Chapter XXX: Appendix: No. II

UNHEEDED WARNINGS.

The three F’s: Fixity of Tenure, Fair Rent, Freedom of Sale.

_Contemporary Review_, February, 1881.

The grounds on which the principle of the three F’s were opposed in 1880:--

_The Act of 1870 was to be final, and it is a breach of faith to
reopen the land question._

1. The Land Act of 1870 was an encroachment on the rights of
landlords, but was allowed to pass on the understanding that it
would be final.

2. To reopen the question with _further_ confiscation is a gross
breach of faith.

3. More especially it is a breach of faith with those landowners
who have, on the invitation of Government, purchased land in the
“Encumbered Estates Court.” The indefeasible title granted to
them by the Court (and for which they paid large sums) would be
turned into a mere claim to a precarious rent charge.

_The three F’s are an infringement of the rights of the landlord.
He must be compensated for the material, moral, and sentimental
wrong which he will suffer._

4. “Tenant right” is landlord wrong.

5. Land is the absolute undoubted property of the landlord,
and he has a right to do that which he wills with his own. Any
curtailment of his power is an injustice, and affects the very
principle of property.

6. If the State interferes with his freedom of action, and causes
him any material, moral, or sentimental injury, it must properly
compensate him.

7. To take away the enjoyment, control, and management of his
land is a very tangible infringement of rights, and one for which
compensation must be given.

8. To fix a rent is to deprive the landlord of the advantages of
competition, and affects him financially.

9. It would reduce him to the position of a mere mortgagee, but
without the security and certainty of payment.

10. To deprive him of his power of eviction, is to take away a
privilege, a necessity.

11. The tenant’s claim to a “right” in the soil is not founded on
any tangible or real historical basis.

_The abuse of eviction or raisings of rent is rare; the use is
necessary and justifiable._

12. There is little or no abuse of the power of arbitrary
eviction; and even when rent is not paid, the landlords, as a
class, are lenient. It is occasionally necessary for the good of
the estate to evict (compensation for “disturbance” being paid)
in order to consolidate holdings.

13. Eviction is seldom enforced, except in the case of bad and
wasteful tenants; good and improving tenants are never evicted.
Therefore, any diminution in the power of eviction would be
disastrous to the prosperity of the country by retaining on the
land worthless tenants.

14. Most landlords do properly compensate their tenants for any
improvements effected by them.

15. They are justified in raising the rents when the land
produces greater increase.

16. Even if a few bad landlords injure their tenants, it is
unfair to visit on the heads of the majority the sins of the few
by bringing them all under the same confiscating law.

17. The existing law provides ample safeguards against arbitrary
and unjust eviction; the landlord’s power is sufficiently
curtailed.

_The relations of landlord and tenant are those of contract; the
State must not interfere in freedom of contract._

18. Any State interference in contract between man and man
is very inexpedient and demoralizing, more especially in
interference in the matter of price and value.

19. The relations between landlord and tenant are merely those of
contract.

20. The movement of progressive societies is from status to
contract, and not the reverse.

21. It is illogical and unfair of the tenant to demand freedom of
contract in the sale of tenant-right, and ask for curtailment of
contract in his dealings with the landlord.

_The objections to a fixed rent; and the difficulties in the way
of fixing a fair rent._

22. It would be impossible to fix a rent which would content both
parties.

23. As tenants vary in ability, character, and energy, it would
be impossible to legislate so that the rent the tenant had to pay
would be that which he is able to pay.

24. A fixed rent, even if fair at first, would soon weigh heavily
on one or other of the parties.

25. All future enhancements of rent, based on whatever ground,
would be strenuously resisted.

26. While the landlord would be bound to accept the valuation,
the tenant could refuse to pay it and quit his holding.

27. If the Government, by valuation or arbitration, were to fix
the rent, the landlord would consider that he had been guaranteed
his rent by the State; while the tenant (in bad seasons) would
look to the State to assist him to pay it.

28. If fixity of tenure were conceded, the next demand would be
for the abolition of the rent charge, more especially on the
ground of increased absenteeism, which would itself have been
encouraged by the change.

29. At all events, in bad seasons, a demand would be made for
abatement of rent, on the ground that otherwise the value of the
tenant-right would be injuriously affected.

30. The power conceded to the landlord of selling the
“tenant-right” on breach of contract, would be rendered nugatory
by the combination of tenants to prevent a purchase; and so the
landlord would be deprived of all means of obtaining his rent, or
of preventing subletting or subdivision.

31. It is illogical and unjust that, in the matter of rent, the
landlord should be deprived of the benefits of competition, while
in the sale of tenant-right competition should be allowed.

32. The landlords, bound by a hard-and-fast rule, would expect to
receive their full fixed rents, and would not be willing or able,
as they are now, to allow indulgences in time or remission in bad
seasons.

33. The pressure of violence would be brought to bear on the
valuators to induce them to undervalue the rents.

_The right of free sale of “tenant-right” would amount to
confiscation of part of the landlord’s property. It would benefit
only existing tenants, and would cripple all future tenants._

34. As the existing tenants would, on the day of the passing of
the law, be able to sell their tenant-right for a large sum,
_having done nothing_ to earn it, the amount at which it can be
valued, is so much subtracted from the rightful gains of the
landlord.

35. As tenants had not this scheme in view when they bargained
for their farms, its adoption would be conceding them a valuable
privilege entirely at the expense of the landlords.

36. Only the existing tenants would benefit pecuniarily from the
change; all future in-coming tenants would be burdened by the
amount they would have to pay for the “tenant-right,” and the
interest on this payment in addition to the “fair” rent, would
constitute a sum exceeding any rack-rent.

37. The unhealthy “earth-hunger,” which exists in Ireland, would
force up the price of tenant-right far above the real value,
and thus entrench on the security of the landlord for his rent,
whilst reckless tenants would outbid the prudent.

38. The payment for tenant-right would cripple the in-coming
tenant just at the moment when he most required capital to
cultivate the land--to the injury of production, while it would
leave him no margin to fall back upon in bad times.

39. The tenants who would benefit most would be those who have
had indulgent landlords. When rents are low “tenant-right” would
be more valuable than when they are high.

40. The tenants can obtain security of tenure by demanding and
accepting leases; many landlords are willing to grant long leases
at fixed rents on fair terms.

41. Therefore, at the most the law should force the landlords to
grant “security leases,” and leave them to obtain (by means of a
fine) any extra value which security will fetch.

42. Any further privileges obtained by the tenant would only be
used as additional facilities for borrowing money at ruinous
rates.

43. The Ulster tenants have obtained their tenant-right by
purchase, or by a _quid pro quo_; the concession of free sale
would gratuitously endow existing tenants with a valuable
property, which they have neither earned, bought, nor inherited.

44. Many landlords have bought up the tenant-right on their
farms; it is manifestly unfair to reimpose it without
compensation.

_The landlords have largely invested capital in the soil; the
three F’s would prevent them in future from making improvements;
and the tenants’ power to do so would also be diminished._

45. The landlords, as a class, have invested capital very largely
in the improvement of the soil; the improvements have been by no
means entirely effected by the tenant.

46. It would no longer be to the interest of the landlord to
invest his capital in the soil; an effectual obstacle would have
been placed in the way of his doing so.

47. Therefore, those improvements,--drainage, straightening
fields and boundaries, &c., which affect many holdings, and can
only be done by the landlord, would no longer be executed.

48. As he will have to pay for the “tenant-right,” the in-coming
tenant will have less capital to invest in the soil than at
present, while the sum he has paid will be taken out of the land
for ever; thus, on both hands, the capital available for these
purposes would be diminished, and production would suffer.

_Further evils which would result from the adoption of the three
F’s._

49. By making the landlord merely a rent-charger, and depriving
him of all power or interest in his land, absenteeism and
non-residence, with their attendant evils, would be enormously
increased.

50. The proposed scheme would perpetuate the present system
of landlord and tenant, while the desirable aim should be to
increase the number of proprietors.

51. The tenant, possessing security of tenure, would be less
desirous of purchasing land, while sale, except to the tenant,
would be greatly hindered.

52. It would perpetuate the absurd distribution of land at
present existing in many parts of Ireland.

53. While it would confirm not only good and bad tenants in their
tenure of land and affect equally good and bad landlords,

54. It would increase the antagonism between the landlord and the
tenant;

55. It would be practically impossible to prevent subdivision and
subletting with their manifold attendant evils.

56. The Irish people are so miserably lazy, thriftless, and
short-sighted, that no reform of the land-law would benefit them.

57. _Nothing short of separation from England will satisfy the
Irish_; land-reforms are useless.

58. Under small proprietors or semi-proprietors, the lot of
labourers would be harder than ever.

59. The various parts of Ireland differ so much in every way that
it would be inexpedient and impossible to apply one scheme to the
whole; if it answered in one part it would necessarily fail in
others.

60. If the principle of the three F’s were once conceded, it
would form a precedent for land-legislation in England; and then
for legislation directed against all forms of property.

61. It is the first step towards democratic and socialistic
legislation.

62. The concession is the more dangerous, inasmuch as it is only
conceded to clamour and lawlessness.

LONDON:
PRINTED BY WILLIAM CLOWES AND SONS, LIMITED,
STAMFORD STREET AND CHARING CROSS.

TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE

Obvious typographical errors and punctuation errors have been
corrected after careful comparison with other occurrences within
the text and consultation of external sources.

Except for those changes noted below, all misspellings in the text,
and inconsistent or archaic usage, have been retained. For example,
livestock, live stock; highroad, high road; Free Trader, Free-Trader;
descanting; squib; cess; uncourteous.

Pg 26, ‘Liberal politicans’ replaced by ‘Liberal politicians’.
Pg 41, ‘nearly 3,000,000’ replaced by ‘nearly 300,000’.
Pg 47, ‘M. DeLavergne’ replaced by ‘M. De Lavergne’.
Pg 58, ‘without his cousent’ replaced by ‘without his consent’.
Pg 74, ‘cause the landord’ replaced by ‘cause the landlord’.
Pg 84, ‘thoughout Bengal’ replaced by ‘throughout Bengal’.
Pg 87, ‘posperity of each’ replaced by ‘prosperity of each’.
Pg 92, ‘for the artizan’ replaced by ‘for the artisan’.

End of Project Gutenberg's The British Jugernath, by Guildford L. Molesworth