Chapter XI: Indian Territory in 1863, January to June Inclusive (1)

As with the war as a whole, so with that part of it waged on the Arkansas frontier, the year 1863 proved critical. Its midsummer season saw the turning-point in the respective fortunes of the North and the South, both in the east and in the west. The beginning of 1863 was a time for recording great depletion of resources in Indian Territory, as elsewhere, great disorganization within Southern Indian ranks, and much privation, suffering, and resultant dissatisfaction among the tribes generally. The moment called for more or less sweeping changes in western commands. Those most nearly affecting the Arkansas frontier were the establishment of Indian Territory as a separate military entity[692] and the detachment of western Louisiana

[Footnote 692: The establishment of a separate command for Indian Territory was not accomplished all at once. In December, 1862, Steele had been ordered to report to Holmes for duty and, in the first week of January, he was given the Indian Territory post, subject to Hindman. On or about the eighth, he assumed command [_Official Records_, vol. xxii, part i, 28] at Fort Smith. In less than a week thereafter, his command was separated from that of Hindman [Ibid., part ii, 771]. The following document shows exactly what had been the previous relation between the two:

Head Qrs. Dept. Indn. Terry.
Ft. Smith, Jan. 31st, 1863.

COLONEL: Your special No. 22, par. viii has been recd. I would respectfully suggest that when assigned to this command by Maj. Gen'l Hindman the command was styled in orders, "1st Div'n 1st Corps Trans. Miss. Army." The special order referred to, it is respectfully suggested, may be susceptible of misconstruction as there are under my command two separate Brigades, one under the command (cont.)]

and Texas from the Trans-Mississippi Department.[693] Both were accomplished in January and both were directly due to a somewhat tardy realization of the vast strategic importance of the Indian country. Unwieldy, geographically, the Trans-Mississippi Department had long since shown itself to be. Moreover, it was no longer even passably safe to leave the interests of Indian Territory subordinated to those of Arkansas.[694]

The man chosen, after others, his seniors in rank, had declined the dubious honor,[695] for the command of Indian Territory was William Steele, brigadier-general, northern born, of southern sympathies. Thus was ignored whatever claim Douglas H. Cooper might have been thought to have by reason of his intimate and long acquaintance with Indian affairs and his influence, surpassingly great, with certain of the tribes. Cooper's unfortunate weakness, addiction to intemperance, had stood more or less in the way of his promotion right along just as it had decreased his military efficiency on at least one memorable occasion and had hindered the confirmation of his appointment as superintendent of Indian affairs in the Arkansas and Red River constituency. In this narrative, as events are divulged, it will be seen that the preference for Steele exasperated Cooper, who was not a big enough man to put love of country before the gratification of his own

[Footnote 692: (cont.) of Gen'l D.H. Cooper and one under command of Col. J.W. Speight.

I am, Col., Very Res'py W. STEELE, _Brig. Gen'l_., Col. S.S. Anderson, A.A.G.

P.S. Please find enclosed printed Gen. Order, no. 4, which I have assumed the responsibility of issuing on receipt of Lt. Gen'l Holmes' order declaring my command in the Ind'n country independent.

(Sd) W. STEELE, _Brig. Gen'l_.

[A.G.O., _Confederate Records_, chap. 2, no. 270, p. 65].]

[Footnote 693: _Official Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, 771-772.]

[Footnote 694:--Ibid., 771.]

[Footnote 695:--Ibid., 843; _Confederate Records_, chap. 2, no. 270, pp. 25-27.]

ambition, consequently friction developed between him and his rival highly detrimental to the service to which each owed his best thought, his best endeavor.[696]

Conditions in Indian Territory, at the time Steele took command, were conceivably the worst that could by any possibility be imagined. The land had been stripped of its supplies, the troops were scarcely worthy of the name.[697] Around Fort Smith, in Arkansas, things were equally bad.[698] People were clamoring for protection against marauders, some were wanting only the opportunity to move themselves and their effects far away out of the reach of danger, others were demanding that the unionists be cleaned out just as secessionists had, in some cases, been. Confusion worse confounded prevailed. Hindman had resorted to a system of almost wholesale furloughing to save expense.[699] Most of the Indians had taken advantage of it and were off duty when Steele arrived. Many had preferred to subsist at government cost.[700] There was so little in their own homes for them to get. Forage was practically non-existent and Steele soon had it impressed [701] upon him that troops in the Indian Territory ought, as Hindman had come to think months before,[702] to be all unmounted.

Although fully realizing that it was incumbent upon him to hold Fort Smith as a sort of key to his entire command, Steele knew it would be impossible to

[Footnote 696: It might as well be said, at the outset, that Cooper was not the ranking officer of Steele. He claimed that he was [_Official Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, 1037-1038]; but the government disallowed the contention [Ibid., 1038].]

[Footnote 697:--Ibid., part i, 28; part ii, 862, 883, 909.]

[Footnote 698: _Confederate Records_, chap. 2, no. 270, pp. 29-30.]

[Footnote 699: _Official Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, 895, 909.]

[Footnote 700:--Ibid., part i, 30.]

[Footnote 701: _Confederate Records_, chap. 2, no. 270, p. 31.]

[Footnote 702: _Official Records_, vol. xiii, 51.]

maintain any considerable force there. He, therefore, resolved to take big chances and to attempt to hold it with as few men as his commissary justified, trusting that he would be shielded from attack "by the inclemency of the season and the waters of the Arkansas."[703] The larger portion of his army[704] was sent southward, in the direction of Red River.[705] But lack of food and forage was, by no manner of means, the only difficulty that confronted Steele. He was short of guns, particularly of good guns,[706] and distressingly short of money.[707] The soldiers had not been paid for months.

The opening of 1863 saw changes, equally momentous, in Federal commands. Somewhat captiously, General Schofield discounted recent achievements of Blunt and advised that Blunt's District of Kansas should be completely disassociated from the Division of the Army of the Frontier,[708] which he had, at Schofield's own earlier request, been commanding. It was another instance of personal jealousy, interstate rivalry, and local

[Footnote 703: _Official Records_, vol. xxii, part i, 30.]

[Footnote 704: Perhaps the word, _army_, is inapplicable here. Steele himself was in doubt as to whether he was in command of an army or of a department [_Confederate Records_, chap. 2, no. 270, p. 54].]

[Footnote 705: _Confederate Records_, chap. 2, no. 270, p. 36. See also, Steele to Anderson, January 22, 1863 [ibid., 50-51], which besides detailing the movements of Steele's men furnishes, on the authority of "Mr. Thomas J. Parks of the Cherokee Nation," evidence of brutal murders and atrocities committed by Blunt's army "whilst on their march through the northwestern portion of this State in the direction of Kansas."]

[Footnote 706: Crosby's telegram, February first, to the Chief of Ordnance is sufficient attestation,

"Many of Cooper's men have inferior guns and many none at all. Can you supply?" [Ibid., 65-66].]

[Footnote 707: The detention and the misapplication of funds by William Quesenbury seem to have been largely responsible for Steele's monetary embarrassment [ibid., 28, 63-64, 75, 76, 77, 79-81, 101, 147]. Cotton speculation in Texas was alluring men with ready money southward [ibid., 94, 104].]

[Footnote 708: _Official Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, 6.]

conflict of interests.[709] So petty was Schofield and so much in a mood for disparagement that he went the length of condemning the work of Blunt and Herron[710] in checking Hindman's advance as but a series of blunders and their success at Prairie Grove as but due to an accident.[711] General Curtis, without, perhaps, having any particular regard for the aggrieved parties himself, resented Schofield's insinuations against their military capacity, all the more so, no doubt, because he was not above making the same kind of criticisms himself and was not impervious to them. In the sequel, Schofield reorganized the divisions of his command, relieved Blunt altogether, and personally resumed the direction of the Army of the Frontier.[712] Blunt went back to his District of Kansas and made his headquarters at Fort Leavenworth.

In some respects, the reorganization decided upon by Schofield proved a consummation devoutly to be wished; for, within the reconstituted First Division was placed an Indian Brigade, which was consigned to the charge of a man the best fitted of all around to have it, Colonel William A. Phillips.[713] And that was not all; inasmuch as the Indian Brigade, consisting of the three regiments of Indian Home Guards, a battalion of the Sixth Kansas Cavalry, and a four-gun battery that had been captured at the Battle of Old

[Footnote 709: It seems unnecessary and inappropriate to drag into the present narrative the political squabbles that disgraced Missouri, Kansas, Arkansas, and Colorado during the war. Lane was against Schofield, Gamble against Curtis.]

[Footnote 710: Yet both Blunt and Herron were, at this very time, in line for promotion, as was Schofield, to the rank of major-general [_Official Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, II, 95.]]

[Footnote 711:--Ibid., 6, 12, 95; _Confederate Military History_, vol. x, 195.]

[Footnote 712:--Ibid., 22.]

[Footnote 713: Britton, _Civil War on the Border_ vol. ii, 18-19.]

Fort Wayne,[714] was almost immediately detached from the rest of Schofield's First Division and assigned to discretionary "service in the Indian Nation and on the western border of Arkansas."[715] It continued so detached even after Schofield's command had been deprived by Curtis of the two districts over which the brigade was to range, the eighth and the ninth.[716] Thus, at the beginning of 1863, had the Indian Territory in a sense come into its own. Both the Confederates and the Federals had given it a certain measure of military autonomy or, at all events, a certain opportunity to be considered in and for itself.

Indian Territory as a separate military entity came altogether too late into the reckonings of the North and the South. It was now a devastated land, in large areas, desolate. General Curtis and many another like him might well express regret that the red man had to be offered up in the white man's slaughter.[717] It was unavailing regret and would ever be. Just as with the aborigines who lay athwart the path of empire and had to yield or be crushed so with the civilized Indian of 1860. The contending forces of a fratricidal war had little mercy for each other and none at all for him. Words of sympathy were empty indeed. His fate was inevitable. He was between the upper and the nether mill-stones and, for him, there was no escape.

Indian Territory was really in a terrible condition. Late in 1862, it had been advertised even by southern men as lost to the Confederate cause and had been

[Footnote 714: It is not very clear whether or not the constituents of the Indian Brigade were all at once decided upon. They are listed as they appear in Britton, _Civil War on the Border_, vol. ii, 3. Schofield seems to have hesitated in the matter [_Official Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, 26].]

[Footnote 715:--Ibid., 33.]

[Footnote 716: On the subject of the reduction of Schofield's command, see Ibid., 40.]

[Footnote 717: Curtis to Phillips, February 17, 1863, Ibid., 113-114.]

practically abandoned to the jayhawker. Scouting parties of both armies, as well as guerrillas, had preyed upon it like vultures. Indians, outside of the ranks, were tragic figures in their utter helplessness. They dared trust nobody. It was time the Home Guard was being made to justify its name. Indeed, as Ellithorpe reported, "to divert them to any other operations" than those within their own gates "will tend to demoralize them to dissolution."[718]

The winter of 1862-1863 was a severe one. Its coming had been long deferred; but, by the middle of January, the cold weather had set in in real earnest. Sleet and snow and a constantly descending thermometer made campaigning quite out of the question. Colonel Phillips, no more than did his adversary, General Steele, gave any thought to an immediate offensive. Like Steele his one idea was to replenish resources and to secure an outfit for his men. They had been provided with the half worn-out baggage train of Blunt's old division. It was their all and would be so until their commander could supplement it by contrivances and careful management. Incidentally, Phillips expected to hold the line of the Arkansas River; but not to attempt to cross it until spring should come. It behooved him to look out for Marmaduke whose expeditions into Missouri[719] were cause for anxiety, especially as their range might at any moment be extended.

The Indian regiments of Phillips's brigade were soon reported[720] upon by him and declared to be in a sad state. The first regiment was still, to all intents and purposes, a Creek force, notwithstanding that its fortunes had been varied, its desertions, incomparable.

[Footnote 718: _Official Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, 49.]

[Footnote 719: _Confederate Military History_, vol. x, 161, 162.]

[Footnote 720: _Official Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, 56-58.]

The second regiment, after many vicissitudes, and after having gotten rid of its unmanageable elements, notably, the Osages and the Quapaws, had become a Cherokee and the third was largely so. That third regiment was Phillips's own and was the only one that could claim the distinction of being disciplined and even it was exposed occasionally to the chronic weakness of all Indian soldiers, absence without leave. The Indian, on his own business bent, was disposed to depart whenever he pleased, often, too, at times most inopportune, sometimes, when he had been given a special and particular task. He knew not the usages of army life and really meant no offence; but, all the same, his utter disregard of army discipline made for great disorder.

It was not the chief cause of disorder, however, for that was the unreliability of the regimental officers. The custom, from the first, had been to have the field officers white men, a saving grace; but the company officers, with few exceptions, had been Indians and totally incompetent. Strange as it may seem, drilling was almost an unknown experience to the two regiments that had been mustered in for the First Indian Expedition. To obviate some of the difficulties already encountered, Phillips had seen to it that the third regiment had profited by the mistakes of its forerunners. It had, therefore, been supplied with white first lieutenants and white sergeants, secured from among the non-commissioned men of other commands. The result had fully justified the innovation. After long and careful observation, Phillips's conclusion was that it was likely to be productive of irretrievable disaster and consequently an unpardonable error of judgment "to put men of poor ability in an Indian regiment." Primitive man has an inordinate respect for a strong

character. He appreciates integrity, though he may not have it among his own gifts of nature. "An Indian company improperly officered" will inevitably become, to somebody's discomfiture, "a frightful mess."

If any one there was so foolish as to surmise that the independent commands, northern and southern, would be given free scope to solve the problems of Indian Territory, unhampered by contingent circumstances, he was foreordained to grevious disappointment. Indian Territory had still to subserve the interests of localities, relatively more important. It would be so to the very end. In and for herself, she would never be allowed to do anything and her commanders, no matter how much they might wish it otherwise--and to their lasting honor, be it said, many of them did--would always have to subordinate her affairs to those of the sovereign states around her; for even northern states were sovereign in practice where Indians were concerned. General Steele was one of the men who endeavored nobly to take a large view of his responsibilities to Indian Territory. Colonel Phillips, his contemporary in the opposite camp, was another; but both met with insuperable obstacles. The attainment of their objects was impossible from the start. Both men were predestined to failure.

Foraging or an occasional scouting when the weather permitted was the only order of the winter days for Federals and Confederates. With the advent of spring, however, Phillips became impatient for more aggressive action. He had been given a large programme, no insignificant part of which was, the restoration of refugees to their impoverished homes; but his first business would necessarily have to be, the occupancy of the country. Not far was he allowed to venture within

it during the winter; because his superior officers wished him to protect, before anything else, western Arkansas. Schofield and, after Schofield's withdrawal from the command of southwestern Missouri, Curtis had insisted upon that, while Blunt, to whom Phillips, after a time, was made immediately accountable, was guardedly of another way of thinking and, although not very explicit, seemed to encourage Phillips in planning an advance.

Phillips's inability to progress far in the matter of occupancy of Indian Territory did not preclude his keeping a close tab on Indian affairs therein, such a tab, in fact, as amounted to fomenting an intrigue. It will be recalled that on the occasion of his making the excursion into the Cherokee Nation, which had resulted in his incendiary destruction of Fort Davis, he had gained intimations of a rather wide-spread Indian willingness to desert the Confederate service. He had sounded Creeks and Choctaws and had found them surprisingly responsive to his machinations. They were nothing loath to confess that they were thoroughly disgusted with the southern alliance. It had netted them nothing but unutterable woe. Among those that Phillips approached, although not personally, was Colonel McIntosh, who communicated with Phillips through two intimate friends. McIntosh was persuaded to attempt no immediate demonstration in favor of the North; for that would be premature, foolhardy; but to bide the time, which could not be far distant, when the Federal troops would be in a position to support him.[721] The psychological moment was not yet. Blunt called Phillips back for operations outside of Indian

[Footnote 721: _Official Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, 61-62.]

Territory; but the seed of treason had been sown and sown in fertile soil, in the heart of a McIntosh.[722]

In January, 1863, Phillips took up again the self-imposed task of emissary.[723] The unionist Cherokees, inclusive of those in the Indian Brigade, were contemplating holding a national council on Cowskin Prairie, which was virtually within the Federal lines. Secessionist Cherokees, headed by Stand Watie, were determined that such a council should not meet if they could possibly prevent it and prevent it they would if they could only get a footing north of the Arkansas River. Their suspicion was, that the council, if assembled, would declare the treaty with the Confederate States abrogated. To circumvent Stand Watie, to conciliate some of the Cherokees by making reparation for past outrages, and to sow discord among others, Phillips despatched Lieutenant-colonel Lewis Downing on a scout southward. He was just in time; for the Confederates were on the brink of hazarding a crossing at two places, Webber's Falls and Fort Gibson.[724] Upon the return of Downing, Phillips himself moved across the border with the avowed intention of rendering military support, if needed, to the Cherokee Council, which convened on the fourth of February.[725] From Camp Ross, he continued to send out scouting parties, secret agents,[726] and agents of distribution.

The Cherokee Council assembled without the preliminary formality of a new election. War conditions

[Footnote 722: This remark would be especially applicable if the Colonel McIntosh, mentioned by Phillips, was Chilly, the son of William McIntosh of Indian Springs Treaty notoriety.]

[Footnote 723: _Official Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, 100.]

[Footnote 724:--Ibid., 85.]

[Footnote 725:--Ibid., 96-97.]

[Footnote 726:--Ibid., 100, 108.]

had made regular pollings impossible. Consequently, the council that convened in February, 1863 was, to all intents and purposes, the selfsame body that, in October, 1861, had confirmed the alliance with the Confederate States. It was Phillips's intention to stand by, with military arm upraised, until the earlier action had been rescinded. While he waited, word came that the harvest of defection among the Creeks had begun; for "a long line of persons"[727] was toiling through the snow, each wearing the white badge on his hat that Phillips and McIntosh had agreed should be their sign of fellowship. Then came an order for Phillips to draw back within supporting distance of Fayetteville, which, it was believed, the Confederates were again threatening.[728] Phillips obeyed, as perforce, he had to; but he left a detachment behind to continue guarding the Cherokee Council.[729]

The legislative work of the Cherokee Council, partisan body that it was, with Lewis Downing as its presiding officer and Thomas Pegg as acting Principal Chief, was reactionary, yet epochal. It comprised several measures and three of transcendant importance, passed between the eighteenth and the twenty-first:

1. An act revoking the alliance with the Confederate States and re-asserting allegiance to the United States.

2. An act deposing all officers of any rank or character whatsoever, inclusive of legislative, executive, judicial, who were serving in capacities disloyal to the United States and to the Cherokee Nation.

[Footnote 727: _Official Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, 101.]

[Footnote 728:--Ibid., 111-112.]

[Footnote 729:--Ibid., 115.]

3. An act emancipating slaves throughout the Cherokee country.[730]

His detention in Arkansas was not at all to Phillips's liking. It tried his patience sorely; for he felt the crying need of Indian Territory for just such services as his and, try as he would, he could not visualize that of Arkansas. Eagerly he watched for a chance to return to the Cherokee country. One offered for the fifth of March but had to be given up. Again and yet again in letters[731] to Curtis and Blunt he expostulated against delay but delay could not well be avoided. The pressure from Arkansas for assistance was too great. Blunt sympathized with Phillips more than he dared openly admit and tacitly sanctioned his advance. Never at any time could there have been the slightest doubt as to the singleness of the virile Scotchman's purpose. In imagination he saw his adopted country repossessed of Indian Territory and of all the overland approaches to Texas and Mexico from whence, as he supposed, the Confederacy expected to draw her grain and other supplies. Some regard for the Indian himself he doubtless had; but he used it as a means to the greater end. His sense of justice was truly British in its keenness.

[Footnote 730: Ross to Dole, April 2, 1863 [Indian Office General Files, _Cherokee_, 1859-1865, R 87]; Commissioner of Indian Affairs, _Report_, 1863, p. 23; Britton, _Civil War on the Border_, vol. ii, 24-25; Moore, _Rebellion Record_, vol. vi, 50; Eaton, _John Ross and the Cherokee Indians_, 196.]

[Footnote 731: Britton [_Civil War on the Border_, vol. ii, 27] conveys the idea that, while Phillips, truly enough, wished to enter the Indian country at the earliest day practicable, he did not care to go there before the Indian ponies could "live on the range." He knew that the refugees at Neosho would insist upon following in his wake. It would be heartless to expose them to starvation and to the ravages of diseases like the small-pox. Nevertheless, the correspondence of Phillips, scattered through the _Official Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, 121-367, shows conclusively that the weeks of waiting were weary ones.]

His Indian soldiers loved him. They believed in him. He was able to accomplish wonders in training them. He looked after their welfare and he did his best to make the government and its agents of the Indian Office keep faith with the refugees. Quite strenuously, too, he advocated further enlistments from among the Indians, especially from among those yet in Indian Territory. If the United States did not take care, the Confederates would successfully conscript where the Federals might easily recruit. In this matter as in many another, he had Blunt's unwavering support; for Blunt wanted the officers of the embryo fourth and fifth regiments to secure their commands. Blunt's military district was none too full of men.

March was then as now the planting season in the Arkansas Valley and, as Phillips rightly argued, if the indigent Indians were not to be completely pauperized, they ought to be given an opportunity to be thrown once more upon their own resources, to be returned home in time to put in crops. When the high waters subsided and the rivers became fordable, he grew more insistent. There was grass in the valley of the Arkansas and soon the Confederates would be seizing the stock that it was supporting. He had held the line of the Arkansas by means of scouts all winter, but scouting would not be adequate much longer. The Confederates were beginning, in imitation of the Federals, to attach indigents to their cause by means of relief distribution and the "cropping season was wearing on."

At the end of March, some rather unimportant changes were made by Curtis in the district limits of his department and coincidently Phillips moved over the border. The first of April his camp was at Park Hill. His great desire was to seize Fort Smith; for he

realized that not much recruiting could be done among the Choctaws while that post remained in Confederate hands. Blunt advised caution. It would not even do to attempt as yet any permanent occupation south of the Arkansas. Dashes at the enemy might be made, of course, but nothing more; for at any moment those higher up might order a retrograde movement and anyhow no additional support could be counted upon. Halleck was still calling for men to go to Grant's assistance and accusing Curtis of keeping too many needlessly in the West. The Vicksburg campaign was on.

The order that Blunt anticipated finally came and Curtis called for Phillips to return. La Rue Harrison, foraging in Arkansas,[732] was whining for assistance. Phillips temporized, having no intention whatsoever of abandoning his appointed goal. His arguments were unanswerable but Curtis like Halleck could never be made to appreciate the plighted faith that lay back of Indian participation in the war and the strategic importance of Indian Territory. The northern Indian regiments, pleaded Phillips, were never intended for use in Arkansas. Why should they go there? It was doubtful if they could ever be induced to go there again. They had been recruited to recover the Indian Territory and now that they were within it they were going to stay until the object had been attained. Phillips solicited Blunt's backing and got it, to the extent, indeed, that Blunt informed Curtis that if he wanted Indian Territory given up he must order it himself and take the consequences. It was not given up but Phillips suffered great embarrassments in holding it. The only support Blunt could render him was to send a negro regiment to Baxter Springs to protect supply

[Footnote 732: _Confederate Military History_, vol. x, 166-168.]

trains. Guerrillas and bushwhackers were everywhere and Phillips's command was half-starved. Smallpox[733] broke out and, as the men became more and more emaciated, gained ground. Phillips continued to make occasional dashes at the enemy and in a few engagements he was more than reasonably successful. Webber's Falls was a case in point.

As May advanced, the political situation in Missouri seemed to call loudly for a change in department commanders and President Lincoln, quite on his own initiative apparently, selected Schofield to succeed Curtis,[734] Curtis having identified himself with a faction opposed to Governor Gamble. The selection was obnoxious to many and to none more than to Herron and to Blunt, whose military exploits Schofield had belittled. The former threatened resignation if Schofield were appointed but the latter restrained himself and for a brief space all went well, Schofield even manifesting some sympathy for Phillips at Fort Gibson, or Fort Blunt, as the post, newly fortified, was now called. He declared that the Arkansas River must be secured its entire length; but the Vicksburg campaign was still demanding men and Phillips had to struggle on, unaided. Indeed, he was finally told that if he could not hold on by himself he must fall back and let the Indian Territory take care of itself until Vicksburg should have fallen.

[Footnote 733: Britton, _Civil War on the Border_, vol. ii, 26.]

[Footnote 734: A change had been resolved upon in March, E.V. Sumner being the man chosen; but he died on the way out [Livermore, _Story of the Civil War_, part iii, book i, 256]. Sumner had had a wide experience with frontier conditions, first, in the marches of the dragoons [Pelzer, _Marches of the Dragoons in the Mississippi Valley_] later, in New Mexico [Abel, _Official Correspondence of James S. Calhoun_], and, still later, in ante-bellum Kansas. His experience had been far from uniformly fortunate but he had learned a few very necessary lessons, lessons that Schofield had yet to con.]

The inevitable clash between Schofield and Blunt was not long deferred. It came over a trifling matter but was fraught with larger meanings.[735] It was probably as much to get away from Schofield's near presence as to see to things himself in Indian Territory that led Blunt to go down in person to Fort Gibson. He arrived there on the eleventh of July, taking Phillips entirely by surprise. Vicksburg had fallen about a week before.

The difficulties besetting Colonel Phillips were more than matched by those besetting General Steele. He, too, struggled on unaided, nay, more, he was handicapped at every turn. Scarcely had he taken command at Fort Smith when he was apprised of the fact that the chief armorer there had been ordered to remove all the tools to Arkadelphia.[736] Steele was hard put to it to obtain any supplies at all.[737] Many that he did get the promise of were diverted from their course,[738] just as were General Pike's. This was true even in the case of shoes.[739] He tried to fit his regiments out one by one with the things the men required in readiness for a spring campaign[740] but it was up-hill work. And what was perfectly incomprehensible to him was, that when his need was so great there was yet corn available for private parties to speculate in and to realize enormous profits on.[741] In April, the Indian regiments, assembling and reforming in expectation of a call to action, made special demands upon his granaries but they were

[Footnote 735: June 9, orders issued redistricting Schofield's Department of Missouri [_Official Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, 315].]

[Footnote 736: _Confederate Records_, chap. 2, no. 270, p. 34.]

[Footnote 737: Steele to Blair, February 10, 1863, Ibid., 87-88.]

[Footnote 738: Steele to Anderson, February 8, 1863, Ibid., 81-82.]

[Footnote 739: Duval to Cabell, May 15, 1863, Ibid., 244-245.]

[Footnote 740: Steele to Cabell, March 19, 1863, Ibid., 148.]

[Footnote 741: Steele to Anderson, March 22, 1863, Ibid., 158.]

nearly empty.[742] It was not possible for him to furnish corn for seed or, finally, the necessaries of life to indigent Indians. Indian affairs complicated, his situation tremendously.[743] He could get no funds and no

[Footnote 742: Steele to Anderson, April 3, 1863, _Confederate Records_, 179-180.]

[Footnote 743: For instance the officers of the First Cherokee regiment had a serious dispute as to the ranking authority among them [Ibid., Letter from Steele, March 14, 1863, p. 143]. The following letters indicate that there were other troubles and other tribes in trouble also:

(a)

"Your communication of 13 Inst. is to hand. I am directed by the Commanding Gen'l to express to you his warmest sympathy in behalf of your oppressed people, and his desire and determination to do all that may be in his power to correct existing evils and ameliorate the condition of the loyal Cherokees. The Gen'l feels proud to know that a large portion of your people, actuated by a high spirit of patriotism, have shown themselves steadfast and unyielding in their allegiance to our Government notwithstanding the bitter hardships and cruel ruthless outrages to which they have been subjected.

"It is hoped that the time is not very far distant, when your people may again proudly walk their own soil, exalted in the feeling, perhaps with the consciousness that our cruel and cowardly foe has been adequately punished and humiliated.

"Your communication has been ford. to Lt Gen'l Holmes with the urgent request that immediate steps be taken to bring your people fully within the pale of civilized warfare.

"It is hoped that there may be no delay in a matter so vitally important.

"We are looking daily for the arrival of Boats from below with corn, tis the wish of the Gen'l that the necessitous Indians sh'd be supplied from this place. Boats w'd be sent farther up the river, were we otherwise circumstanced. As it is the Boats have necessarily to run the gauntlet of the enemy--The Gen'l however hopes to be able to keep the River free to navigation until a sufficient supply of corn to carry us through the winter can be accumulated at this place.

"You will receive notice of the arrival of corn so that it may be conveyed to the Indians needing it."--CROSBY to Stand Watie, commanding First Cherokee Regiment, February 16, 1863, Ibid., pp. 91-93.

(b)

"I am directed by Gen'l Steele to say that a delegation from the Creeks have visited him since your departure and a full discussion has been had of such matters as they are interested in.

"They brought with them a letter from the Principal Chief Moty Kennard asking that the Cattle taken from the refugee Creeks be turned over to the use of the loyal people of the nation. The Gen. Com'dg has ordered a disposition of these Cattle to be made in accordance with the wishes of the chief. If necessary please give such instructions as will attain this object. (cont.)]

instructions from Richmond so he dealt with the natives as best he could.[744] Small-pox became epidemic

[Footnote 743: (cont.) No Boats yet. Will endeavor to send one up the river should more than one arrive."--Crosby to D.H. Cooper, February 19, 1863, Ibid., p. 97.

(c)

"I enclose, herewith, a letter from the agent of the Seminoles. You will see from that letter the danger we are in from neglecting the wants of the Indians. I have never had one cent of money pertaining to the Indian superintendency, nor have I received any copies of treaties, nor anything else that would give me an insight into the affairs of that Department. I wrote, soon after my arrival at this place, to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs but have received no reply. If you have any knowledge of the whereabouts of the superintendent who has been lately appointed I hope you will urge upon him the necessity of coming at once and attending to these matters."--STEELE to Anderson, April 6, 1863, Ibid., 180.

(d)

"I have today received a long letter from the Chief of the Osages, which I enclose for your perusal. Maj. Dorn came in from Texas a few days since, and has, I understand, gone down to Little Rock on the steamer 'Tahlequah.' It is certainly represented that a portion of the funds in his hands is in specie. Please have the latter surely delivered. Please return Black Dog's letter unless you wish to forward it."--STEELE to Holmes, May 16, 1863, Ibid., 249.

(e)

"Letters, received today, indicate a great necessity for your presence with the tribe for whom you are Agent. I wish you, therefore, to visit them, and relieve the discontent, as far as the means in your hands will permit. The Osage Chief, 'Black Dog,' now acting as 1st Chief, claims that certain money has been turned over to you for certain purposes, for which they have received nothing."--STEELE to A.J. Dorn, May 16, 1863, Ibid., 249.]

[Footnote 744: "Your letter of May 6th, with letter of Black Dog enclosed, has been received and the enclosure forwarded to Lieut. Gen. Holmes for his information. The General Com'dg desires me to express his regrets that the affairs of the Osage and Seminole tribes should be in such a deplorable condition, but he is almost powerless, at present, to remedy the evils you so justly complain of. He has written again and again to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs at Richmond requesting instructions in the discharge of his duties as ex-officio Superintendent of Indian Affairs, but not a word has ever been received in reply to his reiterated requests, owing probably to the difficulty of communication between this point and the Capital. He has also requested that funds be sent him to liquidate the just demands of our Indian Allies, but from the same cause his requests have met with no response. You must readily appreciate the difficulties under which Gen. Steele necessarily labors. In fact his action is completely paralized by the want of instructions and funds. In connection with this he has been compelled to exert every faculty in defending the line of the Arkansas River against an enemy, vastly his superior in arms, numbers, artillery and everything that adds to the efficiency of an army, and consequently has not been able to pay (cont.)]

among his men,[745] as among Phillips's--and from like causes.

Then General Steele had difficulty in getting his men and the right kind of men together. Lawless Arkansans were unduly desirous of joining the Indian regiments, thinking that discipline there would be lax enough to suit their requirements.[746] Miscellaneous conscripting by ex-officers of Arkansan troops gave much cause for annoyance[747] as did also Cooper's unauthorized commissioning of officers to a regiment made

[Footnote 744: (cont.) that attention to the business of the superintendency that he would under other circumstances.

"It was stated, some time ago, in the newspapers, that a superintendent had been appointed in Richmond, and the General Com'dg has been anxiously expecting his arrival for several weeks. He earnestly hopes that the superintendent may soon reach the field of his labors, provided with instructions, funds and everything necessary to the discharge of his important duties.

"Major Dorn, the Agent for the Osages, was here, a few days ago, but he is now in Little Rock. The General has written to him, requiring him to come up immediately, visit the tribe for which he is the Agent and relieve their necessities as far as the means in his hands will permit.

"The General has been offically informed that Major D. has in his possession, for the use of the Osages twenty odd thousand dollars.

"I have to apologize, on the part of Gen'l Steele, for the various letters which have been received from you, and which still remain unanswered, but his excuse must be that, in the absence of proper instructions etc. he was really unable to answer your questions or comply with your requests, and he cannot make promises that there is not, at least, a _very strong probability_ of his being able to fulfil. Too much harm has already been occasioned in the Indian Country by reckless promises, and he considers it better, in every point of view, to deal openly and frankly with the Indians than to hold out expectations that are certain not to be realized.

"It is not possible, however, to say in a letter what could be so much better said in a personal interview, and the Gen'l therefore, desires me to say that as soon as your duties will admit of your absence, he will be happy to see and converse with you fully and freely at his Head Quarters" [Ibid., no. 268, pp. 27-29].

On this same subject, see also Steele to Wigfall, April 15, 1863, _Official Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, 819-821.]

[Footnote 745: _Confederate Records_, chap. 2, no. 270, p. 220.]

[Footnote 746: Steele to Anderson, May 9, 1863, Ibid., 233-234.]

[Footnote 747: Same to same, March 1, and 3, 1863, Ibid., 112-113, 113-114.]

out of odd battalions and independent companies.[748] Cooper, in fact, seemed bent upon tantalizing Steele and many of the Indians were behind him.[749] Colonel Tandy Walker was especially his supporter. Cooper had been Walker's choice for department commander[750] and continued so, in spite of all Steele's honest attempts to propitiate him and in spite of his promise to use every exertion to satisfy Choctaw needs generally.[751] To Tandy Walker Steele entrusted the business of recruiting anew among the Choctaws.[752]

[Footnote 748: Steele to Anderson, February 13, 1863, _Confederate Records_, chap 2, no. 270, p. 89.]

[Footnote 749: It was not true, apparently, that the Chickasaws were dissatisfied with Cooper. See the evidence furnished by themselves, _Official Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, 1116-1117.]

[Footnote 750: _Confederate Military History_, vol. x, 134, _footnote_.]

[Footnote 751: Steele to Tandy Walker, February 25, 1863, _Confederate Records_, chap. 2; no. 270, p. 109.]

[Footnote 752: Crosby to Walker, March 11, 1863, Ibid., p. 136. Steele thought that the Indians might as well be employed in a military way since they were more than likely to be a public charge. To Colonel Anderson he wrote, March 22, 1863 [Ibid., p. 155], "I forward the above copy of a letter from Gen'l Cooper for Gen'l Holmes' information. I purpose if not otherwise directed to call out all the available force of the Nations within the conscript age.... They have to be fed and might as well be organized and put into a position to be useful." From the correspondence of Steele, it would seem that there was some trouble over Walker's promotion. April 10, Steele wrote again to Anderson on the subject of Indian enrollment in the ranks and referred to the other matter.

"The enclosed copy of some articles in the Treaty between the C.S. Govt and the Choctaws with remarks by Gen'l Cooper are submitted for the consideration of the Lt. Gen'l.

"It appears that Col. Walker was recommended to fill the vacancy made by the promotion of Col. Cooper, the right being given by the treaty to appoint to the office of Col., the other offices being filled by election, and that at the time, the enemy were at Van Buren. Col. Walker being at the convenient point was put upon duty by Col. Cooper and has since been recognized by several acts of my own, not however with a full knowledge of the circumstances. That under instructions from Gen'l Hindman a Regt was being organized which it was expected would be commanded by Col. Folsom, the whole of which appears to be a very good arrangement. The necessity that exists of feeding nearly all the Indians would seem to present an (cont.)]

Furloughs and desertions were the bane of Steele's existence.[753] In these respects Alexander's brigade,

[Footnote 752: (cont.) additional reason for having them in service. Companies are also being organized from the Reserve Indians, with the view to replace white troops with them who are now engaged protecting the frontier from the incursions of the wild tribes. Moreover the enemy's forces being composed partially of Indians, the troops would be effective against them, when they might not be against other troops..." [Ibid., pp. 186-187]. Appointments, as well as promotions, within the Indian service caused Steele much perplexity. See Steele to Anderson, April 13, 1863, Ibid., pp. 190-191.]

[Footnote 753: Steele thought it desirable to arrest all men, at large, who were subject to military duty under the conscript act, unless they could produce evidence "of a right to remain off duty" [Crosby to Colonel Newton, January 12, 1863, Ibid., p. 32]. Presumably whole companies were deserting their posts [Crosby to Cooper, February 1, 1863, Ibid., pp. 66-67]. It was suggested that some deserters should be permitted to organize against jayhawkers as, under sanction from Holmes, had been the case with deserters in the Magazine Mountains [Steele to Anderson, February 1, 1863, Ibid., p. 67]. When word came that the Federals were about to organize militia in northwestern Arkansas, Steele ordered that all persons, subject to military duty, who should fail to enroll themselves before February 6, should be treated as bushwhackers [same to same, February 3, 1863, Ibid., pp. 69-70]. Colonel Charles DeMorse, whose Texas regiment had been ordered, February 15, to report to Cooper [Crosby to DeMorse, February 15, 1863, Ibid.,], asked to be allowed to make an expedition against the wild tribes. Some two hundred fifty citizens would be more than glad to accompany it. Steele was indignant and Duval, at his direction, wrote thus to Cooper, April 19: "... Now if these men were so anxious to march three or four hundred miles to _find_ the enemy, they could certainly be induced to take up arms _temporarily_ in defence of their immediate homes" [Ibid., p. 203]. It was not that Steele objected to expeditions against the wild tribes but he was disgusted with the lack of patriotism and military enthusiasm among the Texans and Arkansans. Colonel W.P. Lane's regiment of Texas Partizan Rangers was another that had to be chided for its dilatoriness [Ibid., pp. 168-169, 199, 234]. Deficient means of transportation was oftentimes the excuse given for failure to appear but Steele's complaint to Anderson, April 10 [Ibid., 185-186], was very much more to the point. He wrote,

"... I find that men are kept back upon every pretext; that QrMasters and Govt Agents or persons calling themselves such have detailed them to drive teams hauling cotton to Mexico, and employed them about the Gov't agencies. This cotton speculating mania is thus doing us great injury besides taking away all the transportation in the country...." Public feeling in Texas was on the side of deserters to a very great extent and in one instance, at least, Steele was forced to defer to it, "You will desist from the attempt to take the deserters from Hart's Company or any other in northern Texas if the state of public feeling is such that it cannot be done without (cont.)]

within which Colonel Phillips had detected traitors to the Confederate cause,[754] was, perhaps, the most incorrigible.[755] From department headquarters came impassioned appeals[756] for activity and for loyalty but

[Footnote 753: (cont.) danger of producing a collision with the people. The men are no doubt deserters, but we have no men to spare, to enforce the arrest at the present time" [Steele to Captain Randolph, July i, 1863, Ibid., p. 116. See also Steele to Borland, July 1, 1863, Ibid., no. 268, p. 117]. When West's Battery was ordered to report at Fort Smith it was discovered going in the opposite direction [Steele to J.E. Harrison, April 25, 1863, Ibid., no. 270, p. 213; Duval to Harrison, May 1, 1863, Ibid., p. 221; Steele to Anderson, May 9, 1863, Ibid., p. 233; Steele to Cooper, May 11 1863, Ibid., pp. 237-238].

One expedition to the plains that Steele distinctly encouraged was that organized by Captain Wells [Steele to Cooper, March 16, 1863, Ibid., pp. 145-146]. It was designed that Wells's command should operate on the western frontier of Kansas and intercept trains on the Santa Fé trail [Steele to Anderson, April 17, 1863, Ibid., p. 197].]

[Footnote 754: _Official Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, p. 62.]

[Footnote 755: For correspondence with Alexander objecting to further furloughing and urging the need of promptness, see _Confederate Records_, chap. 2, no. 270, pp. 121-122, 163-164, 170, 178-179, 210-211.]

[Footnote 756: The following are illustrations:

"... Every exertion is being made and the Gen'l feels confident that the means will be attained of embarking in an early spring campaign. It only remains for the officers and men to come forward to duty in a spirit of willingness and cheerfulness to render the result of operations in the Dept (or beyond it as the case may be) not only successful but to add fresh renown to the soldiers whom he has the honor to command ..."--CROSBY to Talliaferro, February 24, 1863, _Confederate Records_, chap. 2, no. 270, pp. 105-106.

"The Commanding Gen'l would be gratified to grant the within petition were it compatible with the interests of the service and the cause which petitioners 'Hold dearer than life.' He is fully aware of the many urgent reasons which a number of officers and men have for visiting their homes, providing for their families, etc., etc.

"The Enemy conscious of his superior strength is constantly threatening the small force that now holds him in check on the line of the Arkansas river. Speight's Brigade was sent to their present position--not because they were not needed here--but for the reason that it was an utter impossibility to subsist it in this region.

"Every consideration of patriotism and duty imperiously demands the presence of every officer and soldier belonging to this command. The season of active operations is at hand. The enemy in our front is actively employed in accumulating supplies and transportation and in massing, drilling, and disciplining his troops. His advance cannot be expected to be long (cont.)]

without telling or lasting effect. The Confederate service in Indian Territory was honeycombed with fraud and corruption.[757] Wastrels, desperadoes, scamps of every sort luxuriated at Indian expense. It was no wonder that false muster rolls had to be guarded against.[758] The Texans showed throughout so great an aversion to the giving of themselves or of their worldly goods[759] to the salvation of the country that

[Footnote 756: (cont.) delayed. This enemy is made up of Kansas Jayhawkers, 'Pin Indians,' and Traitors from Missouri, Arkansas and Texas. The ruin, devastation, oppression, and tyranny that has marked his progress has no parallel in history. The last official Report from your Brigade shews a sad state of weakness. Were the enemy informed on this point _our line of defence would soon be transferred from the Arkansas to Red river_. In the name of God, our country and all that is near and dear to us, let us discard from our minds every other consideration than that of a firm, fixed, and manly determination to do our duty and our whole duty to our country in her hour of peril and need. The season is propitious for an advance. Let not supineness, indifference and a lack of enthusiasm in a just and holy cause, compel a retreat Texas is the great Commissary Depot west of the Mississippi. The enemy must be kept as far from her rich fields and countless herds, as possible. Let us cheerfully, harmoniously, and in a spirit of manly sacrifice bend every energy mental and physical to preparations for a forward movement. The foregoing reasons for a refusal to grant leave of absence will serve as an answer in all similar cases and will be disseminated among the officers and men of the Brigade by the Commanders thereof."--CROSBY, by command of Steele, March 20, 1863, _Confederate Records_, chap. 2, no. 270, pp. 151-152.]

[Footnote 757: J.A. Scales to Adair, April 12, 1863, _Official Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, 821-822.]

[Footnote 758: _Confederate Records_, chap. 2, no. 270, p. 224.]

[Footnote 759: Holmes, as early as March, warned Steele that he would have to get his supplies soon from Texas. It would not be possible to draw them much longer from the Arkansas River. He was told to prepare to get them in Texas "at all hazard," which instruction was construed by Steele to mean, "take it, if you cant buy it" [Ibid., 145-146]. It was probably the prospect of having to use force or compulsion that made Steele so interested, late in May, in finding out definitely whether Hindman's acts in Arkansas had really been legalized [Steele to Blair, May 22, 1863, Ibid., 34]. Appreciating that it was matter of vital concern that the grain crop in northern Texas should be harvested, Steele was at a loss to know how to deal with petitions that solicited furloughs for the purpose [Steele to Anderson, May 4, 1863, Ibid., 227; Duval to Cabell, May 7, 1863, Ibid., 230-231]. Perhaps, it was a concession to some such need that induced him, in June, to permit seven day furloughs [Duval to Cooper, June 27, 1863, Ibid., no. 268, p. 100].]

Steele in despair cried out, "... it does appear as if the Texas troops on this frontier were determined to tarnish the proud fame that Texans have won in other fields."[760] The Arkansans were no better and no worse. The most fitting employment for many, the whole length and breadth of Steele's department, was the mere "ferreting out of jayhawkers and deserters."[761]

The Trans-Mississippi departmental change, effected in January, was of short duration, so short that it could never surely have been intended to be anything but transitional. In February the parts were re-united and Kirby Smith put in command of the whole,[762] President Davis explaining, not very candidly, that no dissatisfaction with Holmes was thereby implied.[763] Smith was the ranking officer and entitled to the first consideration. Moreover, Holmes had once implored that a substitute for himself be sent out. As a matter of fact, Holmes had become too much entangled with Hindman, too much identified with all that Arkansans objected to in Hindman,[764] his intolerance, his arrogance, his illegalities, for him to be retained longer, with complacency, in chief command. Hindman and he were largely to blame for the necessity[765] of suspending the privilege of the writ of _habeas corpus_ in Arkansas and the adjacent Indian country, which had just been done. Strong

[Footnote 760: Steele to Alexander, April 23, 1863, _Confederate Records_, no. 270, pp. 210-211.]