Chapter III: Strategy (5)

We cannot be better convinced of these truths than by the consideration of the position of Massena in Switzerland in 1799. After Jourdan's defeat at Stockach, he occupied the line from Basel by Schaffhausen and Rheineck to Saint-Gothard, and thence by La Furca to Mont-Blanc. He had enemies in front of Basel, at Waldshut, at Schaffhausen, at Feldkirch, and at Chur; Bellegarde threatened the Saint-Gothard, and the Italian army menaced the Simplon and the Saint-Bernard. How was he to defend such a circumference? and how could he leave open one of these great valleys, thus risking every thing? From Rheinfelden to the Jura, toward Soleure, it was but two short marches, and there was the mouth of the trap in which the French army was placed. This was, then, the pivot of the defense. But how could he leave Schaffhausen unprotected? how abandon Rheineck and the Saint-Gothard? how open the Valais and the approach by Berne, without surrendering the whole of Switzerland to the Coalition? And if he covered each point even by a brigade, where would be his army when he would need it to give battle to an approaching force? It is a natural system on a level theater to concentrate the masses of an army; but in the mountains such a course would surrender the keys of the country, and, besides, it is not easy to say where an inferior army could be concentrated without compromising it.

After the forced evacuation of the line of the Rhine and Zurich, it seemed that the only strategic point for Massena to defend was the line of the Jura. He was rash enough to stand upon the Albis,--a line shorter than that of the Rhine, it is true, but exposed for an immense distance to the attacks of the Austrians. If Bellegarde, instead of going into Lombardy by the Valtellina, had marched to Berne or made a junction with the archduke, Massena would have been ruined. These events seem to prove that if a country covered with high mountains be favorable for defense in a tactical point of view, it is different in a strategic sense, because it necessitates a division of the troops. This can only be remedied by giving them greater mobility and by passing often to the offensive.

General Clausewitz, whose logic is frequently defective, maintains, on the contrary, that, movements being the most difficult part in this kind of war, the defensive party should avoid them, since by such a course he might lose the advantages of the local defenses. He, however, ends by demonstrating that a passive defense must yield under an active attack,--which goes to show that the initiative is no less favorable in mountains than in plains. If there could be any doubt on this point, it ought to be dispelled by Massena's campaign in Switzerland, where he sustained himself only by attacking the enemy at every opportunity, even when he was obliged to seek him on the Grimsel and the Saint-Gothard. Napoleon's course was similar in 1796 in the Tyrol, when he was opposed to Wurmser and Alvinzi.

As for detailed strategic maneuvers, they may be comprehended by reading the events of Suwaroff's expedition by the Saint-Gothard upon the Muttenthal. While we must approve his maneuvers in endeavoring to capture Lecourbe in the valley of the Reuss, we must also admire the presence of mind, activity, and unyielding firmness which saved that general and his division. Afterward, in the Schachenthal and the Muttenthal, Suwaroff was placed in the same position as Lecourbe had been, and extricated himself with equal ability. Not less extraordinary was the ten days' campaign of General Molitor, who with four thousand men was surrounded in the canton of Glaris by more than thirty thousand allies, and yet succeeded in maintaining himself behind the Linth after four admirable fights. These events teach us the vanity of all theory _in details_, and also that in such a country a strong and heroic will is worth more than all the precepts in the world. After such lessons, need I say that one of the principal rules of this kind of war is, not to risk one's self in the valleys without securing the heights? Shall I say also that in this kind of war, more than in any other, operations should be directed upon the communications of the enemy? And, finally, that good temporary bases or lines of defense at the confluence of the great valleys, covered by strategic reserves, combined with great mobility and frequent offensive movements, will be the best means of defending the country?

I cannot terminate this article without remarking that mountainous countries are particularly favorable for defense when the war is a national one, in which the whole people rise up to defend their homes with the obstinacy which enthusiasm for a holy cause imparts: every advance is then dearly bought. But to be successful it is always necessary that the people be sustained by a disciplined force, more or less numerous: without this they must finally yield, like the heroes of Stanz and of the Tyrol.

The offensive against a mountainous country also presents a double case: it may either be directed upon a belt of mountains beyond which are extensive plains, or the whole theater may be mountainous.

In the first case there is little more to be done than this,--viz.: make demonstrations upon the whole line of the frontier, in order to lead the enemy to extend his defense, and then force a passage at the point which promises the greatest results. The problem in such a case is to break through a cordon which is strong less on account of the numbers of the defenders than from their position, and if broken at one point the whole line is forced. The history of Bard in 1800, and the capture of Leutasch and Scharnitz in 1805 by Ney, (who threw fourteen thousand men on Innspruck in the midst of thirty thousand Austrians, and by seizing this central point compelled them to retreat in all directions,) show that with brave infantry and bold commanders these famous mountain-ranges can generally be forced.

The history of the passage of the Alps, where Francis I. turned the army which was awaiting him at Suza by passing the steep mountains between Mont-Cenis and the valley of Queyras, is an example of those _insurmountable_ obstacles which can always be surmounted. To oppose him it would have been necessary to adopt a system of cordon; and we have already seen what is to be expected of it. The position of the Swiss and Italians at Suza was even less wise than the cordon-system, because it inclosed them in a contracted valley without protecting the lateral issues. Their strategic plan ought to have been to throw troops into these valleys to defend the defiles, and to post the bulk of the army toward Turin or Carignano.

When we consider the _tactical_ difficulties of this kind of war, and the immense advantages it affords the defense, we may be inclined to regard the concentration of a considerable force to penetrate by a single valley as an extremely rash maneuver, and to think that it ought to be divided into as many columns as there are practicable passes. In my opinion, this is one of the most dangerous of all illusions; and to confirm what I say it is only necessary to refer to the fate of the columns of Championnet at the battle of Fossano. If there be five or six roads on the menaced front, they should all, of course, be threatened; but the army should cross the chain in not more than two masses, and the routes which these follow should not be divergent; for if they were, the enemy might be able to defeat them separately. Napoleon's passage of the Saint-Bernard was wisely planned. He formed the bulk of his army on the center, with a division on each flank by Mont-Cenis and the Simplon, to divide the attention of the enemy and flank his march.

The invasion of a country entirely covered with mountains is a much greater and more difficult task than where a dénouement may be accomplished by a decisive battle in the open country; for fields of battle for the deployment of large masses are rare in a mountainous region, and the war becomes a succession of partial combats. Here it would be imprudent, perhaps, to penetrate on a single point by a narrow and deep valley, whose outlets might be closed by the enemy and thus the invading army be endangered: it might penetrate by the wings on two or three lateral lines, whose outlets should not be too widely separated, the marches being so arranged that the masses may debouch at the junction of the valleys at nearly the same instant. The enemy should be driven from all the ridges which separate these valleys.

Of all mountainous countries, the tactical defense of Switzerland would be the easiest, if all her inhabitants were united in spirit; and with their assistance a disciplined force might hold its own against a triple number.

To give specific precepts for complications which vary infinitely with localities, the resources and the condition of the people and armies, would be absurd. History, well studied and understood, is the best school for this kind of warfare. The account of the campaign of 1799 by the Archduke Charles, that of the campaigns which I have given in my History of the Wars of the Revolution, the narrative of the campaign of the Grisons by Ségur and Mathieu Dumas, that of Catalonia by Saint-Cyr and Suchet, the campaign of the Duke de Rohan in Valtellina, and the passage of the Alps by Gaillard, (Francis I.,) are good guides in this study.

ARTICLE XXIX.

Grand Invasions and Distant Expeditions.

There are several kinds of distant expeditions. The first are those which are merely auxiliary and belong to wars of intervention. The second are great continental invasions, through extensive tracts of country, which may be either friendly, neutral, doubtful, or hostile. The third are of the same nature, but made partly on land, partly by sea by means of numerous fleets. The fourth class comprises those beyond the seas, to found, defend, or attack distant colonies. The fifth includes the great descents, where the distance passed over is not very great, but where a powerful state is attacked.

As to the first, in a strategic point of view, a Russian army on the Rhine or in Italy, in alliance with the German States, would certainly be stronger and more favorably situated than if it had reached either of these points by passing over hostile or even neutral territory; for its base, lines of operations, and eventual points of support will be the same as those of its allies; it may find refuge behind their lines of defense, provisions in their depots, and munitions in their arsenals;--while in the other case its resources would be upon the Vistula or the Niemen, and it might afford another example of the sad fate of many of these great invasions.

In spite of the important difference between a war in which a state is merely an auxiliary, and a distant invasion undertaken for its own interest and with its own resources, there are, nevertheless, dangers in the way of these auxiliary armies, and perplexity for the commander of all the armies,--particularly if he belong to the state which is not a principal party; as may be learned from the campaign of 1805. General Koutousoff advanced on the Inn to the boundaries of Bavaria with thirty thousand Russians, to effect a junction with Mack, whose army in the mean time had been destroyed, with the exception of eighteen thousand men brought back from Donauwerth by Kienmayer. The Russian general thus found himself with fifty thousand men exposed to the impetuous activity of Napoleon with one hundred and fifty thousand, and, to complete his misfortune, he was separated from his own frontiers by a distance of about seven hundred and fifty miles. His position would have been hopeless if fifty thousand men had not arrived to reinforce him. The battle of Austerlitz--due to a fault of Weyrother--endangered the Russian army anew, since it was so far from its base. It almost became the victim of a distant alliance; and it was only peace that gave it the opportunity of regaining its own country.

The fate of Suwaroff after the victory of Novi, especially in the expedition to Switzerland, and that of Hermann's corps at Bergen in Holland, are examples which should be well studied by every commander under such circumstances. General Benningsen's position in 1807 was less disadvantageous, because, being between the Vistula and the Niemen, his communications with his base were preserved and his operations were in no respect dependent upon his allies. We may also refer to the fate of the French in Bohemia and Bavaria in 1742, when Frederick the Great abandoned them and made a separate peace. In this case the parties were allies rather than auxiliaries; but in the latter relation the political ties are never woven so closely as to remove all points of dissension which may compromise military operations. Examples of this kind have been cited in Article XIX., on political objective points.

History alone furnishes us instruction in reference to distant invasions across extensive territories. When half of Europe was covered with forests, pasturages, and flocks, and when only horses and iron were necessary to transplant whole nations from one end of the continent to the other, the Goths, Huns, Vandals, Normans, Arabs, and Tartars overran empires in succession. But since the invention of powder and artillery and the organization of formidable standing armies, and particularly since civilization and statesmanship have brought nations closer together and have taught them the necessity of reciprocally sustaining each other, no such events have taken place.

Besides these migrations of nations, there were other expeditions in the Middle Ages, which were of a more military character, as those of Charlemagne and others. Since the invention of powder there have been scarcely any, except the advance of Charles VIII. to Naples, and of Charles XII. into the Ukraine, which can be called distant invasions; for the campaigns of the Spaniards in Flanders and of the Swedes in Germany were of a particular kind. The first was a civil war, and the Swedes were only auxiliaries to the Protestants of Germany; and, besides, the forces concerned in both were not large. In modern times no one but Napoleon has dared to transport the armies of half of Europe from the Rhine to the Volga; and there is little danger that he will be imitated.

Apart from the modifications which result from great distances, all invasions, after the armies arrive upon the actual theater, present the same operations as all other wars. As the chief difficulty arises from these great distances, we should recall our maxims on deep lines of operations, strategic reserves, and eventual bases, as the only ones applicable; and here it is that their application is indispensable, although even that will not avert all danger. The campaign of 1812, although so ruinous to Napoleon, was a model for a distant invasion. His care in leaving Prince Schwarzenberg and Reynier on the Bug, while Macdonald, Oudinot, and Wrede guarded the Dwina, Victor covered Smolensk, and Augereau was between the Oder and Vistula, proves that he had neglected no humanly possible precaution in order to base himself safely; but it also proves that the greatest enterprises may fail simply on account of the magnitude of the preparations for their success.

If Napoleon erred in this contest, it was in neglecting diplomatic precautions; in not uniting under one commander the different bodies of troops on the Dwina and Dnieper; in remaining ten days too long at Wilna; in giving the command of his right to his brother, who was unequal to it; and in confiding to Prince Schwarzenberg a duty which that general could not perform with the devotedness of a Frenchman. I do not speak now of his error in remaining in Moscow after the conflagration, since then there was no remedy for the misfortune; although it would not have been so great if the retreat had taken place immediately. He has also been accused of having too much despised distances, difficulties, and men, in pushing on as far as the Kremlin. Before passing judgment upon him in this matter, however, we ought to know the real motives which induced him to pass Smolensk, instead of wintering there as he had intended, and whether it would have been possible for him to remain between that city and Vitebsk without having previously defeated the Russian army.

It is doubtless true that Napoleon neglected too much the resentment of Austria, Prussia, and Sweden, and counted too surely upon a _dénouement_ between Wilna and the Dwina. Although he fully appreciated the bravery of the Russian armies, he did not realize the spirit and energy of the people. Finally, and chiefly, instead of procuring the hearty and sincere concurrence of a military state, whose territories would have given him a sure base for his attack upon the colossal power of Russia, he founded his enterprise upon the co-operation of a brave and enthusiastic but fickle people, and besides, he neglected to turn to the greatest advantage this ephemeral enthusiasm.

The fate of all such enterprises makes it evident that the capital point for their success, and, in fact, the only maxim to be given, is "never to attempt them without having secured the hearty and constant alliance of a respectable power near enough the field of operations to afford a proper base, where supplies of every kind may be accumulated, and which may also in case of reverse serve as a refuge and afford new means of resuming the offensive." As to the precautions to be observed in these operations, the reader is referred to Articles XXI. and XXII., on the safety of deep lines of operations and the establishment of eventual bases, as giving all the military means of lessening the danger; to these should be added a just appreciation of distances, obstacles, seasons, and countries,--in short, accuracy in calculation and moderation in success, in order that the enterprise may not be carried too far. We are far from thinking that any purely military maxims can insure the success of remote invasions: in four thousand years only five or six have been successful, and in a hundred instances they have nearly ruined nations and armies.

Expeditions of the third class, partly on land, partly by sea, have been rare since the invention of artillery, the Crusades being the last in date of occurrence; and probably the cause is that the control of the sea, after having been held in succession by several secondary powers, has passed into the hands of England, an insular power, rich in ships, but without the land-forces necessary for such expeditions.

It is evident that from both of these causes the condition of things now is very different from that existing when Xerxes marched to the conquest of Greece, followed by four thousand vessels of all dimensions, or when Alexander marched from Macedonia over Asia Minor to Tyre, while his fleet coasted the shore.

Nevertheless, if we no longer see such invasions, it is very true that the assistance of a fleet of men-of-war and transports will always be of immense value to any army on shore when the two can act in concert. Still, sailing-ships are an uncertain resource, for their progress depends upon the winds,--which may be unfavorable: in addition, any kind of fleet is exposed to great dangers in storms, which are not of rare occurrence.

The more or less hostile tone of the people, the length of the line of operations, and the great distance of the principal objective point, are the only points which require any deviation from the ordinary operations of war.

Invasions of neighboring states, if less dangerous than distant ones, are still not without great danger of failure. A French army attacking Cadiz might find a tomb on the Guadalquivir, although well based upon the Pyrenees and possessing intermediate bases upon the Ebro and the Tagus. Likewise, the army which in 1809 besieged Komorn in the heart of Hungary might have been destroyed on the plains of Wagram without going as far as the Beresina. The antecedents, the number of disposable troops, the successes already gained, the state of the country, will all be elements in determining the extent of the enterprises to be undertaken; and to be able to proportion them well to his resources, in view of the attendant circumstances, is a great talent in a general. Although diplomacy does not play so important a part in these invasions as in those more distant, it is still of importance; since, as stated in Article VI., there is no enemy, however insignificant, whom it would not be useful to convert into an ally. The influence which the change of policy of the Duke of Savoy in 1706 exercised over the events of that day, and the effects of the stand taken by Maurice of Saxony in 1551, and of Bavaria in 1813, prove clearly the importance of securing the strict neutrality of all states adjoining the theater of war, when their co-operation cannot be obtained.

EPITOME OF STRATEGY

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The task which I undertook seems to me to have been passably fulfilled by what has been stated in reference to the strategic combinations which enter ordinarily into a plan of campaign. We have seen, from the definition at the beginning of this chapter, that, in the most important operations in war, _strategy_ fixes the direction of movements, and that we depend upon _tactics_ for their execution. Therefore, before treating of these mixed operations, it will be well to give here the combinations of grand tactics and of battles, as well as the maxims by the aid of which the application of the fundamental principle of war may be made.

By this method these operations, half strategic and half tactical, will be better comprehended as a whole; but, in the first place, I will give a synopsis of the contents of the preceding chapter.

From the different articles which compose it, we may conclude that the manner of applying the general principle of war to all possible theaters of operations is found in what follows:--

1. In knowing how to make the best use of the advantages which the reciprocal directions of the two bases of operations may afford, in accordance with Article XVIII.

2. In choosing, from the three zones ordinarily found in the strategic field, that one upon which the greatest injury can be done to the enemy with the least risk to one's self.

3. In establishing well, and giving a good direction to, the lines of operations; adopting for defense the concentric system of the Archduke Charles in 1796 and of Napoleon in 1814; or that of Soult in 1814, for retreats parallel to the frontiers.

On the offensive we should follow the system which led to the success of Napoleon in 1800, 1805, and 1806, when he directed his line upon the extremity of the strategic front; or we might adopt his plan which was successful in 1796, 1809, and 1814, of directing the line of operations upon the center of the strategic front: all of which is to be determined by the respective positions of the armies, and according to the maxims presented in Article XXI.

4. In selecting judicious eventual lines of maneuver, by giving them such directions as always to be able to act with the greater mass of the forces, and to prevent the parts of the enemy from concentrating or from affording each other mutual support.

5. In combining, in the same spirit of centralization, all strategic positions, and all large detachments made to cover the most important strategic points of the theater of war.

6. In imparting to the troops the greatest possible mobility and activity, so as, by their successive employment upon points where it may be important to act, to bring superior force to bear upon fractions of the hostile army.

The system of rapid and continuous marches multiplies the effect of an army, and at the same time neutralizes a great part of that of the enemy's, and is often sufficient to insure success; but its effect will be quintupled if the marches be skillfully directed upon the decisive strategic points of the zone of operations, where the severest blows to the enemy can be given.

However, as a general may not always be prepared to adopt this decisive course to the exclusion of every other, he must then be content with attaining a part of the object of every enterprise, by rapid and successive employment of his forces upon isolated bodies of the enemy, thus insuring their defeat. A general who moves his masses rapidly and continually, and gives them proper directions, may be confident both of gaining victories and of securing great results therefrom.

The oft-cited operations of 1809 and 1814 prove these truths most satisfactorily, as also does that ordered by Carnot in 1793, already mentioned in Article XXIV., and the details of which may be found in Volume IV. of my History of the Wars of the Revolution. Forty battalions, carried successively from Dunkirk to Menin, Maubeuge, and Landau, by reinforcing the armies already at those points, gained four victories and saved France. The whole science of marches would have been found in this wise operation had it been directed upon the decisive strategic point. The Austrian was then the principal army of the Coalition, and its line of retreat was upon Cologne: hence it was upon the Meuse that a general effort of the French would have inflicted the most severe blow. The Committee of Public Safety provided for the most pressing danger, and the maneuver contains half of the strategic principle; the other half consists in giving to such efforts the most decisive direction, as Napoleon did at Ulm, at Jena, and at Ratisbon. The whole of strategy is contained in these four examples.

It is superfluous to add that one of the great ends of strategy is to be able to assure real advantages to the army by preparing the theater of war most favorable for its operations, if they take place in its own country, by the location of fortified places, of intrenched camps, and of _têtes de ponts_, and by the opening of communications in the great decisive directions: these constitute not the least interesting part of the science. We have already seen how we are to recognize these lines and these decisive points, whether permanent or temporary. Napoleon has afforded instruction on this point by the roads of the Simplon and Mont-Cenis; and Austria since 1815 has profited by it in the roads from the Tyrol to Lombardy, the Saint-Gothard, and the Splugen, as well as by different fortified places projected or completed.