Chapter IV: Section 244: On and after the first day of January, A. D. 1892, every

elector shall, in addition to the foregoing qualifications, be able to read any section of the constitution of this state; or he shall be able to understand the same when read to him, or give a reasonable interpretation thereof. A new registration shall be made before the next ensuing election after January the first, A. D. 1892.

The qualifications at the present time, therefore, of an elector are:

1. Male, 2. Inhabitant of the state, excluding idiots, insane persons and Indians not taxed, 3. Citizen of the United States, 4. Twenty-one years old or upwards, 5. Resident of the state for two years, 6. Resident for one year in the election district, or city or town, except ministers of the gospel who may vote on six months' residence, 7. Duly registered, 8. Never convicted of bribery and other enumerated crimes, 9. Has paid two years' taxes, 10. Able to read any section of the constitution of the state; or able to understand the same when read to him, or give a reasonable interpretation thereof.

It will be noted that these constitutional qualifications, unlike the provisions of former fundamental laws, are by the section above quoted made to apply to electors in municipal elections; the legislature, however, is authorized to prescribe additional qualifications. And it has prescribed as such additional qualifications, by the section on that subject in the chapter of the new Code on Municipalities, that the voter must have resided within the corporate limits for one year next before he offers to register and he must not be in default for taxes due the municipality for the two preceding years.

Much has been said about this constitution, both for and against it; especially has the "understanding clause," the tenth qualification as enumerated above, been severely criticised. Thus we find in the American Law Review of January-February, 1892, the following: "It is quite apparent that this clause was never intended to be carried out faithfully. It will be so administered as to exclude the negro voters, hardly one of whom will be eligible under it, and so as not to exclude the ignorant white voter. The last qualification, the ability to give a reasonable interpretation of any clause of the constitution of the state, would exclude nearly all the lawyers and judges in the state. In this manner the people of Mississippi endeavor to solve the appalling problem of carrying on civil government with a mass of voters easily corrupted and so stolid and ignorant as not to be able to understand the first principles of their political institutions."

And we find in the Atlantic Monthly, December, 1892, the following statement in reference to it:

"That it may, and probably will, be put into operation so as
to preclude the negro from voting, while his equally ignorant
white neighbor is allowed the privilege, appears from the fact
that the inability to read does not constitute an absolute
basis of exclusion; for the inspectors may allow a person to
vote who can understand or give a reasonable interpretation of
a section of the constitution when read to him. It is apparent
that an inspector may very easily reject as unreasonable an
interpretation from a colored man, and accept one no whit
better from a white man. Such discrimination in practice would
be very hard to discover."

And Mr. John F. Dillon, one of the most distinguished of American lawyers, in his address as President of the American Bar Association, at Saratoga, August, 1892, speaking of this section of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890, says:

"It has been supposed that this clause was a concession made
in the interest of illiterate whites; but whether this be so
or not, a general and indiscriminate requirement that all
voters shall be able to read and write is, in my judgment, not
contrary to the fundamental principles of American government,
but in accordance with the principles on which such government
must securely rest, namely, the intelligence and virtue of the
people."

I have heard attributed to a distinguished United States Senator, who would have been glad to have come to a different conclusion, that this constitution demonstrated that Anglo-Saxon ingenuity could accomplish anything; that the provisions of it on the subject of the suffrage was a practical repeal of the fifteenth amendment of the constitution of the United States, and yet the result was effected in such a way that its legality could not be successfully denied.

The truth is, without reference to the designs of its authors, that we have under it in the state, to all intents and purposes, an educational qualification pure and simple. More negroes, the American Law Review and the Atlantic Monthly to the contrary notwithstanding, have registered under the alternate or understanding clause than white men. Only 2,672 illiterate, both white and black, had up to 1893 registered under it. I have not seen the figures since. The negroes who have taken advantage of it exceed the white men who have done so in a majority of the counties of the state.

It seems that the illiterate white man shrinks from an application to be registered under the "understanding clause;" a refusal to advertise his incapacity, while the negroes as a rule have but little to lose; but another truth is that with scarcely an exception the negroes are thoroughly content with the constitution, and are satisfied to be measured for registration and voting by its standards. The writer, as a member of the convention which adopted the constitution, voted against the "understanding clause," but now that he has seen its practical workings he is prepared to say that the convention did the very best thing that it could have done under the circumstances surrounding it.

This "understanding clause" is not without a parallel in the constitutions of other states; as was pointed out by Senator George of this state in the United States Senate, it is no more difficult of honest administration than are the provisions of the constitutions of other states: for example, the constitution of Vermont of 1777 provided that an elector "should be of quiet, peaceable behavior," and the constitution of Connecticut requires at this day that the voter shall sustain "a good moral character," and numerous other like instances that might be mentioned.

The constitutional provision that a person shall not register as a voter within four months of an election is believed to be a wise measure; the ignorant, the indifferent and the sordid voter fails to register; political excitement never exists to any considerable extent so long before the election; there is no such thing as hiring men to register, for those who can be hired, cannot be trusted for so long a time to vote in the promised or expected way. It is believed that the provision is worthy of adoption everywhere.

The legislation of Mississippi under the constitution of 1890 conforms to that instrument.

By sections 3624 to 3640 of the code (1892) ample provision is made for appeals from adverse rulings of registration officers, and the humblest citizen of the land, the humblest negro, if you please, can invoke the courts of the country, even the Supreme Court, for protection in case he be improperly denied the right to register and vote, and he is also provided with ample remedy before the courts in every case where the right is improperly granted to others. These Code sections are as follows:

3624. _Appeal by person denied registration._--Any person
denied the right to register as a voter may appeal from
the decision of the registrar to the Board of election
commissioners by filing with the registrar, on the same day
of such denial or within five days thereafter, a written
application for appeal.

3625. _Appeal by other than person denied._--Any elector of the
county may likewise appeal from the decision of the registrar
allowing any other person to be registered as a voter; but
before the same can be heard the party appealing shall give
notice to the person whose registration is appealed from, in
writing, stating the grounds of the appeal; which notice shall
be served by the sheriff or constable, as process in other
courts is required to be served; and the officer may demand and
receive for such service, from the person requesting the same
the sum of one dollar.

3626. _Appeal heard de novo._--All cases on appeals shall be
heard by the boards of election commissioners de novo, and
oral evidence may be heard by them; and they are authorized to
administer oaths to witnesses before them; and they have the
power to subpoena witnesses, and to compel their attendance;
to send for persons and papers; to require the sheriff and
constables to attend them and execute their process. The
decisions of the commissioners in all cases shall be final as
to questions of fact, but as to matters of law they may be
revised by the circuit and supreme courts. The registrar shall
obey the orders of the commissioners in directing a person to
be registered, or a name to be stricken from the registration
books.

3637. _Appeal from the decision of the Commissioners._--Any
elector aggrieved by the decision of the commissioners, shall
have the right to file a bill of exceptions thereto, to be
approved and signed by the commissioners, embodying the
evidence in the case and the findings of the commissioners,
within two days after the rendition of the decision, and may
thereupon appeal to the circuit court upon the execution of a
bond, with two or more sufficient sureties, to be approved by
the commissioners, in the sum of one hundred dollars, payable
to the state, and conditioned to pay all costs in case the
appeal shall not be successfully prosecuted; and in case the
decision of the commissioners be affirmed, judgment shall be
entered on the bond for all costs.

3638. _Duty of Commissioners in case of appeal to Circuit
Court._--It shall be the duty of the commissioners, in case of
appeal from their decision, to return the bill of exceptions
and the appeal bond into the circuit court of the county
within five days after the filing of the same with them;
and the circuit courts shall have jurisdiction to hear and
determine such appeals.

3629. _Proceedings in the Circuit Court._--Should the judgment
of the circuit court be in favor of the right of an elector
to be registered, the court shall so order, and shall, by its
judgment, direct the registrar of the county forthwith to
register him. Costs shall not, in any case, be adjudged the
commissioners or the registrar.

3630. _Costs; compensation, etc._--The election commissioners
shall not award costs in proceedings before them; but the
circuit and supreme courts shall allow costs, as in other
cases. The sheriffs, when required to attend before the
commissioners at their meetings, shall be paid two dollars a
day, to be allowed by the board of supervisors.

Having now considered and presented the evolution of suffrage in this state and given by way of recital and incidentally at least, its present status, we come to consider the objects upon which the suffrage may be exercised, and this can be easily stated by the general averment that all legislative and executive officers are elected by the suffragists; the executive officers of the state are not elected necessarily by a plurality or a majority vote. We have a sort of an electoral scheme, which is created by the constitution in the following words: