Chapter XXXI: Introduction: On the Divine Idea (2)

The lecture of Chief Justice Dunne is a well-reasoned document, written in a plain, direct, and popular style--that of a lawyer who both understands his subject and the way of presenting it to an audience which will make them understand it.

HOW TO MAKE A LIVING. Suggestions upon the Art of Making,
Saving, and Using Money. By George Carey Eggleston. New York:
Putnams. 1875.

This very small and neat book contains a great many practical and sensible suggestions.

THE STORY OF A CONVERT. By B. W. Whitcher, A.M. New York: P.
O’Shea. 1875.

Those who have read the _Widow Bedott Papers_ have not forgotten that humorous and extremely satirical production. The authorship of this clever _jeu d’esprit_ was in common between Mr. Whitcher and his former wife, a lady who died many years ago. Something of the piquant flavor of that early work is to be found in _The Story of a Convert_. It is, however, in the main, serious, argumentative, and remarkably plain and straightforward. Mr. Whitcher was an Episcopalian minister. He became a Catholic from reading, conviction, and the grace of God, which, unlike many others, he obeyed at a great sacrifice. He has, since that time, lived a laborious, self-denying, humble life as a Catholic layman; and his arguments have therefore the weight of his good example to increase their force. The fidelity to conscience of such men is a severe reproach to the _dilettanti_ and amateur theologians who dabble for amusement in pseudo-Catholicism, and are ready to sacrifice their consciences and to mislead others to their eternal perdition for the sake of worldly advantages. This little book is one well worthy of circulation, and likely to do a great deal of good. We notice that the author mentions the name of McVickar among the converts from the General Theological Seminary. We have never heard of any convert of that name who was ever a student at this seminary, and we think Mr. Whitcher’s memory must have deceived him in this instance. We trust that this excellent little book will find an extensive sale and the honesty of the author at least a few imitators.

THE ORPHAN’S FRIEND, ETC. By A. A. Lambing, late Chaplain to S.
Paul’s Orphan Asylum, Pittsburg. New York: D. & J. Sadlier &
Co. 1875.

This series of plain, simple instructions in religion and morals is intended, by a kind friend of the orphans, to be a guide to them when they are sent forth into the world. The poor orphans certainly need all the friends and all the sympathy and help they can get, and it was a good thought in the pious author to prepare this excellent little book.

THE OLD CHEST; or, The Journal of a Family of the French People
from the Merovingian Times to Our own Days. Translated from the
French by Anna T. Sadlier. New York: D. & J. Sadlier & Co. 1875.

THE STRAW-CUTTER’S DAUGHTER, and THE PORTRAIT IN MY UNCLE’S
DINING-ROOM. Two Stories. Edited by Lady Georgiana Fullerton.
Translated from the French. Same publishers.

The first of these pretty little volumes is quite unique in its idea. A picture is given of French life and manners at the different epochs of history, by a series of supposed narratives preserved and handed down from father to son in an old chest, which was bequeathed by the last of the family to a friend, who published its contents. It is not so good in execution as in conception; for, indeed, it would require the hand of a master to carry out such an idea successfully. Nevertheless it is quite interesting and instructive reading.

The two stories of the second volume are romantic, tragic, vividly told, and quite original in conception.

ESSAYS ON CATHOLICISM, LIBERALISM, AND SOCIALISM, considered
in their fundamental principles. By J. D. Cortes, Marquis of
Valdegamas. Translated from the Spanish by Rev. W. McDonald,
A.B., S.Th.L., Rector of the Irish College, Salamanca. Dublin:
W. B. Kelly. 1874. (New York: Sold by The Catholic Publication
Society.)

We do not ordinarily feel called upon to speak of _new editions_, but in the present instance the book under notice is also a new translation of a valuable work. These _Essays_ were translated by an accomplished lady in this country several years since; but as the work was not issued by a Catholic house, it may have escaped the attention of many of our readers who would be glad to make its acquaintance. We perceive that the original work was submitted to the approval of one of the Benedictine theologians at Solesmes, and that Canon Torre Velez has, in an appreciative introduction, discussed the plan and analysis of the work, so that the reader is pretty well certified of the value and correctness of the opinions advanced.

The title of the first chapter, “How a great question of theology is always involved in every great political question,” shows what a direct bearing the work has on topics of permanent interest.

We have a special reason for wishing that this and similar works may be widely known, in the fact that Spain--intellectually, more, perhaps, than physically--is so much a _terra incognita_ to the rest of the world.

DOMUS DEI: A Collection of Religious and Memorial Poems. By
Eleanor C. Donnelly. Philadelphia: Peter F. Cunningham & Son.
1875.

This volume is published “for the benefit of the Church of S. Charles Borromeo,” in course of erection at Philadelphia. The authoress is already before the public.

Among the “religious” poems is one entitled “Bernadette at the Grotto of Lourdes.” They are all pleasant reading. The “memorial” poems, again, will be considered by many the choicest part of the book.

We wish the volume an extensive patronage.

THE IRISH WORLD.

It is not customary nor ordinarily proper for a magazine to engage in controversies which are waged among newspapers. Nevertheless, the one in which the _Irish World_ is engaging itself with a considerable number of our Catholic newspapers is of such unusual importance and violence that we trust we may be permitted to make a few remarks upon it. Disunion, division of sentiment founded on differences of nationality and race, extreme partisan contests on any pretext whatever, and violent hostilities, among those who profess the Catholic religion, especially just at this time and in this country, are to be deprecated as more injurious to the cause of the faith and church of God than any amount of opposition from professed enemies of the Catholic religion. These can only be avoided by adopting and following out pure and perfect Catholic principles In all things whatsoever, and making the Catholic rule of submission to lawful authority, and conformity to the Catholic tradition, the Catholic spirit, and the common-sense which pervades the whole body of sound, loyal, hearty Catholics everywhere, without any exception or reservation, the standard of judgment and the law of action. It is necessary to be first a Catholic and afterwards French, German, American, English, or Irish, as the case may be; to be first of all sure that we understand and receive the teaching and the spirit of the Catholic Church, in theology, philosophy, morals, politics, and that we make her rights and interests, her advancement and glory, the spiritual and eternal good of the whole human race, the triumph of Jesus Christ, and the glory of God, paramount to everything. Secondary interests, and ideas, opinions, projects, which spring merely from private conviction or characterize nationalities, schools, parties, associations of human origin, should always be subordinate and be kept under the control of the higher principles of Catholic unity, charity, and enlightened regard for the rights of all men. This is the only true liberality. Liberalism, as it is called, which is nothing else than the detestable, anti-Christian Revolution, destroys all this by subverting the principle of order, which alone secures harmony, a just equality, and the rights of all. What is called Catholic liberalism, and has been denounced by Pius IX. as more dangerous and mischievous among Catholics than any open heresy could be, is a system of independence of Catholic authority, and of separation from the Catholic common doctrine and sentiment, of disrespect, disloyalty, irreverence, disobedience, and opposition to the hierarchy and the Holy See, in those things which are not categorically defined as articles of faith, yet, nevertheless, are doctrinally or practically determined by authority.

We have not been in much danger in this country from any clique of ecclesiastical and theological liberals. But the line adopted by the _Irish World_ shows an imminent danger from another quarter. The editor professes submission to the authority of the Catholic Church in respect to the faith, and those precepts of religion and morals which are essential. We give him credit for sincerity and honesty and for good intentions. These are not, however, sufficient guarantees against principles and opinions which are erroneous, logically incompatible with doctrines of faith, tending to subvert faith in the minds of his readers, and producing an irreverent and disloyal spirit contrary to the true Christian and Catholic submission and respect to the prelates and the priesthood which is commanded by the law of God. If the respected gentleman who edits the _Irish World_ desires to employ his talents and zeal to a really noble and useful purpose, with success and honor, for the spiritual and temporal welfare of men of his own race and religion, we recommend to him, in a friendly spirit, to modify some of his ideas in a more Catholic sense, and to take counsel from those who understand thoroughly the doctrine and spirit of the Catholic Church. Much greater men than any of us--Jansenius, De Lamennais, Döllinger, and a host of others--began by professing to be Catholics in _faith_. But they preferred their own private notions in respect to certain reforms in doctrine, discipline or morals, and politics, which they considered to be necessary and important, to the judgment of their spiritual rulers and the common Catholic sense. Their end was in heresy or apostasy, and they misled to their ruin those who followed them. We trust we shall be spared the misfortune of seeing a falling away from the faith of any part of the Catholic race of Ireland, either at home or in other countries. They are in no danger of perversion to Protestantism, nor are they at present assailable by open and avowed enemies of religion. It is by hidden poison only that they can be gradually infected and destroyed. This poison must disguise itself in some way as Liberal Catholicism. This is precisely the lurking poison which the unerring Catholic instinct has detected in the specious, pseudo-Christian, pseudo-Scriptural, pseudo-Catholic, and pseudo-Irish communism into which the conductors of the _Irish World_ have been unwittingly betrayed. A journal so extensively circulated must necessarily, unless purged from this foreign and noxious element, do a great deal of harm. If the good sense, honesty, and Catholic faith of its editors are strong enough to free them from the specious illusions of Liberalism, the _Irish World_ is in a condition to exert a very great and extensive influence for good, and we shall heartily wish it success. We approve of the free and generous activity of laymen in associations and through the press. Nevertheless, the great liberty enjoyed by them is liable to misdirection, and it is very necessary to guard against disorders which may spring from its abuse.

* * * * *

“Sacerdos” is requested to send his address to the editor of THE CATHOLIC WORLD, who will be happy to answer his note in a private letter.

BOOKS AND PAMPHLETS RECEIVED.

From G. P. PUTNAM’S Sons: The Maintenance of Health. By J. M.
Fothergill, M.D. 12mo, pp. 362. Protection and Free Trade. By
Isaac Butts, 12mo, pp. 190. Religion as affected by Modern
Materialism. 18mo, pp. 68.

From KELLY, PIET & CO.: Meditations of the Sisters of Mercy,
before the Renewal of Vows. By the late Rt. Rev. Dr. Grant,
Bishop of Southwark (Reprinted from an unpublished edition of
1863.) 18mo, pp. 116.

From R. WASHBOURNE, London: Rome and Her Captors. Letters
collected by Count Henry D’Ideville. 1875. 12mo, pp. 236.

From D. & J. SADLIER & CO., New York: The Month of S. Joseph;
or, Exercises for each day of the month of March. By the Rt.
Rev. M. de Langalerie, Bishop of Belley. 1875.

From BURNS & OATES, London: Jesus Christ, the Model of the
Priest. From the Italian, by the Rt. Rev. Mgr. Patterson. 24mo,
pp. 103.

From MCGLASHAN & GILL, Dublin: The History of the Great Irish
Famine of 1847. By the Rev. J. O’Rourke. 12mo, pp. xxiv., 559.

From LEE & SHEPARD, Boston: The Island of Fire. By Rev. P. C.
Headley. 12mo, pp. 339.

From THE CATHOLIC PUBLICATION SOCIETY, New York: The Spirit of
Faith; or, What must I do to Believe? Five Lectures, delivered
at S. Peter’s, Cardiff, by the Rt. Rev. Bishop Hedley. O.S.B.
12mo, pp. 104.

THE CATHOLIC WORLD.

VOL. XXI., No. 124.--JULY, 1875.

Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1875. by Rev. I. T. HECKER, in the Office of the Librarian of Congress, at Washington, D. C.

SPACE.

I.

Mathematicians admit three kinds of continuous quantities, viz., the quantity of space measured by local movement, the quantity of time employed in the movement, and the quantity of change in the intensity of the movement. Thus all continuity, according to them, depends on movement; so that, if there were no continuous movement, nothing could be conceived as continuous. The ancient philosophers generally admitted, and many still admit, a fourth kind of continuous quantity, viz., the quantity of matter; but it is now fully demonstrated that bodies of matter are not, and cannot be, materially continuous, even in their primitive molecules, and that therefore the quantity of matter is not continuous, but consists of a discrete number of primitive material units. Hence, matter is not divisible _in infinitum_, and gives no occasion to infinitesimal quantities, except inasmuch as the volumes, or quantities of space, occupied (not filled) by matter are conceived to keep within infinitesimal dimensions. We may, therefore, be satisfied that space, time, and movement alone are continuous and infinitely divisible, and that the continuity of space and time, as viewed by the mathematicians, is essentially connected with the continuity of movement. But space measured by movement is a _relative_ space, and time--that is, the duration of movement--is a _relative_ duration; and since everything relative presupposes something absolute which is the source of its relativity, we are naturally brought to inquire what is _absolute_ space and _absolute_ duration; for, without the knowledge of the absolute, the relative can be only imperfectly understood. Men of course daily speak of time and of space, and understand what they say, and are understood by others; but this does not show that they know the intimate nature, or can give the essential definition, of either time or space. S. Augustine asks: “What is time?” and he answers: “When no one asks me, I know what it is; but when you ask me, I know not.” The same is true of space. We know what it is; but it would be hard to give its true definition. As, however, a true notion of space and time and movement cannot but be of great service in the elucidation of some important questions of philosophy, we will venture to investigate the subject, in the hope that by so doing we may contribute in some manner to the development of philosophical knowledge concerning the nature of those mysterious realities which form the conditions of the existence and vicissitudes of the material world.

_Opinions of Philosophers about Space._--Space is usually defined “a capacity of bodies,” and is styled “full” when a body actually occupies that capacity, “void,” or “empty,” when no body is actually present in it. Again, a space which is determined by the presence of a body, and limited by its limits, is called “real,” whilst the space which is conceived to extend beyond the limits of all existing bodies is called “imaginary.”

Whether this definition and division of space is as correct as it is common, we shall examine hereafter. Meanwhile, we must notice that there is a great disagreement among philosophers in regard to the reality and the essence of space. Some hold, with Descartes and with Leibnitz, that space is nothing else than the extension of bodies. Others hold that space is something real, and really distinct from the bodies by which it is occupied. Some, as Clarke, said that space is nothing but God’s immensity, and considered the parts of space as parts of divine immensity. Fénelon taught that space is virtually contained in God’s immensity, and that immensity is nothing but unlimited extension--which last proposition is much criticised by Balmes[115] on the ground that extension cannot be conceived without parts, whereas no parts can be conceived in God’s immensity.

Lessius, in his much-esteemed work on God’s perfections, after having shown (contrary to the opinion of some of his contemporaries) that God by his immensity exists not only within but also without the world, puts to himself the following objection: “Some will say, How can God be in those spaces outside the skies, since no spaces are to be found there which are not fictitious and imaginary?” To which he answers thus: “We deny that there are not outside of the whole world any true intervals or spaces. If air or light were diffused throughout immensity outside of the existing world, there would certainly be true spaces everywhere; and in the same manner, if there is a Spirit filling everything outside of this world, there will be true and real spaces, not corporeal but spiritual, which, however, will not be really distinct from one another, because a Spirit does not extend through space by a distribution of parts, but fills it, so to say, by its totalities.… Hence, when we say that God is outside of the existing world, and filling infinite spaces, or that God exists in imaginary spaces, we do not mean that God exists in a fictitious and chimerical thing, nor do we mean that he exists in a space really distinct from his own being; but we mean that he exists in the space which his immensity formally extends, and to which an infinite created space may correspond.… We may therefore distinguish space into _created_, _uncreated_, and _imaginary_. Created space embraces the whole corporeal extension of the material world. Uncreated space is nothing less than divine immensity itself, which is the primitive, intrinsic, and fundamental space, on the existence of which all other spaces depend, and which by reason of its extension is equivalent to all possible corporeal spaces, and eminently contains them all. Imaginary space is that which our imagination suggests to us as a substitute for God’s immensity, which we are unable to conceive in any other wise. For, just as we cannot conceive God’s eternity without imagining infinite time, so neither can we conceive God’s immensity without imagining infinite space.”[116]

Boscovich, in his _Theory of Natural Philosophy_, defines space as “an infinite possibility of ubications,” but he does not say anything in regard to the manner of accounting for such a possibility. Others, as Charleton, were of opinion that real space is constituted by the real ubication of material things, and imaginary space by the actual negation of real ubications.

Among the modern authors, Balmes, with whom a number of other philosophers agree on this subject, gives us his theory of space in the following propositions:

“1st. Space is nothing but the extension of bodies themselves.

“2d. Space and extension are identical notions.

“3d. The parts which we conceive in space are particular extensions, considered as existing under their own limits.

“4th. The notion of infinite space is the notion of extension in all its generality--that is, as conceived by the abstraction of all limits.

“5th. Indefinite space is a figment of our imagination, which strives to follow the intellectual process of generalization by destroying all limits.

“6th. Where no body exists, there is no space.

“7th. Distance is the interposition of a body, and nothing more.

“8th. If the body interposed vanishes, all distance vanishes, and contiguity, or absolute contact, will be the result.

“9th. If there were two bodies only, they would not be distant; at least, we could not intellectually conceive them as distant.

“10th. A vacuum, whether of a large or of a small extent, whether accumulated or scattered, is an absolute impossibility.”[117]

These assertions form the substance of Balmes’ theory of space. But he wisely adds: “The apparent absurdity of some of these conclusions, and of others which I shall mention hereafter, leads me to believe either that the principle on which my reasonings rest is not altogether free from error, or that there is some latent blunder in the process of the deduction.”[118]

Lastly, to omit other suppositions which do not much differ from the ones we have mentioned, Kant and his followers are of opinion that space is nothing but a subjective form of our mind, and an intuition _a priori_. Hence, according to them, no real and objective space can be admitted.

Amid this variety and discord of opinions, we can hardly hope to ascertain the truth, and satisfy ourselves of its reality, unless we settle a few preliminary questions. It is necessary for us to know, first, whether any vacuum is or is not to be admitted in nature; then, we must know whether such a vacuum is or is not an objective reality. For, if it can be established that vacuum is mere nothingness, the consequence will be that all real space is necessarily and essentially filled with matter, as Balmes and others teach; if, on the contrary, it can be established that vacuum exists in nature, and has an objective reality, then it will follow that the reality of space does not arise from the presence of bodies, and cannot be confounded with their extension. In this case, Balmes’ theory will fall to the ground, and we shall have to borrow from Lessius and Fénelon, if not the whole solution of the question, at least the main conceptions on which it rests.

_Existence of Void Space._--The first thing we must ascertain is the existence or non-existence of vacuum in nature. _Is there any space in the world not occupied by matter?_

Our answer must be affirmative, for many reasons. First, because without vacuum local movement would be impossible. In fact, since matter does not compenetrate matter, no movement can take place in a space full of matter unless the matter which lies on the way gives room to the advancing body. But such a matter cannot give room without moving; and it cannot move unless some other portion of matter near it vacates its place to make room for it. This other portion of matter, however, cannot make room without moving; and it cannot move unless another portion of matter makes room for it; and so on without end, or at least till we reach the outward limits of the material world. Hence, if there is no vacuum, a body cannot begin to move before it has shaken the whole material world throughout and compelled it to make room for its movement. Now, to make the movement of a body dependent on such a condition is absurd; for the condition can never be fulfilled. In fact, whilst the movement of the body cannot begin before room is made for it, no room is made for it before the movement has begun; for it is by moving that the body would compel the neighboring matter to give way. The condition is therefore contradictory, and can never be fulfilled, and therefore, if there is no vacuum, no local movement is possible.

Secondly, it has been proved in one of our articles on matter[119] that there is no such thing in the world as material continuity, and that therefore all natural bodies ultimately consist of simple and unextended elements. It is therefore necessary to admit that bodies owe their extension to the intervals of space intercepted between their primitive elements, and therefore there is a vacuum between all the material elements. This reason is very plain and cannot be questioned, as the impossibility of continuous matter has been established by such evident arguments as defy cavil.

Thirdly, bodies are compressible, and, when compressed, occupy less space--that is, their matter or mass is reduced to a less volume. Now, such a reduction in the volume of a body does not arise from material compenetration. It must therefore depend on a diminution of the distances, or void intervals, between the neighboring particles of matter.

Fourthly, it is well known that equal masses can exist under unequal volumes, and _vice versa_--that is, equal quantities of matter may occupy unequal spaces, and unequal quantities of matter may occupy equal spaces. This shows that one and the same space can be more or less occupied, according as the density of the body is greater or less. But the same space cannot be more or less occupied if there is no vacuum. For, if there is no vacuum, the space is _entirely_ occupied by the matter, and does not admit of different degrees of occupation. It is therefore evident that without vacuum it is impossible to account for the specific weights and unequal densities of bodies.

Against this, some may object that what we call “vacuum” may be full of imponderable matter, say, of ether, the presence of which cannot indeed be detected by the balance, but is well proved by the phenomena of heat, electricity, etc. To which we answer, that the presence of ether between the molecules of bodies does not exclude vacuum; for ether itself is subject to condensation and rarefaction, as is manifest by its undulatory movements; and no condensation or rarefaction is possible without vacuum, as we have already explained.

Another objection against our conclusion may be the following: Simple elements, if they be attractive, can penetrate through one another, as we infer from the Newtonian law of action. Hence, the possibility of movement does not depend on the existence of vacuum. We answer, that the objection destroys itself; for whoever admits simple and unextended elements, must admit the existence of vacuum, it being evident that no space can be filled by unextended matter. We may add, that natural bodies and their molecules do not exclusively consist of attractive elements, but contain a great number of repulsive elements, to which they owe their impenetrability.

The ancients made against the existence of a vacuum another objection, drawn from the presumed necessity of a true material contact for the communication of movement. Vacuum, they said, is _contra bonum naturæ_--that is, incompatible with the requirements of natural order, for it prevents the interaction of bodies. This objection need hardly be answered, as it has long since been disposed of by the discovery of universal gravitation and of other physical truths. As we have proved in another place that “distance is an essential condition of the action of matter upon matter,”[120] we shall say nothing more on this point.

_Objective Reality of Vacuum._--The second thing we must ascertain is _whether space void of matter be a mere nothing, or an objective reality_. Though Balmes and most modern philosophers hold that vacuum is mere nothingness, we think with other writers that the contrary can be rigorously demonstrated. Here are our reasons.

First, nothingness is not a region of movement. But vacuum is a region of movement. Therefore, vacuum is not mere nothingness. The minor of this syllogism is manifest from what we have just said about the impossibility of movement without vacuum, and the major can be easily proved. For, the interval of space which is measured by movement may be greater or less, whilst it would be absurd to talk of a greater or a less nothing; which shows that vacuum cannot be identified with nothingness. Again, void space can be really occupied, whilst it would be absurd to say that nothingness is really occupied, for occupation implies the presence of that which occupies in that which is occupied; hence, the occupation of nothingness would be the presence of a thing to nothing. But presence to nothing is no presence at all, just as relation to nothing is no relation. And therefore, the occupation of void space, if vacuum were a mere nothing, would be an evident contradiction. Moreover, nothingness has no real attributes, whereas real attributes are predicated of void space. We find no difficulty in conceiving void space as infinite, immovable, and virtually extended in all directions; whilst the conception of an extended nothing and of an infinite nothing is an utter impossibility. Whence we conclude that space void of matter is not a mere nothing.

Secondly, a mere nothing cannot be the foundation of a real relation: space void of matter is the foundation of a real relation; therefore, space void of matter is not a mere nothing. In this syllogism the major is quite certain; for all real relation has a real foundation, from which the correlated terms receive their relativity. Now, all real foundation is something real. On the other hand, nothingness is nothing real. Therefore, a mere nothing cannot be the foundation of a real relation. The minor proposition is no less certain, because space founds the relation of distance between any two material points, which relation is certainly real. In fact, that on account of which a distant term is related to another distant term, is the possibility of movement from the one to the other--that is, the possibility of a series of successive ubications between the two terms, without which no distance is conceivable. But the possibility of successive ubications is nothing else than the successive occupability of space, or space as occupable. And therefore, occupable space, or space void of matter, is the foundation of a real relation, and accordingly is an objective reality.

Thirdly, if vacuum were mere nothingness, no real extension could be conceived as possible. For, since all bodies are ultimately composed of elements destitute of extension, as has been demonstrated at length in our articles on matter, and since the primitive elements cannot touch one another mathematically without compenetration, the extension of bodies cannot be accounted for except by the existence of void intervals of space between neighboring elements. But, if vacuum is a mere nothing, all void intervals of space are nothing, and nothing remains between the neighboring elements; and if nothing remains between them, all the elements must be in mathematical contact, and therefore unite in a single indivisible point, as even Balmes concedes. Whence it is evident that the existence of real extension implies the objective reality of vacuum. We conclude, therefore, that space void of matter is not a mere nothing, but an objective reality.

Against this proposition some objections are made by the upholders of a different doctrine. In the first place, distance, they say, is a mere negation of contact; and since a mere negation is nothing, there is no need of assuming that vacuum is a reality.

We answer, that, if distance were a mere negation of contact, there would be no different distances; for the negation of contact does not admit of degrees, and cannot be greater or less. Distances may be, and are, greater or less. Therefore, distance is not a mere negation of contact. The negation of contact shows that the terms of the relation are distinct in space; for distinction in space is the negation of a common ubication. But the distinction of the terms, though a necessary condition for the existence of the relation, does not constitute it. Hence, the relation of distance presupposes, indeed, the distinction of the terms and the negation of contact, but formally it results from a positive foundation by which the terms are linked together in this or that determinate manner. If the interval between two material points were nothing, a greater interval would be a greater nothing, and a less interval a less nothing. We presume that no philosopher can safely admit a doctrine which leads to such a conclusion.

A second objection is as follows: It is possible to have distance without any vacuum between the distant terms. For, if the whole space between those terms were full of matter, their distance would be all the more real, without implying the reality of vacuum.

We answer, first, that, to fill space, continuous matter would be needed; and, as continuous matter has no existence in nature, no space can be filled with matter so as to exclude real vacuum. We answer, secondly, that, were it possible to admit continuous matter, filling the whole interval of space between two distant terms, the reality of that interval would still remain independent of the matter by which it is assumed to be filled; for matter is not space; and, on the other hand, if all the matter which is supposed to fill the interval be removed, the distance between the terms will not vanish; which shows that the filling of space, even if it were not an impossible task, would not in the least contribute to the constitution of real distances. Hence, space, even if it were assumed to be full of matter, would not found the relation of distance by its fulness, but only by its being terminated to distinct terms, so as to leave room between them for a certain extension of local movement.

A third objection may be the following: True though it is that real attributes are predicated of void space, it does not follow that void space is an objective reality. For, when we say that space, as such, is infinite, immovable, etc., we must bear in mind that we speak of a potential nature, and that those predicates are only potential. Again, though we must admit that void space can be measured by movement, we know that such a mensuration is not made by terms of space, but by terms of matter. Lastly, although space is the capacity of receiving bodies, it does not follow that there is in space any receptive reality; for its capacity is sufficiently accounted for by admitting that space becomes real by its very occupation.[121]

To the first point of this objection we answer, that space may, perhaps, be called a “potential nature” in this sense, that it is susceptible of new extrinsic denominations; but if by “potential nature” the objector means to express a potency of being, and to convey the idea that such a nature is not real, then it is absolutely wrong to say that void space is a potential nature. Space is not in a state of possibility, and never has been, as we shall presently show. Hence the predicates, _infinite_, _immovable_, etc., by which the nature of space is explained, express the actual attributes of an actual reality. The author from whom we have transcribed this objection says that such predicates of space are real, not _objectively_, but only _subjectively_. He means, if we understand him aright, that the reality of such predicates must be traced to the bodies which occupy space, not to space itself, and that, though we conceive those predicates to be real owing to the real bodies we see in space, yet they are not real in space itself. As for us, we cannot understand how “to be _infinite_, to be _immovable_, to be _occupable_, etc.,” can be the property of any body which occupies space, or be the property of space, by reason of its occupation and not by reason of its own intrinsic nature. Space must be really occupable before it is really occupied; and nothing is really occupable which is not real, as we have already established. Whence we conclude that this part of the objection, as confounding the possibility of occupation with the possibility of being, has no weight.

To the second point we answer, that the thing mensurable should not be confounded with that by which it can be measured. Whatever may be the nature of the measure to be employed in measuring, no mensuration is possible unless the mensurable is really mensurable. Hence, no matter by what measure space is to be measured, it is always necessary to concede that, if it is really measured, it is something real. The assertion that space is measured “by terms of matter” can scarcely have a meaning. Terms, in fact, measure nothing, but are merely the beginning and the end of the thing measured. Space is measured by continuous movement, not by terms of matter; but before it is thus measured, it is mensurable; and its mensurability sufficiently shows its objective reality.[122]

To the third point of the objection we reply, that space is not a _subject_ destined to receive bodies; and therefore it is not to be called “a capacity of _receiving_ bodies.” Hence, we admit that space has no “receptive” reality. But there are realities which are not receptive, because they are not intrinsically potential; and such is the reality of space, as we shall hereafter explain. With regard to the assertion that “space becomes real by its very occupation,” we observe that, if space void of matter is nothing, as the objection assumes, it is utterly impossible that it become a reality by the presence of bodies in it. The presence of a body in space is a real relation of the body to the space occupied; and such a relation presupposes two real terms--that is, a real body and a real space. If space, as such, is nothing, bodies were created in nothing, and occupy nothing. Their volumes will be nothings of different sizes, their dimensions nothings of different lengths, and their movements the measurement of nothing. It is manifest that real occupation presupposes real occupability, and real mensuration real mensurability; and, since mensurability implies quantity (_virtual_ quantity, at least), to say that occupable and mensurable space is nothing, is to pretend that nothingness implies quantity--a thing which we, at least, cannot understand. Moreover, to consider void space as a potency of being, destined to become a reality through the presence of bodies, is no less a blunder than to admit that the absolute is nothing until it becomes relative, or to admit the relative without the absolute. In fact, the space occupied by a body is a relative space, as its determination depends on the relative dimensions of the body. On the other hand, the relative dimensions of the body are themselves dependent on space, for without space there are no dimensions; and the space on which such relative dimensions depend must be a reality in itself, independently of the same dimensions, it being evident that the dimensions of the body cannot bestow reality upon that which is the source of their own reality. To say the contrary is to destroy the principle of causality, by making the absolute reality of the cause dependent on the reality of its effects. The assertion that “the absolute is nothing until it becomes relative,” leads straight to Pantheism. If you say that absolute space is nothing until it is occupied by bodies, and thus actuated and exhibited under determinate figures, the Pantheist will say, with as much reason, that the absolute being is nothing until it is evolved in nature, and thus actuated and manifested under different aspects. If you say that absolute space, as such, is but an imaginary conception, he will draw the inference that absolute being, as such, is similarly a mere figment of our brains. If you say that the only reality of space arises from its figuration and occupation, he will claim the right of concluding, in like manner, that the only reality of the absolute arises from its evolution and manifestation. We might dilate a great deal more on this parallel; for everything that the deniers of the reality of void space can say in support of their view can be turned to account by the deniers of a personal God, and be made to serve the cause of German Pantheism--the manner of reasoning of the latter being exactly similar to that of the former. This is a point of great importance, and to which philosophers would do well to pay a greater attention than was done in other times, if they admit, in the case of space, that “the absolute is nothing until it becomes relative,” they will have no right to complain of the Pantheistic applications of their own theory.

_Vacuum unmade._--The third thing we have to ascertain is, _whether void space, absolutely considered as to its reality, be created or uncreated_. This point can be easily settled. Those who say that vacuum has no objective reality have, of course, no alternative. For them, vacuum must be uncreated. But they are probably not prepared to hear that we too, who defend the reality of void space, do not differ from them in the solution of this question.

To prove that space void of matter is not created, the following plain reasons may be adduced. First, space void of matter is neither a material nor a spiritual creature. It is no material creature; for it excludes matter. It is no spiritual creature; for, whether there be spiritual creatures or not, it is necessary to admit occupable space.

Secondly, no created thing is immovable, unchangeable, and unlimited. Absolute space is evidently immovable, unchangeable, and unlimited. Therefore, absolute space is not a product of creation.

Thirdly, space considered absolutely as it is in itself, exhibits an infinite and inexhaustible possibility of real ubications. But such a possibility is to be found nowhere but in God alone, in whom all possible things have their formal possibility. And therefore, the reality of absolute space is all in God alone; and accordingly, such a reality not only is not, but could never be, created.

Fourthly, whatever is necessary, is uncreated and eternal. Space considered absolutely as it is in itself is something necessary. Therefore, absolute space is uncreated and eternal. The major of this syllogism is evident; the minor is thus proved: Space absolutely considered is nothing else than the formal possibility of real ubications; but the possibility of things contingent is necessary, uncreated, and eternal; for all contingent things are possible before any free act of the creator, since their intrinsic possibility does not depend on God’s volition, as Descartes imagined, but only on his essence as distinctly and comprehensively understood by the divine intellect.

Our next proposition will afford a fifth proof of this conclusion. Meanwhile, we beg of our reader not to forget the restriction by which we have limited our present question. We have spoken of space _absolutely considered_ as it is in itself--that is, of absolute space. Our conclusion, if applied to relative space, would not be entirely true; for relative space implies the existence of at least two contingent terms, and therefore involves something created. We make this remark because men are apt to confound relative with absolute space, owing to the sensible representations which always accompany our intellectual operations, and also because we think that the philosophical difficulties encountered by many writers in their investigation of the nature of space originated in the latent and unconscious assumption that their imagination of relative space was an intellectual concept of absolute space. It is thus that they were led to consider all space void of matter as imaginary and chimerical.

_Quiddity of Absolute Space._--It now remains for us to ascertain _the true nature of absolute space_, and to point out its essential definition. Our task will not be difficult after the preceding conclusions. If absolute space is an uncreated, infinite, eternal, and unchangeable reality, it must be implied in some of the attributes of Godhead. Now, the divine attribute in which the reason of all possible ubications is contained, is immensity. Hence, absolute space is implied in God’s immensity, and we shall see that it is nothing else than _the virtuality or the extrinsic terminability_ of immensity itself.

Before we prove this proposition, we must define the terms _virtuality_ and _terminability_. “Virtuality” comes from _virtus_ as formality from _forma_. Things that are actual owe their being to their form; hence, whatever expresses some actual degree of entity is styled “a formality.” Thus, personality, animality, rationality, etc., are formalities exhibiting the actual being of man under different aspects. Things, on the contrary, that have no formal existence, but which may be made to exist, owe the possibility of their existence to the power (_virtus_) of the _efficient cause_ of which they can be the effect, or to the nature of the _sufficient reason_ from which they may formally result. In both cases, the things in question are said to exist virtually, inasmuch as they are virtually contained in their efficient cause or in their sufficient reason. Hence, every efficient cause or sufficient reason, as compared with the effects which it can produce or with the results of which it may be the foundation, is said to have “virtuality”; for, the virtuality of all producible effects, as of all resultable relations, is to be found nowhere but in their efficient cause and in their formal reason. Thus all active power has a virtuality extending to all the acts of which it may be the causality, and all formal reason has a virtuality extending to all the results of which it may be the foundation. God’s omnipotence, for instance, virtually contains in itself the reality of all possible creatures, and therefore possesses an infinite virtuality. In a similar manner, God’s immensity has an infinite virtuality, as it virtually contains all possible ubications, and is the reason of their formal resultability. Omnipotence has an infinite virtuality as an _efficient_ principle; immensity has an infinite virtuality as a _formal_ source only.

These remarks about virtuality go far to explain the word “terminability.” Whenever an efficient cause produces an effect, its action is terminated to an actuable term; hence, so long as the effect is not produced, the power of the efficient cause is merely terminable. In the same manner, whenever a formal reason gives rise to an actual result, and whenever a formal principle gives being to a potential term, there is a formal termination; and therefore, so long as the result, or the actual being, has no existence, its formal reason is merely terminable. Hence, terminability has the same range as virtuality; for nothing that is virtually contained in an efficient or in a formal principle can pass from the virtual to the actual state except by the termination of an efficient or a formal act to a potential term.

We have said that absolute space is nothing else than the virtuality, or extrinsic terminability, of God’s immensity. The first proof of this conclusion is as follows. Absolute space is the possibility of all real ubications. But such a possibility is nothing else than the infinite virtuality of God’s immensity. Hence our conclusion. The major of our syllogism is obviously true, and is admitted by all, either in the same or in equivalent terms. The minor needs but little explanation; for we have already seen that absolute space is an uncreated reality, and therefore is something connected with some divine attribute; but the only attribute in which the possibility of all real ubications is contained, is God’s immensity. Hence, the possibility of real ubications is evidently nothing else than the extrinsic terminability of divine immensity. In other terms, God’s immensity, like other divine attributes, is not only an immanent perfection of the divine nature, by which God has his infinite ubication in himself, but also the source and the eminent reason of all possible ubications, because it contains them all _virtually_ in its boundless expanse. Hence, the infinite virtuality of God’s immensity is one and the same thing with the possibility of infinite ubications. And, therefore, absolute space is nothing but the virtuality of divine immensity.

Let the reader take notice that divine immensity is, with regard to absolute space, the _remote principle_, or, as the Schoolmen would say, the _principium quod_, whilst the virtuality or extrinsic terminability of divine immensity is the _proximate principle_, or the _principium quo_. Hence, it would not be altogether correct to say that absolute space is nothing but God’s immensity; for, as we call “space” that in which contingent beings can be ubicated, it is evident that the formal notion of space essentially involves the connotation of something exterior to God; and such a connotation is not included in divine immensity as such, but only inasmuch as it virtually pre-contains all possible ubications. And for this reason the infinite virtuality of God’s immensity constitutes the formal ratio of absolute space. It is in this sense that we should understand Lessius when he says: “The immensity of the divine substance is to itself and to the world a sufficient space: it is an expanse capable of all producible nature, whether corporeal or spiritual. For, as the divine essence is the first essence, the origin of all essences and of all conceivable beings, so is the divine immensity the first and self-supporting expanse or space, the origin of all expanse, and the space of all spaces, the place of all places, and the primordial seat and basis of all place and space.”[123]

The second proof of our conclusion may be the following. Let us imagine that all created things be annihilated. In such a case, there will remain nothing in space, and there will be an end of all contingent occupation, presence, or ubication. Yet, since God will remain in his immensity, there will remain that infinite reality which contains in its expanse the possibility of infinite contingent ubications; for there will remain God’s immensity with all its extrinsic terminability. In fact, God would not cease to be in those places where the creatures were located; the only change would be this, that those places, by the annihilation of creatures, would lose the contingent denominations which they borrowed from the actual presence of creatures in them, and thus all those ubications would cease to be _formal_, and would become _virtual_. It is plain, therefore, that the reality of void space must be accounted for by the fact that, after the annihilation of all creatures, there remains God’s immensity, whose infinite virtuality is equivalent to infinite virtual ubications. Hence, space void of matter, but filled with God’s substance, can be nothing else than the infinite virtuality of divine immensity.

A third proof of our conclusion, and a very plain one, can be drawn from God’s creative power. Wherever God is, he can create a material point; and wherever a material point can be placed, there is space; for space is the region where material things can be ubicated. Now, God is everywhere by his immensity; and therefore, everywhere there is the possibility of ubicating a material point--that is, absolute space has the same range as God’s immensity. On the other hand, there is no doubt that a material point, by being ubicated in absolute space, is constituted in God’s presence, and is thus related to God’s immensity; and this relation implies the extrinsic termination of God’s immensity. Therefore, the ubication of a material point in space is the extrinsic termination of divine immensity; whence it follows that the possibility of ubications is nothing but the extrinsic terminability of the same immensity.

The fourth proof of our conclusion consists in showing that none of the other known opinions about space can be admitted. First, as to the _subjective form_ imagined by Kant, we cannot believe that it has any philosophical claim to adoption, as it evidently defies common sense, and is supported by no reasons. “Kant,” says Balmes, “seems to have overlooked all distinction between the imagination of space and the notion of space; and much as he labored in analyzing the subject, he did not succeed in framing a theory worthy of the name. While he considers space as a receptacle of natural phenomena, he at the same time despoils it of its objectivity, and says that space is nothing but a merely subjective condition, … an imaginary capacity in which we can scatter and arrange the phenomena.”[124] “To say that space is a thing merely subjective,” continues Balmes, “is either not to solve the problems of the outward world, or to deny them, inasmuch as their reality is thereby denied. What have we gained in philosophy by affirming that space is a merely subjective condition? Did we not know, even before this German philosopher uttered a word, that we had the perception of exterior phenomena? Does not consciousness itself bear witness to the existence of such a perception? It was not this, therefore, that we wished to know, but this only: whether such a perception be a sufficient ground for affirming the existence of the outward world, and what are the relations by which our perception is connected with the same outward world. This is the whole question. He who answers that in our perception there is nothing but a merely subjective condition, Alexander-like, cuts the knot, and denies, instead of explaining, the possibility of experimental knowledge.”[125]