Chapter I: The Turning of the Tide (3)

It will be seen by the above that General Colvile had been appointed to the command of the Ninth Division, while Colonel Pole-Carew was transferred from the command of the Ninth Brigade to that of the Guards Brigade, and was succeeded in the former post by Colonel Douglas, late Chief of the Staff to Lord Methuen.

Having viewed this force, it becomes somewhat interesting to note how smoothly wheel turned within wheel. The movement began by the concentration of General French's division at Ramdam. On the morning of the 12th the infantry appeared, and General French moved on, crossed Dekiel's Drift on Tuesday the 13th, and captured Klip Drift and Drieput Drift, on the Modder River. Following him closely on the 12th came the divisions of General Tucker and General Kelly-Kenny. The latter division was accompanied by Lord Kitchener and his staff. The negotiation of the first drift, which was almost impassable for transport, next occupied the ingenuity and tested the perseverance of the troops. The drifts, like the kopjes, are the almost unconquerable bogies of South Africa. They are the natural defences of the country, offering obstruction on every hand, and, however boldly you may storm the kopje, you must with infinite patience negotiate the drift. This is no small undertaking, for drifts, in a way, partake of the paradoxical character of individuals--the weaker the person, the more difficult is he to manage; the more insignificant the river, the greater the perverseness of the drift. It resolves itself in both cases into a question of narrowness. Small streams and small minds are banked up too high to allow moving room in their midst. The result of an attempt to advance is congestion of a painful kind. At this particular drift it was found impossible for the team of mules to lug the formidable waggon-loads up the north bank, and at last the feat had to be accomplished by adding relays of oxen to assist in the tremendous labour. Finally, by 4 A.M. the next morning the troops got across, General Tucker's division marching to within some three miles of Jacobsdal, and hugging the river all the way, so as to run no risk of being without water. General Kelly-Kenny followed, marching from Waterval Drift to Wegdraai on the morning of the 14th, and proceeding thence at 5 P.M. on the same day to Klip Drift, which was reached in the middle of the night. The rapidity with which this rush on his heels was accomplished enabled General French, who had been awaiting the arrival of the infantry, to proceed on his flying swoop for the relief of Kimberley. This, as we know, was accomplished on Thursday the 15th of February. Meanwhile the wheels of the strategic machinery were going round. A small cavalry patrol had entered Jacobsdal, which town was found to be full of wounded, including many of our own invalids from Rensburg. On the way back the mounted infantry were attacked, and Colonel Henry was fired on by a party of Dutchmen who were concealed in the vicinity of the river, and so sudden was the attack that nine men were wounded. Colonel Henry, Major Hatchell, and ten men were missing. A battery of artillery shelled the environs of the place, and put to flight such Boers as were hanging about, whereupon the British remained masters of the situation. Thus it will be seen that while the Dutchmen were fleeing from Jacobsdal, from Alexandersfontein, and from the neighbourhood of Kimberley, for fear of being cut off, they had surrounding them Lord Methuen at Majersfontein, General Tucker at Jacobsdal, General Kelly-Kenny at the Klip and Rondeval Drifts, General French on the north, and General Colvile wheeling around, ready to suit his movements to any emergency. In this manner Cronje found the teeth of a trap preparing to close on him, and recognised that there was no alternative but to "make a bolt for it."

Thus the first part of the programme was accomplished. Kimberley was automatically relieved; Cronje was on the run. But his running was no easy matter. Since Lord Roberts' strategy had come into play, there was a prospect of a neck-and-neck race between the mobile Boer and the mobile Briton, and success depended on General French's ability not only to rout but to head off the retreat of the Dutchman. That the British cavalry commander should outmatch him in celerity was a contingency which had not occurred to Cronje; that he should advance independently of the rail, and start off across the Riet to trek to the Modder, was described by one of his countrymen as distinctly "un-British." Whether this epithet was used to denote admiration or contempt we cannot say. Certain it was that the wily persecutor of Mafeking and Kimberley thought that the secret of the art of trekking was confined to himself and his rabble, until he discovered, too late, that the equally wily French with his disciplined legions was ready to ride over him. On the 16th of February the astonished commandant, with a horde of 10,000 Boers, was scudding in full retreat towards Bloemfontein. On all sides were Boer laagers in a state of abandonment--stores, tents, food, Bibles, raiment--everything had been left by the amazed and panic-stricken Dutchmen. Dronfield, Saltpan, Scholtz Nek, and Spyfontein were now evacuated. Under cover of darkness the investing hordes had taken to their heels, leaving behind them even herds of cattle and ammunition, in their desire to gain a loophole of escape. But they soon found that, wherever they might go, there was the rumour of British opposition, an armed and avenging race advancing!

The fact was that the trekking of the Boer hordes had been adroitly discovered by Lord Kitchener, who, having detected an unusual haze of dust in the distance, at once gave orders for the mounted infantry not to follow French, but to pursue the enemy. Accordingly, to quote the _Times_ correspondent, who was present:--

"The mounted infantry rode in pursuit across the plain, endeavouring to get to the north of the convoy, while General Knox's Brigade was pushed along the north bank of the river, which makes a large bend to the north between Klip Drift and Klipkraal Drift, to strike the convoy on its southern flank. Cronje sent on his waggons to Drieputs Farm, at the north-eastern end of the bend, where they laagered at about eleven, and maintained a running fight with our troops all day. The skill with which the Boers conducted this rear-guard action extorted unqualified praise from all our officers. As the detachments on the extreme right of the Boer line were driven back by our mounted infantry, they rode round behind their centre and took up fresh positions on their left against the 81st Battery and Knox's Brigade, which were advancing along the north bank of the river. At midday the Boers attempted to hold three low kopjes two miles north-east of Klip Drift, but were driven back to a stronger position at Drieputs."

Drawing by Stanley L. Wood, from a Sketch by an Officer.]

Fighting went on throughout the day. At seven o'clock on the evening of the 16th it became almost possible to see the end; the artillery had commenced the vigorous shelling of the laager, and all the divisions moving on the great axis were now aware that Lord Roberts' strategic plan was likely--how soon they knew not--to be crowned with success.

But we must here break off to eulogise the wonderful activity of Kelly-Kenny's division, which acquitted itself so honourably. The march from Graspan to Brandvallei beyond Klip Drift, a distance 553/4 miles, was accomplished in five marching days. The Light Brigade on the eve of the battle of Talavera did sixty-two English miles in twenty-six hours, losing only seventeen stragglers by the way. They accomplished this feat by adopting the peculiar step invented by Sir John Moore, three paces walking alternating with three paces running, which enabled them, when tracks were suitable, to cover six miles an hour! No such evolutions as these were possible, owing to the torrid weather and the necessity to take precautions against exposure in the open veldt during midday. The temperature may be imagined when it is stated that in one day about sixty-six soldiers sun-stricken fell out of the ranks. On the morning of the 12th of February the infantry marched some nine and a half miles from Graspan to Ramdam, and from thence on the 13th moved to Waterval Drift. On the 14th they proceeded to Wegdraai, and on to Klip Drift, which was reached in the small hours of the 15th. Here, notwithstanding their fatigues, the 13th Brigade at once engaged with the enemy's rearguard, and exhibited splendid fighting qualities, which in the circumstances were remarkable even for Englishmen. The West Riding, Gloucesters, Buffs, and Oxfords had a warm time during the whole of the 16th, as the enemy from kopjes beyond the river in the region of Klipkraal assailed them for nearly eight hours, assisted by a pom-pom which caused considerable loss. Though a furious sandstorm later on permitted the Boers under cover of night to get away, abandoning seventy-eight waggons, the next morning the invincible Sixth Division started in pursuit. Captain Trevor (1st East Kent Regiment), Lieutenant Shipway (2nd Gloucester Regiment), and Colonel M'Donnell, R.A., were wounded in the course of the engagement. Major Evelegh, Oxford Light Infantry, while proceeding to join his battalion in the Sixth Division with a small convoy and escort, was surrounded by a large party of Boers, and after a gallant defence was forced to surrender.

Fighting and marching without ceasing, the infantry went to Brandvallei and thence to Paardeberg, where they arrived at 9.30 P.M. on the 17th, in time to take a brief rest prior to the operations which have yet to be described, and in which they took such a prominent part. The marching, considering the tremendous heat and the difficulty of obtaining water, was a feat of which General Kelly-Kenny might justly have felt proud. Though plodding along incessantly through the heavy burning sand under a sun which baked and frizzled even through their uniforms, these men maintained patience and cheerfulness in a rare degree. The whole force was animated by complete faith in their commander, and moved unanimously like some magnificent piece of machinery, scarce taking time to eat or sleep in the zest of their persistent pursuit of the enemy. And they were not alone in their zealous performance of their share in the great scheme. The nicety and precision of the transport arrangements may be imagined when we remember that at one time four divisions were moving independently of their base, making marches across the arid waterless tracks, and carrying with them the necessaries of life for a healthy working multitude. A new regime had begun, and the mobility of our columns had grown equal to that of the Boers, while the railway had been relegated to a subordinate place in the strategical plan.

Colonel Graham, in his "Art of War," declares that "to organise the means of transport for an army acting at a long distance from its principal magazines, in a country where it is entirely dependent on its own supplies, is a problem difficult of solution." Now, the solution of this problem was due to the wonderful talent of Lord Kitchener, who was earning his right to be looked upon as the greatest military organiser of his generation. But his gigantic effort did not increase the popularity of the late Sirdar. He ran counter to too many private interests. The army is too intersected with grooves to be crossed without a few nasty jars, and it was scarcely possible for so young and successful a general and a peer--one possessed of almost criminal good luck and amazing moral as well as physical courage--to be looked upon by his contemporaries-in-arms with excessive approval. The secret of discord was given in a nutshell by Mr. Ralph of the _Daily Mail_. He wrote:--"His first conspicuous act when in South Africa was the withdrawal of the transport service from separated commands in order that it should be managed by the Army Service Corps. Thus it came about that every brigadier and colonel saw a certain amount of his power shifted to what he considered a subordinate branch of the service. A goodish degree of latitude in the enjoyment of comforts and extras, which had been made possible when these officers controlled the waggons, was also curtailed. The army wailed and gnashed its teeth, but I confess I always thought that reason and right were on Lord Kitchener's side in this matter. Lord Kitchener's plan was the only one by which an insufficient number of waggons and teams could be utilised for all that they were worth."

The mobility of an army depends on the reduction of transport, and to the task of organising transport sufficient to ensure the mobility of 100,000 men the hero of Omdurman applied himself with his customary thoroughness. He conceived the gigantic ambition of doing away with all distinctions of transport, regimental, departmental, ammunition, or ambulance, and merging them in an immense whole, thus creating a single general corps, and it was doubtless to this conception and the able way that the scheme--with the assistance of Colonel Richardson--was carried out, that Lord Roberts owed the expedition of his march to Bloemfontein and the further success which resulted from his sure and swift rushes onward. Ordinarily speaking, in the army each unit is allowed its own transport. For instance, colonel, adjutant, and orderly-room are allotted by regulation a tent apiece. Every three officers share a tent, every fourteen men another. Staff-sergeants, batmen, and other details are proportionately provided for. Mounted officers are allowed 80 lbs. baggage, double the amount allowed for "smaller fry." Without going into minute particulars, we may reckon that a brigade would move with 70 waggons and a division with about 180. To reduce the huge encumbrance of say some 2000 waggons, with their complement of oxen and drivers, was a stupendous labour, from which, with its consequences, this military Hercules did not shrink. Each unit was taken in hand, and its excrescences--regulation excrescences, we may call them--were cut down, peeled of all superfluities, much to the disgust of the staff officers and various other personages who stickle for their rights, and resent any innovation that threatens to dock off an iota of the creature comforts that belong to them by the divine right of red-tape and red-book regulations.

Not only were the rules of transport revised, but special hints tending to the development of the initiative of the private soldier were issued to the troops. Herewith is appended the notable document which may be said to have marked the beginning of the new era:--

CAPE TOWN, _February 5, 1900_.

The following notes by the Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief
are communicated for the guidance of all concerned.--By order,

KITCHENER OF KHARTOUM, _Chief of Staff_.

NOTES FOR GUIDANCE IN SOUTH AFRICAN WARFARE

_Cavalry_

1. On reconnaissances or patrols not likely to be prolonged
beyond one day, the cavalry soldier's equipment should be
lightened as much as possible, nothing being taken that can
possibly be dispensed with.

2. It has been brought to my notice that our cavalry move too
slowly when on reconnaissance duty, and that unnecessary long
halts are made, the result being that the enemy, although
starting after the cavalry, are able to get ahead of it. I
could understand this if the country were close and difficult,
but between the Modder and the Orange Rivers its general
features are such as to admit of small parties of cavalry,
accompanied by field-guns, being employed with impunity.

_Artillery_

3. If the enemy's guns have, in some instances, the advantage
of ours in range, we have the advantage of theirs in mobility,
and we should make use of them by not remaining in position the
precise distance of which from the enemy's batteries has
evidently been fixed beforehand. Moreover, it has been proved
that the Boers' fire is far less accurate at unknown distances.
In taking up positions, compact battery formations should be
avoided, the guns should be opened out, or it may be desirable
to advance by sections or batteries. Similarly retirements
should be carried out, at considerably increased intervals, by
alternate batteries or sections, if necessary, and care should
be taken to travel quickly through the dangerous zone of
hostile artillery fire.

The following plan, frequently adopted by the Boers, has
succeeded in deceiving our artillery on several occasions.

Suppose A to be a gun emplacement, the gun firing smokeless
powder. Simultaneously with the discharge of the gun at A a
powder flash of black powder will be exploded at B, a hill in
rear, leading us to direct our projectile on B. Careful
calculation with a watch, however, will defeat this plan.

_Infantry_

4. The present open formation renders it difficult for officers
to exercise command over their men, except such as may be in
their immediate vicinity. A remedy for this would appear to be
a system of whistle calls, by which a company lying in extended
order could obey orders as readily as if in quarter column. I
invite suggestions for such a system of whistle calls as would
be useful.

5. It is difficult to recognise officers as equipped at
present, and it seems desirable they should wear a
distinguishing mark of some kind, either on the collar at the
back of the neck or on the back of the coat.

6. Soldiers, when under fire, do not take sufficient advantage
of the sandy nature of the soil to construct cover for
themselves. If such soil is scraped, even with a canteen tin, a
certain amount of cover from rifle fire can be obtained in a
short time.

7. The distribution of ammunition to the firing line is one of
the most difficult problems of modern warfare. One solution,
which has been suggested to me, is for a portion of the
supports gradually to creep forward until a regular chain of
men is established from the supports (where the ammunition
carts should be) right up to the firing line. The ammunition
could then be gradually worked up by hand till it reached the
firing line, where it could be passed along as required. This
would, no doubt, be a slow method of distributing ammunition,
but it appears to be an improvement on the present method,
which is almost impossible to carry out under fire.

8. Reports received suggest that the Boers are less likely to
hold entrenchments on the plain with the same tenacity and
courage as they display when defending kopjes, and it is stated
that this applies especially to night-time, if they know that
British infantry are within easy striking distance from them.
How far this is true time only can show.

ROBERTS, _Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief, South Africa_.

To return, however, to the great advance. Much of the travelling was done by night, in order to save the oxen from the trying temperature of the day, though even during the night the heat was equal to that of an ordinary British midsummer. In addition to the painful toil of motion over the heavy, sandy, rugged leagues, there was the hourly danger of attack. Cronje had made known his need for reinforcements, and at the time, from the south, Andries Cronje was moving, and from the north, Commandants Snyman and Fournie, while from other quarters and in the direction of Ladysmith there was the belief that Boer hordes might be advancing. There was only one encounter with the Dutchmen, but it ended in a mishap that was a serious one, for the results were felt for days afterwards, and helped to try the heroism of the troops who engaged in the movement to the uttermost. A convoy of 180 waggons, one-quarter of the total transport, containing forage and provisions, was lost at Waterval Drift. An interesting picture of the terrible passage of the drift was given by a sapper who accompanied the convoy:--

"It was a pitiful sight to see the poor infantry fellows played out, some dropping with a slight sunstroke, and the cattle dropping dead in all directions. We moved sometimes by day and sometimes by night. Night-time was the best on account of the oxen working much better in the cool of night. Nothing occurred of note with us--but our fellows were fighting every day in front on their way to Kimberley--till we got to Riet River or Drift, which was a terrible pass in the river. Miles and miles of transport had to pass through a narrow passage across the drift, and it took a terrible time for one waggon to pass over, let alone the hundreds that had to pass. We were lucky to get across and encamp below a hill for the night. Next day they still continued to pass the drift, in fact they had been at it all night, and still hundreds of waggons to come on. The Boers evidently knew of this obstacle, and a party came up from the south and had vengeance on the column, as they couldn't on the fighting line. It was a lucky thing for us we were clear, or else we might have found our baggage gone and ourselves put over the border (i.e. sent to Pretoria or shot). The Boers took up position in the hills and shelled the waggon convoy. The nigger drivers are terrible cowards, and all fled to the hills or kopjes near at hand, leaving the waggons and oxen to the mercy of the Boers. Some of the oxen we succeeded in driving back into our camp on the other side of the river. The good old New Zealanders (who have proved of great use and very daring in this campaign) rode over to where the nigger drivers were, and threatened to blow their brains out if they didn't return to the waggons, which they did after the Boers had left off shelling for a bit, after doing a terrible lot of damage. Lord Bobs came up just as they were going to try and get some of the waggons away, and said 'Let them go.' Our loss proved to be over L100,000, which I am glad to say we recovered later. The Boers thought this convoy was lost purposely, and when we arrived here we found the whole of it except what had been sent to our prisoners at Pretoria."

The unpleasant adventures of E Squadron of Kitchener's Light Horse, who were taken as prisoners to Pretoria, make a separate narrative of themselves, as they took place while the main body was moving on to the relief of Kimberley.

The squadron was attached to General French's column, and took part in the engagement at Riet River. On its way to the relief of Kimberley, a halt was made at a farm a short distance from Modder River, and part of E squadron was detached to hold a well of water until the arrival of another column, expected in four hours, and then to advance along with them. The relieving column never arrived. Squadron E held the position for four days without food against a large force of Boers. They (E Squadron) occupied an old farmhouse. They loopholed the walls, and although continuously harassed by the Boer fire, they managed to maintain their position and the post they were placed in charge of. During that time they had to subsist on water only, and that brackish. Their horses were dying daily, as there was not a blade of grass on the veldt, and the stench was abominable. On the third day of the siege a poor goat that had wandered near the besieged was immediately captured and devoured. On the fourth day they commandeered one of the enemy's horses, which they intended to slaughter, their own being too emaciated for that purpose. But the Boers, having been reinforced, gave them no time to do the butchering. On the evening of the fourth day a messenger bearing a letter from General de Wet arrived, demanding surrender within ten minutes. The Boer force consisted of 500 men and two 12-pounders. The officers consulted together, and decided, in view of the hopeless condition of their little garrison of fifty all told, worn out and starving and their horses dead, to accept the inevitable.

While all this was going on, and Cronje was making the discovery that he might be completely outflanked, and that the position of the Boer army at Spyfontein must become untenable, Lord Roberts was entering into Jacobsdal. The place was orderly and quiet. The three churches were full of patients, the town having been used mainly as an hospital. The invalids, for the most part, were sufferers from enteric, the result of too much Modder River. After a long and painful intimacy with the grilling veldt, the sight of houses and civilised dwellings struck gratefully on the eyes of the incoming troops. A store was hailed as a veritable godsend. Some one bought a tin of oatmeal, and walked off with it as one who had secured a prize; some one else gave a goodly price for a pot of pickles, and came away licking his lips like a modern Eliogabalus. The rejoicing was no mean emotion, for the unfortunate men, with the appetites of athletes, had been existing on lovers' fare. One of the famished but cheery fellows wrote: "We marched into Jacobsdal, and as soon as we arrived we thronged the stores for provisions. I made the following purchases for three of us:--

_s._ _d._
Three two-pound loaves at 1s. each 3 0
Three tins of condensed milk at 1s. each 3 0
Two tins of syrup at 1s. 3d. each 2 6
One small packet of cocoa 0 9
One tin of Quaker oats 1 3
One pound of sugar 0 6
--------
11 0

Then we gorged ourselves to make up for three weeks' semi-starvation. The most prominent building of Jacobsdal is the church, which stands in the centre of the town. The town itself lies in a hollow--Sleepy Hollow would be an apt title for the place just now. Most of the houses, including the church, are at present converted into hospitals, and the female population are acting as nurses. Most of them are in mourning for relatives lost during the campaign." Later, the troops moved on and encamped at a farm which had also been used as an hospital. Sights pathetic were only too common--our own sick and wounded in various stages of suffering, and outside, to use a "Tommy's" description, "some poor devils wrapped in sheets ready to be put to bed for the last time!"

From a Photo by M. Plumbe.]

Lord Roberts visited the large German hospital, and expressed himself well pleased with the splendid cleanliness of the place and the general evidences of good management. Among the sufferers was found Colonel Henry, who had been taken prisoner on the 14th. Strangely enough, all the inhabitants of the place evinced satisfaction at the arrival of the British, particularly on making the discovery that it was not the habit of the British troops to loot and destroy, as they had been led by the Burghers to believe was the case. They were now made acquainted with the proclamation which Lord Roberts issued to the Burghers of the Orange Free State when his force invaded their territory. It was printed both in English and Dutch:--

"The British troops under my command having entered the Orange
Free State, I feel it my duty to make known to all Burghers the
cause of our coming, as well as to do all in my power to put an
end to the devastation caused by this war, so that, should they
continue the war, the inhabitants of the Orange Free State may
not do so ignorantly, but with full knowledge of their
responsibility before God for the lives lost in the campaign.

"Before the war began the British Government, which had always
desired and cultivated peace and friendship with the people of
the Orange Free State, gave a solemn assurance to President
Steyn that, if the Orange Free State remained neutral, its
territory would not be invaded, and its independence would be
at all times fully respected by Her Majesty's Government.

"In spite of that declaration, the Government of the Orange
Free State was guilty of a wanton and unjustifiable invasion of
British territory.

"The British Government believes that this act of aggression
was not committed with the general approval and free will of a
people with whom it has lived in complete amity for so many
years. It believes that the responsibility rests wholly with
the Government of the Orange Free State, acting, not in the
interests of the country, but under mischievous influences from
without. The British Government, therefore, wishes the people
of the Orange Free State to understand that it bears them no
ill-will, and, so far as is compatible with the successful
conduct of the war and the re-establishment of peace in South
Africa, it is anxious to preserve them from the evils brought
upon them by the wrongful action of their Government.

"I therefore warn all Burghers to desist from any further
hostility towards Her Majesty's Government and the troops
under my command, and I undertake that any of them who may so
desist, and who are found staying in their homes and quietly
pursuing their ordinary occupations, will not be made to suffer
in their persons or property on account of their having taken
up arms in obedience to the order of their Government. Those,
however, who oppose the forces under my command, or furnish the
enemy with supplies or information, will be dealt with
according to the customs of war.

"Requisitions for food, forage, fuel, or shelter made on the
authority of the officers in command of Her Majesty's troops,
must be at once complied with; but everything will be paid for
on the spot, prices being regulated by the local market rates.
If the inhabitants of any district refuse to comply with the
demands made on them, the supplies will be taken by force, a
full receipt being given.

"Should any inhabitant of the country consider that he or any
member of his household has been unjustly treated by any
officer, soldier, or civilian attached to the British army, he
should submit his complaint, either personally or in writing,
to my headquarters or to the headquarters of the nearest
general officer. Should the complaint on inquiry be
substantiated, redress will be given.

"Orders have been issued by me prohibiting soldiers from
entering private houses or molesting the civil population on
any pretext whatever, and every precaution has been taken
against injury to property on the part of any person belonging
to or connected with the army.

"ROBERTS, _Field-Marshal, Commanding-in-Chief, South Africa_."

THE HERDING OF CRONJE

To return to General French. The cavalry division bivouacked outside the town of Kimberley, but their repose was limited. At 3 A.M. on the morning of the 16th they were up and doing. The enemy in the north was giving trouble. Some sharp fighting took place, during which Lieutenants Brassey (9th Lancers) and P. Bunbury were killed. This early activity was tough work for the already weary troops, who had been fifteen hours without a meal. Indeed, it was generally remarked that the relievers looked sorrier specimens of humanity than the relieved. The Colonial troops, the Queensland and New Zealand Contingents, and the New South Wales Lancers, considering all things, were wonderfully fit after having played a conspicuous part in the operations. These troops had joined General French's column from the regions of the Orange and Modder Rivers. The New South Wales Lancers rode on the extreme right flank of the first brigade, and their ambulance corps, under Lieutenant Edwards, kept up with the column, and was complimented on being the first ambulance to cross the Modder River. Like the rest of the troops, they had taken their share of small rations, merely nominal rest, sun-scorching, and maddening thirst, and yet were full of zeal--"keen as mustard," as some one said--to engage in the herding of Cronje and effect his capture. Worn out as they were, they had sprung to attention on a rumour brought in by a despatch-rider to the effect that Cronje had evacuated Majersfontein and was in full retreat.

At midnight on the 16th, no confirmation of this news had been received. The jaded troops, and still more jaded horses--mere skeletons in horse's skins--were preparing for real repose, when all was changed! A telegram arrived from Lord Kitchener saying that Cronje, with 10,000 men, was in full retreat from Majersfontein, with all his waggons and equipment and four guns, along the north bank of the Modder River towards Bloemfontein; that he had already fought a rearguard action with him; and that if French, with all available horses and guns, could head him and prevent his crossing the river, the infantry from Klip Drift would press on and annihilate or take the whole force prisoners.

Here was a surprise! Pleasant yet unpleasant, for shattered men in the last stage of fatigue. But General French--whom some one has described as possessing the shape of a brick, with all the solid and excellent qualities of one--rose to the occasion. He was on the point of going to sleep, but there was no thought of rest now. Arrangements had to be made, horses weeded--out of a division of 5000 only one brigade was fit to move!--more borrowed from the Kimberley Light Horse, whose holiday-time had come, and other preparations hurriedly set on foot to ensure an immediate rush--a swoop that should be as swift and successful as it was startling!

One may imagine the midnight picture. The dark immensity of veldt--the dust-driven, sweltering veldt--and Cronje, miles ahead with his horde, the remnant of his convoy, his women and children, fleeing along the north bank of the Modder, harassed by the Sixth Division, threatened by the Seventh and Ninth, and yet longing to cross the river, to get safely to Koodoosrand Drift, where he hourly expected reinforcements would come to his succour. French, dead beat after glorious work accomplished, rising from the first hospitable pillow he had seen for days--springing suddenly to action, ordering, organising, deciding how to effect the great swoop on Koodoosrand Drift and head off the fugitive. There was no time for the buckling on of mental and moral armour; only the warrior at soul could have been ready for such a situation. But such an one was here. He gave swift orders. In three hours' time General Broadwood and his brigade and three batteries of artillery--the only ones available out of seven--sallied forth towards the east, in the dusk of the morning. Their destination--Koodoosrand Drift--was some forty miles off, and once here Cronje's last loophole of escape would be gone! The General and his staff followed at 4.15 A.M., riding at full speed, and catching up the brigade about fifteen miles off.

The whole nature of their errand and the proposed movement was a surprise, for this manoeuvre had not entered into General French's original calculations.

When the General had seen the Sixth Division safely at Klip Drift and secured his left flank, he proceeded on his rush to Kimberley. Of other movements save his own he was ignorant. Even as he and the troops were riding into the town, Cronje, who had discovered the futility of his position at Majersfontein and the danger of it, was trekking madly across the front of the Sixth Division. On the morning of the 16th Lord Kitchener, hearing that the Majersfontein laager and the Modder River camp were deserted, and seeing a cloud of dust in the distance, had guessed what was happening, and immediately altered his plans to meet the emergency. As we are aware, he instantly gave orders for the mounted infantry not to follow French, but to pursue and attack the Boer convoy, while he telegraphed later to French, with the results just described. General French grasped the position at a glance. He knew no time was to be lost, and soon Broadwood's brigade, with horses that could barely move, was pushing on as fast as spurs could insist. The early morning dusk broke into the green and grey and gold of dawn; birds flew frightened hither and thither; foxes rushed to their holes; springbok and hares tempted the sportsmen, but never a glance to right or left was wasted. All eyes were strained to the east, to the momentous east, and the wooded banks of the distant river. Nearer and ever nearer they came--specks were seen on the horizon--men?--horses?--the enemy moving?--scudding away before he could be cornered? No--Yes? A moment of excitement, anguish--joy! The General had mounted a kopje, reconnoitred, and discovered the truth. It was Cronje's force--the remnants of his convoy some 4000 yards off--the convoy streaming down into the drifts that lead to Petrusberg and thence to Bloemfontein! They must never reach that destination! Kitchener's words--"Head him and prevent his crossing the river"--so simple in sound, so complex in execution, thrilled every heart. Quickly the guns were got into action--grandly--almost magically--the first shot plumped--bang! in front of the leading waggon just as the convoy was preparing to descend the drift! What a reveille! Cronje, as we know, was rushing from the clutches of the Sixth Division at Drieputs. Breathless, he gathered himself together. Suddenly he found himself assailed by a new force--a new terror! He divined in a moment what had happened. It was French, the ubiquitous French--French redivivus, as it were--who was putting the finishing touch to the chapter of disaster. Poor Captain Boyle, in his letter to the _Nineteenth Century_, thus described the great Dutchman's plight:--

"His only chance now was to sacrifice his guns and convoy, and cut his way across the river under the heavy fire of our guns. Immediately on the first shell bursting in the laager, about thirty Boers galloped out to seize a kopje on our right, afterwards called Roberts' Hill; but the 10th Hussars in a neck-and-neck race had the legs of them, and seizing the hill in advance, beat them off with their carbine and Maxim fire. The Boers from their laager answered our shell fire for a short time with great accuracy from two or three guns. But these were quickly silenced, and shell after shell from Artillery Hill fell plump into the laager. Finally, our second battery was moved to a little distance from Roberts' Hill and opened fire from the southern slope on to a kopje to which the Boers had retired. All that afternoon at intervals our guns poured shells into the laager, but no response came, and we spent our time watching the Boers, now 3000 yards away, entrenching themselves in the open and along the river-bank. Their waggons caught fire and the ammunition exploded, and as they realised their position more and more, so must their hearts have sunk. Anxiously must they have waited for the first sign of the infantry gathering round, as anxiously as we did in our turn watching from the high kopjes.

"The cavalry, worn out as they were and without food, had to hold the kopjes and water their horses in turn some five miles off. They got what grazing they could in the kopjes as they lay there, for no corn had come on from Kimberley, and neither men nor horses had had any food except the three days' rations with which they originally started from Klip Drift the Thursday before, a good deal of which had been shaken off the saddles or lost in the long gallop up the plain to Kimberley. The General, the men, the horses, all alike had to live on what was found at Kamilfontein--a few mealies, a few onions, and the crumbs of biscuits in our pockets were all we had until some Free Staters' sheep and cattle were rounded and killed. Had it not been for this plentiful supply of meat, the men must have fared very badly for the next three days. No transport came in until Monday night, and the horses had but 11/2 lb. of corn in three days. The men were put on half rations of biscuits even after the transport arrived.

"Meanwhile, on Saturday afternoon about 5 P.M. Broadwood sent word to French that in the far distance he observed the dust rising, which he took for Kelly-Kenny's division. French returned to Roberts' Hill, and, until the sun set, anxiously awaited the arrival of the infantry--but they marched but slowly. From 6 P.M. till 7 P.M. we opened fire again from our batteries to show Lord Kitchener our exact positions." The splendid work done by the Royal Horse Artillery was described by another eye-witness. He said: "I will give you an idea of what good gunners we have in the Artillery. General French said to one of the gunners, 'See those three waggons over there? (a distance of about 31/2 miles); see what you can do with them.' The gunner fired three shell, and the waggons were no more."

We must now watch the progress of the other portions of the force who were actively engaged in taking their share in the huge undertaking. Colonel Stephenson's brigade, on the night of the 16th (while General French was learning the great news), had re-crossed the river at Klip Drift, and on the morning of the 17th (at the same hour as Broadwood's brigade was moving from Kimberley) had marched to the south of the river with the same intention--that of heading off Cronje at Paardeberg and Koodoosrand Drift. Thus, with Broadwood's brigade on one side, and Stephenson's on the other, Cronje's prospects of escape were scarcely worth a dime. The _Times'_ correspondent, talking of Colonel Stephenson's troops on the morning of the fateful 17th, said:--

"They were joined about ten at Klipkraal Drift by Knox's brigade, which marched along the northern bank. The mounted infantry, pushing on, reached Paardeberg Drift that evening, and encamped on rising ground close to the south bank. The infantry, leaving Klipkraal at six in the evening, made a night march for Paardeberg Drift, but, missing their way, slightly passed the Drift and bivouacked on some rising ground nearly two miles beyond, separated from the river by a smooth plain shelving gently down to it. The mistake was a fortunate one, as it brought the infantry almost opposite to the place where Cronje had determined to cross. Cronje had left Drieputs during the night after the battle, abandoning seventy-eight waggons, and pushed on along the north bank of the river during Saturday for Koodoosrand Drift. Soon after passing north of Paardeberg Drift he heard that French had already returned from Kimberley, and was holding a line of high kopjes running north-west from Koodoosrand Drift, and completely commanding the drift. Wheeling his waggons to the right across the plain, he laagered on the north bank of the river at Wolveskraal Farm. This was opposite to a drift of the same name, about half-way between Paardeberg and Koodoosrand Drifts, being about four miles in a straight line from each. Here he intended to cross on Sunday morning. But already, during the night, he became aware of the presence of the mounted infantry south of Paardeberg Drift, and decided that he could not get his convoy away without fighting. Probably Cronje did not realise that Kelly-Kenny's infantry could have already marched up and occupied the rising ground not three thousand yards south of Wolveskraal Drift; still less could he know that General Colvile's division (whose endurance had been extraordinary) was but a few miles behind, and was to reach Paardeberg Drift before daybreak. If Cronje had known this, there is little doubt that he would have promptly sacrificed all his transport and all his guns in order to get his men away and escape from the trap into which he was now caught. As it was, he sent a great part of his force to line the river-bed all the way down to Paardeberg Drift, in order to act as a rear-guard and check any attempt to interfere with his crossing Wolveskraal Drift at his leisure."

Later on, the Ninth Division, with the Highland Brigade, who had made a forced march from Jacobsdal, arrived on the scene just in time to see the Boers sending up rockets to show their position to expected reinforcements. And there is little doubt that Cronje, unable to realise the expeditious advance of "lumbering Britons," mistook General Colvile's troops for the longed-for relief.

Among the missing from near Paardeberg were Lieutenants Romilly (Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry) and Metge (Welsh Regiment), and Captains Arnold and Vaughan of Kitchener's Horse.

Here we have the position of affairs as they stood on the night of the 17th and on the morning of the 18th, when the trap so ingeniously set for Cronje commenced to close little by little--north, south, east, and west. Everywhere he turned the detestable rooineks menaced him, and he who so lately had eaten his breakfast to the tune of his 100-pounder gun, that belched ruin and mutilation over the whole region of Kimberley, was now constrained to breakfast to a new and disagreeable inversion of an identical melody!

THE BATTLE OF PAARDEBERG

On Sunday, the 18th of February, the most exciting action of the war took place. It was costly as it was momentous, for it served to decide the fate of the fleeing Dutchman. The scene of the drama was not unpicturesque. From the Paardeberg to the Koodoosrand Drift the Modder flowed along a deep hollow from thirty to a hundred yards in depth. To either side the forks of small dongas radiated, while the high banks were fringed with the feathery foliage of the mimosa and willow. Donga and tree stump afforded excellent cover for the slim adversary, sniper or scout. The river travelled from Koodoosrand Drift west-south-west, deviating southwards on either side of the Wolveskraal Drift. A vast expanse of veldt, some two thousand yards wide, shelved down towards the south bank of the river, fringed by higher ground; and this grassy plain extending eastwards joined a circle of kopjes now known as Kitchener's Hill. On the opposite, the north bank of the river, was another similar plain, dotted with minor kopjes to within a thousand yards of the river, and beyond them was the higher hump of Paardeberg Hill.

The action began at dawn. Firing grew hotter and hotter with the growth of the morning, and soon pandemonium was let loose. While part of the mounted infantry was forcing the rearguard up the river another part was manoeuvring on the right front and flank of the enemy. The Dutchmen meanwhile from King's Kop turned on a quick-firing Hotchkiss gun, which swept the flat country from the kop to the southern bank of the river. The antagonists had both posted themselves on the north bank of the river--both banks of which were level, and this expanse afforded no cover for movements. Over this expanse the Ninth Brigade had to move, struggling through a zone of fire towards the concealed enemy.

Cronje by this time had realised that his position was critical--almost hopeless. Bringing his fine military qualities to bear on the situation, he decided to make the best of a bad job, and entrench himself with all the skill possible. He held about one square mile of the river-bed on either side of Wolveskraal Drift, and beyond that he knew were encircling kopjes, each one concealing its multitude of rooineks. On the east, slowly creeping up, were the menacing numbers of Tucker's Division; on the west the vast crowds of the mounted infantry and the Sixth Division; on the south were field-guns little more than a mile off, threatening to shower destruction from Gun Hill, while on the north were Naval guns and howitzers. Indeed, everywhere was fate frowning, obdurate, vengeful. But the Dutchman retained his pluck and his wits. He even believed that with everything against him he might yet employ the same tactics which had nonplussed Lord Methuen at Modder River. He still retained a poor opinion of his adversary, and his delusion lent him confidence. He hurriedly built trenches, that in themselves were masterpieces of defensive art, and took up his headquarters in the centre, in a red brick house--a species of travellers' hostelry, which may be found near all drifts in South Africa. Here at night Mrs. Cronje joined him. During the day she was placed in the women's shelter at the east side of the area, which shelter was protected by waggons and trenches all along the bed of the river. Talking of these trenches, the correspondent of the _Times_ declared that "the skill with which they were constructed as defences against both rifle and shell fire was worthy of the highest praise. All except those of the outer lines of pickets were made so narrow and deep that it seems as though they were in many cases entered from one end rather than the top, as any such ingress must even in a week's time have considerably widened the neck of the excavation. At the top they were perhaps eighteen inches wide, at the bottom about three feet, and by crouching down the most complete protection was afforded from bursting shell.

"Every natural protection, such as the ramifications of the dongas which eat into the banks on both sides of the river, had been utilised, though the bombardment from both sides compelled them to abandon their first hasty breastworks cut into the actual top of the bank, which was here from about fifty to a hundred yards from the river itself, and thirty feet in height.

"For the first time here the 'T' trenches, of which much has been said during the present campaign, were used. They did not seem to present the least advantage over the ordinary shapes, except that in an exposed angle they may have provided additional protection against an enfilading fire."

Cronje's first object in entrenching himself in the bed of the river was to arrest the further advance of the mounted infantry, who had taken possession of the bed of the river west of his position. In this he was successful. Worn, harassed, and almost helpless, he determined to make a desperate stand, hoping against hope to gain time till some help from without should arrive. But this help never reached him. A grand enveloping movement commenced, and Cronje, brought to bay, found himself face to face with what proved to be his Sedan.

By this time he and his followers were snugly ensconced in bush and donga and scrub round the laager, and from the trees around they vigorously sniped and poured volleys at the advancing troops. In the advance to the attack the Highland Brigade was on the left, General Knox's brigade in the centre and on the right, while General Smith Dorrien's brigade, after crossing the river by Paardeberg Drift, moved along the north bank. The Highland Brigade had a terrific duty. The Boers, from their position in the bed of the river and on both sides of it, commanded the left of the Brigade, and as the kilted mass moved forward in the open poured upon them a deadly fire, which forced them to lie prone for the rest of the day. Here at noon, when bullets were humming their loudest, General Hector Macdonald was wounded. He had dismounted, and was directing the movements of the brigade, when overtaken by a shot which penetrated thigh and foot. Despite this unlucky accident and a tremendous spell of hard fighting, the brigade exhibited splendid pluck and tenacity. They were destitute of cover, but maintained their position with astonishing fortitude, and this after the long forced march they had made from Jacobsdal, and while enduring the tortures of maddening thirst, which could not be assuaged. A heavy thunderstorm mercifully overtook them in the course of the afternoon and raindrops large as gooseberries clattered down their relieving moisture on the parched and exhausted troops.

Drawing by Sidney Paget from a Sketch by W. B. Wollen, R.I.]

On the north bank of the river was Cronje's laager, an environment of waggons, carts, ammunition, and stores. While General Smith Dorrien's force, among which were the Canadians, Gordons, and Shropshires, attempted to charge into the laager, they too were vigorously shelled by the enemy, who, undefeatable, held on valiantly to a kopje on the south bank of the river. Here they posted a Vickers-Maxim and other deadly weapons, and in a measure divided our force in two. The Seaforths and the Cornwall Regiment made a splendid charge with the bayonet, and drove the Boers from their cover round the drift, but in the glorious rush both the Colonel and Adjutant of the Cornwalls were stricken down. Ninety-six of the men were wounded, but they now held the north-west side of the enemy's position.

On the east the Sixth Division was hard at work tackling a horde of Boers, who made a last despairing lunge in order to burst through the entangling forces and push for the south bank of the river. The effort was stubborn as it was desperate, but they were defeated by the dash of the West Riding Regiment, who pressed forward with the bayonet and succeeded in seizing the drift. Many splendid fellows were wounded and slain in the collision. Meanwhile the artillery continued to direct their incessant thunder against the laager, pouring in a deluge of destruction from all quarters, and forcing the Dutchmen to shrink within the space, little more than a mile square, into which they had so hurriedly scrambled.