Chapter XXXII: Introduction: On the Divine Idea (3)

As to Descartes’ and Leibnitz’ opinion, which makes the reality of space dependent on material occupation, we need only observe that such an opinion, even as modified by Balmes, leads to numerous absurdities, presupposes the material continuity of bodies, which we have shown to be intrinsically repugnant,[126] and assumes, by an evident _petitio principii_, that space void of matter is nothing. The same opinion is beset by another very great difficulty, inasmuch as it assumes that the reality of space lies in something relative, whilst it recognizes nothing absolute which may be pointed out as the foundation of the relativity. This difficulty will never be answered. In all kind and degree of reality, before anything relative can be conceived, something absolute is to be found from which the relative borrows its relativity. On the other hand, it is obvious that real space, as understood by Descartes, and by Balmes too, is something purely relative; for “space,” says Balmes, “is nothing but the extension of bodies themselves”; to which Descartes adds, that such a space “constitutes the essence of bodies.” But the extension of bodies is evidently relative, since it arises from the relations intervening between the material terms of bodies. The three dimensions of bodies--length, breadth, and depth--are nothing but distances, and distances are relations in space. Hence, no dimension is conceivable but through relations in space; and therefore, before we can have real dimensions in bodies, we must have, as their foundation, real space independent of bodies. Finally, since the opinion of which we are speaking affirms that relative space is a reality, while it denies that space without bodies is real, the same opinion lays down the foundation of real and of ideal Pantheism, as we have already remarked. This suffices to show that such an opinion must be absolutely rejected.

Nothing therefore remains but to accept the doctrine of those who account for the reality of absolute space either by divine immensity or by the possibility of real ubications. But these authors, as a little reflection will show, though employing a different phraseology, teach substantially the same thing; for it would be absurd to imagine the possibility of infinite real ubications as extraneous to God, in whom alone all things have their possibility. We must, therefore, conclude that space, considered absolutely as to its quiddity, may be defined to be the infinite virtuality, or extrinsic terminability, of divine immensity.

_A Corollary._--Absolute space is infinite, eternal, immovable, immutable, indivisible, and _formally_ simple, though _virtually_ extended without limits--that is, equivalent to infinite length, breadth, and depth.

_Solution of Objections._--It may be objected that absolute space, being only a virtuality, can have no formal existence. In fact, the virtuality of divine immensity is the mere possibility of real ubications; and possibilities have no formal existence. Hence, to affirm that absolute space has formal being in the order of realities, is to give body to a shadow. It would be more reasonable to say that space is contained in divine immensity just as the velocity which a body may acquire is contained in the power of an agent; and that, as the power of the agent is no velocity, so the virtuality of immensity is no space.

This objection may be answered thus: Granted that the virtuality of divine immensity is the mere possibility of real ubications, it does not follow that absolute space has only a _virtual_ existence, but, on the contrary, that, as the virtuality of divine immensity is altogether _actual_, so also is absolute space. The reason alleged, that “possibilities have no formal existence,” is sophistic. A term which is only possible, say, another world, has of course no formal existence; but its possibility--that is, the extrinsic terminability of God’s omnipotence--is evidently as actual as omnipotence itself. And in the same manner, an ubication which is only possible has no formal existence; but its possibility--that is, the extrinsic terminability of God’s immensity--is evidently as actual as immensity itself. If absolute space were conceived as an array of actual ubications, we would readily concede that to give it a reality not grounded on actual ubications would be to give a body to a shadow; but, since absolute space must be conceived as the mere possibility of actual ubications, it is manifest that we need nothing but the actual terminability of God’s immensity to be justified in admitting the actual existence of absolute space.

Would it be “more reasonable” to say, as the objection infers, that space is contained in divine immensity just as velocity is contained in the power of the agent? Certainly not, because what is contained in divine immensity is the virtuality of contingent ubications, not the virtuality of absolute space. There is no virtuality of absolute space; for there is no virtuality of possibility of ubications; as the virtuality of a possibility would be nothing else than the possibility of a possibility--that is, a chimera. Hence, the words of the objection should be altered as follows: “Contingent ubications are contained in divine immensity just as velocity is contained in the power of an agent; for, as the power of the agent is no actual velocity, so the virtuality of immensity is no actual contingent ubication.” And we may go further in the comparison by adding, that, as the formal possibility of actual velocity lies wholly in the power of the agent, so the possibility of actual ubications--that is, absolute space--lies in the virtuality of divine immensity.

Thus the objection is solved. It will not be superfluous, however, to point out the false assumption which underlies it, viz., the notion that the extrinsic terminability of divine immensity has only a virtual, not a formal, reality. This assumption is false. The terminability is the formality under which God’s immensity presents itself to our thought, when it is regarded as the source of some extrinsic relation, _ut habens ordinem ad extra_. Such a formality is not a mere concept of our reason; for God’s immensity is not only conceptually, but also really, terminable _ad extra_; whence it follows that such a terminability is an objective reality in the divine substance. Terminability, of course, implies virtuality; but this does not mean that such a terminability has only a virtual reality; for the virtuality it implies is the virtuality of the extrinsic terms which it connotes, and not the virtuality of its own being. Were we to admit that the extrinsic terminability of God’s immensity is only a virtual entity, we would be compelled to say also that omnipotence itself is only a virtual entity; for omnipotence is the extrinsic terminability of God’s act. But it is manifest that omnipotence is in God formally, not virtually. In like manner, then, immensity is in God not only as an actual attribute, but also as an attribute having an actual terminability _ad extra_, which shows that its terminability is not a virtual, but a formal, reality.

A second objection may be made. Would it not be better to define space as _the virtuality of all ubications_, rather than _the virtuality of God’s immensity_? For when we think of space, we conceive it as something immediately connected with the ubication of creatures, without need of rising to the consideration of God’s immensity.

We answer that absolute space may indeed be styled “the virtuality of all ubications;” for all possible ubications are in fact virtually contained in it. But such a phrase does not express the quiddity of absolute space; for it does not tell us what reality is that in which all ubications are virtually contained. On the contrary, when we say that absolute space is “the virtuality of divine immensity,” we point out the very quiddity of space; for we point out its constituent formality which connects divine immensity with all possible ubications.

True it is that we are wont to think of space as connected with contingent ubications; for it is from such ubications that our knowledge of place and of space arises. But this space thus immediately connected with existing creatures is _relative_ space, and its representation mostly depends on our imaginative faculty. Hence, this manner of representing space cannot be alleged as a proof that _absolute_ space can be intellectually conceived without referring to divine immensity.

A third objection may be the following. Whatever has existence is either a substance or an accident. But absolute space is neither a substance nor an accident. Therefore, absolute space has no existence, and is nothing. The major of this argument is well known, and the minor is proved thus: Absolute space does not exist in any subject, of which it might be predicated; hence, absolute space is not an accident. Nor is it a substance; for then it would be the substance of God himself--an inference too preposterous to be admitted.

This objection will soon disappear by observing that, although everything existing may be reduced either to the category of substance or to some of the categories of accident, nevertheless, it is not true that every existing reality is _formally_ a substance or an accident. There are a great many realities which cannot be styled “substances,” though they are not accidents. Thus, rationality, activity, substantiality, existence, and all the essential attributes and constituents of things, are not substances, and yet they are not accidents; for they either enter into the constitution, or flow from the essence, of substance, and are identified with it, though not formally nor adequately. Applying this distinction to our subject, we say that absolute space cannot be styled simply “God’s substance,” notwithstanding the fact that the virtuality of divine immensity identifies itself with immensity, and immensity with the divine substance. The reason of this is, that one thing is not said simply to be another, unless they be the same not only as to their reality, but also as to their conceptual notion. Hence, we do not say that the possibility of creatures is “God’s substance,” though such a possibility is in God alone; and in the same manner, we cannot say that the possibility of ubication is “God’s substance,” though such a possibility has the reason of its being in God alone. For the same reason, we cannot say simply that God’s eternity is his omnipotence, nor that his intellect is his immensity, nor that God understands by his will or by his goodness, though these attributes identify themselves really with the divine substance and with one another, as is shown in natural theology. It is plain, therefore, that absolute space is not precisely “God’s substance”; and yet it is not an accident; for it is the virtuality or extrinsic terminability of divine immensity itself.

A fourth objection arises from the opinion of those who consider God’s immensity as the foundation of absolute space, but in such a manner as to imply the existence of a _real_ distinction between the two. Immensity, they say, has no formal extension, as it has no parts outside of parts; whereas, absolute space is formally extended, and has parts outside of parts; for when a body occupies one part of space, it does not occupy any other--which shows that the parts of space are really distinct from one another; and therefore absolute space, though it has the reason of its being in God’s immensity, is something really distinct from God’s immensity.

To this we answer, that it is impossible to admit a _real_ distinction between absolute space and divine immensity. When divine immensity is said to be the foundation, or the reason of being, of absolute space, the phrase must not be taken to mean that absolute space is anything made, or extrinsic to God’s immensity; its meaning is that God’s immensity contains in itself _virtually_, as we have explained, all possible ubications of exterior things, just as God’s omnipotence contains in itself _virtually_ all possible creatures. And as we cannot affirm without error that there is a real distinction between divine omnipotence and the possibility of creatures which it contains, so we cannot affirm without error that there is a real distinction between divine immensity and the possibility of ubications which it contains.

That immensity has no parts outside of parts we fully admit, though we maintain at the same time that God is everywhere _formally_ by his immensity. But we deny that absolute space has parts outside of parts; for it is impossible to have parts where there are no distinct entities. Absolute space is one simple virtuality containing in itself the reason of distinct ubications, but not made up of them; just as the divine essence contains in itself the reason of all producible essences, but is not made up of them.

As to the _formal extension_ of immensity, Lessius seems to admit it when he says that “God exists in the space which his immensity _formally extends_.” Fénelon also holds that “immensity is infinite extension”; whilst Balmes does not admit that extension can be conceived where there are no parts. The question, so far as we can judge, is one of words. That God is everywhere _formally_ is a plain truth; on the other hand, to say that he is _formally_ extended, taking “extension” in the ordinary signification, would be to imply parts and composition; which cannot be in God. It seems to us that the right manner of expressing the infinite range of God’s immensity would be this: “God through his immensity is formally everywhere, though by a virtual, not a formal, extension.” In the same manner, space is formally everywhere, though it is only virtually, not formally, extended. And very likely this, and nothing more, is what Lessius meant when saying that immensity “formally extends” space. This phrase may, in fact, be understood in two ways; first, as meaning that immensity causes space to be _formally extended_--which is wrong; secondly, as meaning that immensity is _the formal_, not the efficient, _reason_ of the extension of space. This second meaning, which is philosophically correct, does not imply the _formal_ extension of space, as is evident, unless by “formal extension” we understand the “formal reason of its extending”; in which case the word “extension” would be taken in an unusual sense.

Lastly, when it is objected that “bodies occupying one part of space do not occupy another,” and that therefore “space is composed of distinct parts,” a confusion is made of absolute space, as such, and space extrinsically terminated, or occupied by matter, and receiving from such a termination an extrinsic denomination. Distinct bodies give distinct names to the places occupied by them; but absolute space is not intrinsically affected by the presence of bodies, as we shall see in our next article; and, therefore, the distinct denominations of different places refer to the distinct ubications of matter, not to distinct parts of absolute space. As we cannot say that the sun and the planets are parts of divine omnipotence, so we cannot say that their places are parts of divine immensity or of its terminability; for as the sun and the planets are only extrinsic terms of omnipotence, so are their places only extrinsic terms of immensity. Such places, therefore, may be distinct from one another, but their possibility (that is, absolute space) is _one_, and has no parts. But this subject will receive a greater development in our next article, in which we intend to investigate the nature of relative space.

TO BE CONTINUED.

CORPUS CHRISTI.

Not lilies here, their vesture is too pale,
Nor will they crush to fragrance ’neath the tread
Where every step must rapturous thought exhale
Of the triumphant King whose thorn-crowned head
Dripped crimson life-drops but a while ago.
Not lilies here, to-day the roses know
It is Love’s feast, and sacred banquet-hall
And holy table should be decked and strewn
With Love’s bright flowers, the perfumed gifts of June.
Oh! that our hearts might lie beneath his feet
Even as the drifting petals, pure and sweet!
Joy, drooping soul! His peace is over all.
Gethsemane is past, Golgotha’s darkness fled:
To-day the guests are bidden, the heavenly banquet spread.

ARE YOU MY WIFE?

BY THE AUTHOR OF “PARIS BEFORE THE WAR,” “NUMBER THIRTEEN,” “PIUS VI.,” ETC.