Chapter IV: Marengo.8 (3)

That Suchet did not take this course was due to several causes. The soldiers of the Army of Italy had just finished a great fight. They had already performed heroically their part in the great struggle. Many of them, too, having starved and suffered at Genoa, had become so emaciated that they could hardly bear the weight of their equipments. Moreover, Suchet, who was still acting under the orders of Masséna, had been cautioned not to peril his army by advancing too far. Inasmuch as Bonaparte had been more than twenty days in Italy, and had not yet destroyed Melas, Masséna was somewhat doubtful of the outcome. Consequently he wished to hold the Army of Italy well in hand, so that, in case Bonaparte should be defeated, it could fall back to the Var, and, being there re-enforced from the departments of southern France, make another effort to save France from invasion.

On the morning of the 14th of June the forces of Melas concentrated at Alessandria numbered thirty-two thousand men. He held the two bridges spanning the Bormida, and the bridge-head on the right bank. On the opposite side of the river the French forces available for battle numbered twenty-two thousand men. In addition, Desaix's division, if it could be recalled in time, would increase the French forces to twenty-eight thousand. Early in the day Melas had despatched two thousand five hundred men of his reserve cavalry on Acqui. It will thus be seen that the opposing forces at Marengo were about equal in strength: the Austrians numbered twenty-nine thousand five hundred men; the French, twenty-eight thousand. But at the outset the advantages were greatly in favor of Melas. He outnumbered Bonaparte in both cavalry and artillery, and the plain of Marengo was especially favorable to these arms. His forces were united; the French were scattered. Desaix's division was marching on Novi; and the remainder of Bonaparte's forces extended over a distance of ten miles from Marengo to and even beyond the Scrivia. Moreover, Bonaparte was not expecting a battle. Thus it happened that when the Austrians crossed the Bormida, the French were surprised and outnumbered. At first Victor bore the brunt of the fight; then he and Lannes were attacked by nearly the whole Austrian army. By the time Bonaparte arrived on the field with the Consular Guard, the reserve cavalry, and Monnier's division, Victor was crushed and Lannes badly shattered. It was then too late for the re-enforcement under Bonaparte to turn the tide of battle. That too was soon overwhelmed. In short, Melas defeated the French forces in detail. During that morning he was always stronger than his adversary at the decisive points.

In the afternoon all was changed. The Austrians were scattered; they stretched from Marengo to San Giuliano. Moreover, they were marching carelessly and had no expectation that Bonaparte would attack them. Meanwhile, Desaix had returned, and Bonaparte's forces had rallied behind the hillocks near San Giuliano. In a short time Bonaparte overthrew the advance under Zach, then proceeding westward, gathering momentum and strength as a result of his first success, he outnumbered and crushed in succession the several Austrian organizations. Thus the Austrians were defeated in detail in the afternoon as the French had been defeated in the morning. Here again is seen the necessity of outnumbering an enemy at the vital point of the battle-field. Courage and heroism on the field of battle are of little avail, unless a commander concentrates his forces and outnumbers his adversary at the decisive point. The brain of the commanding general is the birthplace of victory.

In this battle the genius of Bonaparte is seen, not in the knowledge he displayed of his adversary's doings, for Bonaparte was completely surprised at Marengo; not in the arrangement of his forces, for that could hardly have been worse; not in any deeds of surpassing courage, for no one could excel the heroism of Lannes on that battle-field; but in his complete mastery of the situation,--in the fact that, amidst turmoil, ruin, and death, he saw just when and where and how the blow should be struck to change disaster into victory. This was the merit of Bonaparte at Marengo. On that field he was a great tactical captain. While the storm of battle was at its height, and the dying and the dead were around him, he was cool, clear-headed, and vigilant. While disaster was staring him in the face, he saw the vulnerable spot in the formation of his adversary's forces, and by massing troops there, crushed and overwhelmed them.

In this campaign Bonaparte was fortunate in having a Masséna at Genoa, a Suchet on the Var, and a Lannes at Montebello and at Marengo. He was fortunate, too, in having a Desaix near at hand, who dared march to the sound of the cannon, and who counselled hope when he might have counselled despair.

Though these operations of Bonaparte were brilliant in strategic manoeuvres and in far-reaching results, nevertheless they were faulty in execution. Out of a total force of fifty-five thousand men, the greater part of whom might have been present on the battle-field of Marengo, only twenty-eight thousand fought there. Instead of calling in his detachments before the engagement, and of outnumbering his enemy on the battle-field, as had always been his plan heretofore, he permitted himself to be outnumbered by Melas. Rather than let a single Austrian escape, he took great chances on the battle-field. In short, he attempted to grasp too much; and, by doing so, sacrificed a certain amount of safety. Doubtless within his breast there was the feeling that he would stake all and abide by the consequences. Reckless of the sequel, he pressed on with the faith of a fatalist, little realizing how much glory and how much gloom yet remained in store for him. It would seem that his triumph was written in the stars; perhaps, too, his fall was written there.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 8: See Maps 2 and 4.]

[Footnote 9: In his memoirs and in other places Napoleon often speaks of "lines of operations," meaning "lines of communication." Every advancing army must necessarily have a line of operations. If the roads leading from an army to its base are held by the enemy, the army is said to have lost its communications; in other words, to have lost its line of communication with its base of operations. The point that Napoleon intended to make in the discussion is this: Fort Bard being at the time in possession of the Austrians, the French army had no unobstructed line of communication back to its base of operations at Lake Geneva; hence, if defeated, it would find great difficulty in retreating by this route.]

[Footnote 10: An army _forms front to a flank_ when it operates on a front parallel to the line communicating with its base.]