Chapter V (1)

VALENCIA, BATTLE OF.--Taken by the Earl of Peterborough in 1705, and soon again lost. Resisted the attempts of many, but was taken from the Spaniards by the French, under Suchet, January 9th, 1812; all the garrison, 16,000 men, and immense stores, surrendered.

VALENCIENNES, SIEGE OF.--Besieged from May 23rd to July 14th, when the French garrison surrendered to the Duke of York, 1793. Retaken by the French, on capitulation; the garrison and 1100 emigrants made prisoners, with immense stores, viz. 200 cannon, 1,000,000 pounds of gunpowder, 8,000,000 florins in specie, 6,000,000 of livres, 1000 head of cattle, &c., on August 30th, 1794.

VALUE OF PRINCES.--£400,000 was the price paid to the Scots for delivering up to the English Charles I.

Margaret of Anjou was ransomed for £12,500.

£1,000 offered by Parliament for the head of Charles II.

£30,000 for that of the Pretender.

Richard I was ransomed for the large sum of £100,000 or 150,000 marks; he had before been sold by the Duke Leopold of Austria, to the Emperor Henry IV, for £60,000.

King John, of France, was to be redeemed by his subjects for the enormous sum of 3,000,000 crowns, but they could not raise the amount.

VARNA, BATTLE OF.--The Emperor Nicholas of Russia arrived before Varna, the head-quarters of his army, then besieging the place, August 5th, 1828. The Turks made a vigorous attack on the besiegers August 7th; another on the 21st, but they were repulsed; surrendered to the Russians, October 1st, 1828. Famous as the point of _rendezvous_ of the Allied army, preparatory to the Crimean war. The cholera made dreadful devastation in both the English and French armies; then a great fire nearly destroyed the town, but purified the air; and the news of the Crimean invasion expedition dispelled the gloom and melancholy which pervaded, to a very great degree, our troops.

VIENNA.--Besieged by the Turks, under Solyman the Magnificent, with an army of 300,000 men, but forced to raise the siege having lost 70,000 soldiers. Again besieged in 1683, and the siege raised by the celebrated John Sobieski, King of Poland, who totally routed the Turkish army of 100,000 men. Taken by the French, November 14th, 1805, and afterwards retaken and taken for some time.

VILLA FRANCA, BATTLE OF.--Engagement here between the British cavalry, under Cotton, and the French cavalry, under Soult. The French were defeated, April 10th, 1812. When Napoleon heard of the result he reproached Soult the first time in his life.

VIMEIRA, BATTLE OF.--Between the British, under Wellington, and the whole of the French and Spanish forces, in Portugal, under Marshal Guinot, whom the British signally defeated, August 21st, 1808. The enemy’s force were 14,000 men, of whom 1600 were cavalry. They attacked the English at Vimeira early in the morning. The principal assault was on the English centre and left, with the view, according to a favourite French expression of “driving the English into the sea,” which was close in their rear. The attack was made with great bravery but as bravely repulsed. It was repeated by Kellerman, at the head of the French reserve, which was also signally repulsed, and the French being charged with the British bayonet, withdrew on all sides in confusion, leaving many prisoners, a General Officer, and 14 cannon, with ammunition, in the hands of the British. French loss, killed and wounded, 1800. English 720; only one-half of the British force was actually engaged.

VINEGAR HILL, BATTLE OF.--Between the British troops and the Irish insurgents, in 1798. The rebels suffered a severe defeat, and much blood shed on both sides. June 12th, 1798.

VITTORIA, BATTLE OF.--Fought, June 21st, 1813, between the French and English. The following is a graphic account of this great victory:

“The splendid achievements of the campaign of 1812 produced their natural results. Even the torpid obstinacy of Castilian pride was at last overcome, and by a decree of the Cortes of September 22nd, 1812, the great English General was invested with the supreme command of the Spanish armies. He repaired to Cadiz on the 24th of December, and on the 30th he was received by the Cortes in full assembly. The news of Napoleon’s overthrow in Russia had just arrived, and all hearts seemed to expand with hope of the speedy expulsion of his troops from Spain.

England herself also now began to put forth efforts commensurate with the crisis. At the opening of the year 1813 her land forces consisted of 228,000 men, besides 28,000 in India, 95,000 militia at home, and 32,000 foreign troops in the British service. And, besides these, she had 200,000 native troops in India, a local militia of 300,000, and a yeomanry cavalry of 68,000, forming a grand total of 949,000 men in arms; and her expenditure in the year amounted to £118,000,000 sterling.

Thus supported, her great Commander, of whom it may be questioned if his equal _in all respects_ ever stood upon a field of battle, looked forward with reasonable expectation to a coming harvest; to a campaign in which, after four years’ toils and sufferings, the grand object of the final expulsion of the French from Spain might be anticipated. And assuredly the means he took to gain this end in the simplest and completest manner, were marked by the most consummate skill and wisdom.

To be nearer to his supplies, and to relieve the wasted provinces of Spain, Wellington had withdrawn his army into cantonments on the Coa and the Agueda, that is, in Leon and in Beira, or Northern Portugal. All the Lusitanian kingdom had long been free from the French, and the campaign of 1812 had compelled them to abandon all Andalusia Murcia, Granada, Asturias and Estramadura. The French army now occupied only central and eastern Spain, the bulk of the troops being quartered in New and Old Castile.

Wellington’s chief attention was naturally devoted, during the winter, to the task of reorganizing his forces for the final struggle of the opening year. His own English army was the only force he had which was at all in a condition to march against the enemy. Of the Spanish troops he found it necessary to give the Spanish Minister of War, in March 1813, the following description:--“There is not a single battalion or squadron in the Spanish armies in a condition to take the field; there is not in the whole kingdom of Spain a depôt of provisions for the support of a single battalion for one day; there is not a shilling of money in any military chest. To move them forward at any point now, against even inconsiderable bodies of the enemy, would be to insure their certain destruction.”

But by unceasing exertions these evils were, in a measure, overcome: and Wellington found himself, in the month of May, 1813, for the first time in a state approaching to an equality with the French. Their force, which in former years had often amounted to nearly 400,000 men, was now reduced to 239,000 of which about 197,000 were present with the eagles. Meanwhile Wellington’s nominal force now amounted to 200,000, and although only about one-half of this number were fit to take the field, the remainder was still of use in maintaining the communications, guarding convoys, and cutting off the foraging parties of the enemy. His principal army of English and Portuguese mustered about 75,000 men, of whom about 44,000 were English. The efficiency of the Portuguese troops was advanced in a surprising manner; reinforcements, especially of cavalry, had arrived from England; and the Anglo-Portuguese troops, conscious of an improved organization, were more confident than ever; while the French, hearing of the calamities of their brethren in Russia, were proportionably depressed. Even the Spaniards had, in some numbers, been brought into better condition:--Wellington had kept them fed and clothed during the winter, and had now several efficient corps of native troops, ready to act in conjunction with his own army. Hence, on the 22nd of May the great English General began his march, and when he crossed the stream which divides Portugal from Spain, he rose in his stirrups, and waving his hand, exclaimed, “Good bye to Portugal!”

The military skill and talent of a commander is never more conspicuously seen than in those manœuvres by which an enemy is defeated _without a battle_. Such manœuvres often resemble the skill and power with which an able and fearless horseman, even while on the ground, will control a powerful courser, forcing him backwards by a small leverage upon his mouth. In the present instance the French still had a considerable army and able Generals, and they occupied the centre of Spain, defending the capital, and ready to fight, if needful, a succession of battles before they would relinquish their prey. But their more able antagonist forced them to retreat, step by step, without fighting, until their last and only stand was made at Vittoria, almost in sight of France; and then delivering his attack, he utterly routed them, and chased them over the Pyrenees. On the 22nd of May, as we have said, the English army marched out of Portugal; on the 21st of June it fought and gained the battle of Vittoria; and before the 1st of July the shattered remains of the French army, with their King Joseph at their head, had fled over the Pyrenees. Little more than a single month had sufficed to destroy, uproot, and utterly abolish the French dominion in Spain, and that at a time, too, when there were still 197,000 French soldiers in the field, under many able Commanders.

A brave general of the ordinary kind would have marched in quest of the French, lying in front of Madrid; would have defeated them, and taken the capital. All the smaller bodies of French in Spain would then have been called round the King; and in July a second battle would have been fought in Arragon, or in front of Burgos. One more victory,--a third, supposing the English to have been always victorious, might have sent the French out of Spain; but any mistake or mishap might have prevented this. But Wellington, by masterly tactics, always threatening to turn the enemy’s right wing and to get upon his communications, backed his foe as a man backs a horse, till he could bring the opposing army into a position fit for his purpose; and then, delivering at once a knock-down blow, he drove the whole mass, king and army, in four-and-twenty hours, out of Spain.

King Joseph had reckoned, in the spring, upon a direct attack by the great road of Madrid; but when it would come, or where it would fall, he could not divine, for Wellington kept him constantly in doubt, by a variety of feigned movements.

At last, towards the end of May, he found that Wellington, sending 40,000 men under Graham through the difficult passes of the Tras-os-Montes, and moving himself a week after on the Esla, had carried his whole army, by the 4th of June, over the Douro, and was now in full march for Valladolid. If he should gain that place, Joseph well knew that his communications would be cut off, and his whole army taken, to use Napoleon’s phrase, “_flagrante delicto_.” Hastily, therefore, Madrid was abandoned, the whole army put in retreat; and now Joseph would make his stand at Burgos.

Thus 100 miles of Spanish ground had been cleared of the French without firing a shot. And now, Joseph would fight for his kingdom in this, his second position. But his Generals examined the country, and disliked the prospect. Meanwhile Wellington pushed on, conducting his operations continually on the same principle,--pushing forwards his left wing, and out-flanking and turning the French right. Again perplexed, Joseph now abandoned his second purpose, as he had abandoned his first. Burgos must be given up, and the retreat must be continued on Vittoria. Into Vittoria there was poured, therefore, the artillery depôts of Madrid, of Valladolid, and of Burgos, and the baggage and stores of several armies; with the King’s valuables, the archives, and papers of the State and of the army, and a large amount of treasure.

Vittoria is only 26 miles from Irun, on the French frontier. Here, therefore, had been driven together, like a flock of sheep, the intruders and plunderers of Spain, and one vigorous assault only was needed to rid the land of them altogether. It was not long delayed.

It was about the 15th of June when King Joseph found his army assembled round Vittoria, reckoning, Napier tells us, from 60,000 to 70,000 men. Wellington had left his sixth division at Medina de Pomar, and therefore had 60,000 English and Portuguese, besides some Spanish troops. In the number and calibre of their guns the French had the advantage.

From the mountain-region through which the British army was marching, the way to Vittoria lay over many a rugged steep, and through many dangerous defiles; but no difficulty was allowed to stop their march. “Six days they toiled unceasingly; but on the seventh, swelled by a Spanish reinforcement, they burst like raging streams from every defile, and went foaming into the basin of Vittoria.”

The French army was drawn up round this basin, which is a small plain about 10 miles in length, by 8 in breadth, through which runs the river Zadora. As this battle-field was approached by various mountain-passes, Wellington resolved to enter it from three sides at once, forming three distinct combats. General Graham, with a corps of about 20,000 men, was to attack from the British left, and to pass the Zadora at Ariaga, near the city of Vittoria. Hill was to attack from the right with an equal force. Wellington stationed himself in the centre, with a rather larger force, which was to descend from the mountain ridges, to cross the Zadora by various roads, and to march straight upon Vittoria. In fact, the whole battle was merely an attack on a strong army hemmed in, by an army equally strong, and marching to the attack on three sides at the same moment.

At daybreak the English began to move; but the distance to Vittoria was several miles, and every step was to be contended for. Hill reached the village of Puebla about ten in the morning; pushed on, fighting hard, till he gained the village of Subijana de Alava, and so placed himself in communication with the English centre. Graham had to make a march of several miles to reach Ariaga, near Vittoria; but about one o’clock his attack began to tell. This was a serious one for the French; for, if successful, it would cut them off from the great road to Bayonne. King Joseph, finding both his flanks thus threatened, sent an order to the centre to retire. But the troops were fiercely engaged, and retreat was difficult. Meanwhile, however, three attacks of the English, right, left, and centre, were all succeeding; and step by step, the French were being pushed back upon Vittoria.

“At six o’clock,” says Napier, “the French reached the last defensible height in front of Vittoria. Behind them was the plain in which the city stood, and beyond the city were thousands of carriages and animals, and of men, women, and children, crowded together in all the madness of terror; and as the English shot went booming overhead, the vast crowd started and swerved with a convulsive movement, while a dull and horrid cry of distress arose; but there was no hope, no stay for army or multitude, it was the wreck of a nation!” Still the courage of the French soldiers was unquelled. Their artillery for a time kept the Allies in check, but suddenly the fourth English division, rushing forward, carried a hill on the left, and the heights were at once abandoned. Joseph finding the main road so completely blocked up by carriages that the artillery could not pass, indicated the road of Salvatierra as the line of retreat, and the army went off in a confused and yet compact body on that side, leaving Vittoria on its left. The British infantry followed hard, and the light cavalry galloped through the town to intercept the new line of retreat. All became disorder and confusion, the guns were left, while the artillerymen fled with the horses. Vehemently and closely did the British pursue, and nothing could stop their victorious career until night and the disappearance of the flying masses had ended the struggle. The French lost all their artillery, all their baggage, all their equipages, all their stores, treasures, and papers, “so that no man,” says a French writer, “could prove even how much pay was due to him. Generals and subordinate officers were alike reduced to the clothes on their backs, and many of them were barefooted.”

“Never was victory more complete. The trophies were innumerable. Marshal Jourdan’s baton of command was brought to Lord Wellington, who sent it to the Prince Regent, from whom he quickly received one of an English marshal in return. The loss of the French was never ascertained; that of the Allies was 3,567 English, 1,059 Portuguese, and 550 Spanish. The spoil taken was enormous. “The soldiers of the army,” wrote Lord Wellington, “have got among them about 1,000,000 sterling in money, with the exception of about 100,000 dollars found in the military chest. Rich vestures of all sorts, gold and silver plate, pictures, jewels, parrots, monkeys, and children, lay scattered about the field amidst weeping mothers and wailing children. Joseph himself narrowly escaped; a squadron of dragoons pursued his carriage and fired into it.”

All the remaining bodies of the French in Spain fell in the fall of Vittoria. They escaped out of the kingdom by various roads as quickly as possible. “Joseph’s reign was over, the crown had fallen from his head, and after years of toil and combats, which had rather been admired than understood, the great English leader, emerging from the chaos of the Peninsular struggle, stood on the summit of the Pyrenees a recognized conqueror. From those lofty pinnacles the clangour of his trumpets pealed clear and loud, and the splendour of his genius appeared as a flaming beacon to warring nations.”[15]

Thus, in some five or six weeks, had a great kingdom been cleared of its invaders and oppressors--not by the power of superior numbers, but by the natural ascendency of a consummate military genius. “Here,” remarks Napier, “was a noble army driven like sheep before prowling wolves, although in every action the officers had been prompt and skilful, and the soldiers brave, firm, and obedient. The French troops were excellent and numerous, and the country strong and favourable for defence; but the soul of a great Commander was wanting; and hence, the Esla, the Tormes, the Douro, the Pisuerga, seemed to be all dried up, the mountains to be levelled; and 60,000 veteran soldiers, willing to fight at every step, were hurried with all the tumult and confusion of defeat across the Ebro.”

The deliverance of the Peninsula, by a force so far inferior to that of the French, must always remain one of Wellington’s greatest glories. The same French writer, whom we have already quoted, Jules Maurel, remarks this surprising fact. He says: “The truth is, that from 1808 to 1813, Wellington never had 30,000 English under his orders, even at a period when the Imperial armies deluged the Peninsula with no fewer than 370,000 men.”

Nor were the results of this great day confined to the Spanish peninsula. Like its predecessor, the victory of Salamanca, the battle of Vittoria shook the whole continent of Europe. Napoleon himself, holding his ground at Dresden, had, up to this moment, succeeded in withholding Austria from any actual participation in the confederacy against him. He had even succeeded, on the 30th of June, in obtaining a convention for the restoration of peace between himself, Russia and Prussia. But the very next day the news of the expulsion of the French from Spain reached Dresden, filling Napoleon and his ministers with consternation, and giving new life and vigour to the Russian and Prussian councils. The Allies regretted that any cessation of arms had been agreed to, and they began to long for its termination. The very moment it expired by lapse of time, Austria joined the Allies; war was actively resumed, and the autumn had not ended before Napoleon had been driven across the Rhine, and Germany freed from the presence of the French armies.

The French writer from whom we have just quoted, Jules Maurel, thus notices this remarkable passage in modern history:

“Scarcely had the armistice been signed when intelligence arrived that the French had lost everything in Spain. In 40 days Wellington had turned, one after another, all the positions occupied by the French armies of the centre, of the south and of the north, and had crossed the Tormes, the Douro, the Esla, the Carrion, and the Ebro. He had reached Vittoria; he had gained a decisive battle; he had expelled King Joseph from the Peninsula, and had planted his army on the Pyrenees. In the beginning of May he was in Portugal; on the 23rd of June he was on the frontiers of France. The defeat of Vittoria entirely neutralized the victories of Lutzen and Bautzen, and at once restored the coalition.”

VOUGLE, BATTLE OF.--Fought between Alaric II and Clovis of France. Alaric was entirely overthrown, and the whole country subdued. Clovis afterwards made Paris the capital, and became the founder of the French Monarchy.

W.

WAGRAM, BATTLE OF.--Fought, July 5th, 1809, between the Austrians and French, in which the former were completely overthrown; 20,000 were taken by the French. The slaughter on both sides was dreadful. The defeated army retreated into Moravia.

WAKEFIELD, BATTLE OF.--Fought, December 31st, 1460, between Queen Margaret, the wife of Henry VI, and the Duke of York, in which the latter was slain, and 3000 Yorkists fell in the field. This was one of the bloodiest battles between the houses of York and Lancaster.

WALCHEREN EXPEDITION.--This important expedition consisted of thirty-five ships of the line, and 200 smaller vessels, and 40,000 troops, under the command of the Earl of Chatham. The fleet was commanded by Sir Richard Strachan. A large number of the forces died, and the whole expedition came to nothing, December 28th, 1809.

WARSAW, BATTLES OF.--The Poles suffered a great defeat here from the Russians, October 10th and 12th, 1794. Suwarrow, the Russian General, after the siege of Warsaw, cruelly butchered 30,000 Poles, November 8th, 1794. The battle preceding the surrender of Warsaw was fearfully bloody; of 26,000 men, more than 10,000 were killed; nearly 10,000 were made prisoners, and only 2000 escaped the merciless fury of the Russian butcher. Another battle fought here, and the Poles again defeated, September 7th and 8th, 1831.

WASHINGTON.--Taken, August 24th, 1814, in the war between Great Britain and the United States, by General Ross, when all the superb national structures were consumed, in a general conflagration--the troops not sparing the national library.

WATERLOO, BATTLE OF.--The greatest of all British engagements, fought June 18th, 1815, between the Duke of Wellington and Napoleon. The carnage on both sides was immense. The account of this great battle is taken from the “Twelve Great Battles of England.” The following is a fine account of the visit of Scott to the field of Waterloo after the battle, and also Alison on the defeat of the Old Guard:

WATERLOO AT NOON ON THE DAY AFTER THE BATTLE.

“On a surface of two square miles, it was ascertained that 50,000 men and horses were lying! The luxurious crop of ripe grain which had covered the field of battle was reduced to litter, and beaten into the earth; and the surface, trodden down by the cavalry, and furrowed deeply by the cannon wheels, was strewn with many a relic of the fight. Helmets and cuirasses, shattered fire-arms and broken swords; all the variety of military ornaments; Lancer caps and Highland bonnets; uniforms of every colour, plume, and pennon; musical instruments, the apparatus of artillery, drums, bugles; but, good God! why dwell on the harrowing picture of a foughten field? Each and every ruinous display bore mute testimony to the misery of such a battle. * * * Could the melancholy appearance of this scene of death be heightened, it would be by witnessing the researches of the living midst its desolation for the objects of their love. Mothers, and wives, and children, for days were occupied in that mournful duty; and the confusion of the corpses, friend and foe intermingled as they were, often rendered the attempt at recognising individuals difficult, and in some cases impossible. * * * In many places the dead lay four deep upon each other, marking the spot some British square had occupied, when exposed for hours to the murderous fire of a French battery. Outside, lancer and cuirassier were scattered thickly on the earth. Madly attempting to force the serried bayonets of the British, they had fallen, in the bootless essay, by the musketry of the inner files. Farther on, you traced the spot where the cavalry of France and England had encountered. Chasseur and hussar were intermingled; and the heavy Norman horse of the Imperial Guard were interspersed with the grey chargers which had carried Albion’s chivalry. Here the Highlander and tirailleur lay, side by side, together; and the heavy dragoon, with Green Erin’s badge upon his helmet, was grappling in death with the Polish lancer. * * * On the summit of the ridge, where the ground was covered with death, and trodden fetlock-deep in mud and gore, by the frequent rush of rival cavalry, the thick-strewn corpses of the Imperial Guard pointed out the spot where Napoleon had been defeated. Here, in column, that favoured corps, on whom his last chance rested, had been annihilated; and the advance and repulse of the Guard was traceable by a mass of fallen Frenchmen. In the hollow below, the last struggle of France had been vainly made; for the Old Guard, when the middle battalion had been forced back, attempted to meet the British, and afford time for their disorganised companions to rally. Here the British left, which had converged upon the French centre, had come up; and here the bayonet closed the contest.”

DEFEAT OF THE OLD GUARD AT WATERLOO.

“The Imperial Guard was divided into two columns, which, advancing from different parts of the field, were to converge to the decisive point on the British right centre, about midway between La Haye Sainte and the nearest enclosures of Hougoumont. Reille commanded the first column, which was supported by all the infantry and cavalry which remained of his corps on either flank, and advanced up the hill in a slanting direction, beside the orchard of Hougoumont. The second was headed by Ney in person, and moving down the _chaussée_ of Charleroi to the bottom of the slope, it then inclined to the left, and leaving La Haye Sainte to the right, mounted the slope, also in a slanting direction, converging towards the same point whither the other column was directing its steps. Napoleon went with this column as far as the place where it left the hollow of the high road, and spoke a few words--the last he ever addressed to his soldiers--to each battalion in passing. The men moved on with shouts of _Vive l’Empereur!_ so loud as to be heard along the whole British line, above the roar of artillery, and it was universally thought the Emperor himself was heading the attack. But, meanwhile, Wellington had not been idle. Sir Frederick Adam’s brigade, consisting of the 52nd, 71st, and 95th, and General Maitland’s brigade of Guards, which had been drawn from Hougoumont, with Chasse’s Dutch troops, yet fresh, were ordered to bring up their right shoulders, and wheel inward, with their guns in front, towards the edge of the ridge; and the whole batteries in that quarter inclined to the left, so as to expose the advancing columns coming up to a concentric fire on either flank: the central point, where the attack seemed likely to fall, was strengthened by nine heavy guns; the troops at that point were drawn up four deep, in the form of an interior angle: the Guards forming one side, the 73rd and 30th the other;--while the light cavalry of Vivian and Vandeleur was brought up behind the line, at the back of La Haye Sainte, and stationed close in the rear, so as to be ready to make the most of any advantage which might occur.

It was a quarter past seven when the first column of the Old Guard, under Reille, advanced to the attack; but the effect of the artillery on its flank was such, that the cavalry were quickly dispersed: and the French battalions uncovered, showed their long flank to Adam’s guns, which opened on them a fire so terrible, that the head of the column, constantly pushed on by the mass in the rear, never advanced, but melted away as it came into the scene of carnage. Shortly after, Ney’s column approached with an intrepid step; the veterans of Wagram and Austerlitz were there; no force on earth seemed capable of resisting them; they had decided every former battle. Drouot was beside the Marshal, who repeatedly said to him they were about to gain a glorious victory. General Friant was killed by Ney’s side: the Marshal’s own horse was shot under him; but bravely advancing on foot, with his drawn sabre in his hand, he sought death from the enemy’s volleys. The impulse of this massy column was at first irresistible; the guns were forced back, and the Imperial Guard came up to within forty paces of the English Foot Guards, and the 73rd and 30th regiments. These men were lying down, four deep, in a small ditch behind the rough road, which there goes along the summit of the ridge. “Up Guards, and at them!” cried the Duke, who had repaired to the spot; and the whole, on both sides of the angle into which the French were advancing, springing up, moved forward a few paces, and poured in a volley so close and well directed, that nearly the whole first two ranks of the French fell at once. Gradually advancing, they now pushed the immense column, yet bravely combatting, down the slope; and Wellington, at that decisive instant, ordered Vivian’s brigade to charge the retiring body on one flank, while Adam’s foot advanced against it on the other. The effect of this triple attack, at once in front and on both flanks, was decisive: the 52nd and 71st, swiftly converging inward, threw in so terrible a volley on their left flank, that the Imperial Guard swerved in disorder to the right; and at that very instant the 10th, 18th, and 21st dragoons, under Vivian, bore down with irresistible fury, and piercing right through the body, threw it into irrevocable confusion. The cry, “Tout est perdu--la Garde recule!” arose in the French ranks, and the enormous mass, driven headlong down the hill, overwhelmed everything which came in its way, and spread disorder through the whole French centre.”

DESCRIPTION OF WATERLOO FROM THE TWELVE BATTLES.

“We have seen the three several stages by which the Duke of Wellington had conducted the British army to that elevated position in which the peace of 1814 left it. We have seen how it had, first, on the broad fields of Castile, boldly encountered a French army of twice its strength, and had sent it back in defeat. Next, at Salamanca, meeting an army of equal force, it had scattered it by an assault of a single hour, annihilating at a blow one-half of its strength. And lastly, falling upon the intrusive King himself in his final position of retreat and defence at Vittoria, it had driven his entire array, like a flock of frightened sheep, over the Pyrenees. After those triumphs, by which a whole realm of great extent had been delivered from its invaders, there seemed scarcely any way by which the fame and honour of the British army and its illustrious Commander could be enhanced, except by an event not to be anticipated--an encounter with the great conqueror of modern times, now an exile at Elba; and a triumph over him.

This event, however unlikely it might seem, was reserved for England’s soldiers and her General; and it occurred in less than a year after the apparent restoration of peace. Napoleon suddenly left his island-home, reappeared in France, gathered his soldiers round him, and re-entered Paris as once more its Emperor. Naturally enough, the Sovereigns who had compelled his retirement, scarcely nine months before, resolved to maintain their position; and they covenanted with each other to place armies amounting to 600,000 men on the soil of France in the course of July, 1815. The British portion of this force was collecting together in the months of May and June, under the Duke’s command; when Napoleon determined not to wait for the attack, but to carry the war into the allied territories; and, accordingly, in the second week in June he entered Belgium. Before he had proceeded twenty miles he encountered both the English and the Prussian armies, and on the fourth day, at a distance of about thirty miles from the French frontier, was fought the great and decisive battle of Waterloo.

This momentous contest will require of us a more lengthened description than we have given of any of the great battles; both because it was an event of the highest possible importance to the fate of England, of Europe, and of the world; and also because it was, so to speak, a succession of battles fought on one field, and on the same day. In a former case we have seen “an army of forty thousand men defeated in forty minutes;” but here the deadly strife occupied nearly ten hours. The French opened the attack at eleven in the morning, and at nine o’clock at night the last of their battalions had not yet quitted the field. In the course of these ten hours four or five desperate and prolonged contests had taken place; each of which might have been justly called a battle. It will be impossible, therefore, to give any fair or complete idea of this long continued struggle, without occupying much greater space than is required for an ordinary battle.

It is also a history which is thickly strewn with controversies. The defeated General himself was the first to open this wordy strife. The loss of the fight of Waterloo was a fact to which he never could be reconciled. That battle hurled him, finally, from the throne on which he had for the second time seated himself, and sent him to wear out the few remaining years of his life on the rock of St. Helena. In that retirement he occupied himself, for the most part, in a series of efforts to resuscitate his extinguished “glory.”[16] In these attempts he was hampered by no moral scruples; for, as Emerson has remarked, “this, the highest-placed individual in the world, had not the merit of common truth and honesty; he would steal, slander, assassinate, as his interest indicated.” Any reasonable man, therefore, will read his “Historical Memoir,” book ix, written at St. Helena, and published in London in 1820, with that caution which is so plainly called for when a document is confessedly an _exparte_ statement, and written by one who is known to be of unscrupulous character.

Yet that document has been received in many quarters with a credulity which is somewhat surprising. It is true that this credulity may be accounted for in the case of the French historians--who, obliged to confess that their defeat at Waterloo was “horrible”--a “massacre”--a “deluge of blood”--are glad to have supplied to them, under Napoleon’s own hand, the apology that he was overmatched and greatly outnumbered; and that yet, after all, he would have proved victorious if one of his Generals had not disobeyed his commands.

The latter of these two pleas has been generally rejected by English writers--utterly denied as its truth has been by the party so accused. But, strangely enough, although there was every probability that Napoleon’s account of his own strength, and of that of his opponent, would be wholly untrustworthy--several of our best English writers have given entire credence of his statement of the real amount of his army; even while those statements are clearly refuted by abundant testimonies of many Frenchmen. And this point is not an immaterial one. For if we could admit the truth of Napoleon’s final conclusion, that “On that day 69,000 French beat 120,000 men, and the victory was only torn from them between eight and nine o’clock at night by the increase of the allies to 150,000 men”[17]--what merit could we assign to the British soldiers, or to their great commander, for such a victory? But, in sober verity, of all the falsehoods deliberately put forth by Napoleon in the course of his life, this, probably, is nearly the greatest.

Let us, however, now endeavour to arrange our narrative in its proper order. The army which was assembling in Belgium under the Duke’s command, had reached, in the beginning of June, the respectable amount of almost 100,000 men. It contained, however, far more Belgians, Hanoverians, Brunswickers, and Dutchmen, than British troops, and far more new levies, landwehr, and militia, than of experienced soldiers. The English regiments which had followed the Duke through all the fields of Spain had been sent to America, and were now on the Atlantic, on their return home. He had some of the Guards, and a few other regiments of some standing; but the largest portion of the British troops which had yet reached Belgium were second battalions--new recruits drafted from the militia--and the same observation would apply to the Hanoverians and other auxiliaries.

It was a knowledge of this intrinsic weakness of the Duke’s army, and of the fact that 10,000 or 15,000 of his old Peninsular troops would soon join him, that decided Napoleon, as is frankly confessed,[18] to make a sudden attack on the British and Prussian forces before they were fully prepared to meet him. Silently, therefore, but with his usual skill and rapidity, Napoleon brought together a powerful army, and on the morning of the 15th of June he moved forward and entered Belgium.

And here we are met by the most current of all the fictions which are connected with this history. A variety of writers have repeated, one after another--Napoleon himself setting them the example--the story that the Duke never heard of the approach of the French until eleven o’clock in the evening of that day, while at a ball at Brussels. The facts, however, which are beyond dispute, are these--that the French did not enter Charleroi, the first Belgian town, until eleven or twelve o’clock on June the 15th--that tidings of their movement reached the Duke at Brussels by three o’clock, and that between four and five o’clock that same afternoon orders went out to every corps of the British army to move to the front, many of them beginning their march that same evening. There was no surprise, then, nor was there the loss of a single day. The French had not marched thirty miles--had not entered any place of the least importance, when, on the third day, they found the British army drawn up across their path, and had to fight the battle of Waterloo.

They had, indeed, found their progress arrested still earlier. Entering Belgium on the 15th, they were stopped the very next day at Ligny by the Prussians, at Quatre Bras by a part of the English army. Marshal Blucher being defeated, and retiring a few miles, the Duke fell back also, and thus was enabled to draw up his army at Waterloo--a position which he had before observed to be an advantageous one, and which was in all respects well suited to the defence of Brussels.

It was on the afternoon of the 17th June that the Duke’s army found itself assembled on this spot. The French army, led by Napoleon himself, soon approached, but the day was too far advanced to afford time for a general engagement. The two armies, therefore, took position, the English on a rising ground called Mont St. Jean, about half a mile in advance of the village of Waterloo, and nine miles on the French side of Brussels; the French on a series of heights facing Mont St. Jean, having the village of Planchenoit on the right, and looking down upon a small valley which separated the two hosts.

And now we are naturally brought to a consideration of the question, what was the respective strength of these two armies? This is a point upon which Napoleon has bestowed great pains in his “Historical Memoir, Book ix,” and on which he has succeeded in deluding many English writers.

As to the strength of the British army, there can be no kind of doubt upon that point, for the actual numbers present in each battalion and squadron was carefully recorded; and these records were needed to establish the respective rights of all present to honours and rewards. We have spoken of a gross amount of nearly 100,000 men. But of these, several thousands were required to garrison Antwerp, Ostend, Nieuport, Ypres, Tournai, and Mons,--the loss at Quatre Bras had been 3000 or 4000, and a post of observation at Hal, consisted of nearly 6000. When these deductions were made, not quite 70,000 men remained, to meet Napoleon’s attack at Waterloo.

The British infantry in the field were 15,181, and the German Legion infantry were 3301. The British and German cavalry were 7840, and their artillery was 3493. Thus the whole reliable force of the Duke--the force to which he must look to stand the French attack--was not quite 30,000 men. All this was well known to Napoleon, who, in his “Book ix,” says, “Victory appeared to be _certain_,” for the French army consisted of “good troops, while, in the enemy’s army, the English only, amounting to 40,000 _at most_, could be reckoned upon as such.”[19]

The “Allied troops,” who made up the Duke’s array, consisted of 10,755 Hanoverians, many of whom were mere landwehr or militia, and nearly 25,000 Belgians, Dutch, and men of Brunswick and Nassau. Some of these fought gallantly, but others retreated whenever the French approached,--some actually flying from the field. Hence Napoleon justly says, “one Englishman might be counted for one Frenchman:--two Dutchmen, Prussians, or soldiers of the Confederation, for one Frenchman.”

Adopting, therefore, Napoleon’s own method of calculation, we may say, that the Duke had an army nominally amounting to about 68,000 men, really equal to something less than 50,000.

And now we turn to the other side of the account. Here we must, to be safe, accept only French testimony. If we draw together all the credible statements of this class that we can find, we shall probably be able to arrive at a just conclusion.

There was published at Paris, in 1815, a volume by an officer attached to the staff, which may be considered to be “the French account,” at the time and in detail, of this battle. In this volume, the whole army which entered Belgium is stated to have been “150,000 effective men of whom about 30,000 were cavalry.” It seems improbable that a staff-officer should have greatly erred, or that a Frenchman should have exaggerated the strength of the beaten army. Reckoning, therefore, the gross number to have been 150,000; and deducting 15,000 for losses at Ligny, and at Quatre Bras, we may estimate the force detached under Grouchy on the 17th, at about 38 or 40,000 men, and the strength of the French army at Waterloo at something more than 90,000.

And this estimate precisely agrees with Napoleon’s own statement, written at Paris three days after the battle. In this bulletin he says, “We estimated the force of the English army at 80,000 men. We _supposed_ that a Prussian corps which _might be_ in line toward the right might be 15,000 men. The enemy’s force, then, was upwards of 90,000 men; ours less numerous.”

He is here speaking of the morning. But there was not a Prussian soldier in the field until five o’clock in the afternoon; and this Napoleon well knew. Why, then, does he here introduce a “supposed” Prussian corps? Clearly, in order to bring up the allied force to 95,000 men, so that he might be able to add, “Ours, _less numerous_.” He had every possible motive, as a beaten General, striving to make the best of his case,--for saying, _if he had dared_,--“The enemy was more than 90,000 strong, but we had not quite 70,000.” But he could not venture, in the face of abundant evidence then existing, to say that his army was less than 80,000, the force he assigns to the English. He therefore, by an “ingenious device,” augments the allied force to 95,000; and then he can venture to assert that his own army was inferior in numbers. There is clearly implied in this statement an admission that his own force was not greatly below 95,000.

Yet when Ney and others were dead, and the records, in all probability, scattered or destroyed, the same man who wrote this bulletin, concocted at St. Helena, four or five years after, a widely-different account. In his “Book ix,” p. 128, he puts forth an elaborate table, purporting to show, that the whole force of the French army at Waterloo was only 68,650 men! And such has been the imposing effect of this table, that many English writers, while they could detect the falsehood of other statements in that same volume, still accepted, as an undeniable fact, the conclusion, that Napoleon’s army at Waterloo consisted of only 68,650 men! Yet only common prudence, and the use of a little careful scrutiny, was needed, to prove that these same elaborate tables in “Book ix” were nothing more than what is usually called, in railway language, “a cooked account.”

The proof of this shall be given from French writers alone. And, first, let “Book ix” refute itself, by its own self contradictions. At page 71, it gives the second corps, 19,800 infantry; while at p. 95-97, it states the same infantry, at the same moment, at 21,000. At page 128 it gives the first corps 16,500 infantry, and at table F it calls the same infantry, 17,600. At page 128 the cavalry of the Guard and the third and fourth corps of cavalry are stated at 10,000; while at pp. 158 and 173 they are twice called 12,000. At p. 35 we are told that “the regiments generally had but two battalions; each battalion consisting of 600 men, _present and under arms_.” Yet in the principal table, F, the regiments are always estimated at either 1000 or 1100 men, the battalions at 500 or 550. Thus it is abundantly clear, even from the pages of “Book ix” itself, that its writer is one who “plays at fast and loose with figures.”

But other refutations, from purely French sources, are abundant. We have seen that Napoleon states, in “Book ix,” p. 35, that his battalions had 600 men; but that he quietly puts them down in table F, as being only 500 or 550.

Now in his portfolio, captured at Charleroi, and published at Brussels, there was one report, made by an officer named De Launoy, and dated “Montalimert, June 4th,” which said, “The first battalion, 720 strong, marched on the 1st of June.” And, in the _Moniteur_ of May 28th, published at Paris under Napoleon’s own authority, there was given a letter dated “Lille, May 26th,” which says, “Our garrison is entirely composed of battalions of select troops, which successively arrive: the 20th arrived yesterday; almost all consist of 720 men; we are expecting two battalions of veterans.” Now these troops formed part of the first corps, as stated in “Book ix,” p. 31; and in table F they are all set down as having in each battalion, 550 men!

It was of this first corps that Marshal Ney spoke in his letter of June 26th, 1815, in which he complained of having it taken away from him on the 16th. He describes it as having consisted of “between 25,000 and 30,000 men.” He must have had the actual returns in his pocket when he wrote this. Now if the battalions generally consisted of 720 men, as the _Moniteur_ of May 28th had told us, then its thirty-two battalions would have contained 23,040; which added to 1400 cavalry, and 1564 artillery men, would be accurately described as “between 25,000 and 30,000 men.” But Napoleon, in his statement of the force at Waterloo, sets down the infantry of this corps as only 16,500; thus contradicting at once the statement of the _Moniteur_, the report found in his own portfolio, and the declaration of the Marshal who commanded that corps!

In the same spirit, in the table of the troops at Waterloo, (Book ix, p. 128,) we find the infantry of the Guard set down as being 11,500. Yet Gourgaud, Napoleon’s Aide-de-Camp, and Fleury de Chaboulon, his secretary, both concur in stating this infantry to have been 14,000.[20]

Of the heavy cavalry we have already seen, that while Napoleon, in his table, at p. 128, sets it down at 4000, 3000, and 3000, or 10,000 in all, he afterwards twice describes it, at p. 158 and at p. 173, as “these 12,000 select horse.”

Once more, in “Book ix,” p. 129, he states the force detached under Grouchy to have been 34,300. His own companion at St. Helena, General Montholon, in his history, (vol. i, p. 14,) calls this force 42,000.

All this evidence, then, drawn from several quarters, but wholly French, points to one conclusion,--namely, that Napoleon, in forming his tables for “Book ix,” deliberately reduced his real strength at Waterloo by about one-fourth or one-fifth; and that his first statement, in his bulletin issued at the time, was the true one; namely, that his army was only somewhat “less numerous than 95,000.”

And to this conclusion a remarkable support is found, in the behaviour of the two Generals on the day preceding the action. Wellington had beaten nearly every one of Napoleon’s Marshals;[21]--and could not but feel a degree of exultation at the thought of meeting the master of them all. Napoleon, on his part, had to encounter a General who had never been conquered. Supposing, then, the armies to have been nearly equal in strength, what might have been anticipated, but a degree of eager anticipation on Wellington’s side, and of seriousness on Napoleon’s? Instead of which, what do we hear? The Duke writes to Marshal Blucher, that he will accept battle, _if_ the Marshal will assist him with one corps of his army. Meanwhile, Napoleon’s only anxiety is lest the English should escape him. “He was surprised,” writes his secretary, Fleury, “when daylight discovered to him that the English army had not quitted its positions, but appeared disposed to accept battle.” “He returned to his head-quarters (Book ix, p. 125) full of satisfaction at the great fault committed by the enemy’s General.” “He held this,” says Brialmont, “to be rashness, and a fault, exclaiming, ‘At last, then, I have them,--these English!’” Do not these views and anticipations, on the part of both of the Generals, make it quite evident that each of them was fully aware of the great superiority of the French army; and of the temerity of which the Duke would be guilty if, without any assurance of support, he ventured on an engagement in the face of such odds?

It is worth remark, too, that while several of the best English writers have accepted with the most good-natured simplicity, Napoleon’s own account of the force with which he fought this battle--French historians, even when admirers of Napoleon, show much less faith in his assertions. Thus, Lamartine, having Napoleon’s ixth Book before him, in which the number, “sixty-eight thousand, six hundred and fifty men,” is strenuously insisted on--quietly disregards the fiction, and repeatedly speaks of the French force as being “eighty thousand men.”[22]

But Napoleon’s “_certainty_ of success,” of which he speaks at p. 127 of his Book ix, rested more upon the superior _quality_ of his troops than on their superior _numbers_. He was thoroughly well aware, both of the slight value of the Belgian and Hanoverian auxiliaries, and of the excellence of his own troops. And the Duke, also, knew full well both of these facts. On the 8th of May he had written to Lord Stewart, “I have got an infamous army; very weak and ill-equipped; and a very inexperienced staff.” And seven days after the battle, he repeated to Lord Bathurst, that he had got “not only the worst troops, but the worst-equipped army, with the worst staff, that ever was brought together.”[23]

On the other hand, Napoleon’s army was, for its amount, the finest that he had ever led into the field. Thus his secretary, Fleury, says, “The whole army was superb, and full of ardour.” Lamartine speaks of it as “his grand army of chosen men; every battalion of which had a soul equal to the utmost extremity.” Napoleon himself, in “Book ix,” says: “The spectacle was really magnificent: the earth seemed proud of being trod by such intrepid combatants.” And at St. Helena he told O’Meara: “My troops were so good, that I esteemed them sufficient to beat a hundred and twenty thousand.”[24]