Chapter IV: Part 4

Neither do I say, that the _understanding thing_ and _intellection_ are the same, or that the _understanding thing_ and the _intellect_ are the same, if the _intellect_ be taken for the _Faculty_, but only when ’tis taken for the _thing it self that understands_. Yet I willingly confess, that I have (as much as in me lay) made use of _abstracted words_ to signifie that _thing_ or _substance_, which I would have devested of all those things that belong not to it. Whereas contrarily this Philosopher uses the most _concrete Words_ to signifie this _thinking thing_, such as _subject_, _matter_, _Body_, &c. that he may not suffer it to be separated from _Body_.

Neither am I concern’d that His manner of joyning many things together may seem to some fitter for the discovery of Truth, than mine, wherein I separate as much as possibly each particular. But let us omit words and speak of things.

_It may be_ (sayes he) _that a Thinking thing is a corporeal thing, the contrary whereof is here assumed and not proved._ But herein he is mistaken, for I never _assumed_ the _contrary_, neither have I used it as a _Foundation_, for the rest of _my Superstructure_, but left it wholly _undetermin’d_ till the _sixth Meditation_, and in that ’tis proved.

Then he tells us rightly, _that we cannot conceive any Act without its subject_, as _thought_ without a _thinking thing_, for what _thinks_ cannot be _nothing_; but then he subjoyns without any Reason, and against the usual manner of speaking, and contrary to all Logick, _that hence it seem to follow, that a thinking thing is a corporeal Being_. Truly the _subjects_ of all _Acts_ are understood under the notion of _substance_, or if you please under the notion of _matter_ (that is to say of _metaphysical matter_) but not therefore under the notion of _Bodies_.

But Logicians and Commonly all Men are used to say, that there are some _Spiritual_, some _Corporeal_ substances. And by the Instance of Wax I only proved that _Colour_, _Consistence_, _Shape_, &c. appertain not to the _Ratio Formalis_ of the Wax; For in that Place I treated neither of the _Ratio Formalis_ of the _Mind_, neither of _Body_.

Neither is it pertinent to the business, that the Philosopher asserts, _That one Thought cannot be the subject of an other thought_, for Who besides Himself ever Imagin’d This? But that I may explain the matter in a few words, ’Tis certain that _Thought_ cannot be without a _Thinking Thing_, neither any _Act_ or any _Accident_ without a _substance_ wherein it resides. But seeing that we know not a _substance immediately by it self_, but by this alone, that ’tis the _subject_ of several _Acts_, it is very consonant to the commands of Reason and Custome, that we should call by _different names_ those _substances_, which we perceive are the _subjects_ of very _different Acts_ or _Accidents_, and that afterwards we should examine, whether those _different names_ signifie _different_ or _one_ and the _same_ thing. Now there are some _Acts_ which we call _corporeal_, as _magnitude_, _figure_, _motion_, and what ever else cannot be thought on without _local extension_, and the _substance_ wherein these reside we call _Body_; neither can it be imagin’d that ’tis one _substance_ which is the _subject_ of _Figure_, and another _substance_ which is the _subject_ of _local motion_, &c. Because all these _Acts_ agree under one common notion of _Extension_. Besides there are other _Acts_, which we call _cogitative_ or _thinking_, as _understanding_, _will_, _imagination_, _sense_, &c. All which agree under the common notion of _thought_, _perception_, or _Conscience_; And the _substance_ wherein they are, we say, is a _thinking thing_, or _mind_, or call it by whatever other name we please, so we do not confound it with _corporeal substance_, because _cogitative Acts_ have no affinity with _corporeal Acts_, and _thought_, which is the common _Ratio_ of _those_ is wholly different from _Extension_, which is the common _Ratio_ of _These_. But after we have formed two _distinct conceptions_ of these two _substances_, from what is said in the sixth Meditation, ’tis easie to know, whether they be _one_ and the _same_ or _different_.

OBJECT. III.

* _Which of them is it, that is distinct from my thought? which of them is it that can be separated from me?_

Some perhaps will answer this Question thus, I my self, who _think_ am distinct from my _thought_, and my _thought_ is _different_ from me (tho’ not _seperated_) as _dancing_ is _distinguished_ from the _Dancer_ (as before is noted.) But if _Des-Cartes_ will prove, that _he_ who _understands_ is the same with his _understanding_, we shall fall into the Scholastick expressions, the _understanding understands_, the _sight sees_, the _Will wills_, and then by an exact analogy, the Walking (or at least the _Faculty_ of walking) shall walk. All which are obscure, improper, and unworthy that perspicuity which is usual with the noble _Des-Cartes_.

ANSWER.

I do not deny, that _I_ who _think_ am _distinct_ from my _thought_, as a _thing_ is _distinguish’d_ from its _modus_ or _manner_; But when I ask, _which of them is it that is distinct from my thought_? this I understand of those various _modes_ of _thought_ there mention’d, and not of _substance_; and when I subjoyn, _which of them is it that can be separated from me_? I only signifie that all those _modes_ or _manners_ of _thinking_ reside in me, neither do I herein perceive what occasion of _doubt_ or _obscurity_ can be imagined.

OBJECT. IV.

* _It remains therefore for me to Confess that I cannot Imagine what this Wax is, but that I conceive in my mind What it is._

There is a great Difference between _Imagination_ (that is) having an _Idea_ of a Thing, and the _Conception of the Mind_ (that is) a _Concluding_ from _Reasoning_ that a thing _Is_ or _Exists_. But _Des-Cartes_ has not Declared to us in what they Differ. Besides, the Ancient Aristotelians have clearly deliver’d as a Doctrine, that _substance_ is not _perceived_ by _sense_ but is _Collected_ by _Ratiocination_.

But what shall we now say, if perhaps _Ratiocination_ be nothing Else but a _Copulation_ or _Concatenation_ of _Names_ or _Appellations_ by this Word _Is_? From whence ’twill follow that we _Collect_ by _Reasoning_ nothing _of_ or _concerning_ the _Nature_ of _Things_, but of the _names_ of _Things_, that is to say, we only discover whether or no we _joyn_ the _Names_ of _Things_ according to the _Agreements_ which at Pleasure we have made concerning their _significations_; if it be so (as so it may be) _Ratiocination_ will depend on _Words_, _Words_ on _Imagination_, and perhaps _Imagination_ as _also Sense_ on the _Motion_ of _Corporeal Parts_; and so the _Mind_ shall be nothing but _Motions_ in some Parts of an _Organical Body_.

ANSWER.

I have here Explain’d the Difference between _Imagination_, and the Meer _Conception_ of the _Mind_, by reckoning up in my Example of the Wax, what it is therein which we _Imagine_, and what it is that we _conceive_ in our _Mind_ only: but besides this, I have explained in an other Place How we _understand_ one way, and _Imagine_ an other way One and the same Thing, suppose a Pentagone or Five sided Figure.

There is in _Ratiocination_ a _Conjunction_ not of _Words_, but of _Things signified_ by _Words_; And I much admire that the _Contrary_ could Possibly enter any Mans Thoughts; For Who ever doubted but that a _Frenchman_ and a _German_ may argue about the _same Things_, tho they use very _Differing Words_? and does not the Philosopher Disprove himself when he speaks of the _Agreements which at pleasure we have made about the significations of Words_? for if he grants that _something_ is _Signified_ by _Words_, Why will he not admit that our Ratiocinations are rather about this _something_, then about _Words_ only? and by the same Right that he concludes the _Mind_ to be a _Motion_, he may Conclude Also that the Earth is Heaven, or What else he Pleases.

OBJECT. V.

_Against the Third Meditation of God._

* _Some of These (viz. ~Humane Thoughts~) are as it were the Images of Things, and to these alone belongs properly the Name of an Idea, as when I Think on a Man, a Chimera, Heaven, an Angel, or God._

When I Think on a _Man_ I perceive an _Idea_ made up of _Figure_ and _Colour_, whereof I may _doubt_ whether it be the _Likeness_ of a _Man_ or not; and so when I think on _Heaven_. But when I think on a Chimera, I perceive an _Image_ or _Idea_, of which I may _doubt_ whether it be the _Likeness_ of any _Animal_ not only at present Existing, but possible to Exist, or that ever will Exist hereafter or not.

But thinking on an _Angel_, there is offer’d to my Mind sometimes the _Image_ of a _Flame_, sometimes the _Image_ of a _Pretty Little Boy_ with _Wings_, which I am certain has no _Likeness_ to an _Angel_, and therefore that it is not the _Idea_ of an _Angel_; But beleiving that there are some Creatures, Who do (as it were) wait upon God, and are Invisible, and Immaterial, upon the _Thing Believed_ or _supposed_ we Impose the _Name_ of _Angel_; Whereas the _Idea_, under which I Imagine an Angel, is compounded of the Ideas of sensible Things.

In the like manner at the Venerable Name of _God_, we have _no Image_ or _Idea_ of God, and therefore we are forbidden to _Worship God_ under any _Image_, least we should seem to _Conceive_ Him that is inconceivable.

Whereby it appears that we have no _Idea_ of _God_; but like one _born blind_, who being brought to the _Fire_, and perceiving himself to be _Warmed_, knows there is _something_ by which he is _warmed_ and Hearing it called _Fire_, he Concludes that _Fire Exists_, but yet knows not of what _shape_ or _Colour_ the Fire is, neither has he any _Image_ or _Idea_ thereof in his _Mind_.

So Man knowing that there must be some _Cause_ of his _Imaginations_ or _Ideas_, as also an other _cause before That_, and so _onwards_, he is brought at last to an _End_, or to a _supposal_ of some _Eternal Cause_, Which because it never _began_ to _Be_ cannot have any other _Cause before it_, and thence he Concludes that ’tis _necessary_ that some _Eternal Thing Exist_: and yet he has no _Idea_ which He can call the _Idea_ of this _Eternal Thing_, but he names this _Thing_, which he believes and acknowledges by the Name _God_.

But now _Des-Cartes_ proceeds from this Position, _That we have an Idea of God in our Mind_, to prove this Theoreme, _That God (that if an Almighty, Wise, Creatour of the World) Exists_, whereas he ought to have explain’d this _Idea_ of _God_ better, and he should have thence deduced not only his _Existence_, but also the _Creation_ of the World.

ANSWER.

Here the Philosopher will have the Word _Idea_ be only Understood for the _Images_ of _Material_ Things represented in a _Corporeal_ Phantasie, by which Position he may Easily Prove, that there can be no Proper _Idea_ of an _Angel_ or _God_. Whereas as I declare every Where, but especially in this Place, that I take the Name _Idea_ for whatever is immediately _perceived_ by the _Mind_, so that when I _Will_, or _Fear_, because at the same time I _perceive_ that I _Will_ or _Fear_, this very _Will_ or _Fear_ are reckon’d by me among the number of _Ideas_; And I have purposely made use of that Word, because It was usual with the Antient Philosophers to signifie the Manner of _Perceptions_ in the _Divine Mind_, altho neither we nor they acknowledge a Phantasie in _God_: and besides I had no fitter Word to express it by.

And I think I have sufficiently explain’d the _Idea_ of _God_ for those that will attend my meaning, but I can never do it fully enough for those that will Understand my Words otherwise then I intend them.

Lastly, what is here added concerning the _Creation_ of the World is wholly beside the Question in hand.

OBJECT. VI.

* _But there are Other (~Thoughts~) That have Superadded Forms to them, as when I Will, when I Fear, when I Affirm, when I Deny; I know I have alwayes (whenever I think) some certain thing as the Subject or Object of my Thought, but in this last sort of Thoughts there is something More which I think upon then Barely the Likeness of the Thing; and of these Thoughts some are called Wills and Affections, and others of them Judgements._

When any one _Fears_ or _Wills_, he has certainly the _Image_ of the _Thing Fear’d_, or _Action Will’d_, but what more a _Willing_ or _Fearing_ Man has in his Thoughts is not explain’d; and tho _Fear_ be a _Thought_, yet I see not how it can be any other then the _Thought_ of the _Thing Fear’d_; For what is the _Fear_ of a _Lion rushing on me_, but the _Idea_ of a Lion Rushing on me, and the _Effect_ (which that _Idea_ produces in the _Heart_) whereby the Man _Fearing_ is excited to that Animal Motion which is called Flight? but now this Motion of _Flying_ is not _Thought_, it remains therefore that in _Fear_ there is no other _Thought_, but that which consists in the _likeness_ of the thing. And the same may be said of _Will_.

Moreover _Affirmation_ and _Negation_ are not without a _voice_ and _words_, and hence ’tis that Brutes can neither _affirme_ or _deny_ not so much as in their Thought, and consequently neither can they judge. But yet the same thought may be in a beast as in a Man; for when we _affirme_ that a Man runs, we have not a _thought_ different from what a Dog has when he sees his Master running; _Affirmation_ therefore or _Negation_ superadds nothing to _meer thoughts_, unless perhaps it adds this thought, that the _names_ of which an _Affirmation_ consists are (to the Person _affirming_) the _Names_ of the _same thing_; and this is not to comprehend in the _thought_ more then the _likeness_ of the _thing_, but it is only comprehending the same _likeness twice_.

ANSWER.

’Tis self evident, That ’tis one thing to _see_ a Lion and at the same time to _fear_ him, and an other thing _only_ to _see_ him. So ’tis one thing to _see_ a Man Running, and an other thing to _Affirme_ within my self (which may be done without a voice) That I _see_ him.

But in all this objection I find nothing that requires an Answer.

OBJECT. VII.

* _Now it remains for me to examine, how I have received this Idea of God, for I have neither received it by means of my senses, neither comes it to me without my forethought, as the Ideas of sensible things use to do, when those things work on the Organs of my sense, or at least seem so to work; Neither is this Idea framed by my self, for I can neither add to, nor detract from it. Wherefore I have only to conclude, that it is innate, even as the Idea of me my self is Natural to my self._

If there be no _Idea_ of _God_, as it seems there is _not_ (and here ’tis not proved that there is) this whole discourse falls to the ground. And as to the _Idea_ of _my self_ (if I respect the _Body_) it proceeds from _Sight_, but (if the _Soul_) there is no _Idea_ of a _Soul_, but we collect by Ratiocination, that there is some inward thing in a Mans Body, that imparts to it _Animal Motion_, by which it _perceives_ and _moves_, and this (whatever it be) without any _Idea_ we call a _Soul_.

ANSWER.

If there be an _Idea_ of _God_ (as ’tis manifest that there is) this whole _Objection_ falls to the ground; and then he subjoyns, _That we have no Idea of the Soul, but collect it by Ratiocination_, ’Tis the same as if he should say, that there is no _Image_ thereof represented in the _Phantasie_, but yet, that there is such a Thing, as I call an _Idea_.

OBJECT. VIII.

* _An other Idea of the Sun as taken from the Arguments of Astronomers, that is consequentially collected by me from certain natural notions._

At the same time we can certainly have but one _Idea_ of the Sun, whether it be look’d at by our eyes, or collected by _Ratiocination_ to be much bigger than it seems; for this last is not an _Idea_ of the Sun, but a proof by Arguments, that the _Idea_ of the _Sun_ would be much larger, if it were look’d at nigher. But at different or several times the _Ideas_ of the Sun may be diverse, as if at one time we look at it with our bare eye, at an other time through a Teloscope; but Astronomical arguments do not make the _Idea_ of the Sun greater or less, but they rather tell us that the _sensible Idea_ thereof is _false_.

ANSWER.

Here also (as before) what he says is not the _Idea_ of the Sun, and yet is described, is that very thing which I call the _Idea_.

OBJECT. IX.

* _For without doubt those Ideas which Represent substances are something more, or (as I may say) have more of objective Reality in them, then those that represent only accidents or modes; and again, that by which I understand a mighty God, Eternal, Infinite, Omniscient, Omnipotent, Creatour of all things besides himself, has certainly in it more objective reality, then those by which Finite substances are exhibited._

I have before often noted that there can be no _Idea_ of _God_ or the _Mind_: I will now superadd, That neither can there be an _Idea_ of _Substance_. For _Substance_ (Which is only _Matter Subject_ to _Accidents_ and _Changes_) is _Collected_ only by _Reasoning_, but it is not at all _Conceived_, neither does it _represent_ to us any _Idea_. And if this be true, How can it be said, _That those Ideas which represent to us Substances have in them something More, or More Objective Reality, then those which represent to us Accidents_? Besides, Let _Des-Cartes_ again Consider what he means by ~More Reality~? Can _Reality_ be increas’d or diminish’d? Or does he think that One _Thing_ can be _More A Thing_ then an other Thing? let him Consider how this can be Explain’d to our Understandings with that _Perspicuity_ or Clearness which is requisite in all _Demonstrations_, and Which He Himself is used to present us with upon other Occasions.

ANSWER.

I have often noted before, That that very Thing which is _evidenc’d_ by _Reason_, as also whatever else is perceived by any other Means, is Called by Me an _Idea_. And I have sufficiently explain’d How _Reality_ may be _Encreas’d_ or _Diminish’d_, in the same manner (to wit) as _Substance_ is _More_ a _Thing_, then A _Mode_; and if there be any such things as _Real Qualities_, or _Incomplete Substances_, these are _More Things_ then _Modes_, and _Less Things_ then _Complete Substances_: and Lastly if there be an _Infinite Independent Substance_ this is _More_ a _Thing_, then a _Finite, Dependent Substance_. And all this is self-evident.

OBJECT. X.

* _Wherefore There only Remains the Idea of God; Wherein I must consider whether there be not something Included, which cannot Possibly have its Original from me. By the Word, God, I mean a certain Infinite Substance, Independent, Omniscient, Almighty, by whom both I my self and every thing Else That Is (if any thing do actually exist) was Created; All which attributes are of such an High Nature That the more attentively I consider them, the Less I Conceive my self alone possible to be the Author of these notions; from what therefore has been said I must Conclude there is a God._

Considering the _Attributes_ of _God_, that from thence we may gather an _Idea_ of _God_, and that we may enquire whether there be not something in that _Idea_ which cannot Possibly Proceed from our selves, I discover (if I am not Deceived) that what we think off at the _Venerable name_ of _God_ proceeds neither from our selves, neither is it Necessary that they should have any other _Original_ then from _Outward Objects_. For by the Name of _God_ I understand a ~Substance~, that is, I understand that _God_ Exists (not by an _Idea_, but by Reasoning) ~Infinite~ (that is, I cannot conceive or Imagine Terms or Parts in him so Extream, but I can Imagine others Farther) from whence it follows, that not an _Idea_ of _Gods Infinity_ but of my Own bounds and Limits presents it self at the Word _Infinite_. ~Independent~, That is, I do not conceive any _Cause_ from which _God_ may proceed; from whence ’tis evident that I have no other _Idea_ at the word _Independent_, but the memory of my own _Ideas_ which at Different Times have _Different Beginnings_, and Consequently they must be _Dependent_.

Wherefore, to say that God is _Independent_, is only to say That _God_ is in the Number of those things, the _Original_ whereof I do not Imagine: and so to say that _God_ is _Infinite_, is the same as if we say That He is in the Number of Those Things whose _Bounds_ we do not Conceive: And thus any _Idea_ of _God_ is Exploded, for What _Idea_ can we have without _Beginning_ or _Ending_?

~Omniscient~ or Understanding all things, Here _I_ desire to know, by what _Idea_, _Des-Cartes_ understands _Gods Understanding_? ~Almighty~, I desire also to know by What _Idea Gods Power_ is _understood_? For _Power_ is in Respect of Future Things, that is, Things not Existing. For my Part, I understand _Power_ from the Image or Memory of past Actions, arguing with my self thus, He did so, therefore he was _able_ (or had _Power_) to do so, therefore (continuing the same) he will again have _Power_ to do so. But now all these are _Ideas_ that may arise from _external Objects_.

~Creatour~ of all things, _I_ can frame an _Image_ of _Creation_ from what I see every day, as a Man Born, or growing from a Punctum to that shape and size he now bears; an other _Idea_ then this no man can have at the word _Creatour_; But the _Possibility_ of _Imagining_ a Creation is not sufficient to prove that the world _was created_. And therefore tho it were _Demonstrated_ that some _Infinite Independent Almighty Being_ did _exist_, yet it will not from thence follow that a _Creatour exists_; unless one can think this to be a right inference, we _believe_ that there exists something that has created all other things, therefore the world _was Created_ thereby.

Moreover when he says, that the _Idea_ of _God_, and of our _Soul_ is _Innate_ or _born in us_, I would fain know, whether the _Souls_ of those that _sleep soundly_ do _think_ unless they _dream_; If not, then at that time they have no _Ideas_, and consequently no _Idea_ is _Innate_, for what is _Innate_ to us is never _Absent_ from us.

ANSWER.

None of _Gods_ Attributes can proceed from _outward objects_ as from a _Pattern_, because there is nothing found in God like what is found in _External_, that is, _Corporeal_ things; Now ’tis manifest that whatever we think of in him _differing_ or _unlike_ what we find in them proceeds not from them, but from a cause of that very _diversity_ in our Thought.

And here I desire to know, how this Philosopher deduces _Gods Understanding_ from _outward Things_, and yet I can easily explain what _Idea_ I have thereof, by saying, that by the _Idea_ of _Gods Understanding_ I conceive whatever is the _Form_ of any _Perception_; For who is there that does not perceive that he _understands_ something or other, and consequently he must thereby have an _Idea_ of _understanding_, and by enlarging it _Indefinitely_ he forms the _Idea_ of _Gods Understanding_. And so of his other Attributes.

And seeing we have made use of that _Idea_ of _God_ which is in us to demonstrate his existence, and seeing there is contain’d in this _Idea_ such an _Immense Power_, that we conceive it a contradiction for _God_ to _Exist_, and yet that any thing should _Be_ besides Him, which was not _Created_ by Him, it plainly follows that demonstrating His existence we demonstrate also that the whole world, or all things different from _God_, were _Created_ by God.

Lastly when we assert, that some _Ideas_ are _Innate_ or _natural_ to us, we do not mean that they are always present with us (for so no _Idea_ would be _Innate_) but only that we have in our selves a Faculty of producing them.

OBJECT. XI.

* _The whole stress of which Argument lyes thus; because I know it impossible for me to be of the same nature I am, ~viz~, having the Idea of a God in me, unless really there were a God, A God (I say) that very same God, whose Idea I have in my mind._

Wherefore seeing ’tis not _demonstrated_ that we have an _Idea_ of _God_, and the Christian Religion commands us to believe that _God_ is _Inconceivable_, that is, as I suppose, that we cannot have an _Idea_ of Him, it follows, that the _Existence_ of _God_ is not demonstrated, much less _the Creation_.

ANSWER.

When _God_ is said to be _Inconceiveable_ ’tis understood of an _Adequate full conception_. But I am ’een tired with often repeating, how notwithstanding we may have an _Idea_ of _God_. So that here is nothing brought that makes any thing against my _demonstration_.

OBJECT. XII.

_Against the Fourth Meditation, Of Truth and Falshood._

* _By Which I understand that Error (as it is Error) is not a Real Being, Dependent on God, but is only a Defect; and that therefore to make me Err there is not requisite a Faculty of Erring Given me by God._

’Tis Certain that _Ignorance_ is only a _Defect_, and that there is no Occasion of any _Positive Faculty_ to make us _Ignorant_. But this position is not so clear in Relation to _Error_, for Stones and Inanimate Creatures cannot _Err_, for this Reason only, because they have not the _Faculties_ of _Reasoning_ or _Imagination_; from whence ’tis Natural for us to Conclude, That to _Err_ there is requisite a _Faculty_ of _Judging_, or at least of _Imagining_, both which _Faculties_ are _Positive_, and given to all _Creatures_ subject to Error, and to Them only.

Moreover _Des-Cartes_ says thus, _I find_ (my Errors) _to Depend on two concurring Causes_, viz. _on my Faculty of Knowing, and on my Faculty of Choosing, or Freedom of my Will_. Which seems Contradictious to what he said before; And here also we may note, that _Freedom of Will_ is assumed without any Proof contrary to the Opinion of the Calvinists.

ANSWER.

Tho to make us _Err_ there is requisite a _Faculty_ of _Reasoning_ (or rather of _Judging_, that is, of _Affirming_ and _Denying_) because _Error_ is the _Defect_ thereof, yet it does not follow from thence that this _Defect_ is any thing _Real_, for neither is _Blindness_ a _Real_ Thing, tho stones cannot be said to be _Blind_, for this Reason only, That they are _incapable of sight_. And I much wonder that in all these _Objections_ I have not found one _Right Inference_.

I have not here assumed any thing concerning the _Freedom_ of _Mans Will_, unless what all Men do Experience in themselves, and is most evident by the Light of Nature. Neither see I any Reason, Why he should say that this is Contradictious to any former Position.

Perhaps there may be Many, who respecting _Gods predisposal_ of Things cannot Comprehend, How their _Freedom_ of _Will_ Consists there-with, but yet there is no Man who, respecting himself only, does not find by Experience, That ’tis one and the same Thing to be _Willing_, and to be _Free_. But ’tis no Place to Enquire what the Opinion of others may be in this Matter.

OBJECT. XIII.

* _As for Example, When lately I set my self to examine Whether any Thing Do Exist, and found, that from my setting my self to examine such a Thing, it evidently follows, That I my self Exist, I could not but Judge, what I so clearly understood, to be true, not that I was forced thereto by any outward Impulse, but because a strong Propension in my Will did follow this Great Light in my Understanding, so that I believed it so much the more Freely and Willingly, by how much the Less indifferent I was thereunto._

This expression, _Great Light in the Understanding_, is _Metaphorical_, and therefore not to be used in Argumentation; And every one, that Doubts not of his Opinion, Pretends such a _Light_, and has no less a _Propension_ in his _Will_ to Affirm what he doubts not, than He that _really_ and _truely_ knows a Thing. Wherefore this _Light_ may be the cause of _Defending_ and _Holding_ an Opinion _Obstinately_, but never of _knowing_ an Opinion _Truly_.

Moreover not only the _Knowledge_ of _Truth_, but _Belief_ or _Giving Assent_, are not the _Acts_ of the _Will_; for Whatever is _proved_ by _strong Arguments_, or _Credibly_ told, we Believe whether we will or no.

’Tis true, To _Affirm_ or _Deny_ Propositions, to _Defend_ or _Oppose_ Propositions, are the _Acts_ of the _Will_; but it does not from thence Follow that the _Internal Assent_ depends on the _Will_. Wherefore the following Conclusion (_so that in the abuse of our Freedom of Will that Privation consists which Constitutes Error_) is not fully Demonstrated.

ANSWER.

’Tis not much _matter_, Whether this expression, _Great Light_, be _Argumentative_ or not, so it be explicative, as really it is, For all men know, that by _light in the understanding_ is meant _clearness_ of _knowledge_, which every one has not, that _thinks_ he has; and this hinders not but this _light_ in the _Understanding_ may be very different from an _obstinate Opinion_ taken up without _clear perception_.

But when ’tis here said, _That we assent to things clearly perceived whether we will or no_, ’tis the same, as if it were said, _that willing or nilling, we desire Good clearly known_; whereas the word _Nilling_, finds no room in such Expressions, for it implies, that we will and nill the same thing.

OBJECT XIV.

_Against the Fifth Meditation. Of the Essence of material things._

* _As when for Example, I imagine a Triangle, tho perhaps such a Figure exists no where out of my thoughts, nor ever will exist, yet the Nature thereof is determinate, and its Essence or Form is immutable and eternal, which is neither made by me nor depends on my mind, as appears from this, that many propositions may be demonstrated of this Triangle._

If a Triangle be _no where_, I understand not how it can have _any Nature_, for what is _no where_, is not, and therefore has not a _Being_, or any _Nature_.

A Triangle in the _Mind_ arises from a Triangle _seen_, or from one made up of what has been _seen_, but when once we have given the name of a _Triangle_ to a thing (from which we think the _Idea_ of a _Triangle_ arises) tho the Triangle it self perish, yet the _name_ continues; In the like manner, when we have once conceived in our thought, _That all the Angles of a Triangle are equal to two right ones_, and when we have given this other name (viz. _Having its three Angles equal to two right ones_) to a Triangle, tho afterwards there were no such thing in the World, yet the _Name_ would still continue, and this Proposition, _A Triangle is a Figure having three Angles equal to two right Ones_, would be _eternally true_. But the Nature of a Triangle will not be eternal if all Triangles were destroy’d.

This Proposition likewise, _A Man is an Animal_, will be _true_ to _Eternity_, because the Word _Animal_ will eternally signifie what the Word _Man_ signifies; but certainly if _Mankind_ perish, _Humane Nature_ will be no longer.

From whence ’tis Manifest, That _Essence_ as ’tis distinguish’d from _Existence_ is nothing more than the _Copulation_ of _Names_ by this word _Is_, and therefore _Essence_ without _Existence_ is meerly a _Fiction_ of our own; and as the _Image_ of a _Man_ in the _Mind_ is to a _Man_, so it seems _Essence_ is to _Existence_. Or as this Proposition _Socrates is a Man_, is to this, _Socrates Is or Exists_, so is the _Essence_ of _Socrates_ to his Existence. Now this Proposition, _Socrates is a Man_, when _Socrates_ does not exist, signifies only the Connection of the Names, and the word _Is_ carries under it the _Image_ of the _unity_ of the thing, which is called by these _Two Names_.

ANSWER.

The Difference between _Essence_ and _Existence_ is known to all Men. And what is here said of _Eternal Names_ instead of _Eternal Truth_, has been long ago sufficiently rejected.

OBJECT. XV.

_Against the Sixth Meditation. Of the Existence of Material Beings._

* _And seeing God has given me no Faculty to know whether these Ideas proceed from Bodies or not, but rather a strong inclination to believe, that these Ideas are sent from Bodies, I see no reason, why God should not be counted a Deceiver, if these Ideas came from any where, but from Corporeal Beings, and therefore we must conclude that Corporeal Beings exist._

’Tis a received opinion, that Physicians who deceive their Patients for their Healths sake, and Fathers, who deceive their Children for their Good, are guilty thereby of no Crimes, for the _fault_ of _Deceit_ does not consist in the _falsity_ of _Words_; but in the _Injury_ done to the Person deceived.

Let _D. Cartes_ therefore consider whether this Proposition, _God can upon no account deceive us_, Universally taken be _true_; For if it be not _true_ so universally taken, that Conclusion, _Therefore Corporeal Beings exist_, will not follow.

ANSWER.

’Tis not requisite for the establishment of my Conclusion, _That we cannot be deceived on any account_ (for I willingly granted, that we may be _often_ deceived) but that we cannot be deceived, when that our _Error_ argues that in _God_ there is such a _Will_ to _Cheat_ us as would be _contradictious_ to his _Nature_. And here again we have a _wrong inference_ in this _Objection_.

The Last Objection.

* _For now I plainly discover a great difference between them (~that is sleep and waking~) for my Dreams are never conjoyn’d by my Memory, with the other Actions of my Life._

I desire to Know, whether it be certain, that a Man _dreaming_, that the _doubts_ whether he _dream or not_, may not _Dream_, that he joyns his _Dream_ to the _Ideas_ of things past long since; if he may, than those _Actions_ of his past life, may be thought as _true_ if he were awake.

Moreover because (as _D. Cartes_ affirms) the _Certainty_ and _truth_ of all _knowledge_ depends only on the _knowledge_ of the _True God_, either an Atheist cannot from the _Memory_ of his past life conclude that he is _awake_, or else ’tis possible for a man to know that he is _awake_ without the _Knowledge_ of the _True God_.

ANSWER.

A Man that _dreams_ cannot _really_ connect his _dreams_ with the _Ideas_ of past things, tho, I confess, he may _dream_ that he so connects them; for whoever deny’d That a man when he is _a sleep_ may be _Deceived_? But when he awakens he may easily discover his Error.

An Atheist from the memory of his past life may collect that he is awake, but he cannot know, that this _Sign_ is sufficient to make him _certain_, that he is not _deceived_, unless he know that he is _created_ by a _God_ that will not _deceive_ him.

FINIS.

_A Catalogue of some Books sold by ~Benjamin Took~ at the Ship in St. ~Pauls~ Church-yard._

_Herodoti Halicarnassei Historiarum libri novem ejusdem narratio de vita Homeri, Gr. Lat. & H. Stephani Apologia pro Herodoto accesserunt huic Edition Chronologia Historia, & Tabula Geographica Herodotææ, necnon variantes Lectiones & notæ ex pluribus M. S. S. Cod. & Antiquis scriptoribus collectæ._ fol.

_Francisci Suarez. Doct. Theol. Grau. Tractatus de Legibus ac Deo Legislatore in decem libros distributus._ fol.

_Thorndicius de Ratione ac Jure finiendi Controversias Ecclesiæ._ fol.

The Holy Court in five Tomes, written in French by _N. Causin_, translated by Sir _T. H._ the fourth Edition. _fol._

The Works of the most Reverend _John Bramhal_, D. D. late L. Archbishop of _Armagh_, some of which never before printed, with the life of the Author, _&c._ _fol._

The History and Vindication of the Irish Remonstrance against all Calumnies and Censures in several Treatises. _folio._

A Collection of all the Statutes now in use in the Kingdom of _Ireland_, with Notes in the Margin. And likewise the Acts of Settlement and Explanation, with the rest of the Acts, made in the Reign of his Majesty that now is, to the dissolution of the Parliament, _Aug. 7. 1666_.

Several Chyrurgical Treatises by _Rich. Wiseman_, Serjeant Chyrurgion. _folio._

The Primitive Origination of Mankind considered and examined, according to the light of Nature, written by Sir _M. Hale_, Kt. late Lord Chief Justice of the Kings Bench. _folio._

_Sir Rich. Baker_’s Chronicle of the Kings of _England_ from the Romans Government to this time.

Thirty five Sermons by the Right Reverend _R. Sanderson_ late Lord Bishop of _Lincoln_.

_Le Beau Pledeur_, a Book of Entries containing Declarations, Informations, and other select and approved Pleadings; with special Verdicts and Demurrers in most actions real, personal, and mixt, which have been argued and adjudged in the Courts of _Westminster_, with faithfull references to the most authentick Law Books, by Sir _Humphry Winch_, Kt. sometimes one of the Justices of the Court of Common Pleas, _fol._

_Etymologicon Linguæ Anglicanæ; seu explicatio vocum Anglicarum Etymologica ex propriis fontibus. Omnia Alphabetico ordine in quinque distinctas Classes digesta. Authore Step. Skinner, M.D._ folio.

A large Dictionary in three Parts by _Tho. Holyoake_ D.D. _folio._

_Horæ Hebraicæ & Talmudicæ impensæ in Evangelium S. Johannis._ p. I. Lightfoot. quarto.

Doctor _Browns_ Travels in _Hungaria_, _Servia_, _Bulgaria_, _Macedonia_, &c. As also through a great part of _Germany_, with Observations on the Mines, Baths, and mineral Waters in those Parts, illustrated with the Figures of some habits and remarkable places. _quarto._

A Representation of the State of Christianity in _England_, and of its Decay and Danger from Sectaries as well as Papists.

The Controversial Letters, or the grand Controversie, concerning the pretended authority of Popes and true Soveraign of Kings, in 16 Letters. _quarto._

A True Widow, a Comedy written by _T. Shadwel_. _quarto._

A Vindication of the sincerity of the Protestant Religion in the point of Obedience to Sovereigns, opposed to the Doctrine of Rebellion authorised and practised by the Pope and the Jesuites, by _Peter Du Moulin_. _quarto._

_Phocæna_, or the Anatomy of a Porpess dissected at _Gresham_ Colledge, with a Preliminary discourse concerning Anatomy, and a Natural History of Animals. _quar._

_Dodwells_ separation of Churches from Episcopal Government, as practised by the present Nonconformists proved Schismatical from such principles as are least controverted, and do withal most popularly explain the sinfulness and mischief of Schism. _quarto._

—Two Letters of Advice. 1. For the susception of Holy Orders. 2. For Studies Theological, especially such as are rational; at the end of the former is inserted a Catalogue of the Christian Writers, and genuine works of the first three Centuries. _octavo._

—Some Considerations of present Concernment; how far Romanists may be trusted by Princes of another Perswasion. _octavo._

—Two short Discourses against the Romanists 1. An Account of the fundamental Principle of Popery. 2. An Answer to six Queries. _twelves._

Navigation and Commerce their Original and Progress, containing a succinct account of Traffick in general, by _John Evelin_, Esq; _octavo._

Of Gifts and Offices in the publick Worship of God, in three parts, endeavouring an impartial account, what was in the inspired Age of the Church, what succeeded in the more ordinary State; what reasonably may be allowed in Prayer, singing, and preaching, by _Edw. Wetenhal_, D.D. _octavo._

The Catechism of the Church of _England_ with marginal Notes, very plainly setting forth its meaning, and proving the same out of the Scriptures, for the use of Schools by _Edw. Wetenhal_, D.D.

Poems and Songs by _Tho. Flatman_. _octa._

Poems by _N. Tate_. _octavo._

The Degrees of Consanguinity affinity described and delineated, by _Robert Dixon_, D.D. in _octavo_.

The French Gardiner instructing how to cultivate all sorts of Fruit Trees and Herbs for the Garden, together with instructions to dry and conserve them, written in French, and Englished by _Jo. Evelin_, Esq; in _octavo_.

_Ataxiæ Obstaculum_; being an Answer to several Queries dispersed in several parts of _Glocestershire_ in _octavo_.

_S. Gardinerus S. T. P. de Trinitate contra Sandium_, in octavo.

_Deus Nobiscum._ A Narrative of a great Deliverance at Sea, by _W. Johnson_, D.D. _Phædri Augusti Cæsaris Liberti Fabularum Esopiarum Libri V. in usum scholarum Anglæ._ octavo.

A Short View of the chief points in Controversie between the Reformed Churches, and the Church of _Rome_, by Dr. _Peter Du Moulin_. in _octavo_.

The Country Parsons advice to his Parishioners in two Parts. 1. Containing a plain and serious Exhortation to a Religious Life. 2. General Directions how to live accordingly. in _octavo_.

FINIS.