Chapter II: Preface: To the First Edition
In May, 1887, a Select Committee was appointed to examine into the Army and Navy Estimates. On the 8th of July Major-General (now Lieut-General) Brackenbury, in the course of examination by the Committee, made a series of comparisons between the English and the German systems of army management. He referred particularly to the great general staff of the German army, which he described as "the keystone of the whole system of German military organization ... the cause of the great efficiency of the German army ... acting as the powerful brain of the military body, to the designs of which brain the whole body is made to work." "I cannot but feel," he said, "that to the want of any such great central thinking department is due that want of economy and efficiency which to a certain extent exists in our army."
If at any time a statesman should be found to undertake the work of an English Minister of War, his first wish would be to grasp the nature of this keystone of the German system, to distinguish in it between essentials and accessories, to perceive which of its peculiarities are local, temporary, and personal; and what are the unchangeable principles in virtue of which it has prospered. Equipped with this knowledge, he would be able to reform without destroying, to rise above that servile imitation which copies defects as well as excellences, and, without sacrificing its national features, to infuse into the English system the merits of the German.
For such a statesman, and for the public upon whose support he must depend, this book has been written. It is an endeavour to describe the German general staff and its relation to the military institutions from which it is inseparable.
To illustrate the general staff at work in war, the campaign of 1866, rather than that of 1870, has been chosen, because it better exemplifies some of the relations between strategy and policy.
_December_, 1889.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PART I
_THE GENERAL STAFF IN THE MANAGEMENT OF A CAMPAIGN_
CHAPTER I
THE EVE OF KÖNIGGRÄTZ
Political and military situation on the 2nd of July--Position of the Prussian armies---Topography of the district--Supposed position of the Austrian army, and consequent arrangements for July 3rd--True position of the Austrian army discovered--Consequent fresh orders for July 3rd--Which result in a decisive victory
CHAPTER II
BEHIND THE SCENES
The secret of King William's military success--His selection of a single adviser, and resolute adherence to his proposals--History of the office of chief of the general staff--Proceedings at Gitschin the night before the battle
CHAPTER III
FIVE SHORT ORDERS
Prussian system of division of labour and organization of responsibility--Simplicity of its working illustrated from the fewness and brevity of the orders issued
CHAPTER IV
PRELIMINARIES OF A CAMPAIGN
Nature of the preparations for a campaign--Mobilization--Concentration--Influence of considerations of policy--King William in 1866 anxious to avoid war--Problems solved by the Prussian staff in preparation for the campaign: calculation of the force required--Its distribution in the theatre of war--Choice of points of concentration; formation of two armies in 1866 inevitable--Movement of troops to the points selected; transport by rail and subsequent marches--Position on June 6th--Opening of campaign postponed for political reasons--Delay leads to better knowledge of Austrian movements, and corresponding modification of Prussian arrangements--King William finally decides for war--Invasion of Saxony--Position of Prussian armies on June 22nd--Summary
CHAPTER V
THE CRITICS
Difficulties which beset the judgment of the conduct of a campaign--Insufficiency of the attainable knowledge of the motives which guided the commanders--Reserve therefore incumbent on the military critic--Illustration of hasty judgment--Impartiality consists only in the attempt to understand
PART II
_THE GENERAL STAFF AND THE ARMY_
CHAPTER I
THE SPIRIT OF PRUSSIAN MILITARY INSTITUTIONS
Spirit of the Prussian officers--The officer the teacher and leader of his men--System of promotion--Selection for the higher commands--Superiors responsible for the efficiency of their subordinates
CHAPTER II
THE ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY
The army corps and its subdivisions--The company, squadron, and battery commanders--The superior prescribes the object, and leaves to his subordinate the choice of means--Graduation of authority and responsibility--Resulting in freedom of superiors from the burden of detail
CHAPTER III
THE SYSTEM OF TRAINING
Peace training determined solely by the requirements of war--It culminates in the manoeuvres--Which complete the training of the troops--And develop and test the capacity of the generals
CHAPTER IV
THE ARMY CORPS
Review of the means adopted to secure its proper handling--Vastness of the administrative tasks involved in its management--Sketch of a mobilized Prussian army corps on the march and in quarters--Dual nature of its commander's anxieties--System devised to relieve him--Administrative services organized under two or three responsible heads--Military functions partly those of direction, partly those of routine--The latter dealt with by the adjutancy
CHAPTER V
THE GENERAL STAFF IN THE ARMY CORPS
The bureau which assists the general in the military direction--Enumeration of its functions in war--And in peace--The chief of the general staff of the army corps--Summary
CHAPTER VI
COMPOSITION OF THE GENERAL STAFF AND ITS DISTRIBUTION THROUGH THE ARMY
Forms a corps by itself, but not a close corporation--Alternation between service on the general staff and service with the troops--No career merely on the staff except for scientific work, involving abandonment of prospect of command--Numbers and distribution of general staff--Alternative service on great general staff, and on general staff of a constituent part of the army--Influence on the work of the experience thus acquired--Members of the general staff dispersed throughout the army--The general staff recruited from the pick of the young combatant officers
PART III
_THE GREAT GENERAL STAFF_
CHAPTER I
AN INTELLIGENCE DEPARTMENT
Direct preparation for war consists in determining beforehand the distribution of the forces, their concentration and transport to the frontier--Information on which these arrangements are based collected by general staff--Its subdivision for the purpose--Thoroughness of the work--The _Registrande_--Merely a preliminary groundwork--Explains Prussian knowledge of enemy's resources in 1866 and 1870--Similar organization in other armies--Railway arrangements--Production of maps
CHAPTER II
A MILITARY UNIVERSITY
Regeneration of Prussia assisted by education--War school founded by Scharnhorst in 1810--Scharnhorst's earlier educational work--History of the war academy since 1810--The present regulations--The order of service--Object of the war academy--Constitution and management--Entrance examination--Practical lessons compulsory--The order of teaching--Standard by which to judge it---Course of study at the academy--Method of instruction--Tactics--Military history--History--Staff duties and tour--Comparison with the university ideal
CHAPTER III
THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING
Relation between teaching and research--Exemplified in practice of general staff--Military history--School of Clausewitz--The critical method--Historical works of the Prussian general staff--Campaign of 1859--The "applicatory method"--Campaigns of 1866 and of 1870-71--Historical monographs--Connection between military history and theory--Theory in Prussia the work of individuals--Moltke's paper on the influence of new firearms upon tactics--His views justified by the events of 1866--Contributions to military doctrine by individual members of the Prussian staff--Moral influence of the intellectual lead taken by the general staff
CHAPTER IV
THE CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF
Character needed for a strategist--Relation between a commander-in-chief and the chief of his staff--Element of permanent value in the Prussian system--Classification of duties--General summary
SKETCH MAPS
I. THE NEIGHBOURHOOD OF KÖNIGGRÄTZ
II. PRUSSIA IN 1866
III. THE OPENING MOVEMENTS OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1866
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The Brain of an Army: A Popular Account of the German General StaffChapter II: Preface: To the First Edition
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