Chapter IV: Part 4

The _T‘ung Tien_ has 故能爲變化司命. Capt. Calthrop’s version of
this paragraph is so remarkable that I cannot refrain from quoting
it in full: “Now the secrets of the art of offence are not to be
easily apprehended, as a certain shape or noise can be understood,
of the senses; but when these secrets are once learnt, the enemy
is mastered.”

10. 進而不可禦者衝其虛也退而不可追者速而不可及也

You may advance and be absolutely irresistible, if you make for the enemy’s weak points; you may retire and be safe from pursuit if your movements are more rapid than those of the enemy.

The second member of the sentence is weak, because 不可及 is nearly
tautologous with 不可追. The _Yü Lan_ reads 遠 for 速.

11. 故我欲戰敵雖高壘深溝不得不與我戰者攻其所必救也

If we wish to fight, the enemy can be forced to an engagement even though he be sheltered behind a high rampart and a deep ditch. All we need do is to attack some other place that he will be obliged to relieve.

Tu Mu says: “If the enemy is the invading party, we can cut his
line of communications and occupy the roads by which he will have
to return; if we are the invaders, we may direct our attack
against the sovereign himself.” It is clear that Sun Tzŭ, unlike
certain generals in the late Boer war, was no believer in frontal
attacks.

12. 我不欲戰畫地而守之敵不得與我戰者乖其所之也

If we do not wish to fight, we can prevent the enemy from engaging us even though the lines of our encampment be merely traced out on the ground. All we need do is to throw something odd and unaccountable in his way.

In order to preserve the parallelism with § 11, I should prefer to
follow the _T‘u Shu_ text, which inserts 雖 before 畫地. This
extremely concise expression is intelligibly paraphrased by Chia
Lin: 雖未修壘壍 “even though we have constructed neither wall nor
ditch.” The real crux of the passage lies in 乖其所之也. 之 of
course = 至. Ts‘ao Kung defines 乖 by the word 戾, which is perhaps
a case of _obscurum per obscurius_. Li Ch‘üan, however, says:
設奇異而疑之 “we puzzle him by strange and unusual dispositions;”
and Tu Mu finally clinches the meaning by three illustrative
anecdotes—one of 諸葛亮 Chu-ko Liang, who when occupying 陽平
Yang-p‘ing and about to be attacked by 司馬懿 Ssŭ-ma I, suddenly
struck his colours, stopped the beating of the drums, and flung
open the city gates, showing only a few men engaged in sweeping
and sprinkling the ground. This unexpected proceeding had the
intended effect; for Ssŭ-ma I, suspecting an ambush, actually drew
off his army and retreated. What Sun Tzŭ is advocating here,
therefore, is nothing more nor less than the timely use of
“bluff.” Capt. Calthrop translates: “and prevent the enemy from
attacking by keeping him in suspense,” which shows that he has not
fully grasped the meaning of 乖.

13. 故形人而我無形則我專而敵分

By discovering the enemy’s dispositions and remaining invisible ourselves, we can keep our forces concentrated, while the enemy’s must be divided.

The conclusion is perhaps not very obvious, but Chang Yü (after
Mei Yao-ch‘ên) rightly explains it thus: “If the enemy’s
dispositions are visible, we can make for him in one body;
whereas, our own dispositions being kept secret, the enemy will be
obliged to divide his forces in order to guard against attack from
every quarter.” 形 is here used as an active verb: “to make to
appear.” See IV, note on heading. Capt. Calthrop’s “making feints”
is quite wrong.

14. 我專爲一敵分爲十是以十共其一也則我衆而敵寡

We can form a single united body, while the enemy must split up into fractions. Hence there will be a whole pitted against separate parts of a whole,

The original text has 以敵攻其一也, which in accordance with the
_T‘ung Tien_ and _Yü Lan_ has been altered as above. I adopt the
more plausible reading of the _T‘u Shu_: 是以十攻其一也, in spite of
having to refer 十 to ourselves and not to the enemy. Thus Tu Yu
and Mei Yao-ch‘ên both regard 十 as the undivided force, consisting
of so many parts, and 一 as each of the isolated fractions of the
enemy. The alteration of 攻 into 共 can hardly be right, though the
true text might conceivably have been 是以十共攻其一也.

which means that we shall be many to the enemy’s few.

15. 能以衆擊寡者則吾之所與戰者約矣

And if we are able thus to attack an inferior force with a superior one, our opponents will be in dire straits.

For 擊, the _T‘ung Tien_ and _Yü Lan_ have 敵. Tu Yu, followed by
the other commentators, arbitrarily defines 約 as 少而易勝 “few and
easy to conquer,” but only succeeds thereby in making the sentence
absolutely pointless. As for Capt. Calthrop’s translation: “In
superiority of numbers there is economy of strength,” its meaning
is probably known to himself alone. In justification of my own
rendering of 約, I would refer to _Lun Yü_ IV. 2 and VII. 25 (3).

16. 吾所與戰之地不可知不可知則敵所備者多敵所備者多則吾所與戰者寡矣

The spot where we intend to fight must not be made known; for then the enemy will have to prepare against a possible attack at several different points;

Sheridan once explained the reason of General Grant’s victories by
saying that “while his opponents were kept fully employed
wondering what he was going to do, _he_ was thinking most of what
he was going to do himself.”

and his forces being thus distributed in many directions, the numbers we shall have to face at any given point will be proportionately few.

17. 故備前則後寡備後則前寡備左則右寡備右則左寡無所不備則無所不寡

For should the enemy strengthen his van, he will weaken his rear; should he strengthen his rear, he will weaken his van; should he strengthen his left, he will weaken his right; should he strengthen his right, he will weaken his left. If he sends reinforcements everywhere, he will everywhere be weak.

In Frederick the Great’s _Instructions to his Generals_ we read:
“A defensive war is apt to betray us into too frequent detachment.
Those generals who have had but little experience attempt to
protect every point, while those who are better acquainted with
their profession, having only the capital object in view, guard
against a decisive blow, and acquiesce in smaller misfortunes to
avoid greater.”

18. 寡者備人者也衆者使人備己者也

Numerical weakness comes from having to prepare against possible attacks; numerical strength, from compelling our adversary to make these preparations against us.

The highest generalship, in Col. Henderson’s words, is “to compel
the enemy to disperse his army, and then to concentrate superior
force against each fraction in turn.”

19. 故知戰之地知戰之日則可千里而會戰

Knowing the place and the time of the coming battle, we may concentrate from the greatest distances in order to fight.

There is nothing about “defeating” anybody in this sentence, as
Capt. Calthrop translates. What Sun Tzŭ evidently has in mind is
that nice calculation of distances and that masterly employment of
strategy which enable a general to divide his army for the purpose
of a long and rapid march, and afterwards to effect a junction at
precisely the right spot and the right hour in order to confront
the enemy in overwhelming strength. Among many such successful
junctions which military history records, one of the most dramatic
and decisive was the appearance of Blücher just at the critical
moment on the field of Waterloo.

20. 不知戰地不知戰日則左不能救右右不能救左前不能救後後不能救前而況遠者 數十里近者數里乎

But if neither time nor place be known, then the left wing will be impotent to succour the right, the right equally impotent to succour the left, the van unable to relieve the rear, or the rear to support the van. How much more so if the furthest portions of the army are anything under a hundred _li_ apart, and even the nearest are separated by several _li_!

The Chinese of this last sentence is a little lacking in
precision, but the mental picture we are required to draw is
probably that of an army advancing towards a given rendez-vous in
separate columns, each of which has orders to be there on a fixed
date. If the general allows the various detachments to proceed at
haphazard, without precise instructions as to the time and place
of meeting, the enemy will be able to annihilate the army in
detail. Chang Yü’s note may be worth quoting here: “If we do not
know the place where our opponents mean to concentrate or the
day on which they will join battle, our unity will be forfeited
through our preparations for defence, and the positions we hold
will be insecure. Suddenly happening upon a powerful foe, we
shall be brought to battle in a flurried condition, and no
mutual support will be possible between wings, vanguard or rear,
especially if there is any great distance between the foremost
and hindmost divisions of the army.”

21. 以吾度之越人之兵雖多亦奚益於勝敗哉故曰勝可爲也

Though according to my estimate the soldiers of Yüeh exceed our own in number, that shall advantage them nothing in the matter of victory.

Capt. Calthrop omits 以吾度之, and his translation of the remainder
is flabby and inaccurate. As Sun Tzŭ was in the service of the 吳
Wu State, it has been proposed to read 吳 instead of 吾—a wholly
unnecessary tampering with the text. Yüeh coincided roughly with
the present province of Chehkiang. Li Ch‘üan very strangely takes
越 not as the proper name, but in the sense of 過 “to surpass.” No
other commentator follows him. 勝敗 belongs to the class of
expressions like 遠近 “distance,” 大小 “magnitude,” etc., to which
the Chinese have to resort in order to express abstract ideas of
degree. The _T‘u Shu_, however, omits 敗.

I say then that victory can be achieved.

Alas for these brave words! The long feud between the two states
ended in 473 B.C. with the total defeat of Wu by 勾踐 Kou Chien and
its incorporation in Yüeh. This was doubtless long after Sun Tzŭ’s
death. With his present assertion compare IV. § 4: 勝可知而不可爲
(which is the obviously mistaken reading of the _Yü Lan_ here).
Chang Yü is the only one to point out the seeming discrepancy,
which he thus goes on to explain: “In the chapter on Tactical
Dispositions it is said, ‘One may _know_ how to conquer without
being able to _do_ it,’ whereas here we have the statement that
‘victory can be achieved.’ The explanation is, that in the former
chapter, where the offensive and defensive are under discussion,
it is said that if the enemy is fully prepared, one cannot make
certain of beating him. But the present passage refers
particularly to the soldiers of Yüeh who, according to Sun Tzŭ’s
calculations, will be kept in ignorance of the time and place of
the impending struggle. That is why he says here that victory can
be achieved.”

22. 敵雖衆可使無鬥故策之而知得失之計

Though the enemy be stronger in numbers, we may prevent him from fighting.

Capt. Calthrop quite unwarrantably translates: “_If_ the enemy be
many in number, prevent him,” etc.

Scheme so as to discover his plans and the likelihood of their success.

This is the first of four similarly constructed sentences, all of
which present decided difficulties. Chang Yü explains 知得失之計 as
知其計之得失. This is perhaps the best way of taking the words,
though Chia Lin, referring 計 to ourselves and not the enemy,
offers the alternative of 我得彼失之計皆先知也 “Know beforehand all
plans conducive to our success and to the enemy’s failure.”

23. 作之而知動靜之理形之而知死生之地

Rouse him, and learn the principle of his activity or inactivity.

Instead of 作, the _T‘ung Tien_, _Yü Lan_, and also Li Ch‘üan’s
text have 候, which the latter explains as “the observation of
omens,” and Chia Lin simply as “watching and waiting.” 作 is
defined by Tu Mu as 激作, and Chang Yü tells us that by noting the
joy or anger shown by the enemy on being thus disturbed, we shall
be able to conclude whether his policy is to lie low or the
reverse. He instances the action of Chu-ko Liang, who sent the
scornful present of a woman’s head-dress to Ssŭ-ma I, in order to
goad him out of his Fabian tactics.

Force him to reveal himself, so as to find out his vulnerable spots.

Two commentators, Li Ch‘üan and Chang Yü, take 形之 in the sense
of 示之 “put on specious appearances.” The former says: “You may
either deceive the enemy by a show of weakness—striking your
colours and silencing your drums; or by a show of strength—making
a hollow display of camp-fires and regimental banners.” And the
latter quotes V. 19, where 形之 certainly seems to bear this sense.
On the other hand, I would point to § 13 of this chapter, where 形
must with equal certainty be active. It is hard to choose between
the two interpretations, but the context here agrees better, I
think, with the one that I have adopted. Another difficulty arises
over 死生之地, which most of the commentators, thinking no doubt of
the 死地 in XI. § 1, refer to the actual _ground_ on which the
enemy is encamped. The notes of Chia Lin and Mei Yao-ch‘ên,
however, seem to favour my view. The same phrase has a somewhat
different meaning in I. § 2.

24. 角之而知有餘不足之處

Carefully compare the opposing army with your own,

Tu Yu is right, I think, in attributing this force to 角; Ts‘ao
Kung defines it simply as 量. Capt. Calthrop surpasses himself with
the staggering translation “Flap the wings”! Can the Latin _cornu_
(in its figurative sense) have been at the back of his mind?

so that you may know where strength is superabundant and where it is deficient.

Cf. IV. § 6.

25. 故形兵之極至於無形無形則深閒不能窺知者不能謀

In making tactical dispositions, the highest pitch you can attain is to conceal them;

The piquancy of the paradox evaporates in translation. 無形 is
perhaps not so much actual invisibility (see _supra_, § 9) as
“showing no sign” of what you mean to do, of the plans that are
formed in your brain.

conceal your dispositions, and you will be safe from the prying of the subtlest spies, from the machinations of the wisest brains.

深閒 is expanded by Tu Mu into 雖有閒者深來窺我. [For 閒, see XIII,
note on heading.] He explains 知者 in like fashion:
雖有智能之士亦不能謀我也 “though the enemy may have clever and
capable officers, they will not be able to lay any plans against
us.”

26. 因形而錯勝於衆衆不能知

How victory may be produced for them out of the enemy’s own tactics—that is what the multitude cannot comprehend.

All the commentators except Li Ch‘üan make 形 refer to the enemy.
So Ts‘ao Kung: 因敵形而立勝. 錯 is defined as 置. The _T‘u Shu_ has
措, with the same meaning. See IV. § 13. The _Yü Lan_ reads 作,
evidently a gloss.

27. 人皆知我所以勝之形而莫知吾所以制勝之形

All men can see the tactics whereby I conquer, but what none can see is the strategy out of which victory is evolved.

_I.e._, everybody can see superficially how a battle is won; what
they cannot see is the long series of plans and combinations which
has preceded the battle. It seems justifiable, then, to render the
first 形 by “tactics” and the second by “strategy.”

28. 故其戰勝不復而應形於無窮

Do not repeat the tactics which have gained you one victory, but let your methods be regulated by the infinite variety of circumstances.

As Wang Hsi sagely remarks: “There is but one root-principle (理)
underlying victory, but the tactics (形) which lead up to it are
infinite in number.” With this compare Col. Henderson; “The rules
of strategy are few and simple. They may be learned in a week.
They may be taught by familiar illustrations or a dozen diagrams.
But such knowledge will no more teach a man to lead an army like
Napoleon than a knowledge of grammar will teach him to write like
Gibbon.”

29. 夫兵形象水水之行避高而趨下

Military tactics are like unto water; for water in its natural course runs away from high places and hastens downwards.

行 is 劉晝子 Liu Chou-tzŭ’s reading for 形 in the original text.

30. 兵之形避實而擊虛

So in war, the way is to avoid what is strong and to strike at what is weak.

Like water, taking the line of least resistance.

31. 水因地而制流兵因敵而制勝

Water shapes its course according to the nature of the ground over which it flows;

The _T‘ung Tien_ and _Yü Lan_ read 制形,—the latter also 制行. The
present text is derived from Chêng Yu-hsien.

the soldier works out his victory in relation to the foe whom he is facing.

32. 故兵無常勢水無常形

Therefore, just as water retains no constant shape, so in warfare there are no constant conditions.

33. 能因敵變化而取勝者謂之神

He who can modify his tactics in relation to his opponent and thereby succeed in winning, may be called a heaven-born captain.

34. 故五行無常勝四時無常位日有短長月有死生

The five elements

Water, fire, wood, metal, earth.

are not always equally predominant;

That is, as Wang Hsi says: 迭相克也 “they predominate alternately.”

the four seasons make way for each other in turn.

Literally, “have no invariable seat.”

There are short days and long; the moon has its periods of waning and waxing.

Cf. V. § 6. The purport of the passage is simply to illustrate the
want of fixity in war by the changes constantly taking place in
Nature. The comparison is not very happy, however, because the
regularity of the phenomena which Sun Tzŭ mentions is by no means
paralleled in war.

VII. 軍爭篇

MANŒUVRING.

The commentators, as well as the subsequent text, make it clear
that this is the real meaning of 軍爭. Thus, Li Ch‘üan says that 爭
means 趨利 “marching rapidly to seize an advantage”; Wang Hsi
says: 爭者爭利得利則勝 “‘Striving’ means striving for an advantage;
this being obtained, victory will follow;” and Chang Yü:
兩軍相對而爭利也 “The two armies face to face, and each striving to
obtain a tactical advantage over the other.” According to the
latter commentator, then, the situation is analogous to that of
two wrestlers manœuvring for a “hold,” before coming to actual
grips. In any case, we must beware of translating 爭 by the word
“fighting” or “battle,” as if it were equivalent to 戰. Capt.
Calthrop falls into this mistake.

1. 孫子曰凡用兵之法將受命於君

Sun Tzŭ said: In war, the general receives his commands from the sovereign.

For 君 there is another reading 天, which Li Ch‘üan explains as
恭行天罰 “being the reverent instrument of Heaven’s chastisement.”

2. 合軍聚衆交和而舍

Having collected an army and concentrated his forces, he must blend and harmonise the different elements thereof before pitching his camp.

Ts‘ao Kung takes 和 as referring to the 和門 or main gate of the
military camp. This, Tu Mu tells us, was formed with a couple of
flags hung across. [Cf. _Chou Li_, ch. xxvii. fol. 31 of the
Imperial edition: 直旌門.] 交和 would then mean “setting up his 和門
opposite that of the enemy.” But Chia Lin’s explanation, which has
been adopted above, is on the whole simpler and better. Chang Yü,
while following Ts‘ao Kung, adds that the words may also be taken
to mean “the establishment of harmony and confidence between the
higher and lower ranks before venturing into the field;” and he
quotes a saying of Wu Tzŭ (chap. 1 _ad init._): “Without harmony
in the State, no military expedition can be undertaken; without
harmony in the army, no battle array can be formed.” In the
historical romance 東周列國, chap. 75, Sun Tzŭ himself is
represented as saying to 伍員 Wu Yüan: 大凡行兵之法先除內患然後方可外征
“As a general rule, those who are waging war should get rid of all
domestic troubles before proceeding to attack the external foe.” 舍
is defined as 止. It here conveys the notion of encamping after
having taken the field.

3. 莫難於軍爭軍爭之難者以迂爲直以患爲利

After that, comes tactical manœuvring, than which there is nothing more difficult.

I have departed slightly from the traditional interpretation of
Ts‘ao Kung, who says: 從始受命至於交和軍爭難也 “From the time of
receiving the sovereign’s instructions until our encampment over
against the enemy, the tactics to be pursued are most difficult.”
It seems to me that the 軍爭 tactics or manœuvres can hardly be
said to begin until the army has sallied forth and encamped,
and Ch‘ên Hao’s note gives colour to this view: “For levying,
concentrating, harmonising and intrenching an army, there are
plenty of old rules which will serve. The real difficulty comes
when we engage in tactical operations.” Tu Yu also observes that
“the great difficulty is to be beforehand with the enemy in
seizing favourable positions.”

The difficulty of tactical manœuvring consists in turning the devious into the direct, and misfortune into gain.

以迂爲直 is one of those highly condensed and somewhat enigmatical
expressions of which Sun Tzŭ is so fond. This is how it is
explained by Ts‘ao Kung: 示以遠速其道里先敵至也 “Make it appear that
you are a long way off, then cover the distance rapidly and arrive
on the scene before your opponent.” Tu Mu says: “Hoodwink the
enemy, so that he may be remiss and leisurely while you are
dashing along with the utmost speed.” Ho Shih gives a slightly
different turn to the sentence: “Although you may have difficult
ground to traverse and natural obstacles to encounter, this is a
drawback which can be turned into actual advantage by celerity of
movement.” Signal examples of this saying are afforded by the two
famous passages across the Alps—that of Hannibal, which laid Italy
at his mercy, and that of Napoleon two thousand years later, which
resulted in the great victory of Marengo.

4. 故迂其途而誘之以利後人發先人至此知迂直之計者也

Thus, to take a long and circuitous route, after enticing the enemy out of the way, and though starting after him, to contrive to reach the goal before him, shows knowledge of the artifice of _deviation_.

Chia Lin understands 途 as the _enemy’s_ line of march, thus: “If
our adversary’s course is really a short one, and we can manage to
divert him from it (迂之) either by simulating weakness or by
holding out some small advantage, we shall be able to beat him in
the race for good positions.” This is quite a defensible view,
though not adopted by any other commentator. 人 of course = 敵,
and 後 and 先 are to be taken as verbs. Tu Mu cites the famous
march of 趙奢 Chao Shê in 270 B.C. to relieve the town of 閼與
O-yü, which was closely invested by a 秦 Ch‘in army. [It should be
noted that the above is the correct pronunciation of 閼與, as given
in the commentary on the _Ch‘ien Han Shu_, ch. 34. Giles’
dictionary gives “Yü-yü,” and Chavannes, I know not on what
authority, prefers to write “Yen-yü.” The name is omitted
altogether from Playfair’s “Cities and Towns.”] The King of Chao
first consulted 廉頗 Lien P‘o on the advisability of attempting a
relief, but the latter thought the distance too great, and the
intervening country too rugged and difficult. His Majesty then
turned to Chao Shê, who fully admitted the hazardous nature of the
march, but finally said: “We shall be like two rats fighting in a
hole—and the pluckier one will win!” So he left the capital with
his army, but had only gone a distance of 30 _li_ when he stopped
and began throwing up intrenchments. For 28 days he continued
strengthening his fortifications, and took care that spies should
carry the intelligence to the enemy. The Ch‘in general was
overjoyed, and attributed his adversary’s tardiness to the fact
that the beleaguered city was in the Han State, and thus not
actually part of Chao territory. But the spies had no sooner
departed than Chao Shê began a forced march lasting for two days
and one night, and arrived on the scene of action with such
astonishing rapidity that he was able to occupy a commanding
position on the 北山 “North hill” before the enemy had got wind of
his movements. A crushing defeat followed for the Ch‘in forces,
who were obliged to raise the siege of O-yü in all haste and
retreat across the border. [See 史記, chap. 81.]

5. 故軍爭爲利衆爭爲危

Manœuvring with an army is advantageous; with an undisciplined multitude, most dangerous.

I here adopt the reading of the T‘ung Tien, Chêng Yu-hsien and the
_T‘u Shu_, where 衆 appears to supply the exact _nuance_ required
in order to make sense. The standard text, on the other hand, in
which 軍 is repeated, seems somewhat pointless. The commentators
take it to mean that manœuvres may be profitable, or they may be
dangerous: it all depends on the ability of the general. Capt.
Calthrop translates 衆爭 “the wrangles of a multitude”!

6. 舉軍而爭利則不及委軍而爭利則輜重捐

If you set a fully equipped army in march in order to snatch an advantage, the chances are that you will be too late.

The original text has 故 instead of 舉; but a verb is needed to
balance 委.

On the other hand, to detach a flying column for the purpose involves the sacrifice of its baggage and stores.

委軍 is evidently unintelligible to the Chinese commentators, who
paraphrase the sentence as though it began with 棄輜. Absolute
tautology in the apodosis can then only be avoided by drawing an
impossibly fine distinction between 棄 and 捐. I submit my own
rendering without much enthusiasm, being convinced that there is
some deep-seated corruption in the text. On the whole, it is clear
that Sun Tzŭ does not approve of a lengthy march being undertaken
without supplies. Cf. _infra_, § 11.

7. 是故卷甲而趨日夜不處倍道兼行百里而爭利則擒三將軍

Thus, if you order your men to roll up their buff-coats,

卷甲 does not mean “to discard one’s armour,” as Capt. Calthrop
translates, but implies on the contrary that it is to be carried
with you. Chang Yü says: 猶悉甲也 “This means, in full panoply.”

and make forced marches without halting day or night, covering double the usual distance at a stretch,

The ordinary day’s march, according to Tu Mu, was 30 _li_; but on one
occasion, when pursuing 劉備 Liu Pei, Ts‘ao Ts‘ao is said to have
covered the incredible distance of 300 _li_ within twenty-four hours.

doing a hundred _li_ in order to wrest an advantage, the leaders of all your three divisions will fall into the hands of the enemy.

8. 勁者先罷者後其法十一而至

The stronger men will be in front, the jaded ones will fall behind, and on this plan only one-tenth of your army will reach its destination.

For 罷, see II. § 14. The moral is, as Ts‘ao Kung and others point
out: Don’t march a hundred _li_ to gain a tactical advantage,
either with or without impedimenta. Manœuvres of this description
should be confined to short distances. Stonewall Jackson said:
“The hardships of forced marches are often more painful than the
dangers of battle.” He did not often call upon his troops for
extraordinary exertions. It was only when he intended a surprise,
or when a rapid retreat was imperative, that he sacrificed
everything to speed.[171]

9. 五十里而爭利則蹶上將軍其法半至

If you march fifty _li_ in order to outmanœuvre the enemy, you will lose the leader of your first division, and only half your force will reach the goal.

蹶 is explained as similar in meaning to 挫: literally, “the leader
of the first division will be _torn away_.” Cf. Tso Chuan, 襄 19th
year: 是謂蹶其本 “This is a case of [the falling tree] tearing up
its roots.”

10. 三十里而爭利則三分之二至

If you march thirty _li_ with the same object, two-thirds of your army will arrive.

In the _T‘ung Tien_ is added: 以是知軍爭之難 “From this we may know
the difficulty of manœuvring.”

11. 是故軍無輜重則亡無糧食則亡無委積則亡

We may take it then that an army without its baggage-train is lost; without provisions it is lost; without bases of supply it is lost.

委積 is explained by Tu Yu as 芻草之屬 “fodder and the like;” by Tu
Mu and Chang Yü as 財貨 “goods in general;” and by Wang Hsi as
薪鹽蔬材之屬 “fuel, salt, foodstuffs, etc.” But I think what Sun Tzŭ
meant was “stores accumulated in dépôts,” as distinguished from
輜重 and 糧食, the various impedimenta accompanying an army on its
march. Cf. _Chou Li_, ch. xvi. fol. 10: 委人 ... 斂薪芻凡疏材木材凡
畜聚之物.

12. 故不知諸侯之謀者不能豫交

We cannot enter into alliances until we are acquainted with the designs of our neighbours.

豫 = 先. Li Ch‘üan understands it as 備 “guard against,” which is
hardly so good. An original interpretation of 交 is given by Tu Mu,
who says it stands for 交兵 or 合戰 “join in battle.”

13. 不知山林險阻沮澤之形者不能行軍

We are not fit to lead an army on the march unless we are familiar with the face of the country—its mountains and forests, its pitfalls

險, defined as 坑塹 (Ts‘ao Kung) or 坑坎 (Chang Yü).

and precipices,

阻, defined as 一高一下.

its marshes

沮, defined as 水草漸洳者.

and swamps.

澤, defined as 衆水所歸而不流者.

14. 不用鄉導者不能得地利

We shall be unable to turn natural advantages to account unless we make use of local guides.

§§ 12–14 are repeated in chap. XI. § 52.

15. 故兵以詐立以利動

In war, practise dissimulation, and you will succeed.

According to Tu Mu, 立 stands for 立勝. Cf. I. § 18. In the tactics
of Turenne, deception of the enemy, especially as to the numerical
strength of his troops, took a very prominent position.[172]

Move only if there is a real advantage to be gained.

This is the interpretation of all the commentators except Wang
Hsi, who has the brief note 誘之也 “Entice out the enemy” (by
offering him some apparent advantage).

16. 以分合爲變者也

Whether to concentrate or to divide your troops, must be decided by circumstances.

17. 故其疾如風其徐如林

Let your rapidity be that of the wind,

The simile is doubly appropriate, because the wind is not only
swift but, as Mei Yao-ch‘ên points out, 無形跡 “invisible and
leaves no tracks.”

your compactness that of the forest.

It is hardly possible to take 徐 here in its ordinary sense of
“sedate,” as Tu Yu tries to do. Mêng Shih comes nearer the mark in
his note 緩行須有行列 “When slowly marching, order and ranks must be
preserved”—so as to guard against surprise attacks. But natural
forests do not grow in rows, whereas they do generally possess the
quality of density or compactness. I think then that Mei Yao-ch‘ên
uses the right adjective in saying 如林之森然.

18. 侵掠如火不動如山

In raiding and plundering be like fire,

Cf. _Shih Ching_, IV. 3. iv. 6: 如火烈烈則莫我敢曷 “Fierce as a
blazing fire which no man can check.”

in immovability like a mountain.

That is, when holding a position from which the enemy is trying to
dislodge you, or perhaps, as Tu Yu says, when he is trying to
entice you into a trap.

19. 難知如陰動如雷霆

Let your plans be dark and impenetrable as night, and when you move, fall like a thunderbolt.

The original text has 震 instead of 霆. Cf. IV. § 7. Tu Yu quotes a
saying of T‘ai Kung which has passed into a proverb:
疾雷不及掩耳疾電不及瞑目 “You cannot shut your ears to the thunder or
your eyes to the lightning—so rapid are they.” Likewise, an attack
should be made so quickly that it cannot be parried.

20. 掠鄉分衆廓地分利

When you plunder a countryside, let the spoil be divided amongst your men;

The reading of Tu Yu, Chia Lin, and apparently Ts‘ao Kung, is
指向分衆, which is explained as referring to the subdivision of the
army, mentioned in V. §§ 1, 2, by means of banners and flags,
serving to point out (指) to each man the way he should go (向).
But this is very forced, and the ellipsis is too great, even for
Sun Tzŭ. Luckily, the _T‘ung Tien_ and _Yü Lan_ have the variant
嚮, which not only suggests the true reading 鄉, but affords some
clue to the way in which the corruption arose. Some early
commentator having inserted 向 as the sound of 鄉, the two may
afterwards have been read as one character; and this being
interchangeable with 向, 鄉 must finally have disappeared
altogether. Meanwhile, 掠 would have been altered to 指 in order to
make sense. As regards 分衆, I believe that Ho Shih alone has
grasped the real meaning, the other commentators understanding it
as “dividing the men into parties” to search for plunder. Sun Tzŭ
wishes to lessen the abuses of indiscriminate plundering by
insisting that all booty shall be thrown into a common stock,
which may afterwards be fairly divided amongst all.

when you capture new territory, cut it up into allotments for the benefit of the soldiery.

That this is the meaning, may be gathered from Tu Mu’s note:
開土拓境則分割與有功者. The 三略 gives the same advice: 𫉬地裂之. 廓
means “to enlarge” or “extend”—at the expense of the enemy,
understood. Cf. _Shih Ching_, III. 1. vii. 1: 憎其式廓 “hating all
the great States.” Ch‘ên Hao also says 屯兵種蒔 “quarter your
soldiers on the land, and let them sow and plant it.” It is by
acting on this principle, and harvesting the lands they invaded,
that the Chinese have succeeded in carrying out some of their most
memorable and triumphant expeditions, such as that of 班超 Pan
Ch‘ao who penetrated to the Caspian, and in more recent years,
those of 福康安 Fu-k‘ang-an and 左宗棠 Tso Tsung-t‘ang.

21. 懸權而動

Ponder and deliberate

Note that both these words, like the Chinese 懸權, are really
metaphors derived from the use of scales.

before you make a move.

Chang Yü quotes 尉繚子 as saying that we must not break camp until
we have gauged the resisting power of the enemy and the cleverness
of the opposing general. Cf. the “seven comparisons” in I. § 13.
Capt. Calthrop omits this sentence.

22. 先知迂直之計者勝此軍爭之法也

He will conquer who has learnt the artifice of deviation.

See _supra_, §§ 3, 4.

Such is the art of manœuvring.

With these words, the chapter would naturally come to an end. But
there now follows a long appendix in the shape of an extract from
an earlier book on War, now lost, but apparently extant at the
time when Sun Tzŭ wrote. The style of this fragment is not
noticeably different from that of Sun Tzŭ himself, but no
commentator raises a doubt as to its genuineness.

23. 軍政曰言不相聞故爲金鼓視不相見故爲旌旗

The Book of Army Management says:

It is perhaps significant that none of the earlier commentators
give us any information about this work. Mei Yao-ch‘ên calls it
軍之舊典 “an ancient military classic,” and Wang Hsi, 古軍書 “an old
book on war.” Considering the enormous amount of fighting that had
gone on for centuries before Sun Tzŭ’s time between the various
kingdoms and principalities of China, it is not in itself
improbable that a collection of military maxims should have been
made and written down at some earlier period.

On the field of battle,

Implied, though not actually in the Chinese.

the spoken word does not carry far enough: hence the institution of gongs and drums.

I have retained the words 金鼓 of the original text, which recur in
the next paragraph, in preference to the other reading 鼓鐸 “drums
and bells,” which is found in the _T‘ung Tien_, _Pei T‘ang Shu
Ch‘ao_ and _Yü Lan_. 鐸 is a bell with a clapper. See _Lun Yü_ III.
24, _Chou Li_ XXIX. 15, 29. 金 of course would include both gongs
and bells of every kind. The _T‘u Shu_ inserts a 之 after each 爲.

Nor can ordinary objects be seen clearly enough: hence the institution of banners and flags.

24. 夫金鼓旌旗者所以一民之耳目也

Gongs and drums, banners and flags, are means whereby the ears and eyes of the host

The original text, followed by the _T‘u Shu_, has 人 for 民 here
and in the next two paragraphs. But, as we have seen, 人 is
generally used in Sun Tzŭ for the enemy.

may be focussed on one particular point.

Note the use of 一 as a verb. Chang Yü says:
視聽均齊則雖百萬之衆進退如一矣 “If sight and hearing converge
simultaneously on the same object, the evolutions of as many as a
million soldiers will be like those of a single man”!

25. 民既專一則勇者不得獨進怯者不得獨退此用衆之法也

The host thus forming a single united body, it is impossible either for the brave to advance alone, or for the cowardly to retreat alone.

Chang Yü quotes a saying: 令不進而進與令不退而退厥罪惟均 “Equally
guilty are those who advance against orders and those who retreat
against orders.” Tu Mu tells a story in this connection of 吳起 Wu
Ch‘i, when he was fighting against the Ch‘in State. Before the
battle had begun, one of his soldiers, a man of matchless daring,
sallied forth by himself, captured two heads from the enemy, and
returned to camp. Wu Ch‘i had the man instantly executed,
whereupon an officer ventured to remonstrate, saying: “This man
was a good soldier, and ought not to have been beheaded.” Wu Ch‘i
replied: “I fully believe he was a good soldier, but I had him
beheaded because he acted without orders.”

This is the art of handling large masses of men.

26. 故夜戰多火鼓晝戰多旌旗所以變民之耳目也

In night-fighting, then, make much use of signal-fires and drums, and in fighting by day, of flags and banners, as a means of influencing the ears and eyes of your army.

The _T‘ung Tien_ has the bad variant 便 for 變. With regard to the
latter word, I believe I have hit off the right meaning, the whole
phrase being slightly elliptical for “influencing the movements of
the army through their senses of sight and hearing.” Li Ch‘üan, Tu
Mu and Chia Lin certainly seem to understand it thus. The other
commentators, however, take 民 (or 人) as the enemy, and 變 as
equivalent to 變惑 or 變亂 “to perplex” or “confound.” This does
not agree so well with what has gone before, though on the other
hand it renders the transition to § 27 less abrupt. The whole
question, I think, hinges on the alternative readings 民 and 人.
The latter would almost certainly denote the enemy. Ch‘ên Hao
alludes to 李光弼 Li Kuang-pi’s night ride to 河陽 Ho-yang at the
head of 500 mounted men; they made such an imposing display with
torches, that though the rebel leader 史思明 Shih Ssŭ-ming had a
large army, he did not dare to dispute their passage. [Ch‘ên Hao
gives the date as 天寳末 A.D. 756; but according to the 新唐書 New
T‘ang History, 列傳 61, it must have been later than this, probably
760.]

27. 故三軍可奪氣將軍可奪心

A whole army may be robbed of its spirit;

“In war,” says Chang Yü, “if a spirit of anger can be made to
pervade all ranks of an army at one and the same time, its onset
will be irresistible. Now the spirit of the enemy’s soldiers will
be keenest when they have newly arrived on the scene, and it is
therefore our cue not to fight at once, but to wait until their
ardour and enthusiasm have worn off, and then strike. It is in
this way that they may be robbed of their keen spirit.” Li Ch‘üan
and others tell an anecdote (to be found in the _Tso Chuan_, 莊公
year 10, § 1) of 曹劌 Ts‘ao Kuei, a _protégé_ of Duke Chuang of Lu.
The latter State was attacked by Ch‘i, and the Duke was about to
join battle at 長勺 Ch‘ang-cho, after the first roll of the enemy’s
drums, when Ts‘ao said: “Not just yet.” Only after their drums had
beaten for the third time, did he give the word for attack. Then
they fought, and the men of Ch‘i were utterly defeated. Questioned
afterwards by the Duke as to the meaning of his delay, Ts‘ao Kuei
replied: “In battle, a courageous spirit is everything. Now the
first roll of the drum tends to create this spirit, but with the
second it is already on the wane, and after the third it is gone
altogether. I attacked when their spirit was gone and ours was at
its height. Hence our victory.” 吳子 (chap. 4) puts “spirit” first
among the “four important influences” in war, and continues:
三軍之衆百萬之師張設輕重在於一人是謂氣機 “The value of a whole army—a
mighty host of a million men—is dependent on one man alone: such
is the influence of spirit!”

a commander-in-chief may be robbed of his presence of mind.

Capt. Calthrop goes woefully astray with “defeat his general’s
ambition.” Chang Yü says: 心者將之所主也夫治亂勇怯皆主於心 “Presence
of mind is the general’s most important asset. It is the quality
which enables him to discipline disorder and to inspire courage
into the panic-stricken.” The great general 李靖 Li Ching (A.D.
571–649) has a saying: 夫攻者不止攻其城擊其陳而已必有攻其心之術焉
“Attacking does not merely consist in assaulting walled cities or
striking at an army in battle array; it must include the art of
assailing the enemy’s mental equilibrium.” [問對, pt. 3.]

28. 是故朝氣銳晝氣惰暮氣歸

Now a soldier’s spirit is keenest in the morning;

Always provided, I suppose, that he has had breakfast. At the
battle of the Trebia, the Romans were foolishly allowed to fight
fasting, whereas Hannibal’s men had breakfasted at their leisure.
See Livy, XXI, liv. 8, lv. 1 and 8.

by noonday it has begun to flag; and in the evening, his mind is bent only on returning to camp.

29. 故善用兵者避其銳氣擊其惰歸此治氣者也

A clever general, therefore,

The 故, which certainly seems to be wanted here, is omitted in the
_T‘u Shu_.

avoids an army when its spirit is keen, but attacks it when it is sluggish and inclined to return. This is the art of studying moods.

The _T‘ung Tien_, for reasons of 避諱 “avoidance of personal names
of the reigning dynasty,” reads 理 for 治 in this and the two next
paragraphs.

30. 以治待亂以靜待譁此治心者也

Disciplined and calm, to await the appearance of disorder and hubbub amongst the enemy:—this is the art of retaining self-possession.

31. 以近待遠以佚待勞以飽待飢此治力者也

To be near the goal while the enemy is still far from it, to wait at ease

The _T‘ung Tien_ has 逸 for 佚. The two characters are practically
synonymous, but according to the commentary, the latter is the
form always used in Sun Tzŭ.

while the enemy is toiling and struggling, to be well-fed while the enemy is famished:—this is the art of husbanding one’s strength.

32. 無要正正之旗勿擊堂堂之陳此治變者也

To refrain from intercepting

邀 is the reading of the original text. But the 兵書要訣 quotes the
passage with 要 _yao_^1 (also meaning “to intercept”), and this is
supported by the _Pei T‘ang Shu Ch‘ao_ the _Yü Lan_, and Wang
Hsi’s text.

an enemy whose banners are in perfect order, to refrain from attacking an army drawn up in calm and confident array:

For this translation of 堂堂, I can appeal to the authority of Tu
Mu, who defines the phrase as 無懼. The other commentators mostly
follow Ts‘ao Kung, who says 大, probably meaning “grand and
imposing”. Li Ch‘üan, however, has 部分 “in subdivisions,” which is
somewhat strange.

—this is the art of studying circumstances.

I have not attempted a uniform rendering of the four phrases 治氣,
治心, 治力 and 治變, though 治 really bears the same meaning in each
case. It is to be taken, I think, not in the sense of “to govern”
or “control,” but rather, as K‘ang Hsi defines it, = 簡習 “to
examine and practise,” hence “look after,” “keep a watchful eye
upon.” We may find an example of this use in the _Chou Li_, XVIII.
fol. 46: 治其大禮. Sun Tzŭ has not told us to control or restrain
the quality which he calls 氣, but only to observe the time at
which it is strongest. As for 心, it is important to remember that
in the present context it can only mean “presence of mind.” To
speak of “controlling presence of mind” is absurd, and Capt.
Calthrop’s “to have the heart under control” is hardly less so.
The whole process recommended here is that of VI. § 2: 致人而不致於人.

33. 故用兵之法高陵勿向背邱勿逆

It is a military axiom not to advance uphill against the enemy, nor to oppose him when he comes downhill.

The _Yü Lan_ reads 倍 for 背.

34. 佯北勿從銳卒勿攻

Do not pursue an enemy who simulates flight; do not attack soldiers whose temper is keen.

35. 餌兵勿食歸師勿遏

Do not swallow a bait offered by the enemy.

Li Ch‘üan and Tu Mu, with extraordinary inability to see a
metaphor, take these words quite literally of food and drink that
have been poisoned by the enemy. Ch‘ên Hao and Chang Yü carefully
point out that the saying has a wider application. The _T‘ung
Tien_ reads 貪 “to covet” instead of 食. The similarity of the two
characters sufficiently accounts for the mistake.

Do not interfere with an army that is returning home.

The commentators explain this rather singular piece of advice by
saying that a man whose heart is set on returning home will fight
to the death against any attempt to bar his way, and is therefore
too dangerous an opponent to be tackled. Chang Yü quotes the words
of Han Hsin: 從思東歸之士何所不克 “Invincible is the soldier who
hath his desire and returneth homewards.” A marvellous tale is
told of Ts‘ao Ts‘ao’s courage and resource in ch. 1 of the _San
Kuo Chih_, 武帝紀: In 198 A.D., he was besieging 張繡 Chang Hsiu in
穰 Jang, when 劉表 Liu Piao sent reinforcements with a view to
cutting off Ts‘ao’s retreat. The latter was obliged to draw off
his troops, only to find himself hemmed in between two enemies,
who were guarding each outlet of a narrow pass in which he had
engaged himself. In this desperate plight Ts‘ao waited until
nightfall, when he bored a tunnel into the mountain side and laid
an ambush in it. Then he marched on with his baggage-train, and
when it grew light, Chang Hsiu, finding that the bird had flown,
pressed after him in hot pursuit. As soon as the whole army had
passed by, the hidden troops fell on its rear, while Ts‘ao himself
turned and met his pursuers in front, so that they were thrown
into confusion and annihilated. Ts‘ao Ts‘ao said afterwards:
虜遏吾歸師而與吾死地戰吾是以知勝矣 “The brigands tried to check my
army in its retreat and brought me to battle in a desperate
position: hence I knew how to overcome them.”

36. 圍師必闕窮宼勿迫

When you surround an army, leave an outlet free.

This does not mean that the enemy is to be allowed to escape. The
object, as Tu Mu puts it, is 示以生路令無必死之心 “to make him
believe that there is a road to safety, and thus prevent his
fighting with the courage of despair.” Tu Mu adds pleasantly:
因而擊之 “After that, you may crush him.”

Do not press a desperate foe too hard.

For 迫, the _T‘u Shu_ reads 追 “pursue.” Ch‘ên Hao quotes the
saying: 鳥窮則搏獸窮則噬 “Birds and beasts when brought to bay will
use their claws and teeth.” Chang Yü says: 敵若焚舟破釜決一戰則不可逼
迫來 “If your adversary has burned his boats and destroyed his
cooking-pots, and is ready to stake all on the issue of a battle,
he must not be pushed to extremities.” The phrase 窮宼 doubtless
originated with Sun Tzŭ. The _P‘ei Wên Yün Fu_ gives four examples
of its use, the earliest being from the _Ch‘ien Han Shu_, and
I have found another in chap. 34 of the same work. Ho Shih
illustrates the meaning by a story taken from the life of 符彥卿 Fu
Yen-ch‘ing in ch. 251 of the 宋史. That general, together with his
colleague 杜重威 Tu Chung-wei, was surrounded by a vastly superior
army of Khitans in the year 945 A.D. The country was bare and
desert-like, and the little Chinese force was soon in dire straits
for want of water. The wells they bored ran dry, and the men were
reduced to squeezing lumps of mud and sucking out the moisture.
Their ranks thinned rapidly, until at last Fu Yen-ch‘ing
exclaimed: “We are desperate men. Far better to die for our
country than to go with fettered hands into captivity!” A strong
gale happened to be blowing from the north-east and darkening the
air with dense clouds of sandy dust. Tu Chung-wei was for waiting
until this had abated before deciding on a final attack; but
luckily another officer, 李守貞 Li Shou-chêng by name, was quicker
to see an opportunity, and said: “They are many and we are few,
but in the midst of this sandstorm our numbers will not be
discernible; victory will go to the strenuous fighter, and the
wind will be our best ally.” Accordingly, Fu Yen-ch‘ing made a
sudden and wholly unexpected onslaught with his cavalry, routed
the barbarians and succeeded in breaking through to safety.
[Certain details in the above account have been added from the
歴代紀事年表, ch. 78.]

37. 此用兵之法也

Such is the art of warfare.

Chêng Yu-hsien in his 遺說 inserts 妙 after 法. I take it that these
words conclude the extract from the 軍政 which began at § 23.

VIII. 九變篇

VARIATION OF TACTICS.

The heading means literally “The Nine Variations,” but as Sun Tzŭ
does not appear to enumerate these, and as, indeed, he has already
told us (V. §§ 6–11) that such deflections from the ordinary
course are practically innumerable, we have little option but to
follow Wang Hsi, who says that “Nine” stands for an indefinitely
large number. “All it means is that in warfare 當極其變 we ought to
vary our tactics to the utmost degree ... I do not know what Ts‘ao
Kung makes these Nine Variations out to be [the latter’s note is
變其正得其所用九也], but it has been suggested that they are
connected with the Nine Situations”—of chap. XI. This is the view
adopted by Chang Yü: see note on 死地, § 2. The only other
alternative is to suppose that something has been lost—a
supposition to which the unusual shortness of the chapter lends
some weight.

1. 孫子曰凡用兵之法將受命於君合軍聚衆

Sun Tzŭ said: In war, the general receives his commands from the sovereign, collects his army and concentrates his forces.

Repeated from VII. § 1, where it is certainly more in place. It
may have been interpolated here merely in order to supply a
beginning to the chapter.

2. 圮地無舍衢地合交絶地無留圍地則謀死地則戰

When in difficult country, do not encamp.

For explanation of 圮地, see XI. § 8.

In country where high roads intersect, join hands with your allies.

See XI, §§ 6, 12. Capt. Calthrop omits 衢地.

Do not linger in dangerously isolated positions.

絶地 is not one of the Nine Situations as given in the beginning
of chap. XI, but occurs later on (_ibid._ § 43, _q.v._). We may
compare it with 重地 (XI. § 7). Chang Yü calls it a 危絶之地,
situated across the frontier, in hostile territory. Li Ch‘üan says
it is “country in which there are no springs or wells, flocks or
herds, vegetables or firewood;” Chia Lin, “one of gorges, chasms
and precipices, without a road by which to advance.”

In hemmed-in situations, you must resort to stratagem.

See XI. §§ 9, 14. Capt. Calthrop has “mountainous and wooded
country,” which is a quite inadequate translation of 圍.

In a desperate position, you must fight.

See XI. §§ 10, 14. Chang Yü has an important note here, which must
be given in full. “From 圮地無舍,” he says, “down to this point,
the Nine Variations are presented to us. The reason why only five
are given is that the subject is treated _en précis_ (舉其大略也).
So in chap. XI, where he discusses the variations of tactics
corresponding to the Nine Grounds, Sun Tzŭ mentions only six
variations; there again we have an abridgment. [I cannot
understand what Chang Yü means by this statement. He can only be
referring to §§ 11–14 or §§ 46–50 of chap. XI; but in both places
all the nine grounds are discussed. Perhaps he is confusing
these with the Six 地形 of chap. X.] All kinds of ground have
corresponding military positions, and also a variation of tactics
suitable to each (凡地有勢有變). In chap. XI, what we find
enumerated first [§§ 2–10] are the situations; afterwards
[§§ 11–14] the corresponding tactics. Now, how can we tell that
the 九變 “Nine Variations” are simply the 九地之變 “variations of
tactics corresponding to the Nine Grounds”? It is said further
on [§ 5] that ‘the general who does not understand the nine
variations of tactics may be well acquainted with the features
of the country, yet he will not be able to turn his knowledge to
practical account.’ Again, in chap. XI [§ 41] we read: ‘The
different measures adapted to the nine varieties of ground
(九地之變) and the expediency of aggressive or defensive tactics
must be carefully examined.’ From a consideration of these
passages the meaning is made clear. When later on the nine grounds
are enumerated, Sun Tzŭ recurs to these nine variations. He wishes
here to speak of the Five Advantages [see _infra_, § 6], so he
begins by setting forth the Nine Variations. These are inseparably
connected in practice, and therefore they are dealt with
together.” The weak point of this argument is the suggestion that
五事 “five things” can stand as a 大畧, that is, an abstract or
abridgment, of nine, when those that are omitted are not less
important than those that appear, and when one of the latter is
not included amongst the nine at all.

3. 塗有所不由軍有所不擊城有所不攻地有所不爭君命有所不受

There are roads which must not be followed,

“Especially those leading through narrow defiles,” says Li Ch‘üan,
“where an ambush is to be feared.”

armies which must not be attacked,

More correctly, perhaps, “there are times when an army must not be
attacked.” Ch‘ên Hao says: “When you see your way to obtain a
trivial advantage, but are powerless to inflict a real defeat,
refrain from attacking, for fear of overtaxing your men’s strength.”

towns

Capt. Calthrop says “castles”—an unfortunate attempt to introduce
local colour.

which must not be besieged,