Chapter III: Part 3

Now therefore, if from this alone, _That I can frame the Idea of a Thing in my Mind_, it follows, _That whatever I clearly and distinctly perceive belonging to a thing_, does _Really belong to it_; Cannot I from hence draw an Argument to Prove the _Existence_ of a _God_? Certainly I find the _Idea_ of a _God_, or _infinitely perfect Being_, as _naturally_ in me, as the _Idea_ of any _Figure_, or _Number_; and I as _clearly_ and _distinctly_ understand that it appertains to his _Nature Always to Be_, as I know that what I can _demonstrate_ of a _Mathematical Figure_ or _Number_ belongs to the _Nature_ of that _Figure_ or _Number_: so that, tho all things which I have _Meditated_ upon these three or four days were not _true_, yet I may well be as _certain_ of the _Existence_ of a _God_, as I have hitherto been of _Mathematical Truths_.

_Doubt._ Yet this Argument at first sight appears not so _evident_, but looks rather like a _sophism_; for seeing I am used in all other things to _Distinguish Existence_ from _Essence_, I can easily perswade my self that the _Existence_ of _God_ may be _distinguish’d_ from his _Essence_, so that I may _Imagine God_ not to _Exist_.

_Solution._ But considering it more strictly, ’tis manifest, that the _Existence_ of _God_ can no more be _seperated_ from his _Essence_, then the _Equality_ of the _Three Angles_ to _two right ones_ can be _seperated_ from the _Essence_ of a _Triangle_, or then the _Idea_ of a _Mountain_ can be _without_ the _Idea_ of a _valley_; so that ’tis no less a _Repugnancy_ to think of a _God_ (that is, _A Being infinitely perfect_) who wants _Existence_ (that is, who wants a _Perfection_) then to think of a _Mountain_, to which there is _no Valley adjoyning_.

_Doubt._ But what if I cannot imagine _God_ but as _Existing_, or a _Mountain without a Vally_? yet supposing me to think of a _Mountain with a Vally_, it does not from thence follow, that there _Is a Mountain_ in the World; so supposing me to think of a _God_ as _Existing_, yet does it not follow that _God Really Exists_. For my _Thought imposes_ no _necessity_ on Things, and as I may imagine a _Winged Horse_, tho no _Horse_ has _Wings_, so I may imagine an _existing God_, tho no _God exist_.

_Solution._ ’Tis true the _Sophism_ seems to lie in this, yet tho I cannot conceive a _Mountain_ but with a _Vally_, it does not from hence follow, that a _Mountain_ or _Vally_ do _Exist_, but this will follow, that whether a _Mountain_ or a _Vally do_ or _do not Exist_, yet they cannot be _seperated_: so from hence that I cannot think of _God_ but as _Existing_, it follows that _Existence_ is _Inseperable_ from _God_, and therefore that he _Really Exists_; Not because my _Thought_ does all this, or _Imposes_ any _necessity_ on any Thing, but contrarily, because the _necessity_ of the thing it self (_viz._ of _Gods Existence_) _Determines_ me to _think_ thus; for ’tis not in my Power to think a _God_ without _Existence_ (that is, _A Being absolutely perfect_ without the _Cheif Perfection_) as it is in my Power to imagine a Horse either _with_ or _without Wings_.

_Doubt._ And here it cannot be said, that I am forced to suppose _God Existing_, after I have supposed him _endowed_ with all _Perfections_, seeing _Existence_ is one of them; but that my _First Position_ (_viz._ His _Absolute Perfection_) is not _necessary_. Thus, for example, ’tis not _necessary_ for me to think all _Quadrilateral Figures_ inscribed in a _Circle_; But supposing that I think _so_, I am then _necessitated_ to Confess a _Rhombe Inscribed_ therein, and yet this is evidently _False_.

_Solution._ For tho I am not forced at any time to think of a _God_; yet as often as I cast my Thoughts on a _First_ and _Cheif Being_, and as it were bring forth out of the Treasury of my Mind an _Idea_ thereof, I must of necessity attribute thereto all Manner of _Perfections_, tho I do not at that time _count_ them over, or _Remark_ each single One; which _necessity_ is sufficient to make me hereafter (when I come to consider _Existence_ to be a _Perfection_) conclude _Rightly, That the First and Chief Being does Exist_. Thus, for example, I am not obliged at any time to imagine a _Triangle_, yet whenever I please to Consider of a _Right-lined Figure_ having only _three Angles_, I am then _necessitated_ to allow it all those _Requisites_ from which I may argue rightly, _That the Three Angles thereof are not Greater then Two Right Ones_, Tho upon the first consideration this came not into my Thought. But when I enquire what Figures may be _inscribed_ within a _Circle_, I am not at all _necessitated_ to think that all _Quadrilateral Figures_ are of that sort; neither can I possibly imagine this, whilst I admit of nothing, but what I _clearly_ and _distinctly_ Understand: and therefore there is a great Difference between these _False suppositions_, and _True natural Ideas_, the _first_ and _Chief_; whereof is that of a _God_; For by many wayes I understand _That_ not to be a _Fiction depending_ on my _Thought_, but an _Image_ of a _True_ and _Immutable Nature_; As first, because I can think of no other thing but _God_ to Whose _Essence Existence_ belongs. Next because I cannot Imagine _Two_ or _More Gods_, and supposing that he is _now_ only One, I may plainly perceive it _necessary_ for _Him_ to _Have been from Eternity_, and _will Be to Eternity_; And Lastly because I perceive many Other Things in _God_, Which I cannot _Change_, and from which I cannot _Detract_.

But whatever way of Argumentation I use, it comes All at last to this one Thing, That I am fully perswaded of the _Truth_ of those things only, which appear to me _clearly_ and _distinctly_. And tho some of those things, which I so perceive, are obvious to _every_ Man, and some are only discover’d by Those that search more _nighly_, and enquire more _carefully_, yet when such _truths_ are discover’d, they are esteem’d no less _certain_ than the Others. For Example, Tho it do not so easily appear, that in a Rightangled Triangle, the square of the Base is equal to the squares of the sides, as it appears, that the Base is suspended under its Largest Angle, yet the _first Proposition_ is _no less certainly_ believed when once ’tis perceived, then this _Last_.

Thus in Reference to _God_; certainly, unless I am overrun with _Prejudice_, or have my thoughts begirt on all sides with _sensible Objects_, I should acknowledge nothing _before_ or _easier_ then him; For what is more _self-evident_ then that there is a _Chief Being_, or then that a _God_ (to whose _essence alone Existence_ appertains) does _Exist_? And tho serious Consideration is required to perceive thus much, yet _Now_, I am not only equally _certain_ of it, as of what seems most _certain_, but I perceive also that the _Truth_ of other Things so _depends_ on it, that without it nothing can ever be _perfectly known_.

For tho my _nature_ be _such_, that during the time of my _Clear_ and _Distinct_ Perception, I cannot but believe it _true_; yet my _Nature_ is _such_ also, that I cannot fix the _Intention_ of my _Mind_ upon one and the same thing alwayes, so as to perceive it _clearly_, and the Remembrance of what _Judgement_ I have formerly made is often stirred up, when I cease attending to those reasons for which I passed such a Judgment, other Reasons may then be produced, which (if I did not _know God_) may easily _move_ me in my _Opinion_; and by this means I shall never attain to the _true_ and _certain Knowledge_ of any Thing, but _Wandring_ and _Unstable opinions_. So, for example, when I consider the Nature of a Triangle, it plainly appears to me (as understanding the Principles of Geometry) that its three Angles are equal to two right ones; And this I must of necessity think _True_ as long as I attend to the _Demonstration_ thereof; but as soon as ever I withdraw my Mind from the _Consideration_ of its _Proof_ (altho I remember that I have once _Clearly_ perceived it) yet perhaps I may _doubt_ of Its _Truth_, being as yet _Ignorant_ of a _God_; For I may perswade my self, that I am so framed by _Nature_, as to be _deceived_ in those things which I imagine my self to perceive most _evidently_, Especially when I recollect, that heretofore I have often accounted many things _True_ and _Certain_, which afterward upon other Reasons I have Judged as False. But when I perceive that there is a _God_; because at the same time I also Understand that all things _Depend_ on Him, and that he is not a _Deceiver_; and when from hence I Collect that all those Things which I _clearly_ and _distinctly_ perceive are _necessarily True_; tho I have no further Respects to those Reasons which induced me to believe it _True_, yet if I do but remember, that I have _once clearly_ and _distinctly_ perceived it, no Argument can be brought on the contrary, that shall make me _doubt_, but that I have _true_ and _certain_ Knowledge thereof; and not onely of that, but of all other _Truths_ also which I remember that I have _once Demonstrated_, such as are _Geometrical Propositions_ and the like.

What now can be _Objected_ against me? shall I say, that I am so made by _Nature_, as to be often _deceived_? No; For I now Know that I cannot be _deceived_ in those Things, which I _clearly_ Understand. Shall I say, that at other times I have esteem’d many Things _True_ and _Certain_, which afterwards I found to be _falsities_? No; for I perceived none of those things _clearly_ and _distinctly_, but being Ignorant of this _Rule_ of _Truth_, I took them up for Reasons, which Reasons I afterward found to be _Weak_. What then can be said? Shall, I say, (as lately I objected) that Perhaps I am _asleep_, and that what I now think of is no more _True_, then the _Dreams_ of People _asleep_? But this it self _moves_ not my Opinion; for certainly tho I were _asleep_, if any thing appear’d _evident_ to my Understanding, ’twould be _True_.

And Thus I Plainly see, that the _Certainty_ and _Truth_ of all _Science_ Depends on the _Knowledge_ of the _True God_, so that before I had _Known Him_, I did _Know nothing_; But now many things both of _God_ himself, and of other _Intellectual Things_, as also of _Corporeal nature_, which is the _Object_ of _Mathematicks_, may be _Plainly Known_ and _Certain_ to me.

MEDITAT. VI.

_~Of Corporeal Beings~, and Their ~Existence~: As Also of the Real Difference, Between ~Mind~ and ~Body~._

It now remains that I examine whether any _Corporeal Beings_ do _Exist_; And already I know that (as they are the _Object_ of _Pure Mathematicks_) they _May_ (at least) _Exist_, for I _clearly_ and _distinctly_ perceive them; and doubtless _God_ is _able_ to _make_, whatever I am _able_ to _perceive_, and I never Judged any thing to be _beyond_ his _Power_, but what was _Repugnant_ to a _distinct perception_. Moreover, such _Material Beings seem_ to _Exist_ from the _faculty_ of _Imagination_, which I find my self make use of, when I am conversant about them: for if I attentively Consider what _Imagination_ is, ’twill appear to be only _a certain Application of our Cognoscitive or knowing Faculty to a Body or Object that is before it_; and if it be _before it_, It must _Exist_.

But that this may be made more _Plain_, I must first examine the _difference_ between _Imagination_, and _pure Intellection_, or _Understanding_. So, for example, when I _Imagine_ a Triangle, I do not only _Understand_ that it is a _figure comprehended_ by _three Lines_, but I also _behold_ with the _eye_ of my _mind_ those _three lines_ as it were _before Me_, and this is that which I call _imagination_. But if I convert my Thoughts to a _Chiliogone_, or _Figure consisting_ of a _Thousand Angles_, I know as well that this Is a _figure comprehended_ by a _Thousand sides_, as I know that a _Triangle_ is a _Figure Consisting_ of _three sides_; but I do not in the same Manner _Imagine_, or _behold_ as _present_ those _thousand sides_, as I do the _three sides_ of a _Triangle_. And tho at the time when I so think of a _Chiliogone_, I may _confusedly_ represent to my self some _Figure_ (because whenever I Think of a _Corporeal Object_, I am used to _Imagine_ some _Shape_ or other) yet ’tis evident that this _Representation_ is not a _Chiliogone_, because ’tis in nothing _different_ from what I should Represent to my self if I thought of a _Milion-angled figure_, or any other Figure of _More sides_; Neither does such a _Confused Representation_ help me in the least to know those _Properties_, by which a _Chiliogone_ differs from other _Polygones_ or _Manyangled Figures_. But if a Question be put concerning a _Pentagone_, I know I may _Understand its Shape_, as I _Understand_ the _Shape_, of a _Chiliogone_, without the help of _Imagination_, but I can also _imagine_ it, by applying the _Eye_ of my _Mind_ to its _Five sides_, and to the _Area_ or _space_ contained by Them; And herein I manifestly perceive that there is required a _peculiar sort_ of _Operation_ in the _Mind_ to _imagine_ a Thing, which I require not to _Understand_ a Thing; which _New Operation_ of the _Mind_ plainly shews the _difference_ between _imagination_ and _pure Intellection_.

Besides this, I Consider that this _Power_ of _Imagination_ which is in me (as it differs from the _Power_ of _Understanding_) does not appertain to the _Essence_ of _Me_, that is, of _my mind_, for tho I _wanted_ it, yet certainly I should be the _same He, that_ now _I am_: from whence it seems to follow, that it depends on something _different_ from _my self_; and I easily perceive that if any _Body_ whatever did _Exist_, to which my _Mind_ were so _conjoyn’d_, that it may Apply it self when it pleased to _Consider_, or (as it were) _Look_ into _this Body_; From hence, I say, I perceive _It may so be_, that by this very _Body_ I may _Imagine Corporeal Beings_: So that this _Manner_ of _Thinking_ differs from _pure Intellection_ only in this, that the _Mind_, when it _Understands_, does as it were turn _it self_, to _it self_, or _Reflect_ on it self, and _beholds_ some or other of those _Ideas_ which are in it self; But when it _Imagines_, it _Converts_ it self upon _Body_, and therein _beholds_ something Conformable to that _Idea_, which it hath _understood_, or _perceived_ by _Sense_.

But ’tis to be remembred, that I said, I easily conceive Imagination _May be_ so performed, supposing _Body_ to _Exist_. And because no so convenient manner of Explaining it offers it self, from thence I _probably_ guess, that _Body_ does _Exist_. But this I only say _probably_, for tho I should accurately search into all the Arguments drawn from the _distinct Idea_ of _Body_, which I find in my _Imagination_, yet I find none of them, from whence I may _necessarily_ conclude, _that Body does Exist_.

But I have been accustomed to _Imagine_ many other things besides that _Corporeal Nature_ which is the _Object_ of _pure Mathematicks_; such as are, _Colours_, _Sounds_, _Tasts_, _Pain_, &c. but none of these so _distinctly_. And because I perceive these better by _Sense_, from Which by the Help of the _Memory_ they come to the _Imagination_, that I may with the Greater advantage treat of them, I ought at the same time to Consider _Sence_, and to try whether from what I perceive by that way of _Thought_, which I call _Sense_, I can deduce any certain Argument for the _Existence_ of _Corporeal Beings_.

And first I will here reflect with my self, what those things were, which being perceived by _Sence_ I have heretofore thought _True_, and the _Reasons_ why I _so thought_: I will then enquire into the _Reasons_ for which I afterwards _doubted_ those things. And last of all I will consider what I _ought_ to _think_ of those Things at _Present_.

[Sidenote: _The Reasons why I Trusted my Senses._]

First therefore I have always thought that I have had an _Head_, _Hands_, _Feet_, and other _Members_, of which _This Body_ (which I have look’d upon as a _Part_ of _Me_, or Perhaps as my _Whole self_) Consists; And I have also thought that this _Body_ of _Mine_ is Conversant or engaged among many _Other Bodies_, by which it is Liable to be _affected_ with what is _advantagious_ or _hurtful_; What was _Advantagious_ I judged by a certain _sense_ of _Pleasure_, what was _Hurtful_ by a _sense_ of _Pain_. Furthermore, besides _Pleasure_ and _Pain_, I perceived in my self _Hunger_, _Thirst_, and other such like _Appetites_, as also certain _Corporeal Propensions_ to _Mirth_, _Sadness_, _Anger_, and other like _Passions_.

As to What hapned to me from _Bodies without_, Besides the _Extension_, _Figure_, and _Motion_ of those _Bodies_, I also perceived in them _Hardness_, _Heat_, and other _tactile Qualities_, as also _Light_, _Colours_, _Smells_, _Tasts_, _Sounds_, &c. and by the _Variation_ of these I _distinguish’d_ the _Heaven_, _Earth_, and _Seas_, and all other _Bodies_ from each other.

Neither was it wholly without Reason (upon the account of these _Ideas_ of _Qualities_, which offer’d themselves to my Thoughts, and which alone I _properly_ and _Immediately perceived_) that I thought my self to Perceive some Things _Different_ from my _Thought, viz._ The _Bodies_ or _Objects_ from whence these _Ideas_ might _Proceed_; for I often found these _Ideas_ come upon me without my _Consent_ or _Will_; so that I can neither perceive an _Object_ (_tho I had a mind to it_) unless it were _before_ the Organs of my _Sense_; Neither can I _Hinder_ my self from perceiving it, when it is _Present_.

And seeing that those _Ideas_ which I take in by sense are much more _Lively_, _Apparent_ and in their kind more _distinct_, than any of those which _I knowingly_ and _Willingly_ frame by Meditation, or stir up in my _Memory_; it seems to me that they cannot proceed from _my self_. There remains therefore no other way for them to come upon me, but from some other Things _Without_ Me. Of Which Things seeing _I_ have no other Knowledge but from these _Ideas_, _I_ cannot Think but that these _Ideas_ are _like_ the Things.

Moreover, Because _I_ remember that _I_ first made use of my _senses_ before my _Reason_; and because _I_ did perceive that those _Ideas_ which _I_ my self did frame were not so _Manifest_ as those which _I_ received by my _senses_, but very often _made up of their parts_, _I_ was easily perswaded to think that _I_ had no _Idea_ in my _Understanding_, which I had not _First_ in my _sense_.

Neither was it without Reason that _I_ Judged, _That Body_ (which by a _peculiar right I_ call my _Own_) to be _more nighly_ appertaining to _Me_ then any _other Body_. For from It, as from other _Bodies_, _I_ can never be _seperated_, _I_ was _sensible_ of all _Appetites_ and _Affections in It_ and _for It_, and lastly _I_ perceived _pleasure_ and _Pain_ in its Parts, and not in any other Without it. But why from the _sense_ of Pain a certain _Grief_, and from the _sense_ of _pleasure_ a certain _Joy_ of the _Mind_ should arise, or Why that _Gnawing_ of the _stomach_, Which _I_ call _Hunger_, should put me in mind of _Eating_, or the _driness_ of my _Throat_ of _Drinking_, _I_ can give no other Reason but _that I am taught so by Nature_. For to my thinking there is no _Affinity_ or _Likeness_ between that _Gnawing_ of the _Stomach_, and the desire of _Eating_, or between the _sense_ of _Pain_, and the _sorrowful thought_ from thence arising. But in this as in all other _judgments_ that I made of _sensible objects_, I seem’d to be taught by _Nature_, for I first perswaded my self that things were _so_ or _so_, before ever I enquired into a Reason that may prove it.

[Sidenote: _The Reasons why I doubted my senses._]

[Sidenote: _Medit. I._]

But afterwards I discover’d many experiments, wherein my _senses_ so grosly deceived me, that I would never trust them again; for Towers which seem’d _Round_ a far off, nigh at hand appear’d _square_, and _large_ Statues on their tops seem’d _small_ to those that stood on the ground; and in numberless other things, I perceived the _judgements_ of my _outward senses_ were _deceived_: and not of my _outward_ only, but of my _inward senses_ also; for what is more _intimate_ or _inward_ than _Pain_? And yet I have heard from those, whose Arm or Leg was cut off, that they have felt _pain_ in that part which they _wanted_, and therefore I am not _absolutely certain_ that any part of me is affected with _pain_, tho I _feel pain_ therein. To these I have lately added two very _general Reasons_ of _doubt_; The first was, that while I was _awake_, I could not believe my self to perceive any thing, which I could not think my self sometimes to perceive, tho I were _a sleep_; And seeing I cannot believe, that what I seem to perceive in my _sleep_ proceeds from _outward Objects_, what greater Reason have I to think so of what I perceive whilst I am _awake_? The other Cause of Doubt was, that seeing I know not the _Author_ of my _Being_ (or at least I then _supposed_ my self not to know him) what reason is there but that I may be so ordered by _Nature_ as to be _deceived_ even in those things which appear’d to me most _true_. And as to the _Reasons_, which induced me to give _credit_ to _sensible_ Things, ’twas easie to return an answer thereto, for finding by experience, that I was impelled by _Nature_ to many Things, which _Reason_ disswaded me from, I thought I should not far trust what I was taught by _Nature_. And tho the perceptions of my _senses_ depended not on my _Will_, I thought _I_ should not therefore conclude, that they proceeded from _Objects different_ from my self; for perhaps there may be some other _Faculty_ in me (tho as yet _unknown_ to me) which might frame those _perceptions_.

[Sidenote: _How far the senses are now to be trusted._]

But now that I begin better to know _my self_ and the Author of my _Original_, I do not think, that all things, which I seem to have from my _senses_ are _rashly_ to be _admitted_, neither are all things so _had_, to be _doubted_. And first because I know that whatever I _clearly_ and _distinctly_ perceive, _may be_ so made by _God_ as I perceive them; the _Power_ of _understanding clearly_ and _distinctly_ one Thing _without_ the other is sufficient to make Me _certain_ that One Thing is _different_ from the Other; because it _may_ at least be placed apart by _God_, and that it may be esteem’d _different_, it matters not by what _Power_ it _may_ be so _sever’d_. And therefore from the knowledge I have, that _I my self exist_, and because at the same time I understand that nothing else appertains to my _Nature_ or _Essence_, but that I am a _thinking Being_, I rightly conclude, that my _Essence_ consists in this alone, that I am a _thinking Thing_. And tho _perhaps_ (or, as I shall shew presently, ’tis _certain_) I have a _Body_ which is very _nighly_ conjoyned to me, yet because on this side I have a clear and _distinct Idea_ of my self, as I am only a _thinking Thing, not extended_; and on the other side because I have a _distinct Idea_ of my _Body_, as it is onely an _extended_ thing, _not thinking_, ’tis from hence _certain_, that I _am really distinct from my Body_, and that I can _exist without_ it.

Moreover I find in my self some _Faculties_ endow’d with _certain_ peculiar waies of _thinking_, such as the _Faculty_ of _Imagination_, the _Faculty_ of _Perception_ or _sense_; without which _I_ can conceive my _whole self clearly_ and _distinctly_, but (changing the phrase) _I_ cannot _conceive_ those _Faculties_ without _conceiving My self_, that is, an _understanding substance_ in which they are; for none of them in their _formal Conception_ includes _understanding_; from whence I perceive they are as _different_ from _me_, as the _modus_ or _manner_ of a Thing is _different_ from the _Thing it self_.

I acknowledge also, that I have several other _Faculties_, such as _changing_ of _place_, _putting on various shapes_, &c. Which can no more be understood without a _substance_ in which they are, then the foremention’d _Faculties_, and consequently they can no more be understood to _Exist_ without that _substance_: But yet ’tis Manifest, that this sort of _Faculties_, to the End they may exist, ought to be in a _Corporeal_, _Extended_, and not in an _Understanding substance_, because _Extension_, and not _Intellection_ or _Understanding_ is included in the _Clear_ and _Distinct conception_ of them.

But there is also in me a certain _Passive Faculty_ of _sense_, or of _Receiving_ and _Knowing_ the _Ideas_ of _sensible Things_; of which _Faculty_ I can make no use, unless there were in my self, or in something else, a certain _Active Faculty_ of _Producing_ and _Effecting_ those _Ideas_. But this cannot be in my self, for it Pre-supposes no _Understanding_, and those _Ideas_ are Produced in me, tho I help not, and often against my _Will_. There remains therefore no Place for this _Active Faculty_, but that it should be in some _substance different_ from me. In which because all the _Reallity_, which is contain’d _Objectively_ in the _Ideas_ Produced by that _Faculty_, ought to be contain’d _Formally_ or _Eminently_ (as I have Formerly taken notice) this _substance_ must be either _a Body_ (in which what is in the _Ideas Objectively_ is contain’d _Formally_) or it Must Be _God_, or some _Creature_ more _excellent_ then a _Body_ (In which what is in the _Ideas Objectively_ is contain’d _Eminently_). But seeing that _God_ is not a _Deceivour_, ’tis altogether Manifest, that _he_ does not Place these _Ideas_ in me either _Immediately_ from himself, or _Mediately_ from any other Creature, wherein their _Objective Reallity_ is not * contain’d _Formally_, but only _Eminently_. And seeing _God_ has given me no _Faculty_ to discern Whether these Ideas proceed from _Corporeal_ or _Incorporeal Beings_, but rather a _strong Inclination_ to believe that they are sent from _Corporeal Beings_, there is no Reason Why God should not be counted a _Deceiver_, if these _Ideas_ came from any Where, but from _Corporeal Things_. Therefore we must conclude that there are _Corporeal Beings_. Which perhaps are not all the same as I comprehend them by _my sense_ (for Perception by sense is in many Things very _Obscure_ and _Confused_) but those things at least, which I _clearly_ and _distinctly_ Understand, that is to say, all those things which are comprehended under the _Object_ of _Pure Mathematicks_; those things I say at least are _True_.

As to What Remains, They are either some _Particulars_, as that the Sun is of such a _Bigness_ or _Shape_, _&c._ or they are Things less _Clearly_ Understood, as _Light_, _Sound_, _Pain_, &c. And tho these and such like Things may be very _Doubtful_ and _Uncertain_, yet because _God_ is not a _Deceiver_, and because that (Therefore) none of my Opinions can be _false_ unless God has Given me some _Faculty_ or other to _Correct_ my _Error_, hence ’tis that I am incouraged with the Hopes of attaining _Truth_ even in these very Things.

And certainly it cannot be doubted but whatever _I_ am taught by _Nature_ has something therein of _Truth_. By _Nature_ in General I understand either _God_ himself, or the _Coordination_ of Creatures Made by God. By my _Own Nature_ in _Particular_ I understand the _Complexion_ or _Association_ of all those things which are given me by God.

Now there is nothing that this _my Nature_ teaches me more _expresly_ then that I have a _Body_, Which is not _Well_ when I _feel Pain_, that this _Body_ wants _Meat_ or _Drink_ When I am _Hungry_ or _Dry_, _&c._ And therefore I ought not to Doubt but that these things are _True_. And by this _sense_ of _Pain_, _Hunger_, _Thirst_, &c. My _Nature_ tells me that _I_ am not in my _Body_, as a _Mariner_ is in his _Ship_, but that I am most _nighly conjoyn’d_ thereto, and as it were _Blended therewith_; so that _I_ with _It_ make up _one_ thing; For Otherwise, when the _Body_ were hurt, _I_, who am only a _Thinking Thing_, should not therefore _feel_ Pain, but should only _perceive_ the Hurt with the _Eye_ of my _Understanding_ (as a _Mariner perceives_ by his _sight_ whatever is broken in his Ship) and when the _Body_ wants either Meat or Drink, I should only _Understand_ this want, but should not have the _Confused sense_ of _Hunger_ or _Thirst_; I call them _Confused_, for certainly the _Sense_ of _Thirst_, _Hunger_, _Pain_, &c. are only _Confused Modes_ or _Manners_ of _Thought_ arising from the _Union_ and (as it were) _mixture_ of the _Mind_ and _Body_.

I am taught also by _Nature_, that there are many other _Bodies Without_ and _About_ my _Body_, some whereof are to be _desired_, others are to be _Avoided_. And because that I Perceive very Different _Colours_, _Sounds_, _Smells_, _Tasts_, _Heat_, _Hardness_, and the Like, from thence I Rightly conclude that there are _Correspondent Differences_ in _Bodies_, from which these _different perceptions_ of _sense_ proceed, tho perhaps not _Alike_. And because that some of these _perceptions_ are _Pleasant_, others _Unpleasant_, ’tis evidently _certain_, that my _Body_, or rather my _Whole self_ (as _I_ am compounded of a _Mind_ and _Body_) am liable to be _Affected_ by these _Bodies_ which encompass me about.

There are many Other Things Also which _Nature_ seems to teach Me, but _Really_ I am not taught by It, but have gotten them by an _ill use_ of Passing my Judgement _Inconsiderately_, and from hence it is that these things happen often to be _false_; as that all _space_ is _Empty_, in which I find _nothing_ that _works_ upon my _Senses_; That in a _hot Body_ there is something _like_ the _Idea_ of _Heat_ which is in me; That in a _White_ or _Green_ Body there is the same _Whiteness_ or _Greenness_ which I _perceive_; And the same _Taste_ in a _bitter_ or _sweet_ Thing, _&c._ That _Stars_, _Castles_, and Other _Remote_ Bodies are of the same _Bigness_ and _Shape_, as they are _Represented_ to my _senses_: and such like. But that I may not admit of any Thing in this very matter, which I cannot _Distinctly_ perceive, it behoves me here to determine more _Accurately_ What I mean when I say, _That I am taught a Thing by Nature_.

Here I take _Nature_ more _strictly_, then for the _Complication_ of all those Things which are Given me by _God_; For in this _Complication_ there are many things contain’d which relate to the _Mind alone_, as, That I perceive What is _done_ cannot be _not Done_, and all Other things which are known by the _Light_ of _Nature_, but of these I speak not at present. There are also many Other Things which belong _only_ to the _Body_, as, That it _tends Downwards_ and such like, of these also I treat not at Present. But I speak of those Things only which _God_ hath bestowed upon me as I am _Compounded_ of a _Mind_ and _Body together_, and not _differently Consider’d_. ’Tis _Nature_ therefore thus taken that teaches me to _avoid troublesome Objects_, and _seek_ after _pleasing Ones_; but it appears not that this _Nature_ teaches us to conclude any thing of these Perceptions of our _senses_, before that we make by our _Understanding_ a diligent examination of _outward Objects_; for to Enquire into the _Truth_ of Things belongs not to the _Whole Compositum_ of a Man as he Consists of _Mind_ and _Body_, but to the _Mind alone_.

So that tho a _star affect_ my eye no _more_ then a _small spark_ of Fire, yet there is in my Eye no _Real_ or _Positive Inclination_ to _believe_ One no bigger then the Other, but thus I have been used to Judge from my Childhood without any Reason: and tho coming nigh the Fire I feel Heat, and Coming too nigh I feel Pain, yet there is no Reason to perswade me, That in the Fire there is any thing _like_ either that Heat or that Pain, but only that there is something therein, Whatever it be, that excites in us those _sensations_ of Heat or Pain: and so tho in some space there may be nothing that Works on my _senses_, it does not from thence follow, that there is no _Body_ there; for I see that in these and many other things I am used to overturn the Order of Nature, because I use these _perceptions_ of _sense_ (which properly are given me by Nature to make known to the mind what is _advantagious_ or _hurtful_ to the _Compositum_, whereof the _mind_ is part, and _so far_ only they are _Clear_ and _Distinct_ enough) as _certain Rules_ immediately to discover the _Essence_ of _External Bodies_, of Which they make known nothing but very _Obscurely_ and _Confusedly_.

[Sidenote: Medit. 4.]

I have * formerly shewn how my _Judgement_ happens to be false notwithstanding _Gods Goodness_. But now there arises a new _Difficulty_ concerning those very things which _Nature_ tells me I am to _prosecute_ or _avoid_, concerning my _Internal senses_, Wherein I find many _Errors_, as when a Man being deceived by the Pleasant Taste of some sort of Meat, devours therein some hidden Poyson. But in this very Instance it cannot be said, that the Man is impelled by Nature to desire the _Poyson_, for of that he is wholly Ignorant; but he is said to Desire the _Meat_ only as being of a grateful Taste; and from hence nothing can be concluded but, That _Mans-Nature_ is not _All-knowing_; which is no Wonder seeing Man is a _Finite Being_, and therefore nothing but _Finite Perfections_ belong to him.

But We often err even in those things to Which we are _Impelled_ by _Nature_, as when sick men desire that _Meat_ or _Drink_, which will certainly prove Hurtful to them. To this it may perhaps be reply’d, That they _Err_ in this because their _Nature_ is _Corrupt_. But this Answers not the Difficulty, For a sick man is no less _Gods Creature_ then a Man in Health, and therefore ’tis as Absurd to Imagine a _Deceitful Nature_ imposed by _God_ on the One as on the Other; And as a Clock that is made up of Wheels and Weights does no less strictly observe the _Laws_ of its _Nature_, when it is _ill_ contrived, and tells the hours _falsly_, as when it answers the Desire of the Artificer in all performances; so if I consider the body of a Man as a meer _Machine_ or _Movement_, made up and compounded of _Bones_, _Nerves_, _Muscles_, _Veins_, _Blood_, and _Skin_; so that, tho there were no _mind_ in It, yet It would perform all those Motions which now are in it (those only excepted which Proceed from the _Will_, and consequently from the _Mind_) I do easily acknowledge, that it would be as _natural_ for him (if for example sake he were sick of a _Dropsie_) to suffer that _Driness_ of his _Throat_ which uses to bring into his mind the _sense_ of _Thirst_, & that thereby his Nerves and other Parts would be so disposed as to take Drink, by Which his disease would be encreased; As (supposing him to be troubled with no such Distemper) by the like Driness of Throat he would be disposed to Drink, when ’tis Requisite. And tho, if I respect the Intended use of a Clock I may say that it _Errs_ from its _Nature_, when it tells the Hours _wrong_, and so considering the _Movement_ of a _Mans Body_ as contrived for such _Motions_ as are used to be performed thereby, I may think That also to _Err_ from its _Nature_, if its _Throat_ is _Dry_, when it has no want of Drink for its _Preservation_. Yet I Plainly discover, that this last _Acceptation_ of _Nature_ differs much from that whereof we have been speaking all this While, for this is only a _Denomination extrinsick_ to the Things whereof ’tis spoken, and _depending_ on my _Thought_, while it _Compares_ a _sick_ man, and a _disorderly_ Clock with the _Idea_ of an _healthy_ man and a _Rectified_ Clock. But by _Nature_ in its former _Acceptation_ I Understand something that is _Really_ in the _Things_ themselves, which therefore has something of _Truth_ in it.

But tho Respecting only a _Body sick_ of a Dropsie it be an _Extrinsick Denomination_ to say, that its _Nature_ is _Corrupt_, because it has a _Dry Throat_, and stands in _no need_ of Drink; yet respecting the _Whole Compound_ or _Mind joyn’d_ to such a _Body_, ’tis not a _meer Denomination_, but a _real Error_ of _Nature_ for it to _thirst_ when _drink_ is _hurtful_ to it. It remains therefore here to be inquired, how the _Goodness_ of _God_ suffers _Nature so taken_ to be _deceivable_.

First therefore I understand that a _chief difference_ between my _Mind_ and _Body_ consists in this, That my _Body_ is of its _Nature divisible_, but my _Mind indivisible_; for while I consider my _Mind_ or _my self_, as I am only a _thinking Thing_, I can distinguish _no parts_ in Me, but I perceive my self to be but _one entire_ Thing; and tho the _whole Mind_ seems to be _united_ to the _whole Body_, yet a Foot, an Arm, or any other part of the Body being cut off, I do not therefore conceive any _part_ of my _Mind_ taken away; Neither can its _Faculties_ of _desiring_, _perceiving_, _understanding_, &c. be called its _Parts_, for ’tis one and the _same_, _mind_, that _desires_, that _perceives_, that _understands_; Contrarily, I cannot think of any _Corporeal_ or _extended Being_, which I cannot easily _divide_ into _Parts_ by my thought, and by this I understand it to be _divisible_. And this alone (if I had known it from no other Argument) is sufficient to inform me, that my _mind_ is _really distinct_ from my _Body_.

Nextly I find, that my _mind_ is not _immediately affected_ by all parts of my _body_, but only by the _Brain_, and perhaps only by one small part of it, That, to wit, wherein the _common sense_ is said to reside; Which part, as often as it is disposed in the _same manner_, will represent to the _mind_ the _same thing_, tho at the same time the other parts of the _body_ may be _differently_ order’d. And this is proved by numberless Experiments, which need not here be related.

Moreover I discover that the _nature_ of my _body_ is such, that no part of it can be _moved_ by an other _remote_ part thereof, but it may also be _moved_ in the _same manner_ by some of the _interjacent_ parts, tho the more _remote_ part lay still and acted not; As for example in the Rope,

A⸺B⸺C⸺D

if its end D. were drawn, the end A. would be moved no otherwise, than if one of the intermediate parts B. or C. were drawn, and the end D. rest quiet. So when I feel _pain_ in my _Foot_, the consideration of Physicks instructs me, that this is performed by the help of _Nerves_ dispersed through the Foot, which from thence being _continued_ like Ropes to the very Brain, whilst they are _drawn_ in the Foot, they also _draw_ the inward parts of the Brain to which they reach, and therein excite a certain _motion_, which is ordain’d by _Nature_ to affect the _mind_ with a _sense_ of _Pain_, as being in the _Foot_. But because these Nerves must pass through the _Shin_, the _Thighs_, the _Loins_, the _Back_, the _Neck_, before they can reach the _Brain_ from the _Foot_, it may so happen, that tho _that part_ of them, which is in the Foot were not touch’d, but only some of their _intermediate parts_, yet the same _motion_, would be caused in the _Brain_, as when the _Foot_ it self is _ill affected_, from whence ’twill necessarily follow, that the _mind_ should _perceive_ the same _Pain_. And thus may we think of any other _Sense_.

I understand lastly, that seeing each single motion perform’d in that part of the _Brain_, which _immediately affects_ the _mind_, excites therein only one sort of _sense_, nothing could be contrived more conveniently in this case, than that, of all those _Senses_ which it can cause, it should cause that which _cheifly_, and most _frequently_ conduces to the _conservation_ of an _healthful Man_; And experience witnesses, that to this very _end_ all our _senses_ are given us by _Nature_; and therefore nothing can be found therein, which does not abundantly testifie the _Power_ and _Goodness_ of _God_. Thus for Example, when the Nerves of the Feet are violently and more than ordinarily moved, that motion of them being propagated through the _Medulla Spinalis_ of the Back to the inward parts of the Brain, there it signifies to the mind, that something or other is to be felt, and what is this but Pain, as if it were in the Foot, by which the Mind is excited to use its indeavours for removing the Cause, as being hurtful to the Foot. But the _Nature_ of _Man_ might have been so _order’d_ by _God_, that That same motion in the Brain should represent to the mind any other thing, _viz._ either it self as ’tis in the Brain, or it self as it is in the Foot, or in any of the other forementioned intermediate parts, or lastly any other thing whatsoever; but none of these would have so much conduced to the _Conservation_ of the _Body_. In the like manner when we want drink, from thence arises a certain _dryness_ in the _Throat_, which moves the Nerves thereof, and by their means the inward parts of the Brain, and this motion _affects_ the _mind_ with the _sense_ of _thirst_; because that in this case nothing is more requisite for us to know, then that we _want drink_ for the _Preservation_ of our _Health_. So of the Rest.

From all which ’tis manifest, that (notwithstanding the _infinite Goodness_ of God) ’tis impossible but the _Nature_ of _Man_ as he consists of a _mind_ and _body_ should be _deceivable_. For if any cause should excite (not in the Foot but) in the Brain it self, or in any other part through which the Nerves are continued from the Foot to the Brain, that _self same_ motion, which uses to arise from the Foot being troubled, the _Pain_ would be felt _as in the Foot_, and the _sense_ would be _naturally_ deceived; for ’tis consonant to Reason (seeing that That same motion of the Brain alwayes represents to the mind that same sense, and it oftner proceeds from a cause _hurtful_ to the _Foot_, than from any other) I say ’tis reasonable, that it should make known to the _mind_ the Pain of the _Foot_, rather than of any other _part_. And so if a _dryness_ of _Throat_ arises (not as ’tis used from the _necessity_ of _drink_ for the _conservation_ of the _Body_, but) from an _unusual Cause_, as it happens in a _Dropsie_, ’tis far better that it should _then deceive us_; then that it should _alwayes deceive_ us when the _Body_ is in _Health_, and so of the Rest.

And this consideration helps me very much, not only to _understand_ the _Errors_ to which my _Nature_ is subject, but also to _correct_ and _avoid_ them. For seeing I know that all my _Senses_ do oftener inform me _falsly_ than _truely_ in those things which conduce to the _Bodies advantage_; and seeing I can use (almost alwayes) more of them than one to _Examine_ the same thing, as also I can use _memory_, which joyns present and past things together, and my _understanding_ also, which hath already discovered to me all the _causes_ of my _Errors_, I ought no longer to fear, that what my _Senses_ daily represent to me should be false. But especially those _extravagant Doubts_ of my First Meditation are to be turn’d off as ridiculous; and perticularly the _chief_ of them, _viz_. That * of not _distinguishing Sleep_ from _Waking_, for now I plainly discover a great _difference_, between them, for my _Dreams_ are never _conjoyned_ by my _memory_ with the other _actions_ of _my life_, as whatever happens to me _awake_ is; and certainly if (while I were awake) any person should suddenly appear to me, and presently disappear (as in _Dreams_) so that I could not tell _from whence_ he came or _where_ he went, I should rather esteem it a _Spectre_ or _Apparition feign’d_ in my Brain, then a _true Man_; but when such things occur, as I distinctly know from _whence_, _where_, and _when_ they come, and I _conjoyn_ the _perception_ of them by my _memory_ with the other _Accidents_ of my _life_, I am _certain_ they are represented to me _waking_ and not _asleep_, neither ought I in the least to doubt of their _Truth_, if after I have called up all my _senses_, _memory_, and _understanding_ to their _Examination_ I find nothing in any of them, that clashes with other truths; For _God_ not being a _Deceiver_, it follows, that In such things I am not _deceived_. But because the _urgency_ of _Action_ in the common _occurrences_ of _Affairs_ will not alwayes allow time for such an _accurate examination_, I must confess that _Mans life_ is _subject_ to many _Errors_ about _perticulars_, so that the _infirmity_ of our _Nature_ must be _acknowledged_ by Us.

_FINIS._

ADVERTISEMENT CONCERNING THE OBJECTIONS.

Among seven Parcels of Objections made by Divers Learned Persons against these Meditations, I have made choise of the Third in the Latine Copy, as being Penn’d by _Thomas Hobbs_ of _Malmesbury_, a Man famously known to the World abroad, but especially to his own the English Nation; and therefore ’tis likely that what comes from Him may be more acceptable to his Countrymen, then what proceeds from a Stranger; and as the strength of a Fortification is never better known then by a Forcible Resistance, so fares it with these _Meditations_ which stand unshaken by the Violent Opposition of so Potent an Enemy. And yet it must be Confess’d that the Force of these Objections and Cogency of the Arguments cannot be well apprehended by those who are not versed in other Pieces of Mr. _Hobbs_’s Philosophy, especially His Book _De Corpore_ and _De Homine_, The former whereof I am sure is Translated into English, and therefore not Impertinently refer’d to Here in a Discourse to English Readers. And this is the Reason that makes the Great _Des-Cartes_ pass over many of these Objections so slightly, Who certainly would have Undermined the whole Fabrick of the _Hobbian Philosophy_ had he but known upon What Foundations it was Built.

OBJECTIONS

Made against the Foregoing

MEDITATIONS,

BY THE FAMOUS

_THOMAS HOBBS_

Of MALMESBURY,

WITH

_DES-CARTES’S_

ANSWERS.

OBJECT. I.

_Against the First Meditation: Of things Doubtful._

’Tis evident enough from What has been said in this Meditation, that there is no _sign_ by Which we may Distinguish our _Dreams_ from _True Sense_ and _Waking_, and therefore that those _Phantasmes_ which we have waking and from our Senses are not accidents inhering in Outward Objects, neither do they Prove that such outward Objects do Exist; and therefore if we trust our Senses without any other Ground, we may well doubt whether any Thing _Be_ or _Not_. We therefore acknowledge the Truth of this Meditation. But Because _Plato_ and other Antient Philosophers argued for the same _incertainty_ in sensible Things, and because ’tis commonly Observed by the Vulgar that ’tis hard to Distinguish Sleep from Waking, I would not have the most excellent Author of such new Thoughts put forth so antique Notions.

ANSWER.

Those Reasons of Doubt which by this Philosopher are admitted as _true_, were proposed by Me only as _Probable_, and I made use of them not that I may vend them as _new_, but partly that I may prepare the Minds of my Readers for the Consideration of Intellectual Things, wherein they seem’d to me very necessary; And partly that thereby I may shew how firm those Truths are, which hereafter I lay down, seeing they cannot be Weaken’d by these Metaphysical Doubts: So, that I never designed to gain any Honor by repeating them, but I think I could no more omit them, then a Writer in Physick can pass over the Description of a Disease, Whose Cure he intends to Teach.

OBJECT. II.

_Against the Second Meditation: Of the Nature of Mans Mind._

I _am a Thinking Thing_. ’Tis True; for because I _think_ or have a _Phantasme_ (whether I am _awake_ or _asleep_) it follows that _I am Thinking_, for _I Think_ and _I am Thinking_ signifie the same Thing. Because _I Think_, it follows That _I am_, for whatever _Thinks_ cannot be _Nothing_. But when he Adds, _That is_, _a Mind_, _a Soul_, _an Understanding_, _Reason_, I question his Argumentation; for it does not seem a Right Consequence to say, _I am a Thinking Thing_, therefore _I am a Thought_, neither, _I am an Understanding Thing_, therefore _I am the Understanding_. For in the same manner I may Conclude, _I am a Walking Thing_, therefore _I am the Walking it self_.

Wherefore _D.Cartes_ Concludes that an _Understanding Thing_ and _Intellection_ (which is the _Act_ of an Understanding Thing) are the same; or at least that an _Understanding Thing_ and the _Intellect_ (which is the _Power_ of an Understanding Thing) are the same; And yet all Philosophers distinguish the _subject_ from its _Faculties_ and _Acts_, that is, from its _Properties_ and _Essence_, for the _Thing it self_ is one thing, and its _Essence_ is an other. It may be therefore that a _Thinking Thing_ is the _Subject_ of a _Mind_, _Reason_, or _Understanding_, and therefor it may be a _Corporeal Thing_, the Contrary Whereof is here _Assumed_ and not _Proved_; and yet this _Inference_ is the _Foundation_ of that Conclusion which _D.Cartes_ would Establish.

[Sidenote: * _Places noted with this Asterick are the Passages of the foregoing Meditations here Objected against._]

In the same Meditation, on, * _I know that I am, I ask, What I am Whom I Thus Know, Certainly the Knowledge of Me precisely so taken depends not on those Things of whose Existence I am yet Ignorant_.

’Tis Certain the Knowledge of this Proposition _I am_, depends on this, _I think_ as he hath rightly inform’d us; but from whence have we the knowledge of this Proposition, _I think_? certainly from hence only, that we cannot conceive any _Act_ without its _subject_, as _dancing_ without a _Dancer_, _knowledge_, without a _Knower_, _thought_ without a _thinker_.

And from hence it seems to follow, that a _thinking Thing_ is a _Corporeal Thing_; for the _Subjects_ of all _Acts_ are understood only in a _Corporeal way_, or after the manner of _matter_, as he himself shews hereafter by the example of a piece of Wax, which changing its _colour_, _consistence_, _shape_, and other _Acts_ is yet known to continue the _same thing_, that is, the _same matter subject_ to so many _changes_. But I cannot conclude from another _thought_ that _I now think_; for tho a Man may _think_ that he _hath thought_ (which consists only in _memory_) yet ’tis altogether impossible for him to _think_ that he _now thinks_, or to _know_, that _he knows_, for the question may be put _infinitely_, how do you _know_ that you _know_, that you _know_, that you _know_? &c.

Wherefore seeing the Knowledge of this Proposition _I am_, depends on the knowledge of this _I think_, and the knowledge of this is from hence only, that we cannot separate _thought_ from _thinking matter_, it seems rather to follow, that a _thinking thing_ is _material_, than that ’tis _immaterial_.

ANSWER.

When I said, _That is a Mind_, _a Soul_, _an Understanding_, _Reason_, &c. I did not mean by these _names_ the _Faculties_ only, but the _things_ indow’d with those _Faculties_; and so ’tis alwayes understood by the two first names (_mind_ and _soul_) and very often so understood by the two last Names (_understanding_ and _Reason_) and this I have explain’d so often, and in so many places of these Meditations, that there is not the least occasion of questioning my meaning.

Neither is there any parity between _Walking_ and _Thought_, for _walking_ is used only for the _Act_ it self, but _thought_ is sometimes used for the _Act_, sometimes for the _Faculty_, and sometimes for the _thing_ it self, wherein the _Faculty_ resides.