Chapter I: The Crisis at Home (3)

Towards the end of October Sir George White decided that something must be done to protect his line of communication with the south. The Boers were spreading out in crescent form and drawing gradually nearer to the town. On the north were troops commanded by General Joubert. On the west was a Free State commando, and on the east was General Lucas Meyer, who owed us a grudge after the events of Talana Hill. Reinforced by troops from General Erasmus, he now desired to press towards the railway with a view to seizing it at some point south of the town. It was necessary at all costs to put a stop to this scheme. Colonel Ian Hamilton with an Infantry Brigade was therefore despatched on the 27th to Lombard's Kop, a hill some five miles east of Ladysmith. There he bivouacked for the night, with a view to clearing the enemy out at the point of the bayonet on the morrow. He never brought his plan into execution, however, for Sir George White, having been informed of the size of Meyer's force, ordered him to fall back on the town. On Sunday the 29th it was discovered that the Boers were intrenched in lines that extended over twenty miles, while "Long Tom," their six-inch gun, was perched on Pepworth Hill, its big ominous muzzle being situated some 7500 yards to the north of Ladysmith. In addition to this formidable weapon, field-guns with a range of some 8000 yards were posted about in well-concealed positions. For the protection of our line of communication it was necessary that the enemy, though three times as strong as the British force, should be dispersed, and that night, at half-past ten o'clock, Colonel Hamilton again set out with three battalions, the Devons, the Gordons, the Manchesters, and a Brigade Division of Artillery. The night was dark but clear, and the troops marched along the Newcastle Road to Limit Hill, a strong kopje some three miles north of Ladysmith, and half-way between that town and Pepworth Hill. There they bivouacked for the night. While this party was moving as described, a small force under Colonel Carleton, composed of four and a half companies of the Gloucestershire Regiment and six companies of the Royal Irish Fusiliers and No. 10 Mountain Battery, was moving towards Nicholson's Nek with a view of seizing it. But of Colonel Carleton's column anon.

On Colonel Ian Hamilton's right flank, towards Lombard's Kop, was Colonel Grimwood, with the 1st and 2nd King's Royal Rifles, the Liverpools, Leicesters, and Dublin Fusiliers, three Field-Batteries, and the Natal Volunteer Artillery. On the extreme right, when day broke, was General French with a Cavalry Brigade and some volunteers. The idea was, that while Colonel Grimwood was shelling the Boer position to the north of Lombard's Kop, General French should prevent any attempt to turn his right; the enemy's artillery silenced, Colonel Grimwood was to drive him along the ridge running to Pepworth, and, under cover of the British guns, press the Boers towards their centre. Meanwhile our centre, under Colonel Hamilton, was to attack a hill where the enemy was in force, rout him and join in the general scheme, while Colonel Carleton protected the centre from a flank movement. Unfortunately "the best laid schemes o' mice and men gang aft agley," and General White's admirable scheme failed, as we shall learn. An artillery duel began operations, and this continued for two long hours, while the warm spring morning developed, and the Boers, who had been warned of our plans and had changed their position during the night, were laughing in their sleeves at the capital surprise they had prepared. They had drawn off their men from the point that was to have been the objective of our centre, and extending and reinforcing their left, were calmly waiting our attack. The artillery duel continued till seven o'clock, our batteries with great difficulty searching out the enemy's position. Colonel Grimwood, with two battalions of the King's Royal Rifles, held the kopjes and ridges in front of Farquhar's Farm, while mounted infantry and troopers of the 18th Hussars, supported by the Liverpools and Leicesters, were posted on the hills on the right. Behind them came the artillery, who directed their fire at the hill above the farm, where the enemy was supposed to be intrenched.

Drawn by R. Caton Woodville.]

The Boers, who in great hordes had streamed from the hills like a mountain torrent and concealed themselves in the surrounding ridges, now made all Colonel Grimwood's plans impossible. He seemed, indeed, in danger of being annihilated by sheer force of superior numbers, when troops from the centre were pushed forward to his support. A smart engagement ensued, the Boers making energetic efforts to penetrate the line between the Infantry and Artillery, while the 53rd Battery changed front to meet the attack and the 5th Lancers struggled to form up on the left of the rifle regiments. But the enemy's automatic quick-firing gun vomited forth its death-dealing steel with such persistence that the cavalry was forced to retire at a gallop. The gunners again came to the rescue, and six field-batteries, spread over in a semicircular front of three-quarters of a mile, sent their shrapnel over the heads of the infantry to crash on the ridges occupied by the Boers.

At this critical moment, when the turmoil of warfare was at its hottest, and when our gallant troops were struggling unsuccessfully to hold their own against an overwhelming number of the enemy, a message came from Sir George White to retire. Some sort of a panic had taken place in the town, owing partly to the fact that the Boers were threatening it from another quarter, partly to the persistent shelling of "Long Tom," which, as some one described, was like a voluble virago, determined to have the last word! All efforts to silence the horrible weapon had failed, and for some three or four hours it had sent its eighty-four-pound shells shrieking into the town. There was no resource but to fall back, which was done to the appalling detonations of the Boer guns all going at once, while "Long Tom," like some prominent solo-singer, dominated the whole clamouring orchestra. To silence him and to cover the retreat, a Lieutenant of the _Powerful_, in charge of a gun drawn by a team of oxen, went out on the road between Limit Hill and Ladysmith. Before the gun could be got in position, however, "Long Tom" had spotted it--barked at it--overturned it, and killed several of the oxen. But his triumph was short-lived. Another rival performer had come on the scene, namely, the twelve-and-a-half-pounder of the Naval Brigade. It came, saw, and conquered, knocking out "Long Tom" at the fourth shot!

The whole action of the Naval Brigade reads like a fairy story. Ladysmith on the point of exhaustion, with all its troops engaged and no big guns wherewith to meet the terrific assaults of the six-inch cannon on Pepworth Hill, was almost in despair. At the eleventh hour up came the Naval Brigade under Captain the Hon. Hedworth Lambton of H.M.S. _Powerful_ with 280 Bluejackets, two 4.7 guns, and four twelve-and-a-half-pounders. Then the affair was done. It was just one, two, three, and away--for the fourth splendidly-directed shot saved the situation.

In this engagement great feats of daring were accomplished, feats which have now become so general that we have almost ceased to gasp in wonder at the heroism of the "mere man" of the nineteenth century. When the regiments were forced to retire from the death-laden region of Lombard's Kop, Major Abdy of the 53rd Battery R.A., dashing across the plain under a storm of shells from a quick-firing gun, brought his battery between the enemy and the straggling mass of retreating soldiers. Horse and man rolled over, but the fire of the 53rd never slackened till the imminence of danger was past. The correspondent of the _Standard_, who was present, said: "When the moment came for the battery to fall back, the limber of one of the guns had been smashed and five horses in one team had been killed. Captain Thwaites sent back for another team and waggon limber, and brought back the disabled gun under a concentrated fire from the enemy, who were not more than four hundred yards distant. Lieutenant Higgins, of the same battery, also distinguished himself for gallantry. One of the guns was overturned in a donga. In the face of a close and heavy fire the Lieutenant succeeded in righting the gun and bringing it into a place of safety."

The following is a list of killed and wounded among the officers who were engaged on Lombard's Kop:--

13th Field Battery, R.A.--Major John Dawkins, wounded,
slightly. 42nd Field Battery.--Lieutenant James Taylor
M'Dougall, killed. 69th Field Battery.--Lieutenant Harold
Belcher, bullet wound, forearm, severely. 1st Battalion King's
Royal Rifles.--Major W. T. Myers (7th Battalion), Lieutenant H.
S. Marsden, and Lieutenant T. L. Forster, killed; Lieutenant H.
C. Johnson, bullet wound in shoulder, severely. 2nd Battalion
King's Royal Rifles.--Major H. Buchanan Riddell, bullet wound,
abdomen, severe. 1st Battalion Gloucestershire
Regiment.--Captain Willcock, bullet wound, shoulder and wrist;
Captain Bertram Fyffe, bullet wound, forearm and chest, severe;
Captain Frederick Staynes, bullet wound, forearm, severe. Royal
Army Medical Corps.--Major Edward G. Gray, killed. Natal
Mounted Rifles.--Lieutenant W. Chapman, killed.

THE DISASTER OF NICHOLSON'S NEK

The circumstances which attended the movements of Colonel Carleton's column are even now somewhat fraught with mystery. He carried out the night march unmolested until within two miles of Nicholson's Nek. Then some boulders, loosened evidently for the purpose, rolled down the hill, and a sudden crackling roll of musketry stampeded the infantry ammunition mules. The alarm became infectious, with the result that the battery mules also broke loose from their leaders, practically carrying with them the whole of the gun equipment. The greater part of the regimental small-arm ammunition reserve was similarly lost. In consequence of this misfortune, Colonel Carleton's small force, after a plucky fight and heavy loss, had to capitulate. The real truth about the affair may never be known, but for the lamentable result Sir George White in an official dispatch, with heroic courage--greater perhaps than any required by warriors in the field--took upon himself the entire blame. The General knew well that the failure of his programme in the engagement of Lombard's Kop had inevitably brought about the disaster to the isolated force.

The list of officers taken prisoners by Boers was as follows:--

Staff.--Major W. Adye. 1st Battalion Royal Irish
Fusiliers.--Lieutenant-Colonel F. R. C. Carleton; Majors F. H.
Munn and C. S. Kincaid; Captains Burrows, Rice, wounded, and
Silver, severely wounded; Lieutenants A. E. S. Heard, C. E.
Southey, W. G. B. Phibbs, A. H. C. MacGregor, H. B. Holmes, A.
L. J. M. Kelly, W. D. Dooner, wounded; Second Lieutenants R. J.
Kentish, C. E. Kinahan, R. W. R. Jeudwine; Chaplain Father
Matthews. 1st Battalion Gloucestershire Regiment.--Majors S.
Humphrey, H. Capel Cure, and W. R. P. Wallace; Captains S.
Duncan and R. Conner, both slightly wounded; Lieutenants A.
Bryant, F. C. Nisbet, J. O'D. Ingram, R. M. M. Davy, C. S.
Knox, W. A. M. Temple, A. H. Radice, F. A. Breul, W. L. B.
Hill, P. H. Short; Second Lieutenants H. H. Smith, W. S.
Mackenzie, R. L. Beasley, Lieutenant and Quartermaster R. J.
Gray. Royal Artillery Mountain Battery.--Major G. E. Bryant;
Lieutenants Wheeler, G. R. H. Nugent, W. H. Moore, Webb
(attached): Newspaper Correspondent, J. Hyde.

Some details of their misfortune were given by the prisoners in Pretoria, and they serve to throw more light on the subject.

Colonel Carleton, as we know, was sent towards Nicholson's Nek to hold it and prevent the Free Staters from coming to the assistance of the other Boers. Having lost his reserve ammunition and the water of all the battery through the stampede of the mules, he set to work to construct a defensive position. But stones were scarce and the defences were slender, and by the light of dawn his position was revealed. At this time a long-range fire was opened from three hills to south and west, dropping from 1500 yards into the position, and taking it both in flank and in rear. From his observations Colonel Carleton discovered that General White's scheme had failed--that it was being abandoned. In consequence of this failure the whole Boer force was enabled to swarm from all directions towards the isolated column. Firing fierce and incessant, exhausted the already worn-out Irish Fusiliers, while the advanced companies of the Gloucesters were severely mauled by the Martini bullets of the enemy. The hill was now completely surrounded, the ammunition expended; still Colonel Carleton had no idea of giving in. The bayonet was left, and by the bayonet he meant to stand or fall. Suddenly a wounded officer ordered the white flag to be raised. It was then hoisted, but uncertainty prevailed as to the authority for the exhibition of the flag, and some of our men still continued to fire. However, the mischief was done, and the surrender was merely a matter of moments.

The most vivid account of the disaster, from an outsider's point of view, was given by the _Times_ special correspondent at Ladysmith. He wrote:--

"This column, consisting of six companies of the Royal Irish
Fusiliers, four and a half companies of the Gloucestershire
Regiment, and No. 10 Mountain Battery, left camp on Sunday
night at 10.30, with the object of occupying a position from
which it would be able to operate upon the right of the Boer
position on Pepworth Hill. The column was guided by Major Adye,
of the Field Intelligence, and a staff of the headquarters
guides. Their destination was Nicholson's Nek, a position
which, when reconnoitred from this side, appeared to possess
the necessary tactical advantages for a detached force.
Nicholson's Nek lies about four miles up Bell's Spruit, a donga
due north of Ladysmith. The men blundered along in the
darkness, the Irish Fusiliers leading, the battery in the
centre, the rear being brought up by the Gloucestershire
Regiment. There seems no doubt upon one point, and that is, the
enemy were aware of this part of the movement from the
beginning. Probably they were aware of the whole of the plans
for Monday, for in Ladysmith it was impossible to say who was a
Boer agent and who not. However that may be, it is certain that
the enemy were on the flanks of the column all night, one of
the survivors positively stating that he constantly heard the
snapping of breeches, and once the peculiar noise which a rifle
makes at night when it is dropped.

"Two hours before daybreak, while the column was in enclosed
country, either a shot was fired or a boulder rolled into the
battery in column of route. The mules stampeded, and easily
broke away from their half-asleep drivers. They came back upon
the Gloucestershire Regiment, the advance party of whom fired
into the mass, believing in the darkness that it was an attack.
This added to the chaos; the ranks were broken by the frenzied
animals, and they dashed through the ranks of the rearguard,
carrying the first and second reserve ammunition animals with
them. It became a hopeless panic; the animals, wild with the
shouting and the turmoil, tore down the nullah into the
darkness, and the last that was heard of them was the sound of
ammunition-boxes and panniers as they were splintered against
the boulders. The hubbub of those few minutes was sufficient to
have alarmed the enemy. By a strenuous effort the officers
succeeded in getting the men again under control, and when
daylight came they seized the first position which presented
itself, and which was about two miles short of the original
goal. They were forced to take advantage of the first kopje, as
Boer scouts were all round them, and the day was ushered in
with desultory firing. It was a sorry position which they had
chosen, and the men were in a sorrier plight. All their reserve
ammunition was gone, and though they had saved pieces of the
screw-guns, they were not able with these pieces to patch up a
single mounting.

"The position itself was a flat kopje commanded on the south by
a self-contained ridge. To the east was another kopje, which
commanded the top of the position at about 500 yards. On the
west were two similar spurs, also commanding the position at
short ranges. The summit of the kopje was a plateau, all the
sides being gradual slopes except the eastern, which was
almost sheer, this latter being the side from which access had
been gained. From below it appeared a defensible position, but
when once the top was reached it was evident that it was
commanded from all sides. The men busied themselves attempting
to build breastworks. The Gloucestershire companies, with their
Maxim gun, were given the northern face to hold, two companies
being detached on to a self-contained ridge of the position
which lay on the south side. The Irish Fusiliers had the
precipitous flank to defend.

"From earliest daybreak Boer scouts were reconnoitring, and
about eight o'clock mounted Boers could be seen galloping in
small groups to the cover at the reverse of the hill on the
west. Later two strong parties of mounted men took position on
the far side of the two hills commanding the kopje from the
west. About nine o'clock these two parties had crowned the
hills and opened a heavy fire at short ranges right down upon
the plateau. Our men made a plucky attempt to return this fire,
but it was impossible; they were under a cross-fire from two
directions, flank and rear. The two companies of Gloucesters
holding the self-contained ridge were driven from their
shelter, and as they crossed the open on the lower plateau were
terribly mauled, the men falling in groups. The Boers on the
west had not yet declared themselves, but about 200 marksmen
climbed to the position which the two companies of the
Gloucesters had just vacated. These men absolutely raked the
plateau, and it was then that the men were ordered to take
cover on the steep reverse of the kopje. As soon as the enemy
realised this move, the men on the western hill teemed on to
the summit and opened upon our men as they lay on the slope.
They were absolutely hemmed in, and what had commenced as a
skirmish seemed about to become a butchery. The grim order was
passed round--'Faugh-a-Ballaghs, fix your bayonets and die like
men!' There was the clatter of steel, the moment of suspense,
and then the 'Cease fire' sounded. Again and again it sounded,
but the Irish Fusiliers were loth to accept the call, and
continued firing for many minutes. Then it was unconditional
surrender and the men laid down their arms."

Photo by Elliott & Fry, London.]

An officer of the Gloucestershire Regiment described the affair thus:--

"HOSPITAL, WYNBERG, 9/11/1899.

"We were ordered out with six companies of Royal Irish
Fusiliers and No. 10 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery, to make
a night march through the Boer lines and hold a hill behind
their right flank till the rest of the troops took us off,
which they expected to do about 11 A.M. As it turned out, they
were not able to do this, but they did keep the Boer guns
employed, luckily for us. We started off at 8.30 P.M., and got
to the foot of our hill about 2 A.M. The Royal Irish Fusiliers
were in front, then the battery and S.A.A. mules, and last
ourselves. The Royal Irish Fusiliers had got part way up the
hill--a very steep one--when three mounted Boers galloped down
amid clouds of dust, rolling stones, &c. They started off the
battery and S.A.A. mules, the Boers firing as they passed. The
mules cut right through the regiment, and all was chaos for a
time.

"It was pitch dark, and the noise of the mules and the loads
and the stores falling about was enough to put any one off.
Several men were hurt, some got in next day, some are
missing.--Part of Stayner's, Fyffe's, and my company were cut
off from the rest altogether, and when we got them in some sort
of order, we had quite lost the rest of the column. The orders
were to push on, no matter what happened, and every one left to
look out for himself. After some time trying to find the
path, we came across a straggler, who told us which way the
regiment had gone, and eventually we found them on the top of a
hill. We were ordered, as soon as we got on the hill, to put up
sangars, which we worked at by the light of a very small moon
till daylight. Then the Boers began on us all round, not very
many, till about half-past eight. From then till 2.30 the fire
was hot, and hottest at 2.30, when our ammunition being almost
down and the fire devilish from all sides, we had to give in.

"I got a grazing shot on my left hand and a bullet in my right
forearm early (about 8.30 A.M., and two more grazers--right
thigh and left elbow)--later, finally, a bullet from behind
through the right shoulder about a quarter of an hour before
the end. I don't know who gave the order to 'Cease fire.' The
firing could not have gone on five minutes more on our side for
want of ammunition, and the Boer fire was tremendous from all
round. It was like 'magazine independent' at the end of
field-firing. The astonishing thing is so few were hit. If we
had had our guns and ammunition, I think we could have held on
until night and then got off, but there were 1200 of them, they
said, to our 800, not counting gunners, and you could not till
the very end see a dozen of them. The way they take cover is
simply wonderful. All the prisoners were marched off at once
and sent by rail to Pretoria. It was a terribly hot day, and no
shade or water except what the Boers gave us. They were very
good about water, giving us all they had, and fetching more
from the bottom of the hill, one and a half mile away."

An officer of the Royal Irish Fusiliers, writing from Staatsmodel Schule, Pretoria, said:--

"We were all taken prisoners, together with the Gloucester
Regiment and a Battery of Mounted Artillery, which accounts for
us being in Pretoria so soon. As we were going up the hill in
the dark, a small party of Boers dashed through our ammunition
mules, causing them to stampede. By this move we lost all our
mules, 200 in all, and with them all our ammunition and
artillery.... You don't know what it means shooting a Boer; he
is behind a rock, and all you can ever see is his rifle
sticking out. For the last hour of the fight I had a rifle and
ammunition which I took from a dead man, and blazed away for
all I was worth. Then we fixed bayonets and prepared for a
rush, when the 'Cease fire' sounded. Our senior Captain has
told me that my name has been mentioned to our Colonel, who was
commanding the force, as having caused a lot of men to rally.
We were all then taken prisoners, except two officers killed
and eight wounded, and marched to the Boer laager, and sent off
that night to a station twenty miles distant in waggons. While
we were in their laager they treated us extremely well, and
gave us food and tobacco. All you read about the Boers in
England is absolutely untrue. They are most kind to the wounded
and prisoners, looking after them as well as their own wounded,
and anything they've got they will give you if you ask them,
even if they deprive themselves. We came up to Pretoria in
first-class sleeping-carriages, and the way they treated us was
most considerate, feeding us and giving us coffee every time we
stopped. The day we arrived we took up quarters on the
racecourse, but we have been moved into a fine brick building
with baths, electric light, &c. They provide us with
everything, from clothes down to tooth-brushes. They also feed
us, and we are constantly getting presents of vegetables and
cigars from private people. In fact, we can have everything we
like except our liberty; for some reason or other they won't at
present give us parole, and we are surrounded by sentries.
There are close upon fifty officers in this building, and they
have got any amount of wounded ones in different places. They
say they won't exchange the officers at any price."

As this letter had evidently to pass through the hands of the prison censor, we may take the eulogies of the Boers for what they were worth! However, it is but just to own that there are Boers and Boers. For instance, it is a fact that Captain Gerard Rice, who was wounded in the ankle and unable to move, offered a Boer half-a-sovereign to carry him off the field. The man refused the money, but performed the action with great kindness.

Father L. Matthews, chaplain of the Royal Irish Fusiliers, who was captured at Nicholson's Nek on October 31 and subsequently released, gave the following version of the disaster:--

"We were sent out to occupy the position with the object of
preventing the two Boer forces from joining. We started at 8.30
on Sunday night, marched ten miles, and got to the hill at 1
A.M. The first mishap was that the mountain battery stampeded
and scattered the whole lot of mules. We formed up again and
gained the top of the hill. The guns were gone, but not all the
ammunition. I do not know what stampeded the mules. They
knocked me down. It was pitch dark.

"We had one hour's sleep. Firing began just after daylight. It
was slack for some time, but the Boers crept round. Then the
firing became furious. Our men made a breastwork of stones.

"After 12 o'clock there was a general cry of 'Cease fire' in
that direction. Our fellows would not stop firing. Major Adye
came up and confirmed the order to cease fire. Then the bugle
sounded 'Cease fire.' In our sangar there was a rumour that the
white flag was raised by a young officer who thought his batch
of ten men were the sole survivors.

"We were 900 alive, having started perhaps 1000. I think that
many of the battery men escaped. Our men and officers were
furious at surrendering. The Boers did not seem to be in great
numbers on the spot, but I heard that the main body had
galloped off.

"The men had to give up their arms. The officers were sent to
Commandant Steenekamp. The officers then ordered the men to
fall in. The officers were taken away from the men and sent to
General Joubert. On the same day the officers went in
mule-waggons and slept at some store _en route_, and next day
took the train at Waschbank for Pretoria. The officers are very
well treated, and so, I have heard, are the men. There has been
no unpleasantness in Pretoria. The officers are in the Model
School, and are allowed to walk as they please in the grounds.

"I think that the surrender was a great blunder, and was caused
by a misunderstanding. Major Adye was much put out. The white
flag was not hoisted by the Irish Fusiliers."

Father Matthews puts the case mildly. Some of the officers of the Irish Fusiliers were so exasperated at the exhibition of the white flag, that they set to work and smashed their swords rather than give them up.

The final figures of the losses sustained at Nicholson's Nek were as follows: The total of missing of the Gloucesters and Royal Irish Fusiliers was 843. Thirty-two of the Gloucesters, 10 of the Fusiliers, and 10 of the Mountain Battery were found dead on the field, while 150 wounded were brought into camp at Ladysmith. Between 70 and 100 of the men escaped and got back to camp.

THE SIEGE OF LADYSMITH

It was now found necessary to issue a proclamation giving all strangers the option of leaving the town at twenty-four hours' notice. In spite of this notice, however, many civilians remained. Meanwhile, shells continued to drop uproariously, if harmlessly, into the town, while the balloon corps worked steadily in their task of locating the hostile guns. The enemy objected to that original form of spy, and aimed at him many a shot, but, fortunately, without effect. The Naval Brigade, always animated, active, and efficient, completed the mounting of the long-range guns which were to add to the safety of the place and the discomfiture of its besiegers. On the whole, the position was becoming somewhat serious, particularly for those whose nerves were unaccustomed to the uproar of diurnal thunderstorms. Lord Wolseley has somewhere said that "the effect of artillery fire is more moral than actual; it kills but very few, but its appalling noise, the way it tears down trees, knocks houses into small pieces, and mutilates the human frame when it does hit, strikes terror into all but the stoutest hearts." It may be imagined that the early days of this experience must have been somewhat embarrassing, though later on, so attuned became the nerves, even of women, that they engaged in shopping in the midst of bombardment, quite unmoved.

On 2nd November at 2.30 P.M. the telegraphic communication with Ladysmith was interrupted, but it was undecided whether the Boers had got sufficiently far south to promote the interruption or whether the wires had been cut by Dutch sympathisers or small scouting parties of the enemy. The Boers applied for an armistice with a view to burying their dead, their real object most probably being, as in many previous cases of a similar nature, to obtain time for refitting their heavy guns. This request was refused, but they were permitted to bury their slain under a flag of truce. Meanwhile, General Joubert's force received large reinforcements of Free State burghers under the command of Lucas Meyer, and additional commandoes from the Middleburgh and Leydenburg districts under Schalkburger were expected.

After this the siege of Ladysmith began in real earnest. "Long Tom," though temporarily incapacitated, soon resumed his volubility, and was assisted by another of his calibre nicknamed "Slim Piet." Curiously enough, the first house hit during the siege was a commodious bungalow-shaped residence with large verandah belonging to Mr. Carter, the author of the now well-known "Narrative of the Boer War." The owner fortunately had left before the bombardment, and the premises were then occupied by nurses.

Lieut. Frederick Egerton, of the _Powerful_, who was wounded by a shell in the left knee and right foot, was promoted to the rank of Commander in Her Majesty's fleet for special services with the forces in South Africa. But his promotion came too late. He expired after some hours of suffering.[4]

The Boers by now had established batteries on Grobler's Kloof, a commanding eminence from whence they could attack both Ladysmith on the north and Colenso on the south. Women and children vacated the place, and the trains coming in and out had to run the gantlet of the Boer fire, both Nordenfeldt quick-firing guns and Mauser rifles being brought to bear on the refugees. The Boers, however, continued to salute the town without much effect, while the naval gunners replied with telling emphasis. They succeeded in dismounting the Boers' 40-pounder which had been so comfortably posted on Pepworth's Hill.

The carriages and platforms on which the naval guns were mounted at Ladysmith, and which proved so important a feature in promoting the defence of the place, were specially designed by Captain Percy Scott of the cruiser _Terrible_. In regard to this officer's resourcefulness the _Times_ expressed an opinion that is worthy of remembrance:--

"Captain Percy Scott, of the _Terrible_, came to the rescue, adding one more to the numerous instances in which this country has owed to individual resource and initiative its escape from the disasters invited by the incompetence of the War Office. There is no need to inquire just now into the balance of political and military considerations which determined the policy of making a stand at Ladysmith. It is enough that that policy was definitely adopted in ample time to allow of providing Ladysmith with the long-range guns which its position renders peculiarly necessary, dominated as it is by hills on three sides. Why were such guns not provided? Why was it left to fortunate accident to furnish the garrison at the very last moment with the means of defence? The conclusions of German military science, as will have been noted by all who read the interesting account of German manoeuvres which we published yesterday, are all in favour of saving the lives of the infantry by a very free use of artillery at long ranges. The country around Ladysmith seems to be one that calls loudly for even a more lavish artillery equipment than might normally suffice. Yet, in spite of science and of common-sense, the Ladysmith garrison, occupying a predetermined position open to artillery fire from all sides, was left absolutely destitute of long-range guns, and none too well provided with field-artillery. But that Captain Scott proved himself able, just in time, to improvise out of the rough materials at hand an effective gun-carriage, there would have been nothing to prevent the Boers from using their big guns at half the distance they have actually had to keep."

At this time British troops were withdrawn from Colenso and moved farther south, and Boer armies continued to close round Ladysmith. Isimbulwana Hill, lying east of Ladysmith, was taken possession of, and a force advancing from Dewdrop, on the west of the town, moved south towards Colenso, and there on high ground posted its guns. Yet, in spite of this, the town showed itself to be "all alive and kicking." Though cut off from the telegraph, it sent out pigeon-posts; though engirdled by Boers, it made sorties of the most animated description, and literally laughed at the hint of surrender. On the 2nd, Colonel Brocklehurst made an attack on the enemy's laagers with a force of cavalry, mounted infantry, and mounted volunteers, surprising the Dutchmen and driving them back with comparatively small loss, and on the following day fighting lasted for some hours between the British cavalry, supported by field-artillery, Imperial Light Horse, and Natal Mounted Volunteers, and the Republicans. Many shells were pitched into the town, and an artillery duel rampaged with such relentless vigour that the general sensation to those who remained enclosed in the town was as though a thunderstorm with earthquake was passing over the place. Nothing worse happened, and the enemy for a while were driven back to their camp and some thirty or more prisoners were taken. Major Charles Kincaid, 1st Royal Irish Fusiliers, with nine wounded prisoners, was exchanged by the Boers for eight of their countrymen in similar plight. Others of them were not fit to travel. The enemy continued active, replacing disabled guns with new ones and dragging fresh powerful weapons to bear on the situation. On the 4th of November they announced their annexation of Upper Tugela, and a counter-proclamation of the nature already quoted was issued by the Governor.

A large commando of the enemy commenced the bombardment of Colenso, and the troops forming the garrison of that place fell back on Estcourt, where was stationed a force of considerable strength. By "considerable strength" it must be understood that the force was sufficiently strong for purposes of defence, though not for purposes of offence. As a matter of fact, the force in Natal was not, and has not since been, sufficiently strong for attack of a foe in such powerfully intrenched positions. From beginning to end our military commanders on that side of the theatre of war were sorely handicapped by the tardy recognition by the Home Government of the gravity of the situation. But here it is now desirable that something should be said of the early history of the towns of Mafeking and Kimberley, which, like Ladysmith, were by this time almost completely isolated, rails and telegraph wires having been cut around both places respectively.

Photo by Wilson, Aberdeen.]

FOOTNOTES:

[1] Colonel Sherston, D.S.O., of the Rifle Brigade, in which he held the rank of Major, was a son of the late Captain Sherston, of Evercreech House, Somerset, and a nephew of Lord Roberts. He entered the army on February 12, 1876, and on the Afghan War breaking out two years later was appointed aide-de-camp to his uncle, then Sir Frederick Roberts. He was present in the engagement at Charasiah on October 6, 1879, and the subsequent pursuit of the enemy, his services being mentioned in despatches. A similar distinction fell to his lot in connection with the operations around Cabul in 1879, including the investment of Sherpore. He accompanied Lord Roberts in the famous march to Candahar, and was present at the battle at that place, when he was again mentioned in despatches. His services during the operations were rewarded with the medal with three clasps and the bronze decoration. In 1881 he took part in the Mahsood Wuzeeree Expedition, and on August 20, 1884, he received his company. He served with the Burmese Expedition in 1886-87 as D.A.A. and Q.G. on the Headquarters Staff, and was again mentioned in despatches and received the Distinguished Service Order and the medal with clasp. On October 15, 1898, A.A.G. in Bengal.

[2] Lieutenant-Colonel Robert Henry Gunning, of the 1st King's Royal Rifles, was the eldest son of Sir George William Gunning, fifth Baronet, of Little Horton House, Northampton, the Chairman of the Conservative Party in Mid-Northamptonshire, by his marriage with Isabella Mary Frances Charlotte, daughter of the late Colonel William Chester-Master, of the Abbey, Cirencester, and was born on July 17, 1852. Educated at Eton, he entered the army as a sub-lieutenant on March 26, 1873, and was gazetted to the 60th Foot (now the King's Royal Rifle Corps) as a lieutenant on September 9, 1874. He served in the Zulu War of 1879 with the third battalion of his regiment, and was present at the action of Gingindhlovu and the relief of Ekowe, afterwards serving as adjutant of the battalion throughout the operations of "Clarke's Column," for which he wore the medal with clasp. He was gazetted captain in August 1883, was an adjutant of the Auxiliary Forces (the 5th Militia Battalion of the King's Royal Rifles) from March 1886 to March 1891, having obtained the rank of major on June 25, 1890. In 1891-92 he took part in the war in Burma, being engaged in the operations in the Chin Hills in command of the Baungshe column, for which he wore a second medal with clasp. His commission as lieutenant-colonel bore date April 16, 1898. Colonel Gunning, who was in the Commission of the Peace for the county of Northants, married in 1880 Fanny Julia, daughter of the late Mr. Clinton George Dawkins, formerly Her Majesty's Consul-General at Venice.

[3] Colonel John James Scott Chisholme, who was killed at Elandslaagte, belonged to the 5th (Royal Irish) Lancers, and who was detached on special service in South Africa, came of an old Scottish family, the Chisholmes of Stirches, Roxburghshire, his family seat being situate at the latter place. He was the only son of the late Mr. John Scott Chisholme (who assumed the name of Scott in 1852 under the will of his uncle, Mr. James Scott of Whitehaugh), by his marriage with Margaret, eldest daughter and co-heir of the late Mr. Robert Walker of Mumrells, Stirlingshire, and was born in 1851. He entered the army in January 1872, his first services being with the 9th Lancers, and reached the rank of captain in March 1878. From that year till 1880 he served with the 9th Lancers in the Afghan War, was present at the capture of Ali Musjid, took part in the affair of Siah Sung, where he was severely wounded, and in the operations around Cabul in December 1879, when he was again wounded, and obtained mention in despatches, being rewarded with the brevet of major (May 2, 1881), and the medal with two clasps. He reached the substantive rank of major in December 1884, and from that year till 1889 was a major of the 9th Lancers, when he was transferred to the 5th Lancers. He was Military Secretary to Lord Connemara when Governor of Madras from 1888 to 1891. He reached the rank of lieutenant-colonel in August 1894, and that of colonel on August 12, 1898.

[4] Commander Egerton was a nephew of the Duke of Devonshire and of the first Earl of Ellesmere. He was the son of the late Admiral the Hon. Francis Egerton, M.P. for East Derbyshire, 1868-86. Commander Egerton, who was in his thirty-first year, entered the navy seventeen years ago. He became a lieutenant in 1891, and in 1897 he was appointed gunnery officer in the cruiser _Powerful_, having specially qualified in gunnery. He possessed honorary certificates from the Royal Naval College, but he had had no previous experience of war service.