Chapter VI: Part 6

Chang Yü says: 上以信使民民以信服上是上下相得也 “The general has
confidence in the men under his command, and the men are docile,
having confidence in him. Thus the gain is mutual.” He quotes a
pregnant sentence from Wei Liao Tzŭ, ch. 4: 令之之法小過無更小疑無中
“The art of giving orders is not to try to rectify minor blunders
and not to be swayed by petty doubts.” Vacillation and fussiness
are the surest means of sapping the confidence of an army. Capt.
Calthrop winds up the chapter with a final mistranslation of a
more than usually heinous description: “Orders are always obeyed,
if general and soldiers are in sympathy.” Besides inventing the
latter half of the sentence, he has managed to invert protasis and
apodosis.

X. 地形篇

TERRAIN.

Only about a third of the chapter, comprising §§ 1–13, deals with
地形, the subject being more fully treated in ch. XI. The “six
calamities” are discussed in §§ 14–20, and the rest of the chapter
is again a mere string of desultory remarks, though not less
interesting, perhaps, on that account.

1. 孫子曰地形有通者有挂者有支者有隘者有險者有遠者

Sun Tzŭ said: We may distinguish six kinds of terrain, to wit: (1) Accessible ground;

Mei Yao-ch‘ên says: 道路交達 “plentifully provided with roads and
means of communication.”

(2) entangling ground;

The same commentator says: 網羅之地往必掛綴 “Net-like country, venturing into which you become entangled.”

(3) temporising ground;

Tu Yu explains 支 as 久. This meaning is still retained in modern
phrases such as 支托, 支演 “stave off,” “delay.” I do not know why
Capt. Calthrop calls 支地 “suspended ground,” unless he is
confusing it with 挂地.

(4) narrow passes; (5) precipitous heights;

The root idea in 隘 is narrowness; in 險, steepness.

(6) positions at a great distance from the enemy.

It is hardly necessary to point out the faultiness of this
classification. A strange lack of logical perception is shown in
the Chinaman’s unquestioning acceptance of glaring cross-divisions
such as the above.

2. 我可以往彼可以來曰通

Ground which can be freely traversed by both sides is called _accessible_.

Generally speaking, 平陸 “level country” is meant. Cf. IX. § 9: 處易.

3. 通形者先居高陽利糧道以戰則利

With regard to ground of this nature,

The _T‘ung Tien_ reads 居通地.

be before the enemy in occupying the raised and sunny spots,

See IX. § 2. The _T‘ung Tien_ reads 先據其地.

and carefully guard your line of supplies.

A curious use of 利 as a verb, if our text is right. The general
meaning is doubtless, as Tu Yu says, 無使敵絶己糧道 “not to allow
the enemy to cut your communications.” Tu Mu, who was not a
soldier and can hardly have had any practical experience of
fighting, goes more into detail and speaks of protecting the line
of communications by a wall (壘), or enclosing it by embankments on
each side (作甬道)! In view of Napoleon’s dictum, “the secret of
war lies in the communications,”[175] we could wish that Sun Tzŭ
had done more than skirt the edge of this important subject here
and in I. § 10, VII. § 11. Col. Henderson says: “The line of
supply may be said to be as vital to the existence of an army as
the heart to the life of a human being. Just as the duellist who
finds his adversary’s point menacing him with certain death, and
his own guard astray, is compelled to conform to his adversary’s
movements, and to content himself with warding off his thrusts, so
the commander whose communications are suddenly threatened finds
himself in a false position, and he will be fortunate if he has
not to change all his plans, to split up his force into more or
less isolated detachments, and to fight with inferior numbers on
ground which he has not had time to prepare, and where defeat will
not be an ordinary failure, but will entail the ruin or the
surrender of his whole army.”[176]

Then you will be able to fight with advantage.

Omitted by Capt. Calthrop.

4. 可以往難以返曰挂

Ground which can be abandoned but is hard to re-occupy is called _entangling_.

Capt. Calthrop is wrong in translating 返 “retreat from it.”

5. 挂形者敵無備出而勝之敵若有備出而不勝難以返不利

From a position of this sort, if the enemy is unprepared, you may sally forth and defeat him. But if the enemy is prepared for your coming, and you fail to defeat him, then, return being impossible, disaster will ensue.

不利 (an example of litotes) is paraphrased by Mei Yao-ch‘ên as
必受制 “you will receive a check.”

6. 我出而不利彼出而不利曰支

When the position is such that neither side will gain by making the first move, it is called _temporising_ ground.

俱不便久相持也 “Each side finds it inconvenient to move, and the
situation remains at a deadlock” (Tu Yu).

7. 支形者敵雖利我我無出也引而去令敵半出而擊之利

In a position of this sort, even though the enemy should offer us an attractive bait,

Tu Yu says 佯背我去 “turning their backs on us and pretending to
flee.” But this is only one of the lures which might induce us to
quit our position. Here again 利 is used as a verb, but this time
in a different sense: “to hold out an advantage to.”

it will be advisable not to stir forth, but rather to retreat, thus enticing the enemy in his turn; then, when part of his army has come out, we may deliver our attack with advantage.

Mei Yao-ch‘ên paraphrases the passage in a curious jingle, the scheme
of rhymes being _abcbdd_: 各居所險，先出必敗，利而誘我，我不可愛，僞去引敵，半出而擊.

8. 隘形者我先居之必盈之以待敵

With regard to _narrow passes_, if you can occupy them first,

Capt. Calthrop says: “Defiles, make haste to occupy.” But this is
a conditional clause, answering to 若敵先居之 in the next paragraph.

let them be strongly garrisoned and await the advent of the enemy.

Because then, as Tu Yu observes, 皆制在我然後出奇以制敵 “the
initiative will lie with us, and by making sudden and unexpected
attacks we shall have the enemy at our mercy.” The commentators
make a great pother about the precise meaning of 盈, which to the
foreign reader seems to present no difficulty whatever.

9. 若敵先居之盈而勿從不盈而從之

Should the enemy forestall you in occupying a pass, do not go after him if the pass is fully garrisoned, but only if it is weakly garrisoned.

10. 險形者我先居之必居高陽以待敵

With regard to _precipitous heights_, if you are beforehand with your adversary, you should occupy the raised and sunny spots, and there wait for him to come up.

Ts‘ao Kung says: 地形險隘尤不可致於人 “The particular advantage of
securing heights and defiles is that your actions cannot then
be dictated by the enemy.” [For the enunciation of the grand
principle alluded to, see VI. § 2]. Chang Yü tells the following
anecdote of 裴行儉 P‘ei Hsing-chien (A.D. 619–682), who was sent
on a punitive expedition against the Turkic tribes. “At nightfall
he pitched his camp as usual, and it had already been completely
fortified by wall and ditch, when suddenly he gave orders that the
army should shift its quarters to a hill near by. This was highly
displeasing to his officers, who protested loudly against the
extra fatigue which it would entail on the men. P‘ei Hsing-chien,
however, paid no heed to their remonstrances and had the camp
moved as quickly as possible. The same night, a terrific storm
came on, which flooded their former place of encampment to the
depth of over twelve feet. The recalcitrant officers were amazed
at the sight, and owned that they had been in the wrong. ‘How did
you know what was going to happen?’ they asked. P‘ei Hsing-chien
replied: ‘From this time forward be content to obey orders without
asking unnecessary questions.’ [See _Chiu T‘ang Shu_, ch. 84, fol.
12 _r_^o, and _Hsin T‘ang Shu_, ch. 108, fol. 5 _v_^o.] From this
it may be seen,” Chang Yü continues, “that high and sunny places
are advantageous not only for fighting, but also because they are
immune from disastrous floods.”

11. 若敵先居之引而去之勿從也

If the enemy has occupied them before you, do not follow him, but retreat and try to entice him away.

The turning-point of 李世民 Li Shih-min’s campaign in 621 A.D.
against the two rebels, 竇建德 Tou Chien-tê, King of 夏 Hsia, and
王世充 Wang Shih-ch‘ung, Prince of 鄭 Chêng, was his seizure of the
heights of 武牢 Wu-lao, in spite of which Tou Chien-tê persisted in
his attempt to relieve his ally in Lo-yang, was defeated and taken
prisoner. [See _Chiu T‘ang Shu_, ch. 2, fol. 5 _v_^o and also ch.
54.]

12. 遠形者勢均難以挑戰戰而不利

If you are situated at a great distance from the enemy, and the strength of the two armies is equal,

The _T‘ung Tien_ reads 夫通形均勢.

it is not easy to provoke a battle,

Ts‘ao Kung says that 挑戰 means 延敵 “challenging the enemy.” But
the enemy being far away, that plainly involves, as Tu Yu says,
迎敵 “going to meet him.” The point of course is, that we must not
think of undertaking a long and wearisome march, at the end of
which 是我困敵銳 “we should, be exhausted and our adversary fresh
and keen.”

and fighting will be to your disadvantage.

13. 凡此六者地之道也將之至任不可不察也

These six are the principles connected with Earth.

Or perhaps, “the principles relating to ground.” See, however, I.
§ 8.

The general who has attained a responsible post must be careful to study them.

Capt. Calthrop omits 至任. Out of the foregoing six 地形, it will
be noticed that nos. 3 and 6 have really no reference to the
configuration of the country, and that only 4 and 5 can be said to
convey any definite geographical idea.

14. 故兵有走者有弛者有陷者有崩者有亂者有北者凡此六者非天之災將之過也

Now an army is exposed to six several calamities, not arising from natural causes,

The _T‘u Shu_ reads 天地之災.

but from faults for which the general is responsible. These are: (1) Flight; (2) insubordination; (3) collapse; (4) ruin; (5) disorganisation; (6) rout.

I take exception to Capt. Calthrop’s rendering of 陷 and 崩 as
“distress” and “disorganisation,” respectively.

15. 夫勢均以一擊十曰走

Other conditions being equal, if one force is hurled against another ten times its size, the result will be the _flight_ of the former.

Cf. III. § 10. The general’s fault here is that of 不料力 “not
calculating the enemy’s strength.” It is obvious that 勢 cannot
have the same force as in § 12, where it was equivalent to 兵力. I
should not be inclined, however, to limit it, with Chang Yü, to
將之智勇兵之利銳 “the wisdom and valour of the general and the
sharpness of the weapons.” As Li Ch‘üan very justly remarks,
若得形便之地用奇伏之計則可矣 “Given a decided advantage in position,
or the help of some stratagem such as a flank attack or an
ambuscade, it would be quite possible [to fight in the ratio of
one to ten].”

16. 卒强吏弱曰弛吏强卒弱曰陷

When the common soldiers are too strong and their officers too weak, the result is _insubordination_.

弛 “laxity”—the metaphor being taken from an unstrung bow. Capt.
Calthrop’s “relaxation” is not good, on account of its ambiguity.
Tu Mu cites the unhappy case of 田布 T‘ien Pu [_Hsin T‘ang Shu_,
ch. 148], who was sent to 魏 Wei in 821 A.D. with orders to lead an
army against 王廷湊 Wang T‘ing-ts‘ou. But the whole time he was in
command, his soldiers treated him with the utmost contempt, and
openly flouted his authority by riding about the camp on donkeys,
several thousands at a time. T‘ien Pu was powerless to put a stop
to this conduct, and when, after some months had passed, he made an
attempt to engage the enemy, his troops turned tail and dispersed
in every direction. After that, the unfortunate man committed
suicide by cutting his throat.

When the officers are too strong and the common soldiers too weak, the result is _collapse_.

Ts‘ao Kung says: 吏强欲進卒弱輒陷 “The officers are energetic and
want to press on, the common soldiers are feeble and suddenly
collapse.” Note that 弱 is to be taken literally of physical
weakness, whereas in the former clause it is figurative. Li Ch‘üan
makes 陷 equivalent to 敗, and Tu Mu explains it as 陷沒於死地
“stumbling into a death-trap.”

17. 大吏怒而不服遇敵懟而自戰將不知其能曰崩

When the higher officers

大吏, according to Ts‘ao Kung, are the 小將 “generals of inferior
rank.” But Li Ch‘üan, Ch‘ên Hao and Wang Hsi take the term as
simply convertible with 將 or 大將.

are angry and insubordinate, and on meeting the enemy give battle on their own account from a feeling of resentment, before the commander-in-chief can tell whether or no he is in a position to fight, the result is _ruin_.

Ts‘ao Kung makes 大將, understood, the subject of 怒, which seems
rather far-fetched. Wang Hsi’s note is: 謂將怒不以理且不知裨佐之才激致
其兇懟如山之崩壞也 “This means, the general is angry without just
cause, and at the same time does not appreciate the ability of his
subordinate officers; thus he arouses fierce resentment and brings
an avalanche of ruin upon his head.” He takes 能, therefore,
in the sense of 才; but I think that Ch‘ên Hao is right in his
paraphrase 不顧能否 “they don’t care if it be possible or no.” My
interpretation of the whole passage is that of Mei Yao-ch‘ên and
Chang Yü. Tu Mu gives a long extract from the _Tso Chuan_, 宣公,
XII. 3, showing how the great battle of 邲 Pi [597 B.C.] was lost
for the 晉 Chin State through the contumacy of 先縠 Hsien Hu and
the resentful spite of 魏錡 Wei I and 趙旃 Chao Chan. Chang Yü also
alludes to the mutinous conduct of 欒黶 Luan Yen [_ibid._ 襄公,
XIV. 3].

18. 將弱不嚴教道不明吏卒無常陳兵縱橫曰亂

When the general is weak and without authority; when his orders are not clear and distinct;

Wei Liao Tzŭ (ch. 4) says: 上無疑令，則衆不二聽，動無疑事，則衆不二志 “If
the commander gives his orders with decision, the soldiers will not
wait to hear them twice; if his moves are made without vacillation,
the soldiers will not be in two minds about doing their duty.”
General Baden-Powell says, italicising the words: “The secret of
getting successful work out of your trained men lies in one
nutshell—in the clearness of the instructions they receive.”[177]
Assuming that clear instructions beget confidence, this is very much
what Wei Liao Tzŭ (_loc. cit._) goes on to say: 未有不信其心而能得其
力者也. Cf. also Wu Tzŭ ch. 3: 用兵之害猶豫最大三軍之災生於狐疑 “the
most fatal defect in a military leader is diffidence; the worst
calamities that befall an army arise from hesitation.”

when there are no fixed duties assigned to officers and men,

吏卒皆不拘常度 “Neither officers nor men have any regular routine”
[Tu Mu].

and the ranks are formed in a slovenly haphazard manner, the result is utter _disorganisation_.

19. 將不能料敵以少合衆以弱擊强兵無選鋒曰北

When a general, unable to estimate the enemy’s strength, allows an inferior force to engage a larger one, or hurls a weak detachment against a powerful one, and neglects to place picked soldiers in the front rank, the result must be a _rout_.

Chang Yü paraphrases the latter part of the sentence 不選驍勇之士使爲
先鋒兵必敗北也, and continues: 凡戰必用精銳爲前鋒者一則壯吾志一則挫敵威也
“Whenever there is fighting to be done, the keenest spirits
should be appointed to serve in the front ranks, both in order to
strengthen the resolution of our own men and to demoralise the
enemy.” Cf. the _primi ordines_ of Caesar (“De Bello Gallico,”
V. 28, 44 _et al._). There seems little to distinguish 北 from 走
in § 15, except that 北 is a more forcible word.

20. 凡此六者敗之道也將之至任不可不察也

These are six ways of courting defeat,

Ch‘ên Hao makes them out to be: (1) 不量寡衆 “neglect to estimate
the enemy’s strength;” (2) 本乏刑德 “want of authority;” (3)
失於訓練 “defective training;” (4) 非理興怒 “unjustifiable anger;”
(5) 法令不行 “non-observance of discipline;” (6) 不擇驍果 “failure
to use picked men.”

which must be carefully noted by the general who has attained a responsible post.

See _supra_, § 13.

21. 夫地形者兵之助也料敵制勝計險阨遠近上將之道也

The natural formation of the country is the soldier’s best ally;

Chia Lin’s text has the reading 易 for 助. Ch‘ên Hao says: 天時不如
地利 “The advantages of weather and season are not equal to those
connected with ground.”

but a power of estimating the adversary,

The insertion of a “but” is necessary to show the connection of
thought here. A general should always utilise, but never rely
wholly on natural advantages of terrain.

of controlling the forces of victory,

制勝 is one of those condensed expressions which mean so much in
Chinese, and so little in an English translation. What it seems to
imply is complete mastery of the situation from the beginning.

and of shrewdly calculating difficulties, dangers and distances,

The _T‘ung Tien_ and _Yü Lan_ read 計極險易利害遠近. I am decidedly
puzzled by Capt. Calthrop’s translation: “an eye for steepness,
_command_ and distances.” Where did he find the word which I have
put in italics?

constitutes the test of a great general.

A somewhat free translation of 道. As Chang Yü remarks, these are
兵之本 “the essentials of soldiering,” ground being only a helpful
accessory.

22. 知此而用戰者必勝不知此而用戰者必敗

He who knows these things, and in fighting puts his knowledge into practice, will win his battles. He who knows them not, nor practises them, will surely be defeated.

23. 故戰道必勝主曰無戰必戰可也戰道不勝主曰必戰無戰可也

If fighting is sure to result in victory, then you must fight, even though the ruler forbid it; if fighting will not result in victory, then you must not fight even at the ruler’s bidding.

Cf. VIII. § 3 _fin._ Huang-shih Kung of the Ch‘in dynasty, who
is said to have been the patron of 張良 Chang Liang and to have
written the 三略, has these words attributed to him: 出軍行師將在自專
進退內御則功難成故聖主明王跪而推轂 “The responsibility of setting an
army in motion must devolve on the general alone; if advance and
retreat are controlled from the Palace, brilliant results will
hardly be achieved. Hence the god-like ruler and the enlightened
monarch are content to play a humble part in furthering their
country’s cause [_lit._, kneel down to push the chariot wheel].”
This means that 閫外之事將軍裁之 “in matters lying outside the
zenana, the decision of the military commander must be absolute.”
Chang Yü also quotes the saying: 軍中不聞天子之詔 “Decrees of the
Son of Heaven do not penetrate the walls of a camp.” Napoleon, who
has been accused of allowing his generals too little independence
of action, speaks in the same sense: “Un général en chef n’est pas
à couvert de ses fautes à la guerre par un ordre de son souverain
ou du ministre, quand celui qui le donne est éloigné du champ
d’opération, et qu’il connaît mal, ou ne connaît pas du tout le
dernier état des choses.”[178]

24. 故進不求名退不避罪唯民是保而利合於主國之寳也

The general who advances without coveting fame and retreats without fearing disgrace,

It was Wellington, I think, who said that the hardest thing of all
for a soldier is to retreat.

whose only thought is to protect his country and do good service for his sovereign,

合, which is omitted by the _T‘u Shu_, is said by Ch‘ên Hao to be
equivalent to 歸. If it had to be separately translated, it would
be something like our word “accrue.”

is the jewel of the kingdom.

A noble presentment, in few words, of the Chinese “happy warrior.”
Such a man, says Ho Shih, 罪及其身不悔也 “even if he had to suffer
punishment, would not regret his conduct.”

25. 視卒如嬰兒故可與之赴深谿視卒如愛子故可與之俱死

Regard your soldiers as your children, and they will follow you into the deepest valleys; look on them as your own beloved sons, and they will stand by you even unto death.

Cf. I. § 6. In this connection, Tu Mu draws for us an engaging
picture of the famous general Wu Ch‘i, from whose treatise on war
I have frequently had occasion to quote: “He wore the same clothes
and ate the same food as the meanest of his soldiers, refused to
have either a horse to ride or a mat to sleep on, carried his own
surplus rations wrapped in a parcel, and shared every hardship
with his men. One of his soldiers was suffering from an abscess,
and Wu Ch‘i himself sucked out the virus. The soldier’s mother,
hearing this, began wailing and lamenting. Somebody asked her,
saying: ‘Why do you cry? Your son is only a common soldier, and
yet the commander-in-chief himself has sucked the poison from his
sore.’ The woman replied: ‘Many years ago, Lord Wu performed a
similar service for my husband, who never left him afterwards, and
finally met his death at the hands of the enemy. And now that he
has done the same for my son, he too will fall fighting I know not
where’.” Li Ch‘üan mentions 楚子 the Viscount of Ch‘u, who invaded
the small state of 蕭 Hsiao during the winter. 申公 The Duke of
Shên said to him: “Many of the soldiers are suffering severely
from the cold.” So he made a round of the whole army, comforting
and encouraging the men; and straightway they felt as if they
were clothed in garments lined with floss silk. [_Tso Chuan_, 宣公,
XII. 5]. Chang Yü alludes to the same passage, saying: 温言一撫士同
挾纊.

26. 厚而不能使愛而不能令亂而不能治譬如驕子不可用也

If, however, you are indulgent, but unable to make your authority felt; kind-hearted, but unable to enforce your commands; and incapable, moreover, of quelling disorder:

Capt. Calthrop has got these three clauses quite wrong. The last
he translates: “overindulgence may produce disorder.”

then your soldiers must be likened to spoilt children; they are useless for any practical purpose.

Cf. IX. § 42. We read in the 陰符經, pt. 2: 害生于思 “Injury comes
out of kindness.” Li Ching once said that if you could make your
soldiers afraid of you, they would not be afraid of the enemy. Tu
Mu recalls an instance of stern military discipline which occurred
in 219 A.D., when 呂蒙 Lü Mêng was occupying the town of 江陵
Chiang-ling. He had given stringent orders to his army not to
molest the inhabitants nor take anything from them by force.
Nevertheless, a certain officer serving under his banner, who
happened to be a fellow-townsman, ventured to appropriate a bamboo
hat (笠) belonging to one of the people, in order to wear it over
his regulation helmet as a protection against the rain. Lü Mêng
considered that the fact of his being also a native of 汝南 Ju-nan
should not be allowed to palliate a clear breach of discipline,
and accordingly he ordered his summary execution, the tears
rolling down his face, however, as he did so. This act of severity
filled the army with wholesome awe, and from that time forth even
articles dropped in the highway were not picked up. [_San Kuo
Chih_, ch. 54, f. 13 _r_^o. & _v_^o.].

27. 知吾卒之可以擊而不知敵之不可擊勝之半也

If we know that our own men are in a condition to attack, but are unaware that the enemy is not open to attack, we have gone only halfway towards victory.

That is, as Ts‘ao Kung says, “the issue in this case is uncertain.”

28. 知敵之可擊而不知吾卒之不可以擊勝之半也

If we know that the enemy is open to attack, but are unaware that our own men are not in a condition to attack, we have gone only halfway towards victory.

Cf. III. § 13 (1).

29. 知敵之可擊知吾卒之可以擊而不知地形之不可以戰勝之半也

If we know that the enemy is open to attack, and also know that our men are in a condition to attack, but are unaware that the nature of the ground makes fighting impracticable, we have still gone only halfway towards victory.

I may take this opportunity of pointing out the rather nice
distinction in meaning between 擊 and 攻. The latter is simply “to
attack” without any further implication, whereas 擊 is a stronger
word which in nine cases out of ten means “to attack with
expectation of victory,” “to fall upon,” as we should say, or even
“to crush.” On the other hand, 擊 is not quite synonymous with 伐,
which is mostly used of operations on a larger scale, as of one
State _making war_ on another, often with the added idea of
invasion. 征, finally, has special reference to the subjugation of
rebels. See Mencius, VII. 2. ii. 2.

30. 故知兵者動而不迷舉而不窮

Hence the experienced soldier, once in motion, is never bewildered; once he has broken camp, he is never at a loss.

The reason being, according to Tu Mu, that he has taken his
measures so thoroughly as to ensure victory beforehand. “He does
not move recklessly,” says Chang Yü, “so that when he does move,
he makes no mistakes.” Another reading substitutes 困 for 迷 and
頓 for 窮. The latter variant only is adopted by the _T‘ung Tien_
and _Yü Lan_. Note that 窮 here means “at the end of his _mental_
resources.”

31. 故曰知彼知己勝乃不殆知地知天勝乃可全

Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and know yourself, your victory will not stand in doubt;

Capt. Calthrop makes the saying end here, which cannot be justified.

if you know Heaven and know Earth,

天 and 地 are transposed for the sake of the jingle between 天 and
全. The original text, however, has 知天知地, and the correction
has been made from the _T‘ung Tien_.

you may make your victory complete.

As opposed to 勝之半, above. The original text has 勝乃不窮, the
corruption being perhaps due to the occurrence of 不窮 in the
preceding sentence. Here, however 不窮 would not be synonymous
with 不困, but equivalent to 不可以窮 “inexhaustible,” “beyond
computation.” Cf. V. § 11. The _T‘ung Tien_ has again supplied the
true reading. Li Ch‘üan sums up as follows: 人事天時地利三者同知則
百戰百勝 “Given a knowledge of three things—the affairs of man, the
seasons of heaven and the natural advantages of earth—, victory
will invariably crown your battles.”

XI. 九地篇

THE NINE SITUATIONS.

Li Ch‘üan is not quite right in calling these 勝敵之地. As we shall
see, some of them are highly disadvantageous from the military
point of view. Wang Hsi more correctly says: 用兵之地利害有九也
“There are nine military situations, good and bad.” One would like
to distinguish the 九地 from the six 地形 of chap. X by saying that
the latter refer to the natural formation or geographical features
of the country, while the 九地 have more to do with the condition
of the army, being 地勢 “situations” as opposed to “grounds.” But
it is soon found impossible to carry out the distinction. Both are
cross-divisions, for among the 地形 we have “temporising ground”
side by side with “narrow passes,” while in the present chapter
there is even greater confusion.

1. 孫子曰用兵之法有散地有輕地有爭地有交地有衢地有重地有圮地有圍地有死地

Sun Tzŭ said: The art of war recognises nine varieties of ground: (1) Dispersive ground; (2) facile ground; (3) contentious ground; (4) open ground; (5) ground of intersecting highways; (6) serious ground; (7) difficult ground; (8) hemmed-in ground; (9) desperate ground.

2. 諸侯自戰其地者爲散地

When a chieftain is fighting in his own territory, it is dispersive ground.

So called because the soldiers, being near to their homes and
anxious to see their wives and children, are likely to seize the
opportunity afforded by a battle and scatter in every direction.
“In their advance,” observes Tu Mu, “they will lack the valour of
desperation, and when they retreat, they will find harbours of
refuge.” The 者, which appears in the _T‘u Shu_, seems to have been
accidentally omitted in my edition of the standard text.

3. 入人之地而不深者爲輕地

When he has penetrated into hostile territory, but to no great distance, it is facile ground.

Li Ch‘üan and Ho Shih say 輕於退也 “because of the facility for
retreating,” and the other commentators give similar explanations.
Tu Mu remarks: 師出越境必焚舟梁示民無返顧之心 “When your army has
crossed the border, you should burn your boats and bridges, in
order to make it clear to everybody that you have no hankering
after home.” I do not think that “disturbing ground,” Capt.
Calthrop’s rendering of 輕地, has anything to justify it. If an
idiomatic translation is out of the question, one should at least
attempt to be literal.

4. 我得則利彼得亦利者爲爭地

Ground the possession of which imports great advantage to either side, is contentious ground.

I must apologise for using this word in a sense not known to the
dictionary, i.e. “to be contended for”—Tu Mu’s 必爭之地. Ts‘ao Kung
says: 可以少勝衆弱勝强 “ground on which the few and the weak can
defeat the many and the strong,” such as 阨喉 “the neck of a pass,”
instanced by Li Ch‘üan. Thus, Thermopylae was a 爭地, because the
possession of it, even for a few days only, meant holding the
entire invading army in check and thus gaining invaluable time.
Cf. Wu Tzŭ, ch. V. _ad init._: 以一擊十莫善於阨 “For those who have
to fight in the ratio of one to ten, there is nothing better
than a narrow pass.” When 呂光 Lü Kuang was returning from his
triumphant expedition to Turkestan in 385 A.D., and had got as far
as 宜禾 I-ho, laden with spoils, 梁熙 Liang Hsi, administrator of
涼州 Liang-chou, taking advantage of the death of Fu Chien, King
of Ch‘in, plotted against him and was for barring his way into the
province. 楊翰 Yang Han, governor of 高昌 Kao-ch‘ang, counselled
him, saying: “Lü Kuang is fresh from his victories in the west,
and his soldiers are vigorous and mettlesome. If we oppose him in
the shifting sands of the desert, we shall be no match for him,
and we must therefore try a different plan. Let us hasten to
occupy the defile at the mouth of the 高梧 Kao-wu pass, thus
cutting him off from supplies of water, and when his troops are
prostrated with thirst, we can dictate our own terms without
moving. Or if you think that the pass I mention is too far off,
we could make a stand against him at the 伊吾 I-wu pass, which is
nearer. The cunning and resource of 子房 Tzŭ-fang himself [i.e.
張良] would be expended in vain against the enormous strength of
these two positions.” Liang Hsi, refusing to act on this advice,
was overwhelmed and swept away by the invader. [See 晉書, ch. 122,
fol. 3 _r_^o, and 歴代紀事年表, ch. 43, fol. 26.]

5. 我可以往彼可以來者爲交地

Ground on which each side has liberty of movement is open ground.

This is only a makeshift translation of 交, which according to
Ts‘ao Kung stands for 交錯 “ground covered with a network of
roads,” like a chess-board. Another interpretation, suggested by
Ho Shih, is 交通 “ground on which intercommunication is easy.” In
either case, it must evidently be 平原 “flat country,” and
therefore 不可杜絶 “cannot be blocked.” Cf. 通形, X. § 2.

6. 諸侯之地三屬先至而得天下之衆者爲衢地

Ground which forms the key to three contiguous states,

我與敵相當而旁有他國也 “Our country adjoining the enemy’s and a third
country conterminous with both.” [Ts‘ao Kung.] Mêng Shih instances
the small principality of 鄭 Chêng, which was bounded on the
north-east by 齊 Ch‘i, on the west by 晉 Chin, and on the south by
楚 Ch‘u.

so that he who occupies it first has most of the Empire at his command,

天下 of course stands for the loose confederacy of states into
which China was divided under the Chou dynasty. The belligerent
who holds this dominating position can constrain most of them to
become his allies. See _infra_, § 48. 衆 appears at first sight to
be “the masses” or “population” of the Empire, but it is more
probably, as Tu Yu says, 諸侯之衆.

is ground of intersecting highways.

Capt. Calthrop’s “path-ridden ground” might stand well enough for
交地 above, but it does not bring out the force of 衢地, which
clearly denotes the central position where important highways meet.

7. 入人之地深背城邑多者爲重地

When an army has penetrated into the heart of a hostile country, leaving a number of fortified cities in its rear,

After 多, the _T‘ung Tien_ intercalates the gloss 難以返.

it is serious ground.

Wang Hsi explains the name by saying that 兵至此者事勢重也 “when an
army has reached such a point, its situation is serious.” Li
Ch‘üan instances (1) the victorious march of 樂毅 Yo I into the
capital of Ch‘i in 284 B.C., and (2) the attack on Ch‘u, six years
later, by the Ch‘in general 白起 Po Ch‘i.

8. 山林險阻沮澤凡難行之道者爲圮地

Mountain forests,

Or simply, “forests.” I follow the _T‘u Shu_ in omitting the 行
before 山林, given in the standard text, which is not only otiose
but spoils the rhythm of the sentence.

rugged steeps, marshes and fens—all country that is hard to traverse: this is difficult ground.

圮 _p‘i_^3 (to be distinguished from 圯 i^4) is defined by K‘ang
Hsi (after the _Shuo Wên_) as 毁 “to destroy.” Hence Chia Lin
explains 圮地 as ground 經水所毁 “that has been ruined by water
passing over it,” and Tu Yu simply as 沮洳之地 “swampy ground.” But
Ch‘ên Hao says that the word is specially applied to deep
hollows—what Chu-ko Liang, he tells us, used to designate by the
expressive term 地獄 “earth-hells.” Compare the 天井 of IX. § 15.

9. 所由入者隘所從歸者迂彼寡可以擊吾之衆者爲圍地

Ground which is reached through narrow gorges, and from which we can only retire by tortuous paths, so that a small number of the enemy would suffice to crush a large body of our men: this is hemmed-in ground.

10. 疾戰則存不疾戰則亡者爲死地

Ground on which we can only be saved from destruction by fighting without delay, is desperate ground.

The situation, as pictured by Ts‘ao Kung, is very similar to the
圍地, except that here escape is no longer possible: 前有高山後有大水
進則不得退則有礙 “A lofty mountain in front, a large river behind,
advance impossible, retreat blocked.” Ch‘ên Hao says: 人在死地如
坐漏船伏燒屋 “to be on ‘desperate ground’ is like sitting in a
leaking boat or crouching in a burning house.” Tu Mu quotes
from Li Ching a vivid description of the plight of an army thus
entrapped: “Suppose an army invading hostile territory without the
aid of local guides:—it falls into a fatal snare and is at the
enemy’s mercy. A ravine on the left, a mountain on the right, a
pathway so perilous that the horses have to be roped together
and the chariots carried in slings, no passage open in front,
retreat cut off behind, no choice but to proceed in single
file (鴈行魚貫之嚴). Then, before there is time to range our
soldiers in order of battle, the enemy in overwhelming strength
suddenly appears on the scene. Advancing, we can nowhere take a
breathing-space; retreating, we have no haven of refuge. We seek a
pitched battle, but in vain; yet standing on the defensive, none
of us has a moment’s respite. If we simply maintain our ground,
whole days and months will crawl by; the moment we make a move, we
have to sustain the enemy’s attacks on front and rear. The country
is wild, destitute of water and plants; the army is lacking in the
necessaries of life, the horses are jaded and the men worn-out,
all the resources of strength and skill unavailing, the pass so
narrow that a single man defending it can check the onset of ten
thousand; all means of offence in the hands of the enemy, all
points of vantage already forfeited by ourselves:—in this terrible
plight, even though we had the most valiant soldiers and the
keenest of weapons, how could they be employed with the slightest
effect?” Students of Greek history may be reminded of the awful
close to the Sicilian expedition, and the agony of the Athenians
under Nicias and Demosthenes. [_See_ Thucydides, VII. 78 sqq.].

11. 是故散地則無以戰輕地則無止爭地則無攻

On dispersive ground, therefore, fight not. On facile ground, halt not. On contentious ground, attack not.

But rather let all your energies be bent on occupying the
advantageous position first. So Ts‘ao Kung. Li Ch‘üan and others,
however, suppose the meaning to be that the enemy has already
forestalled us, so that it would be sheer madness to attack. In
the 孫子敘錄, when the King of Wu inquires what should be done in
this case, Sun Tzŭ replies: “The rule with regard to contentious
ground is that those in possession have the advantage over the
other side. If a position of this kind is secured first by the
enemy, beware of attacking him. Lure him away by pretending to
flee—show your banners and sound your drums—make a dash for other
places that he cannot afford to lose—trail brushwood and raise a
dust—confound his ears and eyes—detach a body of your best troops,
and place it secretly in ambuscade. Then your opponent will sally
forth to the rescue.”

12. 交地則無絶衢地則合交

On open ground, do not try to block the enemy’s way.

Because the attempt would be futile, and would expose the blocking
force itself to serious risks. There are two interpretations of
無絶. I follow that of Chang Yü (不可以兵阻絶其路). The other
is indicated in Ts‘ao Kung’s brief note: 相及屬也 “Draw closer
together”—_i.e._, see that a portion of your own army is not cut
off. Wang Hsi points out that 交地 is only another name for the
通地 “accessible ground” of X. § 2, and says that the advice here
given is simply a variation of 利糧道 “keep a sharp eye on the line
of supplies,” be careful that your communications are not cut. The
_T‘ung Tien_ reads 無相絶.

On ground of intersecting highways, join hands with your allies.

Or perhaps, “form alliances with neighbouring states.” Thus Ts‘ao
Kung has: 結諸侯也. Capt. Calthrop’s “cultivate intercourse” is
much too timid and vague. The original text reads 交合.

13. 重地則掠圮地則行

On serious ground, gather in plunder.

On this, Li Ch‘üan has the following delicious note: 深入敵境不可
非義失人心如漢高祖入秦無犯婦女無取寳貨得人心也此筌以掠字爲無掠字 “When
an army penetrates far into the enemy’s country, care must be
taken not to alienate the people by unjust treatment. Follow
the example of the Han Emperor Kao Tsu, whose march into Ch‘in
territory was marked by no violation of women or looting of
valuables. [_Nota bene_: this was in 207 B.C., and may well cause
us to blush for the Christian armies that entered Peking in 1900
A.D.] Thus he won the hearts of all. In the present passage, then,
I think that the true reading must be, not 掠 ‘plunder’, but 無掠
‘do not plunder’.” Alas, I fear that in this instance the worthy
commentator’s feelings outran his judgment. Tu Mu, at least,
has no such illusions. He says: “When encamped on ‘serious
ground,’ there being no inducement as yet to advance further,
and no possibility of retreat, one ought to take measures for a
protracted resistance by bringing in provisions from all sides,
and keep a close watch on the enemy.” Cf. also II. § 9: 因糧於敵.

In difficult ground, keep steadily on the march.

Or, in the words of VIII. §2, 無舍 “do not encamp.”

14. 圍地則謀死地則戰

On hemmed-in ground, resort to stratagem.

Ts‘ao Kung says: 發奇謀 “Try the effect of some unusual artifice;”
and Tu Yu amplifies this by saying: 居此則當權謀詐譎可以免難 “In
such a position, some scheme must be devised which will suit the
circumstances, and if we can succeed in deluding the enemy, the
peril may be escaped.” This is exactly what happened on the famous
occasion when Hannibal was hemmed in among the mountains on
the road to Casilinum, and to all appearances entrapped by the
Dictator Fabius. The stratagem which Hannibal devised to baffle
his foes was remarkably like that which T‘ien Tan had also
employed with success exactly 62 years before. [See IX. § 24,
note.] When night came on, bundles of twigs were fastened to the
horns of some 2000 oxen and set on fire, the terrified animals
being then quickly driven along the mountain side towards the
passes which were beset by the enemy. The strange spectacle of
these rapidly moving lights so alarmed and discomfited the Romans
that they withdrew from their position, and Hannibal’s army passed
safely through the defile. [See Polybius, III. 93, 94; Livy, XXII.
16, 17.]

On desperate ground, fight.

For, as Chia Lin remarks: 力戰或生守隅則死 “if you fight with all
your might, there is a chance of life; whereas death is certain if
you cling to your corner.”

15. 所謂古之善用兵者能使敵人前後不相及衆寡不相恃貴賤不相救上下不相扶

Those who were called skilful leaders of old

所謂 is omitted in the _T‘u Shu_ text.

knew how to drive a wedge between the enemy’s front and rear;

More literally, “cause the front and rear to lose touch with each
other.”

to prevent co-operation between his large and small divisions; to hinder the good troops from rescuing the bad,

I doubt if 貴賤 can mean “officers and men,” as Capt. Calthrop
translates. This is wanted for 上下.

the officers from rallying their men.

The reading 扶, derived from the _Yü Lan_, must be considered very
doubtful. The original text has 救, and the _T‘u Shu_ 收.

16. 卒離而不集兵合而不齊

When the enemy’s men were scattered, they prevented them from concentrating;

Capt. Calthrop translates 卒離 “they scattered the enemy,” which
cannot be right.

even when their forces were united, they managed to keep them in disorder.

Mei Yao-ch‘ên’s note makes the sense plain: 或已離而不能合或雖合而
不能齊. All these clauses, of course, down to 不齊, are dependent
on 使 in § 15.

17. 合於利而動不合於利而止

When it was to their advantage, they made a forward move; when otherwise, they stopped still.

Mei Yao-ch‘ên connects this with the foregoing: 然能使敵若此當須有利則
動無利則止 “Having succeeded in thus dislocating the enemy, they would
push forward in order to secure any advantage to be gained; if there
was no advantage to be gained, they would remain where they were.”

18. 敢問敵衆整而將來待之若何曰先奪其所愛則聽矣

If asked how to cope with a great host of the enemy in orderly array and on the point of marching to the attack,

敢問 is like 或問, introducing a supposed question.

I should say: “Begin by seizing something which your opponent holds dear; then he will be amenable to your will.”

Opinions differ as to what Sun Tzŭ had in mind. Ts‘ao Kung thinks
it is 其所恃之利 “some strategical advantage on which the enemy is
depending.” Tu Mu says: 據我便地畧我田野利其糧道斯三者敵人之所愛惜倚
恃者也 “The three things which an enemy is anxious to do, and on
the accomplishment of which his success depends, are: (1) to
capture our favourable positions; (2) to ravage our cultivated
land; (3) to guard his own communications.” Our object then must
be to thwart his plans in these three directions and thus render
him helpless. [Cf. III. § 3.] But this exegesis unduly strains the
meaning of 奪 and 愛, and I agree with Ch‘ên Hao, who says that
所愛 does not refer only to strategical advantages, but is any
person or thing that may happen to be of importance to the enemy.
By boldly seizing the initiative in this way, you at once throw
the other side on the defensive.

19. 兵之情主速乘人之不及由不虞之道攻其所不戒也

Rapidity is the essence of war:

兵之情 means “the conditions of war,” not, as Capt. Calthrop says,
“the spirit of the troops.” According to Tu Mu, 此統言兵之情狀
“this is a summary of leading principles in warfare,” and he adds:
此乃兵之深情將之至事也 “These are the profoundest truths of military
science, and the chief business of the general.” The following
anecdotes, told by Ho Shih, show the importance attached to speed
by two of China’s greatest generals. In 227 A.D., 孟達 Mêng Ta,
governor of 新城 Hsin-ch‘êng under the Wei Emperor Wên Ti, was
meditating defection to the House of Shu, and had entered into
correspondence with Chu-ko Liang, Prime Minister of that State.
The Wei general Ssŭ-ma I was then military governor of 宛 Wan, and
getting wind of Mêng Ta’s treachery, he at once set off with an
army to anticipate his revolt, having previously cajoled him by a
specious message of friendly import. Ssŭ-ma’s officers came to him
and said: “If Mêng Ta has leagued himself with Wu and Shu, the
matter should be thoroughly investigated before we make a move.”
Ssŭ-ma I replied: “Mêng Ta is an unprincipled man, and we ought to
go and punish him at once, while he is still wavering and before
he has thrown off the mask.” Then, by a series of forced marches,
he brought his army under the walls of Hsin-ch‘êng within the
space of eight days. Now Mêng Ta had previously said in a letter
to Chu-ko Liang: “Wan is 1200 _li_ from here. When the news of
my revolt reaches Ssŭ-ma I, he will at once inform his Imperial
Master, but it will be a whole month before any steps can be
taken, and by that time my city will be well fortified. Besides,
Ssŭ-ma I is sure not to come himself, and the generals that will
be sent against us are not worth troubling about.” The next
letter, however, was filled with consternation: “Though only eight
days have passed since I threw off my allegiance, an army is
already at the city-gates. What miraculous rapidity is this!” A
fortnight later, Hsin-ch‘êng had fallen and Mêng Ta had lost his
head. [See _Chin Shu_, ch. 1, f. 3.] In 621 A.D., Li Ching was
sent from 夔州 K‘uei-chou in Ssŭ-ch‘uan to reduce the successful
rebel 蕭銑 Hsiao Hsien, who had set up as Emperor at the modern
荆州 Ching-chou Fu in Hupeh. It was autumn, and the Yangtsze being
then in flood, Hsiao Hsien never dreamt that his adversary would
venture to come down through the gorges, and consequently made no
preparations. But Li Ching embarked his army without loss of time,
and was just about to start when the other generals implored him
to postpone his departure until the river was in a less dangerous
state for navigation. Li Ching replied: “To the soldier,
overwhelming speed is of paramount importance, and he must never
miss opportunities. Now is the time to strike, before Hsiao Hsien
even knows that we have got an army together. If we seize the
present moment when the river is in flood, we shall appear before
his capital with startling suddenness, like the thunder which is
heard before you have time to stop your ears against it. [_See_
VII, § 19, note.] This is the great principle in war. Even if he
gets to know of our approach, he will have to levy his soldiers in
such a hurry that they will not be fit to oppose us. Thus the full
fruits of victory will be ours.” All came about as he predicted,
and Hsiao Hsien was obliged to surrender, nobly stipulating that
his people should be spared and he alone suffer the penalty of
death. [See _Hsin T‘ang Shu_, ch. 93, f. 1 _v_^o.]

take advantage of the enemy’s unreadiness, make your way by unexpected routes, and attack unguarded spots.

20. 凡爲客之道深入則專主人不克

The following are the principles to be observed by an invading force: The further you penetrate into a country, the greater will be the solidarity of your troops, and thus the defenders will not prevail against you.

21. 掠於饒野三軍足食

Make forays in fertile country in order to supply your army with food.

Cf. _supra_, § 13. Li Ch‘üan does not venture on a note here.

22. 謹養而勿勞併氣積力運兵計謀爲不可測

Carefully study the well-being of your men,

謹養, according to Wang Hsi, means: 撫循飮食周謹之 “Pet them, humour
them, give them plenty of food and drink, and look after them
generally.”

and do not overtax them. Concentrate your energy and hoard your strength.

Tu Mu explains these words in a rhyming couplet: 氣全力盛一發取勝;
and Ch‘ên Hao recalls the line of action adopted in 224 B.C. by the
famous general 王翦 Wang Chien, whose military genius largely
contributed to the success of the First Emperor. He had invaded
the Ch‘u State, where a universal levy was made to oppose him.
But, being doubtful of the temper of his troops, he declined all
invitations to fight and remained strictly on the defensive. In
vain did the Ch‘u general try to force a battle: day after day
Wang Chien kept inside his walls and would not come out, but
devoted his whole time and energy to winning the affection and
confidence of his men. He took care that they should be well fed,
sharing his own meals with them, provided facilities for bathing,
and employed every method of judicious indulgence to weld them
into a loyal and homogeneous body. After some time had elapsed,
he told off certain persons to find out how the men were amusing
themselves. The answer was, that they were contending with one
another in putting the weight and long-jumping (投石超距). When
Wang Chien heard that they were engaged in these athletic
pursuits, he knew that their spirits had been strung up to the
required pitch and that they were now ready for fighting. By this
time the Ch‘u army, after repeating their challenge again and
again, had marched away eastwards in disgust. The Ch‘in general
immediately broke up his camp and followed them, and in the
battle that ensued they were routed with great slaughter. Shortly
afterwards, the whole of Ch‘u was conquered by Ch‘in, and the king
負芻 Fu-ch‘u led into captivity. [See _Shih Chi_, ch. 73, f. 5 _r_^o.
It should be noted that, 楚 being a taboo character under the Ch‘in
dynasty, the name figures as 荆 throughout.]

Keep your army continually on the move,

In order that the enemy may never know exactly where you are. It
has struck me, however, that the true reading might be, not 運兵,
but 連兵 “link your army together” [cf. _supra_ § 46, 吾將使之屬],
which would be more in keeping with 併氣積力. Capt. Calthrop cuts
the Gordian knot by omitting the words altogether.

and devise unfathomable plans.

Ch‘ang Yü’s paraphrase is: 常爲不可測度之計.

23. 投之無所往死且不北死焉不得士人盡力

Throw your soldiers into positions whence there is no escape, and they will prefer death to flight.

Cf. Nicias’ speech to the Athenians: Τό τε ξύμπαν γνῶτε, ὦ ἄνδρες
στρατιῶται, ἀναγκαῖόν τε ὂν ὑμῖν ἀνδράσιν ἀγαθοῖς γίγνεσθαι ὡς μὴ
ὄντος χωρίου ἐγγὺς ὅποι ἂν μαλακισθέντες σωθείητε, etc. [Thuc.
VII. 77. vii.]

If they will face death, there is nothing they may not achieve.

死 by itself constitutes the protasis, and 焉 is the interrogative
= 安. Capt. Calthrop makes the protasis end with 得: “If there be
no alternative but death.” But I do not see how this is to be got
out of the Chinese. Chang Yü gives a clear paraphrase: 士卒死戰安不得志,
and quotes his favourite Wei Liao Tzŭ (ch. 3): 一夫仗劔擊於市萬人無不避之者
臣謂非一人之獨勇萬人皆不肖也何則必死與必生固不侔也 “If one man were to run
amok with a sword in the market-place, and everybody else tried to
get out of his way, I should not allow that this man alone had
courage and that all the rest were contemptible cowards. The truth
is, that a desperado and a man who sets some value on his life do
not meet on even terms.”

Officers and men alike will put forth their uttermost strength.

士人 appears to stand for the more usual 士卒. Chang Yü says: 同在
難地安得不共竭其力 “If they are in an awkward place together, they
will surely exert their united strength to get out of it.”

24. 兵士甚陷則不懼無所往則固深入則拘不得已則鬥

Soldiers when in desperate straits lose the sense of fear. If there is no place of refuge, they will stand firm. If they are in the heart of a hostile country, they will show a stubborn front.

Capt. Calthrop weakly says: “there is unity,” as though the text
were 則專, as in § 20. But 拘 introduces quite a new idea—that of
_tenacity_—which Ts‘ao Kung tries to explain by the word 縛 “to
bind fast.”

If there is no help for it, they will fight hard.

25. 是故其兵不修而戒不求而得不約而親不令而信

Thus, without waiting to be marshalled, the soldiers will be constantly on the _qui vive_;

Tu Mu says: 不待修整而自戒懼. Capt. Calthrop wrongly translates 不修
“without warnings.”

without waiting to be asked, they will do your will;

Literally, “without asking, you will get.” Chang Yü’s paraphrase
is: 不求索而得情意.

without restrictions, they will be faithful;

Chang Yü says: 不約束而親上.

without giving orders, they can be trusted.

This last clause is very similar in sense to the one preceding,
except that 親 indicates the soldiers’ attachment to their leader,
and 信 the leader’s attitude towards them. I rather doubt if
信 can mean “they will have confidence in their leader,” as the
commentary seems to indicate. That way, the sense is not nearly
so good. On the other hand, it is just possible that here, as in
VIII. § 8 and _infra_, § 55, 信 may = 申: “without orders, they
will carry out [their leader’s plans].” The whole of this
paragraph, of course, has reference to “desperate ground.”

26. 禁祥去疑至死無所災

Prohibit the taking of omens, and do away with superstitious doubts.

祥 is amplified by Ts‘ao Kung into 妖祥之言, and 疑 into 疑惑之計.
Cf. the _Ssŭ-ma Fa_, ch. 3: 滅厲祥.

Then, until death itself comes, no calamity need be feared.

The superstitious, “bound in to saucy doubts and fears,”
degenerate into cowards and “die many times before their deaths.”
Tu Mu quotes Huang-shih Kung: 禁巫祝不得爲吏士卜問軍之吉凶恐亂軍士之心
“‘Spells and incantations should be strictly forbidden, and no
officer allowed to inquire by divination into the fortunes of an
army, for fear the soldier’s minds should be seriously perturbed.’
The meaning is,” he continues, “that if all doubts and scruples
are discarded, your men will never falter in their resolution
until they die.” The reading of the standard text is 無所之 “there
will be no refuge,” which does not fit in well here. I therefore
prefer to adopt the variant 災, which evidently stood in Li
Ch‘üan’s text.

27. 吾士無餘財非惡貨也無餘命非惡壽也

If our soldiers are not overburdened with money, it is not because they have a distaste for riches; if their lives are not unduly long, it is not because they are disinclined to longevity.

Chang Yü has the best note on this passage: 貨與壽人之所愛也所以燒擲
財寳割棄性命者非憎惡之也不得已也 “Wealth and long life are things for
which all men have a natural inclination. Hence, if they burn or
fling away valuables, and sacrifice their own lives, it is not
that they dislike them, but simply that they have no choice.” Sun
Tzŭ is slyly insinuating that, as soldiers are but human, it is
for the general to see that temptations to shirk fighting and grow
rich are not thrown in their way. Capt. Calthrop, mistaking 惡 for
the adjective, has: “not because money is a bad thing ... not
because long life is evil.”

28. 令發之日士卒坐者涕霑襟偃臥者涕交頤投之無所往者諸劌之勇也

On the day they are ordered out to battle, your soldiers may weep,