutional provisions; the section thereof found in the code of 1871 on the subject of criminals excluded from the right to register and vote "persons convicted of bribery, perjury, forgery or infamous crime;" that of 1880 denied suffrage to persons convicted of bribery, perjury, forgery, grand larceny or any felony.

Under this constitution (1869) of course the negroes were voters. Much has been said of late years to the effect that the grant of the right to vote on the negroes by the fifteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States was a mistake; perhaps the adoption of that amendment was an error in statecraft; certainly it proved a party mistake to the Republican party. But every thoughtful and candid man will doubt the proposition that the grant of suffrage to the negro was a mistake when viewed from the standpoint of the negro's welfare. Would his rights as a citizen have been as soon respected had he remained deprived of political power? Of course this is a question that can never be settled. We can only speculate upon it.

The provisions of this constitution, like that of the preceding ones, were construed by the legislature as applying only to state and county elections; hence we find that in municipal matters the provisions of the acts of the legislature passed under it defining who should vote in city, town and village elections are variant. It is sufficient to extract from the numerous municipal charters any governing principle. It is apparent, however, that the tendency was, perhaps from convenience of expression, to adopt the constitutional rule, simply adding that the voter should be a resident of the municipality. In a few instances persons having "permanent business" in the town were permitted to vote at municipal elections even though their citizenship and residence were elsewhere.

This was the case in Bolton, 1871; Quitman, 1880; Laurel, 1886; Scooba, 1886; and non-resident freeholders of the town were permitted to vote in Senatobia in 1882 and Tunica, 1888.

In a majority of cases the provision was that the voter should be a qualified elector of the state, or state and county, and that he should have resided within the municipal limits a specified time. This time varied greatly, from ten days, the shortest, to two years. Of the various acts of legislation on this subject I find thirteen in which the length of residence was required to be only ten days; one in which the time is fifteen days; eight fixing twenty days; forty-five prescribing one month; nine fixing two months; fifteen naming three months; nine prescribing four months; one fixing five months; twenty-one naming six months; three fixing one year, and four prescribing two years. The municipalities in which one year's residence was required are Pass Christian (a seashore resort), the purpose evidently being to exclude summer visitors, 1882; Rosedale, 1890; and Durant, 1890. Those in which two years' residence was prescribed are Eureka Springs, 1880; Seven Pines, 1882; Pass Christian, 1890; and Jackson, 1890. The principal purpose in each, except the summer resort, was to exclude the transient negro voter.

During this period it was not unusual for the legislature to provide that there should be a separate registration of municipal voters. This was the case with Natchez, 1870; Columbus, 1884; Senatobia, 1884; Macon, 1884; Yazoo City, 1884; Ellisville, 1884; Bolton, 1886; Bay St. Louis, 1886; Brooksville, 1886; Fulton, 1886; Pass Christian, 1886; Scooba, 1886; Biloxi, 1888; Terry, 1888; Potts Camp, 1888; Tunica, 1888; Water Valley, 1888; Rosedale, 1890; Clarksdale, 1890; Jackson, 1890; Durant, 1890 Indianola, 1890.

The prepayment of a municipal tax was in several instances made a requisite qualification: This was the case as to a street tax in Brookhaven, 1884; Greenville, 1884 and 1886; Vicksburg, 1886; Vaiden, 1886; and as to street tax and poll tax, Jackson, 1890; Durant, 1890.

In but one instance during the period, 1869 to 1890, do we find the "householders and freeholders" made voters, the case of Greenwood Springs, 1871, though, as we have seen, this was a favorite idea in the early days of the state. In 1882 the spirit of liberality was given full scope by the act providing that "all persons residing within the town limits" should have the right to vote in Columbia; again we will make the suggestion of a skeptic and express doubt whether the girl babies exercised the right.

UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF 1890.

The provisions of the new constitution of Mississippi on the subject of suffrage are as follows:

ARTICLE 12.

FRANCHISE.