Skip to content

Chapter I: The Eve of Königgrätz

Text size

On the afternoon of Monday, the 2nd of July, 1866, King William of Prussia with his retinue drove into the little town of Gitschin, in the hilly region of Northern Bohemia, on the southern side of the Giant Mountains. His upright bearing scarcely showed the burden of his sixty-nine years, nor did his frank expression reveal the weight of care that pressed upon him. After months of weary diplomacy, the political crisis had been brought to a head by a resolution of the Diet of the Germanic Confederation to the effect that Prussia had violated "the peace of the Confederation," and that the armies of the confederated States were to be called out. This resolution, not three weeks old, meant that Prussia was at war with Saxony, Hanover, Hesse, Bavaria and Würtemberg, and with the Austrian Empire. Besides this long array of enemies there were friends of various degrees of good and ill will to be considered. Russia was a benevolent onlooker; Italy an active ally, not indeed very formidable in the field, but able to occupy a portion of the Austrian forces. France was the ambiguous busybody, waiting to take a side according to the prospect of advantage, and the French ambassador was on his way to pay his unwelcome respects to the Prussian king. Even at home there were grave difficulties. The Prussian Parliament, representing at that time a liberal electorate, was directly opposed to the whole policy of which the war was a part. The king had left Berlin to join the army only on Saturday morning, after a fortnight of constant anxiety over the complicated operations which had resulted in the capture of the Hanoverian army and the occupation without fighting of the kingdom of Saxony.

The invasion of Bohemia by two separate armies had been ordered on June 22nd. Each of these armies had passed the mountain wall that shelters Bohemia on the north, and they were now only a day's march apart quartered in scattered villages a few hours' drive to the east of Gitschin. The troops were fatigued with a week's hard work. The Crown Prince coming from Silesia with 115,000 men had with various portions of his army fought three severe battles and as many serious skirmishes. His force lay on the left bank of the Elbe around his headquarters at Königinhof, twenty-one miles due east of Gitschin.[1] Prince Frederick Charles, the king's nephew, commanded the other army of 140,000 men, which had met with little serious resistance, though the troops were tired with the needless marching caused by ill-considered arrangements. This prince had come to report in person to Gitschin from his headquarters at Kamenitz, six or seven miles to the east.

The exact whereabouts of the Austrian army was unknown. It was supposed to have placed itself in position behind the Elbe, which here being about the size of the Isis above Oxford, runs from north to south with a gentle curve to the east. From Königinhof to Königgrätz the straight line, five-and-twenty miles long, runs due north and south. If this line be taken as a bowstring, the Elbe corresponds to the bow, of which the handle is the fortress of Josephstadt. Königgrätz, the southern point of the bow, is in a straight line twenty-seven miles from Gitschin, and the high road roughly coincides with this line. On the Monday afternoon at Gitschin it was believed that the Austrian army was on the left (eastern) bank of the Elbe, with its flanks covered by the fortresses of Königgrätz and Josephstadt. This was an awkward position to attack, and it had been decided to let both Prussian armies rest next day, while officers should be sent to study the approaches and make arrangements for a turning manoeuvre.

Prince Frederick Charles on returning to his headquarters at Kamenitz learned that the whole supposition was wrong. Some of his officers reconnoitring towards Königgrätz had found large bodies of Austrian troops in bivouac on both sides of the high road along the valley of the Bistritz brook, which runs nearly parallel with the Elbe about seven miles to the west of that river. A comparison of reports showed that there must be at least four Austrian army corps behind the Bistritz, so Frederick Charles, interpreting this as indicating the intention to attack him next morning, determined to be beforehand with the enemy and himself to attack at daybreak. At 9 p.m. he issued his orders for this movement, and at 9.45 sent off to Königinhof a letter asking the Crown Prince to send one or more corps towards Josephstadt to occupy the enemy in that quarter. The chief of his staff was sent to Gitschin to report to the king, and arrived there at 11 p.m.

"The king[2] at once decided to attack the enemy in front of the Elbe with all his forces, whether the whole Austrian army or only a large portion of it should be found there.... Accordingly by his Majesty's command the following communication to the second army [that of the Crown Prince] was at once prepared":--

"According to the information received by the first army the enemy in the strength of about three corps, which, however, may be further reinforced, has advanced beyond the line formed by the Bistritz at Sadowa, where an encounter with the first army is to be expected very early in the morning.

"According to the orders issued, the first army will stand to-morrow morning, July 3rd, at 2 a.m., with two divisions at Horsitz with one at Milowitz, one at Cerekwitz, with two at Pschanek and Briskan, the cavalry corps at Gutwasser.

"Your Royal Highness will at once make the arrangements necessary to be able to move with all your forces in support of the first army against the right flank of the enemy's expected advance, and to come into action as soon as possible. The orders sent from here this afternoon under other conditions are no longer valid.

"V. MOLTKE."

This note, with a shorter note to the commander of one of the corps lying between Gitschin and Königinhof (the only part of the second army at this time west of the Elbe), telling him to be ready for the Crown Prince's orders, was despatched at midnight.

The whole Austro-Saxon army (eight corps) was in fact concentrated between the Elbe and the Bistritz, not indeed for attack but for the defence of a strong position on the left bank of the brook, facing westwards. Had the arrangements of Prince Frederick Charles not been supplemented, the 3rd of July might have been an unfortunate day for Prussia. The first army would have been engaged against an enemy strongly posted and counting nearly double its numbers. The detachment by the second army of one corps towards Josephstadt could hardly have produced a decisive effect, and the rest of the second army would have been too far away to co-operate in time. But the order sent from Gitschin entirely met the situation. Without interfering with Prince Frederick Charles's attack it brought the entire second army to his help in the direction where its action would produce the greatest effect--on the enemy's flank.

When the morning came, the attack of the first army as it developed, disclosed the great strength of the Austrian position and the numbers by which it was defended. Prince Frederick Charles was unable to do much more than keep the Austrians engaged until the second army came up. The attack of the Crown Prince's leading divisions decided the day. With their capture and maintenance of Chlum, the key of the position, the situation of the Austrian army became critical, and the issue not only of the fight but of the whole campaign was practically settled. The resolution formed between eleven and twelve at night on July 2nd, in the Lion Inn at Gitschin, had secured the victory of Königgrätz, perhaps the greatest battle of modern times,[3] and without exception the most decisive in its results.

[1] See sketch map 1.

[2] _Der Feldzitg von_ 1866 _in Deutschland_. Redigirt von der Kriegsgeschichtlichen Abtheilung des groszen Generalstabes, p. 249.

[3] There is a doubt whether the number of combatants was greater at Leipsic or at Königgrätz. According to the Belgian Précis (_Bibliothèque Internationale d'Histoire militaire_) the figures are:--

At Leipsic: Allies . . . . . . . . . 300,000
" French . . . . . . . . . 180,000
-------
Total . . . . . . . 480,000
=======

At Königgrätz: Austrians . . . . . . 215,000
" Prussians . . . . . . 220,000
-------
Total . . . . . . . 435,000
=======

According to Rüstow (_Feldhernkunst des 19ten
Jahrhunderts_) the numbers engaged were:--

At Leipsic (Oct. 18th): French . . . 130,000
" " Allies . . . 290,000
-------
Total . . . . . . 430,000
=======
At Königgrätz, total of both sides 450,000
=======

Comments

Log in to leave a comment.

The Brain of an Army: A Popular Account of the German General StaffChapter I: The Eve of Königgrätz

0%6 min left in chapter