Chapter VI: THE CONGRESSIONAL PLAN (Continued)

The Reports of the Committee on Reconstruction--The Idea of a New Electorate as the Basis and Condition of Reconstruction--The Freedmen's Bureau Act of July 16th, 1866--The Disaffection in the Cabinet--The New Orleans Riot--The Issue of Reconstruction in the Campaign of 1866--The Congressional Election of 1866--The President's Final Proclamation Declaring the Civil War Ended--The October Elections--The President's Message of December 3d, 1866--Rejection of the Proposed Fourteenth Amendment by the Legislatures of the Reconstructed "States."

[Sidenote: The reports of the Committee on Reconstruction.]

Two days after the transmission of the Fourteenth Amendment to the "State" legislatures, the Joint Committee of Congress on Reconstruction made its final report, or rather reports, since there were two of them, one being signed by all the Republican members of the Committee, and the other by all the Democratic members.

[Sidenote: The majority report.]

The majority report was an able defence of the view, that by rebellion and attempted secession the eleven "States" in which these things happened had lost their "Statehood" and had become disorganized communities, but that while they could and had destroyed "State" government, and placed themselves outside of the Union so far as exercising the powers and privileges of "State" local government was concerned, they could not, and had not, escaped the obligations of the Constitution and the authority of the {85} central Government. The exact language of the report on this point was: "The Constitution, it will be observed, does not act upon States, as such, but upon the people; while, therefore, the people cannot escape its authority, the States may, through the act of their people, cease to exist in an organized form, and thus dissolve their political relations with the United States." The doctrine is here more clearly expressed than in other places, but even here there is a confusing modification contained in the words "in an organized form." It would have been much clearer if they had been entirely omitted. The framers of the report were evidently haunted by that spectre of an abstract, unorganized "State," which has played such havoc with good sense in some of the subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court, and which is nothing more than a Platonic idea.

Based upon this doctrine, the majority report naturally vindicated the exclusive right of Congress in the work of Reconstruction, which work was virtually the admission of new "States" into the Union. It, furthermore, demonstrated that the situation in these disorganized sections was one largely of exhausted disloyalty only, and that all that the inhabitants of them had done under the President's Reconstruction policy was directed toward putting the same men in power who had led in the rebellion and toward denying civil, to say nothing of political, rights to the freedmen.

And its final conclusion was, "that Congress would not be justified in admitting such communities to a participation in the government of the country without first providing such constitutional or other guarantees as would tend to secure the civil rights of all citizens of the Republic; a just equality of representation; protection against claims founded in rebellion and crime; a temporary restoration of the right of suffrage to those {86} who have not actively participated in the efforts to destroy the Union and overthrow the Government; and the exclusion from positions of public trust of at least a portion of those whose crimes have proved them to be the enemies of the Union, and unworthy of public confidence."

As we have seen, the proposed Fourteenth Article of Amendment had provided for all of these things, except the direct conferring of suffrage on anybody. With this exception, it had gone even further, in its provision declaratory of citizenship, and in its protection of the public debt of the Union.

[Sidenote: The minority report.]

The report of the minority, that is of the three Democrats, was written by Mr. Reverdy Johnson, of Maryland. It was, as a lawyer's brief, an able presentation of the view that a "State" of the Union can never become anything else than a "State," no matter what may be the character, deeds, attempts or disposition of the people who inhabit it, and is at all times entitled to the same powers, rights and privileges, under the Constitution of the United States. It was, however, the veriest dry bones of legal reasoning, the veriest sophistry of juristic abstraction. There was no political science in it, no common sense in it, and it ended with an unfortunate and irritating defence of President Johnson's personal loyalty, which had not been in the slightest degree impugned by the majority.

[Sidenote: The idea of a new electorate as the basis and condition of Reconstruction.]

The majority report indicated, at least, that Congress might require something more than adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment by the communities lately in rebellion before they would be recognized as having been restored to their proper relations in the Union as "States," and entitled to representation in Congress. At the moment, however, it is probable that a prompt adoption of {87} the proposed Amendment by any of the reconstructed legislatures would have been followed by a joint resolution on the part of Congress similar to that enacted in the case of Tennessee. There is no doubt that many of the more radical members of Congress had been long considering the question of creating an entirely new electorate in the South as the only proper basis for reconstruction, and that some of the conservatives, from being opponents of this idea at the beginning of the year, had, by the middle of it, begun, at least, to waver. To those who could read the signs of the times correctly, it was manifest that a rejection of the proposed Fourteenth Amendment by these communities would lead Congress forward upon that line. The President ought to have understood this, when Mr. Raymond voted for the proposed Amendment in the House. He ought to have done all in his power to influence the reconstructed communities to adopt the proposed Amendment, no matter whether the submission of it to them by the Secretary of State of the United States logically involved their recognition as "States" of the Union by the Administration at Washington, or not. They were not in a position to exact the precise conclusion of a logical process in their favor, especially as it was based on a fallacious premise, and the President did both himself and them a great wrong in not discouraging them from so doing.

[Sidenote: The Freedmen's Bureau Act of July 16th, 1866.]

A few weeks later Congress scored another victory over the President, one which did much toward wiping out the defeats of February 19th and 21st. It passed another Freedmen's Bureau Bill, and then repassed it July 16th, over the President's veto. This bill was framed with the purpose in view of avoiding those features of the bill, successfully vetoed by the President on February 19th preceding, {88} which had influenced certain Republicans to sustain the President's veto. The differences between the two measures consisted in the following points. The first bill had no definite time limit; the second would expire in two years from the date of its passage. The first bill vested jurisdiction in the Freedmen's Bureau over the civil rights of freedmen and refugees in all parts of the United States. The second vested the bureau with jurisdiction over loyal refugees and freedmen without mention of place. The first vested a most sweeping power in the Bureau to give all kinds of aid and support to the destitute refugees and freedmen. The second contained only the more moderate provision of the original law of March 3d, 1865, on that subject. Finally the first gave the Bureau jurisdiction over the civil rights of freedmen and refugees, not only when the deprivation of them was the consequence of rebellion, but when it was effected by _any local law_, ordinance, police regulation or other regulation. The second, on the contrary, limited the jurisdiction of the Bureau to those cases where the deprivation was the consequence of rebellion.

[Sidenote: The veto of the measure.]

The President could not, however, see much difference between them. He claimed that his objections to the first bill were valid against the second. The second measure, he contended, was only a war measure for a definite period, in a time of peace. It was the prolongation for a definite time of military jurisdiction over civil matters, when the civil courts both "State" and Union were open and in the unhindered discharge of their business. And he held the ground that Congress had no more constitutional power to create, or perpetuate, military jurisdiction over civil matters for a definite period in time of peace than for an indefinite period. He referred to the fact that the Civil Rights measure, just passed over his veto, met all {89} the points provided for in the Freedmen's Bureau bill, and affirmed that all of the provisions of that law would be executed by him through ordinary civil means, in so far as they should not be repealed by Congress or declared unconstitutional by the courts.

[Sidenote: Correctness of the President's views.]

From the point of view of to-day it is difficult to see why the President was not right. There is no doubt that the Freedmen's Bureau with its powers, jurisdiction and charities, was a far greater source of irritation in the South than was the presence of the United States army. While its superior officers were generally men of ability and character, a large number of the subalterns were canting hypocrites and outright thieves. They kept the negroes in a state of idleness, beggary and unrest, and made them a constant danger to the life and property of the whites; and their veritable tyranny over the white population did more to destroy Union sentiment among the whites and make them regard the United States Government in a hostile light than anything which had happened during the whole course of the rebellion. It was an institution which ought to have been dispensed with the instant that the necessity which called it into existence passed away. The law of March 3d, 1865, had still about eight months to run, and Congress would be in session again four months before it would expire. There was ample opportunity for prolonging the law, and that law, it was to be presumed, was less needed in 1866 than in 1865. It took all of the party discipline of the Republicans to prevent sufficient disaffection in their ranks to sustain the President's veto. On the merits of the question alone they could not have done it. They were in error, and many of them knew it, but they were now in to fight the President and they must stand together.

{90} [Sidenote: The veto overridden.]

The veto of the bill was dated July 16th, and the two Houses repassed it over the veto on the same day. The new law was to be executed through the War Department, as the original measure had been, and the Secretary of War had begun to manifest that indecent hostility to the President which disgraced the last years of the Administration. The President was largely cut off from even the knowledge of what was taking place in the operations of the Freedmen's Bureau, and Mr. Stanton now managed it in such a manner, whether intentional or not, as to cause the greatest possible friction between the Government and the whites of the South, and thus to retard the process of Reconstruction and to destroy what had been already accomplished in that direction.

[Sidenote: Disaffection in the Cabinet.]

[Sidenote: Stanton's attitude toward the President.]

Besides Stanton, three other members of the Cabinet had showed their disaffection toward the President's policy. They were Mr. Speed, the Attorney-General, Mr. Dennison, the Postmaster-General, and Mr. Harlan, the Secretary of the Interior. During the course of the month (July) these three gentlemen resigned their offices, and were replaced by Mr. Stanbery, Mr. A. W. Randall, and Mr. O. H. Browning. Their sense of propriety would not permit them to retain high office under the President while differing with him so widely in regard to the fundamental question of Reconstruction. Mr. Stanton, however, took a different view of his duty. He seemed to feel that he was under obligations to his country to remain in the President's Cabinet, at the head of the most important branch of the Administration at that moment, and protect the country against the purposes of the President. He was sustained in this view by the Republican majority in Congress, which soon entered upon its course of depriving {91} the President of his military control even, by transferring his functions to the Secretary of War and the General of the army. To the men of the present day, Mr. Stanton's conduct appears, at least, lacking in a proper sense of delicacy. It may be regarded in an even more serious light. It may be looked upon as a conspiracy with the Republican majority in Congress to rob the President of his constitutional prerogatives, to change the form of government from the presidential system to the parliamentary system of administration. It is difficult to find any sufficient defence for Mr. Stanton's course. It is impossible to clear him of the appearance of great egotism or of great greed of office, in not resigning along with his dissatisfied colleagues.

The President knew of this difference of feeling between himself and his War Secretary at the time of his reorganization of the Cabinet in July, and would undoubtedly have been glad to receive his resignation, but he did not ask for it. The newspapers which sustained the Administration did, however, and predicted that it would be forthcoming. The Republican leaders, on the other hand, encouraged Stanton to hold on to the office, and represented to him that the welfare of his country demanded the sacrifice of his personal feelings in the matter.

[Sidenote: The opinion and feeling in the North concerning the condition of things in the South.]

It was now generally proclaimed throughout the North that the rebel chieftains had repossessed themselves of the reconstructed "State" governments and were making use of "State" powers to re-enslave the freedmen. It was also proclaimed that the life and property of Union men, of whatever race, at the South were utterly insecure, and that at least a thousand men had been murdered in that section within a year's time, without any considerable number of the {92} murderers having been brought to justice. And it was asserted that the President of the United States had deserted the party of the Union, the party which had elevated him to the chief magistracy of the land, and was now conspiring with his old party friends, the Democrats, in both the North and the South, to drive the Republican party from power and restore the régime of the Democracy of 1860.

[Sidenote: The New Orleans riot.]

At this moment a horrible tragedy was enacted in New Orleans which seemed to give verification to some, if not all, of these statements. It seems that the late Confederate leaders resident in Louisiana, having received pardon from the President of the United States upon fulfilling the conditions of the President's amnesty proclamation, had got possession in 1864 of the reconstructed "State" government of Louisiana, with the exception of the governorship and some of the judicial offices. The constitution of 1864, made by sincere Union men, did not exactly suit them, and the legislature in the spring of 1866 took into consideration a bill for calling another convention together for the purpose of framing a new constitution, but the Administration at Washington frowned upon the movement and the legislature abandoned it. In like manner, the men who formed and established the constitution of 1864 were displeased with the fact that the "State" government under it had been captured at the polls by the old electorate of Louisiana, reinstated through the President's amnesty. They also wanted to change the constitution, to so change it as to create an electorate which would bring them back into power again. This meant negro suffrage. Just before the convention of 1864 adjourned, it passed a resolution vesting in the presiding officer of the convention the power, and imposing on him the duty, of reconvoking the {93} convention in case the constitution framed by it should not be ratified at the polls, or for any other necessary reason, for the purpose of taking such measures as might be needful for forming civil government in Louisiana.

Of course, when the constitution framed by the convention was adopted by popular vote and a "State" government was set up under it, common sense and common honesty would hold that the convention had been finally dissolved, no matter how the wording of the resolution might be forced in the opposite direction. The men of "'64" saw in this wording their only chance, however, to rescue the "State" government from the hands of the amnestied electorate, and in their desperation they were determined to attempt to make use of it. A number of the members of the old convention got together informally on the 26th of June. The president of the old convention did not call them together, and he would not preside at the informal meeting. He made some trivial excuse; but there cannot be much doubt in regard to his real reason. This informal meeting then proceeded to elect a _pro tempore_ president, Judge Howell, an office-holder under the constitution of 1864. It was this man who issued the proclamation of July 7th, reconvoking the old convention of 1864. The time appointed by him was the 30th of July at noon, and the place designated by him was the Mechanics' Institute Building at New Orleans. The men called together were the members of the old convention, but to provide for any vacancies that might have happened or might happen in the former membership of this old body, Judge Howell called on the Governor, Mr. Wells, to issue writs of election. The governor did so, and ordered an election of such delegates to be held September 3d. He thus manifested his approval of the movement.

{94} Naturally the party of the amnestied viewed this scheme for depriving them of the "State" government by means of a new constitution, framed by a defunct convention, and certain to contain a provision for negro suffrage, with the most intense hostility. They were not placated either by being referred to the consideration that the constitution framed by this convention must be submitted to the suffrages of the existing electorate, and must be ratified by a majority of the same, before it could be put into operation. They had a suspicion that the whole thing was instigated by the wicked Republicans at the North, and that the voting upon such a proposed constitution would be controlled by them through the military of the United States Government.

They, therefore, resolved to nip the plan in the bud by preventing the assembly of the convention, or forcing it to disperse if it did assemble. The mayor of the city, Mr. Monroe, the same who was mayor when the Union army entered the city in 1862, applied to the General in command of the United States troops in Louisiana, General Absalom Baird, to know what attitude the military authorities would take toward the convention, and informed General Baird that he intended to disperse the convention if it should attempt to assemble without having the approval of these authorities. General Baird was acting for General Sheridan, who was absent from his post, and he replied with much more caution than he would probably have done had he been alone responsible. He told Mayor Monroe that he thought the Governor of the "State," rather than the mayor of the city, was the man to interfere with the assembly of a body professing to be a "State" convention, if there was to be any interference at all, and he gave the mayor to understand that his proposed course might be perilous. This was the {95} 25th of July. Two days later the mayor went again to the General, this time accompanied by the Lieutenant-Governor, who was of the party of the amnestied. He now told General Baird that the police would not undertake to prevent the assembly of the convention, or disperse its members when assembled, but that its members would be indicted by the grand jury and arrested by the sheriff. The General seemed to think that the convention could lawfully assemble, but agreed with the mayor and Lieutenant-Governor that both he and they would request instructions from Washington.

The General applied to the Secretary of War, and the mayor applied to the President. The General informed the Secretary of the movement to assemble a convention; that it had the approval of the Governor; that the Lieutenant-Governor and the municipal authorities considered it unlawful and proposed to prevent it by arresting the delegates; that he had declared to them that he would not permit them to do this, unless the President should so instruct him; and he asked for orders, in the premises, by telegraph. The Lieutenant-Governor and the Attorney-General of the "State" informed the President of the movement to assemble the old convention; informed him that negroes were assembling, incendiary speeches were being made calling them to arm themselves, and the President was being denounced; that the Governor was in sympathy with the movement; that the matter was before the grand jury; and that it was contemplated to have the members of the convention arrested by criminal process; and they asked the President to inform them whether the military authorities would interfere to prevent the execution of the processes of the criminal court.

Secretary Stanton did not reply to General Baird's application at all. He did not even communicate the {96} General's application to the President. He afterward explained that he did not consider that Baird's telegram required any reply. Baird had said in his despatch that he had informed the Lieutenant-Governor and the city authorities that he would not allow them to arrest the delegates and break up the convention unless instructed to do so by the President. The Secretary did not propose to send the General any such orders, or to allow any such to be transmitted to him from the President through the War Department, and so the Secretary thought it best to let the matter rest where the General had placed it. He did not know that the President had been applied to by the other side, and the President did not inform the Secretary of the despatch which he had received. The confidence between the two men had been already so largely destroyed as to prevent even consultation upon these grave subjects.

The President, on the other hand, answered the application made to him. He telegraphed to the Lieutenant-Governor that the military would be expected to sustain, and not to obstruct, or interfere with, the proceedings of the criminal court. He did not send any orders to General Baird, however. Whether the Lieutenant-Governor showed his telegram from the President to General Baird or not is not positively known, so far as the writer of these pages has been able to discover, but it is probable that he did.

It was certainly then the understanding on all sides, at least, that the "State" and municipal authorities would deal with the delegates to the convention, if they interfered with them at all, through the grand jury and the officers of the criminal court, and not through the police. This did not mean, of course, that the police should not be present in the neighborhood of the convention for the purpose of keeping the {97} public peace. They were ordered to assemble at the stations on the morning of the 30th (July) and to bring their arms. According to General Sheridan's report to the President, the riot was occasioned by the marching of a procession of negroes, about one hundred strong and partly armed, through several of the streets to the locality of the convention. It occurred about an hour after the members of the convention had assembled. Naturally a number of people, mostly of the lower orders, gathered on the sidewalks of the streets through which the procession passed. Hooting and jeering followed. Then a shot was fired, probably by a negro in the procession. Then other shots followed and the crowd rushed after the procession, which soon arrived in front of the building in which the convention sat. Brickbats now flew from each side and the riot was in full progress when the police appeared on the scene. The procession rushed into the building, leaving a few of its members outside. One of these and a policeman came to blows, when another shot was fired, upon which the policemen began firing through the windows of the building. After a few moments a white flag was displayed from one of the windows, whereupon the firing ceased and the policemen rushed into the building. Once in the building they fired their revolvers upon the persons present indiscriminately and with terrible effect. The persons who succeeded in escaping from the building were also fired on by the police and by citizens, and many were killed or wounded. Nearly two hundred persons were killed or injured, mostly negroes, but some whites, and among them some members of the proposed convention. There were no United States troops in the city at the hour of the riot, their barracks being outside. General Baird had ordered four companies to take position near the place of the {98} convention, but owing to the fact that he had got the impression that the convention would assemble at 6 P.M., he had ordered them to repair to the assigned position at 5 P.M. They, consequently, did not arrive until the riot was over and the convention was dispersed.

Each party considered the other the aggressor. The Republicans of the North viewed the massacre as a new rebellion, while the amnestied Southerners considered the riot the result of a justified resistance to an attempt to force negro suffrage and then negro rule upon them. It is very nearly certain that the first shot was fired by a negro, but this would not justify the wholesale massacre executed by the police. It could, therefore, be held by the Republicans with a great show of truth that the public authorities of the reconstructed "State" government of Louisiana not only would not extend the equal protection of the laws to all persons, but would themselves deprive persons even of life without due process of law.

[Sidenote: The issue of Reconstruction in the campaign of 1866.]

The issue of the campaign of 1866 was thus made up. It was simply whether Congress should reconstruct the President's reconstructed "States," or rather should pronounce the President's Reconstruction, and the Reconstruction effected by the amnestied Southerners, null and void, and proceed to do the work _de novo_, with the purpose of creating adequate guarantee for life and property and for the equal protection of the laws to all.

Although it was not a Presidential year, the election of the members of the House of Representatives with such a problem to deal with, and the election of "State" legislatures which would consider the question of adopting the proposed Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, made the canvass of 1866 a truly national {99} one. Four National Conventions were held during the summer and early autumn, two of each party.

[Sidenote: The National Conventions of the summer of 1866.]

The Administration party led off with their great meeting in Philadelphia on the 14th of August. There were a few prominent Republicans among the delegates, such as Montgomery Blair, Raymond, Dix, Cowan, Doolittle and Browning, but the vast majority of them were Democrats. All of the Southern delegates were such. The larger number of the Northern Democrats were conservative men of the stamp and style of R. C. Winthrop, W. B. Lawrence, S. J. Tilden, J. P. Stockton, J. E. English and Reverdy Johnson, but there were also present men of more radical anti-national creed, like Fernando Wood, J. G. Sinclair, and James Campbell. Even Clement L. Vallandigham, presented himself as a delegate. There were many, however, who objected to his presence and he withdrew. The doctrines put forward at this meeting were simply those of the President's Reconstruction policy, the doctrines that the "States" in our Federal system are indestructible and immaculate, and under submission to national authority always possessed of the rights of local self-government and of representation in the National Government. These doctrines were developed into such extreme forms of statement, and such extreme results were boldly accepted as their logical consequences, that the cause of the Administration was damaged rather than helped at the North by the work and experiences of the convention.

Inasmuch as there had been a great display of harmony between the leading men of the South and the Northern delegates in the convention of the 14th of August, making it appear that the Democrats were the party of peace and reunion, while the Republicans were {100} in favor of a continuation of the hostile status, the Southern Republicans, or as they called themselves the loyal Union men of the South, assembled in considerable numbers in Philadelphia on the 3d of September, for the purpose of conferring with the leading Republicans of the North in regard to the condition of things in the South. Such men as John Minor Botts, William G. Brownlow, George W. Paschal, Thomas J. Durant, M. J. Safford, Thomas H. Benton, Lewis M. Kenzie, G. W. Ashburn, and many more of almost equal reputation came to counsel with the leaders of the Republican party. Many of the most important of these were there, Trumbull, Greeley, Morton, Chandler, Schenck, Schurz, Matthews, Curtin, Cameron, Gerry, Speed, the ex-Attorney-General, and Creswell. These are only a few names of the eminent men who were present.

The delegates separated into two bodies, one body comprehending the representatives from the South, and the other those from the North. This was done in order to leave the Southerners free from undue Northern influence. Mr. Speed presided over the Southern assembly, and in his opening words declared the purpose of the convention to be to determine and proclaim whether the assertion of the late Confederates that their constitutional rights were being denied them in not admitting their Representatives- and Senators-elect to seats in Congress was true, or whether, on the other hand, the claim of the emancipated that their civil and natural rights were being denied them was true. He soon left no doubt upon the minds of his hearers as to his own view and belief, and he denounced the President's reconstruction work, both in principle and results, most roundly. On account of the intimate relation in which he had stood to the President as his legal adviser, and on {101} account of the fact that he was a citizen of one of the old slave-holding "States," his words had tremendous effect in steeling the purpose of the Republicans of the North.

Under the inspiration of Mr. Speed's speech, the Southern convention framed and fulminated an address which arraigned the President as almost a traitor to his party and the Union, and as a friend of rebels and of sympathizers with rebels, described the results of his Reconstruction policy and acts as most deplorable, and urged the speedy adoption of the proposed Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution as the only possible cure for the evils which were afflicting the country. This address made up the issues of the campaign. The dividing line of the parties now separated those who favored the adoption of the proposed Fourteenth Amendment from those who did not. The issue was simple, and the vote upon it was decisive, as we shall see.

The Administration party now attempted to divide the late soldiers, as it had attempted to divide the Republicans, with but little better effect. They got together a convention of the veterans at Cleveland, Ohio, on the 17th of September, and had the venerable General Wool preside over it. There were many good men and true present, among them Gordon Granger, Rousseau, Custer, McClernand, and Thomas Ewing; and they accused the Republicans of attempting to stir up another civil war over the question of negro suffrage, and urged their old comrades to insist that the status of peace, and all the consequences thereof, existed and must be preserved.

This movement was met on the other side by the assembly of a Republican soldier convention at Pittsburg on the 25th and 26th of September, for the purpose of upholding Congress in its fight with the Administration over the question of Reconstruction. The convention {102} was presided over by General J. D. Cox, and a host of the most capable officers of the armies of the Union, lately disbanded, participated in its deliberations and resolves. They denounced the President's Reconstruction policy, pronounced their adherence to Congress, and declared for the adoption of the proposed Fourteenth Amendment as the indispensable measure for the re-establishment of peace, justice and union.

[Sidenote: The canvass of 1866.]

During the summer and autumn the orators and politicians of both parties pursued the canvass upon the basis of the doctrines put forth by the conventions. A very large number, an unusually large number, of the leading men of the country, took part in the great debate. Even the President of the United States took part in it.

[Sidenote: The "swing around the circle."]

On the 28th of August he started from Washington to go to Chicago to be present at the laying of the corner-stone of the Douglas monument. He took with him General Grant, Admiral Farragut, three of his Cabinet officers, Seward, Randall and Welles, and a large number of lesser lights. Crowds gathered at all the principal stopping-places, and the President spoke to them in defence of his policy of Reconstruction and of his acts in the execution of it. He denounced his enemies and opponents bitterly, and descended to undignified and even vulgar altercation with individuals in the crowds. In his speech at St. Louis, on September 28th, his hot temper betrayed him into an attempt to throw upon Congress, the radical Congress, as he called it, the blame for the New Orleans riot, and he went to the imprudent extreme of almost making an excuse or a quasi-excuse for the riot. The whole performance of the President upon the journey was termed "swinging around the circle," and it both degraded the great office and its {103} incumbent, and injured the prospects of the Administration party in the campaign.

[Sidenote: The President's final proclamation declaring the Civil War ended.]

[Sidenote: The October elections.]

[Sidenote: The Republican triumph in the elections of 1866.]

The President had on the 20th day of August, a week before setting out upon his tour, finally proclaimed the insurrection and Civil War at an end in every part of the country. He had, on the 2d day of April preceding, declared the insurrection at an end everywhere except in Texas, and the proclamation of August 20th gave official witness to its cessation in Texas. It is certainly a prerogative of the President to proclaim the cessation of opposition to his execution of the laws of the Union, and then to execute the same thereafter through civil, instead of military, officers. If the President had meant no more than this by his proclamations of the termination of the insurrection, the position would have been unassailable. But he evidently intended his proclamations as furnishing a basis for his Reconstruction work, or at any rate as furnishing a great reason for the general recognition of the validity of that work. This we can easily gather from the speeches he made as he "swung around the circle" in the campaign of 1866. He felt that he had solid ground under his feet, and did not appreciate the fact that he was resting one of his doctrines upon another, the latter being no more self-evident than the former. He felt quite sure of victory, until what were called the "October States," at that time, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana and Iowa, held their elections. The two "September States," Vermont and Maine, had largely increased their Republican majorities, which the President had probably expected and allowed for, but when the four "October States" gave only twelve seats in the House of Representatives to the Democrats and nearly fifty to the Republicans, it was pretty clearly revealed {104} that the Administration was on the eve of a terrible defeat. It was as overwhelming as these figures indicated. The final results showed that the Republicans had elected one hundred and forty-three of their candidates to seats in the House of Representatives, while the Democrats had succeeded in securing only forty-nine seats. With the exception of Delaware, Maryland and Kentucky, all the "States" represented in Congress had given the Republican party strong majorities. The strength of the Democratic party was again in the South, where the Democratic candidates for any kind of office had almost universally succeeded. In the Senate the Republicans constituted more than a two-thirds majority of the members, and with their almost three-fourths majority in the House, there could be no question that, in a contest between the President and Congress, the former would be obliged to yield.

[Sidenote: The President's Message of December 3d, 1866.]

Notwithstanding all this, however, the President, in his Message to Congress of December 3d, returned to the contest. He reargued his case from every point of view, and with both moderation and great force. He restated what had been done toward Reconstruction, declaring that peace had been restored everywhere, that all the laws of the United States and all the machinery of the United States Government were in unimpeded operation everywhere throughout the length and breadth of the land, and that loyal "State" governments had been restored everywhere, and lacked but one thing of completion, viz., the admission of Representatives and Senators from ten of the eleven "States" in which secession ordinances had been passed to seats in Congress. He contended that all the departments of the United States Government had proceeded upon the view that the "States" were indestructible--the Congress, in the {105} declaration, at the outset, that the war was not to be waged in any spirit of oppression, nor for any purpose of conquest or subjugation, nor purpose of overthrowing or interfering with the rights or established institutions of the "States" which were the scene of rebellion, but to defend and maintain the supremacy of the Constitution and all laws made in pursuance thereof, and to preserve the Union, with all the dignity, equality, and rights of the several States unimpaired, and in many other acts and resolutions; the Judiciary, in all proceedings affecting the reconstruction communities as "States"; and the Executive, in the entire plan of Reconstruction created by Mr. Lincoln and followed out by himself. He further contended that in recognizing these "States" as restored to their former relations, Congress was not running any risk of having disloyal men thrust into the legislative chambers of the nation, because each House of Congress could reject members-elect on account of disloyalty, and could continue to reject until the constituencies should send up such persons as the House could approve, and could expel any member whose conduct should reveal disloyalty. He therefore urged Congress to acknowledge the Reconstruction of the "States" lately in rebellion, in principle, and to apply the powers of the two Houses in regard to the elections, returns and qualifications of their respective members to the individual persons elected to seats.

[Sidenote: Ineffectiveness of the President's argument.]

[Sidenote: Rejection of the proposed Fourteenth Amendment by the legislatures of the Reconstructed "States."]

[Sidenote: The effect of this on the temper of the North.]

The President's argument fell, however, upon deaf ears. This was, it is true, the second session of the Thirty-ninth Congress, and was not, therefore, composed of the persons just elected; but the influence of the recent elections over its members had been to cow the conservatives, strengthen the radicals, and cause the wavering to incline to the side of the extremists. They took the {106} verdict of the people to be that Congress should ignore the President's work in Reconstruction, develop a plan of its own, put it into operation, and base it upon a newly constructed electorate in the South, in which the lately emancipated should participate. The attitude of the legislatures of the President's reconstructed "States" in regard to the proposed Fourteenth Amendment also strengthened them greatly in this view and purpose. Before the first day of January, 1867, all of these except three had rejected it by overwhelming votes, and these three followed the same course a little later. It was said and believed in Washington that they had rejected the proposed Amendment contemptuously, and under the advice of the President of the United States. It was the angry rejection of the proposed Amendment which did more than anything and everything else to convince the people of the North that Reconstruction must be now undertaken by Congress, and must proceed upon the basis of a new electorate at the South which Congress should create.

{107}