Chapter III: The Effect of the Memorandum

Senator Fulbright, when he inserted the memorandum into the _Congressional Record_, said it was based on the principle of military subordination to civilian control, and that it was not the function of the military to educate the public on political issues.[27] The Senator further said: “The memorandum was directed solely at the impropriety of officers of the armed services lending their prestige and official status to meetings which tend to undermine policies of the civil government of the United States, as set forth by the President and the Congress.”[28]

“The sole objective of my recommendation was to insure that high military personnel adhere to the obligation, which is inherent in their duty as officers to refrain from public expressions of opposition to the policies of the Government and of their Commander-in-Chief.”[29]

We are not impugning the motives of Senator Fulbright when we say that a study of the memorandum reveals that its effect was to challenge the National Security Council directive of 1958. This directive did not deny the principle of civilian control; in fact, because of its subordination to President Eisenhower the military obeyed the directive. Furthermore, the directive did not call for the military to educate the public on political issues in the sense of partisan politics. In the memorandum Senator Fulbright himself said: “Under a National Security Council directive in 1958, it remains the policy of the U. S. Government to make use of military personnel and facilities to arouse the public to the menace of the cold war.”[30]

“The purpose of this memorandum is to give some indication of the dangers involved in education and propaganda activities by the military, directed at the public, and to suggest steps for dealing with the underlying problem.”[31]

“There is little in the education, training or experience of most military officers to equip them with the balance of judgment necessary to put their own ultimate solutions—those with which their education, training and experience are concerned—into proper perspective in the President’s total ‘strategy for the nuclear age’.”[32]

Under “Recommendations” we find:

“1. With reference to the National Security Council directive of 1958, suggested revision is based upon its description in attachment 3 (New York Times article of June 18, 1961), from which the following is excerpted: ‘President Eisenhower and his top policy leaders decreed that the cold war could not be fought as a series of separate and often unrelated actions, as with foreign aid and propaganda’. Rather, it must be fought with a concentration of all the resources of the Government and with the full understanding and support of the civilian population. It was decided, in particular, that the military should be used to reinforce the cold-war effort.”

“This policy should be reconsidered from the standpoint of a basic error, that military personnel have the necessarily broad background which would enable them to relate the various aspects of the cold-war effort, one to the other.”[33]

The memorandum indicates that it is convinced that the National Security Council directive, and its implementation, could be attacked from several grounds, including an assumed violation of the “basic traditional and constitutional question of military efforts to propagandize the public....” As it went on to say: “the violation of these concepts alone should be sufficient basis for challenging the National Security Council policy, and its implementation.”[34]

This also helps make it certain that the memorandum was not directed simply against certain mistakes in the implementation of the policy, but against the policy itself. In addition to saying that the military is _not qualified_ to engage in the cold war, the Senator claims that it is _forbidden on constitutional grounds_.

FOOTNOTES:

[27] _Congressional Record_, August 2, 1961, p. 13436, col. 2,m. Civilian control is not controversial. In his May 12, 1962 speech to the West Point Cadets, General Douglas MacArthur emphasized that political problems were “not for your professional participation or military solution.” _Congressional Record_, May 31, 1962, p. A4009, col. 1,t.

Admiral Arleigh A. Burke testified: “No mature U.S. military officer I know of has ever questioned it. Indeed, it is a sacred part of our military tradition itself. If a military man cannot reconcile his convictions with his civilian superior’s orders, he has only the recourse of leaving the service.”

“But the principle of civilian control can be perverted. Civilian control of the military is properly exerted by the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the secretaries of the individual military departments over the military services, within the guidelines laid down by Congress. The senior civilians in the Government have the final decision on all problems affecting the military posture of the United States. This is proper and correct.”

“In my opinion, it is improper that civilian control should be exercised in any other echelon but at the top. It should not be extended to every subordinate military echelon. To be specific, orders and directives to the military should come from the top civilian elements to the senior military people. They should not come from junior civilian elements to junior military people.” (Military Cold War Education and Speech Review Policies, Part 1, pp. 21-22).

General MacArthur further said: “While for the purpose of administration and command the Armed forces are within the executive branch of the Government, they are accountable as well to the Congress, charged with the policymaking responsibility, and to the people, ultimate repository of all national power. Yet so inordinate has been the application of the Executive power that members of the armed services have been subjected to the most arbitrary and ruthless treatment for daring to speak the truth in accordance with conviction and conscience.” (as quoted by General Edward M. Almond, _Ibid._, Part 2, p. 714.)

[28] “Statement of Senator J. W. Fulbright Relating to a Memorandum Submitted by Him to the Department of Defense,” p. 3.

[29] _Ibid._, page 4.

[30] _Congressional Record_, August 2, 1961, p. 13436, col. 3,b.

[31] _Ibid._, p. 13437, col. 1,t.

[32] _Ibid._, p. 13437, col. 1,b.

[33] _Ibid._, p. 13437, col. 3,t.

[34] _Ibid._, p. 13437, col. 2,b.