Chapter XIV: International Relations of the United States Between 1867 and 1877 (1)

The Purchase of Alaska--The Contention of the House of Representatives in Regard to its Power over Treaties--The Senate's Position and the Compromise--Irritation of the American People against Great Britain--The Johnson-Clarendon Treaty--President Grant's Statements in His First Annual Message and in His Second Annual Address--Sir John Rose's Mission to the United States--The Joint High Commission--The Treaty of Washington--The Alabama Claims and the Geneva Convention--Triumph of the Diplomacy of the United States--Organization of the Tribunal and Filing of the Cases--The Controversy between Mr. Fish and Lord Granville--The Filing of the Counter Cases and the Argument--Obstacles--Decision of the Tribunal in Regard to National and Indirect Damages--The Decision of the Tribunal in the Case of the _Florida_--The Decision in the Case of the _Alabama_--The Decision in the Case of the _Shenandoah_, and other Vessels--International Principles Settled by the Geneva Tribunal--The Northwest Boundary Question--The Fisheries Question--The Halifax Commission and Award--The Burlingame Treaty with China--The Attempt to Annex the Dominican Republic to the United States--The Treaty--The Treaty before the Senate--Its Rejection--The President's Attempt to Renew Negotiations--The Committee of Inquiry--The Report of the Committee--The Abandonment of the Scheme.

The two chief products of American diplomacy in the decade between 1867 and 1877 were the purchase of Alaska, and the treaty of Washington with Great Britain.

[Sidenote: The purchase of Alaska.]

The purchase of Alaska, the northwest corner of the North American continent, together with the islands {300} adjacent thereto, a vast region of some five hundred thousand square miles in extent, inhabited chiefly by a few savage tribes, was effected by a treaty, negotiated by Mr. Seward and the Russian diplomatist, Baron Stoeckl, and ratified by the Senate of the United States on the 30th of March, 1867.

[Sidenote: The reasons for and against the purchase.]

The proposition came from the side of Russia, and it appeared that Russia was more eager to sell than the United States was to buy. The price agreed on was seven millions two hundred thousand dollars in gold, and most people in the United States thought, at the time, that this great sum was being paid for nothing but a barren area of snow and ice. The country was declared to be utterly worthless by some of the best informed men in Congress, and a man of no less ability and influence than Mr. Shellabarger opposed the purchase on the ground that it involved an extension of territory dangerous to the existence of the Republic.

On the other hand, such men as General Banks and Mr. Stevens contended that from the point of view of a business transaction alone it was worth the money; and Mr. Higby, of California, told his colleagues that they were mistaken in regard to the climate of the region. The consideration, however, which seems to have had most weight was gratitude toward Russia, whose government had manifested the most friendly feeling for the Union in the struggle against the giant rebellion, and had even threatened interference in behalf of the Union against interference in behalf of the Confederacy by any other European state. That acute observer of political opinion, Mr. Blaine, affirmed that a like offer from any other European government would most probably have been declined.

{301} [Sidenote: A real political reason for the purchase.]

It is, however, almost certain that Mr. Seward had another very profound reason for making the purchase, one which he could not very well proclaim from the housetops, especially as the feeling on his part, and on the part of the Government and of the people of the North, was most kindly toward Russia. It was this: The United States would in this way and at a comparatively small cost rid herself forever of any danger of Russian colonization on the North American continent, and of the danger of any complications between Russia and Great Britain upon this continent. This was a most important political consideration, one which much overbalanced the price paid for the territory and the cost of its administration.

[Sidenote: The contention of the House of Representatives in regard to its power over treaties involving the payment of money by the United States.]

When the bill for making the appropriation to pay for Alaska came before the House of Representatives, that body raised the question of the power of the House over treaties involving the payment of money by the United States, by asserting in the preamble of the bill that its consent was necessary to the validity of such treaties. It did so on the ground that as an independent legislative body it could refuse any appropriation at its own discretion, and that as all foreign countries were bound to know this from the wording of the Constitution, no foreign country could consider a treaty with the United States, involving financial obligations by the United States, as completed until the House of Representatives should have voted the appropriation of the amount stipulated in the agreement.

[Sidenote: The Senate's position and the compromise.]

The Senate, on the other hand, repudiated this doctrine, and rejected the bill with the preamble containing it as it came from the House of Representatives. {302} The bill then went to a conference committee of the two Houses, and this committee invented a preamble which read: "Whereas the President has entered into a treaty with the Emperor of Russia, and the Senate thereafter gave its advice and consent to said treaty, and whereas said stipulations cannot be carried into full force and effect, except by legislation to which the consent of both Houses of Congress is necessary; therefore be it resolved," etc. Both Houses adopted the bill in this form and it became law July 27th, 1868.

The contention of the House was good political science, but it is still doubtful whether it is the constitutional law of the United States or not. The more recent constitutions of even the European states, such as those of Germany and France, make the consent of both houses of the legislature necessary to the validity of all treaties involving the appropriation of money, or the assumption of any financial obligation. This is as it should be; and the Constitution of the United States ought to be so amended as to establish clearly the same principle.

[Sidenote: Irritation of the American people against Great Britain.]

[Sidenote: Change of Ministry and Parliamentary majority in 1867.]

We have, in the preceding volume of this series, followed the history of the relations of the United States with Great Britain down to the close of the rebellion, and have referred to the general irritation on the part of the loyal people of the United States against the British government for its attitude in regard to the acts of its subjects in furnishing warships and munitions to the Confederates. There were many who favored turning the great military power with which the United States emerged from the Civil War against Great Britain, and forcing a settlement of those difficulties by the trial of arms; but Seward remained in the direction of the foreign affairs of the Union, and he had had enough of war. Moreover, he {303} foresaw a change of government in Great Britain, and with it he hoped for a change of sentiment on the part of the new government on the international question. This event happened in consequence of the parliamentary election of 1867. The Minister of Foreign Affairs in Mr. Gladstone's cabinet was first Lord Stanley, and then the Earl of Clarendon, both of them very different in character from Lord John Russell. From the outset each of them manifested a sincere desire to reach an amicable settlement of all differences with the United States. The trouble at this juncture seems to have been the extravagance of the claims of the United States. Mr. Adams, whose patience had become much worn, talked about private damages, national damages and an apology. The British Ministers thought this too preposterous to be seriously meant.

[Sidenote: The Johnson-Clarendon treaty.]

Before, however, the discussion had fairly begun Mr. Adams returned to the United States, and Mr. Reverdy Johnson was sent out to the British Court. Mr. Johnson yielded much of the ground assumed by Mr. Adams in reference to claims for national injury, and in January of 1869 concluded an agreement with the Earl of Clarendon for submitting to arbitration the claims for direct damage to property rights.

[Sidenote: President Grant's statement in his first Annual Message.]

The Senate of the United States promptly rejected the treaty with much feeling, because it did not contain proper provision, in its view, for the reparation of wrongs to the Nation. The feeling among the people of both countries ran so high that the Governments deemed it wise to cease, for a time, negotiations upon the subject. The new President, Grant, in his Message of December 6th, 1869, described the situation in the following language:

{304} "Toward the close of the last Administration a convention was signed in London for the settlement of all outstanding claims between Great Britain and the United States, which failed to receive the advice and consent of the Senate to its ratification. The time and the circumstances attending the negotiation of that treaty were unfavorable to its acceptance by the people of the United States, and its provisions were wholly inadequate for the settlement of the grave wrongs that had been sustained by this Government, as well as by its citizens. The injuries resulting to the United States by reason of the course adopted by Great Britain during our late Civil War in the increased rates of insurance, in the diminution of exports and imports and other obstructions to domestic industry and production, in its effect upon the foreign commerce of the country, in the decrease and transfer to Great Britain of our commercial marine, in the prolongation of the war and the increased cost, both in treasure and lives, of its suppression, could not be adjusted and satisfied as ordinary commercial claims which continually arise among commercial nations; and yet the convention treated them as such ordinary claims, from which they differ more widely in the gravity of their character than in the magnitude of their amount, great even as is that difference. Not a word was found in the treaty, and not an inference could be drawn from it, to remove the sense of the unfriendliness of the course of Great Britain in our struggle for existence, which had so deeply and universally impressed itself upon the people of this country. Believing that a convention thus misconceived in its scope and inadequate in its provisions would not have produced the hearty, cordial settlement of pending questions, which alone is consistent with the relations which I desire to have firmly established {305} between the United States and Great Britain, I regarded the action of the Senate in rejecting the treaty to have been wisely taken in the interests of peace and as a necessary step in the direction of a perfect and cordial friendship between the two countries. A sensitive people, conscious of their power, are more at ease under a great wrong wholly unatoned than under the restraint of a settlement which satisfies neither their ideas of justice nor their grave sense of the grievance they have sustained. The rejection of the treaty was followed by a state of public feeling on both sides which I thought not favorable to an immediate attempt at renewed negotiations. I accordingly so instructed the Minister of the United States to Great Britain, and found that my views in this regard were shared by Her Majesty's Ministers. I hope that the time may soon arrive when the two Governments can approach the solution of this momentous question with an appreciation of what is due to the rights, dignity and honor of each, and with the determination not only to remove the causes of complaint in the past, but to lay the foundation of a broad principle of public law which will prevent future differences and tend to firm and continued peace and friendship."

[Sidenote: The President's statement in his second annual message.]

For another year things drifted, and the views of the two Governments seemed to be getting wider apart, when President Grant wrote in his Message of December 5th, 1870:

"I regret to say that no conclusion has been reached for the adjustment of the claims against Great Britain growing out of the course adopted by that Government during the Rebellion. The Cabinet of London, so far as its views have been expressed, does not appear to be willing to concede that Her Majesty's Government was guilty of any negligence, or did or permitted any act during the War {306} by which the United States has just cause of complaint. Our firm and unalterable convictions are directly the reverse. I therefore recommend to Congress to authorize the appointment of a commission to take proof of the amount and the ownership of these several claims, on notice to the representative of Her Majesty at Washington, and that authority be given for the settlement of these claims by the United States, so that the Government shall have the ownership of the private claims, as well as the responsible control of all the demands against Great Britain. It cannot be necessary to add that whenever Her Majesty's Government shall entertain a desire for a full and friendly adjustment of these claims the United States will enter upon their consideration with an earnest desire for a conclusion consistent with the honor and dignity of both nations."

This was what is now called "a twist of the lion's tail." It was something of a twist, although it was accompanied with the offer of the olive branch, instead of the sword. It was effective, even more effective for the conciliatory tone of the final paragraph. Moreover, with the German armies encamped around Paris and throughout France, the affairs of Continental Europe were too unsettled and precarious for Great Britain to run the risk of any serious complications with the United States.

[Sidenote: Sir John Rose's mission to the United States.]

[Sidenote: The Joint High Commission.]

Accepting the President's message as an invitation to renew negotiations, the British Government, at the beginning of the next year (1871), sent Sir John Rose to Washington to sound the President in regard to the matter. The President greeted his advances with great cordiality, and on the 26th of the month (January), Sir Edward Thornton, the British Minister to the United States, formally proposed to the Hon. Hamilton Fish, the Secretary of State, the appointment of a Joint High {307} Commission, to consist of five persons representing each Government, to sit at Washington, for the purpose of settling the questions between the two Governments relative to Great Britain's North American possessions. Mr. Fish immediately expressed the willingness of his Government to enter upon the negotiation, provided the differences growing out of the events of the Civil War should be included among the subjects to be considered. The British Government accepted Mr. Fish's proviso, and the respective Governments proceeded to appoint the members of the Commission. President Grant designated Hamilton Fish, Ebenezer R. Hoar, Justice Samuel Nelson, Robert C. Schenck and George H. Williams. Her Majesty selected Earl de Grey and Ripon, Sir John Macdonald, Sir Stafford Northcote, Sir Edward Thornton and Professor Mountague Bernard. These eminent gentlemen proceeded immediately upon their momentous undertaking, and on the 8th of May (1871) concluded the treaty between the two Governments, known as the Treaty of Washington, which was duly ratified, and on the 4th of July proclaimed to the world.

[Sidenote: The Treaty of Washington.]

The first eleven articles of this agreement relate to the claims for damages arising from the incidents of the Civil War, known as the Alabama Claims. This was the subject of transcendent importance in the Treaty; this was the subject which was, by these articles, referred to the Court of Arbitration to sit at Geneva.

They contain, in the first place, an expression of regret for the escape of the Confederate vessels from British ports and for the depredations committed by them.

They provide, secondly, for a tribunal of arbitration, composed of five members, one of whom should be {308} named by the President of the United States, one by Her Britannic Majesty, one by the King of Italy, one by the President of the Swiss Confederation, and one by the Emperor of Brazil; and, in case either of these last three mentioned should fail to name an arbitrator, they provide that one should be named by the King of Sweden and Norway; and finally, that one agent should be named by each of the high contracting parties to represent it generally in all matters connected with the arbitration.

[Sidenote: The Alabama claims and the Geneva convention.]

They provide, in the third place, that "the Arbitrators shall meet at Geneva, in Switzerland, at the earliest convenient day after they shall have been named, and shall proceed impartially carefully to examine and decide all questions that shall be laid before them on the part of the Governments of the United States and Her Britannic Majesty respectively," and that "all questions considered by the Tribunal, including the final award, shall be decided by a majority of all the arbitrators."

They provide, in the fourth place, that each of the two high contracting parties should deliver his written or printed case, together with all the evidence in support of it, to each of the arbitrators and to the agent of the other party, as soon as possible after the organization of the Tribunal, and within a period not exceeding six months from the 17th of June, 1871; that within four months after the delivery on both sides of the case, each party might put in a counter case, with additional evidence, in reply to the case of the other party; that the arbitrators might extend the time, under certain circumstances, for delivering the counter case; that "within two months after the expiration of the time limited for the delivery of the counter case on both sides," the agent of each party should deliver to each of {309} the arbitrators "and to the agent of the other party a written or printed argument showing the points and referring to the evidence upon which his Government relies"; and that the arbitrators might require further argument by counsel, giving to each party an equal chance to be heard.

They provide, in the fifth place, that the Tribunal should consider the case of each vessel separately; that it might, however, award a gross sum, or that in case it did not award a sum in gross, the high contracting parties should appoint two members of a board of assessors, and request the Italian Minister at Washington to appoint a third, which board should determine the amounts due in the cases in which the arbitrators had pronounced responsibility.

They provide, in the sixth place, that in deciding the matters submitted the arbitrators should be governed by the following rules:

"A neutral government is bound, first, to use diligence to prevent the fitting out, arming, or equipping, within its jurisdiction, of any vessel which it has reasonable ground to believe is intended to cruise or to carry on war against a Power with which it is at peace; and also to use like diligence to prevent the departure from its jurisdiction of any vessel intended to cruise or carry on war as above, such vessel having been specially adapted, in whole or in part, within such jurisdiction, to warlike use. Secondly, not to permit or suffer either belligerent to make use of its ports or waters as the base of naval operations against the other, or for the purpose of the renewal or augmentation of military supplies or arms, or the recruitment of men. Thirdly, to exercise due diligence in its own ports and waters, and, as to all persons within its jurisdiction, to prevent any violation of the foregoing obligations and duties."

{310} They provide, in the seventh place, that the high contracting parties would "agree to observe these rules as between themselves in the future, and to bring them to the knowledge of other maritime powers, and to invite them to accede to them."

And they provide, finally, that the result of the proceedings of the Tribunal and the Board of Assessors, in case such board should be appointed, should be accepted as a final settlement of all the claims known as the Alabama Claims, and should be a bar to any further proceedings in regard to them.

[Sidenote: Triumph of the diplomacy of the United States.]

It will be seen that the Government of the United States had in this Treaty substantially won all of the points for which it had contended. The Queen's Government had apologized. It had agreed that the general principles of international law in regard to the duties of neutrals toward belligerents should take precedence over municipal statutes, and should not be limited by municipal statutes. And it had agreed that the Tribunal of Arbitration should decide _all questions_ laid before it by the Governments of the United States and of Her Britannic Majesty respectively.

It is true that Her Majesty's Government qualified its acceptance of the rules to be applied in determining its responsibility by inserting an explanation in the Treaty of the following tenor: "Her Britannic Majesty has commanded her High Commissioners and Plenipotentiaries to declare that Her Majesty's Government cannot assent to the foregoing rules as a statement of principles of international law which were in force at the time when the claims mentioned in Article I. arose, but that Her Majesty's Government, in order to evince its desire of strengthening the friendly relations between the two countries and of making satisfactory provision for the {311} future, agrees that, in deciding the questions between the two countries arising out of those claims, the Arbitrators should assume that Her Majesty's Government had undertaken to act upon the principles set forth in these rules."

And it is also true that, while, according to the letter of the Treaty, the United States Government was left unfettered as to the character of the claims which it might lay before the Arbitrators, Her Majesty's Government had been led to expect more moderation in this respect than the popular sentiment in the United States seemed to indicate.

[Sidenote: The arbitrators, agents and counsel.]

The two Governments and the high personages invited by them proceeded in due time to appoint the Arbitrators. The President of the United States appointed Mr. Charles Francis Adams; Her Majesty named Chief Justice Alexander Cockburn; the Italian King designated Count Frederic Sclopis; the President of the Swiss Confederation designated Mr. Jacob Staempfli, and the Emperor of Brazil named the Baron d'Itajubá.

The President of the United States also appointed Mr. J. C. Bancroft Davis as the agent of the United States before the Tribunal, and Mr. Caleb Cushing, Mr. William M. Evarts and Mr. Morrison R. Waite as counsel.

Her Majesty's Government also appointed Lord Tenterden as the agent of Great Britain before the Tribunal, and Sir Roundell Palmer as chief counsel.

[Sidenote: Organization of the Tribunal and filing of the cases.]

On the 15th of December, 1871, the Arbitrators organized the Tribunal at Geneva with Count Frederic Sclopis in the chair as presiding officer, and with Mr. Alexander Favrot as secretary. The printed case of each of the high contracting parties was filed immediately by the agent of each, and the Tribunal ordered the counter cases to be filed {312} on or before the 15th day of the following April. The Tribunal then adjourned to June 15th following, unless sooner called together by the secretary.

[Sidenote: The controversy between Mr. Fish and Lord Granville.]

The contents of the case of the United States became immediately known to the British Ministers, but not for some weeks to the British people. The Ministers were not apparently disturbed in mind about it, although they discovered at once that it contained claims for national damages and indirect damages as well as for direct damages to individuals; but as soon as the newspapers got hold of this fact, they raised a tremendous hue and cry, and accused those who had prepared the case of taking an unfair advantage of the wording of the treaty. The Minister of the United States in London, General Schenck, informed Mr. Fish by cable of the agitation in London over the subject and of the demand of the newspapers that the claim for national and indirect damages should be withdrawn. Mr. Fish replied firmly that "there must be no withdrawal of any part of the claim presented." At this moment the session of Parliament opened and the Queen's speech contained a criticism of the extravagance of the claims of the United States in the case submitted to the Tribunal. The matter was warmly debated in Parliament, and on February 3d the British Foreign Minister, Lord Granville, opened a diplomatic discussion with Mr. Fish upon the subject. Mr. Fish, however, held his ground with great courage and ability, insisting that the claims of every character should be disposed of by the Tribunal in order to remove them from the domain of further controversy and in order to establish perfect harmony in the relations of the two countries.

[Sidenote: The filing of the counter cases and the argument.]

Before this discussion terminated the day arrived for the filing of the counter cases. They were both {313} promptly filed with a reservation of all rights by each of the high contracting parties. The diplomatic discussion culminated in an attempt to make a supplemental treaty, which should provide that the Government of the United States should withdraw its claims for national losses and indirect losses, on the condition that no such losses should be claimed by either Government in the future. But the day arrived for the filing of the arguments before anything was effected. The agent of the United States filed his argument on the day fixed, the 15th of June, but the British agent only filed a statement setting forth the differences between the two Governments in the interpretation of the Treaty in respect to claims for national and indirect damages, and the late negotiations and discussions between the two Governments concerning these differences. The British agent also expressed the hope that, if time were given, these negotiations would prove fruitful, and asked the Arbitrators to adjourn for eight months.

[Sidenote: Obstacles.]

[Sidenote: Decision of the Tribunal in regard to national and indirect damages.]

It looked as if the work of the commissioners, who had framed the Treaty, and of the Arbitrators, who had now given six months of their time to its execution, would go for naught, and that the Governments and the people of the two countries would be thrown back into the relations existing during the years 1869 and 1870, with intensified feelings of hostility. The Arbitrators realized the seriousness of the situation and did not yield to the request of the British agent. They adjourned to the 19th of the month, that is for four days only, in order to deliberate upon the proposition. When they reassembled on the 19th the President of the Tribunal announced that the Arbitrators had decided to inform the two high contracting parties, at that {314} juncture, that the Arbitrators did not consider the claims for national and indirect damages to be a good foundation in international law "for an award of compensation or computation of damages between nations;" but were unanimously of the opinion that such claims should "be wholly excluded from the consideration of the Tribunal in making its award, even if there were no disagreement between the two Governments as to the competency of the Tribunal to decide them." The President said further, that the Arbitrators made this announcement in order that the Government of the United States might consider if it would adopt some course in reference to these claims, which would relieve the Tribunal from deciding upon the request of the British agent for an adjournment.

The President of the United States was duly informed of this announcement by the Tribunal, and, upon the advice of the learned counsel for the United States, he instructed the agent of the United States to make the following reply to the Tribunal:

"The declaration made by the Tribunal, individually and collectively, respecting the claims presented by the United States for the award of the Tribunal for, first, the losses in the transfer of the American commercial marine to the British flag, second, the enhanced payment of insurance, and, third, the prolongation of the war and the addition of a large sum to the cost of the war and the suppression of the Rebellion, is accepted by the President of the United States as determinative of their judgment upon the important question of public law involved."

This reply was read to the Tribunal on the 25th of June, and on the 27th the British agent, under instructions from his Government, withdrew his request for an adjournment and filed his argument.

{315} It was supposed by the Americans that the whole case on both sides was now in, and that, unless the Arbitrators should require further argument or statement in reference to specific points, the Tribunal would now proceed to make its decisions. But the British counsel and the British agent immediately petitioned the Tribunal to be allowed to prepare and present another argument, and to have six weeks' time in which to do it, and even the member of the Tribunal appointed by the British Government exerted himself to secure this delay and this new opportunity for the British agent and his counsel. The Tribunal felt, however, that it was in possession of the evidence and the argument necessary for determining the question before it, and refused the request.

The Tribunal now adjourned to the 15th of July, in order to give its members time and opportunity to study the cases. On the 15th, the arbitrators reassembled and invited the agent and counsel of each of the high contracting parties to sit with them in their conferences. To all others, however, the doors were closed. They spent some two days discussing the order of the procedure which they should follow, and finally adopted the order proposed by Mr. Staempfli, and also indicated in the Treaty itself, which was to take up the case of each vessel separately, and allow each Arbitrator to express a provisional opinion upon it, which opinion, however, should not be conclusive even on the Arbitrator himself who gave it.

[Sidenote: The decision of the Tribunal in the case of the _Florida_.]

On the 17th of the month (July), the Tribunal proceeded to take up the case of the _Florida_ and to hear the opinions of the Arbitrators upon it. Four of the five Arbitrators were of the opinion that the British Government had failed to exercise due diligence in the discharge of its neutral duties toward the United States in this case. Sir Alexander {316} Cockburn alone disagreed with this view. The four also held that the tenders of the _Florida_ should follow the lot of their principal. The reading of the opinion in the case of the _Florida_ was finished on the 22d, and the Tribunal adjourned to the 25th.

Upon the reassembly of the arbitrators, Baron d'Itajubá called on the British counsel for a statement or an argument on the questions of due diligence, and of the effect of commissions held by Confederate war vessels which had entered British ports, and of the legitimacy of coal supplies to Confederate vessels in British ports. Of course the counsel of the United States would be permitted to reply.

[Sidenote: The decision in the case of the _Alabama_.]

The Tribunal approved the proposition, and then proceeded to the case of the _Alabama_. The Arbitrators agreed unanimously in their views of this case, holding the Government of Great Britain guilty of a lack of due diligence. The case of the tender to the _Alabama_ was viewed in the same light.

[Sidenote: The decision in the case of the _Shenandoah_, and other vessels.]

The Tribunal then took up the case of the _Shenandoah_. The Arbitrators were unanimously of the opinion in this case that the British Government had not failed in due diligence anterior to the time when the vessel entered the port of Melbourne. On the other hand, three of the Arbitrators, Count Sclopis, Mr. Adams and Mr. Staempfli, held that the British Government was responsible for all the acts of this vessel committed after leaving Melbourne.

In regard to all the other vessels mentioned in the case of the United States, excepting only the _Retribution_, the Arbitrators were unanimous in the opinion that the British Government had not failed in due diligence in the discharge of its duties as a neutral, and in regard {317} to the _Retribution_ three of the five Arbitrators held the like opinion. After hearing the additional arguments called for, the Tribunal closed the doors on the 26th of August, and, without the presence even of agents or counsel, deliberated upon the momentous questions submitted to it. On the 9th of September the decision was adopted. The Tribunal then adjourned to the 14th, upon which day the decision was to be proclaimed to the world.

The public session of the Tribunal on the 14th was a solemn and an imposing affair with nothing to mar the satisfaction of those who participated in it, except the discourtesy of Sir Alexander Cockburn, who not only kept the assembly waiting for his appearance long past the appointed hour, but departed with unseemly haste at the close of the valedictory pronounced by the president, Count Sclopis.

The award followed the line of the opinions already recited. It convicted the British Government of a lack of due diligence in the discharge of its neutral duties in the cases of the _Alabama_ and the _Florida_ and their respective tenders, and also in the case of the _Shenandoah_ from the time she left the port of Melbourne, but exonerated it in all other cases.

The award also repeated the decision announced by Count Sclopis, on the 19th of June, excluding the claims for national and indirect damages, and then fixed the amount due to the United States from Great Britain in the gross sum of "fifteen millions five hundred thousand dollars in gold, as the indemnity to be paid by Great Britain to the United States for the satisfaction of all the claims referred to the consideration of the Tribunal." Sir Alexander Cockburn refused to sign the award, and filed a statement of his reasons for his dissent. The other four members of the Tribunal signed {318} it, and as the majority rule had been provided for in the Treaty, both of the high contracting parties were duly bound, and so regarded themselves.

[Sidenote: International principles settled by the Geneva Tribunal.]

As to principles decided by the entire procedure of the commissioners and of their Governments in the formation of the Treaty, and of the Arbitrators in making the award, we may say, first, that all questions of damages resulting from the lack of due diligence on the part of a neutral in the fulfilment of the duties of neutrality were regarded as proper subjects for arbitration, and that the determination of the question whether the claims presented, or any of them, are a good foundation for an award of compensation was also regarded as a proper question for arbitration; second, that due diligence to be exercised by neutral governments is diligence "in exact proportion to the risks to which either of the belligerents may be exposed from a failure to fulfil the obligations of neutrality on their part"; third, that the fact that a commission was only subsequently given by a belligerent to a vessel constructed, equipped or armed for the belligerent in the port of the neutral does not heal the violation of the duties of neutrality by the neutral in not using due diligence to prevent such construction, equipment or armament in its ports; fourth, that the privilege of ex-territoriality accorded to vessels of war can never be appealed to for the protection of acts done in violation of neutrality; fifth, that no neutral can excuse itself from the due discharge of the duties of neutrality on account of imperfections in its own laws and government; and sixth, that the cost to the belligerent of pursuing vessels, which have been enabled to operate against the belligerent on account of the dereliction of the neutral, and all indirect loss resulting therefrom, do not constitute a "good foundation for an {319} award of compensation or computation of damages between nations."

[Sidenote: The Northwest boundary question.]

Two other questions of great importance were placed in course of solution by the Treaty of Washington. One was the contention between the two high contracting parties concerning the boundary line between the United States and British Columbia from the point where the forty-ninth parallel of north latitude intersects the middle of the channel which separates the continent from Vancouver's Island to the Pacific Ocean. The contention on the part of Great Britain was that this line should run, according to the stipulations of the Treaty of June 15th, 1846, through the Rosario Straits, and on the part of the United States that it should run through the Canal de Haro. The high contracting parties agreed, in the thirty-fourth article of the Treaty of Washington, to submit this question to the arbitration and award of His Majesty the German Emperor, whose decision thereon should be final and without appeal. The German Emperor, William I., accepted this duty; and on the 21st of October, 1872, announced his award, upholding the contention of the United States.

[Sidenote: The Fisheries question.]

The other question was that which related to the common rights of fishing to be enjoyed by the citizens and subjects of the two high contracting parties along the Atlantic coast. The eighteenth article of the Treaty provided that the inhabitants of the United States should have for the term of twelve years, in common with the subjects of Her Britannic Majesty, the right to take sea fish "of every kind, except shell-fish, on the sea-coasts and shores, and in the bays, harbors, and creeks, of the Provinces of Quebec, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick, and the colony of Prince Edward's Island, and of the several islands {320} thereunto adjacent, without being restricted to any distance from the shore, with permission to land upon the said coasts and shores and islands, and also upon the Magdalen Islands, for the purpose of drying their nets and curing their fish." By article nineteenth the same right was accorded to British subjects, in common with the citizens of the United States, along "the eastern sea-coasts and shores of the United States north of the thirty-ninth parallel of north latitude, and on the shores of the several islands adjacent thereunto, and in the bays, harbors and creeks of the said sea-coasts and shores of the United States and of the said islands." Finally, by article twenty-first free trade between Canada and Prince Edward's Island and the United States in the produce of their respective sea-fisheries was established.

[Sidenote: The Halifax commission and award.]

The contention on the part of Great Britain in regard to this subject was that the rights and privileges accorded to the citizens of the United States by these articles were more valuable than those conceded to the subjects of Great Britain by the United States, and that a sum of money should be paid to Great Britain by the United States in offset thereof. The United States denied the British assumption, and the two high contracting parties agreed, in the twenty-third article of the Treaty, to leave this matter to the arbitration and award of three commissioners, one to be appointed by the President of the United States, one by Her Britannic Majesty, and a third by the President and the Queen conjointly, provided they could agree upon a person within three months from the date when the Treaty should take effect and, if not, then by the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at the Court of St. James.

The President named, as the representative of the United States, the Hon. Ensign H. Kellogg. The Queen {321} appointed, as her representative, Sir Alexander T. Galt. And the two high contracting parties not being able to agree upon the third member of the commission, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador to the Queen named Maurice Delfosse, the Belgian Minister Plenipotentiary to the United States. Delfosse had been proposed by the British Government to the Government of the United States as the third commissioner, and the President had objected to him as being the representative of a country whose interests were too nearly allied with those of Great Britain. It was naturally understood by the President that this had disposed of Delfosse, and the Government at Washington was taken by surprise when the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at London, Count Beust, made it manifest that he should name Mr. Delfosse. Mr. Fish, the Secretary of State, with true diplomatic instinct, immediately accommodated himself, however, to the situation, and congratulated Delfosse upon his appointment. Count Beust announced the choice of Delfosse on the 2d of March, 1877, nearly six years after the Washington Treaty was negotiated and signed, during which period the fisheries of Newfoundland were brought under the same agreements as those of Canada, Prince Edward's Island, and the United States above the thirty-ninth parallel. The Commission finally met at Halifax in the latter half of the year 1877 and on November 23d, 1877, made its award, sustaining by a vote of two to one the contention of Great Britain, and adjudging that the United States Government should pay the Government of Great Britain the sum of five millions five hundred thousand dollars in gold.

The representative of the United States, Mr. Kellogg, dissented from the decision; and it was felt in the United States that the Government had been overreached in the matter. Considerable delay in the {322} payment of the amount thus resulted, and some controversy over it with Great Britain occurred. But finally, on November 21st, 1878, the draft for the amount was delivered to the British Government by Mr. Welsh, the Minister of the United States at the Court of St. James.

Two other events of an international character happened within the decade between 1867 and 1877 to which brief reference should be made, viz., the Chinese Treaty of 1868, and the strong and persistent attempt of President Grant to bring Santo Domingo under the sovereignty of the United States.

[Sidenote: The Burlingame Treaty with China.]

In 1861 Anson Burlingame, a citizen of the United States and a resident of Massachusetts, was sent as Minister of the United States to China. He was a diplomatist of much skill, and he succeeded in making such a deep impression upon the Emperor of China that the latter, on his resignation as Minister of the United States to China in 1867, made him Envoy Extraordinary from China to the United States and the European states for the purpose of securing treaties of amity and commerce between China and the states of the civilized world. He came immediately to the United States and negotiated with Mr. Seward, the Secretary of State of the United States, the Treaty of July 28th, 1868, whereby freedom of emigration and immigration between China and the United States was established, upon the principle of the "inherent and inalienable right of man to change his home and allegiance" expressly subscribed to by the United States and China in the Treaty; the residence of Chinese consuls in the ports of the United States, with the same privileges and immunities as the British and Russian consuls enjoyed in said ports, was agreed to; and freedom of religion for citizens of {323} the United States in China, and Chinese converts to the Christian religion in China, and for Chinese subjects in the United States, was mutually pledged. This Treaty was heralded at the time as being an immense advance in bringing China into close sympathy with modern civilization. But very soon the "labor element," as it assumes to call itself, in the United States, began to find fault with the liberal provisions upon the subject of emigration and immigration, and has succeeded in forcing the Government of the United States back from its ideal position to the old ground of national exclusiveness. The example set by the United States has been accepted by the Chinese Government as a justification of its old methods, and as an excuse for dropping back into them in great measure.

[Sidenote: The attempt to annex the Dominican Republic to the United States.]

At the moment of General Grant's accession to the presidency there was civil commotion in the Dominican Republic. Buenaventura Baez was the legal President of the Republic, but he had lost the support of a very large proportion of the population, who were following a leader named Cabral. Cabral and his party were so strong that Baez feared the overthrow of his government, and sought to avert it by proposing annexation to the United States.

[Sidenote: The Treaty.]

In July of 1869, President Grant sent General Orville E. Babcock to Santo Domingo with written instructions from the Secretary of State, Mr. Fish, to inquire into the political situation there and into the value and resources of the country. Babcock, terming himself aide-de-camp to the President of the United States, succeeded somehow or other in so impressing his importance and authority upon the willing Baez and his confederates as to move them to sign a treaty for the annexation of the Dominican Republic to the United States. It appears that he pledged the {324} President of the United States to use privately all his influence with the members of Congress for the ratification of the Treaty.

[Sidenote: The Treaty before the Senate.]

On the 10th of January, 1870, President Grant sent this proposed Treaty to the Senate for ratification. He must have thought that there would be no difficulty in securing for it the approval of that body, for his message was only three lines in length and contained no argument. It was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and it soon became manifest that a serious opposition to ratification was developing itself. The President now procured from the Dominican representative at Washington an agreement to an extension of the time for ratification, and in communicating this to the Senate on May 31st he went into an argument in support of the proposed treaty. He said, among other things, that the acquisition of this country would cut off one hundred millions of dollars' worth of the imports of the United States and largely increase its exports, and would thus enable the United States to extinguish its large debt abroad; that it would give the United States military command of the entrance to the Caribbean Sea and "the Isthmus transit of commerce"; and that it was necessary in order to maintain the Monroe Doctrine. He declared that the inhabitants of Santo Domingo yearned "for the protection of our free institutions and laws, and our progress and civilization." And he affirmed that he had information that a European Power was standing ready to offer two millions of dollars for the possession of Samana Bay alone. It would be difficult to find another message of a President of the United States which contained an equal amount of such extravagant nonsense.

[Sidenote: Its rejection.]

The Committee on Foreign Affairs thoroughly sifted the subject, and recommended that the proposed Treaty {325} be not ratified, and the Senate, despite the influence of the Administration, sustained the Committee. This action of the Senate occurred on the 30th of June. The President was surprised, mortified and indignant. He was especially angry with the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Senator Sumner, and was from that moment determined to oust Sumner from that position.

[Sidenote: The President's attempt to renew negotiations.]

In his next annual message, that of December 5th, 1870, he took up the matter again, went over all of his old arguments expressed in even more extravagant language than before, and added the prophecy that if the United States did not take Santo Domingo, European nations would acquire the Bay of Samana and create there a great commercial city to which the United States would become tributary without receiving corresponding benefits, and that then the folly of the rejection of so great a prize by the United States would be recognized. He then asked Congress to authorize him to appoint a commission to negotiate a treaty with the authorities of Santo Domingo for its annexation to the United States, and suggested that the treaty so negotiated might be ratified by a joint resolution of the two Houses of Congress, instead of by the Senate alone.

[Sidenote: The Committee of Inquiry.]

These recommendations and suggestions and the language in which they were expressed were felt to be most exasperating by those Senators and Representatives who opposed the President's scheme, and the President's supporters saw quickly that Congress would not sanction any such measure as he proposed. In place of it, Senator Morton, of Indiana, offered in the Senate a resolution to empower the President to appoint a commission, composed of three persons, to go to Santo Domingo and inquire into the {326} political situation and the resources of the country. This resolution finally passed under strong opposition, and the House of Representatives concurred in it with the proviso, which the Senate accepted, that the resolution should not be construed as committing Congress in any manner or degree to the policy of annexing Santo Domingo to the United States.

[Sidenote: The report of the commissioners.]

The President appointed as commissioners Benjamin F. Wade, Andrew D. White and Samuel G. Howe. These gentlemen proceeded to Santo Domingo, made their inquiries, and furnished the President with a report sustaining his views and recommendations.

[Sidenote: The abandonment of the scheme.]

On the 5th of April, 1871, the President submitted this report to Congress, accompanied by a message which contained a justification of his own conduct in the whole matter, and an attack upon those who opposed his policy of annexation, especially upon Senator Sumner. It was a very undignified, not to say puerile, document, and ought never to have been written, much less sent. It revealed, however, the fact that the President understood at last that he must abandon his pet scheme. He did it, however, with a very bad grace, and in his last annual message he repeated for the third time his old arguments in favor of his miserable project, "not," he said, "as a recommendation for a renewal of the subject of annexation," but in vindication of his conduct in regard to it. It is needless to add that none of his fearful predictions about European occupation of Santo Domingo, in case the United States should fail to seize it, and the destruction of the Monroe Doctrine, have come to pass. On the other hand, the Monroe Doctrine has attained an almost monstrous growth which at times appears as likely to threaten as to preserve the peace of the two {327} Americas, and the poor little Dominican Republic, which was incapable of self-government, still exists and seems to be bettering its condition by its own efforts, while the great European city in the Bay of Samana, to which the United States was to become tributary, has not even the substance of a mirage in the waters upon which the vast marines of the world were to ride in approaching its docks and landings. Such has been the fulfilment of the prophecy upon which was based the supposed necessity of expansion beyond the seas!

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INDEX

Abbott, Josiah G., on electoral commission, 286

Adams, Charles Francis, joins liberal republicans, 264;
candidate for presidential nomination, 265;
returns from England, 303;
at Geneva arbitration, 311, 316

Adams, John Q., nominated for vice-presidency, 267

Alabama, in Lincoln's proclamation, 11;
electoral vote of 1864 rejected, 22;
reconstruction in, 37;
convention and election in, 38;
vote on thirteenth amendment, 55;
in the reconstruction bill, 112;
registration in, 146;
election in, 149;
disfranchisements in, 150;
voting on constitution, 151, 153, 197;
act on admission of members from, 198;
reconstruction declared complete, 202;
ratifies fourteenth amendment, 203, 204;
republicans get control in, 268, 269;
change in character of government, 273

_Alabama_, the, case of, 316, 317

_Alabama_ claims, 307, 308, 316, 317

Alaska, purchase of, 299-302

Alexandria, Va., Pierpont government at, 13, 224

Alta Vela, matter of claim to, 177, 178

Ames, Adelbert, resigns as governor of Mississippi, 275

Anderson, T. C., in Louisiana politics, 269

Arkansas, in Lincoln's proclamation, 11;
Lincoln's acts toward, 12;
presidential reconstruction in, 15;
congressmen refused seats, 15;
in Lincoln's message, 19;
electoral vote of 1864 rejected, 22;
attitude of Johnson to, 38;
vote on thirteenth amendment, 55;
in the reconstruction bill, 112;
registration in, 147;
election in, 149;
disfranchisements in, 150;
ratifies constitution, 155, 197;
ratifies fourteenth amendment, 197;
act of June, 1868, as to, 198, 199, 201;
reconstruction declared complete, 202;
ratifies fourteenth amendment, 203, 204;
change in character of government, 273

Ashburn, George W., in convention of 1866, 100

Ashley, James M., action on thirteenth amendment, 29

Austin, Tex., convention at, 229

Babcock, Orville E., mission to Santo Domingo, 323

Baez, Buenaventura, in Dominican politics, 323

Baird, Absalom, New Orleans riot, 94-97

Baltimore, Md., republican convention at, 20;
democratic convention at, 266

Banks, Nathaniel P., appoints election in Louisiana, 14;
views on purchase of Alaska, 300

Bayard, Thomas F., on electoral commission, 286