Chapter I: Preface

The great war has entered into history. The restraints, direct and indirect, which it imposed being gone with it, we return to sounder tests of what should be public knowledge——uncomfortable truths may be told, secret places explored. At the same time, the first squall of controversy in France over the opening of the land campaign in the West has subsided; this lull is the student’s opportunity. No complete history of the events culminating in the victory of the Marne is yet possible, or soon to be expected. On the German side, evidence is scanty and of low value; on that of the Allies, there is yet a preliminary work of sifting and measuring to undertake ere definitive judgments can be set down. Any narrative conceived in a scientific, not an apologetic or romantic, spirit may claim to further this end.

The difficulty lies less in following the actual movements of that great encounter——the most important of which, and their part in the result, can now be traced pretty accurately——than in estimating the factors that produced and moulded it. Yet, if we are right in holding the battle of the Marne to be essentially the completion of a chapter, the resultant of certain designs and certain misadventures, a vast strategical reversal and correction, such an estimate is necessary to the subject. How did the two chief antagonists envisage the process of modern warfare? Why was the action which was to close the first phase of the war, and largely to shape its after-course, fought not near the northern or eastern frontiers, but between Paris and Verdun? Why and how were the original plans of campaign modified to reach this result? What conditions of victory existed on the Marne that had been lacking on the Sambre? In a word, the key to the meaning of the battle must be sought in the character of the forces in play, their comparative numbers, organisation, and training, armament and equipment, leadership and inspiration.

No sooner is such an inquiry opened than a number of derivative problems appear. Where exactly lay the German superiority of force at the outset, and why was it not maintained? Was the first French concentration justifiable? If not, was it promptly and soundly changed? Could the northern frontier have been defended? Was Lanrezac responsible for Charleroi, and, if so, why not Castelnau for Morhange? Was the German plan of envelopment exaggerated? Could the British have done more at Mons, and were they slow and timorous when the hour arrived to turn about? Was Paris ever in danger? And, coming to the battle itself, how was it decided? What parts did Gallieni, Von Kluck, Sir John French, and Foch play? Was Joffre really master of the field? It may be too soon to answer fully such questions as these; it is too late to evade them.

Outside the mass of official and semi-official bulletins, dispatches, and explanations, much of it now best left to oblivion, a considerable literature has accumulated in France, including personal narratives by combatants of all arms, and critical essays from points of view the most diverse. With the rather cruel sincerity of the French intelligence, the whole military preparation of the Republic has been challenged; and, in the consequent discussion, many important facts have come to light. Thus, we have the texts of the most decisive orders, and many details of the dispositions of troops. We have Marshal Von Bülow’s valuable diary of field movements, and the critical reflections of distinguished officers like Lt.-Col. de Thomasson, Generals Malleterre, Berthaut, Verraux, Percin, Canonge, Bonnal, Palat, Cherfils, and Col. Feyler. Fragmentary statements by General Joffre himself, by Generals Foch, Lanrezac, and Maunoury, the Ministers of War, MM. Messimy and Millerand, by Generals von Freytag-Loringhoven, Von Kluck, and other German officers and men, give useful indications. We are also indebted to the more systematic works of MM. Hanotaux, Reinach, Engerand, and Babin; and, with regard to the British Force, the volumes of Marshal French and Major-General Maurice are important. These and other sources are cited in the pages of “Notes and References” at the end of the volume, in which some questions of detail, especially relating to the preparation of the battle, are discussed.

Having been privileged to watch the war in France from beginning to end, and to live with the French armies (as Correspondent attached to General Headquarters) for more than two years, the writer has also had exceptional opportunities of studying the terrain, and of discussing the drama as a whole and in detail with officers and men from the highest to the most humble. To name all those from whom he has received aid would be impossible; to name any might seem to associate them with conclusions for which he is solely responsible; but he may record his deep gratitude to the French Government, the Headquarters Staff, and the various Army Staffs, for the rare experience of which this volume is unworthy fruit.

_February 1920._

_German units are throughout numbered in Roman capitals_ (“the XX Corps”), _Allied in ordinary figures_ (“the 20th Corps”).

_The small figures in the text refer to “Notes and References” at the end of the volume._

CONTENTS

PAGE
PREFACE v

CHAP.
I. THE DELUGE 1

II. A TRAGEDY OF ERRORS——
i. The German Plan of Campaign 10
ii. The Forces in Play 14
iii. The French War Doctrine 20
iv. The Three French Offensives 28
v. The Battle of Charleroi-Mons 34

III. JOFFRE STARTS AFRESH——
i. Ecce Homo! 46
ii. The Second New Plan 54
iii. Battle of the Gap of Charmes 61
iv. Battles of Le Cateau, Guise, and Launois 64
v. End of the Long Retreat 71

IV. THE GREAT DILEMMA, PARIS–VERDUN——
i. The Government leaves the Capital 76
ii. Kluck plunges South-Eastward 79
iii. Joffre’s Opportunity 84

V. THE ORDER OF BATTLE——
i. Gallieni’s Initiative 92
ii. General Offensive of the Allies 95
_Strength and Position of the Armies_ 97
iii. Features of the Battlefield 106
iv. The Last Summons 110

VI. BATTLE OF THE OURCQ——
i. A Premature Engagement 113
ii. The British Manœuvre 118
iii. A Race of Reinforcements 126
iv. The Paris Taxi-Cabs 129

VII. THE “EFFECT OF SUCTION”——
i. French and d’Espérey strike North 135
ii. Battle of the Marshes of St. Gond 142
iii. Defence and Recapture of Mondemont 148
iv. Foch’s Centre broken 155
v. Fable and Fact of a Bold Manœuvre 160

VIII. FROM VITRY TO VERDUN——
i. The Battle of Vitry-le-François 169
ii. Sarrail holds the Meuse Salient 175

IX. VICTORY 184

X. THE DEFENCE OF THE EAST 197

XI. SUMMING-UP 214

INDEX 271

NOTES AND REFERENCES

The German Objective (p. 239); The Opposed Forces (p. 240); De Bloch’s Prophecy and French’s Confession (p. 242); Criticisms and Defence of the French Staff (p. 244); The Surprise in the North (p. 247); The Abandonment of Lille (p. 252); M. Hanotaux and the B.E.F. (p. 252); The Fall of Maubeuge (p. 256); Paris and the German Plan (p. 259); Some Books on the Battle (p. 263); General Bonnal and the British Army (p. 265); Scenes at Farthest South (p. 266); The Myth of the 42nd Division (p. 268).

LIST OF MAPS

1. POSITION OF THE ARMIES AND LINES OF APPROACH _Frontispiece_

FACING PAGE
2. BATTLE OF CHARLEROI–MONS 38

3. THE OURCQ FRONT, AFTERNOON, SEPT. 6 118

4. THE BRITISH TURN-ABOUT 122

5. OPENING OF ALLIED OFFENSIVE, SEPT. 6 136

6. THE MARNE RE-CROSSED, SEPT. 9, A.M. 142

7. FOCH’S FRONT, SEPT. 6 AND 7 146

8. FOCH’S FRONT, SEPT. 8 AND 9 156

9. FRONT OF FRENCH 4TH ARMY 172

10. THE VERDUN SALIENT 180

11. BATTLE OF THE GRAND COURONNÉ 206

12. CRISIS OF THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE 224

THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE