Chapter II

SECRETARY WHITNEY'S EFFORTS TO REBUILD THE NAVY.

Upon his accession to the Presidency in March, 1885, President Cleveland had appointed a Mr. William C. Whitney, a New York lawyer, secretary of the Navy; and although he had had no previous experience in naval matters, he seems to have been profoundly impressed with the necessity of rebuilding the Navy, and bringing it up to a standard more in consonance with modern methods, and more in keeping with the vast national interests which it might at any time be suddenly called upon to protect and defend. During his entire term of office, Secretary Whitney's reports and official communications were invariably couched in the most earnest and vigorous language; and bore the strongest possible testimony to the serious importance with which he regarded his position; and it is not too much to say that many of the features which at present cause the United States Navy to rank first among the navies of the world, grew out of suggestions and recommendations made by Secretary Whitney.

Like all reformers, however, his path was beset with many difficulties; and although he persisted bravely in the task he had set for himself, he encountered so many obstacles and discouragements, that his health became seriously impaired, and it was only at the earnest solicitation of the President, and leading members of his party, that he consented to serve his full term of four years. During President Cleveland's administration party feeling ran very high, and the Republicans, who had recently been ousted from power, after a continuous enjoyment of it for twenty-four years, seemed to look upon any effort to alter or increase or improve the Navy, as a reflection upon their previous management of the department. Consequently, Secretary Whitney found himself opposed and hampered at every turn; and his well-meant and intelligent efforts in the direction of reform, encountered the open or concealed opposition of Republican Senators and Congressmen; and as the Republicans still held control of the Senate by a narrow majority, but few of his recommendations were at first favorably acted upon. Thus does party prejudice at times outweigh patriotism; and thus the best interests of the country are often neglected or jeopardized in obedience to the behests of a political boss, or in deference to the supposed necessities of a partisan organization.

It is difficult at this late day, to conceive of such a state of affairs as this; but as a partial vindication of our ancestors against a charge of what might almost be called high treason, we must remember that the passions and prejudices which grew out of the "War of the Rebellion," still found a resting-place in the bosoms of most of the older inhabitants; and these extended to the political discussions of the day, rendering party feeling exceedingly bitter and vindictive.

In fact, what would at present be regarded as an absurd impossibility, was then an actual fact; and the two great political parties of the country, twenty years after the close of the Civil War, found themselves divided on precisely the same sectional lines, which had existed previous to and during that conflict; and the most casual reference to the journals of that date can scarcely fail to reveal one or more allusions to "The Solid South," as a political entity whose interests must have necessarily been antagonistic to the other portions of the Union.

The vast manufacturing and mineral interests of Alabama, Georgia and Tennessee, were then in their infancy; and the people of those States still hugged the delusion of free trade, as a sort of an inherited political superstition, in common with the other Southern States, whose interests were almost wholly Agricultural, and which have since found their proper and logical political affiliation with the Agricultural States of the West and Northwest.

During President Cleveland's term of office, the Senate, as has before been remarked, was Republican by a small majority. The House of Representatives, however, was Democratic; so that there was a practical deadlock on all party questions; and as nearly every question that arose became more or less of a party one, scarcely anything in the way of practical legislation was accomplished. In fact it would seem that about the only measures which could safely run the gauntlet of both houses, were bills of the nature of jobs to rob the treasury, which were passed by what were called (in the political slang of that day) "logrolling" methods.

For instance, if a river or harbor needed improvement, the member of Congress in whose district it was situated, looked around for other members who had one or more rivers or harbors similarly affected; and a number of these, combining together, would originate what was called a "river and harbor bill," in which each member's district was to have a good slice of the total appropriation. Then, if there were not votes enough to secure the passage of the bill, other members were drummed up, and were offered appropriations for creeks and harbors in their districts--the expenditure of which would of course be under the direction of their political friends--and thus, at every session of Congress, a gigantic appropriation bill, amounting frequently to $20,000,000 or $25,000,000 was passed; two thirds of which in all probability was sheer robbery. A similar system was pursued with reference to public buildings in different parts of the country; and the extraordinary spectacle was presented, of Senators and Representatives meeting in Washington, year after year, wrangling over these appropriations, and exhibiting their ignorance of the cardinal principles of political economy, in long-winded harangues about "the treasury surplus," while they permitted the United States Navy to go to decay, refused appropriations to fortify the harbors and coasts, and utterly failed to do anything to foster and encourage the re-establishment of the American Merchant Marine, whose value as a nursery or training school for the development of a naval force, had been so conclusively shown in the earlier days of the Republic.

At the time of Secretary Whitney's accession to office, the whole available naval force of the United States consisted of a few old wooden vessels, so rotten as to be scarcely seaworthy, three or four iron-hulled steam corvettes and frigates, of an antiquated and obsolete type, and a few vessels of the "Monitor," or revolving turret style (so called from the fact that the first vessel of this type was called the "Monitor").

These latter, however, were in an unfinished, rotten and rusty condition, having from motives of "economy" been permitted to lie and rot at their docks ever since the conclusion of the Civil War; and were therefore utterly useless for any sudden emergency; as several month's work would have been required to finish the unfinished ones, and repair the completed ones. It is true, that a commencement to rebuild the navy had been attempted during President Arthur's administration, and two modern cruisers, (the Boston and Chicago) and a despatch boat (the Dolphin) were approaching completion when Mr. Whitney became Secretary of the Navy. These vessels, however, were only partially successful; and when finished, were found to fall far below the requirements of the contracts; and it was only after a long series of tests, and many expensive alterations, that they could be rendered serviceable.

In spite of all obstacles, however, Secretary Whitney did make considerable progress in rebuilding the Navy. During the years 1887 and 1888, several new cruisers were added to its effective force, and the construction of two heavily armored battle ships was commenced. Numerous experiments were also made with torpedoes, and various submarine systems were tried with greater or less prospects of success.

A lieutenant in the army named Zalinski, had invented a pneumatic gun, which he claimed would safely throw a dynamite shell a distance of two miles; and a vessel was built expressly to carry guns of this kind. Discussion more or less heated, concerning the disgracefully unprotected condition of our seaboard cities, had been carried on in the newspapers, and at length, early in 1889, the city of New York (or rather a few of its more public-spirited citizens) organized a system of volunteer harbor defense militia.

The Legislature having been appealed to in vain, private subscriptions were started, and a fund was raised sufficient to charter one or two harbor tug boats, and to equip a marine battalion, mostly of longshoremen and stevedores, who were drilled in torpedo practice, electric light signaling, boarding, cable cutting, anchor tripping, night attacks, and various other plans for annoying or disabling supposed hostile ships in our harbor. This drilling and exercise were supervised and carried on under the direction of intelligent naval officers, detailed for that purpose by the Navy Department, and although the limited means at the disposal of the originators of this plan, prevented them from accomplishing any very important results, yet their efforts were instrumental in getting together a splendid body of men, who could be relied upon at any time, in case of a sudden emergency, to volunteer their services; and whose practical skill as a signal corps, and perfect knowledge of the harbor, would render their co-operation of the utmost value to the regular naval force in time of war.

This was in fact the origin of our present magnificent and complete "Harbor Defense Corps," which has so often challenged the admiration of foreign naval experts. Anybody who should at this time publicly advocate its abolition or its curtailment, on mere grounds of "economy," would be ridiculed as an idiot, or branded as a traitor; and yet the Legislature of New York refused even to grant its members exemption from jury duty, on account of the protest of a few intelligent and incorruptible(?) back country members.

Having thus given a general resumé of the condition and situation of the United States up to the years 1887 and 1888, I will in the next chapter endeavor to give a succinct and intelligible review of the events which had a more direct and immediate effect in causing the "Battle of the Swash."