Chapter L: THOMAS, Adjutant-general226
[Footnote 223: Two thousand was most certainly the number, although the communication from the War Department gives it as five.]
[Footnote 224: Dole to Halleck, March 21, 1862 [Indian Office _Letter Book_, no. 67, 516-517].]
[Footnote 225:--Ibid., 517-518.]
[Footnote 226: _Official Records_, vol. viii, 624-625.]
Steele inferred from what passed at the interview with Halleck that the commanding general was decidedly opposed to arming Indians. Steele found him also non-committal as to when the auxiliary force would be available.[227] Dole's letter, with its seeming dictation as to the choice of a commander for the expedition, may not have been to Halleck's liking. He was himself at the moment most interested in the suppression of guerrillas and jayhawkers, against whom sentence of outlawry had just been passed. As it happened, that was the work in which Dole's nominee, Colonel Robert B. Mitchell,[228] was to render such signal service[229] and, anticipating as much, Halleck may have objected to his being thought of for other things. Furthermore, Dole had no right to so much as cast a doubt upon Halleck's own ability to select a proper commander.
A little perplexed but not at all daunted by Halleck's lack of cordiality, Steele proceeded on his journey and, arriving at Leavenworth, presented his credentials to Captain McNutt, who was in charge of the arsenal. Four hundred Indian rifles were at hand, ready for him, and others expected.[230] What to do next, was the question? Should he go on to Leroy and trust to the auxiliary force's showing up in season or wait for it? The principal part of his mission was yet to be executed. The Indians had to be enrolled and everything got in train for their expedition southward. Their homes
[Footnote 227: Steele to Dole, March 27, 1862 [Indian Office General Files, _Southern Superintendence_, 1859-1862, S 537 of 1862].]
[Footnote 228: Robert B. Mitchell was colonel, first of the Second Kansas Infantry, then of the Second Kansas Cavalry. He raised the former, in answer to President Lincoln's first call, 1861 [Crawford, _Kansas in the Sixties_, 20], chiefly in Linn County, and the latter in 1862.]
[Footnote 229: Connelley, _Quantrilt and the Border Wars_, 236 ff.]
[Footnote 230: Steele to Dole, March 26, 1862 [Indian Office General Files, _Southern Superintendence_, 1859-1862].]
once recovered, they were to be left in such shape as to be able to "protect and defend themselves."[231]
Halleck's preoccupation, prejudice, or whatever it was that prevented him from giving any satisfaction to Steele soon yielded, as all things sooner or later must, to necessity; but not to the extent of sanctioning the employment of Indians in warfare except as against other "Indians or in defense of their own territory and homes." The Pea Ridge atrocities were probably still fresh in his mind. On the fifth of April, he instructed[232] General Denver with a view to advancing, at last, the organization of the Indian expedition and Denver, Coffin, and Steele forthwith exerted all their energies in coöperating effort[233]. Some time was spent in inspecting arms[234] but, on the eighth, enough for two thousand Indians went forward in the direction of Leroy and Humboldt[235] and on the sixteenth were delivered to the superintendent[236]. Coffin surmised that new complications would arise as soon as the distribution began; for all the Indians, whether they intended to enlist or not, would try to secure guns. Nothing had yet been said about their pay and nothing heard of an auxiliary force[237]. Again the question was, what,
[Footnote 231: Dole to Steele, March 21, 1862, Indian Office _Letter Book_, no. 67, 508-509.]
[Footnote 232: _Official Records_, vol. viii, 665.]
[Footnote 233: Dole's name might well be added to this list; for he had never lost his interest or relaxed his efforts. On the fifth of April, he communicated to Secretary Smith the intelligence that he had issued instructions to "the officers appointed to command the two Regiments of Indians to be raised as Home Guard to report at Fort Leavenworth to be mustered into service ... "--Indian Office _Report Book_, no. 12, 357.]
[Footnote 234: Steele to Dole, April 7, 1862 [Ibid., General Files, _Southern Superintendency_, 1859-1862, S 538 of 1862].]
[Footnote 235: Denver to Halleck, April 8, 1862 [_Official Records_, vol. viii, 679].]
[Footnote 236: Commissioner of Indian Affairs, _Report_, 1862, 148.]
[Footnote 237: "... I fear we shall have trouble in regard to the guns as many will take guns that will not go and whether they will give up their arms is doubtful. I had a long talk with Opothly-Oholo on that point and told (cont.)]
in the event of its not appearing, should the Indian agents do?[238]
The time was propitious for starting the expedition; for not the shadow of an enemy had been lately seen in the West, unless count be taken of Indians returning home or small roving bands of possible marauders that the people of all parties detested[239]. But the order for the supplanting of Denver by Sturgis had already been issued, April sixth[240], and Sturgis's policy was not yet
[Footnote 237: (cont.) him you could only get 2000 guns and you wanted every one to go and an Indian with it and that if any of them got guns that did not go they must give up their guns to those that would go but I know enough of the Indian character to know that it will be next thing to an impossibility to get a gun away from one when he once gets it and I shall put off the distribution of the guns till the last moment and it would be best to send them on a day or two before being distributed but that would make them mad and they would not go at all and how we are to know how many to look out for from others than those we have here I am not able to see but we will do all that we can but you may look out for dificulty in the matter they all seem anxious now to go and make no objections as yet nor have they said anything about their pay but as they were told before when we expect them to go into the Hunter Lane expedition that they would get the same pay as white troops and set off a part of it for their families it was so indelibly impressed upon their minds that I fear we will have a blow up on that score when it comes up we hear nothing yet of any troops being ordered to this service and I very much fear they will put off the matter so long that there will be no crop raised this season ... the mortality amongst them is great more since warm weather has set in than during the cold weather they foolishly physic themselves nearly to death danc [dance] all night and then jump into the river just at daylight to make themselves bullet proof they have followed this up now every night for over two weeks and it has no doubt caused many deaths Long Tiger the Uchee Chief and one of the best amongst them died to-day--yesterday we had 7 deaths and there will not be less to-day"--Coffin to Dole, April 7, 1862, Indian Office General Files, _Southern Superintendency_, 1859-1862, C 1578 of 1862.]
[Footnote 238: This was the query put to Dole by Steele in a letter of the thirteenth of April, which acknowledged Dole's of the third and ventured the opinion that Postmaster-general Blair "must be imitating General McClellan and practicing strategy with the mails." Steele further remarked, "Gen'l Denver, Maj. Wright and I are in the dark as to the plans of the Indian Expedition. Gen. Denver thinks I should proceed at once to Leroy without waiting for your instructions."--Ibid., S 539 of 1862.]
[Footnote 239: Curtis to Halleck, April 5, 1862 [_Official Records_, vol. viii, 662].]
[Footnote 240: Sturgis, upon the receipt of orders of this date, assumed command of (cont.)]
known. It soon revealed itself, however, and was hostile to the whole project that Dole had set his heart upon. Apparently that project, the moment it had been taken up by Denver, had ceased to have any interest for Lane on the score of its merits and had become identified with the Robinson faction in Kansas politics. At any rate, it was the anti-Robinson press that saw occasion for rejoicing in the complete removal of Denver from the scene, an event which soon took place[241].
The relieving of Denver from the command of the District of Kansas inaugurated[242] what contemporaries described as "Sturgis' military despotism,"[243] in amplification of which it is enough to say that it attempted the utter confounding, if not the annihilation, of the Indian Expedition, a truly noble undertaking to be sure, considering how much was hoped for from that expedition, how much of benefit and measure of justice to a helpless, homeless, impoverished people and considering, also, how much of time and thought and
[Footnote 240: (cont.) the District of Kansas; but Denver was not called east until the fourteenth of May. On the twenty-first of April, it was still expected that he would lead an expedition "down the borders of Arkansas into the Indian country." [KELTON to Curtis, April 21, 1862, Ibid., vol. xiii, 364].]
[Footnote 241: The _Daily Conservative_, for instance, rejoiced over this telegram from Sidney Clark of May 2, which gave advanced information of Denver's approaching departure: "Conservative: The Department of Kansas is reinstated. Gen. Blunt takes command. Denver reports to Halleck; Sturgis here." The newspaper comment was, "We firmly believe that a prolongation of the Denver-Sturgis political generalship, aided as it was by the corrupt Governor of this State, would have led to a revolution in Kansas ..."--_Daily Conservative_, May 6, 1862.]
[Footnote 242: General Sturgis assumed command, April 10, 1862 [_Official Records_, vol. viii, 683], and Denver took temporary charge at Fort Scott [Ibid., 668].]
[Footnote 243: Quoted from the _Daily Conservative_ of May 20; but not with the idea of subscribing thereby to any verdict that would bear the implication that all of Sturgis's measures were arbitrary and wrong. Something strenuous was needed in Kansas. The arrest of Jennison and of Hoyt [Ibid., April 19, 23, 1862] because of their too radical anti-slavery actions was justifiable. Jennison had disorganized his regiment in a shameful manner [Ibid., June 3, 1862].]
energy, not to mention money, had already been expended upon it.
Sturgis's policy with reference to the Indian Expedition was initiated by an order[244], of April 25, which gained circulation as purporting to be in conformity with instructions from the headquarters of the Department of the Mississippi, although in itself emanating from those of the District of Kansas. It put a summary stop to the enlistment of Indians and threatened with arrest anyone who should disobey its mandate. Superintendent Coffin, in his inimitable illiteracy, at once entered protest[245] against it and coolly informed Sturgis that, in enrolling Indians for service, he was acting under the authority, not of the War, but of the Interior Department. At the same sitting, he applied to Commissioner Dole for new instructions[246].
[Footnote 244: _Official Records_, vol. xiii, 365.]
[Footnote 245:
LE ROY COFFEE COUNTY, KANSAS, April 29th 1862.
BRIG. GENL S.D. STURGIS, Fort Leavenworth Kansas
Dear Sir: A Special Messenger arrived here last night from Fort Leavenworth with your orders No. 8 and contents noted. I would most respectfully inform you that I am acting under the controle and directions of the Interior and not of the War Department. I have been endeavoring to the best of my humble ability to carry out the instructions and wishes of that Department, all of which I hope will meet your aprobation.
Your Messenger reports himself Straped, that no funds were furnished him to pay his expenses, that he had to beg his way down here. I have paid his bill here and furnished him with five dollars to pay his way back. Very respectfully your Obedient Servant
W.G. COFFIN, _Sup't. of Indian Affairs_, Southern Superintendency. [Indian Office Special Files, no. 201, _Southern Superintendency_, C 1612 of 1862].]
[Footnote 246: LEROY COFFEY CO., KANSAS, April 29th, 1862.
SIR: Enclosed please find a communication from Brigadier General Sturgis in regard to the organising of the Indians and my reply to the same, the officers are here, or at least four of them. Col Furnace Agutant Elithurp Lieutenant Wattles and Agutant Dole I need scarcely say to you that we shall continue to act under your Instructions til further orders, the Officers above alluded to have been untiring in their efforts to get acquainted with and get the permanent (cont.)]
Colonel John Ritchie[247] of the inchoate Second Regiment Indian Home Guards did the same[248].
The reëstablishment[249] of the Department of Kansas, at this critical moment, while much to be regretted as indicative of a surrender to politicians[250] and an abandonment of the idea, so fundamentally conducive to military success, that all parts must contribute to the good of the whole, had one thing to commend it, it restored vigor to the Indian Expedition. The department was reëstablished, under orders[251] of May second, with James G. Blunt in command. He entered upon his duties, May fifth, and on that selfsame day authorized the issue of the following most significant instructions, in toto, a direct countermand of all that Sturgis had most prominently stood for:
[Footnote 246: (cont.) organization of the Indians under way and have made a fine impression upon them, and I should very much regret any failure to carry out the programe as they have been allready so often disappointed that they have become suspicious and it all has a tendency to lessen their confidence in us and to greatly increase our dificulties All of which is most Respectfully Submitted by your obedient Servant
W.G. COFFIN, Sup't of Indian Affairs. [Indian Office Special Files, no. 201, _Southern Superintendency_, C 1612 of 1862].]
[Footnote 247: For an inferential appraisement of Ritchie's character and abilities, see Kansas _Historical Collections_, vol. iii, 359-366.]
[Footnote 248: Ritchie to Dole, April 26, 1863 [Indian Office Miscellaneous Files, 1858-1863].]
[Footnote 249: The reëstablishment, considered in the light of the first orders issued by Blunt, those set out here, was decidedly in the nature of a reflection upon the reactionary policy of Halleck and Sturgis; but Halleck had no regrets. Of Kansas, he said, "Thank God, it is no longer under my command." [_Official Records_, vol. xiii, 440.] Ever since the time, when he had been urged by the administration in Washington, peculiarly sensitive to political importunities, not to retain, outside of Kansas, the Kansas troops if he could possibly avoid it, there had been more or less of rancor between him and them. His opinion of them was that they were a "humbug" [Ibid., vol. viii, 661].]
[Footnote 250: Almost simultaneously, Schofield was given independent command in Missouri, a similar surrender to local political pressure.]
[Footnote 251: _Official Records_, vol. xiii, 368-369.]
General Orders, HDQRS. DEPARTMENT OF KANSAS, No. 2. Fort Leavenworth, Kans., May 5, 1862.
I. General Orders, No. 8, dated Headquarters District of Kansas, April 25, 1862, is hereby rescinded.
II. The instructions issued by the Department at Washington to the colonels of the two Indian regiments ordered to be raised will be fully carried out, and the regiments will be raised with all possible speed.
By order of Brig. Gen. James G. Blunt,[252]
THOS. MOONLIGHT, _Captain and Assistant Adjutant-general_.[253]
The full extent, not only of Sturgis's failure to coöperate with the Indian Office, but also of his intention utterly to block the organization of the Indian Expedition, is revealed in a letter[254] from Robert W. Furnas, colonel commanding the First Regiment Indian Home Guards, to Dole, May 4, 1862. That letter best explains itself. It was written from Leroy, Kansas, and reads thus:
Disclaiming any idea of violating "Regulations" by an "Official
Report" to you, permit me to communicate certain facts extremely
embarrassing, which surround the Indian Expedition.
In compliance with your order of Ap'l 5th. I reported myself
"forthwith" to the U.S. mustering officer at Ft. Leavenworth and
was "mustered into the service" on the 18th. of April. I "awaited
the orders from Genl Halleck" as directed but rec'd none. On the
20th. Ap'l I rec'd detailed
[Footnote 252: The promotion of Blunt to a brigadier-generalship had caused surprise and some opposition. Referring to it, the _Daily Conservative_, April 12, 1862, said, "Less than three months ago Mr. Lincoln informed a gentleman from this State that no Kansas man would be made a Brigadier 'unless the Kansas Congressional delegation was unanimously and strenuously in his favor' ... Either the President has totally changed his policy or Lane, Pomeroy and Conway are responsible for this most unexpected and unprecedented appointment ..."]
[Footnote 253: _Official Records_, vol. xiii, 370.]
[Footnote 254: Indian Office General Files, _Southern Superintendency_, 1859-1862, F 363 of 1862.]
instructions from Adjt. Gen'l Thomas, authorizing me to proceed
and raise "from the loyal Indians now in Kansas a Regiment of
Infantry." I immediately repaired to this place and in a very
few days enrolled a sufficient number of Indians to form a
minimum[255] Regiment. I am particularly indebted to the Agts.
Maj. Cutler of the Creeks and Maj. Snow of the Seminoles, for
their valuable services. Immediately after the enrolling, and
in compliance with my instructions from Adjt. Gen'l Thomas, I
notified Lieut. Chas. S. Bowman U.S. mustering officer at Ft.
Leavenworth of the fact, to which I have rec'd no answer.
At this point in my procedure a special messenger from Gen'l
Sturgis reached this place with a copy of his "Order No. 8," a
copy of which I herewith send you. On the next day Maj. Minor in
command at Iola, Kansas, and who had been furnished with a copy of
General Sturgis' "Order" came with a company of Cavalry to this
place "to look into matters." I showed him my authority, and
informed him what I had done. He made no arrest, seeming utterly
at a loss to understand the seemingly _confused_ state of
affairs. Whether Gen'l Sturgis will on the reception of my notice
at the Fort arrest me, or not, I know not. I have gone to the
limits of my instructions and deem it, if not my duty, prudent at
least to notify you of the condition of affairs, that you may be
the better enabled to remove obstacles, that the design of the
Department may be fully and promptly executed....[256]
[Footnote 255: The regiment, according to the showing of the muster roll, comprised one thousand nine men. Fifteen hundred was the more usual number of a regiment, which, normally, had three battalions with a major at the head of each.]
[Footnote 256: The remainder of the letter deals with the muster roll of the First Regiment Indian Home Guards, which was forwarded to Dole, under separate cover, the same day, and of which Dole acknowledged the receipt, May 16, 1862 [Indian Office _Letter Book_, no. 68, pp. 240-241]. The roll shows the captain and number of each company as here:
Company A Billy Bowlegs 106
Company B A-ha-luk-tus-ta-na-ke 100
Company C Tus-te-nu-ke-ema-ela 104
Company D Tus-te-nuk-ke 100
Company E Jon-neh (John) 101
Company F Mic-co-hut-ka (White Chief) 103
Company G Ah-pi-noh-to-me 103
(cont.)]
It soon developed that General Halleck had been equally at fault in disregarding the wishes of the government with respect to the mustering in of the loyal Indians. He had neglected to send on to Kansas the instructions which he himself had received from Washington.[257] It was incumbent, therefore, upon Blunt to ask for new. He had found the enlisted Indians with no arms, except guns, no shot pouches, no powder horns, although they were attempting to supply themselves as best they could.[258] Blunt thought they ought to be furnished with sheath, or bowie, knives; but the Indian Office had no funds for such a purpose.[259] The new instructions, when they came, were found to differ in no particular from those which had formerly been issued. The Indian Home Guards were to constitute an irregular force and were to be supported by such white troops, as Blunt should think necessary. They were to be supplied with transportation and subsistence and Blunt was to "designate the general to command." Blunt's own appointment was expected to remove all difficulties that had stood in the way of the Indian Expedition while under the control of Halleck.[260] On
[Footnote 256: (cont.)
Company H Lo-ga-po-koh 94
Company I Jan-neh (John 100
Company J Lo-ka-la-chi-ha-go 98]
[Footnote 257: Coffin to Dole, May 8, 1862, Indian Office General Files, _Southern Superintendency_, 1859-1862.]
[Footnote 258: Same to Same, May 13, 1862, Ibid., Land Files, _Southern Superintendency_, 1855-1870.]
[Footnote 259: Dole to Coffin, May 20, 1862, Ibid., _Letter Book_, no. 68, p. 252.]
[Footnote 260: "I visited the War Department today to ascertain what orders had been forwarded to you and your predecessor relative to the organization of two thousand Indians as a home guard, which when so organized would proceed to their homes in the Indian country in company with a sufficient number of white troops to protect them at their homes.
"I learn from Adjutant General Thomas that all necessary orders have been forwarded to enable you to muster these Indian Regiments into the service as an irregular force; and to send such white force with them as (cont.)]
May 8 came the order from Adjutant-general Thomas, "Hurry up the organization and departure of the two Indian regiments,"[261] which indicated that there was no longer any question as to endorsement by the Department of War.
As a matter of fact, the need for hurry was occasioned by the activity of secessionists, Indians and white men, in southwest Missouri, which would, of itself, suggest the inquiry as to what the Indian allies of the Confederacy had been about since the Battle of Pea Ridge. Van Dorn had ordered them to retire towards their own country and, while incidentally protecting it, afford assistance to their white ally by harassing the enemy, cutting off his supply trains, and annoying him generally. The order had been rigidly attended to and the Indians had done their fair share of the irregular warfare that terrorized and desolated the border in the late spring of the second year of the war. Not all of them, regularly enlisted, had participated in it, however; for General Pike had, with a considerable part of his brigade, gone away from the border as far as possible and had intrenched himself at a fort of his own planning, Fort McCulloch, in the Choctaw Nation, on the Blue River, a branch of the Red.[262] Furthermore,
[Footnote 260: (cont.) in your judgment may be deemed necessary, also that the difficulties we experienced while the expedition was under the control of Gen'l Halleck are now removed by your appointment, and that you will designate the general to command the whole expedition and see that such supplies for the transportation and subsistence as may be necessary are furnished to the whole expedition (Indians as well as whites). Lieut. Kile informs me that there was doubt whether the Quarter Master would be expected to act as Commissary for the Regiment. I suppose that you fully understand this was the intention...."--Dole to Blunt, May 16, 1862, Indian Office _Letter Book_, no. 68, pp. 241-242.]
[Footnote 261: _Daily Conservative_, May 9, 1862.]
[Footnote 262: "... General Albert Pike retreated from the battle of Pea Ridge, Arkansas, a distance of 250 miles, and left his new-made wards to the mercy (cont.)]
Colonel Drew and his men, later converts to secessionism, had, for a good part of the time, contented themselves with guarding the Cherokee Nation,[263] thus leaving Colonel Cooper and Colonel Stand Watie, with their commands, to do most of the scouting and
[Footnote 262: (cont.) of war, stringing his army along through the Cherokee, Creek and Choctaw Nations, passing through Limestone Gap, on among the Boggies, and halted at Carriage Point, on the Blue, 'away down along the Chickasaw line.' Cherokee Knights of the Golden Circle followed Pike's retreat to Texas ... "--Ross, _Life and Times of Hon. William P. Ross_, p. viii.]
[Footnote 263: These two letters from John Ross are offered in evidence of this. They are taken from Indian Office Miscellaneous Files, John Ross _Papers_:
(a)
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT, PARK HILL, March 21st, 1862.
SIR: I am in receipt of your favor of the 23rd. inst. I have no doubt that forage can be procured for Col. Drew's men in this vicinity by hauling it in from the farms of the surrounding Districts. The subject of a Delegate in Congress shall be attended to so soon as arrangements can be made for holding an election. I am happy to learn that Col. Drew has been authorized to furlough a portion of the men in his Regiment to raise corn. I shall endeavor to be correctly informed of the movements of the enemy and advise you of the same. And I shall be gratified to receive any important information that you may have to communicate at all times. I am very respectfully and truly, Yours, etc. John Ross, _Prin'l Chief_, Cherokee Nation.
(b).
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT, C.N. PARK HILL, April 10th, 1862.
SIR: I beg leave to thank you for your kind response to my letter of the 22nd ulto and your order stationing Col. Drew's Regiment in this vicinity. Though much reduced by furloughs in number it will be useful for the particular purposes for which it was ordered here. The unprotected condition of the country however is a source of general anxiety among the People, who feel that they are liable to be overrun at any time by small parties from the U.S. Army which remains in the vicinity of the late Battle Ground. This is more particularly the case since the removal of the Confederate Forces under your command and those under Major Gen'l Price. Without distrusting the wisdom that has prompted these movements, or the manifestation of any desire on my part to enquire into their policy it will be nevertheless a source of satisfaction to be able to assure the people of the country that protection will not be withheld from them and that they will not be left to their own feeble defense. Your response is respectfully requested, I have the honor to be Sir with high regards, Your Obt Servt. JOHN ROSS, _Prin'l Chief_, Cherokee Nation.
To Brig. Gen'l A. Pike Com'dg, Department Indian Territory, Head Qrs. Choctaw Nation.]
skirmishing. So kindly did the Indians take to that work that Colonel Cooper recommended[264] their employment as out-and-out guerrillas. That was on May 6 and was probably suggested by the fact that, on April 21, the Confederate government had definitely authorized the use of partisan rangers.[265] A good understanding of Indian military activity, at this particular time, is afforded by General Pike's report[266] of May 4,
... The Cherokee[267] and Creek troops are in their respective
countries. The Choctaw troops are in front of me, in their
country, part on this side of Boggy and part at Little Boggy, 34
miles from here. These observe the roads to Fort Smith and by
Perryville toward Fort Gibson. Part of the Chickasaw battalion is
sent to Camp McIntosh, 11 miles this side of the Wichita Agency,
and part to Fort Arbuckle, and the Texan company is at Fort Cobb.
I have ordered Lieutenant-colonel Jumper with his Seminoles to
march to and take Fort Larned, on the Pawnee Fork of the Arkansas,
where are considerable stores and a little garrison. He will go as
soon as their annuity is paid.
The Creeks under Colonel McIntosh are about to make an extended
scout westward. Stand Watie, with his Cherokees, scouts along the
whole northern line of the Cherokee country from Grand Saline to
Marysville, and sends me information continually of every movement
of the enemy in Kansas and Southwestern Missouri.
The Comanches, Kiowas, and Reserve Indians are all peaceable and
quiet. Some 2,000 of the former are encamped about three days'
ride from Fort Cobb, and some of them come in at intervals to
procure provisions. They have sent to me to know
[Footnote 264: Cooper to Van Dorn, May 6, 1862, _Official Records_, vol. xiii, 823-824.]
[Footnote 265: _Journal of the Congress of the Confederate States_, vol. v, 285.]
[Footnote 266: _Official Records_, vol. xiii, 819-823.]
[Footnote 267: This situation, so eminently satisfactory to John Ross, did not continue long, however, and on May 10, the Cherokee Principal Chief had occasion to complain that his country had been practically divested of a protecting force and, at the very moment, too, when the Federals were showing unwonted vigor near the northeastern border [Ross to Davis, May 10, 1862, _Official Records_, vol. xiii, 824-825].]
if they can be allowed to send a strong party and capture any
trains on their way from Kansas to New Mexico, to which I have no
objection. To go on the war-path somewhere else is the best way to
keep them from troubling Texas ...
Stand Watie's scouting had brought him, April 26,[268] into a slight action with men of the First Battalion First Missouri Cavalry at Neosho, in the vicinity of which place he lingered many days and where his men[269] again fought, in conjunction with Colonel Coffee's, May 31.[270] The skirmish of the later date was disastrous to the Federals under Colonel John M. Richardson of the Fourteenth Missouri State Militia Cavalry and proved to be a case where the wily and nimble Indian had taken the Anglo-Saxon completely by surprise.[271] From Neosho, Stand Watie moved down, by slow and destructive stages, through Missouri and across into Indian Territory. His next important engagement was at Cowskin Prairie, June 6.
Meanwhile, the organization of the Indian Expedition, or Indian Home Guard, as it was henceforth most commonly styled, was proceeding apace.[272] The
[Footnote 268: _Official Records_, vol. xiii, 61-63; Britton, _Civil War on the Border_, vol. i, 281-282.]
[Footnote 269: Stand Watie's whole force was not engaged and he, personally, was not present. Captain Parks led Watie's contingent and was joined by Coffee.]
[Footnote 270: _Official Records_, vol. xiii, 90-92, 94-95.]
[Footnote 271:--Ibid., 92-94, 409. Watie, although not present, seems to have planned the affair [Ibid., 95]. Lieutenant-colonel Mills, who reported upon the Neosho engagement, was of the opinion that "the precipitate flight" of the Federals could be accounted for only upon the supposition that the "screaming and whooping of the Indians" unnerved them and "rendered their untrained horses nearly unmanageable."--Ibid., 93.]
[Footnote 272: The progress in organization is indicated by these communications to the Indian Office:
(a).
The enrollment, organizing etc. etc. of the Indians, and preparations for their departure, are progressing satisfactorily, though as I anticipated, it will be difficult to raise two Regiments, and I have some fears of our success in getting the full number for the 2nd Regiment. But if we get one full company of Delawares and Shawnees, (cont.)]
completion of the first regiment gave little concern. It was composed of Creeks and Seminoles, eight companies of the former and two of the latter. The second regiment was miscellaneous in its composition and took longer to
[Footnote 272: (cont.) as promised, and four companies of Osages, which the chiefs say they can raise, I think we shall succeed.
Two Regiments of white troops and Rabb's Battery have already started and are down by this time in the Cherokee Nation. Col. Doubleday, who is in command, has notified the officers here to prepare with all possible despatch, for marching orders. We are looking for Aliens Battery here this week and if it comes I hope to make considerable addition to the Army from the loyal Refugee Indians here, as they have great confidence in "_them waggons that shoot_," this has been a point with them all the time.
We were still feeding those that are mustered in and shall I suppose have to do so until the requisitions arive. The Dellawares and Shaw-nees also, I had to make arrangements to feed from the time of their arrival at the Sac and Fox Agency. But from all the indications now we expect to see the whole Expedition off in ten days or two weeks.--Coffin to Dole, June 4, 1862, Indian Office General Files, _Southern Superintendency_, 1859-1862, C 1661.
(b).
It has been some time since I wrote you and to fill my promise I again drop you a line. I presume you feel a lively interest in whatever relates to the Indians. The 1st. Regt. is now mustered into the service and will probably to-day number something over a minimum Regt. It is composed entirely of Creeks and Seminoles, eight companys of the former and two of the latter.
I have understood that the report of the Creek Agent gave the number of Creek men at 1990--If this is a fact it is far from a correct statement--The actual number of Creek men over 14 years of age (refugees) will not number over 900. Some of these are unable to be soldiers. The actual number of Seminoles (men) will not excede 300 over 14 years of age, many of them are old and disabled as soldiers. Thus you will see that but one Regt. could be raised from that quarter. You are aware that the Creeks and Seminoles speak one language nearly and are thus naturally drawn together and they were not willing to be divided.
The second regt. is now forming from the various other tribes and I have no doubt will be filled, it would have been filled long ago, but Col. Ritchie did not repair here for a long time in fact not till after our Regt. was raised--Adjutant Dole came here promptly to do his duty--but in the absence of his Col. could not facilitate his regt. without assuming a responsibility that would have been unwise. I regret that he could not have been placed in our regt. for he will prove a faithful and reliable officer and should I be transfered to (cont.)]
organize, largely because its prospective commander, Colonel John Ritchie, who had gone south to persuade the Osages to enlist,[273] was slow in putting in an appearance at Humboldt. The Neosho Agency, to which the Osages belonged, was in great confusion, partly due to
[Footnote 272: (cont.) any other position which I am strongly in hopes I may be, I hope you will exercise your influence to transfer him to my place, this will be agreable to all the officers of the 1st. regiment and desirable on his part.
The condition of the Indians here at the present writing is very favorable, sickness is abating and their spirits are reviving. I think I have fully settled the fact of the Indians capability and susceptibility to arive at a good state of military disipline. You would be surprised to see our Regt. move. They accomplish the feat of regular time step equal to any white soldier, they form in line with dispatch and with great precission; and what is more they now manifest a great desire to learn the entire white man's disiplin in military matters. That they will make brave and ambitious soldiers I have no doubt. Our country may well feel proud that these red men have at last fell into the ranks to fight for our flag, and aid in crushing treason. Much honor is due them. I am sorry that Dr. Kile did not accept the appointment of Quartermaster but owing to some misunderstanding with Col. Ritchie he declines.
You will please remember me to Gen'l Lane and say that I have not heard from him since I left Washington.--A.C. ELITHORPE to Dole, June 9, 1862, Indian Office General Files, _Southern Superintendency_, 1859-1862, C 1661.
(c).
The Indian Brigade, consisting of about one thousand Creeks and Seminoles, sixty Quapaws, sixty Cherokees and full companies of wild Delawares, Kechees, Ironeyes, Cadoes, and Kickapoos, left this place (Leroy) yesterday for Humboldt, at which place I suppose they will join the so much talked of Indian expedition. Although I have not as yet fully ascertained the exact number of each Tribe, represented in said Brigade, but they may be estimated at about Fifteen Hundred, all of the Southern Refugee Indians who have been fed here by the Government, besides sixty Delawares from the Delaware Reservation, and about two Hundred Osages, the latter of which I have been assured will be increased to about four or five hundred, ere they get through the Osage Nation ...
The news from the Cherokee Nation is very cheering and encouraging; it has been reported that nearly Two Thousand Cherokees will be ready to join the expedition on its approach into that country....--Coffin to Dole, June 15, 1862, Ibid., C 1684.]
[Footnote 273: Coffin to Dole, June 4, 1862, Ibid., _Neosho_, C 1662 of 1862. See also Carruth to Coffin, September 19, 1862, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, _Report_, 1862, 164-166.]
the fact that, at this most untoward moment, the Osages were being approached for a cession of lands, and partly to the fact that Indians of the neighborhood, of unionist sympathies, Cherokees and Delawares[274] from the Cherokee country, Shawnees, Quapaws,[275] and Seneca-Shawnees, were being made refugees, partly, also, to the fact that Agent Elder and Superintendent Coffin were not working in harmony with each other. Their differences dated from the first days of their official relationship. Elder had been influential, for reasons most satisfactory to himself and not very complimentary to Coffin, in having the Neosho Agency transferred to the Central Superintendency.[276] Coffin had vigorously objected and with such effect that, in March, 1862, a retransfer had been ordered;[277] but not before Coffin had reported[278] that everything was now amicable between him and Elder. Elder was evidently of a different opinion and before long was asking to be allowed again to report officially to Superintendent Branch at St. Joseph.[279] There was a regular tri-weekly post between that place and Fort Scott, Elder's present headquarters, and the chances were good that Branch would be in a position to attend to mail more promptly than was Coffin.[280] The counter arguments
[Footnote 274: F. Johnson to Dole, April 2, 1862, Indian Office, _Central Superintendency_, Delaware, J 627 of 1862.]
[Footnote 275: The propriety of permitting the refugee Quapaws to "return to their homes by accompanying the military expedition" was urged upon the Indian Office in a letter from Elder to Coffin, May 29, 1862 [Coffin to Dole, June 4, 1862, Ibid., _Southern Superintendency_, Neosho, C 1663 of 1862].]
[Footnote 276: Office letter of June 5, 1861.]
[Footnote 277: Mix to Branch, March 1, 1862, Indian Office _Letter Book_, no. 67.]
[Footnote 278: Coffin to Dole, February 28, 1862, Ibid., General Files, _Southern Superintendency_, 1859-1862, C 1541 of 1862.]
[Footnote 279: Elder to Dole, May 16, 1862, Ibid., Neosho, E 106 of 1862.]
[Footnote 280: Coffin was spending a good deal of his time at Leroy. Leroy was one hundred twenty-five miles, so Elder computed, from Leavenworth, where he (cont.)]
of Coffin[281] were equally plausible and the request for transfer refused.
The outfit for the Indians of the Home Guard was decidedly inferior. Opoeth-le-yo-ho-la wanted batteries, "wagons that shoot."[282] His braves, many of them, were given guns that were worthless, that would not shoot at all.[283] In such a way was their eagerness to learn the white man's method of fighting and to acquire his discipline rewarded. The fitting out was done at Humboldt, although Colonel William Weer[284] of the Tenth Kansas Infantry, who was the man finally selected to command the entire force, would have preferred it done at Fort Scott.[285] The Indians had a thousand and one excuses for not expediting matters. They seemed to have a deep-seated distrust of what the Federal intentions regarding them might be when
[Footnote 280: (cont.) directed his mail, and sixty or seventy from Fort Scott. His communications were held up until Coffin happened to go to Leavenworth. Moreover, Coffin was then expecting to go soon "into the Indian country."]
[Footnote 281: Coffin complained that Elder neglected his duties. It was Coffin's intention to remove the headquarters of the Southern Superintendency from Fort Scott to Humboldt. It would then be very convenient for Elder to report to him, especially if he would go back to his own agency headquarters and not linger, as he had been doing, at Fort Scott [Coffin to Dole, June 10, 1862, Ibid., C 1668 of 1862.]]
[Footnote 282: _Daily Conservative_, May 10, 1862.]
[Footnote 283: Weer to Doubleday, June 6, 1862, _Official Records_, vol. xiii, 418; Coffin to Dole, June 17, 1862, Indian Office General Files, _Southern Superintendency_, 1859-1862.]
[Footnote 284: Weer was one of the men in disfavor with Governor Robinson [_Daily Conservative_, May 25, 1862]. He had been arrested and his reinstatement to command that came with the appearance of Blunt upon the scene was doubtless the circumstance that afforded opportunity for his appointment to the superior command of the Indian Expedition. Sturgis had refused to reinstate him. In December, 1861, a leave of absence had been sought by Weer, who was then with the Fourth Kansas Volunteers, in order that he might go to Washington, D.C., and be a witness in the case involving Lane's appointment as brigadier-general [Thomas to Hunter, December 12, 1861, _Congressional Globe_, 37th congress, second session, part i, 128].]
[Footnote 285: Weer to Moonlight, June 6, 1862, _Official Records_, vol. xiii, 419.]
once they should be back in their own country. They begged that some assurance be given them of continued protection against the foe and in their legal rights. And, in the days of making preparations, they asked again and again for tangible evidence that white troops were really going to support them in the journey southward.
The main portion of the Indian Expedition auxiliary white force had all this time been more or less busy, dealing with bushwhackers and the like, in the Cherokee Neutral Lands and in the adjoining counties of Missouri. When Blunt took command of the Department of Kansas, Colonel Frederick Salomon[286] of the Ninth Wisconsin Volunteer Infantry was in charge at Fort Scott and the troops there or reporting there were, besides eight companies of his own regiment, a part of the Second Ohio Cavalry under Colonel Charles Doubleday, of the Tenth Kansas Infantry under Colonel William F. Cloud, and the Second Indiana Battery.[287] Blunt's first thought was to have Daubleday[288] lead the Indian Expedition, the auxiliary white force of which was to be selected from the regiments at Fort Scott. Doubleday accordingly made his plans, rendezvoused his men, and arranged that the mouth of Shoal Creek should be a rallying point and temporary headquarters;[289] but events were already in train for Colonel
[Footnote 286: Salomon was born in Prussia in 1826 [Rosengarten, _The German Soldier in the Wars of the United States_, 150]. He had distinguished himself in some of the fighting that had taken place in Missouri in the opening months of the war and, when the Ninth Wisconsin Infantry, composed solely of German-Americans, had been recruited, he was called to its command [Love, _Wisconsin in the War of the Rebellion_, 578].]
[Footnote 287: _Official Records_, vol. xiii, 371-372, 377.]
[Footnote 288: for an account of Doubleday's movements in April that very probably gained him the place, see Britton, _Civil War on the Border_, vol. i, 296.]
[Footnote 289: _Official Records_, vol. xiii, 397, 408.]
Weer to supersede him and for his own assignment to the Second Brigade of the expedition.
Previous to his supersedure by Weer, Doubleday conceived that it might be possible to reach Fort Gibson with ease,[290] provided the attempt to do so should be undertaken before the various independent secessionist commands could unite to resist.[291] That they were planning to unite there was every indication.[292] Doubleday[293] was especially desirous of heading off Stand Watie who was still hovering around in the neighborhood of his recent adventures, and was believed now to have an encampment on Cowskin Prairie near Grand River. Accordingly, on the morning of June 6, Doubleday started out, with artillery and a thousand men, and, going southward from Spring River, reached the Grand about sundown.[294] Watie was three miles away and, Doubleday continuing the pursuit, the two forces came to an engagement. It was indecisive,[295] however, and Watie slipped away under
[Footnote 290: Doubleday to Moonlight, May 25, 1862, _Official Records_, vol. xiii, 397.]
[Footnote 291: Doubleday to Blunt, June 1, 1862, Ibid., 408.]
[Footnote 292: General Brown reported on this matter, June 2 [Ibid., 409] and June 4 [Ibid., 414], as did also General Ketchum, June 3 [Ibid., 412]. They all seem to have had some intimation that General Pike was to unite with Stand Watie as well as Coffee and others, and that was certainly General Hindman's intention. On May 31, the very day that he himself assumed command, Hindman had ordered Pike to advance from Fort McCulloch to the Kansas border. The order did not reach Pike until June 8 and was repeated June 17 [Ibid., 40].]
[Footnote 293: The idea seems to have obtained among Missourians that Doubleday was all this time inactive. They were either ignorant of or intent upon ignoring the Indian Expedition. June 4, Governor Gamble wrote to Secretary Stanton asking that the Second Ohio and the Ninth Wisconsin, being at Fort Scott and unemployed, might be ordered to report to Schofield [Ibid., 414, 438], who at the instance of politicians and contrary to the wishes of Halleck [Ibid., 368] had been given an independent command in Missouri.]
[Footnote 294: Doubleday to Weer, June 8, 1862 [Ibid., 102].]
[Footnote 295: Doubleday reported to Weer that it was a pronounced success, so did Blunt to Schofield [Ibid., 427]; but subsequent events showed that it was (cont.)]
cover of the darkness. Had unquestioned success crowned Doubleday's efforts, all might have been well; but, as it did not, Weer, who had arrived at Fort Scott[296] a few days before and had been annoyed to find Doubleday gone, ordered him peremptorily to make no further progress southward without the Indians. The Indian contingent had in reality had a set-back in its preparations. Its outfit was incomplete and its means for transportation not forthcoming.[297] Under such circumstances, Weer advised the removal of the whole concern to Fort Scott, but that was easier said than done, inasmuch, as before any action was taken, the stores were _en route_ for Humboldt.[298] Nevertheless, Weer was determined to have the expedition start before Stand Watie could be reinforced by Rains.[299] Constant and insistent were the reports that the enemy was massing its forces to destroy the Indian Expedition.[300]
[Footnote 295: (cont.) anything but that and the _Daily Conservative_ tried to fix the blame upon Weer [Weer to Moonlight, June 23, 1862, Ibid., 446]. The newspaper account of the whole course of affairs may be given, roughly paraphrased, thus: Doubleday, knowing, perhaps, that Weer was to supersede him and that his time for action was short, "withdrew his detachment from Missouri, concentrated them near Iola, Kansas, and thence directed them to march to the mouth of Shoal Creek, on Spring River, himself taking charge of the convoying of a train of forty days supplies to the same place ..." He arrived June 4. Then, "indefatigible in forwarding the preparations for a blow upon the camp of organization which the rebels had occupied unmolested on Cowskin Prairie," he made his plans for further advance. At that moment came the news that Weer had superseded him and had ordered him to stop all movement south. He disregarded the order and struck, even though not fully prepared [_Daily Conservative_, June 13, 1862].]
[Footnote 296: Weer to Moonlight, June 5, 1862, _Official Records_, vol. xiii, 418.]
[Footnote 297:--Ibid.; Weer to Doubleday, June 6, 1862, Ibid., 418-419.]
[Footnote 298: Weer to Moonlight, June 13, 1862, Ibid., 430.]
[Footnote 299: Same to same, June 7, 1862, Ibid., 422.]
[Footnote 300: The destruction of the Indian Expedition was most certainly the occasion for the massing, notwithstanding the fact that Missourians were apprehensive for the safety of their state only and wanted to have Weer's white troops diverted to its defence. Curtis, alone, of the commanders in Missouri seems to have surmised rightly in the matter [Curtis to Schofield, Ibid., 432].]
Weer, therefore, went on ahead to the Osage Catholic Mission and ordered the Fort Scott troops to meet him there. His purpose was to promote the enlistment of the Osages, who were now abandoning the Confederate cause.[301] He would then go forward and join Doubleday, whom he had instructed to clear the way.[302]
Weer's plans were one thing, his embarrassments, another. Before the middle of June he was back again at Leroy,[303] having left Salomon and Doubleday[304] at Baxter Springs on the west side of Spring River in the Neutral Lands, the former in command. Weer hoped by his presence at Leroy to hurry the Indians along; for it was high time the expedition was started and he intended to start it, notwithstanding that many officers were absent from their posts and the men of the Second Indian Regiment not yet mustered in. It was absolutely necessary, if anything were going to be done with Indian aid, to get the braves away from under the influence of their chiefs, who were bent upon delay and determent. By the sixteenth he had the warriors all ready at Humboldt,[305] their bullet-proof medicine taken, their grand war dance indulged in. By the twenty-first, the final packing up began,[306] and it was not long thereafter before the Indian Expedition, after having experienced so many vicissitudes, had definitely materialized and was on its way south. Accompanying Weer were the Reverend Evan Jones, entrusted with
[Footnote 301: Weer to Moonlight, June 13, 1862.]
[Footnote 302: Weer to Doubleday, June 6, 1862.]
[Footnote 303: Weer to Moonlight, June 13, 1862.]
[Footnote 304: On the twentieth, General Brown requested Salomon to send Doubleday to southwest Missouri [_Official Records_, vol. xiii, 440] and Salomon so far complied with the request as to post some companies of Doubleday's regiment, under Lieutenant-colonel Ratliff, at Neosho [Ibid., 445, 459].]
[Footnote 305:--Ibid., 434.]
[Footnote 306:--Ibid., 441.]
a confidential message[307] to John Ross, and two special Indian agents, E.H. Carruth, detailed at the instance of the Indian Office, and H.W. Martin, sent on Coffin's own responsibility, their particular task being to look out for the interests and welfare of the Indians and, when once within the Indian Territory, to take careful stock of conditions there, both political and economic.[308] The Indians were in fine spirits and, although looking
[Footnote 307: The message, addressed to "Mutual Friend," was an assurance of the continued interest of the United States government in the inhabitants of Indian Territory and of its determination to protect them [Coffin to Ross, June 16, 1862, Indian Office General Files, _Southern Superintendency_, 1859-1862, C 1684].]
[Footnote 308: "... You will assure all loyal Indians in the Indian Territory of the disposition and the ability of the Government of the United States to protect them in all their rights, and that there is no disposition on the part of said government to shrink from any of its Treaty Obligations with all such of the Indian Tribes, who have been, are now, and remaining loyal to the same. Also that the government will, at the earliest practicable period, which is believed not to be distant, restore to all loyal Indians the rights, privileges, and immunities, that they have enjoyed previous to the present unfortunate rebellion.
"If, during the progress of the Army you should find Indians in a suffering condition whose loyalty is _beyond doubt_, you will, on consultation with the officers, render such assistance, as you may think proper, with such aid as the officers may render you.
"You will carefully look into the condition of the country, ascertain the quantity of Stock, Hogs, and Cattle, also the quantity of Corn, wheat etc. which may be in the hands of the loyal Indians, and the amount of the crops in the ground the present season, their condition and prospects.
"You are requested to communicate with me at this office at every suitable opportunity on all the above mentioned points, in order to enable me to keep the Hon. Com'r of Indian Aff'rs well advised of the condition of affairs in the Indian Territory, and that the necessary steps may be taken at the earliest possible moment, consistent with safety and economy, to restore the loyal Indians now in Kansas to their homes.
"Should any considerable number of the Indians, now in the Army, remain in the Indian Territory, or join you from the loyal Indians, now located therein you will very probably find it best, to remain with them, until I can get there with those, who are now here. But of these matters you will be more able to judge on the ground."--Extract from Coffin's instructions to Carruth, June 16, 1862, Ibid., Similar instructions, under date of June 23, 1862, were sent to H.W. Martin.]
somewhat ludicrous in their uniforms,[309] were not much behind their comrades of the Ninth and Tenth Kansas[310] in earnestness and in attention to duty.[311] Nevertheless, they had been very reluctant to leave their families and were, one and all, very apprehensive as to the future.
[Footnote 309: "I have just returned from Humboldt--the army there under Col. Weer consisting of the 10th Kansas Regiment 4 Companys of the 9th Kansas Aliens Battery of Six Tenths Parrot Guns and the first and second Indian Regements left for the Indian Territory in good stile and in fine spirits the Indians with their new uniforms and small Military caps on their Hugh Heads of Hair made rather a Comecal Ludecrous apperance they marched off in Columns of 4 a breast singing the war song all joining in the chourse and a more animated seen is not often witnessed. The officers in command of the Indian Regements have labored incessantly and the improvement the Indians have made in drilling is much greater than I supposed them capabell of and I think the opinion and confidence of all in the eficency of the Indian Regements was very much greater when they left than at any previous period and I have little doubt that for the kind of service that will be required of them they will be the most efecient troops in the Expedition."--COFFIN to Dole, June 25, 1862, Indian Office General Files, _Southern Superintendency_, 1859-1862, C 1684.]
[Footnote 310: Weer took with him as white anxiliary "the Tenth Kansas, Allen's battery, three companies Ninth Kansas..." [_Official Records_, vol. xiii, 441]. It seems to have been his intention to take the Second Kansas also; but that regiment was determined to stay at Humboldt until it had effected a change in its colonels in favor of Owen A. Bassett [Ibid., 434].]
[Footnote 311: Weer was disgusted with conditions surrounding his white force. This is his complaint, on the eve of his departure:
"Commissions to officers from the Governor are pouring in daily. I am told that the Tenth is rapidly becoming a regiment of officers. To add to these difficulties there are continual intrigues, from colonels down, for promotions and positions of command. Officers are leaving their posts for Fort Leavenworth and elsewhere to engage in these intrigues for more prominent places. The camps are filled with rumors of the success of this or that man. Factions are forming, and a general state of demoralization being produced..."--WEER to Moonlight, June 21, 1862, Ibid., 441-442.]
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The American Indian as Participant in the Civil WarChapter L: THOMAS, Adjutant-general226
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