Chapter V: Introduction (4)

_Sir_: A Court of Inquiry is now in session for the purpose of
inquiring into the conduct of the officers under your command, on the
morning of the 8th of January. As you are somewhat concerned, I have
to request that you will introduce such witnesses on to-morrow as you
may think necessary. The conduct of Colonel Cavalier, and of Majors
Tesla and Arnaud, is yet to be inquired into.

Your Most Obt. Servant,
WM. CARROLL, Maj.-Gen'l,
_Prest. of Court_.

The following opinion was rendered:

REPORT OF THE COURT OF INQUIRY.

HEADQUARTERS 7TH MILITARY DISTRICT. NEW ORLEANS, LA.,
February 19, 1815.

GENERAL ORDERS.

At a Court of Inquiry, convened at this place on the 9th inst., of
which Major-general Carroll is President, the military conduct of
Colonel Davis, of Kentucky Militia, and of Colonels Dijon and
Cavalier, of Louisiana Militia, in the engagement on the 8th of
January last, on the west bank of the Mississippi, were investigated;
the Court, after mature deliberation, is of opinion that the conduct
of those gentlemen in the action aforesaid, and retreat on the 8th of
January, on the western bank of the river, is not reprehensible. The
cause of the retreat the Court attributes to the shameful flight of
the command of Major Arnaud, sent to oppose the landing of the enemy.
The retreat of the Kentucky militia, which, considering their
position, the deficiency of their arms, and other causes, may be
excusable; and the panic and confusion introduced into every part of
the line, thereby occasioning the retreat and confusion of the
Orleans and Louisiana militia. While the Court found much to applaud
in the zeal and gallantry of the officer immediately commanding, they
believe that a further reason for the retreat may be found in the
manner in which the force was placed on the line; which they consider
exceptionable. The commands of Colonels Dijon, Cavalier, and
Declouet, composing five hundred men, supported by three pieces of
artillery, having in front a strong breastwork, occupying a space of
only two hundred yards; whilst the Kentucky militia, composing
Colonel Davis' command, only one hundred and seventy strong, occupied
over three hundred yards, covered by a small ditch only.

The Major-general approves the proceeding of the Court of Inquiry,
which is hereby dissolved.

By Command.
H. CHOTARD, _Asst. Adj. Gen._

CONTROVERSY BETWEEN JACKSON AND ADAIR.

General Adair seems to have regarded the decision of the Court of Inquiry as a modifying compromise, in deference to the high personal character and influence of a number of persons concerned, and not the full vindication of the Kentucky militia from the imputations of ungallant conduct on the field reflected upon them in the official reports. The controversy, and other causes preceding it, had rankled the bosoms of both General Jackson and himself, and estranged the warm friendship that had before existed between them. Adair thought that Jackson should withdraw, or modify, the language of his official report. General Jackson was not a man to readily retract; and was certainly not in the humor with Adair to retract anything he had said. He would do no more than approve the opinion of the Court of Inquiry. This, perhaps, was as much as General Adair should have asked at the time.

On the 10th of February, 1816, the Legislature of Kentucky, in a resolution of thanks to General Adair for gallant services at New Orleans, added: "And for his spirited vindication of a respectable portion of the troops of Kentucky from the libelous imputation of cowardice most unjustly thrown upon them by General Andrew Jackson." This and other incidents intensified the animosity of feeling.

It was some two years after the close of hostilities that the correspondence between Jackson and Adair was terminated in language and spirit so intensely bitter as to make the issue personal. Adair had reported all proceedings and facts concerning the Kentucky troops during the campaign to Governor Shelby, who had taken a very active part in sending all possible aid for the defense of New Orleans. In these reports he reflected on what he deemed the injustice done the Kentucky troops in several official publications; especially by General Jackson, not only in the affair of Morgan's rout, but in his report of other operations during the campaign. These were causes of irritation on the part of the commander-in-chief. The burning words in the reports of General Jackson, General Morgan, and Commodore Patterson, imputing cowardice to a few of their comrades, had touched a sensitive chord and sunk deep into the hearts of the Kentucky troops in the army. In their resentments, expressed in words and sometimes in actions, all danger from the enemy being over, they were perhaps not always so orderly as soldiers should be while in camp, or on scout or picket service.

Eighth Governor of Kentucky.]

In the closing correspondence, the language used by both Jackson and Adair became exceedingly bitter; that of the former beyond all restraint toward his respondent. The issue of this controversy, tradition says, was a challenge to meet upon the field of honor, then so called, and to settle it at the pistol's point. The challenge was accepted. By whom it was sent, the author has not been able to learn. In the absence of any record, written or in print, of this affair, he has to rely upon oral recitals which have come down through members of the Adair family in Kentucky, and are remembered in the main facts to-day. The would-be combatants met by appointment at a spot selected on the border line of their respective States, accompanied each by his second, his surgeon, and a few invited friends. The unfriendly breach between Jackson and Adair, and its possible tragic issue, seems to have given deep concern to some of their friends. There was no other cause of enmity between them save what grew out of the unfortunate occurrences at New Orleans. They were of the same political party--Jeffersonian Republicans, as they were known then, in distinction from Federalists. Jackson had won renown and prestige as no other in America, and his name had already been mentioned in connection with the highest office within the gift of the people. Adair was held in high esteem by the people of Kentucky, and bright hopes of political preferment were held out by his party friends. Other considerations added, induced friends on either side to urge a reconciliation, which was happily effected on terms mutually satisfactory. The above account of this meeting on the field of honor was related to the author by General D.L. Adair, of Hawesville, Kentucky, now long past his fourscore years. He gave the facts to the writer, he said, as he received them from his father, Doctor Adair, of Hardin County, Kentucky, many years ago. Doctor Adair was a cousin of General Adair, of Jackson's army, and was one of the intimate friends whom the General invited to be present upon the ground.

The correspondence of Jackson and Adair throws light upon the subject of this controversy, and reveals to us some of the causes of the errors and contentions of this affair. We have mentioned that Adair, in his eagerness to arm as many as possible of the Kentucky militia and place them in line for the main battle of the eighth, went into the city and plead with the Committee of Safety to loan him four hundred stand of arms, held in the city armory for the protection of New Orleans, for a few days. This urgent request was granted, and the arms privately moved out, hauled to the camp of the Kentuckians, and delivered there about nightfall of the seventh. Four hundred more of the Kentuckians were thus armed and moved up to the rear of the breastwork, ready for the battle next morning. Adair believed that he was acting in the line of his duty, and that Jackson would approve of his device for arming more of his idle men in camp. Busy as he was that day in New Orleans, and in equipping and marshaling the men of his command for battle, he was not made aware of the urgent need of reinforcements on the opposite bank of the river, nor did he know of the purpose of the commander-in-chief to arm these from the city armory. While Adair's device very much strengthened Jackson's line on the left bank, it unfortunately defeated Jackson's plan of sending four hundred more men to reinforce General Morgan on the right bank, and may in this way have largely contributed to the latter's defeat.

When Jackson, late on the seventh, ordered a detail of five hundred of the Kentucky militia to be marched at once to New Orleans, there to be armed, to cross the river and report by daylight to General Morgan, he expected to use the arms from the city armory. There was no other supply.

We may readily imagine the feeling of disappointed chagrin and passion that stirred to its depths the strong nature of Jackson, when the intelligence quickly came to him across the river of the disaster to Morgan's command, and of its retreat toward New Orleans, followed by the enemy. It was in this tumult of passion and excitement that the report of Morgan, followed by that of Patterson, was brought to him, imputing the cause of defeat and disaster to the cowardly retreat of the Kentucky detachment. Under the promptings of these incidents of the day, Jackson's report to the Secretary of War was made, in which the words of censure were so unjustly employed. Jackson must have informed Morgan on the evening of the seventh that he would reinforce him with five hundred armed soldiers. When Colonel Davis reported to Morgan, one hour before daylight, the arrival of the Kentucky contingent, the latter was expecting five hundred men to reinforce him. Had this been done, the Kentucky troops and Major Arnaud's one hundred and fifty Louisianians would have made the forces sent to the front to check the advance of the British under Colonel Thornton over six hundred men. Such a force, well officered, would probably have held the enemy in check, fallen back in good order, and made a stubborn fight on the line of battle. But there was only one third the Kentucky force expected; and when Major Arnaud's command retreated, there was but this contingent of one hundred and seventy Kentucky militia left to resist the advance of one thousand British veterans, and to meet their main assault on the center and right of the long line of battle. It made its march from New Orleans at midnight, and was reported to General Morgan before daybreak. These facts give a more intelligible view of the plan of battle arranged by this officer. It was undoubtedly marred and broken up by the unforeseen incidents mentioned, unfortunately for General Morgan and for the American cause. Commodore Patterson, in his report to the Secretary of the Navy, five days after the battle, makes the force of Kentucky militia that gave way before the British four hundred men, more than double the real number; thus showing the error prevalent.

When the facts came out that General Adair had secured the four hundred stand of city arms for his own immediate command with which Jackson had designed to arm the reinforcement for General Morgan, the incident was naturally very irritating to the Commander-in-chief. It was imputed as a cause, in part, of the defeat and disaster on the right bank. Jackson seems to have complained to Adair that the latter ought to have known of his order to call out the detachment of five hundred Kentuckians in time, and of his intention to arm them in the city. Adair replied that the order came to General Thomas, in chief command of the Kentuckians, lying ill in camp, while he was busily engaged in New Orleans and at the front, preparing his own command for battle next day; that he did not know of the intention of Jackson to use the city arms until too late to repair the mistake. It made up a chapter of accidents and errors, happening with best intentions. As for the little body of Kentucky militia, who were made sensationally notorious, where there was honor and fame for no one, poorly armed and wearied with fasting and a heavy all-night march, they did as well as troops could do. It is doubtful if any one hundred and seventy troops in Jackson's army would have done better. Unsupported, and attacked and flanked by four times their own number, no troops could have held their ground longer.

In the possession of Judge William H. Seymour, of New Orleans, is an original letter of Major Latour, addressed to General Morgan in anticipation of the publication of his "Historical Memoirs of the War of 1812-15," advising him that he would give an account also of the military situation and battle on the west bank, as he viewed them; and inviting any statement from General Morgan in his own vindication that he might choose to make. This letter is not printed in the history, but was seen and copied by the author, through the courtesy of Judge Seymour, who is a lineal descendant of a sister of Andrew Jackson. A diligent inquiry was made by the writer of this monograph for a copy of General Morgan's report, and also of letters or documents from him in vindication of his course in the affairs mentioned. If any such are in print, or otherwise preserved, the author did not succeed in finding them, to his regret.

NEW ORLEANS, LA., April, 1815. TO GENERAL DAVID
MORGAN.

_Sir_: I send you herewith a copy of the publication that I am
preparing for the press, upon the last campaign, relating to the
transaction that took place on the right bank, on the 8th of January.

As I am of opinion that you are to bear the blame of our disgrace on
that part of our defense, I thought myself in duty bound, as a man
of honor, to participate to you what I wrote on the subject previous
to my putting it to the press. What I have stated is, I believe,
strictly true; however, sir, you are in a situation to furnish me
with such observations as may tend to rectify what should not be
printed, in its true light.

Be persuaded, sir, that I have no enmity against you; on the
contrary, as a private citizen, I have the regard for you that I
think you deserve. Then I hope you will not take my conscientious
caution in a bad part, and that you will direct to me in
Philadelphia, where I am departing for in a day or two, anything you
will choose to write for your vindication. It will find room in the
appendix, at all events, should it be founded upon proper
authorities.

I remain, sir, your most respectful servant,

A. LACARRIERE LATOUR.

Incidental prominence has been given to this episode of the battle of the eighth, on the west bank of the river, far beyond its real merits as an event of the military operations around New Orleans. Worse panic and confusion resulted among the American militia at Bladensburg, in front of Washington, and at other places, during the War of 1812-15, and passed into history without unusual criticism, as incidents common to warfare. But the injustice done to the little band of Kentucky militia, imputing to them cowardly conduct, on the part of some of the highest officials of the army, aroused a spirit of indignant protest that echoed far and wide, and would not down. Had it not been for the misleading report of General Morgan, followed by that of Commodore Patterson, and prompting that of General Jackson to the Secretary of War, saying that "the Kentuckians ingloriously fled," and imputing blame to no other party, the incident of the battle and defeat would have been mentioned and passed without comment.

THE COVERT RETREAT OF THE BRITISH.

The battles of the eighth were decisive of the campaign, and of the War of 1812-15, so far as military operations were concerned. The British had been beaten in generalship and beaten upon the field of battle, until they were made to feel and to confess to defeat so crushing as to leave no hope of retrieving disaster. Within fifteen days after landing, they had sustained losses equal to one third of their entire army of invasion. With prestige gone and spirit broken, and their ranks shattered, there was but one thing left to do. To cover their retreat and get safely back to their ships before the broken remnants of their army were made to capitulate by surrender became a matter of gravest concern. The situation is set forth in the following official letter to the Secretary of War:

CAMP BELOW NEW ORLEANS, January 19, 1815.

_Sir_: Last night, at 12 o'clock, the enemy precipitately decamped
and returned to his boats, leaving behind him, under medical
attendance, eighty of his wounded, fourteen pieces of heavy
artillery, and a quantity of ammunition. Such was the situation of
the ground he abandoned, and that through which he retired, protected
by canals, redoubts, intrenchments, and swamps on his right and the
river on his left, that I could not, without great risk, which true
policy did not seem to require, much annoy him on his retreat.

Whether it is the purpose of the enemy to renew his efforts at some
other point, or not, I can not certainly determine. In my own mind,
however, there is little doubt that his last exertions have been made
in this quarter, at least for the present season. In this belief I am
strengthened by the prodigious losses he has sustained at the
position he has just quitted, and by the failure of his fleet to pass
Fort St. Philip. His loss on this ground, since the debarkation of
his troops, as stated by the last prisoners and deserters, and as
confirmed by many additional circumstances, must have exceeded four
thousand men. We succeeded on the 8th, in getting from the enemy
about one thousand stand of arms of various kinds.

Since the action of the 8th, the enemy have been allowed but very
little respite, my artillery from both sides of the river being
constantly employed until the hour of their departure, in annoying
them. They were permitted to find no rest.

I am advised by Major Overton, who commands at Fort St. Philip, in a
letter of the 18th, that the enemy having bombarded his fort for nine
days, with thirteen-inch mortars, without effect, had on the morning
of that day retired. I have little doubt that he would have sunk
their vessels had they attempted to run by.

Do not think me too sanguine in the belief that Louisiana is now
clear of the enemy. I need not assure you, however, that wherever I
command, such a belief shall never occasion any relaxation in the
measures for resistance. I am but too sensible that while the enemy
is opposing us, is not the most proper time to provide for them. On
the 18th, our prisoners on shore were delivered to us, an exchange
having been agreed to. I shall have on hand an excess of several
hundred.

I have the honor to be, &c.,
ANDREW JACKSON,
_Commander-in-Chief_.

The losses to the American army, in the five battles fought from the twenty-third of December to the eighth of January, inclusive, are summarized in the report of the Adjutant-general, which we give:

CAMP BELOW NEW ORLEANS, Jan'y 16, 1815.

Sir: I enclose for the information of the War Department, a report of
the killed, wounded, and missing, of the army under Major-general
Jackson, in the different actions with the enemy since their landing.

ROB'T BUTLER,
_Adjutant-General_.

BATTLE. KILLED. WOUNDED. MISSING.
December 23d 24 115 74
December 28th 9 8 None.
January 1st 11 23 None.
January 8th 13 39 19
----- ------ -----
57 185 93

A total of three hundred and thirty-five men. This includes the killed, wounded, and missing in the two battles on the eighth.

Our English authorities are so marked with exaggerations and discrepancies as to numbers in either army, and also as to losses and casualties, that they are unreliable. There is with nearly all their writers, and in the reports of their officers, a disposition to minimize numbers on their own side, and to overstate those on the side of the Americans. This was no doubt due to a sense of mortified pride and deep chagrin over their repeated defeats and final expulsion from the country, under humiliations such as English armies and navies had rarely before known in history. General Jackson was not far wrong in estimating the entire losses of the British, during the two weeks of invasion, at more than four thousand men. If the large number who deserted from their ranks after the battles of the eighth of January be included, the excess would doubtless swell the numbers much above four thousand. Their killed, wounded, and missing on the eighth approximated three thousand. So decimated and broken up were their columns that they dared not risk another battle.

REPULSE OF THE BRITISH FLEET BEFORE FORT ST. PHILIP.

On the first of January, Major W.H. Overton, in command of Fort St. Philip, which guards the passage of the Mississippi River from its mouth for the protection of New Orleans, received information that the enemy intended to capture or pass the fort, to cooperate with their land forces threatening the city. On the seventh, a fleet of two bomb-vessels, one sloop, one brig, and one schooner appeared and anchored below the fortification and began an attack. For nine days they continued a heavy bombardment from four large sea-mortars and other ordnance, but without the effect they desired. Making but little impression toward destroying the fort, and fearing to risk an attempt finally to pass our batteries, the fleet withdrew on the morning of the eighteenth, and passed again into the Gulf. Our loss in this affair was but two killed and seven wounded. During the nine days of attack the enemy threw more than one thousand bombs from four ten-and thirteen-inch mortars, besides many shells and round shot from howitzers and cannon.

AN ENGLISH SOLDIER'S VIEW OF DEFEAT.

A graphic pen-picture of the chaotic and wretched condition of the English army after the crushing defeat of the eighth, and until its final return to the fleet, is given by Gleig in his "Narrative of the Campaigns." It will be read with all the more interest because it is the frank admission of a brave though prejudiced officer, giving an enemy's view of the great disaster that befell the British arms, in which he fully shared:

General Lambert prudently determined not to risk the safety of his
army by another attempt upon works evidently so much beyond our
strength. He considered that his chances of success were in every
respect lessened by the late repulse. An extraordinary degree of
confidence was given to the enemy, while our forces were greatly
diminished in numbers. If again defeated, nothing could save our army
from destruction; it could only now retreat in force. A retreat,
therefore, was resolved upon while the measure appeared practicable,
and toward that end all our future operations were directed.

One great obstacle existed; by what road were the troops to travel to
regain the fleet? On landing, we had taken advantage of the bayou,
and thus come within two miles of the cultivated country, in our
barges. To return by the same route was impossible. In spite of our
losses there were not enough boats to transport above one half of the
army at one time. If we separated, the chances were that both
divisions would be destroyed; for those embarked might be
intercepted, and those left behind might be attacked by the whole
American army. To obviate the difficulty, it required that we should
build a passable road through the swamp, to Lake Borgne, some twenty
miles away. The task was burthened with innumerable difficulties.
There was no firm foundation on which to work, and no trees to assist
in forming hurdles. All we could do was to bind together large
quantities of swamp weeds and lay them across the quagmire. It was
but the semblance of a road, without firmness and solidity.

To complete this road, bad as it was, occupied nine days, during
which our army lay in camp, making no attempt to molest the enemy.
The Americans, however, were not so inactive. A battery of six guns,
mounted on the opposite bank, kept up a continued fire upon our men.
The same mode of proceeding was adopted in front, and thus, night and
day we were harassed by danger, against which there was no fortifying
ourselves. Of the extreme unpleasantness of our situation, it is
hardly possible to convey an adequate conception. We never closed our
eyes in peace, for we were sure to be awaked before the lapse of many
minutes, by the splash of a roundshot or shell in the mud beside us.
Tents we had none, but lay some in open air, and some in huts of
boards, or any material we could procure. From the moment of our
landing, December 23d, not a man had undressed, except to bathe; many
had worn the same shirt for weeks. Heavy rains now set in, with
violent storms of thunder and lightning, and keen frosts at night.
Thus we were wet all day, and nearly frozen at night. With our
outposts there was constant skirmishing. Every day they were attacked
by the Americans, and compelled to maintain their ground by dint of
hard fighting. No one but those who belonged to this army can form a
notion of the hardships it endured, and the fatigue it underwent.

Nor were these the only evils which tended to lessen our numbers. To
our soldiers every inducement was held out by the enemy to desert.
Printed papers, offering lands and money as the price of desertion,
were thrown into the pickets, while individuals would persuade our
sentinels to quit their stations. It could not be expected that
bribes so tempting would always be refused. Many desertions began
daily to take place, and ere long became so frequent, that the evil
rose to be of a serious nature. In the course of a week, many men
quitted their colors, and fled to the enemy.

Meanwhile, the wounded, except such as were too severely hurt to be
removed, were embarked in the boats and sent off to the fleet. Next
followed the baggage and stores, with the civil officers,
commissaries, and purveyors; and last of all such of the light
artillery as could be drawn without risk of discovery. But of the
heavy artillery, no account was taken. It was determined to leave
them behind, retaining their stations. By the 17th, no part of the
forces was left in camp but the infantry. On the evening of the 18th,
it also began the retreat. Trimming the fires, and arranging all in
the order as if no change were to take place, regiment after regiment
stole away, as soon as darkness concealed their motions, leaving the
pickets to follow as a rear guard, with injunctions not to retire
till daylight appeared. Profound silence was maintained; not a man
opened his mouth, except to issue necessary orders in a whisper. Not
a cough or any other noise was to be heard from the head to the rear
of the column. Even the steps of the soldiers were planted with care,
to prevent the slightest echo. Nor was this precaution unnecessary.
In spite of every endeavor to the contrary, a rumor of our intention
had reached the Americans; for we found them of late very watchful
and prying.

While our route lay alongside the river, the march was agreeable
enough, but as soon as we entered the marsh, all comfort was at an
end. Our roadway, constructed of materials so slight, and resting on
a foundation so infirm, was trodden to pieces by the first corps.
Those who followed were compelled to flounder on the best way they
could. By the time the rear of the column gained the morass, all
trace of a way had disappeared. Not only were the reeds torn asunder
and sunk by the pressure of those in front, but the bog itself was
trodden into the consistency of mud. Every step sunk us to the knees,
and sometimes higher. Near the ditches, we had the utmost difficulty
in crossing at all. There being no light, except what the stars
supplied, it was difficult to select our steps, or follow those who
called to us that they were safe on the other side. At one of those
ditches, I myself beheld an unfortunate wretch gradually sink until
he totally disappeared. I saw him flounder, heard his cry for help,
and ran forward with the intention of saving him; but before I had
taken a second step, I myself sunk to my breast in the mire. How I
kept from smothering is more than I can tell, for I felt no solid
bottom under me, and sank slowly deeper and deeper, till the mud
reached my arms. Instead of rescuing the poor soldier, I was forced
to beg assistance for myself. A leathern canteen strap being thrown
to me, I laid hold of it, and was dragged out, just as my
fellow-sufferer was buried alive, and seen no more.

All night we continued our journey, toiling and struggling through
this terrible quagmire; and in the morning reached the Fishermen's
Huts, mentioned before as standing on the brink of Bayou Bienvenue,
near Lake Borgne. The site is as complete a desert as the eye of man
was ever pained by beholding. Not a tree or a bush grew near. As far
as the eye could reach, an ocean of weeds covering and partially
hiding the swamp presented itself, except on the side where a view of
the Lake changed, without fertilizing, the prospect. Here we were
ordered to halt; and perhaps I never rejoiced more sincerely at any
order than at this. Wearied with my exertions, and oppressed with
want of sleep, I threw myself on the chilly ground, without so much
as pulling off my muddy garments; in an instant all my cares and
troubles were forgotten. After many hours, I awoke from that sleep,
cold and stiff, and creeping beside a miserable fire of weeds,
devoured the last morsal of salt pork my wallet contained.

The whole army having come up, formed along the brink of the Lake; a
line of outposts was planted, and the soldiers commanded to make
themselves as comfortable as possible. But there was little comfort.
Without tents or shelter of any kind, our bed was the morass, and our
sole covering the clothes which had not quitted our backs for a
month. Our fires, so necessary to a soldier's happiness, were
composed solely of weeds, which blazed up and burned out like straw,
imparting but little warmth. Above all, our provisions were expended,
with no way to replenish in reach. Our sole dependence was the fleet,
nearly one hundred miles away, at anchor. It was necessary to wait
until our barges could make the trip there, and return. For two
entire days, the only provisions issued to the troops were some
crumbs of biscuit and a small allowance of rum. As for myself, being
fond of hunting, I determined to fare better. I took a fire-lock and
went in pursuit of wild ducks, of which there seemed plenty in the
bog. I was fortunate enough to kill several, but they fell in the
water, about twenty yards out. There was no other alternative.
Pulling off my clothes, and breaking the thin ice, I waded out and
got my game, and returned to shore, shivering like an aspen. As I
neared the shore, my leg stuck fast in the mire, and in pulling it
out my stocking came off, a loss that gave me great discomfort, until
we went aboard the fleet. I request that I may not be sneered at when
I record this loss of my stocking as one of the disastrous
consequences of this ill-fated expedition.

As the boats returned, regiment after regiment set sail for the
fleet. But, the wind being foul, many days elapsed before all could
be got off. By the end of January, we were all once more on board our
former ships. But our return was far from triumphant. We, who only
seven weeks ago had set out in the surest confidence of glory, and I
may add, of emolument, were brought back dispirited and dejected. Our
ranks were woefully thinned, our chiefs slain, our clothing tattered
and filthy, and our discipline in some degree injured. A gloomy
silence reigned throughout the armament, except when it was broken by
the voice of lamentation over fallen friends. The interior of each
ship presented a scene well calculated to prove the misadventures of
human hope and human prudence. On reaching the fleet, we found that a
splendid regiment, the 40th Foot, of one thousand men, had just
arrived to reinforce us, ignorant of the fatal issue of our attack.
But the coming of thrice their number could not recover what was
lost, or recall the fateful past. There was no welcome, nor
rejoicing; so great was the despondency that no attention was given
to the event. A sullen indifference as to what might happen next
seemed to have succeeded all our wonted curiosity, and confidence of
success in every undertaking.

On the 4th of February, the fleet weighed anchor and set sail, though
detained by adverse winds near the shore of Cat Island until the 7th,
when it put to sea. Our course, towards the east, led to the
conjecture that we were steering towards Mobile. Nor was it long
before we came in sight of the bay which bears that name.

SECOND ATTACK ON FORT BOWYER, MOBILE BAY.

So great and so repeated had been the reverses of the British arms, that an opportunity to retrieve lost prestige, even in a small degree, could not well be permitted to pass unimproved. The great flotilla of sixty vessels, with the fragments of the shattered army, which set sail with flags and pennants gayly flying in the breeze from Negril Bay, Jamaica, but a little over two months ago, was still a power upon the sea, at a safe distance from Jackson's triumphant army. The little outpost of a fort that guarded Mobile Bay, which had inflicted a heavy loss on, and beaten off, a squadron of the enemy's ships a few months before, lay in their path homeward, and it was determined to invest it, and to overwhelm it with numbers. On the sixth of February, the great armament appeared in sight of Dauphin Island. On the seventh, twenty-five ships anchored in a crescent position extending from the island toward Mobile Point, where stood the fort. On the morning of the eighth, the enemy landed five thousand troops opposite the line of ships at anchor, investing the fort by sea and land. The fortification was erected for defense mainly on the sea side, to render it formidable to ships attempting to enter the pass into Mobile Bay. On the land side was a sandy plain, rendering it incapable of defense against a superior force protected by extensive siege works. The enemy mounted a number of batteries behind parapets and epaulements, which directed their fire upon the weakest parts of the defense. The fort was gallantly defended by a garrison of three hundred and fifty men, under command of Colonel William Lawrence. Some losses were inflicted on the besiegers as they continued to push their works to within short musket-range of the fort. But the heavy cannonading and fire from small-arms encircled the besieged from every direction, and further defense became hopeless. Terms of surrender were agreed to on the eleventh, and on the twelfth the garrison marched out with the honors of war, yielding possession to the enemy.

NEGOTIATIONS FOR PEACE CONCLUDED ON THE 24TH OF DECEMBER, 1814.

The small victory at Mobile Bay was barren of any gain to the British cause; for, on the fourteenth, two days after the surrender, intelligence came from England to General Lambert that articles of peace had been signed by the plenipotentiaries of the belligerent nations, in session at Ghent. Gleig remarks, in his "Narrative": "With the reduction of this trifling work ended all hostilities in this quarter of America; for the army had scarcely reassembled, when intelligence arrived from England of peace. The news reached us on the fourteenth, and I shall not deny that it was received with much satisfaction."

On the nineteenth, General Jackson issued an address from headquarters, from which we reproduce as follows: "The flag-vessel, which was sent to the enemy's fleet at Mobile, has returned, and brings with it intelligence, extracted from a London paper, that on the twenty-fourth of December articles of peace were signed by the commissioners of the two nations."

Thus, on the day after the first landing of the British army on Louisiana soil, and after the first battle was fought at night, terms of peace were agreed on. It was fifteen days after that auspicious event until the battles on the eighth occurred, causing such disaster and loss of valuable lives to the English army and nation; and fifty-two days from the signing of articles until a message of the good news was received by the commander-in-chief of the British forces. There was no alternative but to await the slow passage of the ship across the wide Atlantic, with sails set to breeze and calm, and sometimes tossed and delayed by adverse storm. To-day, the news of such an event would be flashed over the great cables under the sea and the network of electric wires throughout the land, in the twinkling of an eye after its occurrence. Such an advantage at the time would have been worth to England the entire cost of the telegraph system of the world.

LEGISLATURE SUPPRESSED UNDER MARTIAL LAW--CHARGES OF TREASONABLE UTTERANCES.

On the morning of the twenty-eighth of December, just as the British began their attack on the American line, General Jackson issued an order forcibly forbidding the meeting of the Legislature in session, and for taking possession of the legislative halls. The proceeding created great excitement in the civil and military circles of the city, especially among the members of the body and their immediate friends. The author is indebted to Mr. William Beer, of the Howard Library of New Orleans, for the loan of a copy of a rare little book entitled "Report of the Committee of Inquiry on the Military Measures Employed Against the Legislature of the State of Louisiana, the 28th of December, 1814." In the full report of the testimony taken by the committee, we have a history of the causes which led to this open rupture between the commander-in-chief and the General Assembly of Louisiana, and of its incidents and issues.

Since the landing of the British army on the twenty-third, there were afloat in nebulous form some rumors of disaffection toward the American military occupation of Louisiana, among an element of the population unfriendly to the sovereignty of the United States over the territory since its purchase from Napoleon. Up to the time of the military occupation under Jackson, this hostile feeling seemed to display its temper and policies mainly in matters of civil procedure. There was very naturally a jealous opposition on the part of many leading citizens, of French and Spanish descent, of whom the population west of the Mississippi was almost entirely made up, against the annexation of the territory east of that river as part of Louisiana, on equal terms of citizenship and co-sovereignty. This east territory, they felt, had been rudely seized and possessed by the United States, against the claim and protest of Spain. It was being settled by American people, who in time would help to Americanize the country, and to lessen the power and control of the former creole domination. The virtues of a patriotic love of their native countries yet lingered in the bosoms of these citizens--a patriotic love which, when finally transferred to the new government they were under, burned as brightly for the new sovereignty as for the old.

Captain Abner L. Duncan, aid to Jackson, testified before the committee as follows:

On the 28th, Colonel Declouet (of General Morgan's command) coming in
haste from the city, joined this respondent and begged him to inform
General Jackson that a plan was on foot among several members of the
Legislature for the surrender of the country to the enemy. Colonel
Declouet named in confidence to myself, to Generals Jackson and
Morgan, and to Major Robinson, several members as persons determined
on making the attempt. He added, that he heard one or more members
say, that Jackson was carrying on a Russian war (alluding to the
burning of Moscow), and that it was best to save private property by
a timely surrender; that he, Colonel Declouet, had been invited to
join in the measure. On this respondent making the communication to
General Jackson, the order he received was: "Tell Governor Claiborne
to prevent this, and to blow them up if they attempt it!"

Colonel Declouet told me the plan had been first disclosed to him by
the Speaker of the House, Mr. Guichard. He said in presence of
General Jackson and Mr. Daresac, that many other influential men were
concerned in it, and that they had held several night or secret
meetings on the subject. He gave the names of Mr. John Blanque and
Mr. Marigny, and generally all those voting with Mr. Blanque in the
House. He stated that, as an inducement offered to unite in the
plan, he was informed by Mr. Guichard that General Jackson would burn
and destroy everything before him sooner than surrender the country,
and that the English would respect private property. I understood
also, from some members of the House, Mr. Harper and Mr. Fickland
among them, and in the Senate from General Morgan and Mr. Hireart,
that an attempt would be made to dismember the State. I also
understood from other members that they would consider it an act of
violence; and would resist it by violence.

Colonel Declouet was the chief informant at headquarters; but rumors had been rife for several days of disloyal utterances and of mysterious proceedings, which caused uneasiness to the civil and military authorities, and especially to Governor Claiborne, who had made known his apprehensions of trouble from the disaffected element, warning General Jackson of the dangers possible from this quarter. The Legislature was to convene on the twenty-eighth; and it was intimated that the overture for a surrender might be resolved upon that day. Such a possible action, in the very crisis of battle, could be but an attempt to marplot the military plans of the commander-in-chief, and to marshal an enemy in the rear. The information brought in so abruptly on that morning by Colonel Declouet made a profound impression on the mind of General Jackson. The enemy had already opened the battle of the twenty-eighth of December, with the forward movement of his columns and under the heavy fire of his batteries.

In the excitement of the moment, Jackson gave the verbal order to his aid, Captain Duncan, to be delivered at once to Governor Claiborne for immediate execution. This order, as rendered by Captain Duncan, directed the Governor to summarily close the halls of the Legislature, and to place a guard at the doors to prevent a meeting of the body until further orders. Duncan testified that the General put in emphasis the words: "Tell Governor Claiborne to prevent this, and to blow them up if they attempt it!"

The order was executed. The Governor commissioned General J.B. Labitat, of the Louisiana troops, to enforce it; he placed a guard of soldiers at the doors of the building, and forbade entrance to the members on that day. Captain Duncan had put spurs to his horse and started on a lope to the city with the order. On the way he met Colonel Fortier, an aid to the Governor, who consented to promptly deliver the order, permitting Duncan to return. In the proceedings of the committee, Honorable Levi Wells, member of the House of Representatives from Rapides Parish, testified that on the twenty-eighth, under an order of General Jackson, an armed guard was placed at the doors of the legislative halls in the city of New Orleans, which was to hinder the members from assembling; "and even to fire on them, should they dare to persist in their design; and that the life of a representative of the people, and a member of the Body, was exposed to the greatest danger; that a sentinel, to hinder him from repairing to his post, presented his bayonet and threatened to run him through with it, unless he retired, adding to this outrage the most insulting tone."

Through the mediation of friendly counsel the views of both the civil and military chiefs were modified. The order was revoked within twenty-four hours, and the guards withdrawn; on the twenty-ninth, the Legislature was permitted to convene. In the conclusion, the committee exonerated Speaker Guichard and other members of the Legislature referred to as under suspicion, and severely censured Colonel Declouet and Captain Duncan as the indiscreet authors of all the trouble. The measures taken by General Jackson and Governor Claiborne were effectual; while the report of the committee was evidently drawn to modify and explain the imputed indiscretions of some of their fellow-members who had been compromised. The procedure did not include all the legislators; for some of these had volunteered their services, shouldered their muskets, and gone to the front of battle.

A feeling of keen resentment toward General Jackson and some officers involved in this affair was nursed long after by these legislators. After peace was assured and hostilities at an end, the Legislature voted a resolution of thanks for valiant services in defense of Louisiana to the officers and soldiers from the States of Kentucky, Tennessee, and Mississippi, with the request to the Governor that he should convey the sense of this resolution in appropriate terms in a letter each to the officers in command of these troops, respectively. The resolution was as follows:

_Resolved_, That the thanks of the General Assembly be presented, in
the name of the State, to our brave brother soldiers from Tennessee,
Kentucky, and the Mississippi Territory, and their gallant leaders,
Generals Coffee, Carroll, Thomas, Adair, and Colonel Hinds, for the
brilliant share they have had in the defense of this country and the
happy harmony they have maintained with the inhabitants and militia
of the State.

MAGLOIRE GUICHARD,
_Speaker of the House of Representatives_.

FULWAR SKIPWORTH,
_President of Senate_.

Approved, February 2d, 1815.

WM. C. CLAIBORNE,
_Governor of State_.

The great chieftain could well afford to pass the slight in silence, hailed as he was by the acclamations of the multitude--the deliverer of the country, and the hero of the nation!

A similar resolution of thanks was voted to the officers and troops of Louisiana, who had so patriotically sprung to arms on the invasion of the enemy, and who had so gallantly fought in the several battles of the campaign. In this resolution separate mention was made of each of the officers of the State troops and their several commands, reciting the meritorious services they had rendered, in terms of special praise, making exceptions of certain officers who had incurred the displeasure of some of the honorable legislators.

Under the first resolution, letters were addressed each to Generals Coffee and Carroll, of Tennessee, to Major Hinds, of Mississippi, and to Generals Thomas and Adair, of Kentucky. As these letters are of similar tenor, we quote only the correspondence with General Adair:

NEW ORLEANS, February 25th, 1815.

_Sir_: To a soldier who has done his duty in all the conflicts in
which his country has been involved, from the War of Independence to
the present moment, it must be matter of great exultation to notice
the valor and firmness of the children of his old friends; to be
convinced that they are the true descendants of the old stock. That
the young men of your brigade should have looked up to you in the
hour of battle, as their guide and their shield, is only a
continuation of that confidence which their fathers had in a chief
whose arm had so often, and so successfully, been raised against the
foe. The enclosed Resolution of the General Assembly of Louisiana
will show you the high sense which is entertained in this State of
your services and of those of your brothers in arms. Be towards them
the vehicle of our sentiments, and receive for yourself the
assurances of my respect and best wishes.

WM. C.C. CLAIBORNE,
_Governor of Louisiana_.

To General John Adair.

The response of General Adair:

GOV. WM. C.C. CLAIBORNE.

_Sir_: I have the honor of acknowledging the receipt of Your
Excellency's note, inclosing a Resolution of the Legislature of
Louisiana, generously awarding the thanks of the State to the militia
from her sister States, who aided in the late successful struggle to
expel a powerful invading enemy from her shores.

To a proud American, citizen or soldier, the consciousness of having
faithfully discharged his duty to his country must ever be his
highest and most lasting consolation. But when to this is added the
approbation, the gratitude of the wisest, the most respectable part
of the community, with whom and under whose eye it has been his
fortune to act, it will ever be esteemed, not only the highest reward
for his services, but the most powerful incentive to his future good
conduct.

Accept, sir, for the Legislature, my warmest acknowledgments for the
honorable mention they have made of the corps to which I belong, and
for yourself the esteem and respect so justly due from me, for your
polite and highly interesting note of communication; and my best
wishes for your health and happiness.

JOHN ADAIR.

GENERAL JACKSON--CLASH WITH THE COURT.

A member of the Legislature, Mr. Loillier, severely censured the commander-in-chief for continuing New Orleans and vicinity under martial law after the defeat and embarkation of the British army, and for his arbitrary course in sending a body of creole troops to a remote camp near Baton Rouge, in response to their petition for a discharge. Jackson ordered his arrest. Loillier applied to Judge Hall, of the United States District Court, for a writ of habeas corpus, which was promptly granted by the court. General Jackson summarily ordered the arrest of Judge Hall also; and that he and the assemblyman both be deported beyond the military lines, as persons liable to incite insubordination and mutiny within the martial jurisdiction. Intelligence of the treaty of peace at Ghent soon followed, and martial law once again yielded to civil authority.

Judge Hall, resenting what he deemed a great indignity upon the court, issued an order, summoning Jackson to appear before him to answer a grave charge of contempt. Jackson's attorney attempted to plead in his defense, but the judge silenced him, and set the hearing a week after. On the thirty-first of March, Jackson appeared in court in person, but refused to be interrogated. As his defense had been denied, he announced that he was there only to receive the sentence of the court. Judge Hall then imposed a fine of one thousand dollars, which sum the veteran offender drew from his pocket and handed in to the court.

These proceedings were attended with profound excitement throughout the city and community. The hero of the day had a determined following present in crowds at and near the court-room; and among these were the Baratarian contingent, with their leaders, and others as desperate as these. But the great commander had set the example of implicit obedience to the law, and no disrespect to the court was shown. But as the General sought to retire from the scene, the enthusiasm of the crowds overleaped all bounds of propriety. With shouts and roars of applause the devoted people lifted him in their arms and upon their shoulders, and bore him in triumph through the streets of the city to his headquarters, despite the chagrin and helpless protestations of the victim of their admiration. Tall and gaunt, and angular in person, with his long, spare limbs dangling helplessly about him, and rocked and swayed by the movement of the masses under him, the great warrior was never in all his life before in a position more awkward and undignified. The master of men and emergencies was unthroned for one time in life.

The money to pay the fine was proffered over and over again to reimburse him by ardent friends, but Jackson would listen to no terms of payment of the fine, except out of his own purse. He alone had committed the offense--if there was an offense--and he alone would assume to pay the penalty. It was not until 1844, one year before his death, that Congress passed an act to refund the principal and interest, which amounted then to twenty-seven hundred dollars. In advocacy of this bill Stephen A. Douglas, then Senator from Illinois, made his maiden speech upon the floor of the Senate of the United States.