Chapter XXIII: Conclusion (2)

You are well aware that the works of the distinguished
philosopher Antonio Rosmini were made the subject of a most
rigorous examination by the Sacred Congregation of the Index
from 1851 to 1854, and that at the close of this examination
our Holy Father, Pope Pius IX., still happily reigning, in the
assembly of the most reverend consultors and the most eminent
cardinals, whose votes he had heard, and over whom he deigned,
with a condescension seldom shown, to preside in person, after
invoking with fervent prayers the light and help of Heaven,
pronounced the following decree: “All the works of Antonio
Rosmini-Serbati, concerning which investigation has been made
of late, must be dismissed; nor has this same investigation
resulted in anything whatever derogatory to the name of the
author, or to the praiseworthiness of life and the singular
merits towards the church of the religious society founded by
him.”

The author of the article referred to undertakes to discuss the
meaning of the words _Dimittantur opera_, but, while professing
to admit their force, he reduces it well-nigh to nothing. For
he says: “We do not deny that _Dimittantur_ is in a _certain
respect_ equivalent to _Permittatur_; but to permit that a work
may be published and read without incurring ecclesiastical
penalty has nothing whatever to do with declaring the work
itself uncensurable.” Now, by these words one is led to suppose
that the Sacred Congregation, or rather the Holy Father, by
pronouncing that judgment, did nothing more than permit that
the works of Rosmini may be published and read without
incurring a penalty.

But I ask: What penalty did the editors and readers of
Rosmini’s works incur before those works were subjected to so
lengthened and accurate a scrutiny? None whatever. What, then,
would the Sacred Congregation of the Index have done by such
grave study and labors so protracted? Nothing whatever. And to
what purpose would the judgment of the Holy Father have been
given? To no purpose whatever. If, then, we do not wish to fall
into these absurdities, we must say that the accusations
brought against the works of Rosmini were false; that in these
works nothing was found contrary to faith and morals; that
their publication and perusal are not dangerous to the
faithful. Who can ever suppose that the Holy Father has set
free for publication works containing erroneous doctrines, and
liberated the readers of them from penalty? To liberate from
penalty the readers of books infected with error would be an
act productive of greater injury than if a penalty were imposed
or (assuming its previous existence) were maintained in full
vigor.

I might touch on other points of the article in question, and
show that its author has presumed to dive further than he ought
into a matter which does not belong to him. But what I have
said suffices to make it imperative on me to address this
letter to you. As it may not be known to every one that the
Master of the Sacred Palace does not, under existing
circumstances, revise the journals, and as the character and
fame of the _Osservatore Romano_ might lead to a belief that he
(the Master of the Sacred Palace) has approved of the article
in question, I think it necessary to declare to you that I
should never have given my consent to the publication of the
same. Nay, I have to request that you will not, in future,
receive any articles either on the sense of the judgment
_Dimittatur_, or against the learned and pious Rosmini, or
against his works, examined and dismissed.

I take this opportunity to remind all concerned that the Holy
Father, from the time of the issuing of the _Dimittantur
opera_, enjoined silence, and this in order that no new
accusations should be put forward, nor, under any pretext, a
way made for discord among Catholics: “That no new accusations
and discords should arise and be disseminated in future,
silence is now for the third time enjoined, on either party, by
command of His Holiness.”

Who does not see that the seeds of discord are sown by
traducing the works of Rosmini either as not being yet
sufficiently examined, or as suspected of errors which were not
seen either before or after so extraordinary an examination, or
as dangerous; or by using expressions which take away all the
value or diminish excessively the force and authority of a
judgment pronounced with so much maturity and so much solemnity
by the supreme Pastor of the church?

By this it is not meant to affirm that it would be unlawful to
dissent from the philosophical system of Rosmini, or from the
manner in which he tries to explain some truths, and even to
offer a confutation of them in the schools; but if one does not
agree with Rosmini in the manner of explaining certain truths,
it is not on that account lawful to conclude that Rosmini has
denied these truths; nor is it lawful to inflict any
theological censure on the doctrines maintained by him in the
works which the Sacred Congregation has examined and dismissed,
and which the Holy Father has intended to protect from further
accusations in the future.

Believe me, etc., etc.,

Your most obedient servant,
FR. FRANCIS VINCENZO MARIA GATTI,
Of the Order of Preachers,
Master of the Sacred Apostolical Palace.

JUNE 16, 1876.

The following appeared in the _Osservatore Cattolico_ of Milan, July 1, 1876:

The Sacred Roman Congregation of the Index, by a letter
addressed to His Grace the Archbishop of Milan under date of
June 20, 1876, and signed by His Eminence Cardinal Antonio de
Luca, Prefect of the Congregation, and the Very Reverend Father
Girolamo Pio Saccheri, of the Friars Preachers, Secretary, and
delivered by his grace in person to one of the responsible
editors of this journal in the afternoon of Wednesday, July 28,
has enjoined us:

“1. To maintain in future the most rigorous silence on the
question of the works of Antonio Rosmini; because, in
consequence of the authoritative decree of the Holy Father
(_That no new accusations and discords should arise and be
disseminated in future, silence is for the third time enjoined
on either party by command of His Holiness_), it is not
lawful—in matters pertaining to religion and relating to faith
and sound morals—to inflict any censure on the works of Rosmini
or on his person; _the only thing upon which freedom is allowed
being to discuss in the schools and in books_, and within
proper limits, his philosophical opinions and the merits of his
manner of explaining certain truths, even theological. 2. To
declare in an early issue of this journal that we have not
rightly interpreted the sentence _Dimittantur_, which the
Sacred Congregation of the Index thinks fit sometimes, after
mature and diligent examination, to pronounce upon works
submitted to its authoritative judgment.”

Full of reverence for the supreme authority of the Holy See,
and wishing to be faithful to our duty as well as to the
programme of this journal, we, the undersigned, responsible
editors of the _Osservatore Cattolico_, in our own behalf and
of all who have written in our columns on the question
aforesaid, intend to declare and do hereby declare in the most
docile and submissive manner possible, that

1. As to the silence now imposed we repeat and confirm what we
said on occasion of reproducing in this journal the letter of
the Master of the Sacred Palace to the editor of the
_Osservatore Romano_—viz., that it shall be observed.

2. The sentence _Dimittantur_, as used by the Sacred
Congregation of the Index was not rightly interpreted by us.

ENRICO MASSARA, Priest,
DAVIDE ALBERTARIO, Priest,
Editors of the _Osservatore Cattolico_.

MILAN, June 30, 1876.

Another and more recent instance is that of the controversy concerning the constitution of bodies. A letter of the Pope to Dr. Travaligni, president of a scientific society in Italy, commending the effort to bring physical and medical science into harmony with the scholastic philosophy, was interpreted as giving authoritative sanction to a certain doctrine of the Thomist school. A professor in the University of Lille wrote a letter to the Pope on the subject, setting forth the differences of opinion and the continued controversies respecting the constitution of bodies, and praying for a positive decision. In reply to this the professor and all others interested in these questions were instructed, in a letter written and published by order of the Holy Father, that the Holy See had defined nothing in the premises, and that a solution of difficulties should be sought for by scientific investigation and discussion. We have not space for the publication of this letter, but it may be found in one of the back numbers of the _Catholic Review_ of Brooklyn (Sept. 22, 1877).

As for the Rosminian philosophy, we agree personally with Liberatore and the Thomist school in rejecting it as scientifically untenable. Nevertheless, we have heretofore distinctly avowed that in a dogmatic aspect it is free from censure, and we are glad to see the matter placed beyond question, and the controversy relegated to its proper sphere as one debatable only on purely rational grounds. The other question is one which has been extensively discussed in our pages, and which we regard as extremely interesting and important.

The doctrine proposed and elaborately discussed in the articles formerly published under the title “Principles of Real Being” has been attacked by a very learned and able writer in a German periodical published at St. Louis, on dogmatic as well as philosophical grounds. This is a convenient opportunity to state that we have in manuscript a very long and minute defence and vindication of the doctrine advocated in these articles, written by their distinguished author, who is well versed not only in scholastic theology and metaphysics, but also in mathematical and physical science. We refrained from publishing his reply to the attack of his antagonist, partly because the discussion was too subtle and abstruse for our readers, and still more from unwillingness to engage in dogmatic controversy when there is a risk of perplexing pious minds. In matters really dogmatic and pertaining to Catholic doctrine we want no compromise or attenuation. We desire only the restriction of the argument from authority within its actual limits, that the discussion of matters purely philosophical may be carried on by rational arguments alone, without accusations of heterodoxy on either side. In respect to the essence and integrity of the scholastic philosophy according to the system of the two great doctors, Aristotle and St. Thomas, we are in hearty concurrence with the great intellectual movement of the revival and restoration of this philosophy as the only true and scientific metaphysics to its ancient dominating position. We do not, however, consider that a blind submission to the authority even of St. Thomas is reasonable. An author who, like Liberatore, professedly aims at nothing more than an exact exposition of the doctrine of St. Thomas undoubtedly renders a service to metaphysical science and its students. The writer of this article esteems very highly all the philosophical works of this distinguished Jesuit, and has used by preference, for several years, his _Institutiones Philosophicæ ad triennium Accommodatæ_ as a text-book of instruction. Yet we cannot approve of such a complete abdication of original and independent investigation and reasoning as a rule to be followed in philosophical teaching. We do not find that the system of the strict Thomists is proved in a manner entirely satisfactory and conclusive, in some of its details, particularly in that part which relates to the harmony of physical with metaphysical science. There is such a thing as progress and development in theology and philosophy. The opinions of private doctors are not final. Neither St. Augustine in dogmatic theology, St. Alphonsus in moral theology, nor St. Thomas in both these sciences and metaphysics, though declared by the Holy See doctors of the universal church, were competent to pronounce final judgments; since they were not rendered infallible by the superiority of their genius and wisdom, from which alone their authority is derived. Their private doctrine, inasmuch as it passes beyond the line of the Catholic doctrine contained in their works and having its own intrinsic authority, has only a claim to a respectful consideration, with a presumption in its favor. In the last analysis all its weight consists in the rational evidence or proof sustaining it, which is lessened or destroyed by probable or demonstrative proof to the contrary. The Jesuit school has always insisted on these principles. While recognizing St. Thomas as master, it has diverged from the teaching of the Dominican commentators on St. Thomas, both in theology and metaphysics. Whether Suarez and others diverged or not from the genuine doctrine of St. Thomas, in their controversy with writers of the Thomist school, is a matter of dispute. The question as to what is the real sense and import of the doctrine of St. Thomas or of Aristotle is distinct from the question of the material truth and evidence of any controverted proposition. The latter is much the more important of the two, and reason alone must decide it, so far as it can be decided, in the absence of any authoritative definition. If philosophy, therefore, is to make any progress, and if there is to be any real approximation to unity in philosophical doctrine among Catholics, the authority of reason and evidence must prevail over all human authority, and exclusive devotion to systems or great names must be abandoned, that truth may be investigated and brought to light.

The great motive urged by those who write in a specially irenical spirit is to strengthen the combination of forces in the Catholic intellectual army for the polemical contest against error and doubt. That the sophists of heresy and infidelity may be confuted and vanquished, that those who are erring and out of the way may be reclaimed, that honest seekers after truth may be guided to a successful discovery of this hidden treasure, is the great object of Catholic polemics. The great field of contest is the philosophical domain. It springs to view at once that agreement in philosophical doctrine is of the utmost importance for the success of the Catholic cause in this holy warfare. Among those who have labored most zealously and successfully toward this end, the distinguished Jesuit Father Ramière stands pre-eminent. In his most recent publication, _L’Accord de la Philosophie de St. Thomas et de la Science moderne au sujet de la composition des corps_, prepared with the aid of another Jesuit specially versed in the physical sciences, he has made a deeply-studied and masterly effort at harmonizing the peripatetic system with the results of experiment and induction in modern chemical science. It is the most subtile and acute piece of argumentation which has ever proceeded from his pen. The doctrine of Aristotle and St. Thomas has hitherto been generally supposed to be in a diametrical contradiction to that of modern chemistry in respect to the combination of elements in the compound substances. The peripatetic theory has been, on this account, abandoned by most of our modern authors and professors in philosophy. A few, however, among whom Liberatore and the editor of the _Scienza Italiana_ are conspicuous, have exerted all their power of subtile analysis to defend the Thomist opinion. Another recent writer, Dr. Scheid of Eichstädt, has endeavored to maintain the same thesis in the most exclusive sense, and attempts to prove that the Thomist theory alone is either compatible with the dogmatic definitions of the church or adequate to give a satisfactory explanation of the facts established by chemical and physical experiments. On the contrary, Dr. Frédault, who is a French physician and an advocate of the general doctrine of the Thomist school on form and matter, maintains that it is inadmissible in respect to the constituent elements of compound substances. In order to facilitate the understanding of the subject of controversy, we will cite from Father Ramière’s appendix a part of the _Exposé parallèle des deux systèmes_ prepared by a distinguished professor in a Catholic college of France at Father Ramière’s request.

_Peripatetic _Chemical School._
School._

I. WHAT IS A SIMPLE BODY?

It is a composition of It is a material
first matter and substance endowed with
substantial form. determinate forces.

II. WHAT IS A CHEMICAL BODY—FOR INSTANCE, WATER?

It is a composition of It is oxygen and hydrogen
first matter and the combined in the
aqueous substantial proportions of 88 to
form. 11. The forces of the
two components remain
identical in the
composition, although
in the state of
combination they do not
manifest all their
special
characteristics.

III. HOW ARE THE SIMPLE BODIES EXTRACTED FROM A CHEMICAL COMPOUND?

At the moment of The force of the chemical
decomposition the re-agent destroys the
substantial form of the combination and union
compound is destroyed of the simple bodies,
and replaced by the dies, which return to
substantial form of the their primitive state,
components, which are and manifest anew their
produced from their own proper forces in all
proper non-existence their integrity.
(_ex nihilo sui_); and
the simple bodies
recover their former
proportions.

IV. WHAT IS AN ANIMAL BODY—THE BODY OF A MAN, FOR EXAMPLE—OR A PART OF
SUCH A BODY, AS A BONE, ETC.?

This body is a The human body, like all
composition of first bodies, is a
matter and a composition of
substantial form. In molecules and of parts
man this substantial endowed with chemical
form is the rational forces which are united
soul, which gives to together by the mutual
the matter its action of these forces;
_corporeity_, or but, during life, these
corporeal being. In forces are subjected
such a way that a body, and subordinated to the
taken in the vital force of the
reduplicative soul, which penetrates
sense—that is, inasmuch them, dominates them,
as it is considered and unifies them in
simply as body—is a their vital functions,
composition of first and which gives to the
matter and the soul, entire body the form of
which latter gives to a human body, life, and
the body its specific sensibility.
material being. NOTE.—Form does not
mean _figure_ but the
determining principle
of the specific nature
which this organized
body possesses as a
human body.

V.—WHAT PRODUCES DEATH IN THE ANIMAL BODY AND THE HUMAN BODY?

At the moment when the Death consists simply in
soul departs from the the separation of the
body there is produced soul and body, and does
in it a new substantial not exact the
form, the _cadaverous_ production of any
form, which by its substantial form. The
union with the first chemical forces, which
matter constitutes the are no longer dominated
corpse. But when the by the soul, act
dissolution of the freely, and the
corpse proceeds dissolution of the
gradually by the effect corpse is nothing but
of corruption, the the natural result of
cadaverous form is their action.
succeeded by new
substantial forms,
produced from previous
non-existence (_ex
nihilo sui_), as
numerous and different
as are the substances
resulting from
corruption, the
mephitic particles
dispersed in the air
being included.

The theory here presented under the name of the peripatetic, and claiming to be the genuine doctrine of Aristotle and St. Thomas, is frequently called the theory of _substantial generations_. Under that name it has been examined and opposed in the series of metaphysical articles in this magazine already referred to. It is necessary to explain, before proceeding further, that the term _matter_ in scholastic philosophy denotes, not the complete material being or body, whether simple or compound, such as oxygen, water, iron, etc., but merely one element or component of the material substance—viz., the common, indeterminate element, which is the same in all, having a potency or receptivity for every possible determination, but no fixed and necessary union with any. It is the principle of extension, but not extended; the source of inertia and all that is passive, yet not a solid atom; the subject of qualities and active forces, but itself possessing no quiddity or quality, and not having existence, or the possibility of existence, except as joined with its compart, the active and determining element, joined with it in order to make any single material substance. This active element is called the substantial form, which is equally incapable of subsisting alone, and therefore has no separate being, yet is capable of giving its first being to matter, and thus constituting with it material substance. According to the peripatetic theory, as stated above, in chemical combinations which produce a new, compound substance, such as water, nothing remains of the components except the material substratum or first matter. The determining form which gave this matter its specific being as oxygen and hydrogen are destroyed, and a new form, the aqueous, springs forth to give the matter a new first being and constitute the substance water. There is, consequently, in this and every similar case, the generation of a new substance, in which the matter is pre-existent, but the substantial form is educed from the passive potency of the matter, [ex nihilo sui], or from utter previous non-existence.

Father Ramière maintains that this theory is the creation of the commentators on Aristotle and St. Thomas, but does not properly belong to the system of either, and can be refuted by arguments drawn from the works of both these great doctors. This is rather startling and contrary to the prevalent supposition. The Thomist writers, many of whom are men of the most remarkably acute power of analysis and thoroughly conversant with the works of these great masters, honest also and candid withal, have certainly not imputed a theory to Aristotle and St. Thomas which is a pure invention, or without plausible grounds and apparent reasons. Father Ramière gives an explanation which is at least ingenious and merits consideration. In the first place, he argues that the two doctors of peripatetic philosophy did not reason from _à priori_ principles respecting the composition of bodies. They both taught that celestial bodies are composed of what they called _materia quinta_, which is incorruptible by reason of the inseparability of its form from the matter. The separability of matter and form in earthly bodies, therefore, belongs to them as a peculiar kind of bodies, composed from what were supposed to be the four simple elements of earth, air, fire, and water. The fact that these elements are transformed one into the other in the transmutation of substances led to the conclusion that there was a common substratum underlying all, which remained under different substantial forms. But since chemistry has discovered the really simple bodies which are not susceptible of mutual transmutation, and cannot be resolved into other substances by mechanical or chemical agents, Father Ramière argues that the very principles enunciated by Aristotle and St. Thomas respecting _materia quinta_ require that oxygen, hydrogen, etc., should be placed with it under the same category. Moreover, he maintains that the permanence of what we now know to be simple substances and irresolvable in combination, was really taught under another concept and with different terms by Aristotle and St. Thomas; that is, that certain virtualities were recognized as remaining and exercising an active force in the compound or transformed substance, which is incompatible with the supposition that only nude matter remains, acted upon by a wholly different and entirely new active force. In regard to the human body, in particular, he shows an incompatibility between the explanation of the cause of death which St. Thomas gives and the peripatetic theory. The reason of death given by St. Thomas is that contrary forces are combined in the human body which are dominated by the vital force of the soul only to a limited extent and with a limited duration. When, by the laws of nature, these contrary forces begin to free themselves from the dominating vital force, decay commences, and is continued until they have freed themselves to such an extent that they destroy the aptitude of the body for receiving the mode of being from the soul which is called sensitive life. The soul then necessarily ceases to inform the body, and the two comparts of the human substance or essence are separated. The soul, being a self-subsisting, incorruptible form, an immortal spirit, departs to the sphere of spirits, and the body is dissolved by the force of natural decomposition. Now, according to the peripatetic theory, the soul, being the only substantial form or active force in the body, giving to the nude first matter of the body its first being or physical, corporeal existence, must be itself the active cause of decay and death. This is contrary to the teaching of St. Thomas that the soul gives only life to the body, and, so far from ceasing of itself the vital influx, would continue to exert it for all eternity, and thus make the body immortal, if other and contrary forces did not work within the body to make it incapable of receiving this influx, and thus force the soul to abandon it to itself and to the power of death.

Father Ramière acknowledges that it is difficult to make all the texts of Aristotle and of St. Thomas harmonize with each other, and to bring out a completely distinct and finished theory from their writings. He advances a conjecture, with some plausible appearance of probability, that some texts found in the works of St. Thomas have been interpolated by disciples who were more zealous than honest in their efforts to maintain their own system. The same conjecture has been made heretofore in regard to passages relating to the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception. Be this as it may, we think it is quite sufficient to explain obscurities of any kind which are found in the dogmatic or philosophical system of the Angelic Doctor, that he either had not time or any pressing motive for a thorough investigation and elucidation of the matters in question, or had not the requisite data before him for the deductions and conclusions pertaining to the case. It is more to the purpose to discuss the doctrine of the composition of bodies on its own merits, using all the facts discovered by experiment, and rational argumentation, aided by the light of all previous investigations, both physical and metaphysical. Left to its own intrinsic probability, the peripatetic theory is sustained by a kind of argumentation which seems to be more ingenious than conclusive. Several of its ablest advocates have acknowledged that it is incapable of demonstration. It rests its claim to acceptance chiefly on _aliunde_ considerations. And on the other side there are certain arguments which have not yet, so far as we know, received a satisfactory answer.

Father Ramière advances some of these with his usual subtlety and force, and at the same time with the most courteous moderation and respect toward his opponents.

It is admitted—as it indeed must be, for there is no escape from evident facts—that a chemical re-agent applied to a composite substance like water brings back the component elements in their former proportions. Water gives up its eighty-eight parts of oxygen and its eleven parts of hydrogen. What is the producing cause of these so-called new substantial forms which invariably make their appearance _ex nihilo sui_? When the soul, which is said to be the only substantial form of the body, leaves it in its nudity as first matter, without first being, quiddity, or quality, and, as it would seem, doomed to annihilation, what is the cause which produces the cadaverous form, that suddenly appears to actuate the matter and give it being as a corpse? Here Father Ramière has made one of his most dexterous logical passes—one which it will require great dialectical skill to parry. The editor of the _Scienza Italiana_ replies thus to the question as to where these forms come from:

“Certain forms do not come to the subject from an extrinsic cause, but spring up within the subject, by educing them (_traendole_) from the potentiality of the same subject.” Father Ramière desires to be informed “what is the object to which the active verb _traendole_ is referred; what is that which educes these forms from the potentiality of the subject?” If no sufficient cause can be assigned by which substantial forms are educed, the theory becomes untenable.

Father Ramière devotes a considerable part of his treatise to a consideration of the important question, What is the true sense of the proposition that the rational soul is the form of the human body? This proposition, maintained by Aristotle and received by sound scholastic philosophy, has been defined as Catholic doctrine by the Council of Vienne and by Pius IX. Father Ramière refers to Father Palmieri, S.J., the author of a recent philosophical text-book of high repute, who “proves that the Council of Vienne by no means intended to condemn a doctrine maintained at that time and since by perfectly orthodox theologians. The error proscribed by the council is that which ascribes to the human body another vital principle besides the rational soul.” The Catholic doctrine is that the soul is _forma corporis_, in the sense that it is the life-giving principle of the composite, corporeal, organic structure which constitutes the human body in its physical though incomplete nature, as one compart of the total human composite, or complete human nature. Father Palmieri calls the bodily part a complete substance but an incomplete nature, as likewise the spiritual part, which is the soul. Father Ramière adheres to the common terminology which denominates each part an incomplete substance. As considered in distinction from the soul, it lacks its due complement, the vital principle which makes it a living body and sentient. The soul also, as distinct from the body, lacks the complement of its inferior vital force, which is an eminent kind of sensitive and vegetative principle contained in the same subject to which the attribute of rationality belongs, and giving to the subject—that is, to the soul—an exigency for a body as its essential compart. The soul and body complete each other in the human essence or nature. The body is passive and inert in respect to every vital force and function, without the soul. The soul remains in a merely potential state in respect to its inferior faculties, when separate from the body. In the composite essence, the human nature composed of soul and body, the body stands in the relation of _materia_ to the soul, the soul in the relation of _forma_ to the body. Thus is constituted the human, rational _suppositum_ or _persona_, and the specific essence and unity of the human being, of man, according to his logical definition as _animal rationale_. We will let Father Ramière speak for himself, and explain at length in his own language what his own view is on this important topic:

“Between spiritual substance and body there is a complete
opposition, and it is consequently absurd to suppose that a
body can borrow from a spirit that by which it becomes body.
Since the substantial form of a being is that which makes it
formally to exist as such, the soul cannot be the substantial
form by which a body exists as body, unless it is itself
corporeal. It is the same with all forms essentially material,
and consequently with all those which belong to the essence of
the elementary substances. These forces, not being in the soul,
cannot be destroyed when the elements pass into the body;[82]
yet they no longer exist in their former state of independence.
They are seized upon and controlled by the superior force of
the soul, elevated in a certain sort above their natural
condition, and employed as instruments of the vivification of
the matter of the body. Heretofore these elements formed so
many independent unities; henceforth they become fractions of a
whole to which the soul must give the specific determination.
Their entire force continues to subsist; their being is not
destroyed; but, under the domination of a new form, it acquires
a new formal existence. It is thus that the soul is the
principle of the substantial unity of man. It does not destroy
the variety of the elements, but it unites them; it does not
suppress completely their mutual opposition, but tempers it so
far as to establish a condition of harmony. There is really but
one substantial form in man—the reasonable soul, because this
soul alone gives to the entire totality of the human being its
substantial determination; it alone reduces the diversity of
elements to unity. It confers upon the body, by its union with
the same, something which is not a mere accident but a new
being, the being of humanity, which raises it above all purely
corporeal beings, and constitutes it within the generic class
of rational substances.

“The modern theory, understood in this sense, is in perfect
agreement as to its substance with the peripatetic doctrine,
and safe from all the dangerous tendencies imputed to it. There
is no just cause for repeating any longer the accusation
heretofore made against this theory that it suppresses the
substantial unity of bodies, since, as we have shown, so far
from destroying this unity it presents it as it subsists in
various grades, proportioned to the relative degrees of
perfection in substances, much better than the other systems.
There is even less foundation for the pretext that the theory
in question is in opposition to the definitions of the church
regarding the union of soul and body in man. What, in fact, do
these definitions affirm? That the soul is the true form of the
human body, which it informs and vivifies, not accidentally or
mediately, but immediately and essentially. Now, all this is
perfectly verified in our theory, which supposes that the body
receives its life, its specific nature, its existence as human
body, without any interposing medium, from the soul. Moreover,
its union with the soul, so far from being regarded as
accidental, is shown to be, on the contrary, substantial, in
whatever aspect it is considered, whether on the side of the
soul or on the side of the body: on the side of the soul, which
without this union would be unable to exercise several
faculties proceeding from its essence; on the side of the body,
which receives from this union the substantial complement of
its elements. When, therefore, we examine closely that argument
which is the strongest, if not the only, one sustaining the
contrary theory,[83] we perceive that it resolves itself into a
mere equivocation. The partisans of this theory, who sometimes
reproach their adversaries with equivocating in respect to the
words ‘substantial and accidental,’ do not perceive that they
themselves commit this fault. They confound that which is
indispensable to a being that it may exist, with that which is
indispensable to it that it may possess the integrity of its
nature. Union with the body is not essential to the soul in the
former sense, as all acknowledge, but it is certainly not
allowable to conclude from this that it is purely accidental to
it. We may very justly call substantial, and even essential,
all that which is exacted by the nature of anything. Now, union
with the body is certainly exacted by the nature of the soul,
which differs mainly from pure spirits by this exigency.
Nothing could be more contrary to the principles of scholastic
philosophy than to regard that property pertaining to the soul
which adapts it to be the form of the body as a simple
accident; but if this is an essential property, union with the
body cannot be considered as purely accidental, even admitting
that the body is composed of elements endowed with their proper
forms. Let us apply the same reasoning to the elements, which
are themselves made in order to unite themselves with other
elements, as the soul is made in order to unite itself with the
body; and by this simple distinction of the two senses of the
word _substantial_ we shall eliminate the doctrinal
misunderstanding which makes a division between us.

“How, then, could it happen that this division has been so long
continued? It is because the distrust of the defenders of
traditional philosophy has been provoked by the presentation of
the theory at the present day generally adopted by scientists,
as an innovation. This distrust will have no longer any object,
and harmony cannot fail to be re-established, from the moment
when it shall be recognized that the modern experimental
science is in perfect harmony with the principles laid down by
Aristotle and accepted by St. Thomas.”

The professor of physics who prepared the _Exposé_ given in Father Ramière’s appendix presents very distinctly and strongly what is the common sentiment, especially of those who are devoted to the study of physical science, in our modern Catholic schools:

“The peripatetic system on the composition of bodies is
rejected by the greater number of Catholic philosophers,
because this system, considered metaphysically, sustains itself
solely on _equivocations and the begging of questions_ (Card.
Tolomei), and _has no demonstrative_ _force_ (P. Zigliara);
considered psychologically, it gives a handle to materialism;
considered in the aspect of the chemical sciences, it is in
evident contradiction to their experimental facts; considered
historically, it has been, so far as its psychological part is
concerned, always combated by the school of Alexander de Halès,
St. Bonaventure, Scotus, and the Franciscans; was condemned in
the thirteenth century by all the doctors of the English
universities, together with a majority of those of the
Sorbonne; and in the eighteenth century was commonly repudiated
by all the schools, with the exception of the most rigid
Thomists.”

There is certainly no chance whatever that this theory will ever regain any considerable sway from the mere weight of authority which belongs to it from the traditions of the past. As Father Ramière justly remarks:

“We must not forget that the present discussion appertains to
the purely scientific order, and must consequently be
definitively decided _not by authority but by reason_. So long
as the rational arguments which overturn the theory contrary to
our own have not been refuted, nothing will be gained by the
effort to prove from a literal interpretation of some texts
that this theory belongs to St. Thomas. The only interpretation
admissible in this case is the rational interpretation, which
clears up obscure texts by the perfectly clear principles which
the holy doctor loudly proclaimed. It is thus that we explain
many difficult passages in the works of the eagle of Hippo; and
those who act otherwise, far from proving in this way their
respect for him, really inflict an outrage on his memory by
putting him in opposition to himself and to the truth. Let us
not do a similar wrong to St. Thomas. As he was always
attentive to correct himself even to the end of his short
career, we can be sure that, if his mortal existence had been
prolonged to our day, he would not have failed to clear up that
which remained in obscurity in his writings, and to complete,
by the aid of new discoveries in science, what was necessarily
incomplete in his theories. Let us act in the same manner, and
not fear to show ourselves more faithful to the spirit of the
doctrine of St. Thomas than to the letter of a certain number
of texts found in his writings.”

Father Ramière could not have expected to put an end to the controversy by his short essay, and, in fact, the only immediate result of Dr. Frédault’s larger work and his own briefer piece of argument has been to call forth rejoinders from the _Scienza Italiana_ and the _Civiltà Cattolica_. Some of the advocates of the peripatetic theory are unquestionably as well versed in the physical sciences as their opponents. Their studies in chemistry and other branches of science have made them dissatisfied with the prevalent modern theories on the constitution of bodies, and they have for this very reason sought for a more philosophical doctrine in the ancient metaphysics. It is not to be supposed that they will yield to anything short of cogent reasoning, or that any agreement in unity of doctrine can be produced, unless some really solid, satisfactory, and conclusive theory is presented with such convincing proof and evidence that it must command general assent. Until this is done there is no choice except to continue the discussion. If it is interminable, then all sides must agree to differ, and in such a case it is quite natural to fall back on the authority of great men who are supposed to have been gifted with extraordinary perspicacity of intellect, and to have seen into things more clearly and deeply than modern men are able to do, perhaps by the aid of supernatural light. If the constitution of bodies is an impenetrable mystery, we must be content to remain in our ignorance, and accept whatever formulas of metaphysical or physical statement seem to us the best expression of the vague and confused notions we possess. We are not quite prepared to accept this situation as inevitable, and it is certain that not only on the European continent, but in England and America also, the reviving interest in metaphysical studies and the necessity of combating materialism will stimulate an effort toward a more perfect evolution of the truth contained in the ancient philosophy by the help of mathematical and experimental science. It may be asked what metaphysics and theology have to do with these matters, which seem to belong to the domain of physics. We reply to this question in the words of Father Ramière:

“The question what is in general the nature of material beings,
and what is in particular the nature of man as appertaining by
his corporeal part to the material world, does not belong, at
least exclusively, to physics; it is also within the domain of
philosophy and theology. The special object of physics is the
study of the sensible properties of bodies, the observation of
the phenomena by which the different forces with which they are
endowed manifest themselves, and the determination of the laws
which regulate the exercise of these forces. The investigation
of the essential properties which enter into the very idea of
body and distinguish it from spiritual being belongs to
metaphysics. And since, in man, the body, united with the
spirit, participates in its destiny; since, in Jesus Christ,
the corporeal world has been associated to the divine dignity,
theology cannot give us a perfect knowledge of our destiny and
our deification by the divine Person who assumed humanity,
without availing itself of the aid which is furnished by an
exact notion of the nature of bodies.”

It seems to us that the real point of difficulty and of controversy respecting the “nature of bodies” lies deeper than any of the questions proposed by Father Ramière, and that the whole discussion must start from this point in order to be thorough and decisive. It is no solution at all of the question, What is the nature of corporeal being? to tell us that bodies are material substances endowed with determinate forces, or composites of such substances. The drop of water, mechanically divided, gives us only minuter and minuter molecules of water. But since, chemically divided, it gives oxygen and hydrogen in composition with each other to form these minutest molecules, there must be in each of these molecules others of such minute quantity as to elude experiment, which are composed of still smaller distinct molecules of oxygen and hydrogen. One of these molecules of oxygen, considered apart from all other corporeal beings, must be itself constituted by smaller molecules or of some more simple elements. We must come at last to these simple elements, and ask the question, What constitutes the entity and first actuality of these elements? Boscovich and Leibnitz, two of the most original thinkers of modern times, both of them well versed in mathematics as well as eminent in metaphysics, have presented the theory of simple monads, which are dynamic centres radiating in space upon each other the active forces which produce extension, quality, motion, and every kind of material substance with all their specific differences. Father Bayma, in his remarkable work _Molecular Mechanics_, has presented the hypothesis that these simple elements are each separately endowed with only one force—that is, either the attractive or repulsive. The laws of molecular mechanics have been exposed in this treatise with rigid and complicated mathematical demonstrations. The metaphysical part of this hypothesis has been fully developed, so far as its primary and essential principles are concerned, in the pages of this magazine. The arguments by which this hypothesis is sustained and the contrary ones overturned we have never seen fairly and distinctly answered. Certain objections are made, such as these: that a force is not a being in itself, but needs a substance to support it; that dynamism takes away the reality of matter, that it makes material substance like spiritual substance, that it gives no basis for extension and continuous quantity, etc. We think there is some misunderstanding of terms and concepts in the minds of those who make these objections. We understand in this theory such terms as “active force” to denote not an attribute or product without subject or cause, but a principle from which force proceeds, which is also a passive principle upon which active force terminates. It is a real being, simple, unextended, not a body or a spirit, having position but not quantity, marking by its existence a point in space, the first element of the primary composite body or molecule, distinguishable in respect to its matter and form, but not separable, any more than the centre and circumference of a circle are separable. It is a substance, standing _in se et per se_, in respect to existence, but expressly created for entering into composition with similar entities, in order to make bodies with the various attributes and accidents, active powers and passive potencies, which experience shows them to possess. It is not a spirit, because it has no capability of consciousness, intelligence, or volition, but is simply determined by its grade of being to act in space by means of motion. It is _ens mobile_, and the beginning of physical quantity, as the point is the beginning of abstract quantity in geometrical science. As to the difficulty of conceiving how extension arises without a first material _continuum_ to begin with, we think this objection is counteracted by the arguments proving that such a _continuum_ is an absurdity and an impossibility.

The great desideratum in the question of matter is to find the invariable and indestructible element, which remains, and will forever remain, the same amid all transmutations of bodies, the ultimate substance endowed with a perpetual existence _in se_, and competent from its potency and active power to be the principle of every possible combination and mode of being within the limits of the purely corporeal essence. Such a principle seems to be furnished by the theory of Boscovich and Leibnitz, as corrected and developed by Father Bayma. The simple beings endowed with attractive or repulsive force proceeding from a centre which marks a point in space, and having both a form and a material principle which are naturally inseparable, are capable of existing, each one alone by itself, and absolutely indestructible, except by annihilation. Though utterly useless and inoperative, except as existing in multitude and mutually acting on each other in their chemical and mechanical combinations they furnish the substratum of every kind of matter and form which can be predicated of corporeal being as _ens mobile_. The primary molecules of the simple bodies formed by the first combinations of simple elements are so firmly bound together that no power of which man can avail himself suffices to separate them, and we may suppose there is no power in nature which can break up their unity. Nor is there any difficulty in supposing that God can make bodies of any magnitude or composite perfection which are likewise incorruptible, in accordance with the ancient conception of _materia quinta_, or celestial, incorruptible bodies. The reasoning by which this dynamic hypothesis is sustained and contrary theories refuted seems to be extremely probable, and even, in certain parts, demonstrative, from its premises and _data_. If these include all which must be included, and nothing pertaining to the essence and integrity of the matter of demonstration is left out, the hypothesis is sufficient to account for all which must be accounted for, and by its simplicity recommends itself to the mind as proposing enough, and no more than enough, for a distinct notion of the nature of body and its specific difference from soul and spirit. Just here, it seems to us, comes in the need for more full explanation and evolution of the theory, and a more minute discussion between its advocates and those who advocate the theories of the rigid peripatetic system or the system favored by Father Ramière. We would like to see a more complete proof given that all which can be predicated of material substance, as such, can be referred to its nature as _ens mobile_, and accounted for by the two primitive forces of attraction and repulsion.

Especially when we consider the phenomena of organized, living bodies, vegetable and animal, the most important questions arise, demanding from each one of the different philosophical schools the answers which they are able to furnish, and an exposition of the way in which they seek to harmonize this particular portion of their respective systems with the first principles of philosophy, of physics, and of theology. The notions of potential matter and substantial form assume here a new import and present difficulties of the first magnitude, the solution of which in one way or another introduces most considerable modifications into the metaphysics and the theology of each different party in the controversy.

What is the principle of vegetable life and reproduction? If all the facts and phenomena of vegetable life can be explained by the laws of molecular mechanics and chemistry, the need for a distinct, simple form, vital principle, or vegetable soul, is removed; otherwise the hypothesis fails to meet the exigency of the case, and the reasoning of the peripatetic philosophers remains, in this respect, unanswered.

The question of the animal soul stands by itself, and is more important. Molecular mechanics and chemical combinations cannot produce a sentient subject or account for the sensible cognition which animals possess. There is certainly in the animal a distinct form giving to animal nature a potency and a power not reducible to attraction and repulsion between molecules, not a modification of mobility and motion. The ingenious scholastic theory gives us a formula which answers very well as a verbal statement of the difference between the irrational and the rational soul, between the brute and man. According to this theory, the animal soul is not a substance, is not capable of existing _in se_, depends on the body and is destroyed by its death, is not immediately created, but is educed, _ex nihilo sui_, from the potentiality of matter by the physical agencies and laws of generation. What is startling and puzzling about this theory is that it makes an organized, material body exercise sensible cognition. The soul is a mere substantial form, higher than the aqueous or igneous or cadaverous form, but of the same genus. It is educed from the potentiality of matter, and therefore matter is in potency to the sentient faculty, as it is in potency to have quantity, figure, color, and weight. Second causes suffice to evolve from its potency this new form of being in which it can see, hear, feel, imagine and remember, simulate many of the processes and actions of rational beings, enjoy and suffer, recognize friends and enemies, invent stratagems, play tricks, exercise courage, fidelity, fortitude, and constancy in affection, and show forth all those remarkable phenomena which make the animal, in one point of view, the greatest marvel of creation. If the animal soul is not a distinct substance, immediately created and having existence _in se_, the peripatetic theory, pure and simple, with all its mysteriousness, is preferable to any other, and its failure to give demonstration and satisfy the _ingenium curiosum_ of many searchers into the secrets of nature is a necessary consequence of the impenetrable mystery which shrouds the essence of material being.