Chapter IV: Part 4

Now, the resolution of the House of Lords involves the future as well as the past. It lays down for the future a principle of national policy which I consider totally incompatible with the interests, with the rights, with the honor, and with the dignity of the country; and at variance with the practice, not only of this, but of all other civilized countries in the world. Even the person who moved it was obliged essentially to modify it in his speech. But none of the modifications contained in the speech were introduced in the resolution adopted by the other House. The country is told that British subjects in foreign lands are entitled--for that is the meaning of the resolution--to nothing but the protection of the laws and the tribunals of the land in which they happen to reside. The country is told the British subjects abroad must not look to their own country for protection, but must trust to that indifferent justice which they may happen to receive at the hands of the government and tribunals of the country in which they may be.

The House of Lords has not said that this proposition is limited to constitutional countries. The House of Lords has not said that the proposition is inapplicable, not only to arbitrary and despotic countries, but even to constitutional countries where the courts of justice are not free; although these limitations are stated in the speech. The country is simply informed by the resolution, as it was adopted, that, so far as foreign nations are concerned, the future rule of the Government of England is to be, that, in all cases, and under all circumstances, British subjects are to have the protection only which the law and the tribunals of the land in which they happen to be may give them.

No! I deny that proposition; and I say it is doctrine on which no British Minister ever yet has acted, and on which the people of England never will suffer any British Minister to act. Do I mean to say that British subjects abroad are to be above the law, or are to be taken out of the scope of the laws of the land in which they live? I mean no such thing; I contend for no such principle. Undoubtedly, in the first instance, British subjects are bound to have recourse for redress to the means which the law of the land affords them, when that law is available for such a purpose. That is the opinion which the legal advisers of the Crown have given in numerous cases; and it is the opinion on which we have founded our replies to many applications for our interposition in favor of British subjects abroad.[9]

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I say then, that if our subjects abroad have made complaints against individuals, or against the government of a foreign country, if the courts of law of that country can afford them redress, then, no doubt, to those courts of justice the British subject ought in the first instance to apply; and it is only on a denial of justice, or upon decisions manifestly unjust, that the British Government should be called upon to interfere. But there may be cases in which no confidence can be placed in the tribunals, those tribunals being, from their composition and nature, not of a character to inspire any hope of obtaining justice from them. It has been said, “We do not apply this rule to countries whose governments are arbitrary or despotic, because there the tribunals are under the control of the government, and justice cannot be had; and, moreover, it is not meant to be applied to nominally constitutional governments where the tribunals are corrupt.” But who is to be the judge, in such a case, whether the tribunals are corrupt or not? The British Government, or the Government of the state from which you demand justice?

I will take a transaction that occurred not long ago, as an instance of a case in which, I say, the people of England would not permit a British subject to be simply amenable to the tribunals of the foreign country in which he happened to be. I am not going to talk of the power of sending a man arbitrarily to Siberia; nor of a country the constitution of which vests despotic power in the hands of the sovereign. I will take a case which happened in Sicily, where, not long ago, a decree was passed that any man who was found with concealed arms in his possession should be brought before a court-martial, and, if found guilty, should be shot. Now, this happened. An innkeeper of Catania was brought before a court-martial, and accused under this law by some police officers, who stated that they had discovered in an open bin, in an open stable in his inn-yard, a knife which they denounced as a concealed weapon. Witnesses having been examined, the counsel for the prosecution stated that he gave up the case, as it was evident there was no proof that the knife belonged to the man, or that he was aware it was in the place where it was found. The counsel for the defendant said that such being the opinion of the counsel for the prosecution, it was unnecessary for him to go into the defence, and he left his client in the hands of the court. The court, however, nevertheless pronounced the man guilty of the charge brought against him, and the next morning the man was shot.

Now what would the English people have said if this had been done to a British subject? And yet everything done was the result of a law, and the man was found guilty of an offence by a tribunal of the country.

I say, then, that our doctrine is that, in the first instance, redress should be sought from the law courts of the country; but that in cases where redress cannot be so had--and those cases are many--to confine a British subject to that remedy only, would be to deprive him of the protection which he is entitled to receive.

Then the question arises, how does this rule apply to the demands we have made upon Greece? And here I must shortly remind the House of the origin of our relations with Greece, and of the condition of Greece; because those circumstances are elements that must enter into the consideration of the course we have pursued.

It is well that Greece revolted from Turkey in 1820. In 1827, England, France, and Russia determined upon interposing, and ultimately, in 1828, they resolved to employ forcible means in order to bring Turkey to acknowledge the independence of Greece. Greece, by protocol in 1830, and by treaty in 1832, was erected into a separate and independent state. And whereas nearly from the year 1820 up to the time of that treaty of 1832, when its independence was finally acknowledged, Greece had been under a Republican form of government, with an Assembly and a President, the three Powers determined that Greece should thenceforth be a monarchy. But while England assented to that arrangement, and considered that it was better that Greece should assume a monarchical form of government, yet we attached to that assent an indispensable condition, that Greece should be a constitutional monarchy. The British Government could not consent to place the people of Greece, in their independent political existence, under as arbitrary a government as that from which they had revolted. Consequently, when the three Powers, in the exercise of that function which had been devolved upon them by the authority of the General Assembly of Greece, chose a sovereign for Greece, (for that choice was made in consequence of, and by virtue of the authority given to them by the General Assembly of Greece), and when Prince Otho of Bavaria, then a minor, was chosen; the three Powers, on announcing the choice they had made, at the same time declared King Otho would, in concert with his people, give to Greece constitutional institutions.

The choice and that announcement were ratified by the King of Bavaria in the name, and on the behalf of his son. It was, however, understood, that during the minority of King Otho, the establishment of the constitution should be suspended; but that when he came of age, he should enter into communication with his people, and, together with them, arrange the form of constitution to be adopted. King Otho came of age, but no constitution was given. There was a disinclination on the part of his advisers to counsel him to fulfil that engagement. The Government of England expressed an opinion, through various channels, that that engagement ought to be fulfilled. But opinions of a different kind reached the royal ear from other quarters. Other governments, naturally--I say it without implying any imputation--are attached to their own forms. Each government thinks its own form and nature the best, and wishes to see that form, if possible, extended elsewhere. Therefore, I do not mention this with any intention of casting the least reproach upon Russia, or Prussia, or Austria. Those three governments at that time were despotic. Their advice was given and their influence was exerted to prevent the King of Greece from granting a constitution to his people. We thought, however, that in France we might find sympathy with our political opinions, and support in the advice which we wished to give. But we were unfortunate. The then Government of France, not at all undervaluing constitutional institutions, thought that the time was not yet come when Greece could be ripe for representative government. The King of Bavaria leaned also to the same side. Therefore, from the time when the King came of age, and for several years afterward, the English Government stood in this position in Greece with regard to its government--that we alone were anxious for the fulfilment of the engagement of the King, while all the other Powers who were represented at Athens were averse to its being made good, or at least were not equally desirous of urging it upon the King of Greece. This necessarily placed us in a situation, to say the least of it, of disfavor on the part of the agents of those Powers, and on the part of the Government of Greece. I was sorry for it; at the same time, I don’t think the people of this country will be of opinion that we ought, for the sake of obtaining the mere good-will of the Greek Government, to have departed from the principle which we had laid down from the beginning. But it was so; and when people talk of the antagonistic influences which were in conflict at the Greek Court; and when people say, as I have heard it said, that our Ministers, and the Ministers of foreign governments, were disputing about the appointment of _mirarchs_ and _nomarchs_, and God knows what petty officers of the state, I say that, as far as our Minister was concerned, that is a statement entirely at variance with the fact. Our Minister, Sir Edmund Lyons, never, during the whole time he was in Greece, asked any favor of any sort or kind, for himself, or for any friend. No conduct of that mean and low and petty description was carried on by any person connected with the English Government. It was known that we wished the Greek nation should have representative institutions, while, on the other hand, other influences were exerted the other way; and that, and that only, was the ground of the differences which existed.

One of the evils of the absence of constitutional institutions was that the whole system of government grew to be full of every kind of abuse. Justice could not be expected where judges of the tribunals were at the mercy of the advisers of the Crown. The finances could not be in any order where there was no public responsibility on the part of those who were to collect or to spend the revenue. Every sort of abuse was practised.

In all times in Greece, as is well known, there has prevailed, from the daring habits of the people, a system of compulsory appropriation--forcible appropriation by one man of that which belonged to another; which, of course, is very disagreeable to those who are the victims of the system, and exceedingly injurious to the social condition, improvement, and prosperity of the country. In short, what foreigners call brigandage, which prevailed under the Turkish rule, has not, I am sorry to say, diminished under the Greek sovereignty. Moreover, the police of the Greek Government have practised abuses of the grossest description; and if I wanted evidence on that subject, I could appeal to the honorable gentleman who has just sat down, who, in a pamphlet, which all must have read, or ought to read, has detailed the instances of barbarity of the most revolting kind practised by the police. I have here depositions of persons who have been subjected to the most abominable tortures which human ingenuity could devise--tortures, inflicted upon both sexes, most revolting and disgusting. One of the officers, a man of the name of Tzino, at the head of the police, was himself in the habit of inflicting the most diabolical tortures upon Greeks and upon foreigners, Turks, and others. This man Tzino, instead of being punished as he ought to have been, and as he deserved to be, not only by the laws of nature, but by the laws of Greece--this person, I am sorry to say, is held in great favor in quarters where he ought to have received nothing but marks of indignation.

Well, this being the state of things in Greece, there have always been in every town in Greece, a great number of persons whom we are bound to protect--Maltese, Ionians, and a certain number of British subjects. It became the practice of this Greek police to make no distinction between the Maltese and Ionians, and their fellow-subjects. We shall be told, perhaps, as we have already been told, that if the people of the country are liable to have heavy stones placed upon their breasts, and police officers to dance upon them; if they are liable to have their own heads tied to their knees, and to be left for hours in that state; or to be swung like a pendulum, and to be bastinadoed as they swing, foreigners have no right to be better treated than the natives, and have no business to complain if the same things are practised upon them. We may be told this, but that is not my opinion, nor do I believe it is the opinion of any reasonable man. Then, I say, that in considering the case of the Ionians, for whom we demand reparation, the House must look at and consider what was the state of things in this respect in Greece; they must consider the practices that were going on, and the necessity of putting a stop to the extension of these abuses to British and Ionian subjects by demanding compensation, scarcely indeed more than nominal in some cases; but the granting of which would be an acknowledgement that such things should not be done toward us in the future.

In discussing these cases, I am concerned to have to say that they appear to me to have been dealt with elsewhere in a spirit and in a tone which I think was neither befitting the persons concerning whom, nor the persons by whom, nor the persons before whom the discussion took place. It is often more convenient to treat matters with ridicule than with grave argument; and we have had serious things treated jocosely; and grave men kept in a roar of laughter, for an hour together, at the poverty of one sufferer, or at the miserable habitation of another; at the nationality of one injured man, or at the religion of another; as if because a man was poor he might be bastinadoed and tortured with impunity; as if a man who was born in Scotland might be robbed without redressal, or because a man is of the Jewish persuasion, he is fair game for any outrage.[10] It is a true saying and has often been repeated, that a very moderate share of wisdom is sufficient for the guidance of human affairs. But there is another truth, equally indisputable, which is, that a man who aspires to govern mankind ought to bring to the task generous sentiments, compassionate sympathies, and noble and elevated thoughts.

Now, sir, with regard to these cases, I would take first that which I think would first present itself to the mind of an Englishman--I mean the insult offered by the arrest of the boat’s crew of her Majesty’s ship _Fantôme_. The time has been when a man aspiring to a public situation would have thought it his duty to vindicate the honor of the British navy. Times are changed. It is said that in this case there were only a few sailors taken out of a boat by some armed men--that they were carried to the guardhouse, but were soon set at liberty again--and why should we trouble our heads about so small a matter? But did we ask anything extraordinary or unreasonable on account of this insult? What we asked was an apology. I really did not expect to live to see the day, when public men in England could think that in requiring an apology for the arbitrary and unjustifiable arrest of a British officer and British seamen in the performance of their duty, we were making a demand “doubtful in its nature, and exaggerated in its amount.” Now, what is the history of this case? For circumstances have been referred to, in connection with it, which do not appear from the statement of the case itself. The son of the Vice-Consul, who had dined on board the _Fantôme_, was taken ashore in the evening by the coxswain and a boat’s crew, and landed on the beach. The coxswain accompanied the young gentleman to his father’s house, and on returning to the boat was taken prisoner by the Greek guard. The guard went down to the boat, and, finding the seamen in it were without arms, began thumping them with the butt-ends of their muskets, and wounded one man in the hand by a thrust of a bayonet. The guard then took the seamen prisoners, and carried them to the guardhouse; where after a certain time they were released through the interposition of the Vice-Consul, and they returned to their ship. Excuses were given for this proceeding, and the gist of them was this--that the guard thought the boat belonged to the _Spitfire_, and that it had been seen landing rebels, one of whom had escaped;--this supposed rebel being a boy of fourteen years old, who had returned quietly to his father’s house.

The matter to which these excuses related occurred a little while before, in consequence of the disorganized state of Greece--a disorganization, by the by, which arises entirely from the acts of the Government: because it has been, and still is, the practice of the Government, instead of punishing brigands, to give amnesty to and pardon them; and, indeed, it is even supposed that the officers of the police sometimes go shares in the plunder. That, however, is a matter of opinion; but it is a fact that the robbers are almost always pardoned; and such is the encouragement thereby given to the system of plunder that the robbers go about armed, in bands, and sometimes actually attack and occupy towns.

An instance of this kind happened at Patras. Merenditi, the leader of a band of robbers, attacked Patras; the governor had an armed force under his orders; but, whether from a determination to follow the example set by the government of showing deference to the robbers, or because he thought that discretion is the better part of valor, he fled, and left the town to the mercy of the banditti. The inhabitants, finding themselves deserted by their natural defenders, threw themselves on the protection of the foreign consular body, and begged and intreated that the Consuls would intercede for them, and make some arrangement with the robbers. Our Consul accordingly, at the intercession and with the authority of the principal inhabitants of Patras, entered into an arrangement with the leader of the robbers, by which that leader consented to forego the plunder of the town, on condition that he should receive a certain sum of money and be conveyed away from the town in safety by one of the British ships of war. The people of Patras were thankful. The money required by the robbers, which was reduced by negotiation to one half of their original demand, was collected and deposited in the hands of the Vice-Consul. Merenditi marched down to the quay to embark; when the governor, who had run away from danger, now advanced boldly with his men, and endeavored to attack the robbers’ rear-guard, and to take some of them prisoners before they could embark. Our officers, however, said, “No. There is not only honor amongst thieves, but honor to be observed towards thieves. We were asked to make an arrangement, and to give our guarantee--we will abide by that guarantee, and protect this man and his band.” Accordingly he was protected, and went off with the ransom paid by the inhabitants of the town. This was the matter which was alluded to, when the Greek authorities said that the guard supposed the boat’s crew, whom they had made prisoners, had been landing rebels from the _Spitfire_--they pretended to suppose that the boat had landed some of Merenditi’s band. Surely no defence is necessary for having demanded an apology for an insult offered the British navy. I am induced to believe that the governments of other countries would have taken more severe measures under similar circumstances.

I now come to the case of the Ionians who were plundered in the custom-house at Salcina. These men were passing by in boats; they were summoned to go in by the officer in command, and, when in, they were robbed. The men who robbed them were dressed like soldiers, but were said to be banditti. The customs officer alleged that he was beaten by the robbers, and compelled by them to order the Ionians to enter the custom-house. It must be remembered, however, that a Greek vessel lying in the custom-house was not plundered; while the Ionians were plundered, stripped of their clothes, and severely beaten. It is absurd to compare a case of this kind with that of travellers attacked by robbers in passing through a country.

If the government officer was not acting in connivance with the robbers, still, when foreigners were decoyed into a Greek custom-house by one of its officers, and were there beaten and plundered, the Greek Government must be held responsible for what was done. This, however, is said to be a case in which the unhappy Ionian boatmen ought to have gone to law. I should like to know whom they could have prosecuted? In this instance, our demand was moderate; we asked nothing for the indignity and injury the men suffered, but simply the amount of which they had been robbed.

I next come to the case of the two Ionians who, very innocently, as they imagined, on a national festival, according to the custom of their own country, ornamented their little booths, in which they sold trifling articles, with flags. The police interfered and took down the flags. Some discussion arose about indignity offered to the British flag. The matter was not satisfactorily explained, but we let it drop. We did not insist on that; and, if that had been all, nothing further would have been said. But the Ionians were arrested, manacled and thumbscrewed; and in that state paraded through the town, and put in prison. It was said, “How could they go to prison except through the streets?” True; but there was no necessity for taking them through streets which did not lie in their way. They were paraded, by way of insult, through the streets of Patras, and dismissed next day, because no charge could be maintained against them. Then it was said that the application of the thumbscrew had not maimed them for life. Had that indeed been the case, the men would have been entitled to compensation; but for a very little thumbscrewing, applied during an evening walk, no compensation ought to have been required. I am of a different opinion. Thumbscrews are not as easy to wear as gloves, which can be put on and pulled off at pleasure. We therefore felt it necessary to require, in this case, the moderate compensation of £20 each, for the men who had been ill treated; and the more so, because of the habitual infliction of torture by the police.

Then came the case of two men, whose houses being infested by disagreeable insects, thought proper in hot weather to sleep in the streets. They were taken up by the police, carried before an officer, and severely flogged with a whip in the sight of persons who deposed to the fact. What right had the Greek authorities to flog these men? They had committed no offence; there had been no trial, no condemnation, no sentence. In this case, also, compensation was demanded, as a token that persons under British protection cannot be ill treated with impunity.

Then I come to the case of Mr. Finlay.[11] It is said that he is a “cannie Scot”; that he speculated in land, buying in the cheapest, and wishing to sell in the dearest market. His land was taken by the King of Greece, for purposes of private enjoyment. Nobody will deny that it is fitting the Sovereign of Greece should have a palace; and, if it was necessary to take Mr. Finlay’s ground for site, or for the garden attached to it--Mr. Finlay himself made no objection to that. All that Mr. Finlay wanted was to be paid for his land at a very cheap rate. That was a matter with which the Greek Government had nothing to do; they had only to pay Mr. Finlay what was the value of the land at the time when they took it from him.

The conduct of the Greek Government in Mr. Finlay’s case was very different from that of Frederick the Great in a similar case towards one of his subjects, a man of humble rank. This man refused to sell his sovereign a little bit of ground on which a windmill stood, the ground being necessary for the completion of a magnificent plan of residence for the monarch. The conduct of the King of Prussia was very different from that of the King of Greece. The King of Prussia, though a conqueror in the field and the absolute monarch of a great country, respected the rights of a subject however humble; and not only left the monument of the independence of his subject, standing in the midst of his ornamented grounds, but used to point to it with pride, feeling that it was proof that though he was great and powerful, he knew how to respect the rights of the meanest. For fourteen long years Mr. Finlay was driven from pillar to post, put off with every sort of shuffling and evasive excuse, and deprived of compensation for his land, unless he would take what was wholly inadequate.

In 1843 came a revolution. Till 1843 the Greek Government had continued arbitrary; the King declining, under the circumstances I have mentioned, to grant a constitution. In 1843 the patience of the Greeks was exhausted. They rose in Athens, and extorted by force that which had been refused to reason. When the constitution was granted, courts of justice were established, which were not indeed independent, because the judges were liable, not only to be removed from one court to another, but to be entirely dismissed at the will of the sovereign; still in 1843 there were courts to which Mr. Finlay might, as it has been stated, have applied. But they were of no competence with respect to events which had happened before their creation. Mr. Finlay, therefore, had no remedy. But I have heard it most triumphantly, distinctly, positively asserted, that this case exhibits the bad faith of the English Government; for that at the time when Mr. Wyse made his demands on the Greek Government, we and he knew the case of Mr. Finlay was absolutely, finally, and conclusively settled. No such thing. That is an assertion absolutely, finally, and conclusively at variance with the truth.

There had been an agreement made for arbitration in this case; and a most curious sample it affords of the manner in which things are carried on in Greece. Mr. Finlay said, “I will submit my claim to arbitration.” “By all means,” was the reply of the Greek Government; “you shall have one arbiter and we another.” But Mr. Finlay has been described as a “cannie Scot,” and looking far into the future, he foresaw a possibility, which might have struck a man even not so far north, that the two arbiters might differ; and he suggested that an umpire be appointed. The Greek Government said, “You are quite right.” But Mr. Finlay, being a sensible man, did not like to submit his case to a tribunal where there would be two to one against him, and so he declined the arbitration. The Greek Government then gave up this unreasonable proposal, which they had made just as if it had been quite a matter of course, and a commission of arbitration was agreed upon, consisting of two respectable people, and an umpire properly appointed. If that arbitration had gone on, and the money awarded by it had been paid, Mr. Finlay’s case would have been absolutely, finally, and conclusively settled. But by the law of Greece, arbiters so appointed must pronounce an award within three months, or, if they don’t, then the arbitration falls and drops to the ground. The commissioners could not make their award without certain documents, which could only be furnished by an officer of the Greek Government. This officer, by some unfortunate accident, did not furnish them, and the arbitration fell to the ground by efflux of time.

Therefore, when Baron Gros came to inquire into the matter, he found this case just as it had been when Mr. Finlay first made his complaint. Baron Gros said to Mr. Finlay, “Why, your claim is settled.” “Settled? No,” said Mr. Finlay. “Why, have you not received your money?” “Not a farthing; and I don’t know what amount I am to receive.” In short, his case was exactly in the same state in which it was before the arbitration had been agreed to.

That was a case in which we made no specific demand. The only specific demand was, that Mr. Finlay should receive whatever the value of his land should be found to be. We fixed no sum: we were unable to fix any; and the sum he received afterward was the amount which the two arbiters, one named by Mr. Finlay, the other by the Greek Government, were prepared to award, splitting the difference between their respective estimates. I don’t think that in that case, the claim was either doubtful in justice, or exaggerated in amount.

Then we came to the claim of M. Pacifico--a claim which has been the subject of much unworthy comment. Stories have been told, involving imputations on the character of M. Pacifico; I know nothing of the truth or falsehood of these stories. All I know is that M. Pacifico, after the time to which those stories relate, was appointed Portuguese Consul, first to Morocco and afterward to Athens. It is not likely that the Portuguese Government would select for appointments of that kind, a person whose character they did not believe to be above reproach. But I say, with those who have before had occasion to advert to the subject, that I don’t care what M. Pacifico’s character is. I do not, and cannot admit, that because a man may have acted amiss on some other occasion, and in some other matter, he is to be wronged with impunity by others.

The rights of a man depend on the merits of the particular case; and it is an abuse of argument to say that you are not to give redress to a man, because in some former transaction he may have done something which is questionable. Punish him if you will--punish him if he is guilty, but don’t pursue him as a Pariah through life.

What happened in this case? In the middle of the town of Athens, in a house which I must be allowed to say is not a wretched hovel, as some people have described it;--but it does not matter what it is, for whether a man’s home be a palace, or a cabin, the owner has a right to be there safe from injury--well, in a house which is not a wretched hovel, but which in the early days of King Otho was, I am told, the residence of the Count Armansperg, the Chief of the Regency--a house as good as the generality of those which existed in Athens before the sovereign ascended the throne--M. Pacifico, living in this house within forty yards of the great street, within a few minutes’ walk of a guardhouse where soldiers were stationed, was attacked by a mob. Fearing injury, when the mob began to assemble, he sent an intimation to the British Minister, who immediately informed the authorities. Application was made to the Greek Government for protection. No protection was afforded. The mob, in which were soldiers and _gens d’armes_, who, even if officers were not with them, ought, from a sense of duty, to have interfered and to have prevented plunder--the mob headed by the sons of the Minister of War, not children eight or ten years old, but older--that mob, for nearly two hours, employed themselves in gutting the house of an unoffending man, carrying away or destroying every single thing the house contained, and left it a perfect wreck.

Is not that a case in which a man is entitled to redress from somebody? I venture to think it is. I think that there is not a civilised country where a man subject to such grievous wrong, not to speak of the insults and injuries to the members of his family, would not justly expect redress from some quarter or other. Where was he to apply for redress at Athens? The Greek Government neglected its duty, and did not pursue judicial inquiries, or institute legal prosecutions as it might have done for the purpose of finding out and punishing some of the culprits. The sons of the Minister of War were pointed out to the Government as actors in the outrage. The Greek Government were told to “search a particular house; and that some part of M. Pacifico’s jewels would be found there.” They declined to prosecute the Minister’s sons, or to search the house. But, it is said, M. Pacifico should have applied to a court of law for redress. What was he to do? Was he to prosecute a mob of five hundred persons? Was he to prosecute them criminally, or in order to make them pay the value of his loss? Where was he to find his witnesses? Why, he and his family were hiding or flying, during the pillage, to avoid the personal outrages with which they were threatened. He states that his own life was saved by the help of an English friend. It was impossible, if he could have identified the leaders, to have prosecuted them with success.

But what satisfaction would it have been to M. Pacifico, to have succeeded in a criminal prosecution against the ringleaders of the assault? Would that have restored to him his property? He wanted redress, not revenge. A criminal prosecution was out of the question, to say nothing of the chances, if not the certainty, of failure, in a country where the tribunals are at the mercy of the advisers of the Crown, the judges being liable to be removed, and being often actually removed upon grounds of private and personal feeling. Was he to prosecute for damages? His action would have lain against individuals, and not, as in this country, against the hundred.[12] Suppose he had been able to prove that one particular man carried off one particular thing, or destroyed one particular article of furniture; what redress could he anticipate by a lawsuit, which, as his legal advisers told him, it would be vain for him to undertake? M. Pacifico truly said, “If the man I prosecute is rich, he is sure to be acquitted; if he is poor, he has nothing out of which to afford compensation if he is condemned.”

The Greek Government having neglected to give protection they were bound to extend, and having abstained from taking means to afford redress, this was a case in which we were justified in calling on the Greek Government for compensation for the losses, whatever they might be, which M. Pacifico had suffered. I think that claim was founded in justice. The amount we did not pretend to fix. If the Greek Government had admitted the principle of the claim, and had objected to the account sent in by M. Pacifico--if they had said, “This is too much, and we think a less sum sufficient,” that would have been a question open to discussion, and which our Ministers, Sir E. Lyons at first, or Mr. Wyse afterwards, would have been ready to have gone into, and no doubt some satisfactory arrangement might thus have been effected by the Greek Government. But the Greek Government denied altogether the principle of the claim. Therefore, when Mr. Wyse came to make the claim, he could not but demand that the claim should be settled, or be placed in train of settlement, and that within a definite period, as he fixed it, of twenty-four hours.

Whether M. Pacifico’s statement of his claim was exaggerated or not, the demand was not for any particular amount of money. An investigation might have been instituted, which those who acted for us were prepared to enter into, fairly, dispassionately, and justly.

M. Pacifico having, from year to year, been treated either with answers wholly unsatisfactory, or with a positive refusal, or with pertinacious silence, it came at last to this, either that his demand was to be abandoned altogether, or that, in pursuance of the notice we had given the Greek Government a year or two before, we were to proceed to use our own means of enforcing the claim. “Oh! but,” it is said, “what an ungenerous proceeding to employ so large a force against so small a power!” Does the smallness of a country justify the magnitude of its evil acts? Is it held that if your subjects suffer violence, outrage, plunder, in a country which is small and weak, you are to tell them when they apply for redress, that the country is so weak and so small that we cannot ask it for compensation? Their answer would be, that the weakness and smallness of the country make it so much the more easy to obtain redress. “No,” it is said, “generosity is to be the rule.” We are to be generous to those who have been ungenerous to you; and we cannot give you redress because we have such ample and easy means of procuring it.

Well, then, was there anything so uncourteous in sending, to back our demands, a force which should make it manifest to all the world that resistance was out of the question? Why, it seems to me, on the contrary, that it was more consistent with the honor and dignity of the Government on whom we made those demands, that there should be placed before their eyes a force, which it would be vain to resist, and before which it would be no indignity to yield. If we had sent merely a frigate and a sloop of war, or any force with which it was possible their forces might have matched, we should have placed them in a more undignified position by asking them to yield to so small a demonstration. Therefore, so far from thinking that the amount of the force which happened to be on the spot was any aggravation of what was called the indignity of our demand, it seems to me that the Greek Government, on the contrary, ought rather to have considered it as diminishing the humiliation, whatever it might be, of being obliged to give at last to compulsion, that which had been so long refused to entreaty.

Well, then, however, did we, in the application of that force, either depart from established usage, or do anything that was unnecessarily pressing on the innocent and unoffending population of Greece? I say the innocent and unoffending population, because it was against the Government, and not against the nation, that our claim for redress was directed. The courses that may be pursued in cases where wrong is done by one Government towards the subjects of another are various. One is what is commonly called “reprisals”; that is, the seizing something of value, and holding it in deposit until your demands are complied with; or, if you fail in that and don’t choose to resort to other methods, applying that which you have seized, as a compensation for the wrong sustained. That is one method. Another is the modified application of war--such as a blockade--a measure frequently adopted by the governments of maritime states when they demand redress for injuries. Last come actual hostilities. Many instances of such measures have been quoted in this debate as having been adopted by the governments of other countries, especially by the French Government, when they have had a demand to make for injuries sustained by their subjects; and, by the by, when people complain of the peremptory manner in which our demand was made, and the shortness of the time allowed for consideration, I wish to call to the recollection of the Honorable Gentlemen what was done by the French squadron no longer ago than 1848.

There was an insurrection at Naples, in May, 1848. The great street of the town was filled with barricades, and the troops had to force those barricades. To do that, they were obliged to occupy the houses right and left, in order to turn those defences; and as they forced one house after another, and passed on from house to house, they neglected to leave any guards behind them. They were followed by the Lazzaroni,[13] and the houses were plundered. Some French people whose shops were thus rifled, complained to the French Minister, and to the French Admiral--there being then a French squadron before the port at Naples. The French Admiral, Admiral Baudin, quite cut out Sir W. Parker, and being applied to by those French citizens, he sails up the bay, lays his ships broadside to, in front of the palace, and writes a note to the Government to say, that he has been called on by his countrymen to protect them; and he adds--that letter being dated half-past one on the 17th of May--that unless by three o’clock of that very day he obtains a satisfactory assurance--a satisfactory assurance that his countrymen shall be efficiently protected, reserving, he says, for future discussion their claims for compensation--but--

“Unless in one hour and a half I get, on board this ship, a satisfactory assurance that they shall be efficiently protected, I shall land the crews of my fleet, and will take care of them myself.”

Well, then, I say that Sir W. Parker acted with the greatest moderation in enforcing our demands. He began with reprisals, not with a blockade, wishing to avoid all unnecessary interruption to the commerce of other countries. But he made reprisals in a way which I believe has not often been adopted. The Government was the offending party, and he took possession of vessels belonging to the Government. Now, that is not the usual plan, and for very good reasons.

Vessels belonging to governments are armed. They may feel it to be their duty to defend themselves. To seize armed vessels would probably lead to bloodshed; and reprisals are generally effected by seizing merchant vessels belonging to the country on whom the demand is made. But, the disparity of force being so great on this occasion, Sir W. Parker began by seizing the few armed vessels belonging to the state. He then gave the Government time to reflect upon that demonstration. It was not attended to. Even then he did not immediately proceed to make reprisals upon merchant vessels. He first laid an embargo upon them. He gave notice that he had placed a lien upon them, and that they must not quit their ports. That failed; then he took merchant vessels, but only a limited number, and placed them under the custody of his fleet, avoiding to subject commerce in general to any greater degree of restraint than was unavoidably necessary for the execution of his instructions. It has been said, that we seized upon fishing-boats, and interrupted the coasting trade. I don’t believe that. On the contrary, I believe that the embargo did not extend to fishing-boats, or to vessels of small tonnage employed in the coasting trade of the country.

Well, sir, in that state of things, the French Government offered us their good offices and mediation. We readily and cheerfully accepted their good offices. We accepted them by a note of the 12th of February, which has been laid on the table, and in which we distinctly stated the grounds and conditions on which, and the extent to which, those good offices were accepted.

There could be no mistake between the English and French Governments upon that point. We took as our precedent the course that was pursued in the sulphur questions at Naples, when M. Thiers was Minister. In that case, we stated that reprisals would be suspended the moment any French Minister on the spot declared himself authorized to negotiate. In the said present case we went further, and said, that the moment the good offices of France were officially offered and officially accepted, we would send out instructions that the further making of reprisals should be suspended. In both cases we said we could not release the ships that had been detained, because by so doing we should give up the security which we held in our hands against the offending Government.

It has been stated that a misunderstanding arose between the Governments of France and England, in the course of the mediation, good offices, or whatever it may be called. I cannot say that there was any misunderstanding between M. Drouyn de Lhuys and myself, because it will be seen from his own despatches laid before the French Chamber, that he clearly understood the conditions on which the good offices of France were accepted. He repeatedly states that England gives up none of her demands--that is to say, that she gives up none of the principles of her demands; and that the only questions which the French negotiator is competent to discuss are those which did not involve the negation of the principles of our demands. Well, what were those questions? They were only the amount of money to be given to Mr. Finlay and to M. Pacifico, but not the question whether those gentlemen were to receive anything or nothing.

Then the question arose between us, what were the circumstances under which the good offices were to cease, and coercive measures were to be resumed; and it was distinctly understood on my part, as well as on that of M. Drouyn de Lhuys, that Mr. Wyse was not to take upon himself to determine when Baron Gros’s mission had failed; and that it was only when Baron Gros should have announced that his mission had ceased, that Mr. Wyse was to resume coercive measures. It was further agreed between us, and especially on the 9th of April, that if a difference of opinion arose between Baron Gros and Mr. Wyse, on those points which Baron Gros was competent to discuss, Mr. Wyse was not to stand absolutely on his difference, and that if he did not find it possible to give way, he was, instead of saying, “Now, Baron Gros, your mission is at an end,” to refer home for further instructions. It is said that it was wrong of me not to have sent out to Mr. Wyse information of that understanding, come to on the 9th of April with M. Drouyn de Lhuys. Well, but in the first place I had already sent to Mr. Wyse, on the 25th of March, instructions which, if acted on in the spirit in which they were written, would render such a reference home altogether unnecessary. And they did render such reference home altogether unnecessary; because at last, when Baron Gros and Mr. Wyse came to the point of difference as to the amount of money to be paid, and Baron Gros said, “I would counsel the Government of Greece to pay 150,000 drachmas,” while Mr. Wyse said he was ready to accept 180,000 drachmas, Mr. Wyse at last, much more prudently than if he had referred this difference home, and had exposed Greek commerce to the restraint to which a continuance of the _status quo_ would have subjected it for a whole month, said, “I will, if other things are agreed to, come down to your amount--I will waive my opinion, and accept the sum you are willing to recommend the Greek Government to give.” Therefore, practically, I say, and in the result, the case did not arise to which those instructions could have applied.

Those instructions, if they had reached Mr. Wyse, would not have applied to the difference which did arise between him and Baron Gros; for that difference was this--it turned upon the claims of M. Pacifico. Baron Gros, on the 16th of April, was willing to recommend to the Greek Government to take an engagement to investigate the claims of M. Pacifico, in regard to the destruction of his Portuguese documents; and to pay him whatever might be the amount which, upon investigation, he might prove to be entitled to on that account; and to make a deposit of 150,000 drachmas as a pledge for the good faith with which they would execute that engagement. The only difference between Baron Gros and Mr. Wyse upon that occasion was, that Baron Gros proposed that the deposit, which they had both agreed should consist of shares of the Bank of Athens, should be left in the Bank of Athens; whereas Mr. Wyse required that it should be deposited either in the Bank of England, or, if the Greek Government preferred it, in the Bank of France. That seemed to be a difference that might be easily settled. But, on the 22d of April, Baron Gros altered his opinion. He retracted his opinion upon that point, and stated that later information from Portugal had convinced him, that M. Pacifico’s claim, in reference to the destruction of his Portuguese documents, was wholly unfounded. Baron Gros said he would no longer consent to recommend the Greek Government to enter into any engagement to pay anything to M. Pacifico on that account. He would agree to an investigation, but only provided that Portugal, and not the Greek Government should pay what might turn out to be due. But this was a point which Baron Gros was not competent to discuss. This new view of his would have been a negation of the principle upon which one of our claims rested; and, there being a difference of that kind between Mr. Wyse and Baron Gros, Mr. Wyse had no occasion to refer for fresh instructions--for he had received detailed instructions from me in a despatch, dated the 25th of March, sufficient to guide his conduct upon that point.

Baron Gros then withdrew from the negotiation, and that withdrawal was officially communicated, not only to Mr. Wyse, but to the Greek Government also. On the 24th, however, he received a despatch from General Lahitte, giving an account of the conversation which had passed between me and M. Drouyn de Lhuys, on the 9th; an account, by the way, which was not quite accurate, because it made me say that if any difference arose between Baron Gros and Mr. Wyse, Mr. Wyse should refer home for instructions; whereas all that I agreed to was, that such reference should be made in the case of irreconcilable difference between them, as to the amount of money to be paid by the Greek Government for those claims in regard to which we had not specified fixed sums; that is to say, for Mr. Finlay’s land and for M. Pacifico’s losses of furniture and goods at Athens. Baron Gros then proposed to withdraw the note, by which he announced officially the cessation of his functions, and he asked that his draft of arrangement, together with Mr. Wyse’s draft, should be referred to London for decision.