Chapter XI: Summing-Up (3)

_La Rôle de la Cavalerie Française_ à l’aile gauche de la première bataille de la Marne. By J. Hethay (Paris. 1919). Includes an account of the strange raid of the 5th Division, 1st Cavalry Corps, into Villers-Cotterets Forest and region of La Fertê-Milon, ordered by General Bridoux on the morning of September 8. It was driven hither and thither for several days, at last escaping in fragments to the west; but it created some little alarm and disturbance on Von Kluck’s lines of communication.

_Les Marais de Saint Gond._ By Charles le Goffic (Paris: Plon. 1916). A standard work on this part of the battle.

“Mondemont.” Article by “Asker,” in _L’Illustration_, July 3, 1915. Many valuable articles will be found in the files of this weekly journal.

_La Victoire de Lorraine._ By A. Bertrand (Paris: Berger-Levrault. 1917).

_Morhange et les Marsouins de Lorraine._ By R. Christian-Frogé (Berger-Levrault. 1917).

_Sous Verdun._ By M. Genevois (R. Hachette. 1916).

_Die Schlacht an der Marne._ By Major E. Bircher, of the Swiss General Staff. Contains a bibliography of 150 works and a number of useful maps and plans (Berne: Paul Haupt).

[56] _Avec Charles Péguy de la Lorraine à la Marne_, by Victor Boudon (Paris: Hachette). Péguy, a sort of mystical Tory-Socialist, or, as M. Lavisse says, “Catholic-Anarchist,” was author-editor of _Les Cahiers de la Quinzaine_.

[57] M. Hanotaux (p. 126) says that Gallieni’s order of September 4 was “an order for deployment, not for the offensive,” and he adds that the Governor intended that the cavalry should feel the way. There is no evidence of cavalry activity on the 5th; and it is manifest that the encounter before St. Soupplets was a complete surprise for the 6th Army.

[58] Sir John French, in his dispatch, says: “I should conceive it to have been about noon on the 6th September, after the British Forces had changed their front to the right, and occupied the line Jouy le Chatel–Faremoutiers–Villeneuve le Comte, ... that the enemy realised the powerful threat that was being made against the flank of his columns moving south-east, and began the great retreat which opened the battle.” This is a significant mistake. We now know that Bülow sent a first warning of an Allied concentration towards the west on the afternoon of September 5 to Kluck, who by then had his own information from the IV Reserve Corps. A few hours later Kluck was fully aware of his danger; and, as he has since stated to an interviewer, decided “in five minutes” how to meet it.

Field-Marshal French (_1914_, ch. 5), wrongly, I think, considers that Kluck “manifested considerable hesitation and want of energy.”

GENERAL BONNAL AND THE BRITISH ARMY

[59] Several French volumes hint the first criticism, and it is expressed very definitely by General Bonnal in the article already referred to on the battle of the Ourcq in _La Renaissance_ of September 4, 1915. The substance of General Bonnal’s charge is as follows:

“Unfortunately, the British Army, rather hesitant after its checks at Le Cateau, Landrecies, and Compiègne, lost time in displacements dictated by prudence, and did not give the 6th Army in time all the help desirable.” Maunoury had asked for it at noon on Sept. 4; and the Generalissimo’s directions of that night anticipated the British being at Coulommiers and Changis on the evening of the 5th. But, on the afternoon of the 4th, the head of Sir John French’s Staff had announced to Gallieni for that night “an order of movement the result of which was to distance the British Army at once from the 6th and the 5th Armies.” (If this movement was not the further retirement asked for by General Joffre, we do not know what is meant.) “Marshal French occupied during the 5th positions north and south of Rozoy, facing east. But this disposition placed the British Army much to the rear, to the west, of the line first fixed, and permitted the German II Corps, reported in the morning at Coulommiers, to repass the Marne and escape to the north-west. Fearing its appearance on the Ourcq, General Gallieni wrote on the 6th to Marshal French praying him at once to advance in accordance with the orders of General Joffre. On his side, the latter telegraphed to General Maunoury, on the 6th, asking him constantly to support the British left. In consequence, the chief of the 6th Army sent to Meaux the same evening the 8th Division (4th Corps), which had just detrained at Paris.” (This division actually came in on the morning of the 6th.) “If the presence of the 8th Division on his left did not determine Marshal French immediately to take the offensive” (what this means we do not know, for the British offensive had commenced on the morning of the 6th), “it was because at this moment he was much concerned as to the pretty considerable interval between his right and the left of the 5th Army. Yet this interval was watched by the Cavalry Corps of General Conneau.”

“On the evening of the 6th, the British Army reached the line of the Grand Morin, in contact on its right with the 5th Army. Unfortunately this contact was so close that the British Army thought it necessary to march level with and on the same lines as the 5th, which had great difficulty in assuring its route, having to drive before it four corps of Von Bülow’s Army.”

General Bonnal concludes his criticism with a not very amiable homily on the insufficient training of the old British Army, and the inadequacy of its Staff work. Generals not trained as in France and Germany had, he says, a tendency “to practise the linear order,” to move their troops in deployed formation, supporting their flanks on neighbouring bodies, and taking a thousand precautions that lead to delay. That is why “the British Army, composed of officers and men full of strength, vigour, and energy, took more than two days to cover the 20 kilometres between the Grand Morin and the Marne, when, on the 6th, they ought to have marched on the nearest enemy.”

For similar comments, see “La Bataille de la Marne, Recit Succinct,” by General Canonge (_Le Correspondant_, September 25 and October 10, 1917), with details of the battle.

One sentence of M. Hanotaux is more to the point than all these criticisms and suppositions: “No doubt, if the encounter had not been produced, a little prematurely perhaps, in the region of St. Soupplets–Penchard, at noon on the 5th, the whole army of Von Kluck would have been south of the Marne in the evening; while Maunoury would have taken it in reverse on the north bank. Kluck would then have been closed in” (_Histoire_, ch. 38, p. 184).

An interesting attempt to justify Gallieni against Joffre, and to challenge the latter’s strategy at this time, will be found in _La Genèse de la Bataille de la Marne_, by General H. Le Gros (Paris: Payot). He quotes Joffre as complaining to the Government (on Sept. 4) that Gallieni was seeking to “push him into a premature offensive.”

SCENES AT FARTHEST SOUTH

[60] Four days later, in the village inn at Pezarches, Madame, an upstanding woman of about thirty, told me of the following incident:

“On Sunday morning my mother had gone to church, and I remained at home with my father and my little boy. My father left us to get some tobacco. Going out for a moment with the child, I saw a group of horsemen in the street, and said to myself: ‘We are saved. It is the Belgians!’ When I returned, to my surprise, they were in the house, sitting in my room and in the café. An officer asked me to cook him a couple of eggs. I noticed that one of the men was wounded, and asked whether it was painful. He nodded, and I went to the kitchen. There I saw, on the window-sill, a spiked helmet. I nearly fainted! So they were Germans! I managed to take in the eggs. Then the officer asked me, very politely, to show him my left hand, and, pointing to the wedding-ring, said: ‘You are married?’ ‘Yes,’ I replied, trembling. ‘Your husband is a soldier?’ ‘Yes.’ ‘You have a child?’ ‘No, I have no children,’ I said, ‘But I saw him. You are hiding him because you have heard that the Germans cut off the hands of French children. That is false. We never hurt women or children. Bring your little boy.’ But, as I persisted that it was not my child, he said no more. He and the others paid in German money for what they had, and left. A quarter of an hour later the firing began.”

[61] _1914_, ch. 4.

[62] _Le Petit Journal_, September 9, 1917.

[63] In Courtacon, I found eighteen of the two dozen small brick houses completely destroyed by fire, after having been sacked. The pretext given was that villagers had betrayed the German troops——part of the Guard Cavalry Division——to the Allies. The single room of the village school presented an unforgettable exhibition of malice. Dirty straw, remnants of meals, torn books, and broken cartridge cases littered the floor. Piles of half-burnt straw showed that a hurried attempt had been made to destroy the building; there were two such piles under the bookcase and the tiny school museum, which consisted of a few bottles of metal and chemical specimens. Amid this filthy chaos, the low forms, the master’s desk, and wall-charts inculcating “temperance, kindness, justice, and truth,” stood as they had done on the day before the summer holidays. As I turned to leave, I saw, written across the blackboard in bold, fine writing, evidently as the lesson of that day, the words: “_À chaque jour suffit sa peine_”——“Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof,” as our English version has it. Under this motto, all unconscious of it, these brutes had slept and wakened to their incendiary work——men of a nation that boasted itself the pioneer in Europe of elementary schooling. Could any recording angel have conceived a more biting irony?

[64] M. Madelin says that 7000 German corpses were found. The figure may be doubted.

[65] Le Goffic, _Les Marais de St. Gond_.

[66] _Au Centre de la Bataille de la Marne_, by the Abbé Neret, Curé of Vertus, who gives the hours named.

[67] I rely upon the article by M. le Goffic, “La Defense du Mont Août,” in _La Liberte_, September 7, 1918, embodying the narrative of an eye-witness, who mentions the following curious details: “A black cow, maddened by the bombardment, charged the trenches, leaped aside when a shell burst, sniffed the smoke, and stamped in the shell-holes. Slowly, a shepherd, a big, careless ruffian, climbed the slope with his five white sheep. For a moment he stopped level with us, 500 yards to the right. As though by accident, his five sheep were on his left, on our side; and immediately shells began to arrive in fours, the range lengthening each time by a hundred yards. But we were not in range.” This perhaps rather imaginative correspondent thinks that the Germans mistook dead for living Frenchmen on the slopes of Mont Août, and that that is why they did not seek to occupy it.

THE MYTH OF THE 42ND DIVISION

[68] General Canonge, in his historical sketch, confirms my own inquiries. The embryo of the myth is to be found in the “Official Résumé,” published on June 8, 1915, in the _Bulletin des Armées_, according to which, on the evening of September 9, Foch’s Army, “moving from west to east toward Fère Champènoise, took in flank the Prussian Guard and the Saxon Corps which were attacking south-east of this locality. This audacious manœuvre decided the success.” This was presently elaborated, with various romantic decorations.

[69] Canonge, after two inquiries on the spot, and with written evidence in addition, says that the 42nd Division left Broyes between 2 and 3 pm., reached Linthelles about 5 p.m., stopped there, and then bivouacked in the zone Linthes–Linthelles–Ognes–Pleurs, passing the night there “in general reserve,” and moving away only about 5 a.m. on September 10. Fère Champènoise, he adds, was evacuated by the Germans, after an orgie of 24 hours, at about 5.30 p.m. on the 9th, but was traversed during the greater part of the night by German troops coming from Connantre and Gourgancon. Connage thinks that, “on sight of the troops of the 42nd Division, those of General Dubois, certain now of support, advanced, and the Division then stopped and turned back to night-quarters.” Bülow, he believes, had ordered his retreat at 3.30 p.m. The first French detachment entered Fère Champènoise at 7 a.m. next day.

[70] Giraud (_Histoire_, p. 166) gives a rather different report of this dialogue. I rely upon an article in _L’Illustration_ of Jan. 9, 1915, containing a long passage from the diary of “an officer who was the soul of the defence”——doubtless, Captain Heym himself.

[71] Colonel Feyler’s _Avant-Propos Stratégiques_ (Paris: Payot. 1915) are particularly valuable for a pitiless analysis of the “moral manœuvre” represented in early German accounts of the first part of the campaign.

[72] Major-General Maurice says: “I am convinced that history will decide that it was the crossing of the Marne in the early hours of the 9th by the British Army which turned the scale against Kluck and saved Maunoury at a time of crisis.... That an army which on August 23 had been all but surrounded by an enemy who outnumbered it by two to one should have fought its way out, retreated 170 miles, and then immediately turned about and taken a decisive part in the battle which changed the course of the campaign of 1914, is as wonderful an achievement as is to be found in the history of war” (_Forty Days_, pp. 183–4).

[73] Hanotaux, _Histoire Illustrée_, vol. vii. pp. 132–8.

[74] _Idem_, pp. 172–5.

[75] Foch, _Des Principes de la Guerre_.

[76] M. Hanotaux (p. 76) regards this last part of the plan as “pure folly,” as “a few thousand resolute men holding the defiles, crests, and cliffs would break whole armies before Nancy was attained.” This appears to be an exaggeration; but it is highly probable that before Nancy, as before Mons and on other occasions at the beginning of the war, the German Armies lost, through the traditional belief in envelopment, what they might have gained by concentration on the central attack.

[77] “Choses Vues à Metz,” _Revue Hebdomadaire_, December 18, 1915. Colonel Feyler quotes from the _Lokal Anzeiger_ of Berlin the following commentary on one of the Kaiser’s earlier appearances at the Front: “The presence of the Emperor demonstrates clearly what a development events have taken.... The Emperor would never have gone into France if those responsible had envisaged the possibility of the German Army being thrown back beyond the frontier. His presence among his troops in enemy country will not fail to produce a deep impression in Germany as well as abroad.”

[78] Quoted in _Un Village Lorrain en Août—Septembre 1914. Réméréville_, by C. Berlet.

[79] Lt.-Col. Thomasson, _Le Revers_, introduction.

[80] Professor Friedrich Meinecke, of Freiburg University, in the _Frankfürter Zeitung_, December 31, 1916.

INDEX

Air Forces, German and Allied, 18, 27, 126, 140, 141, 167, 241–2

Aisne, German stand on the, 187–8, 192–3

Alsace, French advance and withdrawal in, 2, 29, 56, 212

Amade, General d’, 28, 35, 65, 66, 72

Americans urged to leave Paris, 82, 260

Amiens occupied by Von Kluck, 72, 80

Antwerp, 40, 44, 88, 105

Ardennes, Belgian, French offensive into, 24, 31–3, 36

Armaments, German and Allied compared, 14, 215

Artillery, German and French, 17, 18, 215;
at Namur and Maubeuge, 40, 257;
in the battle of the Marne, 104, 126, 128, 146, 180, 201, 210

Battlefield described, 106–9, 113–4, 143–4, 170–1, 203–7

Bavarian Corps, Prince Ruprecht and, 30, 56, 61–3, 87, 197–213

Belgium, the surprise in, 12–13, 21, 26–7, 34, 36, 38, 41, 45, 49,
54, 215, 247–51

Belgium’s contribution, 15, 27, 32, 37–41, 43–4

Berthaut, General, defends the French Staff, 245–6

Bloch, Jean de, forecasts of, 19, 242–4

Briey coalfield, 33, 248, 249

British Expeditionary Force, 34–44, 65–9, 80–1, 99, 118–26;
advance to the Marne begun, 123;
the Marne crossed, 131, 140–1;
a determining factor, 185, 188–9, 224–5;
M. Hanotaux’ criticisms, 253–5, 259;
General Bonnal’s criticism, 265–6

Bülow, General von, 32, 36–43, 66, 68–9, 81, 85, 100;
compromised by Von Kluck’s retreat, 129, 134, 135–7;
attack upon the French centre, 135, 142, 146–64;
disorder and retreat, 165–8, 190–3

Castelnau, General de, 27, 29–31, 62–3, 71, 104, 197–213, 248

Cateau, Le, battle of, 1, 65–6, 68

Cavalry, rôle of the, 16, 27, 66, 67, 104, 125, 134, 192–3, 264

Châlons reoccupied, 193

Charleroi, battle of, 37–43

Charmes, Gap of, defence of, 31, 56, 61–3

Château-Thierry reoccupied, 141

Command, unity of, 25, 40, 216

Concentration, first French, and re-grouping, 27–8, 251

Coulommiers occupied by the British, 124

Couronné, Grand, of Nancy, defence of, 63, 199, 205–12, 228–9, 269

Crown Prince, the Imperial, 32–3, 63–4, 70–1, 89, 103, 169–72,
178–82, 195

Dubail, General, 27, 29, 30–1, 62–3, 104, 197–8, 200, 203

Eastern defences, French, 12, 31, 44, 56, 61–4, 89–90, 170, 197, 229

Emperor, the German, 84, 205, 209, 269

Espérey, General Franchet d’, 37, 40–1, 100, 122;
advance to the Marne begun, 137;
Marne crossed, 141–2;
helps Foch, 139, 142, 156;
a determining factor in the victory, 189–91;
on the Aisne, 193

Fère Champènoise lost, 157;
reoccupied, 167

Foch, General, his teaching, 22, 24, 50, 160, 202;
at head of 20th Corps, 30, 62;
of 9th Army, 61, 69–70, 101, 138;
battle of St. Gond, 142–54;
the centre broken, 155–64;
projected manœuvre and German retreat, 161–2, 165–8, 190, 193, 268

Forces, German and Allied, compared, 15–16, 30, 32–3, 41, 65;
on eve of the battle of the Marne, 97–105, 137, 144–5, 169, 171–2,
176, 177–8, 198–201, 215–6, 240–1, 255

Fortifications, modern, function of, 21, 229, 245

French, Sir John, 18, 32, 35, 36, 39–43, 66–7, 69, 72, 73;
communications with Gallieni and Joffre, 93–4, 121–3;
battle order, 111;
farthest south, 119, 121;
the pursuit, 188;
criticisms of, 253–6, 258, 265–6

Gallieni, General, 47, 49, 77–9, 81, 83, 90, 133;
order to 6th Army on September 4, 92–3;
communications with Joffre and French, 93–4;
battle of the Ourcq;
his precipitancy, 116–7, 121–3, 134, 224;
Generals Cherfils and Bonnal on, 262

Gaps in German and Allied lines, 69, 85, 111, 136–7, 145, 166, 189,
192–3, 225–6

Generals removed, French, 20, 49, 52, 245;
German, 83, 233

Gond, St., marshes of, 143 _et seq._, 191, 226

Guise, battle of, 68–9

Haig, General Sir D., 37, 64, 66, 99, 141, 193

Hanotaux, M., controverted, 41–3, 252–5

Hausen, General von, and the Saxon Corps, 32–3, 35, 38–41, 69, 71,
101, 135, 145, 155–9, 165–6, 171, 172, 175, 191, 193

Heeringen, General von, 30, 61–3, 192, 197, 199, 200, 203–4

Humbert, General, at Mondemont, 149, 152–4

Italian Frontier, 15, 25, 28

Joffre, General, moves 5th Army and B.E.F. to Sambre (August 16),
35–6, 42;
“most unexpected” news, 41;
career and character, 46–53;
second new plan of campaign, 54–61;
tactical lessons, 58;
watches eastern frontier, 62, 64, 197;
forms 6th Army, 65;
helps the B.E.F., 65–8;
forms 9th Army, 70;
extends the retreat, 73–5;
orders for general offensive, 74–5, 93–7, 111, 121;
M. Millerand on, 77;
gains and superiority of forces, 104–5;
and Gallieni’s precipitancy, 116, 119, 121–3;
and the decisive movement between Kluck and Bülow, 135, 189;
on the victory, 195–6;
the author of the victory, 218–29, 233;
before Commission of Inquiry, 249;
General Lanrezac on, 256;
M. Messimy on, 257

Kitchener, Lord, and Field-Marshal French, 69, 258, 259

Kluck, General von, 32, 38–44, 66–9, 72–3, 79 _et seq._, 97;
withdraws Corps across Marne against Maunoury, 118, 122–4;
his farthest south positions, 119–120;
results of retreat, 135–7, 141, 185;
reaches the Aisne, 187;
his two fatal movements, 220–2;
Kluck and Bülow, 261

Landwehr and Ersatz employed on front, 15–16, 128, 199

Langle de Cary, General de, 28, 32–3, 48, 70, 102, 169–75, 193

Lanrezac, General, 27, 32, 35–43, 49, 67–8, 250, 255–6, 258

Launois, battle of, 70

Lille, fortress of, 34, 249, 252

Longwy, siege of, 33–4, 44

Lorraine, first French offensive in, 29–31

Machine guns, 18, 58, 115, 117, 253

Maud’huy, General, 30, 100, 138, 140, 193

Mangin, General, 37, 100, 138

Maps, German, evidence of the, 240

Maubeuge, 34, 44, 87, 105, 252, 256–7

Maunoury, General, 32, 63–5, 72–3, 77, 80–1, 85, 93, 97, 116, 122,
124, 126–30, 132–4, 184–8, 248

Michel, General, and the French Staff, 47, 49, 248

Mondemont, 143–4, 148–54

Mons, battle of, 37–43, 253–6

Montmirail reoccupied, 140

Morhange–Sarrebourg, battle of, 30–1

Namur, siege and fall of, 27, 38, 40

Nancy bombarded, 211

Nivelle, Colonel, 127

Offences, German, against rules of war, 80, 117, 124, 192, 194–5,
211, 212–3, 267

Offensive, French doctrine of the, 21–24, 58, 201–2, 216, 218,
245–7, 251

—— from the Somme–Laon–Craonne, proposed, 58–60, 65, 71

Ourcq, battle of the, 114–8, 126–35, 184–7

Paris, the defence of, 55, 73, 76–9, 259–60;
the German dilemma, 82–8, 109, 221

Pau, General, 29, 47, 48, 198, 248

Percin, General, 248, 252

Petain, General, 100, 138

Plans of campaign:
the German, 10–14;
disturbed after Guise, 68–9;
the dilemma of Paris–Verdun, 84–91, 109–10, 214 _et seq._, 239–40;
the French, 28–9, 31, 36, 49–50, 54–61, 73–5, 88–9, 105, 110,
216 _et seq._

Proyart, action at, 68

Railways, efficiency of French, 15, 57, 241

Reserves, German and Allied, 16, 21, 198–9, 245

Retreat, the long, scenes on, 1–9, 72–3, 78, 237–8;
necessity of, 54–5;
advantages of, 57;
prolonged, 72–4;
end of, 81, 109, 119;
general German, ordered September 9, 185

Revigny lost, 179;
recovered, 194

Rheims reoccupied and bombarded, 192

Russian victories, influence of, 44, 75, 87

Sambre, German victory on the, 36–43

Sarrail, General, 48, 89, 103, 169–72, 175–82, 195

Sermaize, destruction of, 194

Smith-Dorrien, General, 38, 64, 66, 99, 141

Taxi-cabs and the battle of the Ourcq, 130–1

Toul, German advance toward, 208

Trenches:
German superiority, 18, 31, 33, 35, 58, 114, 217, 253;
Field-Marshal French on, 18, 244;
Castelnau’s defences, 201–2

Troyon, Fort, defence of, 180–3

Verdun, 32, 56, 71, 74, 89, 108, 169–71, 176–82, 195, 221

Vosges, fighting in the, 203–4

War Council, French Higher, 47–51

“Wireless,” German, picked up, 134

Würtemberg, Duke Albrecht of, 32, 70, 102, 169–75, 193

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Transcriber’s Notes

Punctuation and spelling were made consistent when a predominant preference was found in this book; otherwise they were not changed.

Simple typographical errors were corrected; occasional unbalanced quotation marks retained.

Ambiguous hyphens at the ends of lines were retained; occurrences of inconsistent hyphenation have not been changed.

In this version of this eBook, dashes between multiple locations and within numeric ranges are shown as en-dashes (–), which are longer than hyphens (-) but shorter than double-em-dashes (——), which are used for visual clarity where the original book used single em-dashes as delimiters.

Index not checked for proper alphabetization or correct page references.

Page 99: “Ronar’ch’s” is a misprint for “Ronarc’h’s”.

Page 272: The Index reference to General Gallieni and the battle of the Ourcq did not include a page number.

End of Project Gutenberg's The Battle of the Marne, by George Herbert Perris