Chapter V: Part 5

An impression has gone abroad that on that occasion (the 24th), Baron Gros received, and communicated to Mr. Wyse, not merely an account of the conversation between me and M. Drouyn de Lhuys on the 9th of April, but an account of the essential basis and an announcement of the expected arrival of the draft of convention which had been proposed to me by M. Drouyn de Lhuys for the first time on the 15th, discussed on the 16th, agreed to on the 18th, and sent off on the 19th; and Mr. Wyse is greatly blamed by many persons, both here and in France, upon the assumption that, whereas Baron Gros had informed him, on the 24th of April, that the English and French Governments had come to an agreement as to the essential bases of the convention to be signed between England and Greece, and had moreover told him that the convention itself would shortly be received at Athens--yet nevertheless, with this knowledge of the facts, he renewed coercive measures, and compelled the Greek Government to yield to his own demands. This assertion, so far as Mr. Wyse is concerned, is positively untrue. It is totally and wholly untrue. He received no communication from Baron Gros on the 24th, and none earlier than the 2d of May, relative to the draft of the convention agreed upon in London. Whether Baron Gros received the information or not on the 24th by the _Vauban_, I leave to be settled between him and his Government. The explanations of General Lahitte would indeed lead to the inference that he did not.

The statement to which I refer was made by “our own correspondent” of the _Times_. I may say, in passing that one person who has spoken on this subject elsewhere, has had the substance of his speech claimed publicly by the _Morning Herald_ as a compilation from its leading articles; and another has obviously been more indebted to the _Times_ than to the blue books for the statements on which he has founded his assertions. But the correspondent of the _Times_ stated distinctly, and upon that statement public opinion in this country has been formed, that Baron Gros did inform Mr. Wise on the 24th, that he had received by the _Vauban_ a statement announcing the London convention, and that, in spite of that information, Mr. Wyse resumed coercive measures. I understand that the French Government say that this is an entire mistake; that no information respecting the convention could have been communicated to Mr. Wyse on the 24th, because Baron Gros did not receive any by the _Vauban_, which arrived on that day. The complaint, therefore, against Mr. Wyse, come from what quarter it may, and I have no doubt it was sincerely believed at the moment it was made, that complaint can no longer be maintained, and is withdrawn.

With respect to the other complaint, that I did not write to Mr. Wyse an account of what had passed on the 9th of April, the simple reason why I did not was, that he was already in possession of instructions which were sufficient; that I could not have written till the 17th, and that on the 15th another arrangement was proposed, which provided an immediate settlement on the spot, and which therefore rendered any further reference to me by him out of the question. But it was said that if the French Government could have sent information to Baron Gros by the _Vauban_, why could not we have sent at the same time similar information to Mr. Wyse? Why, solely because we were in London, and the French Government was in Paris, and that if a steamer had been despatched by us from Portsmouth, it could not have got round to Athens so soon as a steamer despatched by the French Government from Marseilles or Toulon. But, as I have said, the convention of the 15th having been agreed to, all further reference to me by Mr. Wyse, was rendered unnecessary, because that convention was to be presented as an ultimatum to the Greek Government, by the British and French diplomatic agents.

And when it is said that those demands of ours on the Greek Government were so much repudiated by the Government of Russia and of France; and that by putting forward those claims we ran the risk of involving this country in a war with those Powers, I must be permitted to say, that, with respect to Russia, the despatch of Count Nesselrode to Baron Brunow, of the 19th of February, totally negatives that assertation. In that despatch, Count Nesselrode admits that he was aware as long ago as 1847, that our patience might be exhausted, and that we might have recourse to coercive measures against Greece to enforce our claims; and he says, moreover, that if lately, when we determined to enforce our claims, we had asked Russia to give us her assistance, she would have endeavored to persuade the Greek Government to come to an amicable settlement with us; and if the efforts of Russia to that effect had been unsuccessful, Russia could not then have expected that we should indefinitely postpone coercive measures out of deference to her.

With respect to France, the much-talked-of convention of the 19th of April was to be recommended by France to Greece in a way which made its acceptance pretty certain; and in that convention there was at once full acknowledgment of the principle of all our demands, and of the amount which we thought it just and right to require. I am sorry that the convention did not arrive before the other settlement took place, but that was not the fault of our negotiator. It was not he who put an end to Baron Gros’ functions, but Baron Gros himself. Baron Gros formally and officially withdrew from the negotiation, and that by a written communication, not addressed to Mr. Wyse alone, but to the Greek Government also.

But it is said he was willing to retract it, and that on the 24th of April he wrote to Mr. Wyse to say: “Send me back my note, and I will give you back yours.” Now, to this Mr. Wyse said:

“I cannot exactly do what you wish, but I have another proposal to make to you. You ask me to refer to England, and to maintain the _status quo_ till I get an answer; but to keep the Greek vessels in custody till that answer arrives would subject Greek commerce to great inconvenience. Instead of this, I propose that if the Greek Government will send me 180,000 drachmas with a letter that that sum is in satisfaction of all our claims excepting M. Pacifico’s claim on account of the loss of his Portuguese documents, I will----”

Do--what? Refer home? No. Continue the _status quo_? No.

“I will immediately release all the Greek merchant vessels. I will only retain the few Government vessels as a pledge, leaving the wording of the apology in the case of the _Fantôme_, and the compensation for the loss sustained by M. Pacifico by the destruction of his Portuguese documents, to be settled by future discussion.”

The effect of that arrangement would have been, that the points on which Mr. Wyse and Baron Gros differed would have been left open for future discussion; that coercive measures, as far as Greek commerce was concerned, would have been entirely suspended; the convention of London, of the 19th of April, would have arrived in time; but the Greek Government indeed would, by that convention, have had to pay probably a larger sum than the 180,000 drachmas. But what was Baron Gros’ answer to that? He said, on the 24th, “I have withdrawn from the negotiation, and I cannot therefore officially transmit to the Greek Government your proposal.” Therefore it was not merely by his official notes of the 22d April to Mr. Wyse and M. Londos, that Baron Gros withdrew from the negotiation, for he repeated his withdrawal, in answer to this proposition; but he intimated, in a private letter, that he had made it known to the Greek Government. “To-morrow the 25th,” he said, “I believe you will have, before five o’clock of the afternoon, your letter and your money.”

Now, was Mr. Wyse in a hurry to resume coercive measures? Did he catch at the first moment at which he might have been authorized to resume hostilities? Far from it. He waited from the 22d to the 24th, and from the 24th till five o’clock in the afternoon of the 25th, and it was not till after that hour had passed, at which Baron Gros had led him to expect that he would receive from the Greek Government an acceptance of his conciliatory proposal; it was not till that hour had passed without any communication arriving, that he announced, through the British Consul, that the embargo would again be established.

It is plain, therefore, that Mr. Wyse did not put an end to Baron Gros’ functions, or show any impatience to renew coercive measures. Baron Gros himself put an end to his own functions, in spite of Mr. Wyse’s repeated entreaties that he would not do so; and when Baron Gros had formally withdrawn, Mr. Wyse, instead of at once resuming coercive measures, made another and a very conciliatory proposal; but Baron Gros’ answer to this was a renewed declaration that he had withdrawn from the negotiation, and that his official functions had ceased.

Since then, negotiations have taken place between the Governments of England and France, which, I am happy to say, have been brought at last to a satisfactory conclusion. We are ready to accept such parts of the proposed convention as are still applicable to what remains to be done. Having received and distributed to the claimants the 180,000 drachmas, we don’t insist upon the difference between the sum and the sum that was to be required by the convention. The apology written by M. Londos is retained, and cannot be returned to him, in order that instead of it, he may send us the one proposed by M. Drouyn de Lhuys. The only thing, therefore, that remains to be settled, is the investigation of the claims of M. Pacifico on account of the loss of his Portuguese documents. With regard to these claims, by arrangement of the 27th of April, a material security was given in the shape of a pecuniary deposit. The convention, of which I have drawn up the details, contained on that point a diplomatic guarantee, instead of a substantial guarantee; for it was a convention to be ratified by two sovereigns, providing that a commission of arbitration which should be named by three Governments to investigate was to be made not by a commission, but by the British and Greek Governments jointly. We are perfectly ready to substitute the one arrangement for the other, if the Greek Government choose to adopt it; but we do not intend to urge it upon them, if they do not. If they prefer the arrangement of the convention, we are prepared to conclude a convention to that effect, superseding the corresponding part of the arrangement which was concluded at Athens.

There is, however, one point in Mr. Wyse’s arrangement which was not included in the draft of the convention, because it applies to circumstances of which we were not aware at the time when the convention of London was framed. Mr. Wyse exacted an engagement on the part of the Government of Greece that they should not put forward, or support, if put forward by others, any claims for compensation arising from losses or injuries consequent upon the coercive measures to which we had recourse. The motive of Mr. Wyse for requiring that engagement was, that he understood the Government of Greece had been collecting and beating up for claims of that kind, which they meant to put forward to a very large amount. We attach no value to that engagement as bearing in any manner whatever upon the validity of any such claims. Such claims can have no just foundations whatever; and if they were put forward by the Greek Government our answer could only be, “These claims have no foundation in right or reason, and we utterly and entirely reject them.” But the value of that arrangement was, that by shutting the door against such claims, it prevented the Greek Government from raising discussions which might interrupt the good understanding and friendly relations between the two countries. The British Government are willing, instead of that engagement, to accept the good offices of the French Government, whose good offices with the Government of Greece under existing circumstances have some value, and who will advise the King of Greece not to put forward any such unfounded claims, and with that advice we shall be content.

Thus terminates all difference between the Governments of England and France in regard to these matters; and I believe that if it had not been for discussions which are now taking place in the French Assembly, the distinguished individual who represents the French Government at this Court, might have been present to hear the debate of to-night. So much, then, with regard to the affairs of Greece, and the course which we have pursued in regard to them; but there still remains the question of the far-famed islands of Sapienza and Cervi.

Now, with respect to these islands, my opinion is clear and decided. That opinion, as has been already stated this evening, is supported by the opinion of my predecessor in office, the Earl of Aberdeen, as appears by a despatch from him to Sir E. Lyons, which has been laid on the table. The case is simply this: There are certain islands on the coast of Greece, which originally belonged to Venice, and which, by the Treaty of 1800, between Russia and the Porte, were erected into a separate State.[14] The seven great islands and all the other islands, great and small, inhabited and uninhabited on the coast of Albania and of the Morea, were placed under feudal relations to Turkey; and were secured by the guarantee of Russia; and it was declared that the constitution which that State might give to itself should be communicated to, and be sanctioned by, the two protecting Powers. At that time the Morea and the other parts of Greece belonged to Turkey. In 1803 these islands made their constitution, which, I presume, was communicated to, and sanctioned by, the two protecting Powers; and in 1804, in execution of that constitution they made a municipal distribution of the smaller islands, allotting them respectively to the seven larger islands; and in a public decree, which I cannot doubt must have been made known both to Turkey and Russia, Sapienza aggregated to Zante, and Cervi to Cerigo.

Now, can any man suppose that, if Cervi and Sapienza had been part of the Turkish territory at that time, the Sultan would have allowed his vassals of the Ionian State to appropriate to themselves what belonged to him? or that Russia, who was still more vigilant, and was under engagement, by guarantee, to defend and maintain the territory of this Ionian State, would have permitted a proceeding, which on such a supposition, would have thrown on her the duty of defending for the Ionian State islands which belonged to Turkey? But these islands have always been considered by the British Government, ever since the Septinsular Republic was placed under the protection of England, as belonging to the Ionian State; and it is well known that officers quartered at Cerigo have been in the habit of going to Cervi for purposes of amusement, and that that island has always been held to be part of the Ionian territory.

The boundaries of Greece were settled by the Protocol of February, 1830, with the exception of an improvement in the northern frontier, which was afterwards arranged between the Three Powers and the Porte, and in the settlement of which we were assisted by an honorable and gallant friend of mine, the Member for Portarlington, who was employed in surveying that improved line. A map was attached to the Protocol of February, 1830, and a red line, of which we have heard much, was drawn upon that map to mark part of the boundary which, was established by the Protocol; but that red line was mentioned in the Protocol only as marking the northern boundary of Greece, east and west from sea to sea, and it did not apply to the islands. The islands which were to form part of the Greek State, were enumerated by name in the Protocol, and neither Cervi nor Sapienza were included in that enumeration.

It is, therefore, impossible to contend that the public acts which constituted the Kingdom of Greece included either of these islands within its territory. If, then, the Greek Government has taken possession of either of these two islands, it is the Greek Government that has intruded upon the territory of the Ionian State; and the British Government has not, by demanding the evacuation of those islands, wanted to intrude upon the territory of the Kingdom of Greece. But this question did not form part of the demands made by Mr. Wyse on the 15th of January. It is a separate question, and remains open for fair discussion between the Governments of Greece and England, and of England, France, and Russia.

Our applications about these islands had remained unnoticed by the Greek Government for ten years. It may be asked, then, why did we renew them at this particular time? Because the Greek Government committed last year an act of aggression on the island of Cervi which they had never committed before. A boat going between Cerigo and Zante with convicts was driven by stress of weather upon Cervi, when the convicts were liberated, and other acts were committed as if the island had been Greek territory. It became necessary, therefore, to call for an answer to our application, and if no answer was given, to take possession of the islands--an operation which could be performed by a boat’s crew, without involving any greater employment of force. But, as has already been stated, the Greek Government hearing that these islands were to be taken possession of, at last broke their ten years’ silence, and made a reply; and a discussion being thus opened, the forcible occupation was suspended. With respect to the Government of Russia, that Government was made aware so long ago as the beginning of last October, of the instructions we had given for the occupation of those islands.

Having disposed of the matter of Greece, I now come to the wider range which was taken last night by the Right Honorable Baronet, the Member for Ripon.[15] That Right Honorable Baronet took, I think, a proper view of the question before the House, because the resolution which has been proposed is not confined to one particular act of her Majesty’s Government with regard to foreign affairs, but does fully involve and open the consideration of all the topics to which the Right Honorable Gentleman adverted. I agree, however, with those honorable gentlemen who have contended that the resolution does not imply an absolute and entire approval of every act that has been done by the Government; and, indeed, it would be unreasonable to propose such a vote to the House: because it could hardly be expected that so large a number of men, possessing different degrees of information, holding different views, and not knowing exactly in all cases what have been the grounds upon which the Government have acted, though they may approve of the general principles which have guided the conduct of the Government, should implicitly approve of everything we may have done.

The Right Honorable Baronet was justified in taking that larger range into which he expatiated last night; but I must be allowed to set him right as to the first point upon which he touched. He stated what was quite true, that when he was a member of Earl Grey’s administration, he concurred with me in many acts of foreign policy of which I was the organ, which involved very active interposition in the affairs of other countries. He instanced the negotiations in regard to Belgium, and its separation from Holland. He has done justice to the views which guarded the Government of that day, in their opinion that the independence of Belgium would be a measure advantageous to the peace, present and future, of Europe. But, then, he says, that case was different from the acts of the present Government, because every step in that affair was taken with the concurrence of all the five Powers who were parties to the negotiation, The Right Honorable Baronet said that there were, to be sure, some things which went beyond mere negotiation; there was the siege of Antwerp, and the embargo laid by us upon Dutch ships. He had concurred, he said, in both measures; but were those measures steps taken with the full consent of all five Powers? Were those acts measures of such description that they rendered it quite impossible that the friendly relations of this country with other Powers could be disturbed thereby? The Right Honorable Baronet must, I am sure, recollect that Austria, Russia, and Prussia dissented from those measures; that in consequence thereof they withdrew for a time from the conference, and that a Prussian army was collected near the banks of the Meuse, the presence of which rendered it necessary for the French to send a very large force to Antwerp, much more than was required for the mere siege of the citadel, and also to have a reserve ready in case of need. I know very well that when people are out of office their memory is not so quick and retentive as to things which happened while they were in power as it would have been if they had remained in; but on this point the Right Honorable Baronet made an important mistake, especially as bearing upon the particular question now before the House.

I agree with the Right Honorable Baronet that, in regard to the affairs of Belgium, the Government of England came to a wise determination. I think that the arrangement which in 1815 had been thought conducive to the peace of Europe, and by which, through the union of Belgium with Holland, a Power of some consideration was to be formed in that particular part of Europe, interposed between Germany on one side and France on the other--I think that that arrangement, which originally, by those who framed it, was, and not without reason, expected to prove advantageous to the peace of Europe, had, by the course of events, turned out to have a contrary tendency. The people of Belgium and of Holland evidently could not coalesce; and if certain Powers of Europe had combined at that moment to compel a reunion between these separated portions of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, I doubt whether the reunion could have been effected without the immediate explosion of a war in Europe of the greatest magnitude; and I am quite sure that if it had been effected, it could not have lasted, and the foundation must have been laid thereby of future and inevitable disturbance. We carried out our opinion upon that point to a practical result.

It is not to be disguised, at this time of day, that our opinion on that matter was not shared by Austria, Russia, and Prussia. They would much rather have seen the two countries reunited; and if that reunion was at that time impossible, they would have been glad of an arrangement which might have tended to render a reunion thereafter more easy. This was not breach of faith on their part; they acted, I am bound to say, with great good faith and honor in the whole transaction; but they had that opinion which differed from the opinion of England and France. Nevertheless, our arrangements prevailed; and was that, now, an instance of a policy which deserves the censure and condemnation of Parliament and of the country?

I remember of being taunted in this House by being told of my “little experimental Belgium monarchy.” It was predicted that the experiment would not succeed; it was said that there was no national feeling among the Belgians; that they would, on the first opportunity, throw themselves into the arms of their nearest neighbor; that we were only laying the foundation of another change; and that our arrangement was only “a transition state.” Why, if ever there was an experiment--call it so if you will--that fully and completely succeeded, the erection of Belgium into an independent State was that experiment. In times when almost all the other countries in Europe have been convulsed from top to bottom, Belgium has remained undisturbed. The people have shown the most admirable devotion and attachment to their sovereign; the sovereign the greatest confidence in, and love for, his people; the nation has made rapid advances in industry and in the arts, in everything which distinguishes a civilized state; all this reflects the greatest honor upon the Belgian people; and they have, moreover, acquired a spirit and sentiment of nationality which entitles them to the respect of every other country in the world. I say, then, that so far as we were concerned in effecting that arrangement, I think that is a case to which we can refer with pride and satisfaction, and in regard to which we can justly claim the approbation of Parliament and of the country. But it was not altogether without encountering difficulty, not only in other countries, but at home, that we were able to bring that long negotiation to a successful issue.[16]

Then the Right Honorable Baronet says, that he was also a party to another operation which differed in some degree from pure and mere diplomatic intervention--the interference of this country in the affairs of Portugal by the Quadruple Treaty of 1834.[17]

* * * * *

Now, the fault I find with those who are so fond of attacking me either here or elsewhere, in this country or in others, is that they try to bring down every question to a personal bearing. If they want to oppose the policy of England, they say, “Let us get rid of the man who happens to be the organ of that policy.” Why, it is like shooting a policeman. As long as England is England, as long as the English people are animated by the feelings and spirit and opinions which they possess, you may knock down twenty foreign Ministers one after another, but depend upon it no one will keep his place who does not act upon the same principles. When it falls to my duty, in pursuance of my functions, to oppose the policy of any Government, the immediate cry is, “Oh, it’s all spite against this man, or that man, Count This, or Prince That, that makes you do this.” So the Right Honorable Baronet says our object in 1847 was merely to get rid of Costa Cabral; and, he adds, Costa Cabral being now in office, our purpose has been defeated. Now, as regards mere personal considerations, we did not care who was Minister of Portugal; but we felt that there was in that country much popular excitement, that party was arrayed against party, class against class, that there were bitter animosities ready to break out, and we knew perfectly well that if a member of the Cabral faction, was, at that particular time, made Minister there would be a renewal of civil war; we accordingly excluded, not forever, but merely for a time, and until the Cortes should decide who was to have their confidence, and who should be Minister, all men of the extreme parties, whether of the Cabral faction or of the Junta faction. I, therefore, cannot admit the triumph which the Right Honorable Baronet thinks he has obtained at my expense, by the fact that Costa Cabral, in spite of our proceedings in 1847, is now, in 1850, Minister of Portugal.

Now come to Spain. It is perfectly true that the Right Honorable Baronet was not in office when the Additional Articles of 1835--additional to the Treaty of 1834--were concluded. But what was the Treaty of 1834--the Quadruple Treaty? It was a treaty to expel from the peninsula not Don Miguel only, but Don Carlos also, who was then at the head of the troops in Portugal; and, therefore, so far as the spirit and provisions of that Treaty of 1834 went, the Right Honorable Baronet cannot ride off by saying that it confined itself entirely to Portugal, and did not extend to interference with Spain. Don Carlos was at the time in Portugal, at the head of the troops, with the purpose of getting back into Spain; and, had Don Miguel been successful in Portugal, there is no doubt that Don Carlos would have availed himself of the circumstance to enforce his claims upon Spain. Don Carlos having been expelled from the Peninsula under the Treaty of 1834, came to London for a time, and then returned to Spain. Hostilities were resumed in Spain; and the Additional Articles of 1835 were then concluded, for the purpose of giving to the Queen of Spain assistance, to enable her to retain the Crown, and to expel Don Carlos from Spain.[18]

This was a case exactly similar to that of Portugal in the preceding year. We had no particular interest, in the abstract, in determining whether the Sovereign of Spain should be an infant princess, as Isabella then was, or a full-grown prince; the mere abstract question between Isabella and Carlos was one in regard to which we had nothing to stake, and which the then Government of England would probably not have thought it proper or useful to interfere with. Questions of succession to a Crown have, indeed, at all times been matters with which foreign Powers have concerned themselves; but it has only been when some distant interest has made it worth their while to do so. But in Spain, as in Portugal, the question was between arbitrary rule and constitutional and parliamentary government, and in relation to Spain, as well as to Portugal, we thought that the interests of England in every point of view, commercial and political, would be benefited by the establishment of constitutional government.

If England has any interest more than another with reference to Spain, it is that Spain should be independent, that Spain should be Spanish. Spain for the Spaniards, is the maxim upon which we proceed in our policy with regard to Spain. Much evil must ever come to this country from the fact of Spain being under the dictation of other Powers. It is eminently for our interest that when we have the misfortune to be in dispute or at war with any other Power, we should not, merely on that account and without any offence to or from Spain herself, be at war with Spain also. It is to our advantage that so long as we have given no offence to Spain, and she none to us, differences with other Powers should not involve us in war with her: and we considered that the independence of Spain was more likely to be secured by a Government controlled by a representative and national Assembly, than by a Government purely arbitrary, and consisting merely of the members who might form the Administration. Therefore, on the grounds of strict policy, independently of the general sympathy which animated the people as well as the Government of this country towards Spain at that time, we thought it our interest to take part with Isabella, and against the pretensions of Don Carlos. That policy was successful. The Carlist cause failed; the cause of the constitution prevailed. But it is said by the Right Honorable Baronet that General Narvaez is Minister of Spain. I cannot see in that any defeat of the policy of England; General Narvaez, indeed, is Minister of Spain, but the constitution has of late been more strictly observed than it was at the period to which the Right Honorable Baronet referred.

The Right Honorable Baronet finds fault with a certain despatch which, in July, 1846 after the change of Ministry in this country, I wrote to Sir Henry, then Mr. Bulwer, at Madrid; and the Right Honorable Baronet says: “Here is an instance, not only of the interference of the noble Viscount, but of the manner and tone he uses.” Now, as to manner and tone, there have been certain communications made to other British Ministers by persons in whom the Right Honorable Baronet has confidence, which are certainly couched in terms which may possibly admit of the application of some of those phrases which the Right Honorable Baronet has applied to me. There was a certain despatch, for example, addressed by the Earl of Aberdeen to Sir Edmund Lyons, our Minister at Athens, which has already been read elsewhere, and which I have got a copy of here, and which I think is a very curious specimen of the manner in which the most mild and uninterfering of Foreign Ministers can, when he so likes, deal with the internal arrangement of other Governments.

Everybody knows who Sir Richard Church is; a most distinguished soldier, who fought nobly in the cause of Greek independence, and for a long time was properly respected and honored by the Greek Government. But, in 1843, he was supposed to sympathize with the party who extorted the constitution from the King. I believe that what he then did, was a great service to the King; and that he was very instrumental in saving King Otho from dangers to which he would otherwise have been exposed; but, however, in 1844, he incurred the displeasure of the King, and he was removed from the appointment of Inspector-General of the Greek forces, which he had held; and he was succeeded by General Grivas, a person whose conduct, as it appears from the despatch in question, had not been altogether free from imputations of disloyalty. Well, here are the instructions given on the subject to Sir Edmund Lyons, by the Minister who never interfered with the internal affairs of other countries, and especially with their purely domestic matters:

“Sir--Her Majesty’s Government have learned with deep concern the dismissal of Sir Richard Church from the post of Inspector-General of the Greek Army, which post he had so honorably and successfully filled for many years.”

Perhaps so far it was natural for the English Government to regret the dismissal of a meritorious English officer.

“Their regret is increased by finding that General Grivas, who so recently engaged in open rebellion against the Throne, has been appointed to succeed him.”

As to this point, one would have thought the King of Greece was himself the best judge.

“Her Majesty’s Government do not propose to interfere in the matter; since, however unjust the deprivation of General Church may have been, and however injudicious the elevation of his successor, these acts were certainly within the competence of the Greek Government.”

This is very handsome and candid.

“But,” continues the non-interfering Minister, “though her Majesty’s Government abstain from interfering, they deem it an imperative duty on their part--considering the position in which Great Britain stands with regard to Greece, as a creating and guaranteeing Power, to express--”

They do not interfere-- “to express in the strongest terms their sense of the injustice done to Sir Richard Church, one of the best, most disinterested, and most efficient supporters of Greek independence, by an abrupt and ungracious dismissal, unaccompanied by any word of commendation or acknowledgment of his great services to Greece, and also their sense of the excess of imprudence and impolicy exhibited in the appointment to one of the most responsible offices under the Crown of a man whose recent conduct has shown him to be an enemy to the Throne, and a deliberate perverter of order and discipline.”

This was written by the Minister who never interfered with the internal arrangements of other Powers.

“Her Majesty’s Government,” continues this mild despatch, “consider themselves fully warranted by the overt acts of General Grivas himself, in instructing you to make known these sentiments distinctly in their name to the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs as well as to the King himself--as well as to the King himself, should a favorable opportunity present itself and at the same time to warn His Majesty seriously--seriously and solemnly of the danger to which he will expose his country and his Throne by a perseverance in so fatal a line of policy as that which he has lately pursued.”

The writer of this despatch condemns me for my despatch of the 19th of July, 1846, addressed to Sir Henry Bulwer--a despatch which was not to be communicated to the Sovereign; and the concluding paragraph of which the Right Honorable Baronet might as well have read, when he read the other portion of it, because after stating to Sir Henry Bulwer that, having just come into office, we thought it was essential that we should explain to him the views we entertained as to the position of Spain, and as to the conduct of the Spanish Government, the despatch concluded with the following passage:

“It was certainly not for the purpose of subjecting the Spanish nation to a grinding tyranny, that Great Britain entered into the engagements of the quadruple alliance of 1835, and gave, in pursuance of the stipulations of that treaty, that active assistance, which contributed so materially to the expulsion of Don Carlos from Spain. But her Majesty’s Government are so sensible of the inconvenience of interfering, even by friendly advice, in the internal affairs of independent States, that I have to abstain from giving you instructions to make any representations whatever to the Spanish Ministers on these matters. But, though you will, of course, take care to express on no occasion on these subjects sentiments different from those which I have thus explained to you; and although you will be careful not to express those sentiments in any manner or upon any occasion so as to be likely to create, increase, or encourage discontent, yet you need not conceal from any of those persons who may have the power of remedying the existing evils, the fact that such opinions are entertained by the British Government.”

Now let the House, after comparing these two despatches, say whether it is from that quarter that we deserve the condemnation that has been passed upon us? “If I am worthy to be so treated I do not deserve to be so treated by you.”

But it is said, nevertheless, to me:

“You cannot be commonly courteous or civil, even in your reconciliations; your strong language led to a rupture of diplomatic relations with Spain, and, when matters have been arranged again, you have spoiled the grace and courtesy of the reconciliation by your manner of accepting an apology.”

I am told:

“You mentioned Sir Henry Bulwer, in your note, in reply to the apology of the Spanish Government, as the person whom you would have preferred to send to Madrid; and that was enough to disgust the Spanish Government and the Spanish people.”

No, at the time when the conduct of Sir Henry Bulwer became the subject of discussion in this House, there was not a man of any side who did not do him justice; and no one expressed himself more handsomely in regard to Sir Henry Bulwer than did the Right Honorable Baronet, the Member for Tamworth. Sir, it is not always fitting to tell diplomatic secrets to the House of Commons. Yet I am obliged, in vindication of myself, to do so on this occasion; and to tell the House, but of course in strict confidence, that those two notes--namely, the note of apology from the Spanish Government, and our note of answer, were mutually communicated to and approved by each Government beforehand. Yes, those notes were communicated confidentially and were agreed to by both Governments before they were officially interchanged.

However, sir, the Right Honorable Baronet, the Member for Ripon, says that these affairs of Spain were of long duration, and produced disastrous consequences, because they were followed by events of the greatest importance, as regards another country, namely, France. He says, that out of those Spanish quarrels and Spanish marriages, there arose differences between England and France, which led to no slighter catastrophe than the overthrow of the French monarchy. This is another instance of the fondness for narrowing down a great and national question to the smallness of personal difference. It was my dislike to M. Guizot, forsooth, arising out of these Spanish marriages, which overthrew his administration, and with it the throne of France! Why, sir, what will the French nation say when they hear this? They are a high-minded and high-spirited nation, full of the sense of their own dignity and honor--what will they say when they hear it stated that it was in the power of a British Minister to overthrow their Government, and their monarchy? Why, sir, it is a calumny on the French nation to suppose that the personal hatred of any foreigner to their Minister could have this effect. They are a brave, a generous, and a noble-minded people; and if they had thought that a foreign conspiracy had been formed against one of their Ministers--I say, that if the French people had thought that a knot of foreign conspirators were caballing against one of their Ministers, and caballing for no other reason than that he had upheld, as he conceived, the dignity and interests of his own country; and if they had thought that such a knot of foreign conspirators had coadjutors in their own land, why, I say that the French people, that brave, noble, and spirited nation, would have scorned the intrigues of such cabal, and would have clung the closer to, and have supported the more, the man against whom such a plot had been made. If, then the French people had thought that I, or any other Foreign Minister, was seeking to overthrow M. Guizot, their knowledge of such a design, so far from assisting the purpose, would have rendered him stronger than ever, in the post which he occupied. No, Sir, the French Minister and the French monarchy were overthrown by far different causes. And many a man, both in this country and elsewhere, would have done well to have read a better lesson from the events which then took place.

We had, indeed, a difference with the Government of France relative to the Spanish marriages.[19] I do not wish to open again questions that are gone by, or to remind the House or the country of the grounds of complaint which we had then, as I think, justly, against those who are no longer in power. But since I am pressed upon this matter, and as it is one count of the long indictment preferred against me, I must say, in my own defence, that the dissatisfaction which we felt was not groundless. I must say, too, that I formed my judgment from communications made to me by the noble Lord, (the Earl of Aberdeen), whom I succeeded in the office I hold--from statements from his own mouth, made to me in that interview which always take place between the Foreign Minister who goes out, and the Minister who comes in. I learned from that source, that promises had been made in regard to these marriages--not only by a Minister to a Minister, but between far higher personages--promises, the like of which, so far as I am aware of, have never before in the history of Europe been broken; and yet those promises were deliberately broken. If we felt dissatisfaction then at those marriages, that dissatisfaction was just and well-founded; and upon every ground of national interest and honor, we were entitled, nay, bound, to express it.

Before I quit this subject, I must say that in my opinion the policy which we have pursued in regard to France has been consistent with the interests of this country, and has been characterized by an observance of the principles which the honorable and learned gentleman whose resolution we are discussing, thinks ought to govern our foreign policy, and which are calculated to preserve, as they have preserved, the peace of Europe. Our prompt acknowledgment in 1848 of the Government established in France, and the kindly relations which we have maintained with the successive chiefs of administration in that country, sufficiently show that we have been animated by a kindly feeling towards the French nation; and that in our opinion the maintenance of friendly relations with that country is not only consistent with our interests and our dignity, but also forms a firm foundation for the peace of Europe.

The Right Honorable Baronet, the Member for Ripon, has insinuated that the Marquess of Normandy, in the period immediately preceding the events of February, 1848, had been in too intimate connection with some of the persons whom he describes as the parties who overthrew the throne of France. I know not whom he means, but this I know, that the person with whom the Marquess of Normandy was perhaps in the most frequent communication, because he was an old and intimate friend, was Count Mole; and I have yet to learn that he is a man who was likely to do anything to overthrow, either intentionally or unintentionally, the monarchy of France. But, if that insinuation was meant to convey an imputation that the Marquess of Normandy had done anything, or had held any intercourse inconsistent with his position as the ambassador of a friendly Power, then I say that imputation is totally and entirely unfounded.

Well, sir, I leave the sunny plains of Castile, and the gay vineyards of France, and now I am taken to the mountains of Switzerland, as the place where I am to render a stricter account.[20]

* * * * *

With regard to our policy with respect to Italy, I utterly deny the charges that have been brought against us of having been the advocates, supporters, and encouragers of revolution. It has always been the fate of advocates of temperate reform and of constitutional improvement to be run at as the fomenters of revolution. It is the easiest mode of putting them down; it is the received formula. It is the established practice of those who are the advocates of arbitrary government to say, “Never mind real revolutionists; we know how to deal with them; your dangerous man is the moderate reformer; he is such a plausible man; the only way of getting rid of him is to set the world at him by calling him a revolutionist.”

Now, there are revolutionists of two kinds in this world. In the first place there are those violent, hot-headed, and unthinking men, who fly to arms, who overthrow established governments, and who recklessly without regard to consequences, and without measuring difficulties and comparing strength, deluge their country with blood, and draw down the greatest calamities on their fellow-countrymen. These are the revolutionists of one class. But there are revolutionists of another kind; blind-minded men, who, animated by antiquated prejudices, and daunted by ignorant apprehensions, dam up the current of human improvement, until the irresistible pressure of accumulated discontent breaks down the opposing barriers, and overthrows and levels to the earth those very institutions which a timely application of renovating means would have rendered strong and lasting. Such revolutionists as these are the men who call us revolutionists. It was not to make revolutions that the Earl of Minto[21] went to Italy, or that we, at the request of the Governments of Austria and Naples, offered our mediation between contending parties.

* * * * *

With respect to the questions which arose last Autumn about Turkey, no blame has been imputed to her Majesty’s Government for the course which we pursued on that occasion in answer to the appeal made by Turkey, to this country and to France, for moral and material assistance. On that point all parties agreed. It is a proud and honorable recollection which Englishmen may treasure up, that on any occasion like that, all party differences were merged in high and generous national feeling; and that men of all sides concurred in thinking, that the Government of the Queen would not have been justified in rejecting an appeal so made, on such a subject.

But it has been said that we ought to have confined our interference, at first, to sending a despatch, and that we should not have sent our fleet until we knew whether our despatches would produce the desired effect. That would have been a very imprudent and unwise course of proceeding. The agents of the two Imperial Governments at Constantinople had used most menacing language to the Porte; had demanded the surrender of the refugees in the most peremptory manner; and said, that if they did not receive a categorical answer within a limited time they would suspend diplomatic relations. In short, they intimated that a refusal of their demands might lead to war. We had no means at the time of knowing whether this violent and peremptory language was or was not authorized by the Courts of Russia and Austria, and whether those Governments were prepared to enforce by actual hostilities the threat so held out. It was impossible to say what might occur in the interval between the 6th and the 26th of October; between the day when the despatches of the British Government were sent off to St. Petersburgh and Vienna, and the day when, if it were necessary on the receipt of those answers to send a fleet, that fleet, sent only after the answers were received, could reach the place where its services might be required. The Government did what men of prudence would do, who mean to do that which they profess.[22]

But it has been said that the sending of this fleet was a threat against Russia and Austria. I utterly deny that the sending of the fleet was a threat against either one or the other. A fleet at the Dardanelles was not a threat against Austria. If it had been in the Adriatic, it might have been so regarded. A fleet in the Mediterranean was not a threat against Russia. Had it forced its way through the Dardanelles and Bosphorus, and had gone up to the Black Sea, and had anchored off Sebastopol, it might have been so considered. But a fleet at the mouth of the Dardanelles could be a threat against nobody; it must be manifest to the world that it could only be a symbol and source of support to the Sultan. It was a measure purely of defence and not a measure of offence.

But then we are told that our fleet by anchoring within the outer and inner castles of the Dardanelles, violated, not the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, as was said by mistake, but the Treaty of London, concluded in July, 1841, between the five Powers and Turkey, with respect to the passage of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus. The British Government are accused of violating that treaty by ordering Sir W. Parker to enter the Dardanelles.

Now, by the Treaty of 1809, between England and Turkey, England bound herself to respect the rule of the Turkish Empire, by which, while Turkey is at peace, the Straits of Dardanelles and of the Bosphorus are closed against the ships of war of foreign Powers. But it was not till the Treaty of 1841 that the same engagement was also taken by all the other four Powers. I concur entirely with the Right Honorable Baronet, the Member for Ripon, in thinking that this was a wise and politic arrangement, eminently advantageous to Turkey, and conducive to the peace of Europe. Because when it is considered how easy it would be, if these narrow straits were open to the armed ships of other countries in times of peace, for any maritime Power when she had a discussion of any kind with the Turkish Government, to support the friendly representations of her Minister at Constantinople by the of course, accidental visit of a large fleet off the Seraglio Point--whether the fleet came from the Black Sea or the Mediterranean, it appears essential for the maintenance of the independence of the Porte, that no armed vessel of other Powers should, when the Porte is at peace, be allowed to enter either of those straits.