Chapter III: Part 3

In December, 1812, Sir George Prevost, aware of the importance of strengthening himself against the threatened attempts upon the Canadas, in the interval which would elapse before any reinforcements could by possibility arrive from Europe, had directed Lieutenant-General Sir John Sherbrooke, and Major-General Smyth, to make arrangements for forwarding to him, during the winter, by land, the 104th regiment, then in New Brunswick. This arduous march, which had not before been attempted, and which was thought extremely hazardous, if not altogether impracticable, was effected in the month of March without the loss of a single man, and by the end of April six companies of that regiment arrived at Kingston. This accession to the strength of that garrison enabled Sir George Prevost, who, as already stated, reached Kingston with Sir James Yeo about the middle of May, to avail himself of the opportunity afforded by the sailing of the American fleet for the head of the Lake, to attempt a diversion in favour of the points threatened by the enemy on the Niagara frontier. The expedition against Sackett's Harbour was accordingly resolved upon, the moment the absence of the enemy's squadron was ascertained. The circumstances which attended this expedition, have been misrepresented in the most extraordinary manner by the Quarterly Reviewer,[48] who, instead of ascribing the failure of the enterprise to its real and natural causes, as given in the official report of Colonel Baynes,[49] and which will now be more particularly detailed, has not scrupled to attribute that failure to the indecision and misconduct of the Commander of the forces. As the whole force, which could be mustered for this service, hardly exceeded 700 men, consisting of the greater part of the garrison of Kingston, it must be obvious that means so inadequate could justify an attempt to carry Sackett's Harbour only by surprise. This, in fact, was the sole object in view; and the troops being embarked, together with two field-pieces, on board of our squadron, sailed in the evening of the 27th May, under the immediate command of Colonel, now Major-General Baynes. Sanguine hopes were entertained of teaching the enemy's post in the course of the night, when the surprise would have been complete, and our success infallible; but owing to light and baffling winds, it was not until between 10 and 11 o'clock on the following morning, the 28th, that our fleet was able to approach within 12 or 15 miles of Sackett's Harbour. Previously to this, and as soon as our squadron had been discovered from the port, alarm-guns had been fired, and boats were seen filled with armed men, continually passing down the shores of the Lake, from Oswego towards Sackett's Harbour, to assist in its defence. In the mean time, the troops on board the fleet were held in readiness for landing in the boats, as soon as the vessels should have approached sufficiently near to the shore for that purpose, as well as for insuring their co-operation in the attack. At this period, unfortunately, the wind, which had been rather fair, though light, altogether failed, and shortly afterwards the breeze came almost immediately from the point which the fleet was endeavouring to approach. To have attempted a landing in boats, at the distance of fifteen miles from the object of attack, would have been a most tedious and hazardous undertaking, exposed, as the men must have been, to the fire of musketry and field-pieces from the shore, and to the direct _enfilade_ of all the heavy cannon in the enemy's forts and batteries. The day was too far advanced to leave any hope of completing the service before dark; and without the efficient co-operation of the fleet, which, from the state of the wind, could not be obtained, the most gallant exertions of the troops, as was afterwards proved, would have been ineffectual. From these circumstances, it was the unanimous opinion of the principal officers of the expedition under Colonel Baynes, who, together with Sir James Yeo, had been consulted by him as to the expediency of persevering in the enterprise, that the attempt should be abandoned, and orders were accordingly given for the return of the squadron to Kingston. The incident of the surrender of the cavalry officer and his party, which is stated by the Reviewer with his usual incorrectness, did certainly lead to the determination, which was subsequently taken, of persisting in the expedition; but it was the information obtained from those persons, with regard to the force of the enemy, and their means of defence, which principally influenced that determination. It appearing probable, from the state of the wind, which towards evening again became favourable for approaching Sackett's Harbour, that the men might be brought under cover of the night to the point of attack, in which they would be supported by the active co-operation of the fleet, it was resolved to make the attack at day-break the following morning. In order to favour the belief that we had abandoned the attempt, the ships' heads were kept towards Kingston until the evening commenced, when the squadron stood in for the shore. The troops were in the boats at ten o'clock, and confident hopes were indulged that, on the approach to the landing at day-break, they would be assisted by the artillery, and receive the effectual support and co-operation of the fleet, which was judged most essential to the success of the undertaking. The landing took place as was intended, nearly at day-break; and, considering the local impediments, was effected in a style highly creditable to the military skill of Colonel Baynes. Notwithstanding the want of our artillery, which being on board of a schooner, towed by the boats of the squadron, was still at a considerable distance, and the state of the wind, which prevented the squadron from approaching the shore, our troops, after landing and taking possession of one of their field-pieces and a tumbril, had, by a spirited advance, driven the enemy before them, at the point of the bayonet, through the woods, which were most obstinately maintained by them, and had forced them to retire towards their works and loop-holed barracks. But these works were found to be of such strength, as to render it next to impossible for our small force, unprovided with heavy cannon, to make any impression upon them. The men had been now engaged for several hours, and had sustained a considerable loss. It was at this period that Sir George Prevost, who had landed shortly after the troops, and who had followed their course and progress, came up with the main body engaged with the enemy; and it was then that he received from the officer commanding the expedition, the report of the manner in which the enemy had been driven towards their works and loop-holed barracks, and of the difficulty, if not impossibility, of forcing them without the aid of our artillery and the co-operation of our fleet. The former, with all the exertions made in towing the schooner, had not been landed; and the latter, from the state of the wind, could not approach sufficiently near for their guns to bear upon the enemy's batteries.

The Commander of the forces then, for the first time, interfered, so as to give any orders respecting the expedition. Though there was scarcely a hope of success, yet he determined not to abandon the enterprise whilst a possibility of attaining his object remained. He accordingly directed Colonel Baynes to concentrate his scattered force, and to advance upon the enemy, who were posted in considerable numbers in front of and behind their loop-holed barracks. Not more than from 300 to 400 men could be assembled for this last attack. It was, however, made by this small band with intrepid gallantry. The enemy, though superior in numbers, were driven from their position, and forced to take shelter in the town; but in the further attempt to approach the works, our troops were met by such a galling and destructive fire of grape and musketry, both in front and flank, that they were compelled to abandon a contest to which their numbers were so unequal. The force of the enemy, at this period, consisted, by their own acknowledgment, exclusive of their killed and wounded, of upwards of 1,100 men, including 142 artillerymen. They were strongly posted in Fort Tompkins, armed with heavy guns, and in their block-houses and loop-holed barracks, the very situation which renders the youngest American recruit (a marksman from his youth), more than a match for the most experienced veteran. Our force was reduced to nearly one-third of its effective strength from the casualties of the field, and from the absence of those who had withdrawn to the rear with the wounded and prisoners. We possessed not a single field-piece, the artillery not having yet been landed. Colonel Young had retired from exhaustion, in consequence of previous illness. All the other field-officers, one excepted, were wounded, together with most of the captains and subalterns. Captain Mulcaster commanding the gun-boat, made every exertion in his power; but there was no hope of assistance from the fleet, in consequence of the state of the wind. Under such circumstances, that so small a band, exhausted by previous exertion, should have attacked and carried Fort Tompkins, the block-houses, and the remaining loop-holed barracks of the enemy, so numerously defended as they were, might probably be expected by such experienced warriors as the Quarterly Reviewer, and those upon whose authority he relies; but it was apparent to every officer and man who was present, that success was impossible. Such being the conviction of the Commander of the forces, who had witnessed with feelings of poignant regret the last gallant though unavailing exertions of his troops, he reluctantly ordered their re-embarkation, which was effected in the most perfect order, and without the slightest precipitation, the enemy not attempting to offer the least molestation. This expedition, though certainly attended with a considerable loss on our part, was not unproductive of advantage to us, or of damage and serious inconvenience to our adversaries. Their apprehensions of the result of the last attack, ignorant as they were of the trifling force by which it was made, induced them to set fire to their new ship and naval arsenal; and although, afterwards, when their fear subsided, from a more perfect knowledge of the state of our force, they succeeded in extinguishing the fire on board the ship, before it had got to any height, yet, by their own acknowledgment, they lost their arsenal, with a large quantity of valuable stores; while one field-piece, and upwards of 200 prisoners were brought away, together with some camp-equipage, and another field-piece was rendered useless. Their loss, also, in killed and wounded was, by their own admission, upwards of 150 men. From this detail of facts, to the truth of which there are abundant living witnesses to vouch, it must be obvious that the main object of the expedition failed principally from the smallness of our numbers, compared with the superior force of the enemy; from the want of our artillery, which could not be landed in time; and particularly from the little assistance which, from the state of the wind, the squadron could afford in taking off the fire of the forts. So far from nearly _two days_ being lost, as the Reviewer has stated,[50] it is notorious to every person who was employed in that expedition, that the fleet sailed on the evening of the 27th May from Kingston, and did not arrive at Sackett's Harbour until the morning of the 28th, when the intended attack was prevented solely by the impossibility of approaching the shore from the state of the wind, and that it did in fact take place on the following morning, the 29th, within 24 hours after the fleet had appeared off the place. It is a fact equally well known to every person engaged in this enterprise, that Sir George Prevost did not take the personal command of it, in the sense in which the Reviewer[51] would have it understood. That he accompanied the expedition was never denied, or attempted to be concealed. His zealous and anxious feelings prompted him to that measure, to prevent any delay in the contemplated service, should a reference to him become necessary. It is freely admitted, that when present he could not divest himself of his authority, or responsibility as Commander of the forces. But independently of its being contrary to all military usage, for the Governor in Chief and Commander of the forces in British North America, to assume the immediate command[52] of so inconsiderable a force, no instance of his interference took place until the period of the last attack, which certainly produced the greatest damage that the enemy sustained. The order to retreat was neither precipitate,[53] nor one which the gallant officers "believed with difficulty."[54] They were all convinced, not excepting the naval commander, Sir James Yeo, that it was impossible longer to contend with any prospect of success, and with our diminished means, against the superior numbers and resources of the enemy. It may indeed be confidently asserted, in direct opposition to the Reviewer's statement, that although "the troops withdrew to their boats in disappointment," at their not having been able to accomplish their object, they felt no disgrace in retiring from a contest which they had so long and so bravely supported; nor did either officers or men experience any indignation or shame at a retreat which, after the most gallant, though unavailing exertions, they knew to be indispensable for their own preservation. It may here be observed, that the situation of our troops at the time of the retreat was most critical. At that very period, a reinforcement of 600 men, under Colonel Tuttle, reached Sackett's Harbour. With the overwhelming superiority which this accession to their force gave the enemy, it is obvious that with very moderate pretensions to either skill or enterprise, they might have opposed most formidable obstacles to our re-embarkation. A further perseverance in the attack on our part, or the least delay in the retreat, would probably have ended in the capture or destruction of the whole of our troops. Fortunately, the coolness and deliberation with which that measure was executed, served to deceive the enemy with regard to our numbers and losses; and the re-embarkation being effected without opposition, the troops returned the same day to Kingston with the field-piece, camp-equipage, and prisoners which they had taken.

On the following morning the American squadron, which had been recalled from the head of the Lake to the assistance of Sackett's Harbour, appeared off Kingston, and it was a most fortunate circumstance that they did not fall in with our fleet, encumbered as it was with troops and wounded men. One material advantage immediately accrued from this expedition, by the recal of the enemy's fleet to Sackett's Harbour. Sir George Prevost lost not a moment in availing himself of the opportunity of their being in port, to embark the 49th regiment on board the squadron, and to despatch it to the head of the Lake to reinforce Brigadier-General Vincent, who was then hard pressed by the enemy, and to whose small force that regiment proved an important accession of strength at a very critical period. Sir James Yeo accordingly sailed with, and safely landed them, and from that time our full equality at least, if not our ascendancy, was established on Lake Ontario.

In reviewing the events that took place during the campaign of 1813, it will be necessary to notice the operations on the Detroit frontier, and on Lake Erie, more especially as the Commander of the forces has been accused of neglecting the representations of Colonel Procter, who commanded in that quarter.

The battle of Frenchtown, in which the Americans were totally defeated, and their General captured, was highly creditable to the talents of Colonel Procter, who certainly, until the retreat from Amherstburgh, was entitled to the reputation of a zealous and active officer.

It is said by the Quarterly Reviewer, that at this period Colonel Procter was positively restrained by Sir George Prevost from any offensive operations. The nature of the instructions given by the Commander of the forces to that officer has been already shewn; and will further appear by a reference to the letters[55] of Sir George Prevost to Colonel, now become Brigadier-General Procter, in answer to the despatches received from him, announcing the different operations which had taken place in the Michigan territory. These operations, though not always attended with success on the part of General Procter, and though they occasioned a considerable diminution of his small force from his repeated losses, were yet favourably viewed by Sir George Prevost, who, as it appears from the correspondence already referred to, was always disposed to give him full credit for his exertions, and to put the most favourable construction upon his failures. That Sir George Prevost was fully aware of the importance of General Procter's position, and of the necessity of strengthening it by every means in his power, will now be shewn by the testimony of General Procter himself.

The letters of that officer fully prove, in contradiction to the assertion of the Reviewer, who has attributed to the Commander of the forces, the neglect (if any took place) in forwarding to him the reinforcements which he had so strongly solicited, that no such neglect is imputable to Sir George Prevost.

As early as the month of March, 1813, a confidential letter was addressed by Sir George Prevost to General Procter, upon the subject of the reinforcements he had solicited, and Captain M'Douall, one of the Commander of the forces' Aids-de-camp, was sent for the purpose of ascertaining General Procter's wants, and the best mode of relieving them. In the correspondence between the Commander of the forces and General Vincent, the situation of General Procter was constantly alluded to, and the former officer was desired to pay his particular attention to the subject. On the 20th June, Sir George Prevost acquainted General Procter that General de Rottenburg, who had been appointed to the command of the forces serving in Upper Canada, had received his directions to push on the remainder of the 41st regiment, from the head of Lake Ontario to Amherstburgh. And in his subsequent letters to General Procter, of the 11th and 12th July, after stating that his wants of money, clothing, &c. had been supplied as far as lay in the power of the Commander of the forces, and that those articles were then on their passage to him, he informed him that the whole of the 41st regiment were either on their way, or would be with him before that letter could arrive. This assurance was given by Sir George Prevost, in the full confidence that the orders which he had sent to the officer commanding in Upper Canada, for the immediate forwarding of the remainder of that regiment to Amherstburgh, had been complied with. That they were not complied with as early as Sir George Prevost intended they should be, was owing to circumstances over which the Commander of the forces had no control. The force under Major-General de Rottenburg, from which the 41st regiment was to be detached, was then before an enemy greatly superior in numbers and resources, and he was very unwilling to weaken it by sending off the remainder of that regiment, until other reinforcements which were on their way to him should arrive. It appears, however, by his letter to Sir George Prevost, of 9th July, 1813, that he had, on the 6th of that month, sent forward 120 men of that regiment to Long Point, in order that thence they might be transported by means of the fleet to Amherstburgh, and that it was his intention to send the remainder of the regiment to General Procter, as soon as the Royals, then daily expected, should arrive. In a subsequent letter from Sir George Prevost to Major-General de Rottenburg, dated 23d July, 1813, in which his high opinion of General Procter's merits and conduct is pointedly expressed, he says, "I trust the reinforcements and supplies, which, in consequence of my orders to you, must be near him," &c.

From these letters it is evident that it was Sir George Prevost's intention that General Procter should be reinforced to the extent he had required, and that the commanding officers in Upper Canada, who from the peculiar circumstances in which they were placed at the time, thought themselves justified, as they really were, in so doing, were the persons who delayed the forwarding of such reinforcements.

That to this cause the delay was attributed by General Procter himself, is unequivocally proved by his correspondence respecting it with the Commander of the forces. The letter to Sir George Prevost, of the 4th July, 1813, to which the Reviewer has referred,[56] commences in a way little to be expected, from the extract which that writer has given from it. He says, "I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 4th ult. and _am fully sensible_ that this district has received a due share of your Excellency's attention. I beg to add, that _if I had received from the Line_ the reinforcements _which you had directed should be sent_, I should by this time," &c.

It must not be forgotten that this letter was before the Reviewer, and that he must therefore have designedly suppressed that portion of it, which completely exonerates Sir George Prevost from any charge of neglect.

In General Procter's next letter to the Commander of the forces, of the 11th July, he says, "I beg leave to add, that we are fully confident of every _aid from your Excellency_, and of the fortunate result of the contest, _if we are allowed the benefit of your consideration of us_; but I am unfortunately so situated, that your best intentions towards me are of no avail. If the means were afforded me, and which were no more than what your Excellency has repeatedly directed, &c."--In his next letter to the Commander of the forces, of the 13th July, he says, "The reinforcements which have been reluctantly afforded me, _notwithstanding your Excellency's intentions_, have been so sparingly and tardily sent me, as in a considerable degree to defeat the purpose of their being sent. I have no hopes of any aid from the _centre division_, where our situation is little understood, or has ever been a secondary consideration."--These extracts clearly shew that General Procter ascribed the delay in forwarding to him the remainder of the 41st regiment, not to the Commander of the forces, but to General de Rottenburg, who then commanded the centre division in Upper Canada.

Notwithstanding the Reviewer must have known this to have been the fact, from the very correspondence he was quoting, he has had the hardihood to say, "that although Sir George Prevost fully acknowledged, in his letter of the 12th July, his immediate ability to grant the reinforcement General Procter had asked for, in his letter of the 4th of that month, it will scarcely be credited, that even after this, he should have suffered _above five weeks_ to elapse before he _despatched_ the small amount of regular troops, &c."[57]

Now it appears from General de Rottenburg's letter, before referred to, that 120 men of the 41st, _had been despatched_ to Amherstburgh on the 6th July; and by a return made to the Military Secretary's Office, by Captain Chambers, Deputy-Quarter-Master-General with General Procter's army, dated Amherstburgh, 13th August, 1813, it further appears, that up to the _10th August_, more than 300 rank and file of the 41st, and 41 rank and file of the Royal Newfoundland Regiment, with nearly 50 officers and non-commissioned officers, _had arrived at that post_, which was further strengthened, within ten days afterwards, by a detachment of 50 provincial dragoons. The cavalry and men of the Newfoundland Regiment were particularly requested, by General Procter, in his correspondence with the Commander of the forces, to be sent to him.

It may here be observed, that General Procter appears to have attached by far too much importance to his own command, and not to have made proper allowances for the critical situation of the centre division, from which his reinforcements were expected. Upon the safety of that division his own altogether depended; for had they been defeated, or obliged to retire from the Upper Province, he would have been cut off from all supplies and assistance, and his capture would have been inevitable. Whereas, as afterwards happened, a disaster to the force under General Procter, and the capture of Amherstburgh, would not necessarily involve in it the safety of the centre division. These reasons, without doubt, weighed with General de Rottenburg, in retaining the remainder of the 41st regiment, until they could be despatched to General Procter, without injury to the more important service for which they were required on the Niagara frontier.

Having thus proved that, as far as depended upon Sir George Prevost, General Procter's requisitions, of every description, had been complied with, we now proceed to shew that he did not neglect our marine on Lake Erie.

The Quarterly Reviewer, indeed, has not hesitated to say, "that in the whole course of that vacillation and error, which unhappily distinguished the administration of Sir George Prevost,[58] his imbecility of judgment and action was most flagrant and palpable, in the circumstances which led to the destruction of our marine on Lake Erie." These censures, unfounded as they are, may perhaps be thought to require a more particular and detailed reply.

To the exertions made by Sir George Prevost, both before the war and after its commencement, to preserve our naval ascendancy on Lake Erie, we have already had occasion to refer. From these statements it will appear, that, independently of the new schooner, Lady Prevost, launched, armed, equipped, and upon the Lake, before the month of August, 1812, the Detroit, a ship to carry 18 guns, which the Reviewer would have his readers believe was only _laid down after Captain Barclay's arrival at Amherstburgh in June_,[59] had been commenced building before the month of _March_ preceding, together with several gun-boats. The latter were launched in April. The ship was, in fact, in a state of considerable forwardness, when Captain Barclay assumed the command on the Lake. Upon the declaration of war, we had only one ship and a schooner on Lake Erie; and, within little more than a year afterwards, our fleet there consisted of two ships, a brig, a schooner, and two small vessels. In order properly to appreciate the efforts made for the construction and armament of this squadron, it must be borne in mind that the whole of the supplies necessary for that purpose, with the exception perhaps of the timber alone, were to be transported from the Lower to the Upper Province, by the St. Lawrence and Lake Ontario, and from thence to Lake Erie, where the superiority of our marine enabled us to convey them to Amherstburgh. As the efficiency of this squadron necessarily depended upon the number and discipline of the crews with which it was manned, the subject of a supply of able seamen, for that service, early engaged the attention of Sir George Prevost. Upon Sir James Yeo's arrival at Kingston, and the appointment by him of Captain Barclay, to take the naval command on Lake Erie, the Commander of the forces urgently requested Sir James to supply that officer with a greater number of seamen than he was disposed, from his own wants, to allow him. As the obtaining the naval ascendancy, on Lake Ontario, was a primary consideration, and as the seamen whom Sir James Yeo brought with him were not sufficient adequately to man his own ships, Captain Barclay was obliged to proceed with a very scanty supply of men. The Commander of the forces was in hopes that there might be other opportunities of increasing Captain Barclay's force, and that, in the mean time, the reinforcements which he intended, and immediately afterwards directed, should be sent to General Procter, would enable him to spare a sufficient number of soldiers for the use of the squadron on Lake Erie, until Captain Barclay's wants could be more efficiently supplied. The first letter from Captain Barclay, upon the subject of these wants, was addressed to Brigadier-General Vincent, who then commanded on the Niagara frontier, and was dated 17th June, 1813. The principal object of that letter was to obtain a reinforcement of troops for General Procter, in order to enable him to co-operate with Captain Barclay, in an attack upon the enemy's naval establishment at Presqu' isle, and in that letter he expressly states that he was making an application for seamen to Sir James Yeo. This communication was forwarded to the Commander of the forces by General Vincent, with an intimation that he should immediately push forward the remainder of the 41st regiment, (a company of the regiment having been sent by him the preceding month) in order to assist in the proposed attack upon the enemy's fleet. Before the above letter either was or could be received by Sir George Prevost, he had appointed Major-General de Rottenburg to the command of the forces in Upper Canada, and had given him particular directions for supplying General Procter's wants, and for immediately despatching to him the remainder of the 41st regiment. The Reviewer has asserted,[60] that "Captain Barclay stated the wants of his squadron in men, stores, and guns, with the same truth and earnestness as General Procter had repeatedly expressed; but the _only reply_ of Sir George Prevost, to his statements, was a cold and general promise, in a letter to General Procter, that some petty officers and seamen, for Lake Erie, should be sent forward on the first opportunity."

Captain Barclay's wants were particularly detailed by him to the Commander of the forces, in the only letter he addressed to him on the subject, dated Long Point, 16th July, 1813. The receipt of this letter was acknowledged by Sir George Prevost, on the 21st of the same month, he having the day before sent an extract from it, with a strong letter of representation upon the subject, to Lord Bathurst. In this letter to Captain Barclay, Sir George Prevost states, that he is fully aware of all that officer's difficulties, and that he should endeavour to relieve his wants, as far as was in his power, explaining to him the reasons which prevented him from so doing to the extent required. He repeats, also, what he had before said to General Procter, that Captain Barclay must endeavour to obtain his naval stores from the enemy, but that being satisfied that such a measure could not be effected without an addition to his present strength, he had strongly pressed upon Sir James Yeo the necessity of immediately sending forward to him a supply of petty officers and seamen, and that he (Sir J. Yeo), had assured the Commander of the forces that he would do so without delay: that he had also given positive directions for the remainder of the 41st regiment to be sent to General Procter, and hoped that the arrival of these reinforcements would afford the timely means of attempting something against the enemy's flotilla, before it should be in a state to venture out upon the Lake.--With this assurance from Sir James Yeo, that seamen and officers should be supplied to Captain Barclay, and in the hope that his repeated orders for the reinforcement of General Procter, with the remainder of the 41st regiment, had been complied with, Sir George Prevost might with justice point out to Captain Barclay the necessity of supplying his further wants from the enemy's resources,[61] more especially as General Procter had repeatedly declared that a supply of troops alone would be sufficient to enable him to succeed in an attack upon Presqu'isle.

Subsequent to Captain Barclay's letter to the Commander of the forces, of the 16th July, all further representations respecting the supply of seamen for Lake Erie, were made by General Procter, in his letters to Sir George Prevost. The several answers to these representations the Reviewer has not thought proper to notice, contenting himself with giving a partial and immaterial extract from Sir George Prevost's letter to General Procter, of the 22nd August, evidently for the purpose of introducing what he is pleased to term a _taunt_, but which was in fact neither designed as such by Sir George, nor so considered by the gallant Captain Barclay. After stating that General Procter had, in his letter of the 18th August, 1813, announced to the Commander of the forces, that the Detroit was launched, and that, if he had seamen, a few hours would place that district in security, the Reviewer adds, "but instead of replying to this application, with _an immediate reinforcement of seamen_, the Commander-in-chief answered it as usual, on the 22nd of August, with mere promises."

Without dwelling upon the Reviewer's error in supposing that Sir George Prevost, who had no control whatever over the seamen belonging to the squadron on Lake Ontario, who were exclusively under the orders of Sir James Yeo, could by any possibility immediately have sent forward to Captain Barclay the reinforcement of seamen required, we shall shew that Sir George Prevost's answer to the application was not one of _mere promises_, but that the reinforcement required, and which had been previously provided by him, was then actually on its way to its destination. Within two days after the date of the letter of the Commander of the forces to Captain Barclay before referred to, he acquainted General Procter that Sir James Yeo had assured him, that as many petty officers and seamen as could be spared, should be forwarded to Captain Barclay without delay, but that he, Sir George Prevost, much feared they would, as to numbers, fall short of his expectations. That he was, however, endeavouring to obtain a further supply from Quebec, which he meant should be exclusively appropriated for the service of Lake Erie. This letter, which was an answer to that of General Procter, of the date of 13th July,[62] referred to by the Reviewer, has been altogether suppressed by him, as well as the material fact that almost immediately after the letter of 13th July was written, General Procter relinquished the intended expedition against Presqu'isle, although 120 men of the 41st had been sent forward to Long Point, to be there taken on board by Captain Barclay for that purpose, and employed the whole of his disposable force in an unsuccessful expedition to Forts Meigs and Sandusky, by which proceeding that force was considerably diminished. In his answer of the 22d to General Procter's letter of the 18th August, before referred to, an extract from which is given in the note, Sir George Prevost expressed his opinion of that expedition, and stated the measures he was taking to remedy the inconveniences which might arise from it.[63] After mentioning the reinforcements which he intended to send forward to General Procter, he informed him, that, of the three troop-ships which had arrived at Quebec with De Meuron's regiment, two had conveyed to Halifax 500 American prisoners of war, and the third, the Dover, had been laid up _in consequence of his having directed three-fourths of the officers and seamen to be landed and sent forward for the naval service on the Lakes_; and that he had the satisfaction to inform General Procter, that the first Lieutenant of that ship, with 50 or 60 seamen, were then at Kingston, from whence they were to be forwarded, without delay, to Amherstburgh. This circumstance Sir George Prevost requested might be made known to Captain Barclay. This portion of the letter, which so clearly shews the exertions Sir George Prevost had made, and was then making, to send a supply of seamen to Lake Erie, the Reviewer, with the whole letter before him, has thought proper to omit, and in lieu of it, to insert as the only reply given by Sir George Prevost to General Procter's request for further assistance, a passage in the letter[64] which was evidently meant as a compliment to the bravery of General Procter's troops, and an encouragement to him to persevere under the difficulties of his situation, assured, as he must have been, that every endeavour was making to relieve him. On the 26th August, four days after the date of the last letter, the Military Secretary informed General Procter that Colonel Talbot had been sent to the head of the Lake to await the arrival of the seamen mentioned in his letter of the 25th, and to forward them to Amherstburgh with all possible despatch. He was further informed, that 12 24lb. carronades for the new ship, the Detroit, were expected in the fleet at Burlington Bay, and General Procter was desired to request Captain Barclay, on his arrival at Long Point, to send off an express to the officer commanding at Burlington Heights, to say when he would be ready to receive them on board. In this letter, the Military Secretary, Captain Freer says, "His Excellency trusts, that upon the arrival of the seamen, Captain Barclay will be able to make his appearance on the Lake to meet the enemy."

From all that has been stated upon this subject, it must satisfactorily appear, that every exertion in the power of Sir George Prevost was made by him to supply the wants of Captain Barclay and the squadron, both with seamen and stores, and that at the very period when the action was fought, more men were on their way to him.

The truth of the Reviewer's assertion, that the conduct of Sir George Prevost contributed to the destruction of our marine on Lake Erie, will be best ascertained by a reference to Captain Barclay himself; and the following letter from that officer to the present Sir George Prevost, will clearly shew how unwarrantably the character of the Commander of the forces in the Canadas has been attacked on this occasion.

"_Edinburgh, 14th January, 1823._

"Sir,

"I have had the honor to receive a letter from Miss
Prevost, acquainting me that the family of the late
Lieut.-General Sir George Prevost are preparing a
pamphlet, in vindication of his memory and conduct, so
ungenerously and cruelly aspersed in the Quarterly
Review for October, 1822, and appealing to me for the
truth or falsehood of that portion of the article,
which attributes the defeat and capture of His
Majesty's squadron on Lake Erie, then under my command,
to the imbecility of his conduct, and general
inattention to our necessities.

"I most deeply lament that an article so ungenerous and
severe, should have been written, when the object of
its hostility has been so long in his grave, which must
not only lacerate most deeply the feelings of his
family, but which also tends to open again a
controversy which I had hoped was at rest.

"Agitated, however, as the question again is, by this
anonymous publication; appealed to as I am for its
truth or falsehood, I declare that as far as relates
to Lake Erie, nothing can be more false and groundless.
So contrary indeed is the fact, that I can say, the
only communication which was made by me direct to the
Commander of the forces, and which I was only induced
to make by the extreme urgency of the case, was
answered by his ordering a reinforcement of seamen from
Quebec, and which I am confident would have been
larger, _had it been possible to have waited_ for them.

"It is also but justice in me to declare, that I ever
considered his peremptory order[65] to risk a battle,
(which, however, did not arrive till after the battle
was over,) arose from his firm conviction of the
paramount necessity of a strenuous exertion on the part
of the navy for the preservation of the post, and from
a generous desire on his part, to share with me the
responsibility of a measure so hazardous, should the
issue prove unsuccessful.

I have the honor to be,
Sir,

Your most obedient servant,
R. H. BARCLAY.

"_Sir George Prevost, Bart.
Oriel College, Oxford._"

The subjoined extract of a letter from Sir James Yeo to Sir George Prevost, will also shew that the Naval Commander on the Lakes entertained a very different opinion on this subject from the Reviewer.

"_Kingston, 23d March, 1814._

"Dear Sir,

"I have had the honor of your Excellency's letter of
the 14th inst.

"It is impossible any person can be more truly sensible
of your Excellency's unremitting attention and
assiduity to every thing connected with the naval
department in this country than myself, &c.

* * * * *

I have the honour to remain,
With the highest respect,
Dear Sir,
Your Excellency's
Most obedient servant,
JAMES LUCAS YEO."

With regard to the naval action on Lake Erie, we shall only observe, that it certainly was not lost from the want of skill or courage on the part of the officers and men of our squadron. The decided superiority of the enemy in their weight of metal and seamen, gave them an advantage which the bravest efforts of our squadron, directed and encouraged by the distinguished gallantry and conduct of their Commander, were insufficient to resist. The causes of the disastrous result of that action are best told, in the words of the sentence of the Court-martial upon Captain Barclay and his officers, which will be found in the Appendix.[66] The situation of General Procter was such, after this disaster, as to render it indispensable for him to take the most prompt and energetic measures for withdrawing his troops from posts which were no longer tenable, and to join the main body of the army on the Niagara frontier, to whose force he knew his men would prove a seasonable and powerful accession. Upon this disastrous retreat it is unnecessary to dwell. It must, however, be remarked, that from the sentence of the Court-martial upon General Procter, and the subsequent remarks upon that sentence by order of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent, it certainly appears that General Procter did not avail himself, with sufficient energy and activity of the period which elapsed between the loss of our fleet and the action at the Moravian village, to effect the important object of retiring with his troops to a place of safety.

However meritorious had been the conduct of General Procter, and of the troops serving under him previous to his retreat from Amherstburgh, it was not possible for Sir George Prevost to avoid noticing in the public orders, which announced to the army the capture of the greater part of those troops at the Moravian town, what appeared to him the disgraceful circumstances with which the affair had been attended. Although General Procter might feel hurt by the reflections thus passed upon his conduct, yet the Commander of the forces, in consideration of his former services, was unwilling to make that conduct the subject of public investigation, until His Majesty's Government, to whom General Procter's explanation had been submitted, should determine upon the course to be pursued. It was in obedience to their orders that General Procter was at length put upon his trial.[67]

That the charges against General Procter could only rest upon the events of the retreat which he was accused of misconducting, and that "a long period of arduous services and neglected representations"[68] could form _no part of such charges_, must be obvious to the lowest capacity. General Procter had, of course, the opportunity of availing himself of those services before the Court-martial, and that he did so the nature of the sentence would lead us to suppose. But it surely cannot be inferred from the opinion of the Court, that Sir George Prevost had any other motive in preferring the charges, than the good of the service, and obedience to the commands of his superiors. Whether, under these circumstances, and with the knowledge of Sir George Prevost's military life, which the Reviewer must have possessed, he is justified in making the gross insinuation with which he concludes his strictures on this subject, will be left to the candid reader to determine.

The greater part of the troops under General Procter having been captured, General Vincent was compelled immediately to retreat to Burlington Heights, a measure which the information received by that officer of the extent of General Procter's loss, and the probable immediate advance of the enemy, seemed to render indispensable.

The first intelligence received of General Procter's defeat was through a Staff-Adjutant, who had escaped from the field of battle, and who, by exaggerated accounts of this disaster, and of the consequences to be expected from it, spread terror and dismay through the country as he passed rapidly along to Kingston, where he arrived on the 12th October. In the mean time, General Vincent, whom these reports had reached, and who had also on the 8th received from General Procter intelligence of the action, had begun his retreat from the four-mile creek, and had halted at the twelve-mile creek, when a communication from Colonel Young, at Burlington, induced him immediately to fall back upon that place as a post where he might with less difficulty maintain himself if attacked, and where he might wait for instructions from General de Rottenburg, the officer commanding in Upper Canada.

General de Rottenburg, who was on his way from York to Kingston, when the intelligence of General Procter's defeat overtook him on the road, immediately sent to General Vincent, directing him, in his despatch of the 10th October, if he did not consider himself sufficiently strong to hold out against the superior force of the enemy, to destroy the stores, &c. and to fall back on Kingston. These directions, it is to be observed, were given under the impression created by the Staff-Adjutant's account, which, in a very short time was discovered to be greatly exaggerated; and it appears from General Vincent's letter to General de Rottenburg, previous to the receipt of the despatch last mentioned, as well as from the one in answer to it, that he had no immediate intention of retreating from the position he then occupied, although he thought circumstances might afterwards render such a measure necessary. In the mean time the same exaggerated accounts of the action at the Moravian village, which had been carried to Kingston, having been received at Montreal by the Commander of the forces, together with General de Rottenburg's despatches, communicating the orders he had sent to General Vincent in consequence of that intelligence, Sir George Prevost in his letter to General de Rottenburg of the 18th October, approved of those orders, and directed them to be carried into execution.

On the 18th October, the very day on which this last despatch was dated, General de Rottenburg informed Sir George Prevost, by letter, that the Staff-Adjutant's account, by which he had been induced to give the directions to General Vincent to retreat to York, preparatory to falling back on Kingston, was false and scandalous. As soon as it was thus ascertained at head-quarters at Montreal, what the real nature of General Procter's disaster was, the Commander of the forces having also reason to believe, from the information transmitted to him by General de Rottenburg, that the enemy had designs upon York from Sackett's Harbour, instructions, dated the 29th October, were sent to that officer, directing him to prevent General Vincent's further retreat, and to order him to occupy both Burlington and York with the force under his command. The orders, which were accordingly sent from General de Rottenburg to General Vincent to that effect on the 1st November, were received by him on the 4th, and he in consequence remained in the position he then occupied at Burlington Heights, which undoubtedly led afterwards to the recovery of the Niagara frontier.

From the above correspondence it incontrovertibly appears, that the orders transmitted from the Commander of the forces, through General de Rottenburg to Major-General Vincent, were the real and only cause of that officer's _not retreating_ to York, and of his continuing to hold his position at Burlington; which, as appears by his own letter of the 27th October, before referred to, he was preparing to leave on the 1st November.

Sir George Prevost's orders to General Vincent, to fall back upon Kingston, had not reached him on the 23rd October; previous to which, his orders to retreat had been discretionary. On the 27th he was preparing to obey them, and on the 4th of November he received orders to remain where he was.

There cannot, therefore, be a doubt of the gross incorrectness of all the Reviewer's statements,[69] of the repeated peremptory orders to retreat; of the advice which the firmness of General Procter and others had induced them to give General Vincent to disobey those orders, and of his being persuaded upon their responsibility to adopt it.

It was, in fact, the prompt and decided measures of Sir George Prevost, as soon as the truth, with regard to General Procter's defeat, was made known to him, that alone prevented General Vincent from continuing his retreat, and that led to those offensive operations which followed shortly afterwards on the Niagara frontier, and which, notwithstanding the attempt made by the Reviewer to give the sole credit of them to General Vincent and Colonel Murray, originated in the instructions which the former officer had received from General de Rottenburg, then commanding in Upper Canada. Even the attack upon Fort Niagara had previously been pressed upon the consideration of Major-Generals de Rottenburg and Sheaffe, by the Commander of the forces, as desirable, whenever circumstances might render such a measure practicable.

In summing up the events of the campaign of 1813, the Reviewer observes,[70] "that on the British side, the occurrences of the year, on the part of the _subordinate commanders_ and troops, presented a brilliant series of achievements, the greater number of which were rendered nugatory or imperfect in result, from the absence of all energy, talent, and enterprise, in their Commander-in-Chief."

In support of this opinion, which is sufficiently singular, considering what the Reviewer has himself stated to have been the result of the campaign, he adds, that the successes obtained by General Vincent and Colonel Harvey, by General Procter, Colonel Murray, and Lieutenant-Colonel Morrison, were ALL obtained either against the positive commands of Sir George Prevost, or without any instructions from him; and that in the only measure which could be ascribed to him, he endeavoured to wrest the merit from Lieut.-Colonel De Salaberry, because he happened to arrive when the enemy were beaten.

The following observations will afford a full answer to this unfounded and disgraceful attack upon the character and reputation of Sir George Prevost. The brilliant affair at Stoney Creek, under Major-General Vincent and Colonel Harvey, and the equally successful operation on the Michigan frontier, when General Procter defeated the forces of Winchester and Clay, arose out of the circumstances of the moment, of which those officers immediately, with great judgment and gallantry, availed themselves. There could, therefore, be no time for communication with the Commander of the forces, and consequently the operations in question could not have taken place in direct opposition to commands which were never received. With regard to the general instructions under which the subordinate Commanders acted, it has already been shewn that General Procter had discretionary orders from Sir George Prevost to act on the defensive or otherwise, as circumstances might require; so likewise had General Vincent; and the marked approbation expressed, both in general orders, and in the despatches to the Secretary of State announcing these events, is a further strong proof that the conduct of those officers was in perfect accordance with the orders and instructions which they had received from the Commander of the forces. Colonel Murray's expedition against Plattsburg was, as appears by the despatch to Lord Bathurst, of the 1st August, 1813, planned altogether by Sir George Prevost, who had previously endeavoured to place our marine on the Richelieu, which had been increased by the capture of the two schooners from the enemy, on a respectable footing; first, by the appointment of Captain Pring to the naval command there, and subsequently by obtaining the services of Captain Everard, and the officers and seamen of the Wasp sloop of war, then lately arrived at Quebec from Halifax, to man these vessels and the gun-boats. Colonel Murray was the officer particularly selected by Sir George Prevost to command on this expedition, from the opinion he entertained of his zeal and energy. The event amply justified his expectations, and this enterprise, undertaken by the orders and under the instructions of the Commander of the forces, was in every respect successful.

The daring exploit which was subsequently achieved by Colonel Murray, in the capture of Fort Niagara, so far from being in opposition to Sir George Prevost's orders, or in the absence of any instructions respecting it, was the consequence of the verbal instructions given by Sir George Prevost to Lieutenant-General Drummond, previous to his assuming the command in Upper Canada, and confirmed in his letter to him of the 3rd December, 1813. Lieutenant-Colonel Morrison had been detached from Kingston with the 49th, the 2nd battalion of the 89th, and the Voltigeurs, as a corps of observation, to follow the motions of General Wilkinson's army, then threatening Montreal from Sackett's Harbour, in consequence of the _express orders and directions of Sir George Prevost_; a fact established by his despatch to Lord Bathurst of the 15th November, 1813.