Chapter IX: The Audiencia and the Governor: the Ad Interim Rule (2)

Torralba reported great progress in the repair and restoration of royal and municipal warehouses, hospitals, convents, and churches during his administration. The wall of Manila was re-built and new bronze guns were cast and placed thereon. As acting captain-general, Torralba inspected Fort Santiago, and, "noting grave needs both in construction and in the morale of troops," made the necessary repairs, reforms and corrections. [644] He concerned himself also with the promotion and appointment of military officials. These latter acts were vigorously resisted by the maestre de campo, and by other military officials, as encroachments on their authority. They ultimately sought to bring about the nullification of all Torralba's "unjustifiable acts of interference within the military sphere." [645] Whether animated by a sincere desire to see the natives justly treated, or rather by his natural dislike of the friars, Torralba intervened on various occasions for the protection of the Indians against the encroachments and abuses of the churchmen on the encomiendas and in the native towns. These acts were carried out in the name of the audiencia, and in accordance with the law, ultimately meeting with the approval of the Council of the Indies. [646]

A great deal of dissatisfaction, both at the court and in the colony, had resulted from the audiencia's assumption of the government at various times since 1664. We have already noted that the restoration of this authority to the audiencia was attended by the disgraceful quarrel between Coloma and Montemayor and the usurpation of Bónifaz in 1668. The Pardo controversy did not produce a favorable impression of the activities of the audiencia. Torralba's dictatorship in the name of the audiencia from 1715 to 1717, conspicuous for the huge deficit in which it culminated, demonstrated the unfitness of the audiencia to be entrusted with the rule of the Islands.

Indeed, it may be said that the various experiments made by the monarchs during the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries for the purpose of perfecting a system whereby the governorship could be satisfactorily filled ad interim had failed to demonstrate or develop any authority capable of maintaining harmony or decent government. Co-operation among the authorities of the colony was practically unknown. The royal disapproval was passed upon practically all the official acts of these interim administrations. The thirst for personal glory, and the desire for private gain invariably induced some official who was stronger than his contemporaries to assume control of affairs; thus the government of the colony was made repeatedly to subserve personal ends, and civil and political life was characterized by its strife and discord. The probabilities that the temporary administration of the audiencia would not be entirely successful had been recognized from the beginning, and in order to guard against its misrule the king had authorized the appointment of a temporary governor by the Viceroy of New Spain. It was unavoidable, however, that the audiencia should govern until the arrival of this official. For a time the alternative was tried of allowing the maestre de campo to assume the military command, but this resulted in such an incompetent rule that the former prerogatives of the audiencia were restored. Whether the audiencia was capable of governing successfully or not, it certainly had the power to make or mar the government of any other person or authority, whether he was regularly appointed by the king, or chosen temporarily by the viceroy.

The church, as represented by a succession of triumphant archbishops, had exercised the preponderance of power and authority throughout the forty years of strife, ending with the death of Governor Bustamante. We need not be concerned here with the various struggles and disagreements with governors and audiencias, but the fact remains that the church was the only institution existing during this period which was able to present a solid and united front to its enemies, or which manifested any symptoms of power, unity or royal approbation. The culmination of ecclesiastical power was virtually reached on October 11, 1719, when Governor Bustamante was murdered by emissaries of the church and Fray Francisco de la Cuesta, Archbishop of Manila, assumed the vacant governorship.

Zúñiga, the Dominican historian, says that the archbishop declined the governorship on this occasion, but was subsequently prevailed upon to accept it. [647] It is certain that the tribunal was in no state or condition to take charge of affairs; its administration had been discredited by the murder of its protector, its senior magistrate had been proved an embezzler in his residencia, and the remaining members of the tribunal were not qualified to remain in office. Oidores Villa and Pavón, removed by Torralba and Bustamante, were restored by the archbishop, and were content to recognize him as president of the audiencia. Each of them had his own claims to the position of acting-governor and had Cuesta not occupied the governorship with their consent, these oidores would either have been languishing in banishment as punishment for having resisted the prelate, or they would have been struggling for the honors of a position occupied by a pretended mediator, as on former occasions. So there can be no doubt that it was best for all concerned that the church was powerful at this time; the colony had had enough of strife and murder and there was urgent need of some authority with sufficient power to bring about peace. It is sufficient to say that the audiencia renounced its claims to the government, and, according to Zúñiga, who devotes an unusual amount of space to this important epoch in the ecclesiastical history of the Islands, the people were very content with the archbishop's rule after the injustice and oppression of Bustamante. [648] It may be noted that the archbishop exercised complete authority over the audiencia, even to the extent of restoring oidores who had been unlawfully dismissed, and of acting as an intermediary between magistrates. He was master of the situation and his interim rule was preferred by the sovereign and by the people to that of the audiencia.

The royal order of September 8, 1720, legalizing the government of the prelates, applied not only to the administration of Cuesta, but it established a precedent for the temporary rule of four prelates. [649] In compliance with this decree, three sealed envelopes (pliegos de providencia) were sent to the audiencia to be placed unopened in the archives of that tribunal, and the seals were to be broken only on the death of the governor. These envelopes were accompanied by an order from the king, directing that the person mentioned in the first envelope should be recognized as temporary governor. In case of his absence or incapacity to serve, the second envelope was to be opened and the directions contained therein were to be followed, and if these could not be complied with, the third envelope was to be opened.

No further necessity for the observance of this law of succession arose until after the death of Governor Gaspar de la Torre, when, on August 15, 1745, the first envelope was opened in the presence of the audiencia. The post of archbishop being vacant at this time it became necessary to follow the directions prescribed by the second envelope. It was found that Fray Juan de Arrechedera, Bishop of Nueva Segovia, had been designated as the governor's successor. The audiencia relinquished the control of affairs into his hands and he governed for a period of five years.

It would seem that the ecclesiastical calling of this governor in no way incapacitated or hindered him in the execution of his duties. His administration was characterized especially by various measures taken for the defense and fortification of the Islands. He suppressed several insurrections in Ilocos and Cagayán, dispatching military forces under the command of alcaldes mayores against the revolting natives. He repelled several Moro raids and made treaties of peace with the Sultan of Sulu. [650] There is no evidence of discord between the governor and the audiencia during this period. Although Archbishop Trinidad arrived and took possession of his see on August 27, 1747, he made no attempt to take charge of political affairs. [651] He permitted Arrechedera to continue as governor for three years, handing over to him

a royal mandate, for the absolute expulsion of the Chinese
[which was never] ... carried into execution, the interest of
the Governor being too deeply involved in the suspension of it,
the Chinese paying him a contribution for his forbearance. The
Archbishop found that Arrechedera was strongly attached to this
nation, and he became so far a convert to his sentiments on this
subject that he did not put the royal order in force.... This
seems to have been the only error committed by this illustrious
prelate during the time he held the government. In all other
respects his conduct reflected the highest honour on him. [652]

The third time the government was taken over by a prelate was in 1759 on the death of Governor Arandía. On this occasion it became necessary to open the third pliego de providencia. The metropolitan see of Manila and the diocese of Nueva Segovia being vacant, Bishop Espeleta of Cebú was the senior prelate of the Islands. Shortly after the accession of Espeleta, Manuel Rojo, the new archbishop, arrived, commanding Espeleta to vacate the governorship at once. Rojo refused, citing the precedent established by Bishop Arrechedera. Espeleta appealed to the audiencia for support, but the oidores were unable to agree on the question, two of them, Calderón and Galbán supporting Rojo, and the other two remaining in favor of the retention of the governorship by Espeleta. The question was left to the fiscal, Francisco Leandro de Viana, who advised that the matter should be carried to the Council of the Indies for final settlement. [653] It transpired, therefore, that Espeleta retained the governorship from 1759 until 1761, and he did very effective work in repelling the raids of the Moros, who had been ravaging the provinces with impunity for some time.

The prosecution of Dr. Santiago Orendaín occupied a large share of Espeleta's attention during his administration. This controversy should be noted here because it illustrates the relations between the audiencia and an ecclesiastical governor. Orendaín had been the advisor (asesor) of Governor Arandía, and was held responsible for the repressive measures taken against the church during the administration of the latter. The rule of an unscrupulous prelate presented an excellent opportunity for revenge and Orendaín's prosecution was unanimously demanded by the ecclesiastical element of the colony. The magistrates also welcomed the opportunity to retaliate upon a hitherto successful, but unpopular, rival. The fiscal brought action against Orendaín, who sought refuge in an Augustinian convent, whereupon the civil authorities forced an entrance into the asylum, seizing Orendaín and imprisoning him in Fort Santiago. The provisor of the ecclesiastical court excommunicated Magistrate Villacorta, who had exculpated Orendaín in his trial, but the ban was disregarded by the audiencia. A division over the question arose in the tribunal, and matters were assuming a threatening aspect, when the authorized appointment of Governor Rojo arrived. Espeleta gave up his office, and the first act of the new governor was to restore Orendaín to full favor as his counsellor. The affair of Dr. Orendaín illustrates a phase of Spanish colonial administration which is too characteristic to be left unnoticed here. Aside from the influence which Orendaín exercised over Governor Arandía, his persecution shows the measure of personal rancour which even a prelate might put into his administration, spending practically two years in the pursuit of revenge. In this he was supported by the audiencia. In this affair neither the church nor the audiencia were animated so much by motives of right and justice as they were influenced by personal feelings.

The rule of Archbishop Rojo from 1761 to 1764 was a notable one in the history of the Philippines. The principal event during his administration was the capture of Manila by the British. This furnished the occasion for the resistance of Oidor Simón de Anda y Salazar, in the name of the audiencia, both to the English and to the archbishop who had ordered his surrender. These events show the complete incapacity of an ecclesiastical governor of Rojo's type and personality to fulfill the military requirements of his position. In the operations of Anda we note how a man of decisive action, energy, courage, and loyalty was able to force the issue and deprive the archbishop-governor of the executive functions which he had assumed legally, but which he was unable to dispense. This episode illustrates, furthermore, the general disregard of the laws which placed the governorship in the hands of a man who was unfit for its exercise, showing again that in the selection of a person to carry out the duties of governor the military side of the situation could not be disregarded.

Anda, at the time of the accession of Rojo, was a junior magistrate in the audiencia, having arrived in Manila on July 21, 1761. [654] The British squadron entered Manila Bay on September 22, 1762. The British subsequently attacked the city, the fall of which seemed imminent on account of the neglectful state into which the defense had fallen. [655] The proposition was made to the archbishop-governor by Fiscal Francisco Leandro de Viana and the audiencia that Oidor Anda should be dispatched to the provinces with the title of Governor and Captain-general of the Islands for the purpose of maintaining and defending them under the sovereignty of the Spanish monarch, [656] and "in order that he might keep the natives quiet in their Christian instruction and in their obedience to the king." [657] The archbishop refused to accede to this proposition on the grounds that "neither he nor the Audiencia had any authority to create a governor and captain-general, which was the proper privilege of his Majesty; and that it was enough to give him the title of visitor of the land ... and ... of lieutenant of the captain-general." [658] This was done, therefore, and Anda left on the night of October 3, 1762, with these titles and powers.

It is important to note that Anda was not given the title of governor and captain-general, but that as oidor he was commissioned visitador de tierras and teniente de gobernador y capitán general. [659] The authority to designate oidores as visitors of the provinces was a function regularly exercised by the president of the audiencia and authorized by the laws of the Indies. [660] It appears from the above that Anda was sent to the provinces to defend them against the English. This was the main object as stated in the original proposition of the audiencia. Zúñiga states the purpose of the departure of Anda to have been "to maintain the islands in obedience to the King of Spain," [661] and this is corroborated by the testimonies of Anda, [662] Viana [663] and of Rojo, [664] himself. In view of these facts, Rojo's failure to co-operate with Anda, his proneness to listen to those who counseled surrender, his complete reversal of tactics in repeatedly summoning Anda to abdicate, and his willingness even to betray Anda into the hands of the British are almost inexplicable. [665]

Anda organized a provisional government in his capacity as lieutenant-governor. He disregarded the repeated summons of the archbishop to return to the city and surrender to the British. In a letter to the archbishop, dated October 21, 1762, Anda justified his position and made clear that he was not acting on the basis of any delegation of power as captain-general, which authority, he acknowledged, still rested with Rojo. He stated that he had been appointed visitor-general of the provinces "with the real mission of protecting them if the English captured Manila;" in case this happened he was to solicit the aid of prelates, religious and alcaldes mayores in defending the Islands. He complained that Rojo had already "endeavored to influence the prelates, religious and natives to submit to the British." [666] He urged that Rojo should desist from his opposition to his efforts, pointing out the great desirability of their co-operation.

When Anda became convinced of the infirmity of Rojo and the uselessness of further attempts at co-operation with him he completely changed his attitude towards his own position and towards the question of the defense and government of the Islands. While he had hitherto recognized Rojo as governor and captain-general, he now assumed the position that the archbishop was a prisoner in the city and he therefore refused to recognize the orders of the latter. Anda issued a call to all loyal inhabitants to defend the honor of Spain. He ordered the alcaldes mayores to pay no heed to the dispatches and commands issued by the archbishop or the British in the city. He set himself up as governor and captain-general of the Islands, subsequently moving his capital to Bacolor, Pampanga. He obtained possession of the funds of the royal treasury, which had been sent to the province of Laguna when the English had appeared, and he turned a deaf ear to the demands of the archbishop that the money should be returned to the city in order that it might be applied on the payment of the four million-peso war indemnity imposed by the victorious British. Anda enlisted a military force aggregating eight thousand men, and he successfully prevented the enemy from doing more than capture Cavite, Pásig, and a few other places of minor importance. Notwithstanding the demands of the British, who had placed a price of four thousand pesos on his head, and the entreaties of the archbishop, Anda resisted until he was assured that peace was definitely arranged between Spain and Great Britain. [667]

The justification which Anda offered for his conduct was as follows: the regular governor and the audiencia (excepting himself) were prisoners in the city of Manila; their positions and places were therefore vacant, and Anda, as the sole oidor who was not incapacitated, should accordingly succeed and had succeeded to the management of political affairs and defense. He was both audiencia and governor. In support of his contention that he himself was the legally constituted audiencia, he cited the law promulgated by Philip III on August 14, 1620, declaring that "in some of the audiencias of the Indies it has happened, and it might happen still that the oidores being absent and ... only one remaining, ... in such cases the audiencia is to be conserved and continued with only one oidor." [668] Anda had been a legally appointed oidor on special delegation to the provinces when the city fell into the hands of the British; the governor and the remaining oidores had become prisoners and were civilly dead; being the only magistrate of the audiencia yet on duty, he was at once audiencia and governor. He stated that he would surrender his office to the archbishop and audiencia when both had regained their liberty, but he warned the archbishop that if he went to the extreme of surrendering the Islands, he (Anda) "would in no wise obey so unjust and absurd a treaty," and furthermore stated that if the British wished to rule the country, they would have to conquer it first. He expressed the conviction that neither the archbishop nor any other authority except the king had the power to surrender the Islands. [669] In these arguments and sentiments Anda was supported by the fiscal, Francisco Leandro de Viana, and by Oidores Galbán and Villacorta, who subsequently escaped from the city and joined him in the provinces, aiding him in his resistance to the invaders.

Although the British had agreed in their terms of capitulation that the audiencia should continue in the exercise of its normal powers in Manila, [670] that tribunal and the archbishop were virtually prisoners; the idea of their recognition therefore appears almost an absurdity. The oidores acted as members of the council of war which considered the proposition made by the British for the surrender of the city, but if we may trust the testimony of Viana, the archbishop, influenced by his favorites, Monroy and Orendaín, forced the magistrates to sign the articles of capitulation. Viana says that in the various matters which came up for solution after the city had surrendered, the oidores were formally consulted, but the archbishop followed his own counsel, or that of his favorites. [671]

The position of Rojo after the escape of the fiscal and the oidores was an exceedingly unpleasant one. The English commander complained that the prelate and the audiencia had failed to keep the agreement which had been made between them; in escaping, the fiscal and the oidores had violated their oaths; the indemnity had not been paid; the provinces had not surrendered and Anda was still continuing his resistance. The sack of the city was threatened. These conditions made Rojo redouble his efforts to betray Anda and to get possession of the treasure which had come on the patache, "Filipino". The British offered remission of tribute to all natives then in insurrection who would surrender. Anda was charged with responsibility for the danger with which the city was threatened. He was said to have prevented the fulfillment of the treaty between Rojo and the British. To this Anda replied that he had not been a party to the treaty. The state of perpetual worry in which Rojo was kept brought about his death on January 30, 1764. Even before this he had practically lost his status as governor and the British were treating with Anda for the surrender of the Islands. [672] This continued until the legitimacy of the position of Anda was recognized by Governor Torre. [673]

A statement of the above facts aids in clarifying our view of Anda's position. It certainly can be said that there was neither an audiencia nor a governor with sovereign powers in Manila; this lack furnished a reasonable basis for Anda's claims. However clearly it was established that a vacancy existed in the governorship, his position would have been sufficiently tenable had it been based solely on the grounds that the archbishop had delegated him as lieutenant of the captain-general, with military powers. The archbishop-governor had granted him that title and those powers for the very purpose for which he had utilized them, namely, for the defense of the Islands against the British. In view of the support which was extended to Anda in his contention that he was governor and captain-general as long as the archbishop and the regularly constituted audiencia were prisoners, it is not easy to understand why it was necessary for him to justify himself by advancing the claim, first, that he was the audiencia, and, second, that he was the governor because he had the authority of the audiencia. The only accountable reason for this was probably the necessity of nullifying the commands of the archbishop which were being issued from the captured city. He may have felt that such measures were imperative in order to gain and retain the respect of the natives and provincial officials who were not under his immediate influence and who were consequently more independent and inclined to be insurrectionary and riotous. Yet, it is hardly possible that the legal arguments advanced in support of his claims were understood by this class.

It does not appear, moreover, that Anda was entirely justified in his argument by the laws. No doubt he was right in regarding himself as the audiencia, on the basis of the laws cited by him. However, the law did not at that time authorize the succession of the audiencia to a vacancy in the governorship. The cédulas of September 8, 1720, and of August 15, 1731, were still in force in the Philippines, and by virtue of these and by the special cédula promulgated in 1761 in favor of Rojo, an ecclesiastic was authorized to act as governor in case of a vacancy. According to law and precedent, the post vacated by the archbishop-governor should have been filled by the bishop of Nueva Segovia, and by the bishop of Cebú, respectively. It is true that neither of these ecclesiastics put forth any effort to maintain their legal rights, probably for the reason that they realized their incapacity to organize and conduct the defense of the Islands as well as Anda had done. The audiencia had not succeeded to the government since 1715; it had been forbidden to do so in 1720 and subsequently. It is therefore difficult to understand how Anda could have seriously advanced the claim that in his capacity as sole oidor he should succeed to the government.

Aside from the opposition of the archbishop, there does not seem to have been any great difference of opinion on the question of whether Anda could rightfully claim the prerogatives of the audiencia and governorship at the same time. Rojo paid no attention to the legal arguments advanced by Anda, but contended that both the governor and the audiencia were still in full possession of their powers and in complete enjoyment of their liberties within the city. No comment is to be found on Anda's contention in the royal dispatches which were sent in answer to his reports. It is important to note, however, that after the death of the archbishop, and after the restoration of peace, the fiscal was of the opinion that the government should go to Fray Ustáriz, bishop of Nueva Segovia. [674] In this opinion he was seconded by Oidor Galbán.

It would seem that Anda was supported in his resistance to Archbishop Rojo and the British largely on grounds of expediency. This is clearly brought out in a letter which Fiscal Viana wrote to the king on October 30, 1762, stating his opinion that:

Since the Audiencia and governor are unable to exercise their
duties, Anda, as the only active and unembarrassed minister who is
able to retain his place under the authority of Your Majesty, has
declared himself governor, royal audiencia and captain-general. It
is evident that, being a prisoner, the archbishop cannot be
governor and captain-general, and it is equally certain that
the government and office of captain-general falls back on the
audiencia and the oldest oidor. [675]

This argument savors of expediency and sound practicability rather than of interest in the legal quibble. Had Viana been convinced of the legality of Anda's claims he would not subsequently have supported Ustáriz. Viana contended that neither the archbishop nor the audiencia enjoyed sovereign powers when they were prisoners. Anda, on the other hand, was in such a position that he could utilize his legal powers; he used them to good advantage and effectively, therefore he was entitled to recognition.

Aside from the question of legality, it is important to note that Anda was the only person who was able to exercise sovereign powers during this time. It is certain, moreover, that he prevented the Islands from falling into the hands of the British and that he maintained the continuity of the sovereignty of Spain in the Islands from 1762 to 1764. During his rule in the provinces he exercised practically all the functions of a normal government. Aside from the management of military affairs he administered the finances and levied tribute. As noted above, he contrived to obtain possession of the royal treasure which had been sent to Laguna; he was consequently better equipped financially than he would have been otherwise, and better than his rivals in the city. His finances were also augmented by the favorable circumstance of his capture of the "Filipino" which was returning from Acapulco with the proceeds of the sale of her former cargo. [676]

Other functions of a semi-military and governmental character were exercised by Anda in his capacity as acting governor. In some of these matters he was assisted by the fiscal and audiencia in the latter part of his administration. He regulated the prices of provisions in order to prevent them from attaining prohibitive proportions. He did all that he could to further and encourage interprovincial trade. He issued orders in regulation of wages. In order to discourage drunkenness he forbade the sale of nipa wine except in small quantities. He discouraged the importation of wine from Laguna. He took measures to prevent the Chinese from counterfeiting or chipping coins, and he declared what should be legal tender. He forbade the shipment of provisions to the beleaguered city and refused to permit the natives under his jurisdiction to shelter or otherwise assist an Englishman. He prevented secular priests from communicating with the archbishop. In order to encourage service in the army he exempted natives from the polo, or labor tax, and he also made certain exceptions to the general rule for the payment of tribute to offset the decree of the British who had offered wholesale exemption from the payment of tribute in order to attract the natives. Anda issued very severe orders to prevent looting and extortion on the part of his soldiers. Because of the alliance between the Chinese and the British, Anda was obliged to take repressive measures against the former. He forbade games of dice, cock-fighting and card-playing so as to raise the morale of the natives, to prevent thefts and to encourage law and order. He prescribed the death penalty for theft. Anda's rule was little less than a dictatorship, with all the powers of government centered in himself and in his immediate advisors. [677]

It has already been pointed out that when Anda's resistance gave certain assurances of success, the fiscal, Viana, and the oidores, Galbán and Villacorta, escaped to his capital, attached themselves to his cause and assumed a share in his government. Anda was willing to recognize them as magistrates of the audiencia, and as such they officiated. Villacorta made some trouble for Anda, however, by claiming the right to act as governor on the ground that he was Anda's senior in the audiencia. This was generally recognized, but Anda refused to accede to his demands, and the matter was dropped for a time. [678] Anda found that his colleagues, Viana and Galbán, were of the opinion that Bishop Ustáriz was legally entitled to the office of governor, but there was some doubt in their minds whether he should be invited at that time to act as governor. Anda consulted the Bishop of Camarines and that prelate expressed his willingness to submit to the decision of the audiencia. The Augustinians and Dominicans were of the same opinion, but the Jesuits and Franciscans

told him, that in the then (sic) situation of the islands he alone
could preserve the public tranquillity, and on that account he
ought to retain the supreme authority. This diversity of opinion
was not very gratifying to Señor Anda, and although the troops
were in his favour, he was by no means desirous of having recourse
to violence. [679]

Shortly after the death of Archbishop Rojo, Anda received dispatches informing him that peace had been restored between Spain and England; [680] at the same time the British received orders to evacuate the city. Now that Anda's presence in the field as military commander was no longer absolutely required, a three-cornered fight arose among the supporters of Villacorta, Ustáriz and Anda. Each of these contenders was able to advance a reasonable claim. Villacorta was certainly the senior magistrate, and thus he had a better right legally to the office than Anda. Ustáriz was bishop of Nueva Segovia and as such, was entitled to the governorship according to the most recent law. "Anda had in his favor the circumstance of having defended the islands, and of having prevented the English from advancing to the northern provinces; and, above all, he commanded the troops, who were attached to him, and this served to check the pretensions of the others." [681]

The arrival of the interim governor, Francisco Xavier de la Torre, put an end to these disputes. He had been dispatched to the Islands by the Viceroy of New Spain with the title of teniente del rey (king's lieutenant), and in accordance with his instructions he assumed the temporary government on March 17, 1764, which he retained until the arrival of Governor Raón in July, 1765. Anda's residencia was taken by his successor, and it was found that the finances of the colony had been faithfully and honestly administered during his administration. He was able to account for all of the money taken from the "Filipino", turning over two million pesos of these funds to the new governor, accounting for the balance. Anda was recalled to Spain, where he was presented at court, receiving the personal thanks of the sovereign. [682]

Torre's accession to the governorship marks the discontinuance in the Philippines of the practice of allowing the archbishop to take charge of the government during vacancies. On no subsequent occasion in the history of the Islands did an ecclesiastic take over the rule of the Islands. [683] It would seem that this plan of succession was abandoned quite generally throughout Spain's dominions, though there is no instance in which the rule of a prelate ever resulted quite so disastrously as in the Philippines from 1762 to 1764. Torre's accession marks the return to the practice introduced in 1608 and followed from time to time throughout the history of the Islands.

The audiencia, as a tribunal, concerned itself no further with the temporary government of the Islands. On September 30, 1762, a new cédula authorized the appointment of a teniente del rey by the viceroy of New Spain, and the succession of this official was ordered in case of a vacancy. This law was repromulgated on two subsequent occasions, the first time on November 23, 1774, and again on July 2, 1779. [684] The plan of succession which it authorized was followed quite generally in the subsequent history of the Islands, until the separation of New Spain in 1821 rendered impossible the appointment of a teniente by the viceroy. Anda's government was the last occasion on which the audiencia, in reality or in theory, ever attempted to rule by its own right, except by association with the teniente del rey, with whom it acted in the usual advisory capacity, as authorized in the above-mentioned laws.

By the Royal Instruction of Regents of 1776, the regent was authorized to act as president of the audiencia during the absence of the governor, and in case there were no regent, the senior magistrate of the audiencia was to take his place. [685] This law was confirmed by the cédula of August 2, 1789, which ordered that viceroys and presidents, on going outside of their capitals, "should assign to the regents the faculties for the dispatch of the most important and immediate affairs." [686] A subsequent law, dated July 30, 1779, stated that "these important and immediate affairs" did not include "the duties and functions of the captain-general." Again, the royal order of October 23, 1806, [687] commanded that the audiencia should in no case take control of the government when there was a vacancy, but that the name of the temporary governor should be contained in an envelope which was to be opened on the death of the governor, or on his absence from the district. In case provision had not been made in this way, it was ordered that the government should be taken over by the ranking military officer of the colony, if he were higher than the grade of colonel; if not, the regent or decano should be temporary president, governor and captain-general, without ceding the exercise of any of the functions of this office to the audiencia. [688] This law was suspended by the royal order of July 12, 1812, and by the decree of November 2, 1834, which ordered that the segundo cabo, or lieutenant-commander of the king's forces should succeed the governor and captain-general. [689] It is important to note that these laws were applicable throughout the Spanish colonial empire. Subsequent vacancies in the Philippines were filled by military men, and the audiencia refrained from interference with the government.

Considering the question in its broadest phases, it cannot be said that the audiencia administered the ad interim rule with a great degree of success. This method of filling vacancies in the governorship failed for a number of reasons. Owing to the divided composition of the tribunal, the rivalry and personal jealousy of the magistrates and the perpetual quarrels and struggles which arose as a consequence, the periods of its rule became wild scrambles for power in which the strongest survived and reaped all the benefits of office. By their example, the oidores stimulated others to wrong-doing, and in their efforts to secure advantages for themselves they oppressed the residents, Spanish and native, with the burden of their misrule. They did not scruple to indulge in dishonest practices whenever occasion offered; indeed, they went out of their way to seek such opportunities.

Perhaps the gravest defect of the rule of the audiencia lay in its failure as an executive, owing to the divided character of its composition. There was much jealousy, but neither unity nor centralized responsibility. In their governmental capacity the oidores frequently enacted measures and made recommendations of a statesmanlike character, although they did not always succeed in enforcing them. The magistrates were neither experienced legislators nor trained soldiers, and the latter defect seems to have been a cause of considerable dissatisfaction, especially among the military classes. These were naturally jealous of an assumption of military power by lawyers, whose commands they refused to obey. Nevertheless it must be conceded that such individual oidores as Morga, Alcaraz, Almansa and Anda acquitted themselves of their military duties with great credit when called upon.

The reform which gave the government to the churchmen was designed to obviate the defects expressed above. It was believed that a prelate would not be open to so many ventures of a questionable and mainly commercial character. Moreover, the archbishops in Mexico and elsewhere had fulfilled the duties of the executive on former occasions with a fair degree of success. The church was the most powerful, highly centralized and unified institution in the Philippines at the time when both the audiencia and the governorship were weakest. The ecclesiastical authority had repeatedly triumphed over the civil government, and the former gave promise of being able to control matters more effectively in the future than the audiencia had done in the past. The rule of the churchmen did not remedy matters, however, except that it produced harmony through the exercise of force. During the rule of the archbishops, with the exception of that of Rojo, the audiencia was so completely dominated by the ecclesiastical power that the tribunal could scarcely be considered a factor in the government.

There were various defects in the rule of the ecclesiastics. Of these, perhaps the most prominent was their failure to meet the military requirements of the position. Because of the natural incongruity existing between ecclesiastical and military duties, they were obliged to delegate the command of the troops to military leaders, who thus exercised an influence never realized by them during the rule of the audiencia. Archbishop Rojo was unwilling to trust the problem of defense to any other person, though unable to cope with the situation himself. Hence Anda forced his way to the front because he was fitted to command and Rojo was not. As administrators and executives the prelates were as efficient as any others, but they were never able to reconcile successfully the opposition of the civil, political, and commercial elements, who were displeased with the rule of an ecclesiastic. Surprising as it may seem, the government of a prelate was usually most unsatisfactory to the churchmen and religious authorities. If the prelate-governor were a friar, his rule was resented by the members of all the rival orders. If he were a secular priest, he was opposed by the friars of all the orders.

The failure of Rojo was enough to condemn the practice of permitting ecclesiastics to assume the government, but aside from that, there was a more significant and fundamental reason. The increasing political authority of the church at that time, both in the colonies and in the mother country, its widespread and almost irresistible dominance over temporal affairs, demanded a radical change of policy whereby this dangerous ecclesiastical power could be checked. The rule of Anda, though technically based on that law which gave the succession to the tribunal, was not a typical instance of the government of the audiencia, nor did that period present all the features of such a rule. The influence of the audiencia as a body was practically nil. Anda governed because he was a strong man, not because he was sole oidor or because he was lieutenant-governor. His government was virtually a dictatorship, based on military power, but, nevertheless, just and benevolent. His extra-judicial actions met with the king's approval, because they were efficient.

History will show that the Audiencia of Manila assumed temporary charge of the government because the distance and isolation of the colony rendered such a course necessary and because it was thought that the audiencia was best fitted to assume control. The government by the audiencia in the Philippines was not an isolated incident, but was typical of the entire Spanish colonial empire. Owing to the conditions which we have noted, and judged by the standards which constitute good government, the rule of the audiencia was neither successful nor satisfactory. Its most far-reaching defect, as far as the relations of the audiencia and the governor were concerned, lay in the wholesale exercise of administrative and military functions by the magistrates of the audiencia. This impaired the quality of their services as impartial magistrates and contributed in most cases to an insatiable thirst for power. The magistrates were loath to surrender the exercise of these governmental activities on the accession of the succeeding governor, the audiencia displaying a marked tendency to continue in the exercise of administrative control. This, then, was a decided cause of strife and dissension between the audiencia and the governor.