Chapter VIII: Part II: The Eve of “1641” (4)

These projects—for they were never more than projects—show why Glamorgan had a commission to raise troops abroad as Charles placed no faith in O’Hartigan. O’Hartigan’s letter, in which he expressed his real hopes, had been captured by a Parliamentary cruiser and sent to Ormond. Charles therefore warned the Queen that O’Hartigan was a knave, and in a letter to Ormond mentioned that the Prince of Orange had consented to supply the ships for the continental troops. He urged Ormond to conclude peace, and said that he would consider the Irish army a good bargain even if he had to consent to Poynings’ Law being suspended, and to Ormond’s joining the Confederates against the Scots; he would make no further concession regarding the penal laws than he had already promised. A month later, when his position in England had become still more critical, he wrote “If the suspension of Poynings’ Act for such Bills as shall be agreed on between you there, and the present taking away of the penal laws against Papists by a law will do it I shall not think it a bad bargain, so that freely and vigorously they engage themselves in my assistance against my rebels in England and Scotland.” But even now Ormond was to make a better bargain if possible, and not to mention these greater powers except in the last extremity.

Even if Ormond were as willing as the King to make these concessions, he had to carry on his negotiations with the help of a Privy Council that would not be likely to view them favourably. For this reason the King decided that Glamorgan should now start for Ireland with powers not only as commander, but to enable him to treat with the Confederates “not indeed without Ormond’s knowledge, but in substitution for him if it proved to be necessary.” Charles gave Ormond a further commission with full powers to treat with the Confederates in such matters as had to be agreed to “wherein our Lieutenant cannot so well be seen in, as not fit for us at present public to own.” He urged him to proceed with all secrecy, and promised on the word of a King and a Christian, to ratify whatever Glamorgan should grant to the Confederates, “they having by their supplies testified their zeal to our service.”

In the meantime the King’s cause had grown much weaker, and it was doubtful even if the Irish army could be landed in England, or, if landed, whether it could be of any help. Not only was Charles severely defeated at Naseby, but his private papers were captured at Sherburne, and his instructions to Ormond made known to the Parliament. Glamorgan on his arrival in Ireland found that a new factor had been introduced into the negotiations by the General Assembly’s adoption of the demand of the Catholic clergy that they should be confirmed in the possession of the churches actually in the hands of the Confederates with the property appertaining thereto as well as all derelict churches. The Confederate Commissioners had been instructed to yield nothing on this point, and as Charles refused to concede anything more than he had done already, and as Ormond concealed his powers with regard to the penal laws, the treaty again broke down. Glamorgan seeing that he could do nothing with Ormond, accompanied the disappointed Confederate Commissioners to Kilkenny, where he privately resumed the negotiations, and acting on the very loosely-worded and wide instructions given him by Charles on March 12, he concluded a secret treaty with the Confederates.

By this instrument, which comprised what were called the Religious Articles, and which was signed on August 25, 1645, he agreed on behalf of the King to the free and public exercise of the Catholic religion. This, though set forth more definitely than Ormond would probably have agreed to, may be looked on as not exceeding the terms Ormond was authorized to grant. But in two other clauses Glamorgan’s treaty was far in advance of anything Ormond would grant or to which indeed Charles had consented, unless we regard the secret commission as empowering Glamorgan to promise anything as long as he could get the troops Charles so sorely needed. Glamorgan agreed that all churches fallen into the hands of the Catholics since the rising in Ulster, and the derelict churches “other than such as are now actually enjoyed by his ‘Majesty’s Protestant subjects,’ were to remain in their possession.” Next, he agreed that the Catholics were to be exempt from the jurisdiction of the Protestant clergy, and their own clergy were not to be “molested for the exercise of their jurisdiction over their respective Catholic flocks in matters spiritual and ecclesiastical.” This naturally left open the question of appeals to Rome, since there must be some authority over the clergy to decide what were civil and what were spiritual cases, and it was scarcely likely that the Confederates could consent to its being vested in the King.

Charles had not heard of the question of the churches before Glamorgan started, but when he did he wrote to him on July 31, and said he would consent only to the Catholics building chapels for themselves, and absolutely refused to allow them to retain any of the churches.

It seems probable that the King was sincere when he declared that he would look on the giving up of the churches as the abandonment of his religion, and that Glamorgan, eager to obtain the 10,000 men from the Confederates, had exceeded his instructions, but hoped to have his fault overlooked by Charles in view of the great assistance the Irish soldiers would be to his cause. At the same time, Gardiner, who has discussed this question very freely in his _History of the Great Civil War_, and in a special article in the _English Historical Review_, does not make sufficient allowance for the shifty vacillating character of Charles, and it is quite permissible to assume that when he gave his general instructions in such vague terms to Glamorgan, he contemplated the possibility of having to disavow any action he might take under them, while, if such action were not questioned by his enemies, he was quite ready to profit by it. It would, however, seem that Glamorgan knew he was acting in a way the King would very likely not agree to; for when he signed the treaty he handed the Confederates another document called a _defeasance_, in which he declared that he did not intend to bind the King to consent to anything “other than he himself shall please, after he hath received these ten thousand men being a pledge and testimony” of the loyalty of his Irish Catholic subjects. This document was not to be disclosed to Charles until Glamorgan had done all in his power to induce him to agree to the religious articles.

On this point Gardiner says, “It was hardly within the bounds of possibility that Glamorgan’s action should prove beneficial either to his master or to the Irish people; but he was surely right in thinking that if a military alliance was to be formed with the Confederates it could only be by the acceptance of their own terms. It was childish to expect the hearty co-operation of the Irish if their Church was to be maintained in the position of a merely tolerated sect, the organisation of which was in constant danger of a sudden application of the Statutes of Appeal and Præmunire; and if the ecclesiastical lands and buildings set apart for religious use by their ancestors, and now recovered after a deprivation of less than a century, were to be forcibly torn from them, and restored to the professors of an alien creed, from whom they had nothing but persecution to expect.”

The Supreme Council of the Confederates at once proceeded to test the new alliance they thought they had formed, and on August 29, asked Ormond to join his forces with theirs against the Scots under Monroe in Ulster, but Ormond gave no reply though pressed by Glamorgan, who assured him that the Confederates would now send the 10,000 men to England, and would resume the treaty for the political articles with Ormond. Glamorgan begged Ormond to grant as much as possible and let the Confederates appeal to the King for the rest. Ormond was, of course, kept in the dark as to the secret treaty for the religious articles by which the Confederates had been persuaded that they would get all they wanted from Charles, so that they were willing to accept such instalment as Ormond would offer.

The Confederates accordingly once more sent Commissioners to Dublin, and the discussion with Ormond continued for another two months, but Ormond refused absolutely to exceed his instructions or to yield anything in matters of religion. On November 20, a few days after Rinuccini arrived there, Glamorgan went to Kilkenny. He found the Supreme Council agreed that if Ormond persisted in refusing the terms they demanded as to religion, the political treaty should be published by itself whilst the religious articles should be kept secret until ratified by Charles. They also promised that the 10,000 men should be sent without waiting for the King’s ratification, but Glamorgan was to swear not to employ them in the King’s service until the religious articles were agreed to, and if refused, he was to either compel his consent by force of arms or bring the whole force back to Ireland.

We are now able to take up in its proper order the consideration of Rinuccini’s mission. In the winter of 1644 the Confederates had sent their Secretary Bellings to solicit help in money from the Pope and other Catholic princes. He was favourably received by the new Pontiff Innocent X, and was greatly surprised at hearing that the Pope would send a nuncio who would act directly in his name and report to him concerning the position of Irish parties. In the first instance the Pope selected Luigi Omodei, but as he being a Milanese was a Spanish subject, and his employment might give offence to France, and as the Pope wished to be perfectly impartial between France and Spain, he selected Giovanni Battista Rinuccini, Archbishop of Fermo, who, as a subject of the Duke of Tuscany, could be regarded as neutral. Bellings, in after years, when his thoughts were perhaps embittered by disappointment, said it was a job to please the Duke of Tuscany. Rinuccini was born in 1592, a member of a noble Florentine family, and at the time we speak of was in his forty-third year. His father was Camillo Rinuccini, and his mother Virginia, daughter of Pier Antonio Bandini, sister of Cardinal Ottavio Bandini. He was educated first by the Jesuits in Rome and afterwards went to the University of Bologna in his eighteenth year. Then he studied law at Perugia, and took his doctor’s degree at Pisa, and distinguished himself so remarkably that he was elected a member of the Cruscan Academy though only in his twenty-first year. His first appointments by the Roman Court were those of Chamberlain to Gregory XV, and Secretary to the Congregation of Rites. When Urban VIII became Pope he continued his advancement, and made him Civil Lieutenant to the Cardinal Vicar, and soon after Archbishop of Fermo in 1625. At Fermo Rinuccini seems to have found his most suitable sphere of work, for he proved in all respects an excellent Archbishop, and was so loved by the people and felt so true an interest in them that he declined the metropolitan See of Florence in his native Duchy in 1631. In a religious sense he appears to have been an eminently holy and good man, though perhaps more than ordinarily imbued with the intolerant opinions of the age he lived in. He had, moreover, but small knowledge of the ways of men who live wholly in the world, and was absolutely ignorant of the feelings of people in political matters who had always possessed representative government of which he, as an Italian brought up amongst the despotic courts of the Peninsula, had no experience. The Pope, it must be remembered, was then a great temporal prince, and his government was as despotic in practice as any in Europe. He, too, appears to have shared the belief of Rinuccini, that it was only necessary to gain over the Sovereign of a country, and that no regard need be paid to its other inhabitants, heedless of the fact that where free institutions exist, a king who is disliked or distrusted by his subjects soon ceases to have any authority whatever. England was then leading the way in that struggle for popular liberty which was to continue in revolutions and bloodshed until our own time; but on the Continent at that epoch the great mass of any population simply did not count in political matters. To this ignorance and inexperience of Rinuccini’s of the feelings of men like the Irish who had lived under representative institutions however limited, and were striving to regain and extend them, must be attributed much of his failure in dealing with Irishmen of various parties. He was too autocratic in his methods, and being a man of resolute and inflexible character, determined to bend others to his will utterly regardless that such a course might cause him to lose many whom it was his interest to conciliate. He had, moreover, an exaggerated sense of his own dignity, and a fondness for details of etiquette, dress, and ceremonial, which, though to some extent natural to one brought up in the most ceremonious court of a ceremonious period, was carried by him to a point bordering on the ridiculous. It must be said of him, however, that though he had the ecclesiastical patronage of Ireland in his hands for some years, his appointments were made in the interest of the Church, and no charge of favouritism can be made against him. His object was the restoration of the Church in Ireland “in its full splendour,” and with this before him he did not pause to consider local feelings or local experience of the difficulties in his way in an age and in circumstances when such an enterprise could only be considered Quixotic. From these characteristics it may be inferred how well fitted he was to strike the final blows that broke up the newly-formed union of the Irish nation.

For a hundred years the Catholic Church had been conducting the counter-Reformation, and had already recovered the allegiance of a great part of Europe. To Innocent X it appeared that the time was ripe for restoring his spiritual authority in England. The Catholics there were still a numerous and wealthy body and comprised amongst their leaders many of the most ancient and most highly placed of the nobility, and would afford a solid foundation for such a reconstruction. The difficult position in which the King was placed seemed to render him a peculiarly suitable object for overtures, and if he could be restored chiefly by the aid of the Catholics and the Pope it was hoped that the Church might gain great advantages if not complete re-establishment. We find in the secret instructions given by Innocent to Rinuccini that these expectations are clearly expressed, and show, moreover, how badly informed the Pope was as to the true state of feeling regarding the Catholic Church in England. In the concluding paragraph the Pope says: “In fine, this rebellion in England has already caused so many divisions in religion and so many disputes amongst the Protestants themselves, that all who have some belief in a future life are beginning to waver, and would become Catholics if they were not restrained by the fear of losing their property and temporal comforts. If, then, by means of this Catholic army, you can obtain from His Majesty the revocation of the penal laws against the Catholics, the abolition of the proposed Oath of Fidelity and freedom in religion, that is that the Catholics be able to hold all appointments in the Kingdom and in Parliament like his other subjects, we may hope in a few years for the conversion of the whole Kingdom—a most important step towards the eradication of heresy from the whole North, and without which the Irish can never hope to enjoy in peace the conditions granted in favour of the true faith in Ireland.”

The Catholic army here referred to was to consist chiefly of the troops who had for the past three years formed the subject of negotiation between Charles and the Confederates. It is well to bear in mind the Pope’s instructions with regard to this army as showing that both in his eyes and in Rinuccini’s, the Irish were to be merely the convenient instruments of the greater design. He says: “To ensure success in these negotiations two points remain to be well considered; first, that the requisite conditions be well weighed so that the services we hope from this Catholic army be efficacious; the second, to facilitate by every means the agreement between the King and the Irish.” The first of these conditions may be reduced to the following articles:—

“1. That the Irish army shall never agree to land in England with
less than ten or twelve thousand effective men, that they may be
able to defend themselves without danger of being cut to pieces by
the English who serve under the King.

“2. That two sea ports be placed in their hands to disembark their
troops in England, and that those places be under the command of
persons in their confidence.

“3. That the generals of the army and all the officers ... besides
the governors of the said places be appointed by the Irish.

“4, 5. The fourth and fifth articles are unimportant and need not be
quoted.

“6. That permission and authority from the King be accorded to the
English Catholics to form themselves into a body of cavalry
proportionate in strength to join them when and where appointed by
the Irish general to serve in his army and under his command....

“7. That the Catholic general of this cavalry be a person whom the
Irish can entirely trust, and must, therefore, be first accepted by
their own general.”

That the political freedom of the Irish people, the independence of their Parliament, the right of Catholics to sit therein, in fact the political articles which the Confederates had demanded and which Charles was willing to concede were altogether a secondary consideration in the eyes of the Pope is evident from the following:—

“To facilitate the agreement between the King and the Irish, that
articles must be so framed that nothing essential to the full
establishment of the Catholic religion in Ireland be omitted;
matters of less moment may be remitted, in particular those tending
to changes in the Political Government, as they would, without any
doubt, retard the agreement.” This passage illustrates the
inexperience of the Pope of the power of a people with free
institutions, and that he had yet to learn that a people politically
free may follow any religion they please. It was scarcely likely
that the Catholics, possessing, as they inevitably would, a large
majority in the Irish Parliament, would long submit to the
disabilities under which they laboured in religious matters.

As to any aspirations for the complete independence of Ireland, the
Pope promptly threw cold water on them. In his letter of June 3,
1645, before Rinuccini left Paris, the Cardinal Secretary writes:
“Nor is he (the Pope) too well pleased with the rumours which are
spread by some Irish Catholics, that they desire to throw off their
allegiance to the King because he has not chosen to grant the
concessions they demand; and his Holiness would also desire that
they should speak with greater moderation of the articles of peace.
And, further, he wishes them to understand that he desires to see
them continue obedient to the royal power, hoping, however, that
from the King himself and from the protection of the Queen, they may
gain all they desire. To this end your Excellency’s persuasions and
warnings must be directed; His Holiness rests securely on your
prudence, whenever you can convey news to him of the Irish, whether
it be of rebellion or refusal of submission to the King, and that
you will warn your followers in this matter.”

It cannot, however, be doubted that the Pope was entirely within his rights as head of the Catholic Church in endeavouring to promote its extension and well-being, and, however ill-chosen the time and circumstances, that this was his only object is plain from the following passage in the same letter, as well as from his more formal instructions: “Your Excellency is aware that the intentions of His Holiness respecting the affairs of Ireland do not go beyond the limits of pure benefit to the Catholic religion, and that your mission never had, and has no other aims than to procure its free exercise, to restore ecclesiastical discipline, and to reform the habits of the Catholics relaxed by a long course of free living. In all that touches on the civil government your instructions have been so framed as by no possibility to excite the jealousy of either the King or Queen of England; nor does the Holy Father work to any other purpose in spirit, since he concerns himself solely in the propagation of the Catholic religion without a single thought of prejudicing the temporal power of anyone whatsoever.”

Unfortunately for the good intentions of the Pope, he was, by attempting to seize this imaginary opportunity for an extension of his spiritual authority, taking the most certain course to further prejudice the already shaky temporal dominion of Charles I.

Rinuccini left Rome towards the end of March, 1645, and reached Genoa on April 15. He was received with much honour by the Doge and Senate, and writes to the Pope evidently with great pleasure of the ceremonies that took place and the honours paid to him. “I was escorted from my house by a cortège of almost all the nobility.... At the foot of the stairs four Procurators met me, placed me in the midst of them, and conducted me to the presence chamber, where the Doge waited. He descended four steps from the raised part of the room ... and conducted me to the canopy on his left hand, but to a seat a little lower than his own.”

Having left Genoa he proceeded by Marseilles and Avignon to Paris, where he arrived towards the end of May, and was cordially received by the Queen Regent, Anne of Austria, for whom he had a Golden Rose sent by the Pope. This Rose was the subject of much correspondence, as there seems to have been some doubt as to whether the Queen would receive it with sufficient gratitude. He seems to have at once constituted himself an extra Nuncio at Paris and entered on a lengthy correspondence on French and Spanish affairs without the knowledge of the resident Nuncio. He has been accused by Bellings and others of not wanting to go to Ireland, and of intriguing to replace the Nuncio then at Paris. Mazarin evidently suspected or accused him of some such design, for we find that though Rinuccini’s letter is missing, the Private Secretary’s reply points out that “no one can answer Cardinal Mazarin with greater force than Your Excellency when he complains that His Holiness sent you to France, not merely on your way to Ireland, but that you should adroitly contrive to establish yourself as Nuncio in Paris,” and supplies him with the reasons to be advanced in refutation of this charge. Some grounds were doubtless given for Mazarin’s suspicions through the Pope as he afterwards explained having inadvertently omitted to give Rinuccini letters for the Nuncio at Paris.

Rinuccini had also been favourably received and encouraged by Gaston Duke of Orleans, and by Condé, but nothing practical resulted from the politeness of these princes. Mazarin, from whom he hoped considerable help in money and ships, was very cautious, and his influence over the Queen Regent was very great. The news of Naseby had completely damped any ardour there may have been for the Irish cause as a means of keeping England weak. Rinuccini found that the Queen Henrietta Maria of England would not receive him publicly as Nuncio, because it was contrary to law in England, and through fear of the harm it might do her husband in the eyes of his Protestant subjects. He is much concerned about this, and whether he should go to a private audience and if there uncover his head. The Pope taking a larger and more sensible view of the matter tells him:—“However, if the Queen either for fear of injuring the King her husband, or for any private reason, does not think it well to receive you at a public or private audience, His Holiness does not wish her Majesty to have any trouble about the matter, since he will be satisfied with any resolutions of a Queen so pious and so zealous for the Catholic faith. I am, however, to add that should your Excellency not be disposed to accept private audience, that you may not put in doubt the prerogative of the Nuncio to appear covered before all queens (even if in France at similar audiences a Nuncio does not appear covered) still we do not see how any doubt can rest on the prerogative whilst at all public audiences the right to be covered is established.”

With Secretary Bellings the Nuncio was on very friendly terms, but perhaps because he was desirous to keep him with him so that he should not reach Ireland first as he considered that Bellings would put the interests of Charles I before those of the Pope. Scarampi, the Papal Legate in Ireland, writing at this time says that if peace were concluded between the English royalists and the Catholic Confederation without Rinuccini’s consent, it would be fatal to the Church’s interests.

Rinuccini prolonged his stay at Paris over three months. He had some excuse for this delay, since in his letter of 3rd July, 1645, the Pope says:—“A fortnight ago your Excellency was told if by chance the Queen of France should give you any motive for remaining in that country, Your Excellency might, under some pretext, prolong your stay in that country; but since His Holiness sees that this has not happened ... he has resolved that Your Excellency shall proceed on your journey in the manner first arranged.” However, this hint was lost on Rinuccini, who was evidently in no hurry to exchange Paris even for Kilkenny. It is true he had, or at any rate made, many excuses on the score of difficulty in finding shipping. However, the Pope became impatient, and there is a marked change of tone in the succeeding letters. 14th August—“Let Your Excellency go on your way rejoicing with the blessing of the Holy Father upon you.” 21st—“Your Excellency will hasten your going to Ireland; every day’s delay may produce the worst effects.” 28th—“If you have not already done so, you must set out.” 11th September—“We await with much anxiety news of your Excellency’s arrival in Ireland.” 18th September—“The displeasure of His Holiness increases at your Excellency’s delay in your departure for Ireland, and he laments to see that all the negotiations, missions and provisions which Your Excellency has continued to introduce, tend still more to retard it. He commands, therefore, that Your Excellency with all promptitude, shall set out at once for that island, that you do not delay in any part of France in expectation of letters or information from Spinola, whom you have sent on before, much less wait until the frigates which were to be provided by Invernizzi in Flanders to accompany you shall be put in order.... The General Assembly, if they had known of Your Excellency’s presence, would not perhaps have dissolved without coming to some conclusion, and God knows from what they have lately done, if Your Excellency be not there, whether they many not precipitately form some revolution as little beneficial to the Catholic religion as to its free exercise.” This seemed to have its due effect, for the Pope’s next letter found Rinuccini in Ireland. It is an important document as setting forth the view that must necessarily be taken by any person of sound judgment of Charles’s negotiation through Glamorgan. The Pope refers to a letter received from the Legate in Ireland describing the powers possessed by Glamorgan and the conclusion of the secret treaty, and goes on to say, “Father Scarampi having become aware of this agreement, he remonstrated by letter not only with the Bishops, but also with the Council ... on the small foundation they had in any negotiations with the Earl, whilst the mandates which he had produced were subscribed by the King and his secretary only, signed with the small seal, and in consequence deprived of the necessary authority, the King having no power in himself to dispose of the political affairs of these kingdoms. The whole foundation of the negotiation, therefore, rested on the Earl, which being made by another, could not bind the King if he did not choose to be bound; moreover, being a convention made with the Bishops, it would scandalise the world to see that in the published articles of peace no mention was made of the Church, of ecclesiastical property, or of the authority and jurisdiction of the Bishops, which all remained at the mercy of the King, should he not wish to make peace or observe it; and inasmuch as the Catholic laity when satisfied with the articles which had reference to themselves, would not care to make a stand for others however important, in which their own interest was not involved, would have abandoned them. Although these reasons appeared very strong to the Council and the Bishops ... yet they had remitted the whole affair to the Earl, had declared themselves satisfied on their part with his proposals on ecclesiastical matters, and consented to the publication of the treaty of peace.... His Holiness commands me to say that if by letter from Father Scarampi or from others to be relied on, you are convinced that the peace between the Catholics of Ireland and the King of England is established with the articles and in the manner described, he will be content that you do not prosecute your journey to Ireland, and that you shall wait for further orders from His Holiness; but if the intelligence your Excellency receives does not convey the assurance that the peace is certainly concluded, then you will at once pursue your journey. But should the peace be established with these same articles and in the manner described, then His Holiness desires that neither Your Excellency nor Father Scarampi shall do anything to express approval or disapproval, but remain, so to say, entirely passive.”

It is a curious thing that notwithstanding the Pope’s clear view of the powerlessness of Charles’s position, he should have been willing to treat with him at all.

Rinuccini writing from Limerick on October 25, gives an exciting account of his voyage. He sailed from the island of St. Martin or Isle de Ré, on Monday the 18th, and the wind being favourable, expected to reach Waterford on Thursday. On Thursday, however, there was a fog, and owing to its being full moon, the sea was so rough that it was thought better to keep out to sea. In the grey of the morning on Friday they saw a large vessel in full sail and a small frigate giving them chase. These were commanded by Plunket, an Irishman, who, having joined the Parliament, had been ordered to watch the approaches to Ireland. The Irishmen with the Nuncio and Secretary Bellings in particular, knowing the fate awaiting them if captured, immediately armed, resolved to resist to the last. The Nuncio was ill in bed, the sea being no respecter of persons, “my illness greatly aggravated, and already for two whole days without any attendance whatever from my servants, as they were prostrated by sea-sickness, and as little able to hear as to obey any order.” Nevertheless, he felt his courage rise to a higher pitch than ever before, and prepared in his own heart to give up life and liberty in whatever way God should dispose of him, even if it seemed to him necessary that he and those in his care should be carried captives to London. However, his fortitude was not put to this test, for the chase ended at nightfall. He attributes their escape to a miracle obtained for him by St. Peter, whose image formed the figurehead of the ship; but Father Meehan sententiously remarks, “that he must have subsequently learned that the escape of his pursuers was still more wonderful, for Plunket’s cooking galley having caught fire, and being alarmed for his magazine, he was obliged to shorten sail and thus suffer the San Pietro to escape.” The chase had driven them a long way to the west and they had some difficulty in making the land, but they succeeded next day in reaching Kenmare Bay, where they landed on the 21st of October, 1645. His first lodging was in a shepherd’s hut, and he remained there two days “not so much to repose after our trial as to return thanks for our safety.”

Before leaving Paris he drew upon the Pope for 15,000 dollars; Cardinal Antonio Barberius gave him 10,000, and Mazarin 25,000, altogether 50,000. 20,000 were spent for arms and munitions, and these were now landed. The rest of the money was brought in specie. From Kenmare he started for Limerick with an escort furnished by the Supreme Council and the surrounding gentry. “On his journey he was much pleased at the fine appearance, hardihood, and activity of the men and the beauty and modesty of the women. He was amazed at the fecundity of the latter. There were married couples, he reported with astonishment, which were blessed with no fewer than thirty children still living, whilst he had been told families of fifteen and twenty were quite common.” He was hospitably received at Ardtully Castle by Donough M’Carthy and his wife, a sister of Lord Muskerry and niece of the Marquis of Ormond. At Macroom Castle he was received by the Lady Helena Butler, sister to Ormond and wife of Muskerry, who was then in Dublin. These names are mentioned to show incidentally the close connection between Ormond and the Anglo and Old Irish proprietors. At Dromsecane he was met by Richard Butler, Ormond’s brother, a member of the Supreme Council, at the head of two troops of horse, thence by Clonmeen and Kilmallock to Limerick. Limerick, hitherto neutral, had been persuaded by Scarampi to join the Confederation, and the Nuncio was received with full honours by the clergy, corporation, and the garrison. On November 12th he halted within three miles of Kilkenny, and received a deputation of welcome from the Council. Next day he entered his litter surrounded by a vast concourse of people and set out for the city. He left the litter on approaching the gate, and donning the Pontifical hat and cape mounted a richly caparisoned horse. A canopy was held over him by leading citizens, bare headed in spite of the rain which fell in torrents. At the Market Cross, a beautiful structure erected in 1400 and destroyed in 1771 during the oppression of the penal laws, he halted, and listened to a Latin oration, and then on to the cathedral of St. Canice, where he was received by the Bishop of Ossory. Here from the high altar he bestowed the Pontifical Benediction and the _Te Deum_ was intoned by all present.

Having rested for two days he visited Lord Mountgarret and the Supreme Council who then occupied the ancient castle of the Ormonds. “At the head of the hall was seated Lord Mountgarret, President of the Council, who rose as I approached, but received me without moving at all from his place.” Rinuccini concludes his complaint to the Pope by saying that the reception was arranged by Bellings as one acquainted with Italian etiquette. The Pope replied that a hint should be conveyed to Mountgarret in the shape of an account of the Nuncio’s reception by the Doge of Genoa, who advanced four steps to meet him. Possibly Mountgarret knew it already, but thought the representative of the Irish nation should not condescend so much as the head of a small Italian Republic. The Nuncio addressed the President and Council in Latin, and assured them that the object of his visit was to assist the King as well as procure for the people of Ireland the free and public exercise of their religion and the restoration of the churches and church property. The Council made a grateful acknowledgment in an address to the Pope.

Muskerry and the other Confederate agents were still in Dublin and did not return to Kilkenny until the day after the Nuncio arrived. They found that the old Irish had resolved to rely entirely on the Nuncio, and the Pope, and such other Catholic princes on the Continent as might be induced to help them. The two parties in the Confederation grew daily more estranged, and henceforth were called “Ormondists” and “Nuncioists.” Rinuccini had no trouble in persuading the Old Irish to stand by him. They believed that notwithstanding his protests, he came to form a grand Pontifical army, and that they could rely on the Pope and through him on all Catholic princes for support and aid in throwing off the yoke of England completely. The Nuncio’s comparison of the intelligence of the two parties is not very flattering to the Old Irish. “Nature even,” he says, “seems to widen the breach of difference of character and qualities, the new party being for the most part of low stature, quick-witted and of subtle understanding, while the old are tall, simple-minded, unrefined in their manner of living, generally slow of comprehension, and quite unskilled in negotiation.” And yet it was these simple-minded men whom Rinuccini encouraged in breaking up the Confederacy and in setting aside those whom from his own account by their greater knowledge of affairs, and especially of England, were more likely to justly estimate the chances for and against the success of the Nuncio’s projects. Well has it been remarked of Rinuccini that “With hazy notions as to the meaning or strength of party divisions in Ireland, he made little allowance for local conditions in pursuing his aim of securing the full predominance of the Roman Catholic religion.”

Glamorgan was courteously received by the Nuncio, who, taking him and his credentials at once at their proper value, distrusted him and his power to induce the King to ratify the religious articles. Glamorgan, on the contrary, thought the Nuncio would throw no obstacles in the way of either treaty, and wrote to the Lord Lieutenant that the political treaty would be signed in a day or two. “I am morally certain,” he adds, “a total assent from the Nuncio shall be declared to the propositions for peace, and in the very way your Lordship prescribes.”

Rinuccini finding the Council on the point of coming to terms with Ormond for the political articles, while the religious ones were to be reserved under the secret treaty for the King’s acceptance, protested against the action of the Council. He then set to work to gain control of Glamorgan, who became as wax in his hands, and promised on behalf of the King that even if Ormond accepted the political treaty, it should not be published until Charles had confirmed his own secret treaty of August 25th, and that he would demand their ratification as soon as he landed with the Irish army in England. Rinuccini further induced him to make what was practically a second treaty, by which the King was to bind himself to never again appoint a Protestant Lord Lieutenant, that he would admit the Catholic Bishops to sit in the Irish House of Peers, pass an Act for a Catholic University, and grant the Catholics the churches and ecclesiastical revenues, not only those re-captured by the Confederates before the date on which Ormond’s treaty was signed, but all those taken after that signature and up to the confirmation of the religious articles by the King. Glamorgan, eager to lead 10,000 Irishmen to the help of the King, was ready to promise anything, and as Chester, the only port at which they could now be landed, was threatened by the Parliamentarians, the Supreme Council agreed to allow him take an advanced guard of 3,000 men there at once. But Glamorgan could not do so until he had Ormond’s consent to his appointment as commander of this force, and to the arrangement with Rinuccini by which the political treaty was not to be published until the religious articles, of which Ormond knew nothing as yet, had been ratified. To obtain Ormond’s consent Glamorgan set out for Dublin on the 24th December. On the 26th he was summoned before Ormond and the Privy Council on the demand of Lord Digby. On October 17th the Catholic Archbishop of Tuam had been killed at the siege of Sligo. On his body was found a copy of Glamorgan’s treaty, which was at once sent by the Scots to London and was thence forwarded to Ormond. Ormond at once saw that this revelation of the King’s duplicity would be fatal to his cause with the English people, and making a desperate effort to save the credit of Charles, had Glamorgan arrested on a charge of treason in exceeding his instructions. Charles took Digby’s advice and brazenly denied his instructions to Glamorgan, and declared his “amazement that any man’s folly and presumption should carry him to such a degree of abusing our trust.” The comedy was sustained by Glamorgan’s declaration that he had made the concessions on his own initiative through excess of zeal, and that what he had done was in no way binding on the King. Charles, moreover, disavowed Glamorgan in a letter to the Parliament, “That the Earl of Glamorgan having made offer unto him to raise forces in the Kingdom of Ireland, and to conduct them to England for his Majesty’s service, had a commission to that purpose and to that purpose only. That he had no commission at all to treat of anything else without the privity and directions of the Lord Lieutenant, much less to capitulate anything concerning religion or any propriety (_i.e._ property) belonging either to church or laity.”

Of this disavowal Gardiner says, “It can be no matter of surprise that Charles should have acknowledged what he could not help acknowledging, and should have sought to cast a discreet veil over that which could not be concealed. His really unpardonable fault was that after engaging on such a negotiation with the Irish Catholics he should now have announced his ‘resolution of leaving the managing of the business of Ireland wholly to the Houses, and to make no peace there but with their consent.’ What sort of peace the Houses would establish in Ireland he knew full well. Rinuccini had looked into his heart and estimated his motives to more purpose than Glamorgan.”

Nevertheless, in spite of the perspicuity with which Rinuccini had examined the stuffing of this Stuart puppet he had urged the Supreme Council to hold out for conditions which he should have known very well Charles had no more chance of being able to grant than if he were an inhabitant of another planet.

The Confederates had demanded the release of Glamorgan who had himself made strong representations to Ormond that his imprisonment was a great disservice to the King. He was released on bail and returned to Kilkenny where he pressed the Council to complete the political treaty with Ormond on which all parties were agreed, and to give him at once the 3,000 men for the relief of Chester. On the 29th September he wrote to Ormond that the Council was only awaiting the meeting of the General Assembly to be empowered to conclude the peace, and that the men were ready to sail when the treaty was signed.

It is difficult to believe that Rinuccini could have had any real belief in the King’s powers or those of anyone acting in his name; but whatever the amount of his faith in the dwindling royal authority, it had at last received a rude shock, and he accordingly passed into an opposite phase of distrust. He now thought that Glamorgan by acting as agent between Ormond and the Council had played him false, and that his whole object had been merely to get the Irish regiments into England, leaving the Irish to content themselves with the political articles. He endeavoured, therefore, to prevent any agreement between Ormond and the Confederates, the more so that he had received a copy of the Pope’s treaty with the Queen, in which she had agreed to much more than anything Ormond or even Glamorgan would have conceded. Sir Kenelm Digby had signed with the Pope on behalf of the Queen a treaty by which the entire liberty of Catholic worship and a completely independent Parliament were to be granted to Ireland. Dublin and other towns garrisoned by the King’s troops were to be handed over to Irish or English Catholics, while the forces under Ormond were to join the Confederates against the Scots and English Parliamentarians. As regards England the King was to concede everything required by the Pope’s instructions to Rinuccini already quoted, and to revoke all laws placing the Catholics in an inferior position to the Protestants. This was to be confirmed by the next Parliament, and meanwhile the Supreme Council was to send into England 12,000 infantry under an Irish commander, and these were to be supported by 2,500 or 3,000 English Catholic cavalry. The Pope was to send 100,000 crowns, about £36,000, on ratification of the treaty by the King, a similar amount on the landing of the Irish in England, and the same payment annually for two years if required.

Rinuccini therefore protested against any treaty with Ormond until it should be known whether the Queen’s treaty was accepted by the King. “Preposterous as these terms were,” says Gardiner, “Rinuccini was, from his point of view, perfectly right in adopting them.” It is, however for adopting such a point of view at all that Rinuccini is to be blamed. How could he possibly place reliance on the desperate promises of a poor fugitive wife eager to save her husband by any means when he had been unable to trust her husband when his power was not so reduced as it had since become! Glamorgan, now completely in the hands of Rinuccini, wrote to Ormond urging him to accept the Queen’s treaty, and referring to the expenses he had in equipping the troops which would come to £100,000. He says “How cold shall I find Catholics bent to this service if the Pope be irritated I humbly submit to your Excellency’s better judgment? And here I am constrained ... absolutely to profess not to be capable to do the King that service which he expects at my hands unless the Nuncio be civilly complied with and carried along with us in our proceedings.”

This was an extraordinary letter to a man who if anything was anti-Papal. Ormond replied that he did not know what was meant by the advantageous peace to be obtained of the King by the Queen’s entreaties. “My lord,” he continued, “my affections and interest are so tied to his Majesty’s cause that it were madness in me to disgust any man that hath power and inclination to relieve him in the sad condition he is in; and, therefore your lordship may securely go on in the ways you have proposed to yourself to serve the King without fear of interruption from me, or so much as inquiring the means you work by. My commission is to treat with his Majesty’s Confederate Catholic subjects here for a peace upon conditions of honour and assistance to him and of advantage to them; which accordingly, I shall pursue to the best of my skill, but shall not venture upon any new negotiation foreign to the powers I have received.”

Glamorgan thereupon delivered himself up entirely to the Nuncio and wrote a long Latin oath by which he swore him unlimited obedience. An agreement was drawn up between the Nuncio and Glamorgan on the one hand and the Council on the other, by which the cessation with Ormond was to be extended to May 1, 1646, the extension being for the purpose of allowing the Nuncio to obtain the originals of the Queen’s treaty, as the Council had refused to support the new demands on the King merely from the copy. Rinuccini agreed that if he could not produce the original within the time he would be contented with whatever terms Glamorgan might get from Charles.

In view of this temporary agreement between the Nuncio and the Supreme Council, it seemed as if the troops could now start for Chester. On February 24, 1646, Glamorgan wrote to Ormond that not 3,000 but 6,000 men would be sent, and that he was going to Waterford to hasten the shipping. On March 8 bad news arrived. Chester had surrendered to Brereton and the port was closed against Charles’s Irish army. Still more ominous things happened at home, for a Parliamentary fleet had sailed up the Shannon and seized Bunratty Castle, thus showing that the Parliament felt itself so sure of overcoming the King it was at last in a position to commence active measures in Ireland. The Supreme Council wrote to Ormond that unless he would join forces with them they would neither make peace at Dublin nor send an army to England. Still they could not abandon the negotiation with the Lieutenant of a King who had not the power, and probably not the will, to fulfil the engagements made in his name. They now proposed to Ormond that the conclusion of peace should be postponed to the middle of June, so that Glamorgan should get ships together to carry the army to some port in Wales. In the meantime Glamorgan would send his brother to get a confirmation of his own treaty as to the religious articles from the King. If these were accepted, and if Ormond would agree to join forces with them against the Scots and Puritans, the Council would give him £3,000 for the pay of his troops.

On these terms Ormond signed on 28th March the peace on the understanding that it was to be kept secret until the 1st May. The articles which related to the civil government included some much-needed reforms, especially the admission of Catholics and Protestants to office on equal terms. Religious matters were postponed pending Charles’s answer. The Confederates agreed to send the 10,000 men, of whom 6,000 were to start on 1st April, and the remainder on 1st May. Ormond gave them a written promise that if the Confederates were attacked before the latter date he would join them against their assailants. It was too late. Like Chester, South Wales had now been occupied by the Parliament, Cornwall as well, and there was not a foot of English ground on which the army could land with any chance of maintaining itself. Officers and men refused to leave Ireland. Charles himself wrote that “the foot was to be kept back, as it would be lost if it should now attempt to land, we having no horse nor ports in our power to secure them.”

In May Rinuccini went to Limerick to support the Confederate army besieging Bunratty, and took credit for having, as he says, “adroitly prevented” the despatch of 10,000 Irish infantry to Charles. It was not much to boast of, helping the destruction of the man on whose continuance of power both he and the Pope were relying for the attainment of their religious aims. The original cessation of arms, when the still united Confederates could have made themselves masters of the whole country and treated with King or Parliament was a fatal error; but having decided to back the King and prevent the rise of the power that was destined to destroy them both, they should have helped him quickly. By insisting on conditions which would only tend to make him more unpopular in England, they had wasted valuable time and allowed their intended ally to be weakened and their common enemy to gain strength. The only merit Rinuccini had was that his delays prevented a useless waste of Irish lives; but it is evident that was not in his thoughts when pressing for the acceptance of the Queen’s treaty, as had that been accepted he would have consented, would have been bound by the Pope’s instructions to consent to the despatch of the troops. Charles, to do him justice, was the only one to warn the Irish against starting on account of the danger and uselessness of such a proceeding.

It has been necessary to enter into such a detailed account of these important negotiations that space does not admit of more than a brief reference to the chief events during the remainder of Rinuccini’s mission.