Chapter I: The Turning of the Tide (1)

_February 27, 1900._

"Storm, strong with all the bitter heart of hate,
Smote England, now nineteen dark years ago,
As when the tide's full wrath in seaward flow
Smites and bears back the swimmer. Fraud and fate
Were leagued against her: fear was fain to prate
Of honour in dishonour, pride brought low,
And humbleness whence holiness must grow,
And greatness born of shame to be so great.

The winter day that withered hope and pride
Shines now triumphal on the turning tide
That sets once more our trust in freedom free,
That leaves a ruthless and a truthless foe
And all base hopes that hailed his cause laid low,
And England's name a light on land and sea."

--ALGERNON CHARLES SWINBURNE.

THE VOTE OF CENSURE

The terrible events of the month of December had produced a disquieting effect upon the public mind. Agitated questions were asked on all subjects connected with the series of catastrophes, and the replies were so unsatisfactory that one and all became sensible that the actions of those in power were not sufficiently in unison with public sentiment, and even the keenest supporters of the Government numbly experienced a loss of confidence in those at the helm. It was felt that some one must be to blame for the miserable condition of affairs, the hideous series of defeats that had made Great Britain an object of ridicule on the Continent. For the forwarding of our troops "in driblets," for the ineffectiveness of our guns in comparison with Boer weapons, for the uselessness of the carbine in competition with the Mauser, for the scarcity of horses, for the preparedness of the Boers, for the unpreparedness of the British, for the under-estimation of the strength of the enemy, and for many other things which tended to bring about the national disaster, various members of the Government were blamed. Charges of incapacity were levelled at the Secretary of State for War, the War Office, and the Committee of National Defence. Even the stoutest Tories were found declaiming against the attitude of lethargy--flippancy, some said--adopted by those in whose hands the fate of the nation rested. Mr. Balfour, in certain speeches somewhat ill-advisedly delivered at a critical moment, had contrived almost to wound people who were already deeply wounded by humiliation and anxiety. His mood had not been in sympathy with the public mood. He had endeavoured to brush away the stern problems facing him by minimising their seriousness, by affecting to believe that the Government was, like Caesar's wife, beyond reproach. His attitude implied that the Cabinet could do no wrong, and that the misfortunes and errors (if errors there were) were due to a concatenation of circumstances for which neither the Government at home nor the generals abroad could be held responsible. In consequence of this attitude, on one side Mr. Balfour was blamed, on another, Mr. Chamberlain. The Colonial Secretary was accused of the policy of "bluffing with a weak hand," while the Chancellor of the Exchequer, as was inevitable, came in for his share of obloquy. It was the cheeseparing principle that was at the bottom of it all; cheeseparing and red-tape were responsible for debility and delay of all kinds, and political inertia had undoubtedly spelt defeat. The clamour was reasonable and just. It was felt that prudence and energy should have served as fuel to stoke the engine of public affairs, not as a brake to be put on in the face of disaster. On all hands the public of one consent cried for a new broom and "a great co-ordinating guiding mind," and the universal clamour awoke the Government to a consciousness that there are times and seasons in the history of nations when party recriminations and crystallised party etiquette must give way before the stress of a great national need--the need to preserve at all costs the honour and the reputation of the Empire in face of the whole world.

Accordingly, the opening debate of the Session was one which cannot be passed over. The Queen's Speech struck a note of decision that was at once comforting and in sympathy with her people. Thus it ran: "I have witnessed with pride and the heartiest gratification the patriotism, eagerness, and spontaneous loyalty with which my subjects in all parts of my dominions have come forward to share in the common defence of their Imperial interests. I am confident that I shall not look to them in vain when I exhort them to sustain and renew their exertions until they have brought this struggle for the maintenance of the Empire and the assertion of its supremacy in South Africa to a victorious conclusion."

The Earl of Kimberley commented on the ignorance of the Government regarding the military preparations that for years had been going on in the Transvaal, and indulged in criticisms which might have been weighty had his hearers not been tickled by the strange irony of fate which converted into critic one of the authors of the humiliating drama which had been left to shape itself from the disastrous _scena_ of 1881.

To these criticisms the Prime Minister--somewhat broken by domestic bereavement--offered but a weak and depressing reply. "How," he asked, in regard to the Boer preparations, "could the Government know what was going on?"

"I believe, as a matter of fact, though this must not be taken
as official, that the guns were generally introduced in the
boilers of locomotives, and that the munitions of war were
introduced in piano-cases and tubs. But we had no power of
search, we had no power of knowing what munitions of war were
sent out. We certainly had no power of supervising their
importation into the Transvaal. It is a very remarkable
peculiarity of the public opinion of this country that people
always desire to eat their cake and have it. They rejoice very
much with a spirit of complacency that we have a very small
Secret Service Fund. Information is a matter of money and
nothing else. If you want much information you must give much
money; if you give little money you will get little
information; and considering the enormous sums which are spent
by other Powers, not least by the Transvaal Republic, in secret
service--which I was told on high diplomatic authority has been
L800,000 in one year--and comparing this with the ludicrously
small sums which have for a great number of years been
habitually spent by English Governments, it is impossible for
us to have the omniscience which the noble Earl seems to regard
as a necessary attribute of Her Majesty's Government."

Further on he said:

"We must all join together to exercise all the power that we
can give in order to extricate ourselves from a situation that
is full of humiliation and not free from danger, though I do
not say the danger may not be easily exaggerated. Many a
country has commenced a great war with difficulties of this
kind. We have only to look back at what the Northern States of
America went through at the opening of the Civil War to see how
easy it would be to draw a mistaken inference from the reverses
which we have met at the opening of this war. We have every
ground to think that if we set ourselves heartily to work and
exert all the instruments of power we possess we shall bring
this war to a satisfactory conclusion. I think we must defer
the pleasing task of quarrelling among ourselves until that
result has been obtained. We have a work that now appeals to us
as subjects of the Queen, as Englishmen, and it must throw into
shadow the ancient claims which party expediency has on the
action of all our statesmen."

This speech concluded, Lord Rosebery suddenly sprang up, and delivered himself with thrilling emphasis of sentiments which went at once to the heart of the nation. Deeply he deplored the Prime Minister's speech, which made it hard for "the man in the street" to support the policy of the Government.

The country, he insisted, had a right to know if there was adequate information given to the Government before the crisis of the Transvaal affair, or even sufficient to guide them in their diplomacy or their negotiation. "That is a point which the nation will insist on knowing, whether in this House or the other. If you had not sufficient information, dismiss your Intelligence Department, dismiss Mr. Conyngham Greene and your consular agents wherever they had touch with this matter--at Lourenco Marques or elsewhere. If you did know of it, you have a heavy responsibility to bear. The noble Marquis asks, 'How could we see through a deal board?' I suppose he meant by that to allude to the pianoforte cases in which, with more knowledge than he gave himself credit for, he unofficially states that the ammunition was brought into Pretoria."

Passing on to the question of Secret Service money, he declared that the Government was in possession of a very commanding majority in the House, and that if they had the responsibility of Government they were bound to ask for what funds, whether Secret Service or other, which they might think necessary for the safety of the Empire.

"They cannot," he pursued, "devolve that responsibility on
others by speaking of the working of the British Constitution.
I ask noble Lords to analyse the speech of the noble Marquis,
which is still ringing in their ears. It is the speech of a
Minister explaining a disastrous position. He practically has
only given two explanations of that situation. They are, first,
that the Government had not enough Secret Service money to
obtain information, and, secondly, the mysterious working of
the British Constitution. I suppose that there are foreign
representatives in the gallery listening to this debate, and I
suppose that the speech of the Prime Minister will be flashed
to-night all over Europe, and Europe, which is watching with a
keen and not a benevolent interest the proceedings of our
armies in South Africa, will learn that the causes of our
disasters are one avoidable and the other inevitable. The
avoidable one is the inadequate amount of the Secret Service
Fund, and the inevitable one the secular working of the British
Constitution."

Leaving the question of unpreparedness, he came to the great point, and asked what the Government intended to do.

"There is a paragraph in the Queen's Speech which I rejoice to
see, of a somewhat didactic character in its first sentence,
but not without interest in its second. 'The experience of a
great war must necessarily afford lessons of the greatest
importance to the military administration of the country. You
will not, I am convinced, shrink from any outlay that may be
required to place our defensive preparations on a level with
the responsibilities which the possession of so great an Empire
has laid on us.' The noble Marquis made no reference to that
paragraph, except to say that he does not think we shall see
compulsory service in the life of the youngest peer present. I
do not affirm or question that proposition, but I can say I do
not think it is so immeasurably remote as the noble Marquis
considers that some form of compulsory service may have to be
introduced to meet the growing exigencies of the Empire. I am
sure that neither from this nor from any other sacrifice will
the nation recoil to preserve the predominance of our Empire.
We have sent away from our island a vast mass of troops which
usually garrison it. Situated as we are in the centre of a
universe by no means friendly to us, that we should not have a
hint from the First Minister of the Crown what military
measures the Government propose to take in face of the
disasters we have met with, and what sacrifices we must
inevitably be called on to make to redress them, is one of the
most extraordinary features of the working of the British
Constitution on which the noble Marquis has laid such great
stress. I agree with him in saying that the country will carry
this thing through. It will carry it through in spite of all
the impediments, both of men and of methods, that have shackled
it in the past; but I venture to say that it will have to be
inspired by a loftier tone and by a truer patriotism than we
have heard from the Prime Minister to-night."

Mr. Balfour, in the House of Commons, was as damping to popular hopes as the Prime Minister in the House of Lords. Regarding the all-important subject of the under-estimation of the Boer strength, he somewhat airily said:

"It will be asked, How comes it, then, that this great
under-estimate of the Boer strength was made if we knew
approximately what the Boer armaments were, and what Boers were
likely to take the field? I do not know that I have got any
very satisfactory answer to give to that question. It is a
purely and strictly military problem, and, as history shows, it
is a kind of problem very difficult to answer satisfactorily.
You can gauge the military strength of a European nation with a
fixed army, with all their modern military apparatus, and with
all their military statistics at your disposal; but when you
come to problems of States whose military organisation is not
of that elaborate kind, great mistakes have been made in the
past, and I doubt not great mistakes will be made in the
future. They certainly have been made by almost every military
nation of whom we have any record. But if this is regarded as
an attack upon the military experts of the War Office, it is
surely an unfair attack, because soldiers, who are not
especially given to agreeing with one another, were absolutely
unanimous upon this point. I do not believe you will be able to
quote the opinion of a single soldier of any position whatever,
or of no position, delivered before, say, July 31 or August 31
last, indicating any opinion which will show that the force
which we in the first instance sent out would not be amply
sufficient, or more than amply sufficient, for all purposes.
(Cries of "What about Butler?") The right hon. gentlemen put a
question to me about Sir W. Butler. We had not the slightest
trace at the War Office in any communication, public,
semi-public, or private--no communication of any sort, kind, or
description, which indicated that in Sir W. Butler's opinion
the force we sent out was not sufficient--I was going to say
doubly sufficient--for any work that it might be called upon to
perform."

Indeed, the whole tenor of the speech was generally regarded as unsatisfactory and dispiriting. It was felt that, as Lord Rosebery expressed it, the Government must be left to "muddle through" somehow. People who hung anxiously on the lips of the Government for definite statements regarding future resolute action were disappointed, and waited wearily the conclusion of the debate.

On February 1, Sir Charles Dilke drew vigorous comparisons between the present and former campaigns. In regard to our lack of artillery he said:

"All our generals had told us that direct artillery fire had
failed against the Boer entrenchments. It had been known for
years past that direct artillery fire would be likely to fail
against strong entrenchments; yet we sent twenty-one batteries
of field-artillery to South Africa before the first one of the
three howitzer batteries was despatched. It was one of the
strongest charges which he and others had brought against the
War Office for some years, that our army was more badly
supplied with field-artillery than any other army in the world.
It was not even comparable with the field-artillery of
Switzerland and Roumania. In regard to our guns, the Leader of
the House had stated in a speech at Manchester that we had guns
in South Africa sufficient for three army corps of regular
troops. He should like to know on whose authority the right
hon. gentleman made that statement. The first force sent to
South Africa from India was supplied with guns, not on that
scale, but still in fairly decent and respectable measure. The
forces of Lord Methuen and Sir Redvers Buller fell altogether
short of even the scale adopted for the Indian Contingent. Both
these generals had themselves called attention to their
deficiency in this respect. We had not even now got artillery
on anything like the scale laid down by the right hon.
gentleman, and we could not have it in South Africa, because we
had not got it in the world. In these circumstances he could
only characterise the statement of the Leader of the House as
entirely erroneous and misleading, and altogether a blunder.
With regard to the batteries which were even now being sent
out, many of them were manned by reservists and by garrison
artillerymen, who had had no experience in the handling of
modern field-guns."

Proceeding to the question of lack of cavalry, he argued:

"With regard to cavalry as with regard to artillery, the first
force was well supplied, but the forces of Lord Methuen and
General Buller were very deficient in that respect. In that
connection the First Lord had made an attack on the critics of
the War Office. He said they had not seen, or if they had seen
had not insisted on, a novel fact in the present war, namely,
that for the first time in the history of the world they had
seen an army composed entirely of mounted infantry. The right
hon. gentleman had only to read Sir William Butler's 'Life of
General Colley,' where he would find very marked attention
drawn to that matter. As to the Defence Committee of the
Cabinet, of which the right hon. gentleman was a member, though
he himself had been spoken of as the author of that body, he
must admit that it had failed. It was instituted after a
correspondence in which he himself, his hon. friend (Mr. Arnold
Foster), and Mr. Spenser Wilkinson took part, and it was not
new to the present Government. It was instituted in the time of
Lord Rosebery's Government as a Committee of the Cabinet, but
it had been proclaimed to the world in the time of the present
Government. It had failed on account of the slackness of those
who attended the deliberations of the Committee. It had not
been worked as the authors of the proposal thought it might
have been worked in the interests of the Empire. The Committee
ought to have foreseen these difficulties with respect to
mounted men; they were foreseen by military men. Though
political differences occurred between Sir A. Milner and Sir W.
Butler, Sir A. Milner consulted General Butler on the military
aspect of the situation, and General Butler's opinions were
known to the Government, or should have been. They were known
to Sir A. Milner at any rate and were not concealed by him when
he was in this country a year ago. According to his (Sir C.
Dilke's) information, which reached him immediately after the
statement had been made to Sir A. Milner, General Sir W. Butler
declared that 60,000 men would be required in Cape Colony and
25,000 men in Natal. Leaving that, however, what was the
attitude of the Cabinet with regard to the need for cavalry?
They telegraphed to the Colonies to refuse mounted men. They
gave their reasons in the telegram of October 3: 'In view of
the numbers already available, infantry most and cavalry least
serviceable.' On December 16 they telegraphed to the Colonies,
'Mounted men preferred.' After all the loss of life that had
taken place, and the months of checks and reverses, they had
discovered what competent soldiers had discovered before the
war, and must have told them, that mounted men were essential
for a campaign of this kind."

In reply, the Under-Secretary of State for War made the first telling and apposite statement which had been furnished for the Government during the course of the proceedings. His exposition was straightforwardness itself. Though merely the mouthpiece of the Government, Mr. Wyndham gave utterance to definite statements which created a very favourable impression throughout the country, and served at once to wipe away the taste of foregone pronouncements. He said:

"Every one to his dying day would look back with regret on the
great many disasters which had followed, but no one could ever
know what would have happened if the other course had been
adopted. It was very easy to conceive that if Sir G. White had
not stayed at Ladysmith and Sir R. Buller had not gone to his
relief disaster might have been developed in another line, and
that there might have been that universal rising of the Cape
Dutch which, thank Heaven, had not occurred. When it was stated
that Lord Methuen had not sufficient cavalry and artillery with
him, it must be remembered that Lord Methuen was hurried off to
the Orange River, and, as a matter of fact, he arrived on the
frontier in fewer days than the German army reached the French
frontier, and he had not with him the cavalry, which had been
diverted for the relief of Ladysmith and other purposes. On the
morrow after Nicholson's Nek three more battalions were sent
from home, though none had been asked for, and Lord Landsowne
offered a sixth division. In reply, he was told that
preparation was desirable, but that there was no immediate need
for its despatch. The situation was again changed by the
reverses at Stormberg and Magersfontein and the check at
Colenso. Thereupon the sixth division was ordered to embark
without any communication from South Africa, and at the same
time the seventh division was ordered to be mobilised. On
December 15, the day after his check at Colenso, Sir R. Buller
asked for the seventh division, the mobilisation of which had
already been ordered, and for 8000 mounted irregulars from
this country. Lord Landsowne replied that the seventh division
would embark on January 4, which it did. Next day the first
step was taken in connection with the raising of the Imperial
Yeomanry, and volunteers were invited to come forward in order
to fill the places left vacant by the raising from each
battalion of one company of mounted infantry. The patriotism of
the Militia was also appealed to, and fourteen battalions were
now serving in South Africa, while others were on the way. A
great military authority once said, 'When a battalion is asked
for, send a brigade.' That had been the course pursued by Lord
Landsowne."

In regard to the number of our guns, Mr. Wyndham continued his argument in the following terms:--

"As the right hon. baronet had pressed for information with
regard to the number of guns which had been despatched to South
Africa, it would not be out of place to tell the House that we
had sent and were sending 36 siege train heavy guns; there were
already there 38 mobile naval guns, and in addition to these
there were 36 5-inch howitzers carrying a heavy shell charged
with 50 lbs. of lyddite, in all 110 guns, some of them with a
range of 10,000 yards, and all capable of throwing heavy
shells. Besides these there were 54 horse-artillery guns and
234 field-artillery guns, in all, counting the howitzers, 324
guns capable of accompanying troops in the field. Including the
two mountain batteries, there were altogether 410 guns in South
Africa, without reckoning the guns that were going out with the
Volunteers and the Colonials, which would bring the number up
to 452."

PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN SECRETARY.

Photo by Russell & Sons, London.]

Then taking the subject of mounted troops, he went on:--

"On the question of mounted troops, it had been said that the
Government announced to the world their conviction that
unmounted troops were the kind of troops most suitable to South
African warfare. The word 'mounted' was never used. However, he
would not insist on that, but he did think that those who had
quoted this opinion so often should consider when they were
used, because then they would see that they gave no indication
that the Government held the opinion attributed to them. As a
matter of fact, since the outbreak of the war the Government
had sent out a larger proportion of mounted troops than was
usually contemplated, because they believed that mounted troops
were especially suited to go to Africa. The time at which the
phrase was used that infantry was most wanted and cavalry least
wanted was on October 3, before the ultimatum was sent, before
the war began, and at a time when Sir R. Buller was satisfied
that an army corps, a cavalry division, and the necessary
troops for the line of communication, giving 50,000 men in
addition to the 25,000 already in South Africa, was an adequate
force. When the question of the Colonial Contingents was first
raised, Queensland offered 250 and New Zealand 200 mounted
infantry, and the 108 New South Wales Lancers then in this
country volunteered, making in all 558 mounted men. No specific
offer was received from the other Colonies, but they expressed
a wish that they might be allowed to take some part in the
campaign. He thereon consulted Sir R. Buller as to the number
that should be asked for in order that each Colony might be
represented more or less in proportion to their respective
populations. Sir Redvers stated that it would be easier to give
the Colonial troops an immediate place at the front if they
were invited to contribute manageable units of 125 men each. If
the original offers of the Colonies had been accepted, there
would have been 1375 more mounted men at the front at an
earlier date, when no one contemplated that the force sent out
would be insufficient for its task. The Colonial Legislatures
have not changed their note in consequence of the
disappointments and reverses which have been experienced, but
have made further offers--an example which might well have been
followed nearer home. Altogether there had been accepted from
the Colonies 2075 unmounted and 4678 mounted men. The
proportion of mounted to unmounted troops in South Africa at
four different periods were: In the original garrison, 7600
unmounted and 2000 mounted; on October 9, the day of the
ultimatum, 12,600 unmounted and 3400 mounted; on January 1,
83,600 unmounted and 19,800 mounted; while the total number of
troops in South Africa, not including the Fourth Cavalry
Brigade, were 142,800 unmounted and 37,800 mounted, and in the
next fortnight or three weeks there would be out there 180,600
of all arms."

Sir Edward Grey said:--

"He was giving the right hon. gentleman some instances of the
value of the support from his side. The primary object of the
policy which had ended in the war was not to drive the Boers
from British territory, as they were not then on it. The
primary object was not to plant the British flag at Pretoria
and Johannesburg. These two things might be the result of the
war, but they were not the primary objects of the Government
policy. The objects which he wished to see attained, and which
he would pledge himself to give the utmost support to the
Government in attaining, were, first, equal rights between all
white men in South Africa, and by that he meant that never
again should a situation arise in any part of the British
sphere in which a modern industrial community should be placed
under the heel of an antiquated minority which was dominated by
prejudice and governed by corruption. The second object was
that never again in South Africa should it be possible for
arsenals to be formed or an accumulation of military material
under any control except British control. That was the end to
be attained, and to that end the Government would have
support."

On the 3rd of February Mr. Bryce expressed his opinions. He affected to disbelieve that there had been any Dutch conspiracy to drive the British from South Africa, and considered that, owing to the menace of the Government in the arrangement of negotiations, the meek Boer had no resource but to prepare for war.

Mr. Goschen admitted the gravity of the situation and the responsibility of the Government _en masse_. The Cabinet, he decided, must stand or fall together. The Admiralty, in acceptation of its responsibility, had assisted the army with heavy guns without weakening its resources. Lastly, he touched enthusiastically on the exhibition of Colonial loyalty:--

"Before concluding I must say a word with reference to the
Colonists. They have been supporting us with unstinted loyalty
and unstinted generosity. There has been a spirit shown by the
Colonies of affection to the mother country which has been the
admiration of the world. May we not suggest that that unstinted
loyalty and that unstinted generosity is to some extent a
reward for the consideration which has been shown the Colonies
for some time past; and is it not right to remember that for
years there has not been a Secretary for the Colonies who has
so endeavoured to win the affection of the Colonies as the
right hon. gentleman who now holds that office? You tax us with
not having shown foresight and judgment. At all events our
treatment of the Colonies has ensured, not their loyalty--that
will always be there--but the enthusiastic impulse of the
Colonies to come to the assistance of the mother country. We
have a great work to do; we want to do that work, and now hon.
gentlemen opposite move an amendment the only object of which
could be to damage and weaken the Government, who are the
instruments of the national will. If hon. gentlemen opposite do
not wish to take our places and to bear the burden which rests
on our shoulders, is it wise to endeavour to shake the
confidence of the country in the men who must continue this
war, and gather together all the forces of the Empire to bring
it to a successful conclusion? Supposing there should be a
division which could be called a bad division for the
Government, what would the cheers which would greet that
division mean? They would mean, 'We have succeeded in damaging
and weakening the Government.' The time may come when we will
be damaged. If the war is not successful, sweep us away as men
who have no judgment, but do not lame the arm of the Executive
Government when they have such a work on hand as we have got to
do. There has been patriotic co-operation between us and some
of the Liberal Party. We thank them for it. I believe this is a
Parliamentary bad dream--an interlude between the patriotic
attitude of these gentlemen a few weeks ago and the patriotic
attitude which I hope we may look forward to when this debate
closes. They have assured the country they will support us in
going forward. I thank them for that, for it is more important
than the petty criticisms to which we have been treated. We are
the trustees of the nation for the work that has to be done.
The nation will support us, I believe; and so long as we
receive that support, God willing, we will fulfil our task."

Sir E. Clarke, among other things, said:--

"He did not believe the annexation of the Transvaal and the
Orange Free State would be of the slightest benefit to the
country. The annexation of the two Republics would compel us to
very greatly increase our already enormous military
expenditure, and it would not give us any advantage
commensurate with the difficulties of administration. He had no
desire to press his own views, which were singular, and
certainly not popular, on that side of the House. He only
pleaded that this question might be left open, and that
Ministers might not pledge themselves to a course which would
involve so great a sacrifice. While he agreed generally with
the doctrine of Cabinet responsibility, he considered that the
real responsibility for the war lay with the Colonial
Secretary. The Prime Minister, in whom all England put the
greatest confidence, having many other things to deal with, and
being distressed by domestic anxieties, might not have been
able to attend so closely as he otherwise would have done to
South African affairs; but it could not be gainsaid that there
were two men, one in this country and the other in South
Africa, who must be associated with the beginning of the war.
He wished that the highest sentiments of patriotism would
induce those two men to leave to others the positions they now
occupied. He believed that the difficulties involved in a
solution of the questions arising out of the war would be
increased by the fact that the lines of communication and
action in South Africa were in the hands of the Colonial
Secretary and Sir A. Milner. He had not a word to say about the
honesty of these two gentlemen; but if, for a few weeks or a
few months, in this grave national crisis and time of deep
anxiety, others could take their places--if the Prime Minister
himself would take under his own control the communications of
the Colonial Office with South Africa, and if Lord Rosebery
would give his services to the country, and go out to South
Africa to assist in a solution of the difficulties, it would be
a sacrifice not too great to ask even from the greatest men
among us, and one for which the country would be very grateful.
He had said that he was not going to make a controversial
speech. He did not think he had. If he had, it had been with no
intention of personal attack or party bitterness, but with the
deep conviction that in deciding on the great issues with which
Parliament had to deal we had to consider not only the things
of to-day but the things of the future."

Mr. Chamberlain's speech on the 5th of February was an advance on former proceedings. Sir William Harcourt dilated on the indomitable energy of a free people fighting for their independence, praised the gallantry of the troops, and blamed the Government for being led by the opinions of the authors of the Jameson Raid, to which the Colonial Secretary made dignified reply. Finally he questioned--

"How do we meet the charge of mistakes? Not by denying the
mistakes, but by saying what we have done and what we are doing
to repair them. You say we sent too few troops. We are pouring
troops into South Africa, and, as you have been told, in a few
weeks you will have an army of 200,000. You said we were
forgetful of the need for mounted men. We have been increasing
the number of horse infantry until in a very short time the
number of mounted men in the British forces will be almost as
great, if not as great, as the total number of mounted men in
the Boer army. You say our artillery is deficient and not heavy
enough. We have sent battery after battery, until now you have
an unexampled force of that arm. We have at the same time added
a number of heavier guns. When the war began, no doubt the
needs of the war were under-estimated at that time; it is part
of the same mistake. We failed to respond as we ought to have
done to the splendid offers that came from our Colonies. We
accepted enough to show how much we valued their assistance,
but we hesitated to put on them any greater strain than
necessary. But what is happening now? They are multiplying
their forces, and every offer is gratefully and promptly
appreciated and accepted. And we shall have in this war before
it is over an army of Colonials called to the aid of Her
Majesty who will outnumber the British army at Waterloo and
nearly equal to the total British force in the Crimea."

In conclusion he said:--

"In Africa these two races, so interesting, so admirable, each
in its own way, though different in some things, will now, at
any rate, have learned to respect one another. I hear a great
deal about the animosity which will remain after the war, but I
hope I am not too sanguine when I say that I do not believe in
it. When matters have settled down, when equal rights are
assured to both the white races, I believe that both will enjoy
the land together in settled peace and prosperity. Meanwhile,
we are finding out the weak spots in our armour, and trying to
remedy them. We are finding out the infinite potential
resources of the Empire; we are advancing steadily, if slowly,
to the realisation of that great federation of our race which
will inevitably make for peace, liberty, and justice."

On the following night Mr. Asquith, on Talleyrand's principle--that speech is given us to hide our thoughts--dilated interestingly on the position, his sympathies oscillating between the Opposition, the Government, and Mr. Kruger. Sir Henry Campbell Bannerman declared it to be the duty of the Opposition to press Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice's amendment to a division. He inferred that the conspiracy of the Cape Dutch was a chimera, and went so far as to suggest that when our military supremacy was asserted in South Africa the question of settlement might be left to decide itself _sine die_! Said he: "Provided that our territories are free and our military supremacy asserted, what matters it at what time or what place a settlement is arrived at?"

In his reply Mr. Balfour distinguished himself. He said that it was discovered that the War Office has more than fulfilled its promises, and appealed to the members of the Opposition who sympathised with the justice of the war to reflect before voting for the amendment. It was necessary to help the soldiers at the front by proving to them that they were supported by a united country, and that every hostile vote might induce or encourage our opponents to prolong the contest. He concluded by saying:--

"Can they contemplate with equanimity that their first action
in a session of Parliament meeting under such circumstances
should be a weakening of the Government, whose hands they
profess to desire to strengthen--whose hands I believe they
genuinely desire to strengthen--in every succeeding operation
connected with this war? Can they contemplate with equanimity
the reflection that possibly their votes may lengthen the war,
and, by lengthening it, may increase that tragic list of losses
with which we are already too familiar? If in giving their vote
they add one fraction to the chances of a European
complication, one fraction of a chance that an unnecessary life
may be lost or a family thrown into mourning, can they easily
reconcile that with their duty towards their own principles and
to that country of which they are, I believe, as devoted
servants as we on this side of the House? I think it is a
violation of every Parliamentary tradition that men who desire
to keep in office a Government should vote for an amendment
which, if carried, will turn out that Government, and that it
is contrary to every patriotic instinct to vote in a minority
against the Government. The size of that minority will affect
the whole course of European policy, the whole course of the
war. I have stated the problem as it presents itself to my
mind. I know that you are men of conscience and honour, and I
must leave it to you to decide the problem, each man in his own
case as his conscience and honour dictate. To the House at
large I can only make one appeal. It is that we, who are the
representatives of the country, may rise to the height reached
by those whom we represent. I ask no more, and I can ask no
more, of the House than that they should imitate, for they
cannot exceed, the courage, steadfastness, resolution, and
firmness under adversity, and the calmness of temper with
which our countrymen all over the world have dealt with the
situation in its entirety. If the House of Commons do, as no
doubt they will, imitate, for they cannot better, the conduct
of those who have sent them here, then who can doubt that the
clouds by which we are at present surrounded will in a short
time be dissipated and the Empire will issue from the struggle
in which it is now engaged stronger, not only in its own
consciousness of strength, but in the eyes of the civilised
world."

Photo by Gregory & Co., London.]

In the end, by 352 to 139--a majority of 213--the vote of censure on the Government moved by Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice was defeated. The decision adequately expressed the feelings of the country. It must be remembered that many of the Government supporters were in South Africa, consequently a total poll of 491 represented a heavy vote. The following list serves to show the number of members of both Houses who had sacrificed party spirit to patriotic convictions, and had proceeded to the front:--

HOUSE OF LORDS.--Earl of Airlie, commanding 12th Lancers; Earl
of Albemarle, lieutenant-colonel, City of London Imperial
Volunteers; Lord Basing, major, 1st Dragoons; Lord Castletown,
special service, South Africa; Lord Chesham, commanding a
battalion of Imperial Yeomanry; Earl Cowley, lieutenant,
Imperial Yeomanry; Lord Denman, lieutenant, Imperial Yeomanry;
Earl of Dudley, D.A.A.G. for Imperial Yeomanry; Earl of
Dundonald, C.B., major-general, commanding 3rd Brigade (Natal)
Cavalry Division; Earl of Dunraven, captain, Imperial Yeomanry;
Earl of Erroll, special service, South Africa; Earl of Essex,
second in command of battalion of Imperial Yeomanry; Earl of
Fingal, lieutenant, Imperial Yeomanry; Lord Kitchener of
Khartoum, G.C.B., K.C.M.G., Chief of the Staff; Earl of
Leitrim, lieutenant, Imperial Yeomanry; Earl of Longford,
captain, Imperial Yeomanry; Lord Lovat, captain, Lord Lovat's
Corps; Duke of Marlborough, staff captain for Imperial
Yeomanry; Lord Methuen, K.C.V.O., C.B., commanding 1st Division
in South Africa; Duke of Norfolk, K.G., captain, Imperial
Yeomanry; Lord Roberts of Kandahar, K.P., G.C.B., G.C.I.E.,
G.C.S.I., V.C., Field Marshal Commanding-in-Chief; Lord
Romilly, special service, South Africa; Lord Rosmead, major,
6th Battalion Lancashire Fusiliers; Duke of Roxburghe,
lieutenant, Royal Horse Guards; Earl of Scarborough, second in
command of battalion of Imperial Yeomanry; Earl Sondes,
lieutenant, Imperial Yeomanry; Duke of Westminster, A.D.C. to
Governor; Lord Wolverton, second lieutenant, Somersetshire
Yeomanry Cavalry; Lord Zouche, lieutenant, Imperial Yeomanry.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.--Mr. W. Allen, trooper, Imperial Yeomanry;
Hon. A. B. Bathurst, captain, 4th Battalion Gloucester
Regiment; Colonel A. M. Brookfield, commanding battalion of
Imperial Yeomanry; Lieutenant-Colonel R. G. W. Chaloner,
commanding battalion of Imperial Yeomanry; Hon. T. H. Cochrane,
captain, 4th Battalion Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders; Lord
A. F. Compton, captain, Imperial Yeomanry; Viscount Cranborne,
commanding 4th Battalion Bedford Regiment; Mr. W.
Bromley-Davenport, captain, Imperial Yeomanry; Sir J.
Dickson-Poynder, lieutenant, Imperial Yeomanry; Viscount
Folkestone, major, 1st Wilts Volunteer Rifle Corps; Mr. W. R.
Greene, lieutenant, Imperial Yeomanry; Hon. J. Guest,
lieutenant, Imperial Yeomanry; Mr. G. Kemp, captain, Imperial
Yeomanry; Mr. E. H. Llewellyn, major, 4th battalion Somerset
Light Infantry; Mr. H. L. B. McCalmont, commanding 6th
battalion Royal Warwick Regiment; Mr. F. B. Mildmay,
lieutenant, Imperial Yeomanry; Viscount Milton, lieutenant,
Imperial Yeomanry; Mr. D. V. Pirie, with Remounts Department,
South Africa; Lord Stanley, special service, South Africa; Lord
Edmund Talbot, special service, South Africa; Viscount
Valentia, A.A.G. for Imperial Yeomanry; Major W. H.
Wyndham-Quin, captain, Imperial Yeomanry; Major the Hon. H. V.
Duncombe, adjutant, Imperial Yeomanry; Sir Elliott Lees,
captain, Imperial Yeomanry; Sir S. Scott, lieutenant, Imperial
Yeomanry.

KIMBERLEY

There was little bombardment after the 25th of November, and though not living on the fat of the land, the garrison was not short of provisions. Mr. Rhodes, with characteristic forethought, now caused the formation of a committee to inquire into the resources of those dependent on the men killed, with a view to compensating them for their loss, and in other ways exerted himself for the welfare of sufferers in the town.

Considerable friction occurred between the civil and military authorities. The clashing of wills was inevitable in so small an area, for Colonel Kekewich represented military power, while Mr. Rhodes could be no other than he is, and ever has been--a power in himself. It was unfortunate that two such forces should have been placed in collision, but it remains to the credit of both that, in spite of the tension of the situation, they should have co-operated to the end to save the town from the common enemy, and protect the interests and lives of all who, but for this co-operation, might have suffered much more intensely than they did.

Early on the morning of the 9th of December a force with a battery under Colonel Chamier--to whom the efficient and mobile condition of the artillery was due--made a reconnaissance to the north. The Lancashire's Mounted Infantry and two guns were posted on Otto's Kopje while the Cape Police protected the Dam Wall. The Kimberley Light Horse in the centre extemporised some rifle-pits out of some prospectors' huts in order to cover retreat when necessary.

The enemy were screened by the debris of a wall at Kamfeens, but when the boom of the British gun burst out and a shell roared in their midst, they hurriedly sought cover in their foremost rifle-pits, whence with great energy they "sniped" in the direction of the officers who were superintending the operations. Meanwhile tremendous barking of cannon and pinging of rifles continued, the Boers having got the range of Otto Kopje to perfection. The troops had an exceedingly hard time, but continued their operations till dusk. They lost only one killed and four wounded.

On the wise principle that it is safer to act early on the aggressive if you do not want to have to act late on the defensive, the smart little force indulged in more military movements.

Colonel Kekewich's general plan for the defence of Kimberley was based on the principle of always keeping the enemy on the move and constantly in fear of attack from an unexpected quarter, but the immediate object of the numerous sorties and demonstrations in force now made by the garrison was to assist the operations of Lord Methuen. The Colonel explained that, "when the advance of the Relief Column from the Orange River commenced, and I was put in possession of information concerning the probable date of its arrival at Kimberley, I adopted such measures as I hoped would cause the retention of a large force of the enemy in my immediate neighbourhood, and thus enable the Relief Column to deal with the Boer force in detail." As the portions of mounted corps were continually employed, the work which fell on the detachment, 1st Batt. Loyal North Lancashire Regiment, Cape Police, Diamond Fields Horse, Kimberley Light Horse, and the Diamond Fields Artillery, was very arduous; but the bravery and dash of these troops was unending. Colonel Murray, of the Loyal North Lancashire, was invaluable in many capacities, and Captain O'Brien of the same regiment, in command of a section of the defences, was unfailing in energy and zeal. Cool as the proverbial cucumber were Major Rodger of the Diamond Fields Horse and Major May of the Diamond Fields Artillery. The motto of these officers was the reverse of that of the notable _gens d'armes_, for they were "always there when wanted," and generally in the fore-front. The officers of the Kimberley Regiment, too, were conspicuous for courage, coolness, and sagacity. They knew as by intuition what was wanted and did it. From Colonel Finlayson, who commanded the regiment, to Surgeon-Major Smith, who tended the wounded in the field, there was none who did not contribute to the stock of efficiency which was placed at the disposal of the Colonel.

On the 20th of December, the mounted detachments under Colonel Peakman, with maxims and 7-pounders under Colonel May, started off in the pitch darkness of 2 A.M., and marched through Kenilworth in the direction of the wreck of Webster's Farm, and on towards Tollpan in the Free State. British cannonading then took place, the Kimberley guns shelling Tollpan Homestead at 2500 yards' range, and the Boer gun on Klippiespan ridge returning the compliment with interest. Fortunately the hostile shells burrowed deep in the sandy soil, and consequently little damage was done. The Boers were found to be very comfortably situated at the three corners of a six-mile triangle--at Coetgie, Scholtz, and Alexandersfontein--commanding three separate sources of water supply. This reconnaissance was of importance, as the positions of the enemy's guns and outposts were determined, and the garrison was enabled to be on guard against raiders and snipers, and to protect itself, its patrols, and cattle from the fire of the enemy. In the matter of protecting the cattle from the tricks of the Dutchmen, as in many other ways, Mr. Fynn, manager of the De Beers farms, did splendid service. This gentleman was Mr. Rhodes's right-hand man, and as a natural consequence of the honour he enjoyed rose to every occasion that offered, now managing a corps of scouts, now superintending the conveyance of food, now dealing with truculent natives, and always conducting his varied avocations with immense energy and tact.

THE ROYAL LANCASTERS.

Photo by Gregory & Co., London.]

On the 22nd of December a good deal of martial activity took place. At cockcrow a detachment of mounted forces, with artillery and infantry, went west for the purpose of reconnoitring Voornitzright and part of Weldermstkuil. On the right were the Diamond Fields Horse under Major Rodger, supported by a company of the North Lancashire Regiment under Lieutenant de Putron. Presently an animated cannonade began between the enemy's artillery from Kamferdam and the Diamond Fields Artillery guns on Otto's Kopje. In the centre Colonel Peakman, with the Kimberley Light Horse and Cape Police, proceeded along Lazaretto Ridge. There, before retreating, he made the necessary discoveries--firstly, that the Boer patrols were then the only occupants of the place, and secondly, that the enemy's reinforcements were advancing behind Wimbledon Ridge. Meanwhile Colonel Chamier on the left, with R.A. guns and an escort under Major Snow, was exchanging salutations with the Boer guns posted in the earthwork in the centre of Wimbledon Ridge. This occupation was pursued for some time, during which the enemy were found to be rapidly approaching. Directly the guns were limbered up some 500 Boers came on the scene, and began to pour a fierce fire from the earthworks at the foot of the Ridge upon the Kimberley troops, who retired to cover. The object of the reconnaissance was gained, however, for it proved in what an inconceivably short space of time the enemy could summon his reinforcements, and, moreover, that three of his guns were yet in the neighbourhood of the town.

On Christmas Eve congratulations were received by flashlight signals from the Military Secretary at Cape Town:--

"Convey to Colonel Kekewich and all the garrison and
inhabitants of Kimberley his Excellency's best wishes for their
good luck on Christmas Day and in the coming New Year."

Colonel Kekewich replied:--

"Kindly inform the Military Secretary that I and the garrison
and inhabitants of Kimberley thank his Excellency for his kind
message. We also wish respectfully to offer our very best
wishes for Christmas and New Year."

This little interchange of compliments caused infinite pleasure to those whose days were one unvarying round of trial and suspense. The weather was exceedingly hot; at times the thermometer registered 105 deg. in the shade, and life without absolute necessities in torrid weather is trying even to the patience of the active. To those whose intercourse with the world was confined to flashlight signals, it was barren in the extreme. But with much pluck they thus announced their sentiments in a journal called the _Diamond Fields Advertiser_, which still maintained a languishing existence: "Excepting two or three of our inhabitants who shared the terrible privations of the siege of Paris, few of us have ever spent such a Christmas before, and few will ever care to spend such a Christmas again. The scarcity of turkeys and plum-pudding at this time of traditional plenty need only distress the gourmand. The majority of the people of Kimberley are happily made of sterner stuff, and do not look for luxuries in a time of siege." They were nevertheless not utterly plum-puddingless. Mr. Rhodes, with characteristic forethought, had caused to be cooked in the Sanatorium some two score of these bombshells to digestion, and had distributed them in each of the camps. Here they were devoured with much merrymaking and a general interchange of felicitations, which went on by telephone from one camp to another. From the Mounted Camp to the Royal Artillery: "Best wishes and longer range to your guns." From the gunners, in return, while they kept one ear open for movement in the direction of the Boers' "Susannah:" "May our range be always long enough for us to be guardian-angels to the Mounted Corps."