Chapter XIV: Introduction: The Tragedy of a Frontier (12)
Further on in this book there are similar good-conduct testimonials from Split, where the chief Italian used to wander down with an Austrian official to the harbour and there witness the embarkation, in chains, of the Yugoslav _intelligentsia_ who were being taken as hostages. Hundreds and hundreds of Yugoslavs were shot, hanged, imprisoned; we know the numbers (not difficult to count) of the Italians in Dalmatia who suffered in any way. We know the equally minute numbers who escaped to Italy and enrolled themselves in the Italian army. As for the population of the Italian irredentist provinces, one may read in the _Secolo_ of August 11, 1916 how it became generally known that "with the exception of Cervignano and Monfalcone, our soldiers have been received, on the other side of the old frontier, with demonstrations quite the reverse of enthusiastic on the part of the agrarian population. The surprise and disillusion of our troops were very great, for they expected from our unredeemed brothers, who all speak our language, a joyous reception." This frigidity may, however, have been due to the influence of Austrian priests and gendarmes. What are we to say, though, when we come to the more enlightened classes? The Italians in Austria were represented by twelve deputies who were devoted to the Austrian Government and hostile to Italy, and by six national-liberals and one socialist who were animated with pro-Italian sentiments. In electing such deputies, however, the peasants may not have simply allowed the priests and the gendarmes to command them; it is also possible that they were moved by the fear that the Trentino would economically be ruined if it were to become Italian and had to compete with the agricultural products of the Kingdom. As a matter of fact it was the Trentino _intelligentsia_ which looked forward to annexation, and not, as a class, the peasants. And, during the War, Italian deputies of various parties overflowed with loyal Austrian sentiments; unlike the Yugoslav deputies, who refused in a body to vote the budget and the war credits, the Italian deputies never even ventured on a national pronouncement. Pittoni, chief of the Italian socialists at Triest, Faidutti (who was born in Italy) and Bugatto, the chiefs of the Italian Catholic party of Gradi[vs]ca, uttered not a few words of hate against the Madre Patria. The Italians praise always, and with excellent reason, their three heroes: Battisti, Rismondo and Sauro. But the Yugoslavs, in the course of the late War, lost in the unredeemed provinces so many hundreds of thousands who were hanged in Bosnia, who were dragged away--centenarians and infants--to the prison camps, were spat upon and stoned and treated in the most barbaric fashion, that they look upon those Yugoslavs who, like Battisti, fled from Austria and afterwards were slain by Austrians, as rather to be envied, since at any rate they struck a blow. But anyhow the names of all these volunteers could not be celebrated, on account of their great number. "There is nothing in fact," wired Mr. Beaumont on December 31, 1919, from Milan for the blameless readers of the _Daily Telegraph_, "there is nothing that creates such terrible exasperation in Italy as the persistent repetition of this patent falsehood that the Yugoslavs--meaning thereby the Croats--fought for the common cause."
Poor Battisti--when his regiment was captured he feigned to be dead. His men, however, told the Austrians that it was he, and this they did because they said that he and his Irredentist party were to blame for the War. These facts are now fairly well known, thanks to the Czech doctor who was on the spot and tried to save him by assuring the Austrians that it was not Battisti. The soldiers insisted, and in the end the Austrians executed him.
SOUTHERN SLAVS IN THE AUSTRIAN NAVY
The several transactions or attempted transactions which took place at various periods of the War between the Yugoslav members of the Austro-Hungarian navy, associated with other Yugoslavs, on the one hand and the Italian authorities on the other, were frustrated time and again by the astounding conduct of the Italians. Had they made anything like a proper use of the invaluable information that was showered upon them or if they had requested the other Allied navies in the Mediterranean to act on their behalf many Allied ships in the Mediterranean would not have been torpedoed--since the submarine activity centred at Kotor, one of the stations which could have been seized--the Austrian front in Albania must have collapsed and the entire war would have ended sooner.
In October 1917 the Austrian torpedo boat No. 11 was seized by the Slav members of her crew and brought into Ancona, but their offers of service were refused. The ringleaders showed, by refusing to accept large sums of money, that their purpose was purely patriotic. The Italians, however, simply interned them.
A much more serious affair was that of February 1, 1918, on which day it had been arranged that the Slav sailors at Pola and Kotor should mutiny. At the former place it did not succeed, at Kotor it was so far successful that the mutineers, after imprisoning Admiral Njegovan and many other officers whom they suspected of not being in sympathy with them, took command of the ships and left unanswered an ultimatum addressed to them by the High Naval Command. There was a prospect of the whole fleet shaking off the Austro-Hungarian authority. The chief revolutionary leader was Ante Sesan, a Croat ensign, twenty-six years of age, from near Dubrovnik and the son of a well-known sea captain on the coast. "We drew up," he says, "a proclamation representing our case to the Yugoslavs, Czechs and Poles from the national point of view, and to the Germans and Magyars from the socialist point of view. The Germans threw in their lot with us, but the Magyars went against us. From our ship we continually sent wireless messages asking for help from the Entente fleet, and at first from Italy which was nearest and could help most quickly. The messages were continually jammed by sailors at the Ercegnovo station loyal to Austria-Hungary, but nevertheless it was known in Italy that something was happening at Kotor. We told the High Command at Bok Kotor (Bocche di Cattaro) that we no longer recognized their authority and asked that we might get into touch with our deputies, whom alone we recognized. The High Command consented. We wired for the following deputies to come to us: Tre[vs]i['c] (Yugoslav), Stanjek (Czech), Karolyi (Magyar), Adler (German) and one Polish deputy, but our wires did not, for the most part, get through. Our object was to get help, but meanwhile our situation became more and more desperate. We knew that the Third Division was coming from Pola against us, and also the army in Herzegovina. We were prepared to take the battery of the Punta d'Ostro, the most important battery and the key to Bok Kotor, which was in the hands of sailors inimical to us. The news came from Gaa that the Magyars there had got the upper hand. We tried to bring them over to us, but in vain. They said, 'If you don't stop this, we shall join the Third Division and take action against you.' The Magyars from other boats sent the same message. The Council of Sailors then debated what was to be done, and it was suggested that Rasha (who was shot later) should go in a hydroplane to Italy to give information on the situation and ask for help, and that we in the meantime should lie low, and in the event of help coming, again raise a revolt. Rasha objected that he did not know Italian, and proposed that I should go. The Third Division meanwhile was already in the port Bok Kotor.
"At half-past eight in the morning we flew away in the hydroplane to Italy, I and two Poles. At ten we reached Mattinato, and I explained at the Carabineers' station why I had come and asked to be brought as soon as possible before the Commander of the District. Later I saw Captain Odo (of the Territorials) and told him all, and asked him to put me into communication with Brindisi, Taranto or Rome. He had us put under arrest. I was interviewed by two flying officers two days later, but they went off to Brindisi in my hydroplane without me.
"On February 17 I was taken under armed escort to Brindisi, where I was imprisoned in a cabin of the man-of-war _Varese_.... I told the commander of the ship that I was at his disposal with all my knowledge of the Austrian fleet. I asked him to put questions, because I did not know how much he knew. It was all to no purpose. On February 21 the Admiral in command at Brindisi saw me. From what he said I understood that nothing had been done about Bok Kotor and, what was more, that not one hydroplane had been sent to investigate the situation there. I learned that I was to go to Rome. They clapped me into barracks.... I again asked the Italians to allow me to speak to the Serbian Minister, whom I considered the representative of the Yugoslav people, but the request was refused on the plea that it was a question of high politics. Meanwhile the Polish representative Zamorski was allowed to visit the Poles, but from February 3 to May 25 I was unable to get into communication with any of our people."
In May there was another outbreak at Kotor, but it was overpowered, and many Yugoslav sailors were shot or imprisoned. Sesan was also kept in his Italian prison, though occasionally he was brought out, questioned and then taken back again. Thus at Ferrara he informed Captain Ciano about the whole organization of the Austrian offensive and defensive forces, and especially about Pola and Split. Sesan begged to be allowed to take part in the action against the Austrian fleet, and, at Rome, where he came before Captain Soldati, of the Bureau of Information, he made the same request. With two motor launches he undertook to organize communication between Italy and the Slavs of Dalmatia, in this way to follow events in Austria and help the revolutionary movement. It would be possible to procure the secret wireless codes which the Austrian and German submarines used--but the Italians would do nothing, because they were not willing to recognize that the Yugoslavs were fighting against Austria.... Seeing that he would never move the Italians to take serious action against the Austrian fleet, Sesan asked to be sent to the Serbian army in Macedonia, so that at Salonica he could get into touch with the French and British fleet. In this also he failed, for he was interned from June till December with Yugoslav officers at Nocera Umbra. While there he was visited by Bissolati, from whom he learned that the Chief of the Admiralty was hostile to the Yugoslavs. And at Nocera Umbra he remained until December 6, when he was liberated, owing to the efforts of Trumbi['c] and other members of the Yugoslav Committee.
In the month of September a memorandum was drawn up by Trumbi['c], in which he proposed to English and American political and military circles the landing at [vS]ibenik of a force of 50,000 men. This would have been assisted by the mutinous crews of the Austro-Hungarian Fleet, whose preparations had been completed in July (at this port 90 per cent. of the sailors of the fleet were Yugoslavs, and among them there was a strong national feeling; in fact, if their political leaders had not held them back, they would have endeavoured in July to blow up the naval fortifications and sail with the ships to Corfu). The expeditionary army, once at [vS]ibenik, could have penetrated inland and, acting in consort with the many Yugoslav deserters and the insurgent population of Dalmatia and Bosnia, have accelerated the Austrian _debacle_. In this memorandum Trumbi['c] asked that the combined Anglo-American-French fleet should support the action, but that the Italians, whom the Yugoslavs distrusted, should take no part. He sneered at the cowardice of the Italians who, with a huge army, did not dare to start an offensive on a grand scale.
[In well-informed circles in Italy this memorandum was already known, but when it was read in the Italian Chamber in the spring of 1919 it made a considerable sensation.]
On October 3, Messrs. Frederick [vS]tepanek, Rudolph Giunio, Valentine Zi['c] (of [vS]ibenik) and other authorized Czecho-Slovak and Yugoslav emissaries went in a sailing-boat from Vis to Italy, with a view to getting into connection with Dr. Bene[vs] (afterwards the Czecho-Slovak Foreign Minister) and Dr. Trumbi['c], to inform them as to the situation in the Monarchy and to obtain instructions regarding the moment of the revolution in which their soldiers and sailors were to participate. On arrival in Rome on October 7, the delegates were interrogated by Major Trojani of the Bureau of Information and on the same day for three hours by the Inspector-General of Public Safety. From then till October 20, they were interned in the Macoa barracks at the Castro Pretoris, and although they made repeated attempts to see a member of the Yugoslav Committee or Dr. Bene[vs], who was in Rome, they were told that this "delicate" question could only be solved by the Premier himself; and when brought before him Dr. Bene[vs] had departed. The delegates had entreated that he and Trumbi['c] should be informed of their arrival, but in spite of various assurances nothing whatever was done. It is suggested that the fleet would have been in Slav hands two or three weeks earlier, which would very probably have precipitated events on the Western front, if the Italians had not acted in this inexcusable fashion.
ADVANCE OF THE ALLIES IN MACEDONIA
The collapse of Austria-Hungary was being hastened by the fine work of the Allies' Macedonian army. France and Great Britain had provided for the re-equipment of the Serbs. And of the variegated forces that were based on Salonica none did more magnificently than this resurrected army. A weather-beaten sergeant of the French Infanterie Coloniale told me that he had never seen an exploit such as that of Kaimat[vc]alan, where the Serbs set themselves the task of climbing to the summit, which towers 8000 feet high, and from there dislodging the Bulgarian artillery. Over and over again the Serbs were thrown back, and with terrific losses, for the mountain-side was strewn with rocks not large enough to shelter more than a man or two. But as the Infanterie Coloniale is habitually chosen for the roughest work, so the Serbs asked for nothing better than to climb the wall that shut them out from their own country. The labyrinth of trenches on the mountain-top was taken and retaken many times, until the Bulgars--inadequately supported by their Allies--had to retreat; and this, after further ferocious fighting, enabled the Serbs and the French to liberate Monastir. The complicated story of Greek manoeuvres need not detain us, nor need we ask whether Mr. Leland Buxton[103] is justified in saying that the majority of that people were pro-German, "but were subsequently compelled by the Allied blockade ... to declare themselves supporters of Venizelos, on whose behalf, indeed, the British Admiralty and War Office had to carry on a sort of election campaign (by Eastern European methods) until the numerous waverers wisely decided that it was better to be a well-fed Venizelist than a hungry Royalist." Sufficient that after months of delaying, in the course of which the Russian troops had to be turned into labour battalions, Marshal Mi[vs]i['c]--whose plan of campaign had fortunately been adopted--had the satisfaction of seeing his own countrymen and their Allies racing up at last through Macedonia and Serbia to the Danube and beyond it.... What did they find? Bridges hastily blown up, tunnels rendered impassable by two locomotives laden with dynamite being made to collide in the middle of them--but the Serbs went rushing on. The supply columns could not keep pace with the troops--during the first eight days of the offensive the men of the 2nd Army received but two days' rations--they continued their advance across the Vardar, though but little bread and practically no other food was obtainable. In three days they had covered sixty miles. There was only time for them to greet the women and old men--and even if they had then been told of the 130,000 horses, the 6,000,000 sheep and goats, the 2,000,000 pigs, 1,300,000 cattle and over 8,000,000 poultry which the enemy had taken; if they had learned that the losses sustained by Serbia--exclusive of her own expenses and of the war loans from her Allies--amounted to some 10,000,000,000 frs. on a pre-war valuation, what did all this matter in that joyous time?
HOW THE MAGYARS TREATED THEIR SERBIAN SUBJECTS
At the beginning of the War the dominant Magyars of the Banat had as little uncertainty about the result as Count Julius Andrassy professed to have at a later period. "Victory must come to our troops," he said, "because they are better organized and more efficient, and because they are, above all, filled with unexampled enthusiasm, which makes heroes of them all." The enthusiasm which, for instance, caused the mob at Velika Kikinda to shout "Eljen a haboru!" ["Long live the War!"] while they fired revolvers in at the windows of an unilluminated house because it was the house of a Serb, a son-in-law of the well-known banker, Marko Bogdan, without stopping to ascertain that he was at the front fighting against Serbia, might be dismissed as a folly on the part of the crowd if it were not so characteristic of the whole Magyar administration. The "subject nationalities" were to be enrolled in the Magyar host and treated, at the same time, with contumely. At Ver[vs]ac Dr. Slavko Mileti['c],[104] son of the famous patriot, was suspected not only of cherishing Serbian sympathies, which was natural, but of committing a felony. The authorities believed that in his medical capacity he was exempting people from their military service, and not for the advantage of the Serbian cause so much as for that of his own pocket. Several detectives were therefore put to bed in one or two of the wards of the military hospital; and the upshot of it was that three other doctors--all of them Magyars--who had given way to these practices, committed suicide; the chief of the hospital poisoned himself, one of the staff shot himself, and the third culprit hanged himself in prison. Dr. Mileti['c] had previously been kept for three and a half months under the shadow of a conviction for high treason: one Bonchocat, a Roumanian who did not understand the Serbian language, asserted that the doctor, at a meeting held two weeks before the Archduke's assassination, must have known that war was brewing, since--so said Bonchocat--he had not confined himself to Serbian ecclesiastical affairs, which was the object of the meeting, but had uttered the remark that if the Austrians had bayonets the Serbs had axes. Although Bonchocat was a man condemned to nine years' penal servitude for murder, and although the doctor only called on his own behalf two witnesses who were not Serbs, but the head of the frontier police and the head of the town police, he was nevertheless kept in suspense for three and a half months. Afterwards, owing to the lack of Magyar doctors, he was begged to be the State doctor for the town. Similarly the Orthodox priest, Radulovi['c], of Pan[vc]evo, was transported to Arad and interned there for no other reason than his nationality, whereas his son, a first lieutenant of the Hungarian Honved, was expected to be very loyal. When certain rumours came to the son's ears--he was then serving on the Russian front--he inquired, and was told that his father had merely been warned. Presently he learned the truth, and in consequence deserted to the Russians and became a member of the Yugoslav brigade. Thus it will be seen that the Magyar unwisdom was on a par with that which they had shown in days of peace. Unfortunately for their State the Magyar politicians were less honest than the Magyar peasants, so that the de-nationalizing process met with pretty firm resistance. What can be said for the honesty of a legal decision which laid it down that as two Serbian philanthropists, Barajevac and Sandulovi['c], at Pan[vc]evo had not specially mentioned that the funds they had bequeathed for a school were to be for a Serbian school--(this the benefactors had assumed as a matter of course)--they must be used for a Magyar establishment? Save for the officials there were practically no Magyars in Pan[vc]evo. And when the War began the remainder of the fund was invested by the Magyars in their War Loan! It is curious, by the way, to see what methods were employed to make the Loan successful. Fathers were frequently told that if their subscription was adequate their sons at the front would duly be granted leave. The Slovak village of Kova[vc]ica in the Banat was compelled to put three million crowns into War Loan, the Magyar notary making a list of the amounts which every person had to pay under penalty of being sent to the front; if he was too old for this he was threatened with internment. Kova[vc]ica, a few years before the War, had shown the Magyar fitness for governing an alien people. The population consisted of 5200 Lutheran Slovaks and 200 miscellaneous persons--Jews, Magyars and Germans. Nevertheless it was ordered that the church services must be in the Magyar and not in the Slovak language. When the parishioners objected, the police, with sticks and guns, expelled them from the large, lofty church, and 83 of them were sentenced to various periods of imprisonment. Serbian barristers defended them gratuitously, but the judge had himself taken an active part in turning the people out of the church; and presently the barristers were told that they had themselves been convicted--Dr. Du[vs]an Bo[vs]covi['c] for one year, on the ground that he had had the napkins at a banquet decorated with the Serbian colours; Dr. Branislav Stanojevi['c] for three years, because his visits to Belgrade, where his parents and his brother were living, stamped him, said the Magyar judge, as a traitor. The total number of Magyars at Kova[vc]ica was ten, and for a time they came to hear their language, which had thus been compulsorily introduced. Handbills were sent round to summon the Magyars from neighbouring villages, but gradually this congregation grew smaller and smaller. When two Magyars attended, then the pastor gave them a sermon; if only one was present he confined himself to prayers. The Magyars had seen to it, by the way, that there should not be much sympathy between the pastor and his bishop: of this diocese about three-quarters were Slovaks and one-quarter Germans and Magyars; but the Government vetoed the choice of Dr. Czalva, who was disqualified for being friendly to the Slovaks--his father and grandfather had both been bishops of that same diocese--and a certain Dr. Raffay was appointed, who spoke nothing but Magyar and some words of German.... However, by taking in this way a few examples of Magyar methods, one may be accused of having chosen merely those which illustrate one's theme. It would be hazardous to draw conclusions as to Magyar officers in general because a certain Lieutenant Chaby, who, during the War, found himself quartered on a Serbian family of the name of Stejvovi['c] at Priboj in the Sandjak, behaved differently from his predecessor, an Austrian colonel. This Austrian had been well satisfied, but the lieutenant's first night was so disturbed that he fined his hosts sixty crowns for giving him a bug-ridden bed. Nevertheless, if large numbers of Austrian colonels and Magyar lieutenants had acted in a similar fashion we should be justified in deducing that several characteristics, be they good or bad, are possessed by the average Magyar subaltern. And the catalogue of Magyar limitations in the Banat, both prior to and during the War, is so voluminous that one would have thought them to be not worth discussing; if one restricts oneself to a few it is in order to avoid being tedious, and if they are ineffective among the resolute pro-Magyars of this country, then one must resign oneself to leaving these gentlemen unconvinced. They will argue that stupidity is universal, and that the Magyar authorities should not be called in question for their treatment of the priest of Crvna Crkva, a village with 1108 inhabitants--1048 Serbs, 34 Slovaks, 17 Germans and 9 Magyars. This intelligent man--he is a noted player of a complicated card game--was indicted for high treason, because on hearing that the Emperor William was alleged to have undertaken to slaughter every Serb, the priest remarked that the Emperor should have added, "if God wills it." But near the village of Zlatica there was, at the beginning of the War, one Adam Rada, who was charged with making signals to the Serbs across the Danube by means of lights, and this although the situation of Rada's mill made such a thing impossible. Before being executed he was led ceremoniously through the village, his coffin being carried in the procession. This coffin was so small that Rada's feet had to be cut off. The grave was guarded by a soldier, who kept the family away from it; Rada's servant was in the hands of the police--after having been thrashed in order to compel him to give hostile evidence, he was convicted to six years' imprisonment. But the lack of evidence does not appear to have weighed very strongly with the Magyar judges. "It is quite true," said one of them in 1915 in the town of Bela Crkva, during the trial of a young priest, Voyn Voynovi['c], "that there are witnesses who say he did not utter certain words in 1913, and no witnesses who say that he did; but I am convinced that he uttered them." The ferocity of the punishments may be seen from the example of Alexa Petkovi['c] of Pan[vc]evo, the father of nine, who was condemned to hard labour for nine years because his twelve-year-old son, during the War, is alleged to have said to him: "Father, don't accept German money; it won't have any value." At the same place, in 1914, the Serbian peasants were brought in from the village of Bort[vs]a; there was no proof that they were traitors, but they had been denounced and they were sentenced to be shot. With a military escort they were promenaded through the town, each one of them having to hold a Hungarian flag. At the scene of execution the Hungarian elite, together with their wives and daughters, were assembled. And after the bodies had been thrown on to a cart they were flogged, for some unknown reason, by one Blajek, a detective, while the audience cried "Eljen!" ["Hurrah!"]. But the War brought to an end the bad old days of a tyrannous minority. It will be shown, in a year or two, when a proper census is taken, that the Magyars were always much more in a minority than they ever admitted. Instead of nine millions out of the eighteen millions--which was the pre-war population of Hungary--it will be found that the Magyars themselves numbered barely six millions, though in their efforts to obtain recruits they charged only one crown and afterwards nothing at all for a naturalization paper. The day has gone by when a father could be interned for being a Serb, while his son, an assistant notary, was reckoned a Magyar--only Magyars being eligible for that office. The day has gone when the Buda-Pest Government could order its officials while taking a census to swell the Magyars' numbers as much as possible: the officials at Subotica confessed on oath, after the War, that they had received orders to this effect. One of their practices was to put down as "uncertain" those Serbian children who were too young to speak. Even those who were most willing to be absorbed into magyardom were often indigested: one finds in the statistics cases of converted Jews who, being asked to state their religion and nationality, replied to the former question "Catholic" and to the latter "Jew."
THE SOUTHERN SLAVS PAY PART OF THEIR DEBT TO THE HABSBURG MONARCHY
If the practices of Buda-Pest had been less flagrant one would write of Hungary's decomposition with a certain sympathy. It is conceivable that in the British Empire there are anti-British elements whose aims would commonly be classed by the authorities as "mad ambitions," which is what Count Apponyi called the separatist tendencies of the Southern Slavs in Austria-Hungary. But--may the platitude be pardoned!--there is all the difference between the spirit in which the alien rule of the one government was, and of the other is, administered. No doubt there are portions of the British Empire in which a plebiscite would have the same disintegrating result as it would have had in most of the regions that have been lopped from Hungary. We, with our Allies, declined to permit a plebiscite in Hungary's late territories, since we believed that the population had overwhelmingly displayed its wishes at the end of the War; and an Englishman may hope to escape the charge of hypocrisy if he does not permit the withholding of a plebiscite from certain of his fellow-subjects to prevent him from alluding with satisfaction to those who have been liberated from the sway of Buda-Pest.
(a) IN SYRMIA
Everywhere the dawn was breaking for the Habsburg's Southern Slavs. At Vukovar in Syrmia--to take an example--there was formed, as elsewhere, a National Council. Under Baron Joseph Rajacsich, a grandson of the Patriarch and--to all appearances--a brother of Falstaff, the Council maintained order until the coming of the Serbian army. An Austrian naval captain with a floating arsenal, four steamers and twenty-two drifters, was held up, as he proposed to sail towards Buda-Pest, by being told of a battery at Dalja, higher up the Danube. However, the Vukovar townsfolk, in view of a possible explosion, begged that the prisoner, who had wept at being stopped, should be sent on his way. The German harbour-master, a lieutenant, assured the Baron that he would assist him if he were allowed to keep his liberty. But he was tempted, in the middle of a night, to assist two German captains who were trying to get through, each with a string of drifters. Rajacsich, whose armed force consisted of forty Serbian ex-prisoners and fifty of his own workmen--he armed them with what he found on the drifters--had no means of stopping the German boats. But after telephoning in vain to the ex-harbour-master, he fired a shot into one of the boats, which fortunately found the kitchen, and made such a terrible noise among the pots and pans that the Germans considered it more prudent to remain. The Baron succeeded in sending back to Belgrade altogether 39 steamers and 217 loaded drifters, which contained booty, even from the Ukraine, that was valued at about a milliard crowns; ... but the Austro-Hungarians managed to get away with a considerable amount of plunder. The people of Buda-Pest were surprised, on the morning of November 5, to find the _Sophie_, one of the most luxurious passenger steamers on the Danube, lying at their quay, with her decks groaning under such a pile of packing-cases and parcels and furniture and all kinds of objects heaped upon each other as almost to make the boat unrecognizable. A lieutenant with a dozen soldiers was sent to investigate, and the captain showed him an order from the Minister of War, commanding that the _Sophie_ should take on board the Military Government in Serbia and transport it to Vienna. But the Buda-Pest authorities insisted on removing all the articles whose ownership the passengers were unable to prove; and it took a whole day to unload the enormous quantities of flour, leather, clothing, poultry, sugar, fats, etc. General Rhemen, the former military governor of Serbia, related that on October 5 he received the order to begin the military evacuation of Serbia. This was carried on day by day, and on October 28 it was completed. "We sent by the railway and by boats," said Colonel Kerchnaive to the Hungarian journalists, "4000 carloads of wheat, 10,000 fat oxen, 10,000 transport oxen, 10,000 pigs, 4000 sheep, 15 carloads of wine, 400 carloads of jam, enormous quantities of wood, of telephone material, of arms, munitions and 16 million crowns in silver." Such was the "military evacuation" of Serbia.... And at the beginning of the same month, when the whole Austro-Hungarian monarchy was in a state of collapse, Baron Hussarek stood up in the Reichsrath and said that "the task will arise for the Government carefully to prepare and inaugurate the difficult but hopeful work of reconstructing the monarchy on the basis of national autonomy." The imperturbable Prime Minister announced that "we shall have to go to work and set our house in order." But you will say that the Baron was a futile Mrs. Partington, an isolated antagonist of the inevitable, and only mentioned here for the sake of dramatic effect. Not at all! So far from being laughed at everywhere as an absurd reactionary he was held in the highest Buda-Pest circles to be a perilous innovator. He actually spoke about conciliating the Austro-Hungarian Slavs: not so Count Tisza. "What is happening in Austria," exclaimed the grim Calvinist a few months before, "are strange, grotesque displays of the ridiculous symptoms of the presumptuous mentality of people of no importance."
(b) IN SLOVENIA
One further example of Southern Slav activity may be given, as it will show us what was happening among the pious and industrious Slovenes. It would have been unnatural if the Clerical party had longed for Austria's downfall, and a large number of priests would still have been Austrophil[105] if Dr. Jegli['c], the eminent Prince-Bishop of Ljubljana, had not summoned all the political parties and caused them to adopt a patriotic Yugoslav attitude. (His retirement was in consequence demanded; but the Pope, who asked him for an explanation of the whole movement, was quite satisfied. Nor would Vienna have been able to take any serious steps against the Bishop, seeing that most of the Slovenes were behind him.) But the small Slovene people could, until November 1, 1918, offer nothing more than a passive resistance to their masters. They did not dare to speak Slovene in public. "What is the easiest language in the world?" was being asked in Maribor on the 1st of November. It was the language which so many people had apparently learned in a single night. The people were Slovenes, the officials were Austrian--though one or two of the officials were Slovenes and a minority of the people claimed to be Austrians, this being more marked in the town of Maribor (where the German-Austrians were as many as 35 per cent.) than in the surrounding district (where 95 per cent. are Yugoslav). Dr. Jegli['c] had prepared the forces that were going to break their bonds on that fateful day. At 7 a.m. Dr. Sre[vc]ko Lajn[vs]i['c]--one of the rare Slovene officials--he had been denounced by two of his colleagues and imprisoned at the beginning of the War, for having, as they said, "laughed maliciously" at Great Britain resolving to fight--Dr. Lajn[vs]i['c] and his friend General Maister took over the administration in the name of the Yugoslav State. General Maister had been till then a Major, employed--as he was a political suspect--on depot work. And when the eight or nine Austrian colonels appeared on November 1 before Lajn[vs]i['c], the genial official, and Maister, they were informed by the latter that he was a General--he looks like a swarthy Viking--and they were asked to surrender their swords. As they did not know how many men the General had behind him--as a matter of fact he had nine--they acted on his suggestion; one of them wept as he did so. At 11 a.m. Lajn[vs]i['c] deposed all the chief civil officials in that part of Styria, and the General persuaded the 47th Regiment to leave by train. They were influenced by a notice in the papers which said that 100,000 Frenchmen (invented by the General and Lajn[vs]i['c]) had just arrived at Ljubljana. After this the two companions carried on at Maribor; very little was known of them for a month at Ljubljana, Zagreb or Belgrade. But then they were confirmed in the posts they had assumed and Maister became a regular General. They were not intolerant; they expelled less than ten people, although so many of the German-Austrians had come, under the auspices of the Suedmark Verein (a colonization society) or the Deutsche Schulverein (an educational body), to propagate Germanism. One of these colonists, a doctor, who had lived a dozen years in Maribor, could only say "Good morning" in Slovene; and German women in the market-place (themselves unable to speak proper German) used to insist on the Slovene peasants speaking a language of which they knew scarcely a word. Lajn[vs]i['c] and Maister took no steps against the Bishop of Maribor who, three months after the Austrian collapse, celebrated a Mass in honour of the ex-Emperor. This Bishop, the son of Slovene peasants, had been educated near Vienna, had been a confessor of the House of Habsburg, and he found it difficult to regard himself as a Slovene. Gradually the voice of his own people spoke in him and then, after very long and honourable mental conflict, he developed into an excellent Yugoslav. He and Maister are, both of them, poets. Most of the General's pieces--which are all in Slovene--treat of love and nature. But he wrote at least one set of other verses, which the Austrians suppressed during the War. This is the nearest translation I can make of them:
Have pity, Christ, on Thy poor folk,
For now the fields are desolate
And misery and famine wait
On all, the chimneys give no smoke--
Our men have marched away from us.
Soon will the village bells have gone
From their dark places up on high,
And we who watch will never tie
Gay blossoms round them, and upon
Their path no laughter will resound.
Beloved bells, when thunder rolled
And lightning threatened us you swayed,
Our music-censers, and you prayed
That God Almighty would behold
The danger and be merciful.
O bells that sang of love and joy,
A foul destruction you will spread.
Once you moaned sweetly for the dead
And now 'tis you that will destroy,
And on their course the bullets moan.
But once again, O bells, we pray,
Let the tremendous music roll.
Sing us the secrets of your soul,
And then your last song of dismay
And wrath and sacrilegious death.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 80: Cf. "Le Progres politique et economique sous le
Regne de Pierre I.," by A. Mousset, in _Yugoslavia_, December
15, 1921.]
[Footnote 81: In all, 7130 boys and girls were removed from
Bosnia-Herzegovina. And a year or two after the end of the
war a good many of them were still with their foster-parents
in other parts of Yugoslavia. They preferred to remain there,
because of the lack of food in their own homes; the parents
of many--especially in Herzegovina--had been hanged, and
others had been for so long away from their parents that they
had no keen desire to return to them.]
[Footnote 82: Quoted in the _Times_ of September 24, 1919.]
[Footnote 83: Cf. _Serbia's Part in the War_, vol. i., by
Crawfurd Price. London, 1918.]
[Footnote 84: He intervened, for example, near Lazarevac,
where he observed, with tears in his eyes, that one of the
finest regiments, the 10th [vS]umadija, was giving way to
overwhelming numbers. He told them that he intended to stay
where he was, and he invited any soldier who wished to remain
with him to do so. Every man remained. "Tres charmant," was
the comment of the colonel, an eye-witness, who told me of
this incident.]
[Footnote 85: Cf. _Manchester Guardian_, October 22, 1921.]
[Footnote 86: Cf. _Nineteenth Century and After_, January
1922.]
[Footnote 87: Cf. _Dokumenti o postanku Kraljevine Srba,
Hrvata i Slovenaca, 1914-1919_, by Ferdo [vS]i[vs]i['c].
Zagreb, 1920.]
[Footnote 88: Cf. _International Law_, Part I. p. 321.]
[Footnote 89: _Italy and the Yugoslavs: A Question of
International Law._ Paris, 1919.]
[Footnote 90: July 17, 1920.]
[Footnote 91: I think that, in so far as concerns this
article in the _New Europe_ (July 8, 1920), it is fairer to
describe Mr. Trevelyan as an Italian exponent rather than
apologist. Although we cannot agree with various remarks of
his, he makes it clear that he is out of sympathy with the
Italian extremists. He deprecates also the views of those
English publicists who are altogether on the side of the
Yugoslavs. "The truth, perhaps," says he, "lies somewhere hid
in the centre." And if that is not a very happy observation,
it is at any rate much more moderate than the average views
of those English writers whose spiritual home is in Italy.]
[Footnote 92: Byron, _Childe Harold_.]
[Footnote 93: About 36,000 boys--partly recruits and partly
boys of more tender years--started over the mountains, and
some 20,000 of them perished.]
[Footnote 94: This officer, aided by others, was charged with
having organized an attempt to overthrow the Yugoslav
National Council soon after its constitution in the autumn of
1918. The day of the counter-revolution was to be November
25, according to the _Hrvatska Rije[vc]_ of November 23. The
General and others were arrested, but as he was able to prove
his innocence he was liberated.]
[Footnote 95: _With Serbia into Exile._ New York, 1916.]
[Footnote 96: Cf. _The Question_, by Isidora Sekuli['c].]
[Footnote 97: _Revue des Deux Mondes_, January 1, 1917.]
[Footnote 98: In contrast with this attitude that was adopted
at Nikita's command one must mention the transactions of a
Podgorica merchant, M. Buri[vc], and his partners, who sold
150,000 kilos of grain to the retreating army at cost price,
that is, at one dinar per kilo when they could have obtained
five. Two million kilos of hay they sold at 8 paras per kilo
instead of at 50 or more. There were at this time only 20
tons of flour in all Montenegro. Undoubtedly the refusal of
Buri[vc] and his friends to profit from the distress of their
brother Serbs was much more typical of the Montenegrins than
the conduct which Nikita drew forth from the weak side of
their character.]
[Footnote 99: Cf. an article in the _Gazette de Lausanne_,
November 29, 1917, by Danilo Gatalo, a former Montenegrin
Minister of War.]
[Footnote 100: Cf. p. 204.]
[Footnote 101: _Ex-King Nicholas and his Court_ (Collection
of eighteen original documents in facsimile). Sarajevo,
1919.]
[Footnote 102: These almost incredible facts are vouched for
by Dr. Sekula Drljevi['c], ex-Minister of Justice and
Finance, who was one of the internees at Karlstein.]
[Footnote 103: _The Black Sheep of the Balkans._ London,
1920.]
[Footnote 104: In 1919 this very popular physician became
Minister of Public Health in a Coalition Cabinet, and in 1920
he became Minister of Posts and Telegraphs.]
[Footnote 105: A couple of months before the triumph of the
Yugoslav idea one of these priests, Dr. Alexius
U[vs]eni[vc]nik, Professor of Theology, published at
Ljubljana a little book packed with ancient and modern
quotations from Latin and French, Italian and German sources.
He called it _Um die Yugoslavija; Eine Apologie_; and in the
strongest terms he combated the reproach that the Slovene
bishop, the clergy and the people were not loyal to the
Habsburgs. Dr. U[vs]eni[vc]nik proved that the poor Slovenes
were suffering an almost intolerable subjection at the hands
of the Germans, but he persisted in demanding nothing more
than freedom within the Habsburg Monarchy. "The Monarchy,"
said our unhappy author, "is in the midst of its
development." And this priest, who was so deaf to the grand
Yugoslav idea, quoted with approval the words of Gustave le
Bon: "Ideas take a long time in possessing the people's
soul."]
END OF VOLUME I.
INDEX OF VOLUME I
(_The Names of Books and Newspapers are in Italics._)
Aerenthal (Count) and the bombs, 206. -- -- and Bosnia, 204.
Agram, _see_ Zagreb.
Albania, part of, offered to the Serbs, 251.
Albanian activities, 72 _et seq._, 219. -- language, 13, 14.
Alexander (King of Serbia), the lamentable, 194 _et seq._ -- (King of Yugoslavia), 232 _et seq._ -- (Pope), 40. -- (Prince), the frigid, 117, 122.
Alphabet, Slav, 29.
Andrassy (Count Julius), his confidence, 290.
Apponyi on mad ambitions, 295.
Arad and the Serbs, 117-8. -- Executions at, 125. -- the Magyar slaughter-house, 235 _et seq._
_Arbeiter-Zeitung_ on Berchtold, 229.
Austria and Macedonia, 220. -- -- some atrocities, 225 _et seq._ -- -- some intrigues (and _see_ Habsburgs), 25, 30, 118, 176, 177, 187, 193 _et seq._
_Avenire_, a newspaper, 67.
Bach, his "huzzars," 127.
Ba[vc]ka, 62, 72 _et passim_.
Bahr (H.), his _Dalmatinische Reise_, 201.
Banat, the frontier regiments, 82 _et seq._ -- German colonists, 82 _et seq._ -- Migrants to, 62, 72. -- Revolt in, 71, 121. -- Serbs and Roumanians, 188 _et seq._
Baranja, 62 _et passim_.
Barbulescu (Prof.) on Macedonian language, 166.
Bartlett (C. A. H.) on Treaty of London, 246, 247.
Battisti, how he died, 284.
Beaumont, of the _Daily Telegraph_, 284.
Be[vc]irovi['c], the Macedonian schoolmaster, 169.
Belgrade, 7, 62, 149, 243-4, 260.
Belloc (H.), his pronouncements, 163, 164.
Bene[vs] (Dr. E.), his _Detruisez l'Autriche-Hongrie_, 192. -- -- in Italy, 288-9.
Berchtold (Count) and the Great War, 213-4, 229.
Berlin Congress, 24-5.
Bilinski (Dr.), his tears, 228.
Bismarck on the Balkans, 24.
Bissolati, the gallant Minister, 287.
_Blackwood's Magazine_, quoted, 10.
Bogomile heresy, 37, 45 _et seq._, 126.
Bonchocat, a murderer's testimony, 291.
Boppe, the French Minister, on the Serbs, 260.
Bosnia and the Magyars, 235. -- and Michael, 148. -- and the Powers, 153, 177, 204. -- under the Turks, 56, 117, 176. -- _see_ Tvertko.
Boue (Ami), his _La Turquie d'Europe_, 138-9.
Brailsford (H. N.), his _Macedonia_, 72-3, 198, 199, 219.
Brankovi['c], the despot, 47, 58. -- George (a descendant), 71-2. -- Vuk, 48, 62.
Bratti (R.), his _La Fine della Serenissima_, 39.
Bresse (L.), his _Le Montenegro Inconnu_, 210.
Brki['c] (Patriarch), his description, 80, 277.
Bulgarian language, 13-4, 34, 80-1, 139, 140, 166. -- origins, 33 _et seq._
Bulgars, attitude to Serbia and Yugoslavia, 11 _et seq._, 44-5, 149, 166 _et seq._, 193. -- enter the War, 248 _et seq._
_Bulletin Hellenique_, quoted, 37.
Bulwer (Sir H.), his advice, 158.
Bunjevci, 86 _et seq._
Buric, the patriotic merchant, 262. -- (Vassilje), his brother, 268-9.
Buxton (Leland), his _Black Sheep of the Balkans_, 289, 290. -- -- his unfortunate proposal, 221.
[vC]abrinovi['c] and the Sarajevo crime, 216, 218.
[vC]a[vc]ak and Milo[vs], 137.
Cahun (L.), his _Introduction a l'Histoire de l'Asie_, 36.
[vC]arnoevi['c] (Arsenius), the Patriarch, 72 _et seq._
Cattalinich, his _Memorie_, 92.
Cattaro, _see_ Kotor.
Cavour, 66, 123, 140 _et seq._
Chiala (Gl.), his _Letters of Count Cavour_, 141.
Chopin (J.), his _Le Complot de Sarajevo_, 218.
Christi['c] (Annie) on Serb women in the War, 260.
Christoff, _see_ Tartaro-Bulgar.
Cippico (Antonio), his arguments, 144-5.
[vC]iprovtsi, its outbreak, 71.
Clergy in Croatia, 129. -- in Czecho-Slovakia, 130 _et seq._
Codelli (Baron), his rules, 96.
Constantine (King) and the Serbs, 252-3.
Corfu, Declaration of, 271-2. -- Serbs at, 270.
Crijevi['c] (Elias), the renegade, 65.
Croats, their history, 25, 29, 30-1, 38, 40, 46 _et seq._,
69, 112 _et seq._, 119 _et seq._, 125.
-- relations with Serbs, 177, 187-8, 205, 239 _et seq._, 254 _et seq._,
275 _et seq._
[vC]uk (Madame), her good work, 228.
[vC]uplikac (Colonel), the voivoda, 119, 123.
Cviji['c] (Prof.), 14, 36, 175.
Cyril (Saint), 29.
Czecho-Slovakia, disapproval of, 10. -- its national Church, 130 _et seq._
_Daily Telegraph_, quoted, 284.
Dalmatia, its Christianity, 29. -- suggested settlers, 94. -- and Venice, 40, 41, 47, 50 _et seq._, 64. -- _see_ Morlaks and Tommaseo.
Dandolo (Vincenzo), 100.
Danica, the brotherhood, 113.
Danilo (Crown Prince), the financier, 201 _et seq._, 209 _et seq._, 264, 276. -- (Prince), his death, 145-6.
Deak (Francis), his liberal methods, 143, 160.
Debidour, his _Histoire diplomatique_, 154.
Democracy of Serbs, 61, 233.
Devil, _see_ Alphabet.
Devine (A.), the apologist, 204, 211.
D'Intignano (F. M.), his _I Morlacchi_, 54.
Djakovica, some years ago, 73.
Dobrila (Bishop George), 142.
Dolci, his fate, 99, 100.
Dra[vs]kovi['c], his _Exhortation_, 112.
Drljevi['c] (Dr. S.) on Danilo, 209. -- -- on Montenegrin Red Cross, 274.
Dubourdieu, 104-5.
Dubrovnik, her dissolution, 101. -- her glory, 41, 48-9, 64 _et seq._ -- her moral height, 91. -- her poets, 54, 65-6.
Durham (Edith), her _High Albania_, 73. -- -- her partiality, 206. -- -- in praise of Albanians, 198, 259. -- -- her _Twenty Years of Balkan Tangle_, 206.
Du[vs]an (Emperor), 26. -- -- his ambitions, 43. -- -- his Code, 43. -- -- his greatness, 42, 69. -- -- his sister, 68.
Eliot (Sir Charles), his _Turkey in Europe_, 36, 167.
England in the Adriatic, 104 _et seq._
Essad Pasha, at Scutari, 211.
Evans (Sir Arthur), 39, 176.
Exarchate, its beginning, 159. -- and the Serbs, 168.
_Ex-King Nicholas of Montenegro and his Court_, 217, 270.
Fiume, _see_ Rieka.
Francis Ferdinand (Archduke), his murder, 212-3. -- -- -- various mysteries, 214 _et seq._
Francis Joseph, 123, 133, 143, 162.
Frankopan (Christopher), 71.
Frederick Barbarossa, 37.
Friedjung (Prof.) and the forgeries, 205-6.
Gaj (Ljudevit), the patriot, 112 _et seq._, 119.
Gatalo (Danilo) exposes Nikita, 266.
Gauvain exposes Nikita, 269.
Gavrilovi['c] (Dr. Michael), 16, 98.
_Gazette de Lausanne_, quoted, 266.
George (Prince), his ways, 231-2.
Georgov (Prof.), 35.
German colonists, 82 _et seq._
Germans favoured by Habsburgs, 127-8, 143. -- appraised by Haeckel, 243.
_Geschichte der Franzfelder Gemeinde_, 82.
Ghevgeli, a typical Macedonian town, 168 _et seq._
Giacich on Rieka, 122.
Giesl (Baron) and the Montenegrins, 209, 211-2.
Gladstone and Montenegro, 210. -- his preface, 152. -- and Strossmayer, 133.
Glagolitic, 29, 30, 63-4, 120.
Goad (H. E.), Comments on, 18-9.
Gop[vc]evi['c], his bad book, 178.
Gorica, 39, 127, 278.
Gortchakoff, his inspirations, 153, 177. -- his instructions, 159.
Greek in Macedonian churches, 155 _et seq._, 218. -- -- schools, 137 _et seq._ 169.
Gregory (Pope), quoted, 29.
Grimm (Jacob), his enthusiasm, 109.
Gruen (Anastasius), the Slovene, 112.
Gunduli['c], his works, 65-6.
Habsburgs and the Croats (and _see_ Rieka), 69, 127. -- and the Magyars, 119 _et seq._ -- and Montenegro (and _see_ Lov[vc]en), 201-2, 209, 211-2. -- and the Pragmatic Sanction, 78. -- and the Serbian regiments, 82. -- and the Serbs, 213. -- and the Slovenes (and _see_ Triest), 127-8.
Hajdukovi['c], Nikita's Minister, 268.
Haji['c] (Dr.), against grammar, 109.
Hartwig, the Russian Minister, 214-5.
Hegedues, the villain, 235 _et seq._
Heiduks, 59 _et seq._
Hektorovi['c], the famous poet, 66.
Helen (Queen), 42.
Herbert (Hon. Aubrey, M.P.), considers the Magyars, 236. -- -- considers the Magyars' neighbours, 192.
Herzegovi['c] (Achmet Pasha), 56.
Herzegovina, the dialect (and _see_ Bosnia), 65.
Hibben (Paxton), on Venizelos, 252.
Hodges (Colonel), 112.
Homer, on atrocities, 14.
Hoste (Commodore), 104, 105.
Hupka (Lieut.-Colonel) and Lov[vc]en, 263.
Hussarek (Baron), his optimism, 297-8.
Hussein, the Dragon, 117.
Hvar, bombarded by Russians, 101. -- in the Middle Ages, 50, 66. -- revolts against Napoleon, 102.
Ignatieff (Count), and the Exarchate, 159.
Iorga (Prof.), his suggestion, 189, 190.
Irby (Miss), benefactress and traveller, 12, 152. -- -- her _The Turks, the Greeks and the Slavons_, 152, 176.
Isonzo, important river (and _see_ Mazzini), 39, 102.
Istria in distress, 69, 70. -- its population, 141-2.
Italianized party, 94, 108, 115.
Italians, their Austrian testimonials, 282 _et seq._ -- help the Serbs, 265. -- Surrendering to, 281, 285 _et seq._
Italians, their union, 140 _et seq._ -- against Yugoslavia, 243, 245 _et seq._, 261, 282 _et seq._
Ivanovi['c], the Russian, 126.
Jegli['c] (Prince-Bishop), 30, 298, 299.
Jella[vc]i['c] (J. J.), his decline, 125-6. -- -- his expedition, 121. -- -- Governor of Dalmatia, 123. -- -- his proclamation, 119.
Jire[vc]ek (Dr. C.), his _History of the Bulgars_, 33. -- -- on the Morlaks, 54.
Jones (Fortier), his _With Serbia into Exile_, 258.
Jovius (Paulus), the historian, 56.
Julia (Princess), and Palmerston, 147.
Ka[vc]i['c], his long work, 66.
Kanchov (Basil) and the Macedonians, 168.
Kara George, his end, 110. -- -- his first insurrection, 57, 81, 98. -- -- his internal enemies, 107.
Karaji['c] (Vuk), his great work, 61, 109, 113.
Karaveloff (Ljuba), his articles, 139, 154, 172.
Khuen-Hedervary (Count), 186, 188.
Kiepert (H.), the geographer, 23, 173.
Klobu[vc]ari['c], the police-captain, 257.
Kohler (Prof.), the jurist, 215, 217.
Kolomon (King), 40.
Kossovo, the great battle, 46, 47, 49.
Kossuth, 121 _et seq._, 125, 132, 200.
Kot[vc]a (Captain), 81.
Kotor, 7, 285 _et seq._
Kova[vc]ica, Magyar excesses at, 292-3.
Krk, 51.
Kronimirovi['c], the chieftain, 31.
"Krpitsa," 162.
Kuku[vs], the strange movement, 155, 157, 159.
Ladislas, the traitor, 47.
Laffan (Rev. R. G. D.), his _The Guardians of the Gate_, 196.
Lajn[vs]i['c] (Dr. S.) and the rise of the Slovenes, 299, 300.
Lamartine, quoted, 57.
Landowners in Croatia, 128. -- in Macedonia, 134 _et seq._
Language, Serbo-Croat (and _see_ Albanian and Bulgar), 112 _et seq._
Lansdowne (Lord) on Macedonia, 220.
Lazar (Prince), 45 _et seq._
Lazarevi['c] (Lazar), the militant priest, 101.
Leiper (R.) on Montenegro, 183.
Liubica (Princess), the strong-minded, 110.
Loiseau (C.), his _Le Balkan Slave_, 44, 66.
Lov[vc]en, 126, 201, 262 _et seq._
Luci['c], the lyric poet, 66.
Macedonia and the Allied advance, 239, 240. -- examined, 43, 166 _et seq._ -- in old times, 33, 42. -- under the Turks, 134 _et seq._, 137 _et seq._, 218 _et seq._
Machiedo (Dr.), what he read, 263.
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The Birth of Yugoslavia, Volume 1Chapter XIV: Introduction: The Tragedy of a Frontier (12)
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