Chapter I: Preface

Senator J. W. Fulbright’s memorandum concerning the military and the cold war was likely the most controversial paper which appeared in Washington in 1961. It is probable that the memorandum has been discussed by a lot of people who have not read it, much less studied it. Because it is an important document it ought to be studied by the public as a whole, and not just by men in the armed forces or by those in the political arena.

The importance of the memorandum is underscored not only by what it says but also by the wide and varied reaction to it. As to be expected, it has not been favorably received by those individuals and organizations which it attacks as extremely radical rightwingers. In addition, many individuals from various parts of the United States and from both political parties have been critical of the memorandum.

On the other hand, support for the memorandum has come from many and different sources. President Kennedy stated that Senator Fulbright rendered a service by sending the memorandum to the White House. In the Senator’s own state, the _Arkansas Gazette_ has more than once indicated its editorial backing of the memorandum.

The leftists as a whole have backed the memorandum. This backing has included that of the socialists and of the communists. Kingsley Martin, a British socialist said: “The dangerous change came with the Korean war, when America discovered that GIs, having no notion why they were fighting, were easily influenced by Communist propaganda. As a result, the Pentagon has poured out hundreds of booklets instructing officers how to indoctrinate the army with hatred of Communism. Quotations from these documents, presented at the initial hearing of the Walker case, were, one would have thought sufficient evidence of the virulent anti-Communist propaganda to which the troops are subjected. But the Fulbright memorandum (which should be widely published and not hidden in the Congressional Record) proved that politically-minded generals had used the permitted task of indoctrination as a means of denigrating such distinguished American personalities as Truman, Mrs. Roosevelt and Dean Acheson. These were in effect treated as near-Communists, if not traitors.”[1] So far as the present author understands the matter, the memorandum does not mention but one General even remotely in such a way. And even in his case it states that he said that some prominent Americans were “tainted with Communist ideology.” This is not the same as calling them near-Communists or traitors.

Kingsley Martin further praised Senator Fulbright as an internationalist, and as one who “was making a reasoned attempt to bring Arkansas into the world community.”[2] What kind of “world community” did the socialist Martin have in mind?

Senator Fulbright and his position were backed in the Paris weekly, L’EXPRESS on October 12, 1961. This paper is connected with Pierre Mendes-France, a leader of the leftwing of the Socialist Party in France.[3]

The Socialist Party-Social Democratic Federation has backed it consistently. Norman Thomas said: “Our immediate purpose in preparing this factual pamphlet was to present it to the administration in order to back up Senator Fulbright’s excellent memorandum and continue the work that the Defense Department has begun.”[4]

Irwin Suall, a prominent socialist, has written: “Flushing out and exposing the activities of the ultras is a major current function of the Socialist Party. From that standpoint, Thomas called the results of his press conference ‘highly gratifying’.”[5]

The Communist Party in the United States thought so highly of the memorandum that they reprinted without comment several columns of the memorandum in _The Worker_ for August 27, 1961.

No attempt is made to identify Senator Fulbright with each of these groups just because they back him in this matter. This would be neither sensible nor fair. However, such questions as the following are raised: Why are they backing him in this matter? How do they believe that this would contribute to their long-range or short-range purposes? Would it make a contribution to any of their purposes? We do know that the socialists and the communists are backing the memorandum. This reveals their evaluation of it and indicates whose causes they think that the memorandum serves.

The extent to which the censorship, which is recommended in memorandum of Senator Fulbright, is being carried out already is indicated in a directive issued to Reserve Officers in at least one area of the United States. It reads: “Although Reserve personnel are not subject to Army Regulations except when on active duty, such regulations are distributed to Reserve units with the intention of providing guidance where appropriate. Members of the Reserve are encouraged to conform whenever possible to the spirit and intent of regulations even though they are not bound by them. It is pointed out that information they convey to the public becomes at least quasi-official when linked with their Reserve Status.”

Since within a few months an attempt was being made to carry over the censorship into the private lives of Reservists, in the above manner, what will happen within a few years unless the trend is changed? Will the Reserves be prohibited from the freedom of speech which is the birthright of American citizens?

The memorandum is thus seen to raise questions which are tremendous in their import.

Our examination of the memorandum does not imply that there are no extremists. Obviously there are extremists of all varieties in America, and it would be unreasonable to conclude that there were no extremists in the military or amongst the anti-Communists. However, in the author’s judgment it is highly doubtful that the number of extremists in the military is anywhere near as high as the percentage of soldiers in Korean prisoner of war camps who in one way or another collaborated with the enemy, or defected, or failed to manifest the proper discipline or failed to cooperate with their fellow soldiers.

Our defense of some of the individuals and positions which are attacked in the memorandum does not imply an endorsement of every individual and organization mentioned in the memorandum; nor does it imply an endorsement of everything which may have been said at one time or another by the individuals and organizations in whose defense we have spoken.

In our discussion of the memorandum we have sometimes quoted Senator Fulbright against Senator Fulbright. We have also quoted some liberals against Senator Fulbright. This illustrates that one is not necessarily a so-called ultra rightist just because he opposes certain positions taken by the Senator.

There are some who have implied that Senator Fulbright is not responsible for what is in the memorandum since he did not personally write it. Of such we would ask: Is there anything in the memorandum’s charges and recommendations with which the Senator disagrees? If so, why has he not said so? As far as our knowledge goes, the Senator himself has never suggested that he disagrees with any of its charges and recommendations.

Although the Senator did not personally write the memorandum, he is responsible for it; and as far as we know he has never suggested otherwise. He submitted it “to the Secretary of Defense.”[6] He said: “The memorandum was based on my strong belief in the principle of military subordination to civilian control.”[7] “The memorandum was a personal one.... It was transmitted to the Secretary of Defense as a personal correspondence.” It was a part of his “private papers.”[8]

According to the President, Senator Fulbright’s memorandum presented the Senator’s views. “Senator Fulbright sent a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense at the request of the Secretary of Defense, and expressed his views about a matter which is, of course, of concern to the Department of Defense.”

“So, in my judgment, Senator Fulbright performed a service in sending his viewpoint to the Department of Defense....”[9]

In order to assist the public in their evaluation of the memorandum, the following discussion of the memorandum is placed before the public.

This discussion does not endeavor to present and to examine the basic philosophy, strategy and tactics of the enemy—communism. This the author has endeavored to do in two other books, _Communism: Its Faith and Fallacies_ and _Understanding Communism_.

Appreciation is expressed to those who gave permission to quote from copyrighted material.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] _New Statesman_, November 17, 1961, p. 732, col. 2,t. The difficulty of speaking on some phases of the present world situation without crossing Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt is illustrated by following remarks which she made in a recent interview. _First_, the President has urged the people to build shelters. Mrs. Roosevelt said: “I don’t believe in private shelters, or school shelters.” It must be done, she said, through “a comprehensive government program” if it is to be done at all. _Second_, the President indicates that we shall fight if necessary. Military men teach the same thing. She said: “War is inadmissible anymore.... Today willingness to go to war means willingness to face the loss of civilization.” (Hal Boyle, “Eleanor Roosevelt Recalls Pearl Harbor,” _Arkansas Democrat_, Dec. 7, 1961, p. 19.)

[2] _New Statesman_, p. 732, col. 1,m.

[3] “Politically, it speaks for the non-Communist left and is close to ex-Premier Pierre Mendes-France.” _Newsweek_, Feb. 12, 1962, p. 82, col. 3,b.

[4] _New America_, December 8, 1961, p. 2.

[5] _Ibid._, p. 6, col. 5,t. _Maclean’s_ magazine (September 9, 1961) defended Senator Fulbright and implied that “fanatics, numbskulls and mediocrities” were the core of the opposition to him in his home state (p. 81. From an article by Ian Schlanders.)

[6] _Congressional Record_, August 2, 1961, p. 13436, col. 2,m.

[7] _Ibid._, p. 13436, col. 2,m.

[8] _Ibid._, p. 13436, col. 3,t.

[9] Press conference of August 10. _Congressional Record_, August 11, 1961, p. 14449, col. 1,t,m. See also p. 14559.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTERS Page

Preface

I The Background 1

II The Secret Memorandum Made Public 5

III The Effect of the Memorandum 6

IV Who Is Attacked in the Memorandum 9

V The Protracted Conflict Concept Criticized 29

VI The American People the Principle Problem? 50

VII Who Is the Defeatest? 70

VIII Senator Fulbright and World Opinion 70

IX Is Communism A Matter of Politics? 80

X The Memorandum and the Community Party Line 80

XI Conclusions 101