Chapter XIV: The Partition Treaties and the Grand Alliance

The question of the Spanish succession--The claims of the candidates--Legal and political difficulties of the problem--Importance of the interests involved--The Partition Treaty of 1668--Adoption by Louis of a policy of partition in 1698--Suspicions of William and Heinsius--Objects of Louis, William, and Heinsius--The first Partition Treaty--Death of the Electoral Prince--The negotiations continued--The second Partition Treaty--Advantages of the treaty to France and the maritime powers--Acceptance of the treaty in Europe--Attitude of the Emperor and Savoy--The struggle round the deathbed of Charles II.--The will in favour of France--Acceptance of the will by Louis--Political reasons for his conduct--His deliberate breach of faith--His policy purely opportunist--Its momentary success--Aggressive conduct of Louis--The formation of the Grand Alliance.

[Sidenote: =Question of the Spanish Succession.=]

Ever since the death of Philip IV. of Spain in 1666, Europe had lived under the shadow of an impending catastrophe. Charles II. was the last male representative of the Habsburgs of Spain. Weak in body, and imbecile in mind, he could neither bear the burden of a great empire himself nor hand it on to a child to bear it after him. Married first to Louise of Orléans, and on her death to a German princess, Marie of Neuburg, the blessing of an heir was denied to him; and all Europe knew well that when he died the great powers would wrangle over his dominions like a pack of wolves round the carcase of an ox. The question of the succession to the crown of Spain was one which required the highest powers of statesmanship for its solution. It was complicated by the nicest points of European policy, of international law, and of public and private honour. Practically there were three claimants whose rights were undeniably superior to those of any one else, the House of Bourbon, the House of Habsburg, and the Bavarian house of Wittelbach. In default of heirs to the reigning king, Charles II., the inheritance, according to the usual rules of legitimate succession, would go to his sisters, the only other children of Philip IV.[5] [Sidenote: =Claim of the Dauphin.=] Of them, the elder, Maria Theresa, had married Louis XIV. of France, and their eldest son, the Dauphin, was accordingly the rightful heir of the crown of Spain by descent. But by a special provision of the treaty of the Pyrenees Maria Theresa, in consideration of a dower of 500,000 crowns, covenanted to be paid her by her father Philip IV., had expressly renounced all claims for herself or her descendants upon the throne of Spain. So, if this renunciation was valid, the Dauphin, though heir by descent, would be excluded from the inheritance by international law. But on behalf of the Dauphin it was argued with some force, that as the dower of 500,000 crowns had never been paid by Philip IV., the renunciation, which was expressed to have been made in consideration of it, fell to the ground and was of no effect.

[Sidenote: =Claim of the Electoral Prince.=]

The younger daughter of Philip IV., Margaret Theresa, had married the Emperor Leopold I.; but the only issue of that marriage was a daughter, Maria Antonia, who married Max Emanuel, the elector of Bavaria. They had a son, Joseph Ferdinand, generally known as the Electoral Prince, who became accordingly the representative of the rights of Margaret Theresa by descent. But in his way, as in that of the Dauphin, there was a difficulty of international law. Maria Antonia had on her marriage with the elector of Bavaria expressly renounced her claims on the Spanish inheritance, and thus shut out her son legally from the succession.

If Charles II. had no child, and his two sisters had renounced their claims, it was clear that there was no descendant of Philip IV. who could make out a valid title by descent and law. Recourse must be had to the descendants of Philip III. [Sidenote: =Claim of the Emperor.=] Here again the question lay between two sisters, for Philip IV. was the only son. The elder daughter of Philip III. was Anne of Austria, the wife of Louis XIII. and the mother of Louis XIV. of France, but she, like her niece Maria Theresa, had expressly renounced her claims to the crown of Spain upon her marriage. The younger daughter, Maria, had married the Emperor Ferdinand III., and was therefore the mother of the Emperor Leopold I., who was the living representative of her rights. She had made no renunciation whatever, and the Emperor Leopold accordingly maintained that by the combined effect of descent and law he and he alone was the rightful inheritor of the Spanish monarchy. But Leopold was much too sensible to dream for a moment that Europe would permit the resuscitation of the empire of Charles V., just as Louis XIV. was too sensible to dream of uniting the crowns of France and Spain upon the same head, and he passed on his rights to his second son the archduke Charles, just as Louis and the Dauphin passed on theirs to the second son of the Dauphin, Philip duke of Anjou.

[Sidenote: =Legal difficulties of the question.=]

A more difficult problem has rarely presented itself to statesmen. The simplest solution no doubt was to be found in the purely legal view of the matter taken by the Emperor Leopold. The renunciations had been legally made, and they must be considered legally valid, otherwise there was no sure basis of procedure at all. But whatever force might be attributed to an argument of this sort with reference to the renunciations of Anne of Austria and Maria Theresa, it was very difficult to admit its validity in the case of Maria Antonia, and permit a father to profit by a renunciation, which he himself had imposed upon his own daughter in her extreme youth and in contemplation of marriage. Yet how could any one maintain the invalidity of the renunciation of Maria Antonia on account of parental influence, and the validity of that of Maria Theresa, when it was an admitted fact that the consideration for the latter, _i.e._ the dowry, had never been paid? But then, if the renunciations were to be considered invalid, there was no question as to the right of the Dauphin to the whole succession, and Europe would find itself face to face with a danger far greater than the resuscitation of the empire of Charles V.

[Sidenote: =Political difficulties.=]

Below the purely legal aspect of the matter there was felt to be a momentous European question. Spain had been permitted to retain her vast and splendid dominions, because she was daily becoming weaker and more effete. The longdrawn agony of the Spanish monarchy exactly suited the plans of European statesmen, as long as Europe was in a state of transition. When the chief powers were fighting among themselves for the Low Countries and the Rhine, for the lower Danube and the Baltic, it was highly convenient that problems so grave should not be further complicated by questions of South American trade, and access to the Mediterranean. All Europe was content to leave the monopolies of Spain alone, because Spain was unable to utilise them. But towards the end of the century this feeling was passing away, and the prizes which Spain continued to hold but did not know how to use, were being eagerly and avariciously eyed from two quite different quarters. The ‘maritime nations,’ as they were called in the language of diplomacy, England and Holland, since the revolution of 1688, had succeeded in establishing on the firm basis of a close mutual alliance the superiority of their commerce to that of France. Already they shared between them the trade of the Baltic, of North America, and of the East. But from two quarters of the world they were shut out. The policy of Spain excluded them from a share in the trade with the Spanish Indies, and especially from the lucrative commerce in negroes, which was becoming of greater importance every day in those islands and districts of central America where white labour was an impossibility. The want of a harbour and naval station in the Mediterranean placed their commerce with the Levant at the mercy of pirates, and dependent on the goodwill of the southern powers. At the same time the policy of the House of Habsburg, since the peace of Westphalia, had been tending more and more in the direction of trying to secure a hold upon north Italy. While national interest and the course of events had been pushing the Austrian power further and further down the Danube at the expense of the Turks, the dynastic and personal policy of the Emperors had been rather directed to the gain of compensation upon the Po for what they had lost upon the Rhine.

[Sidenote: =Importance of the European interests involved.=]

It was clear then that the question of the succession to the crown of Spain could not be decided merely according to the legal claims of the various candidates. The vast empire of Spain could not be disposed of merely on principles which decide the devolution of a private inheritance. Behind all personal claims, behind all legal rights, behind even all national policy, loomed the greater principles of the balance of power and the freedom of commerce. If the interests and the rights of France could not permit the union of the Spanish inheritance with the power of Austria, if the interests and the rights of the House of Habsburg could no less permit the annexation of the empire of Spain by the power of France, neither Germany nor England nor the United Provinces could in the interests of Europe permit either the one or the other. But if Europe was going to claim her right to be heard, if claims of descent and of legal rights were to be subordinated to the general good of the European family of civilised nations, the maritime nations would assuredly demand their share in the commerce of the Spanish Indies as the United Provinces would insist upon their barrier against the aggression of France, and Austria the security of its hold upon Italy.

With his usual diplomatic foresight Louis XIV. had grasped the situation as long ago as the period of the war of Devolution. At that time Charles II. was young and as yet unmarried. It was quite possible that in spite of the weakness of his health he might have children born to him before he died. [Sidenote: =The Partition Treaty of 1668.=] Nevertheless his death might occur at any moment, and Louis with his keen eye to the future determined to be ready for all emergencies. He at once recognised the improbability of being able to annex for himself or his house the whole of the Spanish dominions, and accordingly decided to try and obtain by negotiation with the only other serious candidate then in the field--the Emperor Leopold--that part of the inheritance which was of most value to France. His policy was completely successful, and on the 19th of January 1668 he concluded with the Emperor a secret treaty for the partition of the Spanish dominions, after the death of Charles II. without heirs, by which the Emperor was to have Spain and the Indies and the Milanese, and France the Netherlands, Franche Comté, Navarre, Naples, Sicily and Catalonia. In the thirty years which elapsed between the partition treaty of 1668 and the peace of Ryswick much had happened. [Sidenote: =Changes in Europe since 1668.=] Louis had already annexed Franche Comté, and become master of so much of the Spanish Netherlands as to give France a safe and defensible frontier. The Netherlands were no longer of the same value to France as they were in 1668, while their acquisition was much more difficult. Since 1668 the United Provinces, through their successful resistance to Louis in the Dutch war of 1672 and in the war of the League of Augsburg, and through their close alliance with England since 1688, were far more formidable antagonists. Louis knew well that they would fight to the death rather than permit him to break down the barrier of the Spanish power in the Netherlands, which alone kept the Scheldt closed and Amsterdam safe. At the same time the maritime powers, as we have seen, had ambitions of their own in the direction of the Spanish and Mediterranean trade, which would prevent them from acquiescing without a struggle in the rule of France at Naples, or her ascendency in Spanish waters.

[Sidenote: =Adoption by Louis of a policy of Partition.=]

The problem therefore had increased in difficulty since 1668. New interests had to be consulted if diplomacy was to try her hand at a settlement. A long and sanguinary war, which could not fail to embrace all Europe in its terrible folds, was absolutely certain if things were left to take their chance. Who could tell what the results of such a war might be? Both Louis and William had reached an age when statesmen do not willingly set fire to the house on the chance of carrying off some valuables in the confusion. It was madness to think that France could gain more even by a successful war than she had gained by diplomacy in the treaty of 1668. So when the treaty of Ryswick was signed and Europe was once more at peace, Louis sent his friend the Comte de Tallard to London, on a special mission, to submit to William III. a project for the partition of the Spanish monarchy when the moribund king had breathed his last.

[Sidenote: =Mistrust of William III. and Heinsius.=]

Tallard found William III. discouraging, and his friend and confidant the duke of Portland almost hostile. They were naturally suspicious of gifts which came from so pronounced an enemy as Louis XIV. They were astonished at the boldness, not to say the rashness, of the proposal to parcel out the dominions of Charles II. in his lifetime. But the more William thought over the idea the more feasible it seemed. Heinsius, the grand pensionary of Holland, was by no means opposed to it on principle, though he doubted whether the interested parties could ever come to an agreement on the details. William found the people of England so distrustful of him, so suspicious of his designs, so hostile to his advisers, so determined to deprive him of his army, and fetter him by poverty, that he did not dare to reckon on their support should he call upon them again to follow him in a crusade against France. In March 1698 he authorised Portland, who was at Versailles, to invite Louis to lay his proposals for a treaty before him. In so doing he not only expressed his willingness to enter into negotiations with a view to the partition of the Spanish dominions, but also his determination not to consider himself bound any longer by the clause in the League of Augsburg negotiated in 1688, by which he had pledged himself to recognise and enforce the claims of the Emperor upon the whole inheritance.

[Sidenote: =Progress of the negotiations.=]

In April 1698 the negotiations for a partition treaty between France, England and the United Provinces were fairly launched. When once begun they proceeded briskly enough. Did they seem to be flagging, the news of a relapse in the health of Charles II. would set them again feverishly at work. Yet the business owing to its delicate character and many ramifications took a long time to finish. It was not till the September of that year, after five months of incessant negotiations, that Louis could feel sure that his efforts would be crowned with success. During that time the despatches show Louis to have constantly been the active agent in the discussions. William and Heinsius played mainly a passive part. It was theirs to criticise, to accept or to reject what Louis proposed. But as the negotiations continued it is pleasant to see how the desire for peace and agreement grew stronger and stronger, how confidence succeeded to suspicion, and frankness of mind to mistrust. Never did Louis show his great mastery over the foreign politics of Europe in clearer light than in these negotiations. Throughout, his is the master mind. Tallard but played the part of his eyes and ears and mouth in England. William, though quick and clever at seeing the drift of a suggestion, fixed his eyes too closely upon the national interests of the maritime nations to take so broad a view of the whole as that which illuminated the mind of Louis.

At first Louis overrated this tendency of William’s diplomacy. He thought that if he was ready to give ample security for the safety of the United Provinces behind their barrier of the Netherlands, and for the security of English trade in the Mediterranean, he could procure Spain and the Indies for his grandson. [Sidenote: =Objects of Louis’s diplomacy.=] But he quickly found out his mistake, and he fell back upon two principles of action which determined his policy in the whole question from first to last as long as the negotiations lasted. The first was to guard against the revival of the power of the Austro-Spanish House through the succession question. The second was to neutralise the increase of the influence of the Habsburgs, by making the frontiers of France strong, not merely for defence but for offence. In pursuit of the first principle he opposed himself vigorously to the recognition of the archduke Charles as king of Spain, and when through the force of circumstances he was obliged to give way on that point, he did so only on condition that the connection between Spain and Austria through north Italy was cut by the granting of the Milanese to an independent prince, and rendered liable to annihilation by France through her acquisition of the Tuscan ports and Finale. Louis was not going to see the chain of the Austro-Spanish power, which it had cost Henry IV. and Richelieu so much to break, once more woven round her by the arts of diplomacy and the accidents of life. In pursuit of the second principle he took care, that if his grandson could not rule at Madrid, his own armies might have a way easily open to their advance thither by his acquisition of Guipuscoa; while he made his eastern frontier secure by the annexation of Lorraine, and strove hard to make it dangerous by his claim upon Luxemburg.

[Sidenote: =Objects of William and Heinsius.=]

These two principles regulated the diplomacy of France throughout the negotiations for both the partition treaties. Neither of them were necessarily antagonistic to the chief interests of England and the United Provinces. To England the all-important matter was to detach Louis from the support of the House of Stuart, and so to secure the maintenance of the principles of the Revolution. To the United Provinces the possession of a secure barrier against French aggression and the opening of the Scheldt was an essential condition of national existence. To both the maritime powers the duty of preventing France from obtaining the monopoly of trade in Spanish American waters seemed of paramount importance, while the opportunity of obtaining a share in the trade for themselves was one which it was worth running some risk to secure. Both sides were therefore in their heart of hearts more anxious to guard against dangers than to obtain positive increase of power. They were more eager to prevent their enemies from gaining a preponderance than to secure preponderance for themselves. Here lay the secret both of the success and of the dilatoriness of the negotiations. William and Heinsius were easily convinced of the desirableness of a treaty for settling the succession of Spain before Charles II. died. They were attracted by the evident good faith and conciliatory attitude of Louis. They soon found that they had no cause to fear for the security of the barrier of the United Provinces or of the succession in England. The real difficulty lay in providing for the Dauphin such an inheritance as would secure France against the revival of the power of the Austro-Spanish House, and yet would not threaten the trade interests of the maritime powers in the Mediterranean and the Spanish American waters. But that was after all a matter of detail which was certain to be settled, although it might take a long time to settle it. The great object of Louis was to prevent an Austrian succession. The great object of William and Heinsius was to prevent a French succession. Directly both sides were convinced of their mutual interest and each others’ good faith the success of the treaty was assured.

[Sidenote: =The first Partition Treaty, 1698.=]

Fortunately in the Electoral Prince of Bavaria there was a candidate whose advancement to the throne of Spain would satisfy all the conditions required. Neither French nor Austrian by birth and only five years of age, he could be dangerous to neither party either through his territorial influence or personal abilities, while he was likely to be more popular than either of the other candidates in Spain itself, because owing to his tender years he could be educated as a Spaniard. In July 1698 it was agreed that Spain, the Indies, and the Netherlands should go to the Electoral Prince. More than two months were spent in the discussion of the inheritance of the Dauphin. Eventually, on the 10th of October 1698, the first partition treaty was signed. It provided that the Electoral Prince of Bavaria was to receive Spain, the Indies, and the Netherlands. The archduke Charles was to have the Milanese and Luxemburg, and the Dauphin Naples, Sicily,[6] the Tuscan ports, Finale, Guipuscoa, S. Sebastian, and Fuentarabia. On the news of the treaty oozing out at Madrid, Charles II., though very angry, determined to make the best of the position, executed a will in favour of the Electoral Prince, giving him the whole inheritance, and sent for him to Spain in order that he might be educated there in accordance with the traditions of the Spanish court.

[Sidenote: =Likelihood of its success.=]

All seemed now settled. It was true that the Emperor was not likely tamely to acquiesce in the rebuff which had been dealt to his claims, and that the pride of the Spaniards would urge them to fight to the last rather than submit to the enforced partition of their splendid empire. It was probable that the inhabitants of Naples and Sicily would not readily see their long connection with the crown of Spain rudely severed at the dictates of the northern powers. France would have to conquer her inheritance with the sword. But there was little reason to fear that Spain, under the government of a regency, with a foreign boy king at her head, in her exhausted and bankrupt condition, could seriously resist the armies of France and the navies of the maritime powers. And what substantial assistance could the Emperor render with the Bavarians opposed to him on the Danube and the French masters of the sea? Louis knew the sluggish, calculating mind of Leopold too well not to be persuaded that he would soon accept the inevitable, and set himself diligently to profit by the opportunities which the possession of the Milanese gave him in Italy. Venice lay open to him an easy prey. Ascendency in north Italy and the harbour of Venice was more practically useful to the land-locked and poverty-stricken House of Austria than a shadowy and precarious empire beyond the seas. The contracting powers might have to enforce the treaty by war, but the struggle would not be general and could not be prolonged.

[Sidenote: =Death of the Electoral Prince, 1699.=]

Suddenly this fair prospect was marred by an unexpected and tragic blow. On the 6th of February 1699 the Electoral Prince died of smallpox, and the labours of five weary months were dissipated like a bubble in the air. Without a moment’s hesitation, without wasting a minute in unavailing regrets, the indefatigable Louis took up again the web of diplomacy which had for the moment dropped from his hands, and instructed Tallard to negotiate for a new treaty. The matter was much more complicated than heretofore, the details much more difficult to arrange. There was no third candidate now equally suitable to both parties. The duke of Savoy, who was suggested by Tallard, was as objectionable to William and Heinsius as the elector of Bavaria, who was suggested by William, was to Louis. [Sidenote: =The negotiations renewed.=] It soon became clear that the archduke Charles was the only candidate for the crown of Spain and the Indies whom England and the United Provinces would accept. They even refused to listen to the suggestion that the Dauphin ought to have part of the share of the deceased prince. Why should the Dauphin profit, said William, by the death of the Electoral Prince? Louis saw that he must yield if the treaty was to be made. He fell back upon the principles of national consolidation and frontier development, and bent all his energies to obtain for France such a position as would enable her to neutralise the increased power of the Austro-Spanish House.

[Sidenote: =The second Partition Treaty, 1699.=]

He urged strongly that if the Netherlands must go to the archduke, France at least ought to receive compensation in Luxemburg, and that if the Austrian House was to be permitted to add Spain to its dominions he at least might recover the kingdom of Navarre. It was all to no purpose. William and Heinsius refused absolutely to allow Louis to turn the barrier of the Netherlands by the annexation of Luxemburg, or to give his armies a shorter road to Madrid than had been already opened to them by the first treaty. Again Louis saw that he must yield, and in May 1699 the second Partition Treaty was agreed to between Louis, William, and Heinsius. By this treaty Spain, the Indies, and the Netherlands fell to the archduke Charles, the Dauphin received the Milanese, in addition to the share allotted to him by the first treaty, but on condition that he should exchange it for Lorraine with the duke of that country, and annex Lorraine finally to the crown of France. It was further provided by secret articles that the archduke Charles should not be permitted to visit Spain until the Emperor had accepted the Partition Treaty, and that if the Emperor did not accept the treaty before a given date, and the king of Spain before his death, the archduke should forfeit his rights under the treaty, and his share should be given to such prince as the contracting parties might choose.

[Sidenote: =Value of the treaty to France.=]

This treaty was on the face of it more unfavourable to France than the preceding one, and it may well be a matter of surprise at first sight that Louis was prepared to make such great sacrifices in order to obtain it. To seat the archduke Charles on the throne of Spain, while his brother Joseph ruled at Vienna, was a strange termination to the policy of one whose life had been spent in determined antagonism to the House of Habsburg. Yet on consideration it will be seen that the objections to the treaty from the French point of view were more apparent than real. Spain was in such a disorganised condition that it was impossible for her to count among the powers of the world. Her resources were great, but they neither were nor could be developed without capital. Of capital available for such a purpose neither Austria nor Spain had the worth of a dollar. The revenues barely paid for the expenses of the court in either country. Even ambassadors had not enough for the expenses of their household. Important as Spain would soon become if annexed to energetic and prosperous France, she could not but remain a nonentity when joined to sluggish and bankrupt Austria. But that was not all. France was relieved of all serious rivalry on the side of Spain for many years by the disorganisation of the Spanish and imperial finances. She was placed in a position of absolute superiority to Spain by her acquisitions in Italy. The possession of Naples and Sicily made her mistress of the Mediterranean. No communications could pass, no troops could be sent from Austria to Spain, without running the blockade of the French fleet in the Gulf of Lyons. No army could ever reach a port of embarkation without the consent of the duke of Lorraine or the republic of Venice. The gift of the Milanese to the duke of Lorraine completed the policy of Richelieu in 1625. It closed the Valtelline to the armies of the Austro-Spanish power. Were the duke to forget his associations with France, or remember them only too well, and side with her enemy, French troops from the ports of Tuscany and Finale could reach Milan before a German lance flashed in the Valtelline, and French ships could blockade the harbours of Genoa and Savoy at the first note of danger. Even during the war of the Spanish Succession, when English ships rode triumphantly in the Gulf of Lyons, when the imperial armies held Milan, and Genoa was friendly, it was found by no means easy to victual or reinforce the archduke’s troops from Germany. It would have been an absolute impossibility had France been undisputed mistress of the sea.

The enormous advantage gained by Louis XIV. by a simple alliance with the maritime powers, even if it only neutralised their opposition instead of securing their support, has hardly been sufficiently appreciated by historians. [Sidenote: =Advantages of an alliance with the maritime powers.=] The Austro-Spanish power was left by the Partition Treaties huge in bulk but impotent through division. It consisted of four great masses, all dependent upon one another, but unable to communicate with each other, except with the permission of foreign powers. The gold of the Indies was necessary for the payment of the very officials of the Madrid court and government, yet how could Spain pretend to guard her treasure-ships from the united fleets of England and France? The Netherlands depended for their governors and their armies upon Spain. What chance of escaping capture would a Spanish fleet of reinforcements have as it beat up the narrow channel in sight of the coasts of Kent and Picardy? Austria and Spain could not assist one another without first obtaining the mastery in the Mediterranean, and the Netherlands could only communicate with Vienna by permission of the princes of Germany. Had the Partition Treaty been carried out France would have become at a stroke, without bloodshed, incontestably the dominant power in Europe, liable only to be deposed from her pride of place by the rupture of the alliance with the maritime powers, and for that very reason the maritime powers would have held the fate of the world in their hands.

[Sidenote: =Reception of the treaty by the contracting powers.=]

Louis XIV. thoroughly grasped the situation. He fully understood the immense importance of securing the friendship of the maritime powers, the absolute necessity of avoiding their hostility. It was for this reason that he laboured so long and patiently for the success of the policy of partition, that he repressed so strenuously the eager desire of Harcourt, his ambassador at Madrid, to intrigue for the whole inheritance, that he made concession after concession rather than break off the negotiations for a treaty. William and Heinsius were less far-sighted and more suspicious, yet they too were not unaware of the greatness of the position in Europe which an alliance with France would give them. But the people of England and the republican party in the United Provinces were too narrow in mind and bigoted in spirit to recognise anything of the sort. Absurdly fearful for their trade interests, and venomously hostile to the person of William III., they opposed the Partition Treaty blindly because he had made it, and because France had allied with him to make it. There was hardly a man in England outside the little foreign cabal of the court who was in favour of it. Even Somers, the staunchest of Whigs and a devoted adherent of William, when after much doubt he consented to permit it to be sealed with the great seal, only ventured to say that it would doubtless become popular in England if it brought with it a large share of the Spanish-American trade. Fortunately for William England was powerless to stop it, for all foreign negotiations were then wholly under the control of the king, but the Amsterdam traders fought hard and long to prevent its acceptance by the States-General. They insulted Louis by demanding that it should be registered by the Parlement de Paris, and he was actually forced to consent that it should be placed among the archives of that body. It was not till April 1700 that the treaty was at last signed by the three contracting parties and the ratifications exchanged.

[Sidenote: =Its reception by Europe.=]

The agreement of the maritime powers and France with reference to the disposition of the Spanish dominions after the death of Charles II. was a great step towards the maintenance of the peace of Europe, but it did not guarantee it. It was necessary to procure the assent of the chief powers of Europe to the treaty before it was certain that it could be enforced without bloodshed. Here Louis and William found much less opposition than they had any reason to expect. The duke of Lorraine raised no difficulties as to the exchange of his duchy for the Milanese, the Pope and the republic of Venice agreed to the treaty in June. Their adhesion was most important, for Venice held the gates of the passes through the Alps to Austria, and the Pope could block the way to the march of armies to and from Naples. Besides, the opinion of the head of the Catholic world might not unreasonably do much to induce the Spanish court to accept the treaty. Less difficulty still was experienced in Germany. Prussia, now just become a kingdom, signed the treaty in order to gain recognition of her new dignity, the rest of the German princes signed as a protest against the recent creation of the electorate of Hanover.

[Sidenote: =Opposition of Savoy.=]

By the autumn the adhesion of the king of Portugal left the king of Spain, the Emperor, and the duke of Savoy the only important powers of Europe which had not accepted the treaty. Victor Amadeus of Savoy was playing the part traditional in his house. He knew that among the projects present to the mind of Louis was that of exchanging the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily for Savoy and Piedmont. Should war eventually break out between France and Austria his alliance would be of the utmost value to Louis, in enabling him to support the operations of his fleet by the occupation of Milan. Should the Emperor wish to convey his son secretly to Spain he would find the numerous ports of Savoy the most available for his purpose. Convinced of his importance he determined to bide his time and sell himself to the highest bidder. Before long he found that he had miscalculated his chances and lost his market. [Sidenote: =Opposition of the Emperor.=] The Emperor could not bring himself to renounce one jot or tittle of the inheritance which he claimed as his due. Though he received under the treaty far more than he was likely to win by war, though the treaty might easily be described as a diplomatic victory over his rival France, though he had willingly concluded a partition treaty thirty-two years before, which was less favourable than the present, though he knew not where to turn for a florin or look for an ally, nevertheless with the patient stubbornness characteristic of his race, he set himself to obstruct the treaty by delay and defeat it by intrigue. Though he never gave a definite refusal he never really for one moment intended to give an acceptance. His hopes were bent upon obtaining a will in favour of the archduke from Charles II. by means of the influence of the queen, Marie of Neuburg, the sister of the Empress.

[Sidenote: =Events at Madrid.=]

For the moment the interest of the struggle veered to the bedside of the dying king. As the autumn sped on there could no longer be any doubt that the end of that troubled life was at hand. All remedies had been tried but had proved unavailing. The angel of death would not surrender his victim to the revolting mixtures of quack doctors, or the superstitious delusions of monkish exorcists. One duty remained to be performed by Charles ere he quitted the world in which he had lived so wearily. He had to choose, as far as the power of choice was left to him, the successor to his throne. If he chose wrongly he might plunge all Europe into a desolating war and bring his country to absolute ruin. The choice was by no means an easy one nor did his advisers make it easier for him. The Spanish people and Charles himself were united on the great principle of doing all that they could to maintain the integrity of the empire, but they differed as to the means to be adopted to achieve this end. Angry as Charles was at the news of the first Partition Treaty, he accepted it so far as to make a will in favour of the Electoral Prince, and he sent for the young prince in order to educate him in Spain as his heir. The act was popular, for both he and his people believed, no doubt rightly, that the Electoral Prince had a better chance than any other candidate of uniting the whole of the Spanish dominions under himself. But on the death of the prince it became very difficult to decide between the representatives of the Dauphin and of the Emperor. If the Emperor was the weaker, he was the nearer by the traditional ties of policy and of race. But was not France the only power in Europe strong enough to seize and keep the whole inheritance from the hand of the spoiler? It was a hard choice for a moribund king to have to make in his last days of extreme physical and mental weakness.

[Sidenote: =Palace intrigues and revolution.=]

Gradually it became clearer to those who watched by the bedside that personal influence could alone decide his wavering will. Within the palace the queen was paramount, and she, after some little vacillation, had decided to support the archduke strenuously. Outside the palace the feeling was all in favour of France. It grew in intensity as the conviction spread that the Emperor by himself could never defeat a partition treaty. It was fanned by the news that the Pope had pronounced that a decision in favour of France would not be contrary to the interests of the Church. Even the report of the signature of the Partition Treaty did not stem the advancing tide, for with a willing self-deception the Spaniards ascribed it entirely to the hated Dutchman. The national party determined on a palace revolution. The cardinal Porto Carrero, archbishop of Toledo, accompanied by a few religious established himself in the sick-room, and refused to allow the queen or any of the adherents of the archduke to enter. [Sidenote: =Signature of a will in favour of France, 1700.=] He represented to Charles that a will in favour of France was the only way to avoid civil war and a partition of the monarchy. The king freed from the ascendency of his wife gave a tardy assent. On the 7th of October 1700 he signed the will. ‘It is God alone,’ he said as the pen dropped from his nerveless hands, ‘who gives kingdoms, for to Him alone they belong.’ The next day a speedy messenger hurried from Blécourt, Harcourt’s successor, to Paris to acquaint Louis with what had happened. Three weeks afterwards, on the 1st of November, the poor king’s troubles were over, and the last of the line of Arragon was gathered to his fathers. When the will was opened it was found that the whole inheritance of the crown of Spain was given to Philip duke of Anjou, the second son of the Dauphin, and in the event of his death to his younger brother the duc de Berri. If Philip refused to accept the inheritance, the right to it was to pass wholly to the archduke Charles.

[Sidenote: =The problem before Louis.=]

For fifteen days all Europe hung breathless in suspense. What would Louis do? The unexpected, if not the unhoped for, had happened. Harcourt, the able and showy ambassador of France at Madrid, had always maintained that in the end a will in favour of France could certainly be obtained, and Louis, without ever forbidding them, had always quietly put his suggestions aside, and pushed on with all his skill the policy of a partition. And now Harcourt had proved to be right and Louis wrong. The whole of the prize was open to his grasp did he choose to stretch forth his hand and take it. Louis was sorely perplexed. For perhaps the first time in his life he did not see his way clear. His advisers were divided, some of them greatly in doubt. Tallard urged him strongly to keep faith with Europe and maintain the Partition Treaty. Torcy was of the same opinion at first. Beauvilliers was more emphatic even than Tallard. For the moment their advice prevailed, and it was decided to send an envoy to Heinsius to assure him of the good faith of France. But the message was never sent. The wishes of Madame de Maintenon, the earnest remonstrances of the Dauphin, who refused to see his son disinherited without a struggle, reasserted themselves. The feeling of the French court was strongly in favour of a bold policy. Torcy altered his mind as he reflected more carefully upon the state of Europe. The Dauphin insisted with renewed energy on the rights of his son. At last the decision could be put off no longer. The Spanish ambassador reached Paris with the text of the will and required an answer. If it was unfavourable, he was to go straight to Vienna. [Sidenote: =Acceptance of the will.=] On the 16th of November a council was called at Versailles to pronounce a final decision. The courtiers assembled in the great gallery of the palace in unprecedented numbers, for even the most frivolous among them could not but feel the unique gravity of the crisis. The minutes and the hours sped on, the excitement grew more vivid, the strain more intense. At last the great folding doors were thrown open, and as every one bowed low to the ground Louis was seen leaning affectionately on the shoulder of his grandson. Advancing to the edge of the daïs with that kingly dignity which was to him a second nature, he said in clear and deliberate accents, which penetrated to the furthest corners of the vast hall, _Messieurs, voici le roi d’Espagne!_

[Sidenote: =Political reasons for its acceptance.=]

The die was cast. What is to be said of the gamester who staked--and lost--his all on the throw? If moral considerations may for the moment be put on one side, honesty and good faith laid on the shelf, no one can doubt that Louis was right. The interests of his country and the interests of his family demanded at that particular juncture of affairs the acceptance of the will. The difficulties attending the enforcement of the Partition Treaty, in spite of the favour with which the powers of Europe had received it were enormous. To impose the archduke Charles upon Spain by French bayonets, while all Spain and half France was loudly demanding the duke of Anjou was an impossibility. To permit the archduke to establish himself in Spain by means of Austrian troops, before he and his father had accepted the treaty, was too dangerous to be thought of. To act upon the secret article, declare the rights of the archduke forfeited, and give Spain and the Indies to some third person, was to commit a greater outrage than ever upon the pride of Spain and the claims of the Emperor, and to ensure the outbreak of war. The determination of the Emperor to resist a treaty which gave him the lion’s share of the spoil made it impossible to enforce it in its entirety when Charles II. was dead. The contracting powers might, it is true, have executed it as far as was possible. They might have effected the conquest of Naples and Sicily for the Dauphin, and handed over the Milanese to the duke of Lorraine. They might have administered Spain and the Netherlands until a decision was eventually arrived at. But to do these things they would have incurred as large an expenditure of both men and money as would have been entailed by open war, and they would not have avoided open war with the Emperor. To execute the treaty in its entirety was impossible, to execute it partially was costly and dangerous.

[Sidenote: =Remoteness of the dangers of war.=]

To accept the will, on the contrary, presented difficulties comparatively slight. Such a course guaranteed the loyal support of Spain. It did not necessarily involve the active hostility of the Emperor. There was no reason to think that Prussia or the princes of Germany would attach sufficient importance to the principle of the balance of power in Europe, as to incur on its behalf the risks and responsibilities of war. Danger only threatened from the maritime powers, but however deeply William and Heinsius might feel, however bitterly they might resent, his conduct, Louis well knew that they were powerless to act. In both countries the Partition Treaty was more unpopular than the will in favour of France. The English people fully realised that, as long as they kept out of continental complications, their liberties were safe, their control over their king secure. If once they allowed him to involve their interests with those of the Dutch, they thereby put into his hands military and naval power which he could use to make himself independent of Parliament. All the Tories and many of the Whigs were resolute against allowing a standing army on principle, or conniving at it in fact. They cared far more about keeping their own king weak, than they did about preventing Louis from becoming strong. As William bitterly admitted in his letters to Heinsius: ‘I am troubled to the very bottom of my soul to find now that the business has become public, that nearly everybody congratulates himself that France has preferred the will to the treaty, insisting that it is much better for England and for the whole of Europe.... People here are perfectly unconcerned, and turn their thoughts but little to the great change which is happening in the affairs of the world. It seems as if it was a punishment of heaven that this nation should be so little alive to that which passes outside of its own island, although it ought to have the same interests and the same anxieties as the continental nations.’

[Sidenote: =Indifference of England and Holland.=]

William did not conceal from himself the fact that to induce England to declare war against Louis XIV., because of his repudiation of the Partition Treaty and his acceptance of the will of Charles II., was wholly out of the question. He had to content himself with urging the Emperor not to recognise the duke of Anjou, and with endeavouring to gain time. Heinsius was in a similar plight. The republican party were overjoyed at the failure of the Partition Treaty. The citizens of Amsterdam, in their delight at the defeat of the House of Orange, would not hear of any possible dangers to their trade or their barrier. It was doubtful if the States-General could be induced to declare war in alliance with England, it was certain they would not do so by themselves. As far as purely political dangers were concerned Louis might accept the will in perfect security. Not a protest was made, not a murmur was openly heard. Louis thought he might go a step further. [Sidenote: =Their recognition of Philip V.=] In February 1701 he occupied the frontier towns of the Netherlands, took captive the Dutch garrisons which they contained, and restored the towns to the government of the elector of Bavaria, Max Emanuel, who had been appointed by the Spanish government to that charge. To regain their troops the Dutch recognised the duke of Anjou as king of Spain. William held out longer, but at last he was obliged to submit to the pressure of his ministers. In April 1701 England too recognised Philip V., and Louis had for the moment the satisfaction of seeing that he had calculated the chances rightly, and had placed his grandson on the throne of Spain without striking a blow, or involving France in war. Philip himself was received at Madrid with the liveliest expressions of joy and enthusiasm. The grandiloquent boast had come true, _Il n’y a plus de Pyrénées_.

But at what cost had this result been achieved? Never since Richelieu had first launched France on her career of territorial aggrandisement, never since sovereigns had consciously or unconsciously adopted the principles of Macchiavelli in their dealings with one another, had any act so deliberately dishonourable been done as the repudiation of the Partition Treaty by Louis XIV. [Sidenote: =Louis guilty of a deliberate breach of faith.=] Honesty, public faith, private honour, were words of no meaning in international relations, if kings might make treaties one day and break them the next, because it happened to be to their advantage to do so. Push the principle but a little further, and European nations would be once more in a state of pure savagery, for civilisation and progress depend upon contract, and what contract is possible among nations when public faith is dead? If might is right, treaties and bargains are not merely useless but hypocritical. If ever there was a case in which a sovereign ought to have stuck to the bargain which he had made, it was that of Louis XIV. in relation to the Partition Treaty. The treaty was essentially his own handiwork. It was he who had first suggested it. For two years he had urged it, worked for it, made sacrifices for it. At his instance it had been published to the world and accepted by Europe. He was identified with it far more than were William and Heinsius. For him to repudiate his own offspring, because his calculations proved wrong, was to deal a blow at the public morality of Europe from which it took years to recover. His conduct was as plainly unjustifiable in morals as it was advantageous in politics. And no one knew this better than Louis himself. The arguments which he instructed Tallard to advance to William on his behalf, and all the arguments which his apologists have addressed to the world since in his justification, are arguments against the making of a partition treaty, not in favour of its repudiation. They may prove that Louis was foolish to make a treaty, they do not prove that he was right to tear it up directly it was made. They are arguments which Louis had himself discounted when he began the negotiations, and had himself answered, as far as they admitted of an answer, in his earlier instructions to Tallard. It is true that he could not actually have been certain that the Emperor would refuse to accept the treaty, and undoubtedly the fact of his refusal very seriously diminished the chances of the ultimate success of the policy of partition, but it was a contingency highly to be expected, and had as a matter of fact been most carefully provided for in the treaty itself.

[Sidenote: =Not guilty of a deeply laid plan of deception.=]

But among English historians there has been a tendency to make Louis out more culpable than he really was. The whole negotiations for a Partition Treaty have been depicted as an elaborate deception intended to hoodwink the eyes of the maritime powers until the intrigue in Spain should be successful and the will in favour of the duke of Anjou procured. Harcourt at Madrid is described as carrying out the real policy of Louis, while Tallard at London is purposely his dupe, in order that he may with the greater honesty make William and Heinsius his dupes too. The drama is one in which unexampled villainy is everywhere triumphant, dull virtue oppressed and deceived, and retribution lamely limps along full thirteen years behind. Such a theory is opposed both to the facts of history and the limitations of human nature. To keep up a deception planned on such a gigantic scale for two years and a half, without accomplice, or confidant, in the face and to the disadvantage of the ablest intellects of Europe, most of whom were penetrated by suspicion and eager for revenge, is beyond the powers of human villainy and opposed to all that we know of Louis’s character. Louis had often played the hypocrite and broken faith before, but he had done it pompously in the face of Europe with a show of bravado. He had claimed the Netherlands by the law of devolution, and parts of Alsace by virtue of the decisions of the Chambres des Réunions, by sheer audacity not by cunning. He had often been a bully, there is nothing in his long reign, except perhaps his conduct to Fouquet, which could justify the faintest suspicion that he was an accomplished dissembler before whom even Louis XI. must bow the knee. For what does the theory involve? It involves the belief that for two years and a half he was deceiving not merely William and Heinsius, the Emperor, and the king of Spain, but his own most trusted emissaries and friends. He was deceiving Torcy his foreign minister, Tallard his ambassador in London, and Harcourt his ambassador at Madrid. He was to the last assuring the very man, through whose efforts alone he could obtain the whole succession, that he had determined on a different policy; and he was doing this, not in public letters which might see the light, but in his own secret correspondence, which was often sent by special messenger and never went through the foreign office at all. Further he must have carried out this wholesale deception with an elaboration at which the mind sinks back appalled. He wrote hundreds of letters in great detail, held a large number of conferences with his council as a whole, and with individuals by themselves, made numerous speeches to ambassadors, held many and long interviews with Lord Jersey and other envoys, and yet never once in the whole period said or did anything to suggest the slightest suspicion of his good faith! And more than that. He overacted his part terribly. If his real object was to amuse the maritime powers, while his intrigue in Spain was maturing, his obvious course was so to manage the negotiations for the Partition Treaty, as to give as little trouble as possible to himself without exciting the suspicions of William. But on the contrary his private correspondence with Tallard shows that he continually gave himself infinite and unnecessary trouble. His mind was fixed upon the possibilities of the negotiations. He sets out his views at great length on every turn of the diplomatic game. It is he who is continually urging haste, especially when the news of the king of Spain’s health gets more unsatisfactory, the very time when, if he was not in earnest, he might have rested upon his oars without danger. He continued the policy of partition, after he knew that in consequence of it Charles II. had made a will in favour of the Electoral Prince, and that France had become very unpopular in Spain. He even permitted Harcourt to leave Madrid months before Porto Carrero effected his palace revolution, and when all probabilities pointed to a will in favour of the archduke made at the dictation of the queen. Such conduct would have been sheer folly had Louis not been actuated by honest motives.

[Sidenote: =Consistent policy of Louis.=]

In the face of these facts can any one doubt that the negotiations for the Partition Treaties were conducted by Louis in good faith? The principles on which he acted, if not strictly honourable, were far less dishonourable than it has been the fashion to assert. This policy stands out clear in his private letters to Harcourt and to Tallard. It is consistent throughout and intelligible. He never swerved from the opinion that Europe would not permit him to acquire the whole inheritance for his family. He never thought it probable that Charles II. could be induced to make a will in favour of France. Under these circumstances, his obvious policy was to prevent Austria from gaining the whole inheritance, or so much of it as would threaten the ascendency of France in Europe. The best, if not the only way of securing this without involving Europe in war, was by means of the old device of a partition treaty. But it was always possible, if not probable, that the negotiations for a partition would fail, and Louis accordingly left Harcourt free to act as he thought best in his interests until the Partition Treaty was an accomplished fact. Directly the treaty had been concluded, Harcourt was recalled, and placed at the head of the army on the frontier. He was no longer wanted to push the interests of France at the court of Charles II. The time for diplomacy was over, that for action had come, and his services were required to prevent the archduke from coming into Spain in contravention of the treaty. But the unexpected happened. Louis found himself the possessor of the whole inheritance, at a moment when his knowledge of Europe told him that it was more than probable that he could successfuly seize the prize without bloodshed. The temptation was too great, and after a sincere hesitation of some weeks, he turned his back on the policy of the last three years and deliberately broke faith with his allies.

[Sidenote: =Difficulties in the way of Louis.=]

Whatever may have been the motives, the policy of Louis XIV. seemed crowned with success by the spring of 1701. His grandson sat secure upon the throne of Spain, amid the enthusiasm of his people, without a single declared enemy, though it was known that the Emperor was arming. The expulsion of the Dutch from the frontier fortresses placed the Netherlands at the disposal of France. The recognition of Philip V. by the maritime powers seemed to guarantee the peace of Europe in spite of the preparations of the Emperor. None knew better than Louis that the storm was not averted, because for the moment there reigned an ominous calm. It required the most careful and wary tread to avoid the pitfalls open on all sides of him. With or without allies the Emperor would probably declare war. William and Heinsius were working hard to urge the English and the Dutch to action. ‘The only game to play with this nation,’ wrote the king to his confidant, ‘is to engage them in war without their knowing it.’ The princes of Germany were certain to join an alliance against France, were it once set on foot, provided that they received plenty of money and incurred but little risk. Prussia was too nearly interested in the lower Rhineland to stand aloof. Never was it more necessary for Louis to display that spirit of conciliation of which he at times was apt to boast. All his address, all his self-restraint was needed successfully to smooth difficulties, to allay suspicion, to calm prejudice. If one strong power besides the Emperor determined to draw the sword, the fiery cross would run riot over Europe in a moment. Already there had been indications that Tory England and republican Holland had fixed limits to their indifference. Instructions were given to William by the Parliament of 1701 to take such measures as might be needful for the protection of the Dutch. A point might be reached at which distrust of Louis XIV. would get the better of distrust of William III. If the king of France wanted to keep the advantages which he had gained, without running the risks of war, it was essential that he should not excite the suspicions of the English and Dutch.

With a strange infatuation Louis adopted exactly the opposite policy. He formally declared that the rights of the duke of Anjou to the French crown were in no way impaired by the fact of his succession to the throne Of Spain, and early in 1701 he expelled the Dutch troops from the fortresses garrisoned by them in the Spanish Netherlands, and replaced them by French soldiers. [Sidenote: =His aggressive conduct.=] He refused to entertain any proposals whatever for granting compensation to the Emperor out of the dominions of Spain, or security to the Dutch by giving them a fortress barrier. He issued commercial decrees which pointed plainly to the exclusion of English and Dutch ships from the Spanish-American trade, and completed the tale of arrogance and blindness by a deliberate and unpardonable violation of the treaty of Ryswick. On the death of the exiled James II. of England in September 1701, Louis recognised his son James, the Chevalier de St. George, as the rightful king of England. The blunder soon brought its own punishment. Louis had succeeded in doing what William with all his craft could never have done. He had inspired all Englishmen, both Whigs and Tories, with an enthusiastic determination to fight. [Sidenote: =Formation of the Grand Alliance, 1701.=] Flouted in her national pride, threatened in her commercial interests, directly attacked in her liberties and independence, England joined willingly with the Dutch and the Emperor to bring the haughty tyrant of Europe to his knees. In the winter of 1701–2 the Grand Alliance was concluded between England, the Emperor, the Dutch, the king of Prussia, and the grand duke of Hesse, with the object of destroying the tyranny of Louis XIV. and breaking up the Franco-Spanish monarchy by giving Italy to the Emperor, and the Indies to the maritime powers.

[Sidenote: =Death of William III., 1702.=]

The conclusion of the Grand Alliance was the last act permitted to William in the lifelong struggle which he had carried on with the French king. In March 1702 he died, but his spirit still continued to animate the nation. His successor Anne, Tory though she was by conviction, threw herself heartily into his policy under the influence of her friend and favourite the duchess of Marlborough. In May 1702 war was declared and Louis found himself once more face to face with indignant Europe.