Chapter IV: Marengo.8 (2)

It will be seen that Melas had so stationed his troops that he was weak at all points. Except at Genoa and along the Var, the Austrian army may be said to have been composed of a number of detachments scattered throughout northern Italy. Melas seemed to think that he must occupy every fortress, and guard every road and pass, in order to make secure his position in Italy. Herein lay his great fault; for, his forces being thus scattered, he could not unite them readily to oppose Bonaparte. Though Melas learned of the march of the Army of Reserve on Milan more than two weeks before the battle of Marengo, yet he was able to assemble only thirty-two thousand men at Alessandria to oppose the French.

The main cause, however, of the defeat of Melas was the fact that he was completely deceived as to the intentions of the First Consul. He had no expectation that Bonaparte would cross the Alps; in fact, he did not believe in the existence of an army of reserve. Having reached this conclusion from the reports of his own spies, and from the instructions sent him by the Aulic Council, he was utterly confounded when the French descended into Italy from the Mont Cenis, the Great St. Bernard, the Simplon, and St. Gothard passes. Not knowing by which route the strongest column was entering Italy, he knew not where to strike. Consequently, he hesitated and was lost.

Had he fathomed the designs of his adversary in time, he might have rapidly united his forces, and have defeated the several French columns in succession before they could have united in Italy; for, inasmuch as Bonaparte's object was to unite his columns within the Austrian theatre of operations, Melas could concentrate there more quickly than Bonaparte.

On the 29th of May Melas learned of the march of the Army of Reserve on Milan. He then had a splendid opportunity to strike Bonaparte a telling blow. His command at Turin numbered sixteen or seventeen thousand men. In his front at Chivasso and along the Po was Lannes with six or seven thousand. On his left was Thurreau with four thousand. Had Melas left four or five thousand men to hold Thurreau in check, and boldly attacked Lannes with the remainder of his forces, he could easily have defeated Lannes, and have immediately thereafter obtained possession of Bonaparte's communications with France. Such a master stroke would have greatly embarrassed Bonaparte; for he would then have been obliged either to turn back and fight Melas, in order to recover his communications with France, or to push on and fight Vukassovich, in order to establish his communications with Switzerland. Had Bonaparte adopted the former course, Vukassovich could have closed in on the French rear and have thus aided Melas; had he adopted the latter course, Melas could have aided Vukassovich.

That Melas did not carry out this course was due to the fact that no sooner had he learned of the destination of the Army of Reserve than he began to tremble for the safety of his own army. He at once perceived that it was the intention of Bonaparte to sever the Austrian communications. He therefore abandoned any intention which he may have had of attacking Lannes and of seizing the communications of Bonaparte, in order to take the necessary measures for the preservation of his own communications.

Consider now the operations of Bonaparte; they are worthy of careful study. No one who stops to consider the smallness of the means with which he defeated the Austrians in this campaign can fail to appreciate his genius.

At the outset an Austrian army of one hundred thousand men, led by a courageous commander, was in possession of northern Italy. Everywhere Melas had defeated the French. Masséna at Genoa was about to surrender; and Suchet along the Var was fighting desperately to prevent the invasion of France. Melas, encouraged by these successes, looked hopefully forward to new triumphs. Such was the situation when Bonaparte entered Italy with his columns, numbering in all a little less than sixty thousand men. With these forces he plunged into the Austrian theatre of operations, and in a month ended the campaign. He so manoeuvred that a victory of twenty-eight thousand Frenchmen over twenty-nine thousand five hundred Austrians decided the fate of one hundred thousand Austrians and gained for him the greater part of northern Italy.

How, in so short a time and with so few forces, did Bonaparte accomplish such results? In these comments an attempt will be made to answer this question. It is our purpose to analyze somewhat critically the strategical manoeuvres of Bonaparte, to compare the things he did with what he might have done, and to show why the whole of northern Italy fell into his possession as a result of the victory at Marengo. It is our purpose, also, to discuss the battle of Marengo from a tactical point of view, and to set forth some of the reasons why the battle, lost in the morning, was won in the afternoon.

The portion of northern Italy then occupied by the Austrians is divided by the Po and Apennines into three unequal parts, through all which roads pass eastwardly from the French frontier to Mantua. Bonaparte, having decided to lead the Army of Reserve into Italy, might have adopted any one of three plans. He might have marched into the southern part of the Austrian theatre of operations, lying between the Apennines and the Gulf of Genoa; or into the middle part between the Apennines and the Po; or into the northern part between the Po and Switzerland. Let us examine each of these plans, in order to determine, if possible, which would have procured him the greatest advantages.

Inasmuch as the mountainous and narrow strip of country lying between the Apennines and the sea was peculiarly fitted for the operations of an inferior army, composed mostly of infantry, and inasmuch as the Army of Reserve was deficient in both cavalry and artillery, it might seem that Bonaparte should have united his army with Suchet's forces on the Var for an attack against Melas. But other considerations deterred Bonaparte from doing so. His objections to this course were that even if he succeeded in forcing the crossings of the Var, the Austrians, as they fell back from position to position, would be constantly re-enforced, and could maintain the siege of Genoa. And again: if he succeeded in driving them across the Apennines and in defeating them at Genoa, they could still fall back along their communications to their base of operations on the Mincio, where they would be protected by Lake Garda on one side and by the fortress of Mantua on the other. Even should the Army of Reserve and all the undefeated portions of the Army of Italy be united into one army, Bonaparte's total strength would not exceed seventy thousand men. With this force he could hardly expect to defeat one hundred thousand Austrians flushed by their recent successes. Furthermore, by adopting this plan, no opportunity would be offered him of severing the Austrian communications.

"An ordinary general," says Jomini, "alarmed by the victorious attitude of the Austrians in Piedmont, would have gone in all haste by Dauphiné toward Provence, and made the Alps the theatre of operations. But Bonaparte appreciated too well the difficulties of a frontal attack. He preferred to cross the mountains upon the rear of the imperial forces and gain the Ticino unopposed, where his presence could not fail to recall his adversaries, and compel them to accept battle with all the chances of success against them."

In order to accomplish this result, Bonaparte had purposely led Melas to believe that the Army of Reserve was intended to re-enforce the Army of Italy. Though Melas did not believe in the existence of an army of reserve, he knew that an effort was being made to organize troops in France, and he believed that they would eventually be sent to join Suchet. But the First Consul had no intention of doing what Melas expected him to do. It was necessary to the success of Bonaparte that he should conceal as much as possible his own purposes, in order to be able to surprise his adversary. In war it is always wise to lead the enemy to believe that an attack will be made in a different direction from that intended. "In whatever way strategy is employed," says Colonel Maurice, "surprise and concealment are essential to success. On this account it will continually happen, in selecting a line of operations or a scheme of campaign, that the most important point of all is to carry out just what an enemy does not expect. Very often successful campaigns, the method of which has been subsequently much criticised, have owed their success to the fact that, from a nice calculation of time and distance, the successful general has seen that he could carry through an operation dangerous in itself, but sure not to be the one expected by his opponent. For the same reason, in all the brilliant and successful efforts of strategic skill, steps have been taken beforehand to carry out the preliminary movements of an army in such a way as to leave an enemy up to the last moment uncertain in what direction the blow would be struck."

Had Bonaparte marched into the middle part of the Austrian theatre of operations, it would have been necessary to cross the Alps over the Mont Cenis Pass. The objections to this plan were that the country lying between the Apennines and the Po contained the strong fortifications of Turin, Coni, Alessandria, and Tortona, which would enable the Austrians to hold Bonaparte in check long enough for Melas to concentrate his scattered forces. Furthermore, by entering Italy over this pass, Bonaparte would approach the centre of the Austrian line, which would enable the Austrians to concentrate against him more rapidly than if he moved against either flank of their position. Again: since the Austrians held the passes of the Apennines, they could delay the advance of the French on Genoa and continue the siege; or, if defeated, could fall back along the great highway leading from Piedmont through the Stradella Pass to Mantua.

Though the great chain of the Alps seemed to present an almost impassable barrier to an army attempting to enter the extreme northern part of Italy from France or Switzerland, Bonaparte did not allow this fact to deter him from his great undertaking. There were several reasons why he adopted this plan.

First: He knew that Melas was not expecting the French to enter this part of Italy.

Second: He knew that the country lying between the Po and Switzerland contained but few fortifications, and was occupied by only a few thousand Austrians.

Third: Owing to the fact that he had deceived Melas as to the existence and destination of the Army of Reserve, Bonaparte believed that he could cross the Alps with this army, march to Milan, and there be joined by Moncey's corps before Melas should discover his plan.

Fourth: Inasmuch as all the roads leading from the French frontier to the Austrian base of operations on the Mincio passed through the country lying between Milan and Placentia, he hoped that, by adopting this plan, he would be able to assemble his forces in this space, seize the roads there, and thus completely sever the Austrian communications and place Melas in a position where he must fight under a great disadvantage. With the French in possession of these roads, Melas would be compelled to concentrate and fight in order to recover his communications and save his army. In doing so he would be forced to raise the siege of Genoa and to abandon the attempted invasion of France.

Fifth: Should Bonaparte succeed in concentrating his forces as here set forth, the advantages of his position would be immense. The St. Gothard and Simplon routes in his rear would give him a safe retreat into the great stronghold of Switzerland in case of defeat; the Ticino would protect his right flank, the Adda his left; and the fertile plains of the Po would furnish the necessary supplies for his men and animals, while he was making ready to fight the Austrians or awaiting their attack.

Such are the principal reasons that decided Bonaparte to march the Army of Reserve into that part of Italy lying between the Po and Switzerland. But, having decided on this course, he had yet to determine whether he would lead the Army of Reserve across the Great St. Bernard, or march it into Switzerland and thence descend into Italy by way of the St. Gothard or the Simplon. It will be remembered that for a time he was undecided as to what course to take, and did not fully make up his mind until some time after the Army of Reserve had assembled at Lake Geneva.

In several respects the safest course that Bonaparte could have taken was to conduct his army into Switzerland, unite it with Moncey's corps, and march on Milan by way of the St. Gothard Pass. Had he adopted this course, he would have entered Italy with united forces along a single line of operations, and would have avoided the dangerous flank march from Ivrea to Milan within the enemy's territory. At this time his objective was Milan. His purpose was to assemble his army and the corps of Moncey in that vicinity. By crossing the Great St. Bernard with the Army of Reserve, while Moncey marched by way of the St. Gothard Pass, Bonaparte gave Melas the opportunity of concentrating the Austrian forces between the Army of Reserve and Moncey's corps, and of crushing each in turn with superior numbers.

In the comments on Moreau's operations in Germany, it has already been remarked that it is always a dangerous operation to attempt a concentration upon some designated place within the enemy's lines, for, as a rule, the enemy can mass his forces there more rapidly than the commander of an invading army; that in fact many a campaign has failed because the commanding general has attempted to concentrate his scattered forces upon some point within the territory held by the enemy. By so doing he gives the enemy a chance to assemble his forces between the separated columns of the attacking army, and to bring superior numbers against each column in succession. Yet in these operations Bonaparte not only committed this error, not only did what he had condemned Moreau for doing, but he also violated the principle which he himself had so often set forth and had so often exemplified, namely, _not to invade a country with a double line of operations_.

Why then did Bonaparte take this course? To answer satisfactorily this question it is necessary to bear in mind that, at this time, Suchet was fighting greatly superior forces on the Var, and that Masséna was in desperate straits at Genoa. The problem before Bonaparte was not merely to assemble his forces in the vicinity of Milan, but so to assemble them there as to stop the projected invasion of France and bring speedy relief to Masséna.

The most direct route from Lake Geneva to Milan is by way of the Great St. Bernard Pass, and thence through northern Italy. Had, therefore, Bonaparte taken the longer route through Switzerland by way of the St. Gothard, the Austrians, in the meantime, could have forced the crossings of the Var, and have compelled Masséna to surrender. Indeed, these events were the more likely to happen, inasmuch as the Army of Reserve, during its march through Switzerland, would not threaten in the least the Austrian communications.

The importance of crossing the Great St. Bernard with the Army of Reserve is seen in the fact that no sooner had French troops appeared in the valley of the Aosta than Melas at once withdrew ten thousand men from Suchet's front and ordered them to march on Turin. Thus, by the mere crossing of the Great St. Bernard with the Army of Reserve, the projected invasion of France was brought to an end. It was inevitable that such should be the case; for as soon as the French appeared in the extreme northern part of Italy, their mere presence there threatened the communications of the Austrians. It was therefore necessary that Melas should abandon the invasion of France, in order to destroy, if possible, the French troops that were threatening his rear. In war, it will ever be thus. No commander can afford to take the risk of pushing forward to new conquests so long as his communications are seriously threatened by his enemy.

Again: it will be remembered that no sooner had Melas learned that the Army of Reserve was marching on Milan than he sent orders to General Elsnitz to abandon the Var and to General Ott to raise the siege of Genoa. Even the mere knowledge of Bonaparte's destination, before the movement on Milan had actually been completed, was of itself sufficient to cause Melas to change immediately his entire plan of campaign. Had not Masséna, at the time, been just on the point of giving up Genoa, General Ott would not have delayed there two or three days to await the capitulation. In fact, had Masséna known of the exact state of affairs, he doubtless would have held out a day or two longer, and saved himself the humiliation of a surrender. Even without a battle, the concentration of the French forces between Milan and Placentia would, in a short time, have set free Masséna's soldiers; for Melas would then have been obliged to concentrate and fight, in order to recover his communications and connect with his base of supplies. Bonaparte saw clearly this fact. Though he did not know how long Masséna could hold out at Genoa, he realized that matters there were rapidly approaching a crisis, and that it was of the utmost importance that the Army of Reserve should reach Milan at the earliest possible moment. He realized that upon the direction given his columns and upon the rapidity of their movements depended the fate of Suchet on the Var and of Masséna at Genoa.

Other reasons, too, deterred Bonaparte from marching the Army of Reserve through Switzerland. In this rough and mountainous country, supplies could not be easily obtained. Especially was this true of the St. Gothard route, which had been overrun by the French during the two previous years. Besides, this route was reserved for Moncey's corps, which, of itself, would tax to the utmost the resources of the country. Moreover, this road, a mere bridle path in places, passes through narrow defiles and across lofty and rugged mountains. Evidently a large army issuing into Italy by this route would be so stretched out that the advance divisions could be defeated before the rear divisions could re-enforce them.

The Simplon route was shorter than the St. Gothard route, but the difficulties to be overcome on each were of the same character. Inasmuch, however, as Lake Maggiore lies between these two routes, it will be observed that, had Bonaparte advanced into Italy by way of the Simplon, while Moncey marched by way of the St. Gothard, Melas might have assembled a strong force at the foot of the lake, and, from his central position, have thrown superior numbers against each French column in succession. In this way he might have defeated both in detail before they could have united at Milan.

The principal reasons why Bonaparte chose the Great St. Bernard route having been considered, it will now be of interest to point out the several courses that he might have taken after having descended the Alps into the lower valley of the Aosta. It will be remembered that on the 27th of May Bonaparte was between Ivrea and Chivasso with thirty-five thousand men, and that Melas was at Turin with sixteen or seventeen thousand. At this time Bonaparte might have taken any one of three courses. He might have advanced on Turin, driven back Melas, united with Thurreau's division at Susa, and thus have secured his communications with France by the Mont Cenis route; or he might have crossed the Po at Chivasso, attacked and driven Melas from Turin, then have marched on Genoa by way of Alessandria; or, lastly, he might have marched on Milan, and there have united his army with Moncey's corps. In his memoirs Napoleon himself has discussed the advantages and disadvantages of these plans as follows:--

"Of these three courses, the first was contrary to the true
principles of war. Since Melas had considerable forces with him, the
French army, therefore, would run the risk of fighting without having
a certain retreat, Fort Bard not being then taken. Besides, if Melas
should abandon Turin and move on Alessandria, the campaign would be
a failure, and each army would find itself in its natural position:
the French army resting upon Mont Blanc and Dauphiné; and that of
Melas with its left at Genoa, and in its rear the fortified places of
Mantua, Placentia, and Milan.

"The second course appeared impracticable: how hazardous would have
been the situation of the French between the Po and Genoa, in the
midst of an army so powerful as that of the Austrians, without any
line of operations[9] (communication), any assured retreat.

"The third course, on the other hand, presented every advantage:
the French army, once in possession of Milan, would secure all the
magazines, depots, and hospitals, of the enemy's army; it would join
the left under General Moncey, and have a safe retreat by the Simplon
and St. Gothard. The Simplon led to the Valais and Sion, whither
all the magazines of provisions for the army had been sent. The St.
Gothard led into Switzerland, of which we had been in possession for
two years, and which was covered by the Army of the Rhine then on the
Iller. In this position the French general was at liberty to act as
he pleased; if Melas should march with his whole army from Turin upon
the Sesia and the Ticino, the French army could give him battle with
this incalculable advantage, that, if it should be victorious, Melas,
with his retreat cut off, would be pursued and driven into Savoy; and
if it should be defeated, it could retreat by the Simplon and the St.
Gothard. If Melas, as it was natural to suppose, should move towards
Alessandria in order to join the army coming from Genoa, it might be
hoped that, by advancing towards him and crossing the Po, he might
be met and be forced to fight before he could reach Alessandria. (In
other words, before the troops of Melas, and of General Ott, coming
from Genoa, could unite at Alessandria.) The French army having its
rear secured by the river, and by Milan, the Simplon, and the St.
Gothard; while the Austrian army, having its retreat cut off, and
having no communications with Mantua and Austria, would be liable
to be thrown upon the mountains of the western coast of Genoa, or
entirely destroyed, or taken at the foot of the Alps, at the Col
di Tenda and in the county of Nice. Lastly, by adopting the third
course, if it should suit the First Consul, when once master of
Milan, to suffer Melas to pass, and to remain between the Po, the
Adda, and the Ticino, he would thus, without a battle, reconquer
Lombardy, and Piedmont, the Maritime Alps, and the Genoese territory,
and raise the blockade of that city; these were flattering results to
anticipate."

Bonaparte has been severely criticised for not taking the second course, which he has so briefly discussed in his memoirs. It has been represented that in marching on Milan, he sacrificed Masséna, when he might have marched directly to the relief of Genoa by way of Alessandria, and thus have saved his lieutenant the humiliation of a surrender. But what are the facts? They are that Melas sent orders to General Ott to raise the siege of Genoa before the Army of Reserve had even reached Milan. Had, therefore, Bonaparte crossed the Po at Chivasso, attacked and driven back Melas, and marched on Alessandria, he could not have brought relief to Masséna any earlier.

If Bonaparte had crossed the Po, he could undoubtedly have defeated Melas and driven him back to Alessandria; but here the Austrian commander, protected by the fortifications of the city, would doubtless have made a stand, and would have collected a large force to oppose Bonaparte. In this position, Melas would be joined by General Elsnitz, already marching on Alessandria, and could receive re-enforcements from General Ott and from General Vukassovich. Thus, in a short time, he could outnumber Bonaparte's army. Moreover, at Alessandria he could prevent the junction of Moncey's corps with the Army of Reserve, and might possibly be able to defeat them in detail.

In this position, Bonaparte, if defeated, would have no unobstructed line of retreat, for Fort Bard was still held by the Austrians; and, if victorious, he could do no more than force Melas back along the great highway to Mantua. In fact, should Melas be defeated at Alessandria, he could fall back to the fortress of Tortona or to the Stradella Pass, and there occupy another strong position. Here, with the re-enforcements that would doubtless join him from Genoa, from Vukassovich's corps, and from the fortresses in his rear, he would still have great chances of success.

In short, it would have been the height of folly for Bonaparte, with no secure line of retreat, to march into the centre of the Austrian theatre of operations, and expect to conquer Italy with but thirty-five thousand men. Even though it had been necessary to sacrifice Masséna, Bonaparte would have been justified in marching on Milan; for, in no other way could he be joined by Moncey's corps; in no other way could he sever the Austrian communications, and in no other way could he hope to defeat Melas and conquer Italy. Victory was his object.

The most critical part of Bonaparte's operations was the flank march from Ivrea to Milan; for at this time his only line of retreat was by way of the Great St. Bernard; and even on this route the Austrians still held Fort Bard.

Under ordinary circumstances, a flank march is always more or less a hazardous undertaking. When a commander makes this movement and is attacked in route, he must form front to a flank,[10] and fight with his battle-line parallel to his communications, while the enemy can fight with his front perpendicular to his communications. In this position the advantage of the enemy is enormous. If victorious, he severs the communications of his adversary, and may then capture or destroy his army; if defeated, he can retreat in safety along his communications, or fall back to a new position, fight again, and thus prolong the conflict. An army without communications is like a rudderless ship adrift on the ocean. In order to fight, soldiers must have food and ammunition. No greater calamity, short of defeat, can befall a commander than to be cut from his base of operations and lose his source of supply.

Had, therefore, the Army of Reserve been defeated while marching from Ivrea to Milan, it would have lost its line of communication by way of the Great St. Bernard. In that case it would undoubtedly have been captured or destroyed; for since the Italian entrances of the St. Gothard and Simplon passes were then held by ten thousand Austrians under Vukassovich, Bonaparte could not have retreated into Switzerland.

That Bonaparte appreciated the critical features of the situation is seen in the skill with which he planned and executed the march. By ordering Lannes to make preparations to cross the Po at Chivasso, Bonaparte gave Melas the impression that the French intended to cross the Po and attack the Austrians near Turin. Thus Melas was deceived. Meanwhile Bonaparte, with the greater part of the Army of Reserve, marched rapidly on Milan. During the march Lannes descended the Po towards Pavia, thus covering as with a screen the movements of Bonaparte. So skilfully were these manoeuvres made that Melas did not even attempt to cross the river, in fact, did not even learn of the march of Bonaparte until the 29th of May, two days after the movement had begun. On the 31st Bonaparte arrived on the Ticino; and on the 2d of June, having driven back Vukassovich's corps, he entered Milan. Here the critical part of his march ended, for he was then sure of being joined by Moncey's corps, and had, in case of need, a safe line of retreat into Switzerland by the St. Gothard and Simplon passes.

Another circumstance that aided Bonaparte in this march was the presence of Thurreau's division of four thousand men at Susa. Melas, being ignorant of the strength of this division, hesitated to push forward and attack Lannes, so long as these troops remained undefeated on his flank and rear. On this point General Hamley makes the following comments:--

"Thurreau's force, being entirely separated from the main army
throughout the operations, was useful only as leading the enemy to
a false conclusion. But its value in that respect was incalculable.
There were sufficient Austrian troops round Turin to check Thurreau
and crush Lannes, thus laying bare the rear of the French army. But
the road of the Mont Cenis was both more practicable and more direct
than that of the St. Bernard; moreover, Thurreau had artillery,
and Lannes, at first, had not, for his guns had been delayed by
the difficulties of passing the Austrian fort of Bard. It was but
a natural error, therefore, for Melas to believe that Thurreau was
backed by the whole French army."

Upon his arrival at Milan a threefold problem confronted Bonaparte. His object was to prevent the escape of the Austrians, to preserve his communications with Switzerland, and, in case of an Austrian attack, to make a quick concentration for battle. The skill with which he solved this complex problem will become apparent, if we turn to the map and study the positions of the French forces immediately after the arrival of Moncey's corps. These forces numbered fifty-five thousand men. Thirty-two thousand were stationed along the Po from Placentia to the Stradella Pass on the great highway leading from Alessandria to Mantua; ten thousand were stationed on the Ticino; ten thousand on the Adda; and three thousand at Milan. Thus it will be seen that these forces were occupying the sides of the triangular space enclosed by the Ticino, the Po, and the Adda; and that they held possession of all the roads leading from the Alps to the Austrian base of operations on the Mincio. The ten thousand men on the Ticino not only protected the Italian entrance to the St. Gothard on the west side, but they were in a position to dispute the passage of the Ticino, should Melas cross to the north side of the Po and attempt to reach Mantua by way of Pavia and Milan. In the event that Melas should adopt this plan, the resistance that these ten thousand men could offer him would give Bonaparte time to unite all his forces for battle on the north side of the Po. The thirty-two thousand men on the south side of the Po closed with a barrier of steel the great highway leading from Alessandria to Mantua. On this road they had fortified a camp at the Stradella; and across the Po they had constructed five bridges, which would enable Bonaparte, in an emergency, to recross the river rapidly with these troops. The ten thousand men along the Adda not only covered the Italian entrance to the St. Gothard on the east side, but they were in a favorable position for holding in check Vukassovich's corps, should it attempt to march westward to the relief of Melas. It will be observed, too, that, should Melas attempt to escape by marching to Genoa, and thence to Mantua by way of Bobbio and Placentia, the French forces about Placentia and along the Adda could delay the progress of the Austrians long enough for Bonaparte to concentrate all his forces against them.

Occupying a triangle in the heart of northern Italy, the French corps and divisions supported one another. In a few hours Bonaparte could concentrate nearly the whole of his army on the Po, on the Ticino, or on the Adda. In this position he held complete possession of the Austrian communications, and had his own with Switzerland strongly guarded. In this position he could concentrate quickly, and fight with nearly every advantage in his favor.

"Napoleon has told us," says Colonel Hart, "that the whole art of war--the secret of success--consists in being strongest at the decisive point." Even when making a great flank or turning movement against his enemy, Napoleon kept this principle constantly in view. Thus, in these operations, though at the outset the several columns under his immediate command, numbering nearly sixty thousand men, entered Italy from different directions, separated by intervening obstacles and great distances, yet, by deceiving his adversary and by skilful manoeuvres, he succeeded in conducting fifty-five thousand men into such positions that they could, in an emergency, support one another on a single battle-field. His theory of war was concentration. His constant endeavor was to outnumber the enemy in battle. In order to accomplish this result, he nearly always made a great effort to call in his detachments just previous to a general engagement. His skill in strategy consisted in so directing his columns that when needed they could be quickly assembled on the battle-field. His skill in war consisted in the fact that he nearly always brought greater numbers against his enemy on the day of battle, even when he was outnumbered within the theatre of operations. On the battle-field, too, when it was impossible to outnumber his adversary, his quick eye discerned the vital point, the key of the position, so to speak; and there, neglecting the less important points, he massed his troops and overwhelmed his enemy. But in this campaign, strange to relate, after the battle of Montebello, and prior to the battle of Marengo, he seemed to neglect the principle of calling in his columns. When he assembled his forces south of the Po in the Stradella Pass, he felt certain that Melas would shortly advance eastward from Alessandria to attack him; yet he issued no orders for his forces north of the Po to join him. Again: at Marengo he was outnumbered, while ten thousand French soldiers along the Ticino, but a short distance away, had not a single Austrian in their front.

Inasmuch as Bonaparte held the crossings of the Po between Pavia and Cremona, he could easily have assembled the greater part of his army on the south side of the Po, and have brought greatly superior numbers against Melas. But Bonaparte feared that, if he adopted this plan, Melas might cross the Po and make his escape by way of Pavia and Milan. It will be remembered that, just prior to the battle of Marengo, Bonaparte was completely in the dark as to the movements of his adversary. He did not know but that the Austrian commander was making preparations to escape. As a matter of fact Bonaparte had lost touch of his enemy. He was in a state of confusion and uncertainty as to the intentions of Melas. He could not understand why the Austrians did not march eastward from Alessandria and attack the French, unless it was because they were about to attempt their escape by way of Pavia and Milan, or by way of Genoa. Had Bonaparte known the true state of affairs; had he known that the Austrians would soon cross the Bormida to attack the French, undoubtedly he would have assembled on the battle-field the ten thousand men stationed along the Ticino. That he did not do so was an error; perhaps, under the circumstances, an unavoidable one, but nevertheless an error, for he was outnumbered at Marengo when he might easily have outnumbered his adversary. In fact, nearly all his operations after the battle of Montebello are open to criticism. They are not up to the standard of the ordinary operations of Napoleon. His forces were scattered when they might have been united. He attempted too much. In order to win everything, he incurred unnecessary hazard. In order to prevent the Austrians from escaping, he took too great a risk on the battle-field.

It will be borne in mind that it is easy for any one, having a fair knowledge of the science of war, to point out, after the event, the mistakes that were made. During active operations confusion and doubt are constant factors that cannot be ignored by a commander. Neither Bonaparte nor his officers knew, or could know, the facts as we know them to-day. Thus the military student is able, after months of study, to point out the errors made by a great master of war. He approaches the subject from a different point of view from that of the commanding general. He is cognizant of facts, many of which at the time were unknown to the head of the army. He writes in the light; Napoleon marched in the darkness. He has the details of the campaign at his finger's end; Napoleon had to form his conclusions from the doubtful information at hand. Thus it is that mediocrity can criticise what genius alone can conceive and execute.

Again: it must be remembered that the really great soldier is not he who never makes a mistake, but he who in the aggregate makes the fewest mistakes. In war the conditions are such that a commander cannot by any possibility always know the truth. He must often decide momentous questions on the spur of the moment, basing his decisions on unreliable information obtained mostly from reports and rumors. "Speak to me of a general who has made no mistakes in war," says Turenne, "and you speak of one who has seldom made war." "In the profession of war," says Napoleon, "the game is always to the one who makes the fewest mistakes."

If Bonaparte had withdrawn all his forces to the south side of the Po, Melas might have made his escape by way of Pavia and Milan, but even then Bonaparte would have won northern Italy without a battle. Had Melas taken this course, it is evident that he would have severed the communications of Bonaparte with Switzerland. Though the loss of the French communications would doubtless have inconvenienced Bonaparte, it would not have put a stop to his active operations, nor have proved fatal to his army; for he could then have united his forces with those of Suchet, and have at once established another line of communication with France by way of Nice. On this point General Hamley, one of the greatest of military critics, comments as follows:--

"There was a special circumstance in this campaign which should have
induced Napoleon to bring his whole army to the south bank. For if
Melas moved through Milan he would leave the country south of the Po
clear for Napoleon to establish another and better communication
with France by the south of the Apennines, and, moreover, a junction
with Suchet would be effected, and the territory which was to be the
prize of the campaign would be lost to the Austrians. But Napoleon
could not be satisfied to let the enemy escape, even at such a
sacrifice of territory, and therefore it was that he left the Ticino
guarded."

In studying these operations, one cannot but be struck by the fact that Bonaparte seemed extremely anxious to retain his communications with Switzerland. The arrangement of his forces was admirable for this purpose. Even when he fought at Marengo, he had unobstructed communication across the Po to Milan, and thence to the St. Gothard Pass. Rather than weaken his communications by withdrawing his forces from the Ticino, he seemed to prefer the hazard of battle with a superior enemy. In a critical examination of these operations, it is almost impossible not to come to the conclusion that Bonaparte had a good reason for holding on to his communications with Switzerland. Being at the head of the French government, he had control of the armies of the Republic. He had crossed the Alps to conquer. Much depended on his success, for his own destiny hung in the balance. Undoubtedly he intended to return to France triumphant, whatever should be the cost. He was bold enough to stake all on a single throw--to hazard his own and his country's fate on a single battle. If he should be defeated at Marengo and be driven out of the valley of the Po, might he not retreat through Switzerland into Germany with the remnants of his forces? Might he not unite them with Moreau's army, crush Kray in the valley of the Danube, march on the Austrian capital, and "conquer Italy at Vienna"? Is it not possible that this may have been the reason why he held on so persistently to his communications with Switzerland?

In this discussion it has just been assumed that Bonaparte might have been driven out of the valley of the Po. But this assumption is altogether improbable. Even if Bonaparte had been defeated at Marengo, the chances of his success on another field in Italy would still have been greatly in his favor. It needs but a glance at the situation to substantiate this statement. It is evident that if Melas had been victorious at Marengo, he would have attempted to open up his communications with Mantua, by marching eastward from Alessandria through the Stradella Pass. His victorious troops would have numbered at the most but twenty-three thousand men. Doubtless Bonaparte, while holding the Stradella Pass with the detachment already there, would have fallen back across the Po with the remnants of his defeated forces, numbering not less than eighteen thousand men; and would have united them with his columns on the north side of the river. In this way he could have collected in a short time on the north bank of the Po an army of about forty thousand men to oppose the twenty-three thousand under Melas. In this position the French communications would have been in no danger; but the Austrians, in order to recover their communications, would have been obliged to force the intrenched camp of the Stradella; which operation would have given Bonaparte time to cross the Po and attack the Austrians in flank. Having the advantage of position and an overwhelming superiority in numbers, Bonaparte would undoubtedly have crushed and destroyed the army of Melas. If this statement seems too strong, reflect a moment, remember that during his entire career Napoleon never lost a battle in which he outnumbered his adversary.

In the result of the victory at Marengo is seen the brilliancy of Bonaparte's strategy. Having finally won the battle, northern Italy as far as the Mincio at once fell into his hands. Notwithstanding the fact that he failed to outnumber his enemy on the battle-field of Marengo, his strategy was such that he could fight there with the assurance that he would lose little if he were defeated, but would gain much if he were victorious.

On the other hand, Melas fought the battle, knowing that he must conquer or lose all. Already his communications were in the hands of Bonaparte. Nothing short of overwhelming victory could wrest them from the French. Though Melas did not know the number of French troops in his front, yet, having once decided upon the course to take, he made an heroic effort to save his army. Courageously he faced the inevitable. Brave man that he was, when the time came he fought as a soldier should fight.

After the battle of Montebello, Bonaparte united near the Stradella Pass all his forces south of the Po. Here he collected twenty-nine thousand men. Being deficient in cavalry and artillery, while Melas was well supplied with both, Bonaparte decided to occupy this strong position, where his flanks would be protected by the Po on one side and by the spurs of the Apennines on the other. He had every reason to believe that Melas would shortly advance from Alessandria, cross the Scrivia, and attempt to cut his way through the French army. If, therefore, Bonaparte should push westward from the Stradella, he must expect to meet the Austrians in the plain lying between the Scrivia and Bormida rivers. Here, however, the superiority of the Austrians in cavalry and artillery would give them a great tactical advantage. On the plain their artillery would have full sweep, and their cavalry could manoeuvre with freedom against the flanks of the French. Moreover, Bonaparte believed that the Austrian forces, under the immediate command of Melas, outnumbered those of the French.

It was, therefore, neither wise nor prudent for Bonaparte to leave this strong position and march westward into the plain of Marengo. Other reasons, however, caused him to take this course.

First: He feared lest the Austrians should escape. While he remained in this position, they might march on Genoa, or cross the Po at Valenza, thence proceed to Pavia and force the crossings of the Ticino.

Second: He wished to attack and defeat the Austrians under Melas before they could be re-enforced by the numerous other Austrian detachments scattered throughout Italy. Bonaparte had already delayed his movements several days to await the arrival of Moncey's corps. During the delay Masséna had surrendered. Now, Bonaparte was anxious to bring matters to an issue before other advantages should accrue to the Austrians.

Third: Though from a tactical point of view the chances of success in the open country were unfavorable to Bonaparte, yet from a strategical point of view they were greatly in his favor. He had severed the Austrian communications by closing the great highway leading from Alessandria to Mantua. Along the Ticino he had a strong force to prevent Melas from escaping in that direction; in the Stradella Pass he had established a fortified camp; and from Pavia to Cremona he held the line of the Po, across which he had constructed five bridges that could be used for a retreat in case he should be defeated. In the open country, therefore, a defeat would, at the most, be but a temporary check, for he could fall back, cross the Po, unite his defeated troops with the French forces on the north side of the river, and be ready in a short time to fight another battle. On the other hand, since the communications of the Austrians were already in possession of the French, the defeat of Melas must result in the capture or destruction of his army, and in the loss of northern Italy. It follows, therefore, that in the plain of Marengo Bonaparte could gain much more by a victory than he could lose by a defeat.

Fourth: He never was satisfied to take up a defensive position, and there await an adversary. He seldom fought defensive battles. He believed in the offensive. His method of making war was to march and to fight. It was necessary to seek the enemy, to meet him face to face, to crush him on the battle-field.

At the battle of Marengo, Bonaparte was surprised. Having but a small cavalry force under his immediate command, he held it in reserve in rear of his infantry in order that it might, in case of battle, be used against the Austrian cavalry, which greatly outnumbered his own. Had he ordered it to the front to seek the Austrians and to screen the movements of Victor and Lannes, doubtless he would not have remained completely in the dark as to the position and intention of his enemy. It has been said that "Cavalry are the eyes of an army." Certainly for the want of it at Marengo, or for the failure to use what he had for screening and reconnoitring purposes, Bonaparte lost touch of his enemy.

Again: when he found that the village of Marengo was not occupied in force by the Austrians, he was led to believe that Melas was trying to escape. He was still further confirmed in this belief by the result of the reconnoissance made on the 13th of June from Marengo towards Alessandria. Though the Austrians were occupying the bridge-head on the right bank of the Bormida and the two bridges in rear of it, the French officer in command of the reconnoitring party failed to learn this fact. Indeed, he reported that no Austrians were to be found in force along the Bormida. Dumas tells us that "Bonaparte would not go to bed until he made sure whether the Austrians had a bridge over the Bormida. At one o'clock in the morning the officer in charge of this mission returned and reported that it did not exist. This announcement quieted the First Consul. He required a last account of the position of his troops, and went to sleep not believing that there would be an engagement the next day." This false information deceived Bonaparte. It was, in fact, one of the causes that led to his defeat on the following morning.

If this reconnoitring party had done its duty, Bonaparte would undoubtedly have been prepared for battle. In that case he would have held on to Desaix, and would have concentrated his forces at Marengo and along the Fontanone. Had he occupied this position with twenty-eight thousand men, he might have defeated the Austrians in detail as they crossed the Bormida. Even had Melas succeeded in crossing the Bormida with his entire army, he would then have been obliged to fight a great battle with an unfordable river directly in his rear. Thus situated, the defeat of Melas must have resulted in the capture or annihilation of his army.

For several days Melas hesitated whether he should cross the Bormida and attack the French. Owing, however, to the fact that he did not decide until the 13th of June to attack Bonaparte, he neglected to occupy Marengo. This neglect permitted Victor to occupy the village, and aided him materially in resisting the attacks of the Austrians on the next day. Yet, on the whole, this blunder of Melas proved to be more advantageous to the Austrians than to the French; for it led Bonaparte to believe that Melas had no intention of crossing the Bormida and of attacking the French in the plain of Marengo.

In sending two thousand five hundred cavalry to Acqui to watch Suchet, Melas committed an error that probably lost him the battle. There was little or no excuse for this error; for Suchet was so far away that he could not possibly arrive at Marengo in time to take part in the battle. Had Melas kept this cavalry force on the battle-field, and thrown it vigorously against the French as they fell back towards San Giuliano, he would undoubtedly have won the battle. It was the failure of the Austrians to pursue the French promptly that enabled Bonaparte to rally the scattered remnants of his defeated forces near San Giuliano. Says Colonel Hart:--

"When a great battle is imminent, it is unwise for a commander to
detach any part of the force available, unless he is very confident
of victory. There are many examples in history of misfortune, or
misfortune narrowly escaped, in consequence of doing so. Melas would,
in all probability, have made perfectly certain of the victory at
Marengo, if he had not unnecessarily detached 2500 cavalry to arrest
the march of Suchet, who was at too great a distance to be taken
into consideration. Napoleon himself at Marengo, although ultimately
victorious, was as nearly as possible defeated because he detached
Desaix to reconnoitre towards Rivalta; indeed, he was at first
defeated, but the return of Desaix restored the battle."

It is here worthy of notice that while Melas was sending away this detachment of two thousand five hundred men, Bonaparte was making every effort to hasten the return of the six thousand men under Desaix.

At the sound of the first cannon-shot at Marengo, Desaix faced about his command and hurried forward to aid Bonaparte. It was fortunate that the First Consul had Desaix for a lieutenant at Marengo. Had Grouchy marched to the sound of the cannon at Waterloo, and supported his chief as loyally as did Desaix at Marengo, Napoleon might never have fallen.

If Suchet, who was at Acqui with the remnants of the Army of Italy, numbering about twenty thousand men, had pushed on vigorously towards Marengo, and had arrived there on the morning of the 14th of June, the battle would have been decided in favor of the French early in the day. Such a movement would have given Bonaparte an overwhelming superiority in numbers, and would probably have resulted in the destruction or capture of the whole army of Melas.