Chapter II: Part 2

To husband those resources became, under these circumstances, his imperious duty. The posture of affairs in Lower Canada, as he had stated to General Brock, in his letter of the 17th September, particularly on the frontier of Montreal, required every soldier in that Province, and no further reinforcements could be sent by him to the other. Not aware of any advantage which could arise from offensive operations against America, to compensate for the loss they might occasion, and for the consequent insecurity to the Provinces which he was defending, Sir George Prevost continued to urge upon General Brock, and after his death, upon his successor, General Sheaffe, the necessity of adhering to a defensive system; nor does it appear from any part of the correspondence between these officers and Sir George Prevost, that they had any particular object in view, which that policy restrained them from pursuing. Previous to the armistice, and to the capture of Hull's army at Detroit, General Brock had in his letters of 3d and 26th July, 1812, before referred to, given his reasons, which were evidently independent of the consideration of any instructions from Sir George Prevost, why he did not meditate offensive operations against the American frontier; and subsequent to the capture of Detroit, and after his arrival at Fort George in September, it has been clearly shewn, that his situation and means precluded him from such measures, except at a great risk, and for the accomplishment of inadequate objects.

The correctness of this statement appears from a letter addressed by General Brock, to Sir George Prevost, on the 13th September, 1812, from Fort George; in which he says, "that although he had learnt from deserters, (but which information he had reason afterwards to think, as he acknowledged, was not altogether correct), that great dissatisfaction prevailed amongst the American troops on the Niagara frontier, and that therefore much might be effected against such a body at that moment; that keeping in mind his excellency's instructions, and _aware of the policy of permitting such a force to dwindle away by it's own inefficient means, he did not_ CONTEMPLATE _any_ IMMEDIATE ATTACK." Two strong inferences naturally arise from this letter--the one, that General Brock must have considered the instructions received from Sir George Prevost, as to defensive measures not _positive_, as the Reviewer has thought fit to state them to have been, but _discretionary_; the other, that General Brock himself, was convinced of the policy of abstaining from offensive operations against an enemy circumstanced as the Americans then were. That this policy was a wise one, was manifest from the result. Had any attack been made on Fort Niagara, or had that general sweeping of the American garrisons on the frontier, (which the critic seems to think so easy an achievement) been attempted, there cannot be a doubt but that this invasion of the American territory, before the enemy had made an attack upon our own frontier, would have united the whole population, not only of the states bordering upon that line, but of every other part of the union, in the prosecution of the war. The militia already assembled upon that frontier, and who were known to be dissatisfied, and anxious to return to their homes, would in the event of an attack upon their territory, not only have cheerfully remained to repel the aggression, but would have been further obliged to pass the frontier, for the invasion of Canada; which, without such an attack on our part, they could not have been compelled to do. Aware of this circumstance, it was the policy of the American Government, to hold out lures to our officers, commanding on the frontiers, to induce them to commence an offensive warfare. Sir George Prevost, however, saw through their design, and fortunately disappointed it. The consequence was, that finding their militia could no longer be kept together, and that the season was fast approaching, when all offensive operations must cease, the American commanders urged the troops on that line, to that ill-concerted expedition, which ended in the battle of Queenstown, and which, though attended with the irreparable loss to the British forces of their gallant Commander, terminated in the disgrace and defeat of the American army; and was thus the means of preserving, at least for that campaign, the Province of Upper Canada. Brilliant as had been the success of our arms at the battle of Queenstown, and complete as had been the overthrow of the enemy, they still remained in sufficient force on the opposite territory, to make an immediate attack upon their frontier, notwithstanding the dismay with which the critic seems to think the Americans were filled,[30] something more than hazardous. Out of the small force of less than 900 regular troops which we had on the field that day, nearly 100 of them were killed or wounded, and many were necessarily engaged in guarding the prisoners, whose numbers amounted to more than our own regular force. The enemy had received reinforcements in their line during the day of the action, and others were constantly arriving. Under these circumstances is it to be wondered at, that Major-General Sheaffe should not have listened to the suggestions of any of his officers, if such were made, and the fact is more than doubtful, to cross over immediately after the action, when according to the Reviewer's sagacious opinion, "Fort Niagara might have been taken, and the whole of the Niagara line cleared of the American troops!"

Such an attempt might indeed have averted the insinuation levelled by the critic against General Sheaffe and Sir George Prevost as _lovers of armistices_, but would have evinced great want of military judgment and prudence in General Sheaffe, and have hazarded all the advantages gained by the gallant and able conduct of his lamented predecessor, and strengthened and confirmed at Queenstown by himself. General Sheaffe was, therefore, wisely contented with having foiled a second attempt of a superior force to invade the Province; and, anxious to secure its future preservation, he willingly acceded to a proposal for an armistice, which he knew, under the circumstances of his situation, would be of incalculably more benefit to himself than to the enemy. It must be evident to every one at all conversant with military subjects, that to those who are carrying on a defensive warfare, which their inferiority of force and means of every description has obliged them to adopt, a suspension of hostilities must be infinitely more beneficial than to the opposite party. General Sheaffe was fully aware of the importance of this measure to the safety of the province, which on the death of General Brock was entrusted to him, since he was in daily expectation of receiving supplies of clothing, and other articles which were indispensable for the militia, who had become much dissatisfied from the want of those articles. Reinforcements of troops were also on their way to him; and, in fact, these supplies and reinforcements did arrive during the continuance of the armistice, and materially contributed to foil the further efforts of the enemy to invade the Province. It may also be added, that the armistice was further expedient in the first instance, when its duration was limited to three days, for the purpose of affording time for carrying into effect the proposed exchange of prisoners, the removal of those that were wounded, and the passing over to the enemy's side the militia paroles. Some portion of time was also necessary for performing, without any hostile interruption, the last tribute of respect to the memory of the gallant Commander who had then lately fallen. The subsequent prolongation of the armistice to an indefinite period, although it was in the power of either party to terminate the same by thirty hours notice, perfectly coincided with Major-General Sheaffe's system of defensive warfare, and permitted him to leave Fort George for a short time, and proceed to York, where his presence was indispensable for the purpose of being sworn in, and assuming the civil government.

It has been thought necessary to say thus much in vindication of this measure, from a sense of justice to a gallant and meritorious officer, although it was adopted without any reference to, and without the consent or approbation of Sir George Prevost. The Reviewer has indeed thought fit to characterize the armistice[31] as one for which no reason, civil or military, was ever assigned; whereas it was notorious to the army employed on the Niagara line that General Sheaffe was influenced in this step by the motives and circumstances already stated, all of which were immediately communicated by him to Sir George Prevost. If any thing further were necessary to be adduced in vindication of the policy of the defensive system, of which these armistices formed a part, and which the Reviewer has thought fit so groundlessly to denominate short-sighted and ill-judged, although attended with results so favourable to the safety of both Provinces, it will be found in the complete approbation expressed by his Majesty's Government. In Lord Bathurst's despatch to Sir George Prevost, of the 4th July, 1812, written before the intelligence of the declaration of war, by America, had reached England, his Lordship says, "The instructions given by you to Major-General Brock and Sir John Sherbrooke, cautioning them against any premature measures of hostility, or any deviation from a line of conduct strictly defensive, meets with the full approbation of his Royal Highness the Prince Regent."

In a subsequent despatch of the 10th Aug., Lord Bathurst approves of the general principles upon which Sir George Prevost intended to conduct the operations of the war, by making the defence of Quebec paramount to every other consideration, in the event of invasion. In a later despatch of the date of the 1st October, 1812, his Lordship says, "I have it in command from his Royal Highness the Prince Regent, to convey to you his most unqualified approbation of the measures which you have adopted for defending the Provinces under your charge, and of those to which you have had recourse for deferring, if not altogether preventing, any resort to actual hostility." On the subject of the armistice, he adds, "The desire which you have unceasingly manifested to avoid hostilities, with the subjects of the United States, is not more in conformity with your own feelings, than with the wishes and intentions of his Majesty's Government, and therefore your correspondence with General Dearborn cannot fail to receive their cordial concurrence."

In a further despatch from Lord Bathurst, dated the 10th October, 1812, acknowledging the receipt of the letter from Sir George Prevost, which announced the surrender of General Hull, with his army, to General Brock, and communicating his Royal Highness the Prince Regent's approbation of the conduct of General Brock, his officers and troops, on that occasion, his Lordship adds--"I am further commanded by his Royal Highness to say, that in giving every credit to Major-General Brock, and the army under his command, he is fully sensible how much your exertions and arrangements have contributed to the fortunate conclusion of the campaign in Upper Canada." In Lord Bathurst's despatch of the 16th November following, he says, "The measures which you have taken for obstructing the navigation of the Richelieu, by the erection of works on the Isle Aux Noix, appear well calculated to impede the advance of the enemy in that quarter."

Testimonials like these, so highly honorable to the zeal and ability displayed by Sir George Prevost, are sufficient of themselves to afford a complete answer to the Reviewer's assertions. That writer's remark, with regard to "the practical illustration of the tendency"[32] of Sir George Prevost's defensive system, is directly in opposition to the facts, both as respects the conduct of Colonel Procter, in consequence of his orders, and the effect produced by that conduct upon the minds of the Indians. In proof of this assertion, it is only necessary to advert to the two expeditions, of Captain Muir to Fort Wayne, in September, 1812, and of Lieutenant Dewar to the Fort of the Rapids of the Miami, in October following. The former of these expeditions tended, for some time at least, to retard the preparations which the enemy were making for their second advance to the Detroit frontier, which terminated in the defeat and capture of General Winchester and his army, while both expeditions afforded to the Indians a strong proof of our desire to co-operate with them, as far as was consistent with the security of our own Provinces, and of the Michigan territory. Neither of these expeditions would have been undertaken, had not Colonel Procter's orders been _discretionary_ instead of _positive_. It is certainly true, that Sir George Prevost did wish to discourage the employment of the regular troops under Colonel Procter, in offensive operations jointly with the Indians; because such a course of proceeding was neither consistent with the instructions he had received from his Majesty's Government, nor compatible with the military resources of his command. At the same time he merely recommended to Colonel Procter a cautious line of conduct, chiefly directed to the preservation of the district committed to his charge; and it is evident that Colonel Procter's use of the discretion thus entrusted to him, had the effect of retaining the willing services of the Indians during the whole period of our remaining in possession of the Michigan territory, and up to the time of the unfortunate retreat and consequent capture of Colonel Procter's detachment at the Moravian village.

Having thus briefly adverted to the principal occurrences of the first campaign in Upper Canada, it becomes necessary to say a few words with regard to those of the Lower Province, during the same period; and which, being under the _immediate direction of Sir George Prevost_, the Reviewer has thought proper to characterize as _utterly insignificant_.[33] Almost immediately after intelligence of the war had arrived at Quebec, Sir George Prevost repaired to Montreal, for the purpose of providing for the defence of that frontier; and having established a cordon of troops in the situations most exposed to attack, between the St. Lawrence and the Richelieu rivers, consisting of all the flank companies of the 49th and 100th regiments, together with three battalions of embodied militia, and one of Canadian voltigeurs, which last four corps had been raised and disciplined previous to the war, he returned to Quebec, in order to meet the Provincial Parliament. The legislature had been summoned, principally, for the purpose of obtaining from them an act authorizing the circulation of army bills, a measure to which from his deserved popularity with that body, they did not hesitate to accede, and without which, from the want of specie, it would scarcely have been possible to carry on the public service. To many of the arrangements and measures of Sir George Prevost, for reinforcing and strengthening Upper Canada, as well as for guarding the approaches to the Lower Province, reference has already been made. The whole summer had been unceasingly employed in these important objects, and the greatest exertions had been made to transport and convey to Kingston, by the tedious route of the St. Lawrence, against the current, and along a frontier much exposed to the enemy, the various supplies which the exigencies of the Upper Province demanded; all of which, by the judicious and able arrangements made by him for that purpose, arrived safe and without loss, or with very inconsiderable molestation.

In the month of August Sir George Prevost again repaired to Montreal, in order that he might be ready to take the field, should the movements of General Dearborn, who commanded the enemy's forces on that frontier, indicate any intention of attacking our line of defence, which had been entrusted to the charge of Major-General de Rottenburg. General Dearborn having, on the 16th November, advanced from Plattsburg to Champlain town, close upon our frontier line, thereby threatening the front of Major-General de Rottenburg's position, Sir George Prevost, upon the receipt of this intelligence, crossed the St. Lawrence with a considerable proportion of the force then at Montreal, in order to strengthen the point thus threatened, and established his head-quarters at Chambly, where he remained for several weeks. Whether this movement on the part of General Dearborn was made in the expectation of finding that no effectual resistance would be offered by the Canadian population to his further advance into the Province, or with the view of preventing the sending of reinforcements from the Lower to the Upper Province, he was equally disappointed in both these objects. The able measures adopted by Sir George Prevost in the disposition of the regular troops, as well as of the militia, who displayed the most ardent spirit of loyalty, and the most resolute determination to repel every attempt of the enemy to invade the Colony, induced the American Commander in Chief to abandon any further intention of advancing. After pushing forward a few reconnoitring parties which were invariably forced to retreat without effecting their object, he was ultimately compelled, by the advanced season of the year, to close the campaign, and to put the army into winter quarters.

The result of the first campaign was highly honorable to the military talents of the Commander of the forces. The enemy, notwithstanding their superior resources, were foiled in every attempt which they made to invade the Provinces, with the loss in one instance of the whole of their army, together with the Commander; while, in the other, their troops suffered a total defeat, attended with the capture of a General Officer, and upwards of 700 men.

But while thus engaged in his military duties, Sir George Prevost was not unmindful of the importance of our naval superiority upon the Lakes, though in this as in every other part of his conduct, he has fallen under the indiscriminate censure of the Quarterly Reviewer,[34] who has accused him of neglecting to preserve the naval ascendancy which we enjoyed on Lakes Erie and Ontario, at the commencement of the contest.

As early as the month of December, 1811, as appears from a letter addressed by Sir George Prevost to General Brock, he had directed his attention towards our marine on Lake Erie, and had given directions for the building of a schooner at Amherstburg. Our force on the Lake, at that period, consisted of the ship Queen Charlotte, and Hunter schooner, both of which were armed and actually employed. The Americans possessed at the same period a brig, the Detroit, and a sloop, the former a very fine vessel, and in readiness for any service, although then laid up at Presque Isle. During the whole of the campaign of 1812, our vessels navigated the Lake without any attempt on the part of the enemy to interrupt them, and materially contributed to the success of our arms in that quarter, by the countenance and protection afforded by them to the garrison at Amherstburg, and by the transportation from Fort Erie of such stores, provisions, and supplies as were indispensable for the security of the former post. In direct variance with the Reviewer's assertion,[35] that "_not one effort_ was made by Sir George Prevost to increase our marine at that period;" it is a remarkable fact that the schooner, Lady Prevost, which he had ordered to be built in _December_, 1811, was launched and fitted out, and was actually employed on the Lake within a month after the declaration of war, and essentially assisted in the transport of the arms, provisions, &c. before mentioned, during nearly the whole of the first campaign. Of the force which the enemy then possessed on this Lake, consisting of the Detroit and a schooner, the former fell into our possession upon the surrender of General Hull with his army; and, although she was recaptured in the October following, under circumstances which, considering the superiority of the enemy, reflected no discredit upon the officer commanding her, and the men under him, she made no accession to their strength, as she was burnt the day afterwards by our troops, and the Caledonia, a private vessel, captured with her, was rendered a mere wreck by the fire from our fort and batteries. On Lake Erie, therefore, during the whole of the campaign of 1812, our naval ascendancy was decisive; to strengthen and preserve which, the efforts of Sir George Prevost materially contributed. On Lake Ontario, our superiority, as well at the commencement of hostilities, as long prior and subsequent to that period, was still more apparent and efficient. In March, 1812, our force on that Lake consisted of the Royal George ship of 24 guns, the brig Moira of 16 guns, and two schooners; whilst that of the enemy was composed of a single brig laid up at Sackett's Harbour. But the importance of maintaining this great superiority over the enemy was not lost sight of by Sir George Prevost. As early as January, 1812, Captain Gray, an able officer of the Quarter-Master-General's department, under which the marine was placed, was despatched to York for the purpose, amongst other services, of consulting with Major-General Brock, upon the best means of preserving the ascendancy which we possessed upon Lake Ontario. In consequence of Captain Gray's suggestion, the building of a very fine schooner, called the Prince Regent, was commenced at York in the following March, which was launched, equipped, and employed upon the Lake in conveying supplies of great importance on the 3d July, immediately after notice of the declaration of war had been received in Upper Canada. This fact furnishes a full contradiction to the assertion of the Reviewer,[36] that "after slumbering away the summer and autumn without one effort to increase our marine in amount or efficiency, Sir George Prevost suddenly awoke, in the depth of winter, to a sense of the condition to which his supineness had reduced the British cause, and the building of two frigates commenced with convulsive activity." That Sir George Prevost, with so decided a naval ascendancy on both lakes at the commencement of the war, should not have thought himself justified in any extraordinary exertions to increase that ascendancy, is not to be wondered, at when it is considered, that for every purpose of the defensive system which he had adopted, the British force upon the Lakes was amply sufficient, and that Government would not have approved, in the then state of affairs, of the expense which such a measure must unavoidably have occasioned. Aware, however, as Sir George Prevost was of the important advantages which the dominion of the Lakes afforded for the preservation of the Canadas, he had, both long before, and immediately after the commencement of the war, called the attention of His Majesty's Government to that subject. He had also in his communication with General Brock, and particularly by the Deputy Assistant Quarter-Master-General, invited his consideration of the same matter. It certainly affords a strong proof of the conviction of that gallant and able officer, that our force on those waters needed no extraordinary exertion at that time to increase it beyond what had been already made; that, excepting in his letter before referred to, of 2d December, 1811, he never once mentioned the subject of our marine in his various different communications with Sir George Prevost, respecting the means of defending the Upper Province, until in his despatch of the 11th October, 1812, he acquainted the Commander of the forces with the recapture of the brig Detroit by the enemy. Previous, however, to this period, and as soon as Sir George Prevost had reason to suppose from the refusal of the American Government to accede to the Armistice, or to consider the revocation of the Orders in Council a sufficient ground for pacification, that the war would be continued, and that renewed efforts would be made for the invasion of the Canadas, he had strongly represented to His Majesty's Government the absolute necessity of experienced officers and able seamen being sent to him, to enable him to preserve the ascendancy which our marine then enjoyed. In a letter addressed to General Brock, on the 19th October, 1812, he authorized that officer to take whatever measures he might deem necessary for the accomplishment of the same object, without further reference to himself. It was not ascertained, until towards the end of October, that any extraordinary exertions were making by the enemy to equip and fit out a squadron at Sackett's Harbour. The arrival of Commodore Chauncey, with a number of shipwrights and seamen, making their intentions evident, Captain Gray, of the Quarter-Master-General's department, was sent to Kingston, to direct the laying down of the keels of two frigates, the one at that place, and the other at York; and in the month of December, more than 120 shipwrights, together with 30 seamen, engaged at Quebec, arrived in the Upper Province, and the building of the two frigates immediately commenced. In the same month, directions were given for the building of a ship, of the dimensions and tonnage of the Queen Charlotte, together with several gun-boats at Amherstburg, on Lake Erie. During the whole of the summer after the declaration of war, the superiority of our fleet on Lake Ontario, had enabled us uninterruptedly to transport from Kingston to York and Fort George, all the supplies of stores, provisions, and reinforcements of men, necessary for the defence of Upper Canada; nor was it until the month of November, when those services had been completed, and our vessels were on the point of being laid up for the winter, that with all the great advantages which they derived from the immediate vicinity of their resources, particularly of officers and men, seconded by the strenuous exertions which they made, the Americans were able to do more than to fit out the Oneida, a vessel perfectly ready for any service at the commencement of the war, and six small schooners, carrying one or two heavy guns each. With this force they ventured out for the first time on the Lake in the beginning of November, under the command of Commodore Chauncey; and availing themselves of the absence of the Moira brig, and our three schooners, at the head of the Lake, to make on the 11th an ineffectual attack upon the Royal George, under the batteries of Kingston, they retired to Sackett's Harbour, without attempting to interrupt our vessels on their return to Kingston; nor did they again shew themselves upon the Lake until the following year. Up to the month of November, therefore, which may be called the conclusion of the first campaign, as far as respected our means of defending the Province, our ascendancy on Lake Ontario had been preserved. To this object, the measures adopted by Sir George Prevost, by the building of the Prince Regent, and the supply of officers and men furnished to our marine after the commencement of the war, essentially contributed. The superior advantages enjoyed by the enemy, in being able to obtain shipwrights and seamen to an unlimited amount, together with the proximity of all their means for the building and equipment of vessels, had enabled them to launch a frigate at Sackett's Harbour, before the end of the year 1812, and to fit out a squadron, which at the commencement of 1813, gave them a temporary ascendancy on Lake Ontario, before officers and seamen could be sent to Canada from England. This ascendancy on their part was, however, of short duration, for we shall find in pursuing this subject, that the measures planned by Sir George Prevost during the summer of 1812, and carried into effect during the autumn and winter, were such as in their consequence secured to us a full equality, and occasionally the superiority on that Lake, during the two remaining campaigns. Of the nature and extent of the exertions thus made by Sir George Prevost to increase our marine on Lake Ontario, the Reviewer has himself furnished the most abundant proof. "Such," he says, "were the zeal and exertions of Sir James Yeo and his followers on their arrival at Kingston, that before the end of May they were prepared to take the Lake with the British fleet,[37] now composed of two ships of 24 and 22 guns, a brig of 14, and two schooners of 12 and 10 guns."

Sir James Yeo did not arrive at Quebec with his seamen, until the 5th May, and it was not until after the 16th that he reached Kingston; to which place Sir George Prevost had accompanied him from Montreal. The state of forwardness in which he then found the fleet was such, that he was enabled to complete its equipment, and actually to set sail on the 27th of the same month, within little more than a week after his arrival at Kingston. The previous exertion requisite to accomplish the building of the Wolfe, a ship carrying 24 guns, the altering and refitting the brig Moira, and the making of the various repairs and alterations in the other vessels, while at the same time a ship of a large class had been built at York, and was nearly ready to be launched in April, and a ship and several gun-boats were in a state of great forwardness at Amherstburg, may be easily conjectured; particularly, when it is considered that the stores and supplies of almost every description, necessary for the armament and equipment of these vessels, had been transported to the Upper Province from Quebec and Montreal, the greater part of them during the winter, and through roads before deemed impassable for many of the heavy articles required. These difficulties were, however, soon surmounted by the energetic measures of Sir George Prevost; and he had the satisfaction to find on his arrival at Kingston, that the important object of having a fleet ready to take the Lake as early as it was probable that officers and seamen could be sent from England to command and man it, had been accomplished. Upon Sir James Yeo's arrival, as already mentioned, not more than ten days were requisite to put the squadron into a complete state of equipment, and from the period of its appearance on the Lake, the enemy ceased to enjoy the temporary ascendancy which their superior resources of men and supplies had enabled them, during the preceding month, to acquire. The Reviewer has confidently asserted, that these exertions to increase our marine ought to have been earlier made; and that had they been so made, our ascendancy on the Lake would have been retained, and York, together with the ship which was there building, might have been saved. The answer to this has already been partly given. Any extraordinary exertions to increase a marine so decidedly superior to that of the enemy, before the probable continuation of the war was clearly ascertained, and before any steps were taken by the Americans to rival us in that respect, would not have been justified, by the circumstances in which Sir George Prevost was then placed. It was not until the beginning of September, that the termination of the armistice manifested the intention of the American Government to continue the war; nor were any effectual steps taken by them for a material increase of their naval forces at Sackett's Harbour, until the month of October following, when Commodore Chauncey and his seamen arrived at that place. It is evident, therefore, that except in the construction of new vessels, and the forwarding of the supplies necessary for their equipment, nothing further could have been done at that period, to enable us to keep pace with the exertions of the enemy; and that without officers and men, who could not be expected before the spring, any number or description of vessels must have been useless.

Sir George Prevost, soon after the declaration of war, had called the attention of Government, as well as that of the Admiral on the Halifax station, to this subject. He had, therefore, every reason to expect that either from England or from Halifax, he should early in the year receive officers and seamen sufficient to fit out and man a fleet equal at least, if not superior, to any that the enemy might at that time be able to prepare. In this expectation Sir George Prevost was not disappointed; and although the Admiral on the Halifax station had only been able to afford to his strong solicitations on this head, Lieutenants Barclay and Fennis, to act as captains, and four petty officers for lieutenants, who arrived over land from New Brunswick at the end of April, this small supply of able and spirited officers being immediately despatched to Kingston, materially contributed, by their active services, to put the Fleet into the forward condition in which it was found by Sir James Yeo on his arrival.

Notwithstanding the active measures which were thus taken by Sir George Prevost to maintain our ascendancy upon the Lakes, the Quarterly Reviewer has thought proper to observe, that it is perfectly inconceivable how any man, in Sir George Prevost's situation, could have been so infatuated, as to disregard the importance of maintaining his superiority. The gross injustice of this charge will be best proved by citing the words of Sir George Prevost himself, in a letter of the 3rd February, 1813, addressed to General Sheaffe. "The extreme anxiety I experienced respecting the naval force to be employed on Lake Ontario, in the spring of this year, has rendered the proceedings in the dock-yards at Kingston and York, subjects highly interesting to me. You may therefore suppose I shall expect to find the exertions at both these places to have fully corresponded with the magnitude of the object and the difficulties surmounted in forwarding from hence the numerous supplies required for that service."

Much has been said by the Reviewer upon the incompetency of the person commanding, and of the other officers belonging to our Provincial marine on Lake Ontario.[38] Whatever might have been the want of energy and enterprise on the part of Earle, in the instance to which the critic has alluded, and the circumstances of which he has greatly exaggerated, Sir George Prevost did not think it incumbent upon him, on that account, to deprive himself of the services of that officer, who was acknowledged to be a tried and skilful navigator of the Lake, at a period when those services were particularly required for the transport of the various supplies destined for the upper parts of the Province. He was, therefore, retained in the command, not only as being highly useful for the purposes for which he was wanted, but because no person could then be found adequate to supply his place. That the captain of the Tartarus sloop of war, then at Quebec, needed but a hint from Sir George Prevost[39] to proceed with his crew to Lake Ontario, and supersede Earle and his feeble followers, may well be doubted, when we consider the state of the squadron to which he belonged, and the services required from it at the commencement of the war. Whether such a plan was beyond Sir George's _capacity_,[40] may be left for the reader to determine. Had he, however, adopted it, he would certainly have evinced a great want of consistency and judgment. He was, at that period, in the act of negociating with General Dearborn for the armistice, which afterwards took place, with the reasonable expectation that the revocation of the Orders in Council would lead to a return of peace between Great Britain and America. Our force at that time on Lake Ontario was so decidedly superior, not only to what the enemy possessed on those waters, but to any which they could hope for several months to fit out, that an addition, either to its amount or efficiency, seemed to be uncalled for and unnecessary. Offensive operations of any description, on our part, were not in contemplation; and to every purpose of defensive warfare our means on the Lake were amply competent. To have deprived the Admiral, on the Halifax station, of the services of the Tartarus, when every ship was required by him for the protection of our trade from the numerous cruizers of the enemy, without any adequate object in view, would have been altogether unjustifiable on the part of Sir George Prevost. Whether, if the captain and seamen of the Tartarus had been sent to Lake Ontario, the enemy's flotilla, preparing at Sackett's Harbour,[41] could have been destroyed; or whether, if ship-carpenters had, at the commencement of the war, been sent to Kingston, we could have built as rapidly as the enemy, cannot be proved, as neither course was attempted: nor is it material to the present discussion that it should be proved; the only question being, whether Sir George Prevost, in the then state of affairs, ought to have adopted either measure. From the preceding statement, it appears that he would not have been warranted in so doing. The observation of the Reviewer,[42] that the common-place attempt to hire, at Quebec, sailors for the Lake at one-half the wages which merchants were giving at the same moment, was the only exertion used to strengthen our flotilla, would not merit notice, if it were not for the purpose of exposing the writer's disingenuousness and want of candour. He must have known, when he made the assertion, that the merchants at Quebec hire their sailors for what is called the run-home (to England), and that for this purpose double and triple the amount of the common wages is frequently given; one-half, therefore, of that amount for a permanency, and on the Lake establishment, which held out many advantages to the men, was, as it proved, a sufficient inducement for them to enter into that service, and as many of the description required as could be found at Quebec, were procured by active and intelligent officers sent for that purpose. To these were added some valuable and experienced seamen from two transports then in the river St. Lawrence; and this supply of seamen, together with an additional number of shipwrights and other workmen, was during the winter forwarded to Kingston and York.

The situation of York for the building of one of the frigates laid down in December, as before stated, has been censured by the Reviewer,[43] as holding out to the enemy an invitation to destroy it, from the defenceless state of that fort. Long before the first certain intelligence had been received by Sir George Prevost, of the building of a new ship at Sackett's Harbour, or of the fitting out of their flotilla there, Captain Gray, as already mentioned, one of the most intelligent officers of the Quarter-Master-General's department, had been sent to the Upper Province, to ascertain the fittest situation for the construction of new vessels, whenever such a measure should become necessary. It was in consequence of the communication which that officer had with Major-General Brock, who had the highest confidence in his abilities, that it was decided that one ship should be built at York and the other at Kingston. Both places were alike exposed to attack from their unfortified state. York was certainly the weakest, although General Brock had recommended that place as the fittest and most secure, if strengthened, for a naval dock-yard on Lake Ontario. In determining to build at both places, it was thought most prudent not to run the hazard of losing both vessels from the possibility of a successful attempt of the enemy to destroy them, should they both be constructed at either of those places. The most effectual measures, on the part of Sir George Prevost and of those acting under him in the Upper Province, were taken to strengthen and fortify both York and Kingston, and it was expected that the enemy would be repelled in any attack upon either. It was not doubted, but that if York should be attacked and taken, the ship which was building there, might be, as she in fact was, destroyed, and thus be prevented from increasing the strength of the enemy, whilst Kingston might in the mean time be made too strong to occasion any fear for the safety of the fleet in that port. The result shewed the wisdom of this determination, and the capture of York, which considering the overwhelming force of the enemy, was not to be prevented, evidently preserved Kingston.

The only advantage which the Americans derived in this attack, as respected our marine, was the destruction of the new ship, and the capture of an inconsiderable quantity of stores designed for her, together with the Gloucester schooner, then lying a mere hulk, under repairs for a transport. It may in this place be proper briefly to notice another assertion of the Reviewer, respecting our marine--that the enemy commanded the waters of Lake Champlain[44] with a flotilla, before the British Commander in Chief had directed the construction of a single gun-boat to oppose them. That this should have been the fact, will not appear at all remarkable, when it is known that the waters of that Lake belong exclusively to the Americans, who enjoyed the most abundant means and resources for fitting out a fleet, from the number of vessels constantly navigating it for the purposes of trade. It was only necessary to arm and equip some of the vessels of that description, and their command of the water would be undisputed. At the commencement of the war, and for some time afterwards, we neither did nor could possess any force capable of meeting them; but that this subject was not viewed with indifference by Sir George Prevost, notwithstanding the variety of other and more important concerns which commanded his attention, may be inferred from the fact, that in June, 1813, in less than twelve months after the commencement of the war, our force of gun-boats on the Richelieu river, communicating with Lake Champlain, was such, that in conjunction with our troops at Isle aux Noix, they were sufficient for the capture of two fine schooners of the enemy, each carrying 11 guns, and 45 men. To have attempted to create any other force, except gun-boats, for the purpose of defending the Richelieu, would, when no offensive operations were contemplated, have been an useless waste of those means which were required and employed for the increase of our marine on the other Lakes.

These observations upon Sir George Prevost's conduct with respect to our marine on the Lakes, may be concluded by a reference to the opinion of the public bodies in Upper Canada, with regard to the exertions of the Commander of the forces, in preserving our naval ascendancy on those waters.

These documents afford a strong proof of the sentiments almost universally entertained on this head, by persons most capable, from their knowledge of, and interest in the subject, of appreciating the merits of Sir George Prevost's exertions.

In the address of the House of Assembly of Upper Canada,[45] in answer to the President's speech at the opening of the Provincial Parliament, 27th February, 1813, they say, "We learn, with the highest satisfaction, that the most vigorous measures have been adopted under the direction of the Commander of the forces, and are now in operation, to strengthen the Provincial Marine, and preserve the superiority of the Lakes so essential to the prosperity of this Province." The same expressions occur in the address of the Legislative Council, and in March following, on Sir George Prevost's arrival in Upper Canada, the House of Assembly and town of York addressed him in similar terms.

The campaign of 1813 opened, on the part of the Americans, with the attack and capture of York. The squadron under Commander Chauncey employed on this expedition, after landing part of the force at the Niagara frontier, returned to Sackett's Harbour, from whence it again sailed towards the end of May, with another strong force collected from that place and its neighbourhood, for the purpose of uniting with the troops on the Niagara frontier, in an attack upon Fort George. In this attack, which took place on the 27th May, the overwhelming numbers of the enemy prevailed, and the small but gallant band of about 1,500 men, under Brigadier-General Vincent, which had, for more than two hours, opposed nearly 5,000 of the Americans, after evacuating Fort George, spiking the guns, and destroying the ammunition, retreated towards the head of the Lake, General Vincent having first called in all the detachments from the different Posts on that frontier.

The enemy, pursuing his advantages, pushed forwards a force of between 3,000 and 4,000 infantry and cavalry, with nine pieces of artillery, to attack the position which General Vincent occupied at Burlington. Previous, however, to their reaching that point, a well-concerted, daring, and spirited attack was made upon their camp in the night, by a party of General Vincent's force, and under his command, which proved completely successful as a surprise, and Generals Winder and Chandler, the two senior officers, together with 100 prisoners, and four field-pieces being taken, the enemy, after destroying their stores and provisions, &c. precipitately retreated, until they joined the main body of their army. While these operations were proceeding, the most active measures were taking at Kingston to fit out and equip a fleet which might be able to dispute with the enemy the temporary ascendancy which they had gained on the Lake; but whatever efforts might be made to construct vessels and prepare them for service, it must be obvious that no advantage could be derived from any number or description of vessels without officers and seamen. The only reinforcement which up to this period, the end of April, Sir George Prevost had been able to obtain from the Admiral commanding on the Halifax station, consisted of the three lieutenants, and four petty officers, whose arrival at Kingston has been already mentioned, and whose active services had very much accelerated the equipment of our squadron before Sir James Yeo took the command of it. Previous to the arrival of Sir George Prevost at that place in May, his extreme anxiety respecting the naval force preparing on both Lakes, had induced him, during the depth of winter, to proceed in the month of February, from the Lower Province to Kingston, York, and Fort George, where his presence must have essentially contributed to impart increased activity to the preparations then making for the opening of the next campaign. The zeal and energy thus displayed by him in his indefatigable endeavours to promote the public service, although justly appreciated by the inhabitants of both provinces, could not protect him from the unfounded accusations of the Reviewer,[46] who informs his readers that Sir George Prevost had excited the expectations of the Canadian public, "that he had designed an attack upon Sackett's Harbour, where the shipping was known to be very indifferently protected, by marching over the ice, which was stronger at that time than had been known for many years."--And that "the anxious inhabitants of the Provinces who had witnessed his previous inactivity, with gloomy foreboding, were again doomed to be disappointed." What the opinion of the inhabitants of the Provinces was, with regard to Sir George Prevost's "_previous inactivity_," has clearly been shewn from the different addresses presented to him at the period alluded to.

That Sackett's Harbour could at that time, or at any other period of the winter, have been attacked with the smallest prospect of success, may be confidently denied. So far from the shipping, which by the Reviewer's[47] own showing, was a formidable squadron, commanded by an experienced officer, and manned by more than 500 able seamen, being, as he has asserted, indifferently protected, the enemy had constructed batteries for their defence, and it was known that a very considerable force had been assembled at that post, and in its neighbourhood, in order to be ready for embarkation as soon as the season would permit the fleet to take the Lake. To have attempted with the small force which then garrisoned Kingston, and which was scarcely sufficient for its defence, an expedition against an enemy's position, capable of a determined resistance, when it is considered that the troops would have been obliged to march several miles over the ice before they could reach the American territory, from whence they would still have been 15 miles distant from the object of their attack, and exposed during the whole of their approach to the concealed fire of the enemy's troops in the woods, would have been, under the circumstances in which Sir George Prevost was placed, with regard to his resources for defending Kingston, the Key, as it has been termed, to the Lower Province, little short of madness. Nothing but a determination to attach blame to the conduct of Sir George Prevost could have induced the Reviewer to hazard so groundless and unmilitary a stricture. That Sir George was alive to the importance of attacking this place, and of destroying the means there possessed by the enemy for increasing their marine, and for carrying on from thence their offensive operations, will appear evident from the measure which will be immediately adverted to, and which has drawn upon the Commander of the forces the acrimonious censure of the Reviewer.