Chapter IV: Introduction (3)

A view of the positions of the respective corps in Jackson's line will be of interest here. The redoubt on the river, where the right of the line rested, was guarded by a company of the Seventh United States Infantry, commanded by Lieutenant Ross; the artillery was served by a detachment of the Forty-fourth United States Infantry, under Lieutenant Marant. At the extremity of the line, between Battery 1 and the river, was posted Captain Beale's company of New Orleans Rifles, thirty men strong. The Seventh United States Regiment covered the space from Batteries 1 to 3, four hundred and thirty men, commanded by Major Peire. The interval between Batteries 3 and 4 was occupied by Major Plauche's battalion of Louisiana uniformed companies, and by Major Lacoste's battalion of Louisiana men of color, the former two hundred and eighty-nine men, and the latter two hundred and eighty strong. From Batteries 4 to 5, the line was held by Major Daquin's battalion of St. Domingo men of color, one hundred and fifty in number; and next to these were placed the Forty-fourth United States Regulars, two hundred and forty men, commanded by Colonel Baker.

From this point toward the center and left, for eight hundred yards, the breastwork was manned by the troops from Tennessee, commanded by General Carroll, and the Kentuckians, under command of General Adair, supported by the men of the nearest batteries. General Carroll reported that he had over one thousand Tennesseans in his immediate command, in line of action. General Adair had, on the morning of the seventh of January, received arms for only six hundred of the Kentucky troops. He says, in a subsequent correspondence, that on the seventh, anticipating the attack of the British the following day, he went into New Orleans, and plead with the Mayor and Committee of Safety to lend him, for temporary use, several hundred stand of arms stored in the city armory and held for the defense of the city in emergency, and to put a check to any possible insurrectionary disturbance. To this the Mayor and committee finally consented, on the condition that the removal of the arms out of the city should be kept secret from the public. To this end, instead of General Adair marching in and arming his men, the city authorities had the arms, concealed in boxes, hauled out to the camp and delivered there. This was done late in the dusk of the evening, and on the night of the seventh four hundred more of the Kentuckians were thus armed and marched forward to take a position with their comrades just in the rear of the entrenchment, making one thousand Kentuckians under arms and ready for to-morrow's battle.

In council with General Jackson, General Adair had suggested that the British would most probably endeavor to break our line by throwing heavy columns against it at some chosen point; and that such was the discipline of their veterans, they might succeed in the effort without very great resistance was made. To be prepared for such a contingency, it would be well to place a strong reserve of troops centrally in the rear of the line, ready at a moment's notice to reinforce the line at the point of assault. Jackson approved this suggestion, and gave orders to General Adair to hold the Kentucky troops of his command in position for such contingency. With Colonel Slaughter's regiment of seven hundred men, and Major Reuben Harrison's battalion, three hundred and five men (the Kentuckians under arms), Adair took position just in the rear of Carroll's Tennesseans, occupying the center of the breastwork line.

By the statements of their commanders, the joint forces of the Tennesseans and Kentuckians defending the left center were about two thousand men. General Coffee's Tennesseans, five hundred in number, occupied the remainder of the line on the left, which made an elbow-curve into the wood, terminating in the swamp. Ogden's squad of cavalry and a detachment of Attakapas dragoons, about fifty men in all, were posted near the headquarters of the commander-in-chief, and these were later joined by Captain Chauvau, with thirty mounted men from the city. The Mississippi cavalry, Major Hinds in command, were held in reserve, one hundred and fifty strong, posted on Delery's plantation. Detachments of Colonel Young's Louisiana militia, in all about two hundred and fifty men, were placed on duty at intervals on the skirts of the wood, behind the line as far as Piernas' Canal. Four hundred yards in the rear a guard was posted to prevent any one going out of the camp, and a line of sentinels was extended to the wood for the same purpose.

The above details show that there were of Jackson's army on the left bank of the river, on active duty, about forty-six hundred men; yet on the battle-line of the eighth of January there were less than four thousand to engage the enemy. The remainder were in reserve, or on guard duty at various points.

From official reports and historical statements derived from British sources, there were present and in the corps of the British army of assault, on the morning of the eighth of January, about eleven thousand men, fully eight thousand of whom were in the attacking columns and reserve on the left bank of the river, the flower of the English army.

THE BATTLE OF SUNDAY, THE EIGHTH OF JANUARY.

It was not yet daybreak on the morning of the eighth of January when an American outpost came hastily in, with the intelligence that the enemy was in motion and advancing in great force. In brief time, as the day began to dawn, the light discovered to our men what seemed the entire British army in moving columns, occupying two thirds of the space from the wood to the river. Obedient to the commands of their officers, who gallantly led in front of their men, the massive columns of the enemy moved up with measured and steady tread. Suddenly a Congreve rocket, set off at a point nearest the wood, blazed its way across the British front in the direction of the river. This was the signal for attack. Immediately the first shot from the American line was fired from the twelve-pounder of Battery 6. This was answered by three cheers from the enemy, who quickly formed in close column of more than two hundred men in front and many lines deep. These advanced in good order in the direction of Batteries 7 and 8, and to the left of these. It was now evident that the main assault would be made upon that part of the breastwork occupied by Carroll's Tennesseans, with the intent to break the line here and flank Jackson's army on the right.

As soon in the morning as word came that the British were in motion for an advance, General Adair formed his Kentuckians in two lines in close order, and marched them to within fifty paces of the breastwork, in the rear of Carroll's command. The day had dawned, and the fog slowly lifted. There was no longer doubt of the point of main assault, as the enemy's heaviest columns moved forward in Carroll's front. The lines of the Kentucky troops were at once moved up in order of close column to the Tennesseans, deepening the ranks to five or six men for several hundred yards. Batteries 6, 7, and 8 opened upon the enemy when within four or five hundred yards, killing and wounding many, but causing no disorder in his ranks nor check to his advance. As he approached in range, the terrible fire of rifles and musketry opened upon him from the Tennessee and Kentucky infantry, each line firing and falling back to reload, giving place to the next line to advance and fire.

The British attack was supported by a heavy artillery fire, while a cloud of rockets continued to fall in showers throughout the contest. The assaulting columns did little execution with small arms, as they came up relying more on the use of the bayonet in case of effecting a breach in our line. Some of them carried fascines and ladders in expectation of crossing the ditch and scaling the parapet. But all in vain. The musketry and rifles of the Tennessee and Kentucky militia, joining with the fire of the artillery, mowed down whole files of men, and so decimated their ranks as to throw them into a panic of disorder and force a retreat. This first disastrous repulse was within twenty-five minutes after the opening of the battle. Writers present who have undertaken to describe the scene at the time say that the constant rolling fire of cannon and musketry resembled the rattling peals of thunder following the lightning flashes in a furious electric storm. An English officer present mentions the phenomenon, that though the flashes of the guns were plainly visible in front, the firing seemed to be from the wood and swamp a mile or two away on the left. They did not hear the sound from the front, but only the echoes from the direction named, as though the battle raged out there.

The defeated column, forced to fall back broken and disordered, was finally rallied by the heroic efforts of the officers, reinforced with fresh troops, and led to a second attempt at assault; but the carnage and destruction were as great as in the first attempt, while almost no impression was made upon the defensive line of the Americans. The British were again compelled to retreat in disorder, leaving great numbers of their comrades dead or wounded on the ground, or prisoners to the Americans. The hope of victory had now become a forlorn one to the British. They were broken in numbers, broken in order and discipline, and broken in prestige. Yet the brave officers, led by their commanders-in-chief, determined not to give up the contest without a last desperate effort. A part of the troops had dispersed and retreated to shelter among the bushes on their right; the rest retired to the ditch where they were first perceived in the morning, about five hundred yards in our front. In vain did the officers call upon the men to rally and form again for another advance, striking some with the flat of their swords, and appealing to them by every incentive. They felt that it was almost certain destruction to venture again into the storm of fire that awaited them, and were insensible to everything but escape from impending death. They would not move from the ditch, and here sheltered the rest of the day. The ground over which they had twice advanced and twice retreated was strewn thickly with their dead and wounded. Such slaughter of their own men, with no apparent loss on our side, was enough to appal the bravest of mankind.

Nearly one hundred of the enemy reached the ditch in front of the American breastwork, half of whom were killed and the other half captured. A detachment of British troops had penetrated into the wood toward our extreme left, to divert attention by a feint attack. The troops under General Coffee opened on these with their rifles, and soon forced them to retire.

After the main attack on the American left and center had begun, another column of over twenty-five hundred men, under the command of General Keene, advanced along the road near the levee, and between the levee and the river, to attack the American line on the extreme right. They were partly sheltered by the levee from the fire of the artillery, except that of Battery 1 and the guns across the river. Our outposts were driven in, and the head of the column pushing forward occupied the unfinished redoubt in front of our entrenched line before more than two or three discharges of artillery could be made. Overpowering the small force here, they compelled it to fall back, after killing and wounding a few men. Bravely led by Colonel Rence and other officers of rank, the British gained a momentary advantage, and threatened to storm the entrenchment itself. But Beale's Rifles from the city, defending this extreme, poured fatal volleys upon the head of the column, while Batteries 1 and 2 mowed down the ranks. The Seventh Regiment, the only infantry besides Beale's in musket range, did deadly execution also. By these, the farther advance of the enemy was made impossible, while the nearest ground they occupied was strewn with their dead and wounded, among whom were General Keene, Colonel Rence, and other prominent officers. Many passed the ditch and scaled the parapet only to be shot down in the redoubt by the unerring riflemen behind the entrenched line. Like the main column on the left, this second column on the right, broken and shattered, was compelled to fall back in great disorder upon the reserve, with no effort after to renew the assault. The dead and wounded lay thick along the road, the levee, and the river bank, as far out as the range of our guns. A flanking fire from the battery across the river harassed the troops in this column both in the advance and retreat, as they passed in plain view, from which fire they sustained severe losses.

The battle was now ended as far as the firing of musketry and small arms was concerned. The last volleys from these ceased one hour after the British column first in motion attacked our line upon the left center, at half-past seven o'clock. In that brief time, one of the best equipped and best disciplined armies that England ever sent forth was defeated and shattered beyond hope by one half its number of American soldiers, mostly militia. For one hour after the opening attack the firing along the American line had been incessant, and the roar of the cannon, mingling with the rattling noise of the musketry and rifles, reverberated over the open plains and echoed back from the wood and swamp, until the issue of combat sent the enemy to cover beyond range. The artillery from our batteries, however, kept up a continuous fire against the guns of the enemy, or against squads of their troops who might expose themselves, until two o'clock in the afternoon, when the lull of strife came to all.

The scene upon the field of contest was one that can not be pictured in words to convey an adequate impression. British officers who campaigned in Europe, in the wars of the Peninsula, testified that in all their military experiences they had witnessed nothing to equal the stubborn fierceness of the contending forces, and the fearful carnage that befell the troops of the British army. We have mentioned how thickly strewn was the ground along the levee and the road, on the right next to the river, with the dead and the wounded of the enemy. The fatality among the officers here was fearful. General Keene, in command of this second attacking column, was borne from the field badly wounded. Colonel Rence, next in command with Keene, was killed while leading the assault in the redoubt. Near by fell Major King, mortally wounded, and others of rank, leaving the command with but few leaders to conduct the broken ranks in precipitate retreat. On our left, in the front of the Tennesseans and Kentuckians, the greatest execution had been done. The slaughter here was appalling. Within a space three hundred yards wide, and extending out two hundred yards from our breastwork on the battlefield, an area of about ten acres, the ground was literally covered with the dead and desperately wounded. A British officer, who became also historian, says that under the temporary truce he rode forward to view this scene. Such a one he never witnessed elsewhere. There lay before him in this small compass not less than one thousand men, dead or disabled by wounds, all in the uniform of the British soldier; not one American among the number. The fatality to the English officers had been even greater on our left than on our right. Lord Pakenham, commander-in-chief, after the first repulse of the main column, with a courage as reckless as it was vain rode forward to rally his troops and lead them to a second attack in person, and in the midst of a hail of missiles from cannon and small-arms fell mortally hurt with several wounds, and died within an hour. Major-general Gibbs, next in command, was stricken down a few minutes after, dying within a few hours. Others in high rank were carried down in the holocaust of casualties, until the British army became unnerved for the want of leadership in the hour of disaster and peril.

Adjutant-general Robert Butler, in his official report to General Jackson a few days after the battle of the eighth, placed the losses of the British at seven hundred killed, fourteen hundred wounded, and five hundred prisoners; twenty-six hundred men, or almost one third the entire number the enemy admitted to have taken part in the contest of the day. The loss of the Americans was six killed and seven wounded, thirteen in all. Instead of comment upon this remarkable disparity of losses, and the causes that led to such a signal victory for the Americans and such a humiliating defeat for our enemies, it will be more interesting to our readers to quote from English writers who were participants in the battle, and eye-witnesses of the scenes they describe with graphic pen. We are ever curious to know what others see and say of us, especially if they honestly criticize us with a spice of prejudice.

AN ENGLISH OFFICER'S ACCOUNT OF THE BATTLE.

Gleig, in his "History of British Campaigns," says:

Dividing his troops into three columns, Sir Edward Pakenham directed
that General Keene, at the head of the Ninety-fifth, the light
companies of the Twenty-first, Fourth, and Forty-fourth Regiments,
and the two black corps, should make a demonstration on the right;
that General Gibbs, with the Fourth, Twenty-first, Forty-fourth, and
Ninety-third, should force the enemy's left; while General Lambert,
with the Seventh and Forty-third, remained in reserve. Our numbers
now amounted to a little short of eight thousand, a force which, in
any other part of America, would have been irresistible. The forces
of the enemy were reported at twenty-three to thirty thousand. I
suppose their whole force to have been twenty-five thousand. All
things were arranged on the night of the 7th, for the 8th was fixed
upon as the day decisive of the fate of New Orleans.

On the morning of the 8th, the entire army was in battle array. A
little after daylight, General Pakenham gave the word to advance The
troops on the right and the left, having the Forty-fourth to follow
with the fascines and ladders, rushed on to the assault. On the left,
next to the river, a detachment of the Ninety-fifth, Twenty-first and
Fourth, stormed a three-gun battery and took it. It was in advance of
the main line of works. The enemy, in overpowering numbers, repulsed
our attacking force and recaptured the battery _with immense
slaughter_. On our right again, the Twenty-first and Fourth being
almost cut to pieces, and thrown into some confusion by the enemy's
fire, the Ninety-third pushed up and took the lead. Hastening
forward, our troops soon reached the ditch; but to scale the parapet
without ladders was impossible. Some few indeed, by mounting upon
each others' shoulders, succeeded in entering the works; but these
were, most of them, instantly killed or captured. As many as stood
without were exposed to a sweeping fire, which cut them down by whole
companies. It was in vain that the most obstinate courage was
displayed. They fell by the hands of men they could not see. The
Americans, without lifting their faces above the rampart, swung their
fire-locks over the wall and discharged them directly upon their
heads.

Poor Pakenham saw how things were going, and did all that a general
could do to rally his broken troops. He prepared to lead them on
himself, when he received a slight wound in the knee, which killed
his horse. Mounting another, he again headed the Forty-fourth, when a
second ball took effect more fatally, and he dropped lifeless in the
arms of his aid-de-camp. Bravely leading their divisions, Generals
Gibbs and Keene were both wounded, and borne helpless from the field.
All was now confusion and dismay. Without leaders, and ignorant of
what was to be next done, the troops first halted, and then began to
retire, till finally, the retreat was changed into a flight, and they
quitted the ground in the utmost disorder. But the retreat was
covered in gallant style by the reserve. The Seventh and Forty-third,
under General Lambert, presented the appearance of a renewed attack,
and the enemy, overawed, did not pursue.

On the granting of a two-days' truce for the burial of the dead,
prompted by curiosity, I mounted my horse and rode to the front. Of
all the sights I ever witnessed, that which met me there was, beyond
comparison, the most shocking and the most humiliating. Within the
compass of a few hundred yards, were gathered together nearly a
thousand bodies, all of them arrayed in British uniforms. Not a
single American was among them; all were English. And they were
thrown by dozens into shallow holes, scarcely deep enough to hide
their bodies. Nor was this all. An American officer stood by smoking
a cigar, and abruptly counting the slain with a look of savage
exultation, repeating that their loss amounted only to eight killed
and fourteen wounded. I confess that, when I beheld the scene, I hung
down my head half in sorrow, and half in anger. With my officious
informant, I had every inclination to pick a quarrel. But he was on
duty, and an armistice existed, both of which forbade. I turned my
horse's head and galloped back to the camp.

The changes of expression now visible in every countenance, no
language can portray. Only twenty hours ago, and all was hope and
animation; wherever you went, you were enlivened by the sounds of
merriment and raillery. The expected attack was mentioned, not only
in terms of sanguine hope, but in perfect confidence as to the
result. Now gloom and discontent everywhere prevailed.
Disappointment, grief, indignation and rage succeeded each other in
all bosoms; nay, so were the troops overwhelmed by a sense of
disgrace, that, for awhile they retained their sorrow without hinting
at the cause. Nor was this dejection because of laurels tarnished,
wholly. The loss of comrades was to the full, as afflicting as the
loss of honor; for, out of more than seven thousand in action on this
side, no fewer than two thousand had fallen. Among these were two
generals in chief command, and many officers of courage and ability.
Hardly an individual survived who had not to mourn the loss of some
special and boon companion.

BRITISH EXCUSES FOR DEFEAT.

Many causes for the failure of the campaign of invasion, and for the disastrous issue of the battle of the eighth, were conjectured in the English army. Almost universal blame was attributed to Colonel Mullins, of the Forty-fourth Regiment, which was detailed under orders to prepare and have ready, and to carry to the front on the morning of the eighth, fascines and ladders with which to cross the ditch and scale the parapet, as the soldiers fought their way to the breastwork of the Americans. It was freely charged that the Colonel deserted his trust and at the moment of need was half a mile to the rear. It was then that Pakenham, learning of Mullins' conduct, placed himself at the head of the Forty-fourth and endeavored to lead them to the front with the implements needed to storm the works, when he fell mortally wounded. Of this incident another British officer, Major B.E. Hill, writes:

Before sunset of the 7th, I was directed to carry instructions to
Colonel Mullins, of the 44th, respecting the redoubt in which the
fascines and scaling ladders were placed, and to report the result of
my interview to Sir Edward Pakenham. I saw Colonel Mullins, and read
to him the directions from headquarters, begging to know if he
thoroughly understood their purport? I was assured that nothing could
be clearer. Reporting to Sir Edward, he thanked me for so completely
satisfying him that the orders so important would be certainly and
well executed.

Colonel Mullins may have been guilty of conduct unbecoming an officer, for which he was tried and cashiered in England; he probably saved his life at the expense of his honor, in being absent from his post on that day. But the British officers magnified the importance of the presence of himself and his regiment with their fascines and ladders ready for use. Even with the help of these devices, there were not men enough in the English army to have crossed the ditch, climbed the parapet, and made a breach in the breastwork line of the Americans. Some of them might have reached the ditch alive, as did some of their comrades, but like those comrades they would have died in the ditch or been made prisoners. The Americans, too, could have used the bayonet as well as the British, if necessary.

BATTLE OF THE EIGHTH OF JANUARY ON THE WEST BANK OF THE RIVER.

We have mentioned that after the night battle of the twenty-third of December General Jackson ordered General Morgan to move his command of Louisiana troops from English Turn, seven miles below the British camp at Villere's, and to take a position on the west bank of the Mississippi, opposite to the American camp. Very naturally, the possibility, and even the probability, of the enemy, when his army was made formidable by all the reinforcements coming up, throwing a heavy flanking force across the river, marching it to a point opposite New Orleans and forcing a surrender of the city, suggested itself to the military eye of Jackson. After the latter entrenched at Rodrique Canal, by the first of January, there was no other strategical route by which the British could have successfully assailed the city. The importance of this seems to have been fully comprehended neither by the one combatant nor the other until too late to fully remedy the omission.

Just such a flanking movement was undertaken by the English at the latest day, which brought on a second battle on the eighth, on the right bank of the river, resulting in a defeat to the American forces, and well-nigh ending in disaster to the American cause. It is in evidence that this strategic movement was the result of a council of war held by the British officers, at which Admiral Sir Alexander Cochrane was present. This idea of reaching the city by a heavy detachment thrown across the river and marching up to a point opposite, in cannon reach, had occurred before; but the difficulty was in finding a way to cross over the troops and artillery, with the Americans in command of the means of transportation. The suggestion came from Admiral Cochrane that the Villere Canal from the bayou could be easily deepened and widened to the river bank and opened into the river for the passage of the boats and barges from the fleet, and a sufficient force thrown across the river in that way under cover of night. This seemed feasible, and the strategy determined on. It is related further that Lord Pakenham insisted that the main attack upon the city for its capture should be made by a heavy detachment in this direction, and at the same time only a demonstration in force made on the American breastworks with the whole army, supported by the artillery. He urged that to directly assault the fortified line in front would be at a fearful loss of life, if successful; if it failed it would be disastrous. The Admiral replied to this tauntingly, that there was no cause for alarm over anticipated defeat; he would undertake to force the lines of the American militia with two or three thousand marines. In allusion to this, Latour says: "If the British commander-in-chief was so unmindful of what he owed to his country, and to the army committed to his charge, as to yield to the ill-judged and rash advice of the Admiral, he sacrificed reason in a moment of irritation; though he atoned with his life for having acted contrary to his own judgment." Undoubtedly the English made their last and most fatal blunder here.

As the English writers who were with the army have so variously minimized the forces under Colonel Thornton, and so exaggerated the numbers of the Americans in this affair on the west bank, we quote from the official report of Major-general Lambert, who succeeded to the immediate command of the invading army after the fall of Generals Pakenham, Gibbs, and Keene, what appears to be reliable:

_To Lord Bathurst_: JANUARY 10th, 1815.

It becomes my duty to lay before your Lordship the proceedings of the
force lately employed on the right bank of the Mississippi River.
Preparations had been made on our side to clear out and widen the
canal that led from the bayou to the river, by which our boats had
been brought up to the point of disembarkation, and to open it to the
Mississippi, by which our troops could be got over to the right bank,
and the cooperation of armed boats be secured. A corps consisting of
the 85th light infantry, two hundred seamen, four hundred marines,
the 5th West India Regiment, and four pieces of artillery, under the
command of Colonel Thornton, of the 85th, were to pass over during
the night, and move along the right bank toward New Orleans, clearing
its front, until it reached the flanking battery of the enemy on that
side, which it had orders to carry. Unlooked for difficulties caused
delay in the entrance of the armed boats from the canal into the
river, destined to land Colonel Thornton's corps, by which several
hours' delay was caused. The ensemble of the general movement was
lost, a point of the last importance to the main attack on the left
bank, although Colonel Thornton ably executed his instructions.

MAJ.-GEN. LAMBERT, _Com'd'g._

The two regiments above, with the seamen and marines, if all were present, would have given Colonel Thornton a command of nearly two thousand men. But it is said that in consequence of some difficulties in getting the boats through the canal into the river, and delay consequent thereon, a part of the forces were left behind. From the best authorities, there were twelve hundred British troops landed upon the west bank of the river on the morning of the eighth, by daybreak--all except the West India regiment.

DEFENSIVE WORKS AND FORCES ON THE WEST BANK, OPPOSITE JACKSON'S CAMP.

General Morgan, commanding the Louisiana militia, was in position on Raquet's old canal site, next to the river. Major Latour, chief of the engineer corps, had been instructed by General Jackson, a week or two before the battle, to proceed across the river and to select on that side a suitable line for defensive works for General Morgan, in case the enemy should attempt a flanking movement on the right bank. Of this mission, Major Latour writes:

Agreeable to orders, I waited on General Morgan, and in the presence
of Commodore Patterson communicated to him my orders, and told him I
was at his disposal. The General seemed not to come to a conclusion,
but inclined to make choice of Raquet's line. He then desired that I
inspect the different situations myself, and make my report to him.
My orders were to assist him, and my opinion was subordinate to his.

I chose for the intended line of defense an intermediate position,
nearly at equal distances from Raquet's and Jourdan's canal, where
the wood inclines to the river, leaving a space of only about nine
hundred yards between the swampy wood and the river. Works occupying
this space could not well be turned, without a siege and assault in
heavy force by the enemy. I made a rough draft of the intended line,
and immediately the overseer set his negroes to execute the work.
Returning to the left bank, I made my report to the
Commander-in-chief, who approved the disposition made. One thousand
men could have guarded a breastwork line here, and half that number
would have been sufficient had pieces of cannon been mounted in the
intended outworks. That line, defended by the eight hundred troops
and the artillery of General Morgan's command, on the 8th, could have
defied three or four times the number of British who crossed over to
the right bank that day. But these dispositions had been changed by
General Morgan, and the negroes ordered to work on the Raquet line.

Major Latour had selected for General Jackson his line of defense on the left bank of the river, and had directed the construction of the breastwork and redoubts to the entire satisfaction of the General. He objected to the Raquet line favored by General Morgan, as wholly unsuited for defense. The space here from the river to the wood swamp was two thousand yards, or considerably over one mile, a much longer line than Jackson's on the other side. To be effective against an attacking force, the entrenchment and outworks must be extended to cover the entire space. It would require then more than double the number of troops and of pieces of artillery for defense than the situation selected by Latour.

In determining on this change of the line of defense, contrary to the judgment and warning of the chief of the engineer corps, General Morgan seems to have been influenced by one consideration paramount to all others. He was in daily council with Commodore Patterson, and was assured of the powerful aid of his battery on the right bank, which had done such execution in the ranks of the British across the river. Should the enemy attack General Morgan's position at Raquet's line, the Commodore could turn his twelve pieces of cannon in their embrasures, sweep the field, and drive back any reasonable force in range. With this support of his artillery, the few hundred militia of Morgan's command could more successfully repulse an attack at Raquet's line than at the line selected by Latour farther away. This change in the situation and plan of defense is characterized by Latour and other authorities as an unmilitary proceeding, as it abandoned the idea of a fortified line behind which a successful defense could have been made probable, if not certain, for an almost open field subject to the flanking movement of veteran troops against raw militia, with no auxiliary support except a park of artillery with guns turned another way, and of most doubtful use in case of need. General Morgan must not share alone the criticism which has been so freely made of his disposition of forces and changes of strategic plans which resulted in sensational disaster to his command. Commodore Patterson, experienced in military affairs as well as naval, advised with him, and must have approved. This change of line, made some days before the eighth, must have been known, and on the representations of Morgan and Patterson, approved by General Jackson. It is not conceivable that so important a change of plans would have been made by a subordinate officer, affecting seriously the safety of New Orleans, without the consent of the commander-in-chief. The latter seemed always to have held in very high personal esteem these two officers, and to have had confidence in their abilities as commanders.

As mentioned above, the dispositions made for a line of defense by Major Latour were changed by General Morgan, and the negroes set to work on Raquet's line. A breastwork fortification was thrown up by the seventh of January, extending but two hundred yards from the river bank out on the site of the old canal. From this terminus across the plantation land to the wooded swamp was an open plain, with scarce an obstruction to the deploy of troops or the sweep of artillery. The old canal had long been in disuse, and the ditch was filled nearly full with the washings and deposits of years. Behind this two hundred yards of entrenchment General Morgan massed all the Louisiana troops of his command and planted his artillery, three pieces in all. From the end of the breastwork on the right, one mile or eighteen hundred yards to the swamp, there were no defensive works from behind which to repulse the assault of an enemy, nor any means of resistance in sight to an attack, other than the guns in battery of Commodore Patterson, of more than doubtful use, and the yet very doubtful contingent of reinforcements sufficient from General Jackson's limited supply of men and arms.

On the seventh, the forces of Morgan's immediate command were the First Louisiana Militia on the left, next to the river; on the right of these, the Second Louisiana; and on the right of the latter, the drafted Louisiana militia, in all about five hundred men, who occupied the fortified line of two hundred yards. It was not until late this day that General Jackson seemed to fully awaken to the impending dangers of this formidable flanking movement across the river. He at once gave orders that five hundred of the unarmed Kentucky militia in camp should be marched up the river to New Orleans and receive certain arms in store there; then cross the river, and march down five miles on the west bank and reinforce General Morgan's command by, or before, daylight next morning. It was late afternoon when they started on this tramp of ten miles, through mud and mire ankle deep. Arriving at New Orleans, it was found that four hundred stand of arms which were expected to be obtained from the city armory had been loaned to General Adair, and sent to him at the Kentucky camp for other use. From other sources some miscellaneous old guns were obtained to equip less than two hundred of the detailed Kentuckians, who crossed the river, began their weary night march, and reported to General Morgan before daylight of the eighth, ready for duty, though they had not slept for twenty-four hours, nor eaten anything since noon of the previous day. Their arms, a mongrel lot, were many of them unfit for combat; old muskets and hunting-pieces, some without flints, and others too small-bored for the cartridges.

THE BRITISH CROSS THE RIVER AND LAND AT DAYBREAK; THEY BEGIN THE ATTACK--THE BATTLE AND RETREAT.

About sunset on the evening of the seventh, General Morgan was notified of the intention of the enemy to cross the river by Commodore Patterson, who had closely observed his movements in the afternoon. Before day-dawn on the eighth, the General received information of the enemy landing on the west bank, at Andry's plantation. The rapid current of the Mississippi had carried his little flotilla three miles below the point he had desired to land. Having debarked his troops, he marched up the river; his boats, manned by four pieces of artillery, keeping abreast and covering his flank. A detachment of Louisiana militia, about one hundred and fifty men, under command of Major Arnaud, had been sent in the night a mile or two down the river to oppose the landing and to check the advance of the British. These raw militia, very poorly armed, retired before the enemy. The detachment of one hundred and seventy Kentuckians just arrived, under command of Colonel Davis, was ordered to move forward to the support of the command of Major Arnaud. Though wearied with the toilsome all-night march, the Kentucky troops went forward about one mile below Morgan's line and took position on Mayhew's Canal, their left resting on the bank of the river. Major Arnaud halted his Louisiana militia on the right of these in line. The enemy, over one thousand strong, came up in force under Colonel Thornton, who commanded the British in the night battle of the twenty-third. A heavy fire of musketry from the front was supported by a flanking fire of artillery and rockets from the boats. The command of Major Arnaud gave way and hastily retreated to the wood, appearing no more during the day on the field of action. The Kentuckians returned the fire of the enemy with several effective volleys, when they were ordered by an aid-de-camp of General Morgan's, just arrived, to fall back and take a position on his line of defense.

The falling back of the Kentuckians before the enemy was under orders which they could not but obey. They were holding him in check and inflicting heavier losses than they were receiving, against four or five times their own numbers. They fell back one mile in good order. By disposition of the commanding officer, they were placed in line, with an open space of two hundred yards between their extreme left and the extreme right of the entrenched Louisianians, and stretched out to cover a space of three hundred yards, or one man to nearly two yards of space. The remainder of the line stretching to the wood on the extreme right, twelve hundred yards, was wholly without defensive works, or any defense excepting a picket of eighteen men under Colonel Caldwell, stationed out two hundred yards beyond the extreme right of the Kentuckians. Less than two hundred poorly armed militia were thus isolated and distributed in thin ranks to defend a line one mile in length, while General Morgan lay behind his entrenchment, defending a space of two hundred yards with five hundred troops and three pieces of artillery, which could have been easily held by two hundred men.

Colonel Thornton, in command of the British troops, in advancing to the attack, readily perceived with his trained military eye the vulnerable situation of the American forces. Gleig, the English author present, gives the disposition of the enemy's assaulting columns as follows: The Eighty-fifth, Colonel Thornton's own regiment, about seven hundred men, stretched across the field, covering our front, with the sailors, two hundred in number, prepared to storm the battery and works; while the marines formed a reserve, protecting the fleet of barges. It is not probable that the attack upon the entrenchments next to the river was intended to be more than a demonstration in force to hold the attention of General Morgan and his command there, while the main assault was being directed with the Eighty-fifth Regiment against the thin and unsupported line of the Kentucky militia, with a view of flanking these and getting in the rear of General Morgan's breastworks.

We quote from Major Latour's "Historical Memoir" a further account:

The enemy advancing rapidly by the road opposite the left of the
line, the artillery played on him with effect; and as he came nearer,
the musketry began to fire also. This having obliged him to fall
back, he next directed his attack against the detached Kentuckians on
our right, one column moving toward the wood and the other toward the
centre of the line. Now was felt the effect of the bad position that
we occupied. One of the enemy's columns turned our troops at the
extremity of Colonel Davis' command, while the other penetrated into
the unguarded space between the Kentuckians and the breastwork of the
Louisianians. Flanked at both extremes by four times their own
number, and unsupported, the Kentucky militia, after firing several
volleys, gave way; nor was it possible again to rally them.
Confidence had vanished, and with it all spirit of resistance. If
instead of extending over so much space, those troops had been
formed in close column, the confusion that took place might have been
avoided, and a retreat in good order made.

The enemy having turned our right, pushed on towards the rear of our
left, which continued firing as long as possible. At length the
cannon were spiked just as the enemy arrived on the bank of the
canal. Commodore Patterson had kept up an artillery fire on the
British over the river. As they advanced up the road, he would now
have turned his cannon in their embrasures, and fired on those of the
enemy who had turned our line and come in range. But the Kentucky
troops and the Louisianians masked the guns, and made it impossible
to fire without killing our own men. Seeing this, he determined to
spike his guns and retreat.

The Louisiana militia under General Morgan now fell back and took a
position on the Bois Gervais line, where a number of the fleeing
troops rallied. A small detachment of the enemy advanced as far as
Cazelards, but retired before evening. In the course of the night all
the enemy's troops recrossed the river, to join their main body. The
result of this attack of the enemy on the right bank was, the loss of
one hundred and twenty of his men, killed and wounded. The
commander-in-chief, receiving intelligence of the retreat of our
troops on the right bank, ordered General Humbert, formerly of the
French army, who had tendered his services as a volunteer, to cross
over with a reinforcement of four hundred men, assume command, and
repulse the enemy, cost what it might. The order was verbal; some
dispute having arisen over the question of military precedence, and
the enemy withdrawing, no further steps were taken.

"THE KENTUCKIANS INGLORIOUSLY FLED"--A PROFOUND SENSATION.

In this historic review, we dwell exhaustively upon the episode of this battle on the west bank, on the 8th of January, 1815, not because of any intrinsic importance of the subject, but rather from the sensational incidents which attended the movements of the belligerents, and which were consequent upon the issue. The galling words of General Jackson, hastily and unguardedly uttered in an attempt to throw the blame of defeat upon a small detachment of Kentucky militia, "the Kentuckians ingloriously fled," were resented as an undeserved stigma upon the honor and good name of all the Kentuckians in the army, and upon the State of Kentucky herself. The epigrammatic phrase, construed to mean more than was intended, perhaps, like Burchard's "Rum, Romanism, and Rebellion," struck a chord of sympathetic emotion that vibrated not only in the army and the community of Louisiana, but throughout the entire country. These burning words are of record in the archives at Washington, and remembered in history; but the facts in full, which vindicate the truth and render justice to whom it is due, are known to but few, if known to any now living. In the words of Latour: "What took place on the right bank had made so much sensation in the immediate seat of war, and had been so variously reported abroad, to the disparagement of many brave men, that I thought it a duty incumbent on me to inquire into particulars and trace the effect to its cause."

Rather than give our own impressions, we quote from "Reid and Eaton's Life of Jackson" an account of this affair, interesting because written when the subject was yet fresh in the public mind, and from the intimacy of the authors with the personal and public life of General Jackson:

On the night of the 7th, two hundred Louisiana militia were sent one
mile down the river, to watch the movements of the enemy. They slept
upon their arms until, just at day, an alarm was given of the
approach of the British. They at once fell back towards General
Morgan's line. The Kentucky detachment of one hundred and seventy
men, having arrived at five in the morning, after a toilsome
all-night march, were sent forward to cooperate with the Louisiana
militia, whom Major Davis met retreating up the road. They now formed
behind a mill-race near the river. Here a stand was made, and the
British advance checked by several effective volleys. General
Morgan's aid-de-camp being present, now ordered a retreat back to the
main line of defense, which was made in good order. In the panic and
disorderly retreat afterwards are to be found incidents of
justification, which might have occasioned similar conduct in the
most disciplined troops. The weakest part of the line was assailed
by the greatest strength of the enemy. This was defended by one
hundred and seventy Kentuckians, who were stretched out to an extent
of three hundred yards, unsupported by artillery. Openly exposed to
the attack of a greatly superior force, and weakened by the extent of
ground they covered, it is not deserving reproach that they abandoned
a post they had strong reasons for believing they could not maintain.
General Morgan reported to General Jackson the misfortune of defeat
he had met, and attributed it to the flight of these troops, who had
drawn along with them the rest of his forces. True, they were the
first to flee; and their example may have had some effect in alarming
others. But, in situation, the troops differed. The one were exposed
and enfeebled by the manner of their arrangement; the other, much
superior in numbers, covered a less extent of ground, were defended
by an excellent breastwork manned by several pieces of artillery; and
with this difference,--the loss of confidence of the former was not
without cause. Of these facts, Commodore Patterson was not apprised;
General Morgan was. Both reported that the disaster was owing to the
flight of the Kentucky militia. Upon this information, General
Jackson founded his report to the Secretary of War, by which these
troops were exposed to censures they did not merit. Had all the
circumstances as they existed, been disclosed, reproach would have
been prevented. At the mill-race no troops could have behaved better;
they bravely resisted the advance of the enemy. Until an order to
that effect was given, they entertained no thought of retreating.

Intelligence quickly came to General Jackson of the defeat and rout of General Morgan's command, imperiling the safety of the city of New Orleans, in the midst of the congratulations over the great victory of the main army on the east bank. Naturally, a state of intense excitement followed, bordering on consternation for a few hours. When the danger was ended by the withdrawal of the British forces to recross the river, the report of General Morgan, followed by that of Commodore Patterson, came to headquarters, laying the blame of defeat and disaster to the alleged cowardly retreat of the Kentucky militia. With General Jackson's great personal regard for the authors of these reports, he took for granted the correctness of the charge of censurable conduct. Amid the tumult of emotions that must have been felt, rapidly succeeding the changes of scenes and incidents and issues of strategy and battle during that eventful twenty-four hours, the great commander yielded to the impulse of the moment to write in his official report to the Secretary of War, on the ninth, the day succeeding the battles, the following words:

Simultaneously with his advance upon my lines, the enemy had thrown
over in his boats a considerable force to the other side of the
river. These having landed, were hardly enough to advance against the
works of General Morgan; and what is strange and difficult to
account for, at the very moment when their discomfiture was looked
for with a confidence approaching to certainty, the Kentucky
reinforcement, in whom so much reliance had been placed, ingloriously
fled, drawing after them by their example the remainder of the
forces, and thus yielding to the enemy that most formidable position.
The batteries which had rendered me, for many days, the most
important service, though bravely defended, were of course now
abandoned; not, however, until the guns had been spiked.

Commodore Patterson also sent in a report to the Secretary of the Navy, characterizing the little detachment of Kentucky militia in terms as censurable and as unjust as were the words of General Jackson. When these official reports became publicly known, imputing all blame of disaster to the retreat of the Kentuckians, an indignant protest was entered by General Adair and by the entire Kentucky contingent of the army. In this protest they had the sympathy and support of a large portion of other troops of the army, and of the community. Language at this late day of forgetfulness and calmer reason would be too tame to really portray the irritations, the bitter recriminations, and the angry protests which agitated army circles, and the civil community as well, and which were echoed from many parts of the country at large.

A COURT OF INQUIRY APPOINTED BY THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF EXONERATES THE KENTUCKIANS.

General Adair, supported by the officers of his command, insisted that the statements made in these reports to the departments at Washington were made upon a misapprehension of the facts, and that great injustice had been done the Kentucky militia in General Morgan's command by attempting to shift the responsibility of defeat from its real sources, and placing it to their discredit. A military court of inquiry was demanded, and granted by the commander-in-chief, the members of which were officers of rank in the army, and disinterested by their relations in the findings, and General Carroll, of Tennessee, appointed to preside. The following notice was served on General Morgan, and similar notices on other officers concerned:

NEW ORLEANS, LA., February 9, 1815. BRIGADIER-GENERAL
MORGAN.