Chapter II: The History of Carthage from the first Punic War to its (5)

The first advice that Hannibal gave him at this time, and which he frequently repeated afterwards, was, to make Italy the seat of the war.(821) He required an hundred ships, eleven or twelve thousand land forces, and offered to take upon himself the command of the fleet; to cross into Africa, in order to engage the Carthaginians in the war; and afterwards to make a descent upon Italy, during which the king himself should remain in Greece with his army, holding himself constantly in readiness to cross over into Italy, whenever it should be thought convenient. This was the only thing proper to be done, and the king very much approved the proposal at first.

Hannibal thought it would be expedient to prepare his friends at Carthage, in order to engage them the more strongly in his views.(822) The transmitting of information by letters, is not only unsafe, but they can give only an imperfect idea of things, and are never sufficiently particular. He therefore despatched a trusty person with ample instructions to Carthage. This man was scarce arrived in the city, but his business was suspected. Accordingly, he was watched and followed: and, at last, orders were issued for his being seized. However, he prevented the vigilance of his enemies, and escaped in the night; after having fixed, in several public places, papers, which fully declared the occasion of his journey. The senate immediately sent advice of this to the Romans.

(M135) Villius, one of the deputies who had been sent into Asia, to inquire into the state of affairs there, and, if possible, to discover the real designs of Antiochus, found Hannibal in Ephesus.(823) He had many conferences with him, paid him several visits, and speciously affected to show a particular esteem for him on all occasions. But his chief aim, by all this designing behaviour, was to make him be suspected, and to lessen his credit with the king, in which he succeeded but too well.(824)

Some authors affirm, that Scipio was joined in this embassy;(825) and they even relate the conversation which that general had with Hannibal. They tell us, that the Roman having asked him, who, in his opinion, was the greatest captain that had ever lived; he answered, Alexander the Great, because, with a handful of Macedonians, he had defeated numberless armies, and carried his conquests into countries so very remote, that it seemed scarce possible for any man only to travel so far. Being afterwards asked, to whom he gave the second rank; he answered, to Pyrrhus: Because this king was the first who understood the art of pitching a camp to advantage; no commander ever made a more judicious choice of his posts, was better skilled in drawing up his forces, or was more dexterous in winning the affection of foreign soldiers; insomuch that even the people of Italy were more desirous to have him for their governor, though a foreigner, than the Romans themselves, who had so long been settled in their country. Scipio proceeding, asked him next, whom he looked upon as the third: on which Hannibal made no scruple to assign that rank to himself. Here Scipio could not forbear laughing: “But what would you have said,” continued Scipio, “had you conquered me?” “I would,” replied Hannibal, “have ranked myself above Alexander, Pyrrhus, and all the generals the world ever produced.” Scipio was not insensible of so refined and delicate a flattery, which he no ways expected; and which, by giving him no rival, seemed to insinuate, that no captain was worthy of being put in comparison with him.

The answer, as told by Plutarch,(826) is less witty, and not so probable. In this author, Hannibal gives Pyrrhus the first place, Scipio the second, and himself the third.

Hannibal, sensible of the coldness with which Antiochus received him, ever since his conferences with Villius or Scipio, took no notice of it for some time, and seemed insensible of it.(827) But at last he thought it advisable to come to an explanation with the king, and to open his mind freely to him. “The hatred (says he) which I bear to the Romans, is known to the whole world. I bound myself to it by an oath, from my most tender infancy. It is this hatred that made me draw the sword against Rome during thirty-six years. It is that, which, even in times of peace, has caused me to be driven from my native country, and forced me to seek an asylum in your dominions. For ever guided and fired by the same passion, should my hopes be frustrated here, I will fly to every part of the globe, and rouse up all nations against the Romans. I hate them, and will hate them eternally; and know that they bear me no less animosity. So long as you shall continue in the resolution to take up arms against them, you may rank Hannibal in the number of your best friends. But if other counsels incline you to peace, I declare to you, once for all, address yourself to others for advice, and not to me.” Such a speech, which came from his heart, and expressed the greatest sincerity, struck the king, and seemed to remove all his suspicions; so that he now resolved to give Hannibal the command of part of his fleet.

But what havoc is not flattery capable of making in courts and in the minds of princes!(828) Antiochus was told, “that it was imprudent in him to put so much confidence in Hannibal, an exile, a Carthaginian, whose fortune or genius might suggest to him, in one day, a thousand different projects: that besides, this very fame which Hannibal had acquired in war, and which he considered as his peculiar inheritance, was too great for a man who fought only under the ensigns of another: that none but the king ought to be the general and conductor of the war, and that it was incumbent on him to draw upon himself alone the eyes and attention of all men; whereas, should Hannibal be employed, he (a foreigner) would have the glory of all the successes ascribed to him.” “No minds,”(829) says Livy, on this occasion, “are more susceptible of envy, than those whose merit is below their birth and dignity; such persons always abhorring virtue and worth in others, for this reason alone, because they are strange and foreign to themselves.” This observation was fully verified on this occasion. Antiochus had been taken on his weak side; a low and sordid jealousy, which is the defect and characteristic of little minds, extinguished every generous sentiment in that monarch. Hannibal was now slighted and laid aside: however, he was greatly revenged on Antiochus, by the ill success this prince met with; and showed how unfortunate that king is whose soul is accessible to envy, and his ears open to the poisonous insinuation of flatterers.

In a council held some time after, to which Hannibal, for form sake, was admitted, he, when it came to his turn to speak, endeavoured chiefly to prove, that Philip of Macedon ought, on any terms, to be engaged to form an alliance with Antiochus, which was not so difficult as might be imagined.(830) “With regard,” says Hannibal, “to the operations of the war, I adhere immovably to my first opinion; and had my counsels been listened to before, Tuscany and Liguria would now be all in a flame: and Hannibal (a name that strikes terror into the Romans) in Italy. Though I should not be very well skilled as to other matters, yet the good and ill success I have met with must necessarily have taught me sufficiently how to carry on a war against the Romans. I have nothing now in my power, but to give you my counsel, and offer you my service. May the gods give success to all your undertakings!” Hannibal’s speech was received with applause, but not one of his counsels was put in execution.

Antiochus, imposed upon and lulled asleep by his flatterers, remained quiet at Ephesus, after the Romans had driven him out of Greece;(831) not once imagining that they would ever invade his dominions. Hannibal, who was now restored to favour, was for ever assuring him, that the war would soon be removed into Asia, and that he would soon see the enemy at his gates: that he must resolve, either to abdicate his throne, or oppose vigorously a people who grasped at the empire of the world. This discourse awakened, in some little measure, the king out of his lethargy, and prompted him to make some weak efforts. But, as his conduct was unsteady, after sustaining a great many considerable losses, he was forced to terminate the war by an ignominious peace; one of the articles of which was, that he should deliver up Hannibal to the Romans. However, the latter did not give him opportunity to put it in execution, but retired to the island of Crete, to consider there what course it would be best for him to take.

The riches he had brought along with him, of which the people of the island got some notice, had like to have proved his ruin.(832) Hannibal was never wanting in stratagems, and he had occasion to employ them now, to save both himself and his treasure. He filled several vessels with molten lead, the tops of which he just covered over with gold and silver. These he deposited in the temple of Diana, in presence of several Cretans, to whose honesty, he said, he confided all his treasure. A strong guard was then posted round the temple, and Hannibal left at full liberty, from a supposition that his riches were secured. (M136) But he had concealed them in hollow statues of brass,(833) which he always carried along with him. And then, embracing a favourable opportunity to make his escape, he fled to the court of Prusias, king of Bithynia.(834)

It appears from history, that he made some stay in the court of this prince, who soon engaged in war with Eumenes, king of Pergamus, a professed friend to the Romans. By means of Hannibal, the troops of Prusias gained several victories both by land and sea.

He employed a stratagem of an extraordinary kind, in a sea-fight.(835) As the enemy’s fleet consisted of more ships than his, he had recourse to artifice. He put into earthen vessels all kinds of serpents, and ordered these vessels to be thrown into the enemy’s ships. His chief aim was to destroy Eumenes; and for that purpose it was necessary for him to find out which ship he was on board of. This Hannibal discovered by sending out a boat, upon pretence of conveying a letter to him. Having gained his point thus far, he ordered the commanders of the respective vessels to direct their attack principally against Eumenes’s ship. They obeyed, and would have taken it, had he not outsailed his pursuers. The rest of the ships of Pergamus sustained the fight with great vigour, till the earthen vessels had been thrown into them. At first they only laughed at this, and were very much surprised to find such weapons employed against them. But when they saw themselves surrounded with the serpents, which darted out of these vessels when they flew to pieces, they were seized with dread, retired in disorder, and yielded the victory to the enemy.

(M137) Services of so important a nature seemed to secure for ever to Hannibal an undisturbed asylum at that prince’s court.(836) However, the Romans would not suffer him to be easy there, but deputed Q. Flamininus to Prusias, to complain of the protection he gave Hannibal. The latter easily guessed the motive of this embassy, and therefore did not wait till his enemies had an opportunity of delivering him up. At first he attempted to secure himself by flight; but perceiving that the seven secret outlets, which he had contrived in his palace, were all seized by the soldiers of Prusias, who, by perfidiously betraying his guest, was desirous of making his court to the Romans; he ordered the poison, which he had long kept for this melancholy occasion, to be brought him; and taking it in his hand, “Let us,” said he, “free the Romans from the disquiet with which they have so long been tortured, since they have not patience to wait for an old man’s death. The victory which Flamininus gains over a man disarmed and betrayed will not do him much honour. This single day will be a lasting testimony of the great degeneracy of the Romans. Their fathers sent notice to Pyrrhus, to desire he would beware of a traitor who intended to poison him, and that at a time when this prince was at war with them in the very centre of Italy; but their sons have deputed a person of consular dignity to spirit up Prusias, impiously to murder one who is not only his friend, but his guest.” After calling down curses upon Prusias, and having invoked the gods, the protectors and avengers of the sacred rights of hospitality, he swallowed the poison,(837) and died at seventy years of age.

This year was remarkable for the death of three great men, Hannibal, Philopœmen, and Scipio, who had this in common, that they all died out of their native countries, by a death little correspondent to the glory of their actions. The two first died by poison: Hannibal being betrayed by his host; and Philopœmen being taken prisoner in a battle against the Messenians, and thrown into a dungeon, was forced to swallow poison. As to Scipio, he banished himself, to avoid an unjust prosecution which was carrying on against him at Rome, and ended his days in a kind of obscurity.

_The Character and Eulogium of Hannibal._—This would be the proper place for representing the excellent qualities of Hannibal, who reflected so much glory on Carthage. But as I have attempted to draw his character elsewhere,(838) and to give a just idea of him, by making a comparison between him and Scipio, I think myself dispensed from giving his eulogium at large in this place.

Persons who devote themselves to the profession of arms, cannot spend too much time in the study of this great man, who is looked upon, by the best judges, as the most complete general, in almost every respect, that ever the world produced.

During the whole seventeen years that the war lasted, two errors only are objected to him: first, his not marching, immediately after the battle of Cannæ, his victorious army to Rome, in order to besiege that city: secondly, his suffering their courage to be softened and enervated during their winter-quarters in Capua: errors, which only show that great men are not so in all things;(839) _summi enim sunt, homine tamen_; and which, perhaps, may be partly excused.

But then, for these two errors, what a multitude of shining qualities appear in Hannibal! How extensive were his views and designs, even in his most tender years! What greatness of soul! What intrepidity! What presence of mind must he have possessed, to be able, even in the fire and heat of action, to turn every thing to advantage! With what surprising address must he have managed the minds of men, that, amidst so great a variety of nations which composed his army, who often were in want both of money and provisions, his camp was not once disturbed with any insurrection, either against himself or any of his generals! With what equity, what moderation must he have behaved towards his new allies, to have prevailed so far as to attach them inviolably to his service, though he was reduced to the necessity of making them sustain almost the whole burthen of the war, by quartering his army upon them, and levying contributions in their several countries! In short, how fruitful must he have been in expedients, to be able to carry on, for so many years, a war in a remote country, in spite of the violent opposition made by a powerful faction at home, which refused him supplies of every kind, and thwarted him on all occasions; it may be affirmed, that Hannibal, during the whole series of this war, seemed the only prop of the state, and the soul of every part of the empire of the Carthaginians, who could never believe themselves conquered, till Hannibal confessed that he himself was so.

But our acquaintance with Hannibal will be very imperfect, if we consider him only at the head of armies. The particulars we learn from history, concerning the secret intelligence he held with Philip of Macedon; the wise counsels he gave to Antiochus, king of Syria; the double reformation he introduced in Carthage, with regard to the management of the public revenues and the administration of justice, prove, that he was a great statesman in every respect. So superior and universal was his genius, that it took in all parts of government; and so great were his natural abilities, that he was capable of acquitting himself in all the various functions of it with glory. Hannibal shone as conspicuously in the cabinet as in the field; equally able to fill the civil as the military employments. In a word, he united in his own person the different talents and merits of all professions, the sword, the gown, and the finances.

He had some learning, and though he was so much employed in military labours, and engaged in so many wars, he, however, found some leisure to devote to literature.(840) Several smart repartees of Hannibal, which have been transmitted to us, show that he had a great fund of natural wit; and this he improved by the most polite education that could be bestowed at that time, and in such a republic as Carthage. He spoke Greek tolerably well, and even wrote some books in that language. His preceptor was a Lacedæmonian, named Sosilus, who, with Philenius, another Lacedæmonian, accompanied him in all his expeditions. Both these undertook to write the history of this renowned warrior.

With regard to his religion and moral conduct, he was not altogether so profligate and wicked as he is represented by Livy:(841) “cruel even to inhumanity, more perfidious than a Carthaginian; regardless of truth, of probity, of the sacred ties of oaths; fearless of the gods, and utterly void of religion.” _Inhumana crudelitas, perfida plusquam Punica; nihil veri, nihil sancti, nullus deúm metus, nullum jusjurandum, nulla __ religio._ According to Polybius,(842) he rejected a barbarous proposal that was made him before he entered Italy, which was, to eat human flesh, at a time when his army was in absolute want of provisions. Some years after, so far from treating with barbarity, as he was advised to do, the dead body of Sempronius Gracchus, which Mago had sent him, he caused his funeral obsequies to be solemnized in presence of the whole army.(843) We have seen him, on many occasions, evince the highest reverence for the gods; and Justin,(844) who copied Trogus Pompeius, an author worthy of credit, observes, that he always showed uncommon moderation and continence, with regard to the great number of women taken by him during the course of so long a war; insomuch that no one would have imagined he had been born in Africa, where incontinence is the predominant vice of the country. _Pudicitiamque eum tantam inter tot captivas habuisse, ut in Africa natum quivis negaret._

His disregard of wealth, at a time when he had so many opportunities to enrich himself by the plunder of the cities he stormed, and the nations he subdued, shows that he knew the true and genuine use which a general ought to make of riches, _viz._ to gain the affection of his soldiers, and to attach his allies to his interest, by diffusing his beneficence on proper occasions, and not being sparing in his rewards: a quality very essential, and at the same time as uncommon, in a commander. The only use Hannibal made of money was to purchase success; firmly persuaded, that a man who is at the head of affairs is sufficiently recompensed by the glory derived from victory.

He always led a very regular, austere life;(845) and even in times of peace, and in the midst of Carthage, when he was invested with the first dignity of the city, we are told that he never used to recline himself on a bed at meals, as was the custom in those ages, and that he drank but very little wine. So regular and uniform a life may serve as an illustrious example to our commanders, who often include, among the privileges of war and the duty of officers, the keeping of splendid tables, and living luxuriously.

I do not, however, pretend altogether to exculpate Hannibal from all the errors with which he is charged. Though he possessed an assemblage of the most exalted qualities, it cannot be denied but that he had some little tincture of the vices of his country; and that it would be difficult to excuse some actions and circumstances of his life. Polybius observes,(846) that Hannibal was accused of avarice in Carthage, and of cruelty in Rome. He adds, on the same occasion, that people were very much divided in opinion concerning him; and it would be no wonder, as he had made himself so many enemies in both cities, that they should have drawn him in disadvantageous colours. But Polybius is of opinion, that though it should be taken for granted, that all the defects with which he is charged are true; yet that they were not so much owing to his nature and disposition, as to the difficulties with which he was surrounded, in the course of so long and laborious a war; and to the complacency he was obliged to show to the general officers, whose assistance he absolutely wanted, for the execution of his various enterprises; and whom he was not always able to restrain, any more than he could the soldiers who fought under them.

SECT. II. DISSENSIONS BETWEEN THE CARTHAGINIANS AND MASINISSA, KING OF NUMIDIA.—Among the conditions of the peace granted to the Carthaginians, there was one which enacted, that they should restore to Masinissa all the territories and cities he possessed before the war; and further, Scipio, to reward the zeal and fidelity which that monarch had shown towards the Romans, had added to his dominions those of Syphax. This present afterwards gave rise to disputes and quarrels between the Carthaginians and Numidians.

These two princes, Syphax and Masinissa, were both kings in Numidia, but reigned over different nations. The subjects of Syphax were called Masæsuli, and their capital was Cirtha. Those of Masinissa were the Massyli: but they are better known by the name of Numidians, which was common to them both. Their principal strength consisted in their cavalry. They always rode without saddles, and some even without bridles, whence Virgil(847) calls them _Numidæ infræni_.

In the beginning of the second Punic war,(848) Syphax siding with the Romans, Gala, the father of Masinissa, to check the career of so powerful a neighbour, thought it his interest to join the Carthaginians, and accordingly sent out against Syphax a powerful army under the conduct of his son, at that time but seventeen years of age. Syphax, being overcome in a battle, in which it is said he lost thirty thousand men, escaped into Mauritania. However, the face of things was afterwards greatly changed.

Masinissa, after his father’s death, was often reduced to the brink of ruin;(849) being driven from his kingdom by an usurper; pursued warmly by Syphax; in danger every instant of falling into the hands of his enemies; destitute of forces, money, and of every resource. He was at that time in alliance with the Romans, and the friend of Scipio, with whom he had had an interview in Spain. His misfortunes would not permit him to bring great succours to that general. When Lælius arrived in Africa, Masinissa joined him with a few horse, and from that time continued inviolably attached to the Roman interest. Syphax, on the contrary, having married the famous Sophonisba, daughter of Asdrubal, went over to the Carthaginians.(850)

The fate of these two princes again changed, but the change was now final.(851) Syphax lost a great battle, and was taken alive by the enemy. Masinissa, the victor, besieged Cirtha, his capital, and took it. But he met with a greater danger in that city than he had faced in the field, and this was Sophonisba, whose charms and endearments he was unable to resist. To secure this princess to himself, he married her, but a few days after, he was obliged to send her a dose of poison, as her nuptial present; this being the only way that he could devise to keep his promise with his queen, and preserve her from the power of the Romans.

This was a considerable error in itself, and one that could not fail to disoblige a nation that was so jealous of its authority: but this young prince gloriously made amends for his fault, by the signal services he afterwards rendered to Scipio. We observed, that after the defeat and capture of Syphax, the dominions of this prince were bestowed upon him;(852) and that the Carthaginians were forced to restore all he possessed before. This gave rise to the divisions which we are now going to relate.

A territory situated towards the sea-side, near the lesser Syrtis, was the subject of the dispute.(853) The country was very rich, and the soil extremely fruitful; a proof of which is, that the city of Leptis alone, which belonged to that territory, paid daily a talent to the Carthaginians, by way of tribute. Masinissa had seized part of this territory. Each side despatched deputies to Rome, to plead the cause of their respective superiors before the senate. This assembly thought proper to send Scipio Africanus, with two other commissioners, to examine the controversy upon the spot. However, they returned without coming to any decision, and left the business in the same uncertain state in which they had found it. Possibly they acted in this manner by order of the senate, and had received private instructions to favour Masinissa, who was then possessed of the district in question.

(M138) Ten years after, new commissioners having been appointed to examine the same affair, they acted as the former had done, and left the whole undetermined.(854)

(M139) After the like distance of time, the Carthaginians again brought their complaint before the senate, but with greater importunity than before.(855) They represented, that besides the lands at first contested, Masinissa had, during the two preceding years, dispossessed them of upwards of seventy towns and castles: their hands were bound up by that article of the last treaty, which forbade their making war upon any of the allies of the Romans: that they could no longer bear the insolence, the avarice, and cruelty of that prince: that they were deputed to Rome with three requests, (one of which they desired might be immediately complied with,) _viz._ either that the affair might be examined and decided by the senate; or, secondly, that they might be permitted to repel force by force, and defend themselves by arms; or, lastly, that, if favour was to prevail over justice, they then entreated the Romans to specify once for all, which of the Carthaginian lands they were desirous should be given up to Masinissa, that they, by this means, might hereafter know what they had to depend on, and that the Roman people would show some moderation in their behalf, at a time that this prince set no other bounds to his pretensions, than his insatiable avarice. The deputies concluded with beseeching the Romans, that if they had any cause of complaint against the Carthaginians since the conclusion of the last peace, that they themselves would punish them; and not to give them up to the wild caprice of a prince, by whom their liberties were made precarious, and their lives insupportable. After ending their speech, being pierced with grief, shedding floods of tears, they fell prostrate upon the earth; a spectacle that moved all who were present to compassion, and raised a violent hatred against Masinissa. Gulussa, his son, who was then present, being asked what he had to reply, he answered, that his father had not given him any instructions, not knowing that any thing would be laid to his charge. He only desired the senate to reflect, that the circumstance which drew all this hatred upon him from the Carthaginians, was, the inviolable fidelity with which he had always been attached to the side of the Romans. The senate, after hearing both sides, answered, that they were inclined to do justice to either party to whom it might be due: that Gulussa should set out immediately with their orders to his father, who was thereby commanded to send immediately deputies with those of Carthage; that they would do all that lay in their power to serve him, but not to the prejudice of the Carthaginians: that it was but just the ancient limits should be preserved; and that it was far from being the intention of the Romans, to have the Carthaginians dispossessed, during the peace, of those territories and cities which had been left them by the treaty. The deputies of both powers were then dismissed with the usual presents.

But all these assurances were but mere words.(856) It is plain that the Romans did not once endeavour to satisfy the Carthaginians, or do them the least justice; and that they protracted the business, on purpose to give Masinissa time to establish himself in his usurpation, and weaken his enemies.

(M140) A new deputation was sent to examine the affair upon the spot, and Cato was one of the commissioners.(857) On their arrival, they asked the parties if they were willing to abide by their determination. Masinissa readily complied. The Carthaginians answered, that they had fixed a rule to which they adhered, and that this was the treaty which had been concluded by Scipio, and desired that their cause might be examined with all possible rigour. They therefore could not come to any decision. The deputies visited all the country, and found it in a very good condition, especially the city of Carthage: and they were surprised to see it, after having been involved in such a calamity, so soon again raised to so exalted a pitch of power and grandeur. The deputies, on their return, did not fail to acquaint the senate with this circumstance; and declared, Rome could never be in safety, so long as Carthage should subsist. From this time, whatever affair was debated in the senate, Cato always added the following words to his opinion, “and I conclude that Carthage ought to be destroyed.” This grave senator did not give himself the trouble to prove, that bare jealousy of the growing power of a neighbouring state, is a warrant sufficient for destroying a city, contrary to the faith of treaties. Scipio Nasica on the other hand, was of opinion, that the ruin of this city would draw after it that of their commonwealth; because that the Romans, having then no rival to fear, would quit the ancient severity of their manners, and abandon themselves to luxury and pleasures, the never-failing subverters of the most flourishing empires.

In the mean time, divisions broke out in Carthage.(858) The popular faction, being now become superior to that of the grandees and senators, sent forty citizens into banishment; and bound the people by an oath, never to suffer the least mention to be made of recalling those exiles. They withdrew to the court of Masinissa, who despatched Gulussa and Micipsa, his two sons, to Carthage, to solicit their recall. However, the gates of the city were shut against them, and one of them was closely pursued by Hamilcar, one of the generals of the republic. This gave occasion to a new war, and accordingly armies were levied on both sides. A battle was fought; and the younger Scipio, who afterwards ruined Carthage, was spectator of it. He had been sent from Lucullus, who was then carrying on war in Spain, and under whom Scipio then served, to Masinissa, to desire some elephants from that monarch. During the whole engagement, he stood upon a neighbouring hill; and was surprised to see Masinissa, then upwards of eighty years of age, mounted (agreeably to the custom of his country) on a horse without a saddle; flying from rank to rank like a young officer, and sustaining the most arduous toils. The fight was very obstinate, and continued from morning till night, but at last the Carthaginians gave way. Scipio used to say afterwards, that he had been present at many battles, but at none with so much pleasure as at this; having never before beheld so formidable an army engage, without any danger or trouble to himself. And being very conversant in the writings of Homer, he added, that till his time, there were but two more who had had the pleasure of being spectators of such an action, _viz._ Jupiter from mount Ida, and Neptune from Samothrace, when the Greeks and Trojans fought before Troy. I know not whether the sight of a hundred thousand men (for so many there were) butchering one another, can administer a real pleasure; or whether such a pleasure is consistent with the sentiments of humanity, so natural to mankind.

The Carthaginians, after the battle was over, entreated Scipio to terminate their contests with Masinissa.(859) Accordingly, he heard both parties, and the Carthaginians consented to yield up the territory of Emporium,(860) which had been the first cause of the dispute, to pay Masinissa two hundred talents of silver down, and eight hundred more, at such times as should be agreed. But Masinissa insisting on the return of the exiles, and the Carthaginians being unwilling to agree to this proposition, they did not come to any decision. Scipio, after having paid his compliments, and returned thanks to Masinissa, set out with the elephants for which he had been sent.

The king, immediately after the battle was over, had blocked up the enemy’s camp, which was pitched upon a hill, whither neither troops nor provisions could come to them.(861) During this interval, there arrived deputies from Rome, with orders from the senate to decide the quarrel, in case the king should be defeated; otherwise, to leave it undetermined, and to give the king the strongest assurances of the continuation of their friendship; and they complied with the latter injunction. In the mean time, the famine daily increased in the enemy’s camp; and to add to their calamity, it was followed by a plague, which made dreadful havoc. Being now reduced to the last extremity, they surrendered to Masinissa, promising to deliver up the deserters, to pay him five thousand talents of silver in fifty years, and restore the exiles, notwithstanding their oaths to the contrary. They all submitted to the ignominious ceremony of passing under the yoke,(862) and were dismissed, with only one suit of clothes for each. Gulussa, to satiate his vengeance for the ill treatment which, as we before observed, he had met with, sent out against them a body of cavalry, whom, from their great weakness, they could neither escape nor resist. So that of fifty-eight thousand men, very few returned to Carthage.

(M141) _The Third Punic War._—The third Punic war, which was less considerable than either of the two former, with regard to the number and greatness of the battles, and its continuance, which was only four years, was still more remarkable with respect to the success and event of it, as it ended in the total ruin and destruction of Carthage.

The inhabitants of this city, from their last defeat, knew what they had to fear from the Romans, who had uniformly displayed great ill-will towards them, as often as they had addressed them upon their disputes with Masinissa.(863) To prevent the consequences of it, the Carthaginians, by a decree of the senate, impeached Asdrubal, general of the army, and Carthalo, commander of the auxiliary(864) forces, as guilty of high treason, for being the authors of the war against the king of Numidia. They then sent a deputation to Rome, to inquire what opinion that republic entertained of their late proceedings, and what was desired of them. The deputies were coldly answered, that it was the business of the senate and people of Carthage to know what satisfaction was due to the Romans. A second deputation bringing them no clearer answer, they fell into the greatest dejection; and being seized with the strongest terrors, from the recollection of their past sufferings, they fancied the enemy was already at their gates, and imagined to themselves all the dismal consequences of a long siege, and of a city taken sword in hand.

In the mean time, the senate debated at Rome on the measures it would be proper for them to take; and the disputes between Cato the elder and Scipio Nasica, who entertained totally different opinions on this subject, were renewed.(865) The former, on his return from Africa, had declared, in the strongest terms, that he had found Carthage, not as the Romans supposed it to be, exhausted of men or money, or in a weak and humble state; but, on the contrary, that it was crowded with vigorous young men, abounded with immense quantities of gold and silver, and prodigious magazines of arms and all warlike stores; and was so haughty and confident on account of this force, that their hopes and ambition had no bounds. It is farther said, that after he had ended his speech, he threw, out of the lappet of his robe, in the midst of the senate, some African figs; and, as the senators admired their beauty and size, “Know,” says he, “that it is but three days since these figs were gathered. Such is the distance between the enemy and us.”(866)

Cato and Nasica had each of them their reasons for voting as they did.(867) Nasica, observing that the people had risen to such a height of insolence, as led them into excesses of every kind; that their prosperity had swelled them with a pride which the senate itself was not able to check; and that their power was become so enormous, that they were able to draw the city, by force, into every mad design they might undertake; Nasica, I say, observing this, was desirous that they should continue in fear of Carthage, in order that this might serve as a curb to restrain and check their audacious conduct. For it was his opinion, that the Carthaginians were too weak to subdue the Romans; and at the same time too strong to be considered by them in a contemptible light. With regard to Cato, he thought that as his countrymen were become haughty and insolent by success, and plunged headlong into profligacy of every kind; nothing could be more dangerous, than for them to have for a rival and an enemy, a city that till now had been powerful, but was become, even by its misfortunes, more wise and provident than ever; and not to remove the fears of the inhabitants entirely with regard to a foreign power; since they had, within their own walls, all the opportunities of indulging themselves in excesses of every kind.

To lay aside, for one instant, the laws of equity, I leave the reader to determine which of these two great men reasoned most justly, according to the maxims of sound policy, and the true interest of a state. One undoubted circumstance is, that all historians have observed that there was a sensible change in the conduct and government of the Romans, immediately after the ruin of Carthage:(868) that vice no longer made its way into Rome with a timorous pace, and as it were by stealth, but appeared barefaced, and seized, with astonishing rapidity, upon all orders of the republic: that the senators, plebeians, in a word, all conditions, abandoned themselves to luxury and voluptuousness, without moderation or sense of decency, which occasioned, as it must necessarily, the ruin of the state. “The first Scipio,”(869) says Paterculus, speaking of the Romans, “had laid the foundations of their future grandeur; and the last, by his conquests, opened a door to all manner of luxury and dissoluteness. For, after Carthage, which obliged Rome to stand for ever on its guard, by disputing empire with that city, had been totally destroyed, the depravity of manners was no longer slow in its progress, but swelled at once into the utmost excess of corruption.”

Be this as it may, the senate resolved to declare war against the Carthaginians; and the reasons or pretences urged for it were, their having maintained ships contrary to the tenour of the treaty; their having sent an army out of their territories, against a prince who was in alliance with Rome, and whose son they had treated ill, at the time that he was accompanied by a Roman ambassador.(870)

(M142) An event, that chance occasioned to happen very fortunately, at the time that the senate of Rome was debating on the affair of Carthage, doubtless contributed very much to make them take that resolution.(871) This was the arrival of deputies from Utica, who came to surrender up themselves, their effects, their lands, and their city, into the hands of the Romans. Nothing could have happened more seasonably. Utica was the second city of Africa, vastly rich, and had a port equally spacious and commodious; it stood within sixty furlongs of Carthage, so that it might serve as a place of arms in the attack of that city. The Romans now hesitated no longer, but formally proclaimed war. M. Manilius, and L. Marcius Censorinus, the two consuls, were desired to set out as soon as possible. They had secret orders from the senate, not to end the war but by the destruction of Carthage. The consuls immediately left Rome, and stopped at Lilybæum in Sicily. They had a considerable fleet, on board of which were fourscore thousand foot, and about four thousand horse.

The Carthaginians were not yet acquainted with the resolutions which had been taken at Rome.(872) The answer brought back by their deputies, had only increased their fears, _viz._ “It was the business of the Carthaginians to consider what satisfaction was due to them.”(873) This made them not know what course to take. At last they sent new deputies, whom they invested with full powers to act as they should see fitting; and even (what the former wars could never make them stoop to) to declare, that the Carthaginians gave up themselves, and all they possessed, to the will and pleasure of the Romans. This, according to the import of the clause, _se suaque eorum arbitrio permittere_, was submitting themselves, without reserve, to the power of the Romans, and acknowledging themselves their vassals. Nevertheless, they did not expect any great success from this condescension, though so very mortifying; because, as the Uticans had been beforehand with them on that occasion, this circumstance had deprived them of the merit of a ready and voluntary submission.

The deputies, on their arrival at Rome, were informed that war had been proclaimed, and that the army was set out. The Romans had despatched a courier to Carthage, with the decree of the senate; and to inform that city, that the Roman fleet had sailed. The deputies had therefore no time for deliberation, but delivered up themselves, and all they possessed, to the Romans. In consequence of this behaviour, they were answered, that since they had at last taken a right step, the senate granted them their liberty, the enjoyment of their laws, and all their territories and other possessions, whether public or private, provided that, within the space of thirty days, they should send, as hostages, to Lilybæum, three hundred young Carthaginians of the first distinction, and comply with the orders of the consuls. This last condition filled them with inexpressible anxiety: but the concern they were under would not allow them to make the least reply, or to demand an explanation; nor, indeed, would it have been to any purpose. They therefore set out for Carthage, and there gave an account of their embassy.

All the articles of the treaty were extremely severe with regard to the Carthaginians; but the silence of the Romans, with respect to the cities of which no notice was taken in the concessions which that people was willing to make, perplexed them exceedingly.(874) But all they had to do was to obey. After the many former and recent losses which the Carthaginians had sustained, they were by no means in a condition to resist such an enemy, since they had not been able to oppose Masinissa. Troops, provisions, ships, allies, in a word, every thing was wanting, and hope and vigour more than all the rest.

They did not think it proper to wait till the thirty days, which had been allowed them, were expired, but immediately sent their hostages, in hopes of softening the enemy by the readiness of their obedience, though they dared not flatter themselves with the expectation of meeting with favour on this occasion. These hostages were the flower, and the only hopes, of the noblest families of Carthage. Never was any spectacle more moving; nothing was now heard but cries, nothing seen but tears, and all places echoed with groans and lamentations. But above all, the disconsolate mothers, bathed in tears, tore their dishevelled hair, beat their breasts, and, as if grief and despair had distracted them, they yelled in such a manner as might have moved the most savage breasts to compassion. But the scene was much more mournful, when the fatal moment of their separation was come; when, after having accompanied their dear children to the ship, they bid them a long last farewell, persuaded that they should never see them more; bathed them with their tears; embraced them with the utmost fondness; clasped them eagerly in their arms; could not be prevailed upon to part with them, till they were forced away, which was more grievous and afflicting than if their hearts had been torn out of their breasts. The hostages being arrived in Sicily, were carried from thence to Rome; and the consuls told the deputies, that when they should arrive at Utica, they would acquaint them with the orders of the republic.

In such a situation of affairs, nothing can be more grievous than a state of uncertainty, which, without descending to particulars, gives occasion to the mind to image to itself every misery.(875) As soon as it was known that the fleet was arrived at Utica, the deputies repaired to the Roman camp; signifying, that they were come in the name of their republic, in order to receive their commands, which they were ready to obey. The consul, after praising their good disposition and compliance, commanded them to deliver up to him, without fraud or delay, all their arms. This they consented to, but besought him to reflect on the sad condition to which he was reducing them, at a time when Asdrubal, whose quarrel against them was owing to no other cause than their perfect submission to the orders of the Romans, was advanced almost to their gates, with an army of twenty thousand men. The answer returned them was, that the Romans would set that matter right.

This order was immediately put in execution.(876) There arrived in the camp a long train of waggons, loaded with all the preparations of war, taken out of Carthage: two hundred thousand complete sets of armour, a numberless multitude of darts and javelins, with two thousand engines for shooting darts and stones.(877) Then followed the deputies of Carthage, accompanied by the most venerable senators and priests, who came purposely to try to move the Romans to compassion in this critical moment, when their sentence was going to be pronounced, and their fate would be irreversible. Censorinus, the consul, for it was he who had all along spoken, rose up for a moment at their coming, and expressed some kindness and affection for them; but suddenly assuming a grave and severe countenance: “I cannot,” says he, “but commend the readiness with which you execute the orders of the senate. They have commanded me to tell you, that it is their absolute will and pleasure that you depart out of Carthage, which they have resolved to destroy; and that you remove into any other part of your dominions which you shall think proper, provided it be at the distance of eighty stadia(878) from the sea.”

The instant the consul had pronounced this fulminating decree, nothing was heard among the Carthaginians but lamentable shrieks and howlings.(879) Being now in a manner thunderstruck, they neither knew where they were, nor what they did; but rolled themselves in the dust, tearing their clothes, and unable to vent their grief any otherwise, than by broken sighs and deep groans. Being afterwards a little recovered, they lifted up their hands with the air of suppliants one moment towards the gods, and the next towards the Romans, imploring their mercy and justice towards a people, who would soon be reduced to the extremes of despair. But as both the gods and men were deaf to their fervent prayers, they soon changed them into reproaches and imprecations; bidding the Romans call to mind, that there were such beings as avenging deities, whose severe eyes were for ever open on guilt and treachery. The Romans themselves could not refrain from tears at so moving a spectacle, but their resolution was fixed. The deputies could not even prevail so far, as to get the execution of this order suspended, till they should have an opportunity of presenting themselves again before the senate, to attempt, if possible, to get it revoked. They were forced to set out immediately, and carry the answer to Carthage.

The people waited for their return with such an impatience and terror, as words could never express.(880) It was scarce possible for them to break through the crowd that flocked round them, to hear the answer, which was but too strongly painted in their faces. When they were come into the senate, and had declared the barbarous orders of the Romans, a general shriek informed the people of their fate; and from that instant, nothing was seen and heard in every part of the city, but howling and despair, madness and fury.

The reader will here give me leave to interrupt the course of the history for a moment, to reflect on the conduct of the Romans. It is great pity that the fragment of Polybius, where an account is given of this deputation, should end exactly in the most interesting part of this narrative. I should set a much higher value on one short reflection of so judicious an author, than on the long harangues which Appian ascribes to the deputies and the consul. I can never believe, that so rational, judicious, and just a man as Polybius, could have approved the proceedings of the Romans on the present occasion. We do not here discover, in my opinion, any of the characteristics which distinguished them anciently; that greatness of soul, that rectitude, that utter abhorrence of all mean artifices, frauds, and impostures, which, as is somewhere said, formed no part of the Roman disposition; _Minimè Romanis artibus_. Why did not the Romans attack the Carthaginians by open force? Why should they declare expressly in a treaty (a most solemn and sacred thing) that they allowed them the full enjoyment of their liberties and laws; and understand, at the same time, certain private conditions, which proved the entire ruin of both? Why should they conceal, under the scandalous omission of the word _city_ in this treaty, the perfidious design of destroying Carthage? as if, beneath the cover of such an equivocation, they might destroy it with justice. In short, why did the Romans not make their last declaration, till after they had extorted from the Carthaginians, at different times, their hostages and arms, that is, till they had absolutely rendered them incapable of disobeying their most arbitrary commands? Is it not manifest, that Carthage, notwithstanding all its defeats and losses, though it was weakened and almost exhausted, was still a terror to the Romans, and that they were persuaded they were not able to conquer it by force of arms? It is very dangerous to be possessed of so much power, as to be able to commit injustice with impunity, and with a prospect of being a gainer by it. The experience of all ages shows, that states seldom scruple to commit injustice, when they think it will conduce to their advantage.