Chapter V: Introduction (2)

But the remarker thinks _we shall be_ sufficiently _secure in America, if we "raise English forts at such passes as may at once make us respectable to the French and to the Indian nations[28]."_ The security desirable in America may be considered as of three kinds. 1. A security of possession, that the French shall not drive us out of the country. 2. A security of our planters from the inroads of savages, and the murders committed by them. 3. A security that the British nation shall not be obliged, on every new war, to repeat the immense expence occasioned by this, to defend its possessions in America. Forts, in the most important passes, may, I acknowledge, be of use to obtain the _first_ kind of security: but as those situations are far advanced beyond the inhabitants, the expence of maintaining and supplying the garrisons will be very great even in time of full peace, and immense on every interruption of it; as it is easy for skulking-parties of the enemy, in such long roads through the woods, to intercept and cut off our convoys, unless guarded continually by great bodies of men.--The _second_ kind of security will not be obtained by such forts, unless they were connected by a wall like that of China, from one end of our settlements to the other. If the Indians, when at war, marched like the Europeans, with great armies, heavy cannon, baggage, and carriages; the passes through which alone such armies could penetrate our country, or receive their supplies, being secured, all might be sufficiently secure; but the case is widely different. They go to war, as they call it, in small parties; from fifty men down to five. Their hunting life has made them acquainted with the whole country, and scarce any part of it is impracticable to such a party. They can travel through the woods even by night, and know how to conceal their tracks. They pass easily between your forts undiscovered; and privately approach the settlements of your frontier inhabitants. They need no convoys of provisions to follow them; for whether they are shifting from place to place in the woods, or lying in wait for an opportunity to strike a blow, every thicket and every stream furnishes so small a number with sufficient subsistence. When they have surprised separately, and murdered and scalped a dozen families, they are gone with inconceivable expedition through unknown ways; and it is very rare that pursuers have any chance of coming up with them[29]. In short, long experience has taught our planters, that they cannot rely upon forts as a security against Indians: the inhabitants of Hackney might as well rely upon the tower of London, to secure them against highwaymen and housebreakers.--As to the _third_ kind of security, that we shall not, in a few years, have all we have now done, to do over again in America, and be obliged to employ the same number of troops, and ships, at the same immense expence, to defend our possessions there, while we are in proportion weakened here: such forts I think, cannot prevent this. During a peace, it is not to be doubted the French, who are adroit at fortifying, will likewise erect forts in the most advantageous places of the country we leave them; which will make it more difficult than ever to be reduced in case of another war. We know by the experience of this war, how extremely difficult it is to march an army through the American woods, with its necessary cannon and stores, sufficient to reduce a very slight fort. The accounts at the treasury will tell you, what amazing sums we have necessarily spent in the expeditions against two very trifling forts, Duquesne, and Crown Point. While the French retain their influence over the Indians, they can easily keep our long extended frontier in continual alarm, by a very few of those people; and with a small number of regulars and militia, in such a country, we find they can keep an army of ours in full employ for several years. We therefore shall not need to be told by our colonies, that if we leave Canada, however circumscribed, to the French, "we have done nothing[30];" we shall soon be made sensible _ourselves_ of this truth, and to our cost.

I would not be understood to deny, that even if we subdue and retain Canada, some _few forts_ may be of use to secure the goods of the traders, and protect the commerce, in case of any sudden misunderstanding with any tribe of Indians: but these forts will be best under the care of the colonies interested in the Indian trade, and garrisoned by their provincial forces, and at their own expence. Their own interest will then induce the American governments to take care of such forts in proportion to their importance, and see that the officers keep their corps full, and mind their duty. But any troops of ours placed there, and accountable here, would, in such remote and obscure places, and at so great a distance from the eye and inspection of superiors, soon become of little consequence, even though the French were left in possession of Canada. If the four independent companies, maintained by the crown in New York more than forty years, at a great expence, consisted, for most part of the time, of faggots chiefly; if their officers enjoyed their places as sinecures, and were only, as a writer[31] of that country styles them, a kind of military monks; if this was the state of troops posted in a populous country, where the imposition could not be so well concealed; what may we expect will be the case of those, that shall be posted two, three, or four hundred miles from the inhabitants, in such obscure and remote places as Crown Point, Oswego, Duquesne, or Niagara? they would scarce be even faggots; they would dwindle to mere names upon paper, and appear no where but upon the muster-rolls.

Now _all the kinds_ of security we have mentioned are obtained by subduing and _retaining_ Canada. Our present possessions in America are secured; our planters will no longer be massacred by the Indians, who, depending absolutely on us for what are now become the necessaries of life to them (guns, powder, hatchets, knives, and clothing) and having no other Europeans near, that can either supply them, or instigate them against us; there is no doubt of their being always disposed, if we treat them with common justice, to live in perpetual peace with us. And with regard to France, she cannot, in case of another war, put us to the immense expence of defending that long extended frontier; we shall then, as it were, have our backs against a wall in America; the sea coast will be easily protected by our superior naval power: and here "our own watchfulness and our own strength" will be properly, and cannot but be successfully employed. In this situation, the force, now employed in that part of the world, may be spared for any other service here or elsewhere; so that both the offensive and defensive strength of the British empire, on the whole, will be greatly increased.

But to leave the French in possession of Canada, _when it is in our power to remove them, and depend_ (as the remarker proposes) _on our own_ "strength and watchfulness[32]" _to prevent the mischiefs that may attend it, seems neither safe nor prudent_. Happy as we now are, under the best of kings, and in the prospect of a succession promising every felicity a nation was ever blessed with; happy too in the wisdom and vigour of every part of the administration; we cannot, we ought not to promise ourselves the uninterrupted continuance of those blessings. The safety of a considerable part of the state, and the interest of the whole, are not to be trusted to the wisdom and vigour of _future administrations_; when a security is to be had more effectual, more constant, and much less expensive. They, who can be moved by the apprehension of dangers so remote, as that of the future independence of our colonies (a point I shall hereafter consider) seem scarcely consistent with themselves, when they suppose we may rely on the wisdom and vigour of an administration for their safety.--I should indeed think it less material whether Canada were ceded to us or not, if I had in view only the security of _possession_ in our colonies. I entirely agree with the remarker, that we are in North America "a far greater continental as well as naval power;" and that only cowardice or ignorance can subject our colonies there to a French conquest. But for the same reason I disagree with him widely upon another point.

[3. _The blood and treasure spent in the American wars, not spent
in the cause of the colonies alone._]

I do not think, that our "blood and treasure has been expended," as he intimates, "_in the cause of the colonies_," and that we are "making conquests for _them_[33];" yet I believe this is too common an error. I do not say, they are altogether unconcerned in the event. The inhabitants of them are, in common with the other subjects of Great Britain, anxious for the glory of her crown, the extent of her power and commerce, the welfare and future repose of the whole British people. They could not therefore but take a large share in the affronts offered to Britain; and have been animated with a truly British spirit to exert themselves beyond their strength, and against their evident interest. Yet so unfortunate have they been, that their virtue has made against them; for upon no better foundation than this have they been supposed the authors of a war, carried on for their advantage only. It is a great mistake to imagine, that the American country in question between Great Britain and France is claimed as the property of any _individuals or public body in America_; or that the possession of it by Great Britain is likely, in any lucrative view, to redound at all to the advantage of any person there. On the other hand, the bulk of the inhabitants of North America are _land-owners_, whose lands are inferior in value to those of Britain, only by the want of an equal number of people. It is true, the accession of the large territory claimed before the war began (especially if that be secured by the possession of Canada) will tend to the increase of the British subjects faster, than if they had been confined within the mountains: yet the increase within the mountains only would evidently make the comparative population equal to that of Great Britain much sooner than it can be expected, when our people are spread over a country six times as large. I think this is the only point of light in which this question is to be viewed, and is the only one in which any of the colonies are concerned.--No colony, no possessor of lands in any colony, therefore wishes for conquests, or can be benefitted by them, otherwise than as they may be a means of _securing peace on their borders_. No considerable advantage has resulted to the colonies by the conquests of this war, or can result from confirming them by the peace, but what they must enjoy in common with the rest of the British people; with this evident drawback from their share of these advantages, that they will necessarily lessen, or at least prevent the increase of the value of what makes the principal part of their private property [their land]. A people, spread through the whole tract of country on this side the Mississippi, and secured by Canada in our hands, would probably for some centuries find employment in agriculture, and thereby free us at home effectually from our fears of American manufactures. Unprejudiced men well know, that all the penal and prohibitory laws that ever were thought on will not be sufficient to prevent manufactures in a country, whose inhabitants surpass the number that can subsist by the husbandry of it. That this will be the case in America soon, if our people remain confined within the mountains, and almost as soon should it be unsafe for them to live beyond, though the country be ceded to us, no man acquainted with political and commercial history can doubt. Manufactures are founded in poverty: it is the multitude of poor without land in a country, and who must work for others at low wages or starve, that enables undertakers to carry on a manufacture, and afford it cheap enough to prevent the importation of the same kind from abroad, and to bear the expence of its own exportation.--But no man, who can have a piece of land of his own, sufficient by his labour to subsist his family in plenty, is poor enough to be a manufacturer, and work for a master. Hence, while there is land enough in America for our people, there can never be manufactures to any amount or value. It is a striking observation of a very _able pen_[34], that the natural livelihood of the thin inhabitants of a forest country is hunting; that of a greater number, pasturage: that of a middling population, agriculture; and that of the greatest, manufactures; which last must subsist the bulk of the people in a full country, or they must be subsisted by charity, or perish. The extended population, therefore, that is most advantageous to Great Britain, will be best effected, because only effectually secured, by our possession of Canada.

So far as the _being_ of our present colonies in North America is concerned, I think indeed with the remarker, that the French there are not _"an enemy to be apprehended[35];"_--but the expression is too vague to be applicable to the present, or indeed to any other case. Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli, unequal as they are to this nation in power and numbers of people, are enemies to be still apprehended; and the Highlanders of Scotland have been so for many ages, by the greatest princes of Scotland and Britain. The wild Irish were able to give a great deal of disturbance even to Queen Elizabeth, and cost her more blood and treasure than her war with Spain. Canada, in the hands of France, has always stinted the growth of our colonies, in the course of this war, and indeed before it, has disturbed and vexed even the best and strongest of them; has found means to murder thousands of their people, and unsettle a great part of their country. Much more able will it be to starve the growth of an infant settlement. Canada has also found means to make this nation spend two or three millions a year in America; and a people, how small soever, that in their present situation, can do this as often as we have a war with them, is, methinks, "an enemy to be apprehended."

Our North American colonies are to be considered as the _frontier of the British empire_ on that side. The frontier of any dominion being attacked, it becomes not merely "the cause" of the people immediately attacked (the inhabitants of that frontier) but properly "the cause" of the whole body. Where the frontier people owe and pay obedience, there they have a right to look for protection: no political proposition is better established than this. It is therefore invidious, to represent the "blood and treasure" spent in this war, as spent in "the cause of the colonies" only; and that they are "absurd and ungrateful," if they think we have done nothing, unless we "make conquests for them," and reduce Canada to gratify their "vain ambition," &c. It will not be a conquest for _them_, nor gratify any vain ambition of theirs. It will be a conquest for the _whole_; and all our people will, in the increase of trade, and the ease of taxes, find the advantage of it. Should we be obliged at any time, to make a war for the protection of our commerce, and to secure the exportation of our manufactures, would it be fair to represent such a war, merely as blood and treasure spent in the cause of the weavers of Yorkshire, Norwich, or the West; the cutlers of Sheffield, or the button-makers of Birmingham? I hope it will appear before I end these sheets, that if ever there was a national war, this is truly such a one: a war in which the interest of the whole nation is directly and fundamentally concerned. Those, who would be thought deeply skilled in human nature, affect to discover self-interested views every where at the bottom of the fairest, the most generous conduct. Suspicions and charges of this kind meet with ready reception and belief in the minds even of the multitude, and therefore less acuteness and address, than the remarker is possessed of, would be sufficient to persuade the nation generally, that all the zeal and spirit, manifested and exerted by the colonies in this war, was only in "their own cause," to "make conquests for themselves," to engage us to make more for them, to gratify their own "vain ambition."

But should they now humbly address the mother-country in the terms and the sentiments of the remarker; return her their grateful acknowledgments for the blood and treasure she had spent in "their cause;" confess that enough had not been done "for them;" allow that "English forts, raised in proper passes, will, with the wisdom and vigour of her administration," be a sufficient future protection; express their desires that their people may be confined within the mountains, lest [if] they are suffered to spread and extend themselves in the fertile and pleasant country on the other side, they should "increase infinitely from all causes," "live wholly on their own labour" and become independent; beg therefore that the French may be suffered to remain in possession of Canada, as their neighbourhood may be useful to prevent our increase, and the removing them may "in its consequences be even dangerous[36]:"--I say, should such an address from the colonies make its appearance here (though, according to the remarker, it would be a most just and reasonable one) would it not, might it not with more justice be answered:--We understand you, gentlemen, perfectly well: you have only your own interest in view: you want to have the people confined within your present limits, that in a few years the lands you are possessed of may increase tenfold in value! you want to reduce the price of labour, by increasing numbers on the same territory, that you may be able to set up manufactures and vie with your mother-country! you would have your people kept in a body, that you may be more able to dispute the commands of the crown, and obtain an independency. You would have the French left in Canada, to exercise your military virtue, and make you a warlike people, that you may have more confidence to embark in schemes of disobedience, and greater ability to support them! You have tasted too, the sweets of TWO OR THREE MILLIONS sterling per annum spent among you by our fleets and forces, and you are unwilling to be without a pretence for kindling up another war, and thereby occasioning a repetition of the same delightful doses! But, gentlemen, allow us to understand _our_ interest a little likewise: we shall remove the French from Canada, that you may live in peace, and we be no more drained by your quarrels. You shall have land enough to cultivate, that you may have neither necessity nor inclination to go into manufactures; and we will manufacture for you, and govern you.

A reader of the Remarks may be apt to say, if this writer would have us restore Canada, on principles of moderation, how can we, consistent with those principles, retain Guadaloupe, which he represents of so much greater value!--I will endeavour to explain this, because by doing it I shall have an opportunity of showing the truth and good sense of the answer to the interested application I have just supposed: The author then is only apparently and not really inconsistent with himself. If we can obtain the credit of moderation by restoring Canada, it is well: but we should, however, restore it at _all events_; because it would not only be of no use to us; but "the possession of it (in his opinion) may in its consequences be dangerous[37]." As how? Why, plainly, (at length it comes out) if the French are not left there to check the growth of our colonies, "they will extend themselves almost without bounds into the inland parts, and increase infinitely from all causes; becoming a numerous, hardy, independent people; possessed of a strong country, communicating little or not at all with England, living wholly on their own labour, and in process of time knowing little and enquiring little about the mother-country." In short, according to this writer, our present colonies are large enough and numerous enough; and the French ought to be left in North America to prevent their increase, lest they become not only useless, but dangerous to Britain. I agree with the Gentleman, that with Canada in our possession, our people in America will increase amazingly. I know, that their common rate of increase, where they are not molested by the enemy, is doubling their numbers every twenty-five years, by natural generation only; exclusive of the accession of foreigners[38]. I think this increase continuing would probably, in a century more, make the number of British subjects on that side the water more numerous than they now are on this; But,

[4. _Not necessary that the American colonies should_ cease being
useful to the _mother-country_. _Their_ preference _over the
West-Indian colonies stated_.]

_I am far from entertaining on that account, any fears of their becoming either useless or dangerous to us; and I look on those fears to be merely imaginary, and without any probable foundation._--The remarker is reserved in giving his reasons; as in his opinion this "is not a fit subject for discussion."--I shall give mine, because I conceive it a subject necessary to be discussed; and the rather, as those fears, how groundless and chimerical soever, may, by possessing the multitude, possibly induce the ablest ministry to conform to them against their own judgment; and thereby prevent the assuring to the British name and nation a stability and permanency, that no man acquainted with history durst have hoped for, till our American possessions opened the pleasing prospect. The remarker thinks, that our people in America, "finding no check from Canada, would extend themselves almost without bounds into the inland parts, and increase infinitely from all causes." The very reason he assigns for their so extending, and which is indeed the true one (their being "invited to it by the pleasantness, fertility, and plenty of the country,") may satisfy us, that this extension will continue to proceed, as long as there remains any pleasant fertile country within their reach. And if we even suppose them confined by the waters of the Mississippi westward, and by those of St. Laurence and the lakes to the northward; yet still we shall leave them room enough to increase, even in the manner of settling now practised there, till they amount to perhaps a hundred millions of souls. This must take some centuries to fulfil: and in the _mean time_, this nation must necessarily supply them with the manufactures they consume; because the new settlers will be employed in agriculture; and the new settlements will so continually draw off the spare hands from the old, that our present colonies will not, during the period we have mentioned, find themselves in a condition to manufacture, even for their own inhabitants, to any considerable degree, much less for those who are settling behind them.

Thus our trade must, till that country becomes as fully peopled as England (that is for centuries to come) be continually increasing, and with it our naval power; because the ocean is between us and them, and our ships and seamen must increase as that trade increases.--The human body and the political differ in this; that the first is limited by nature to a certain stature, which, when attained, it cannot ordinarily exceed: the other, by better government and more prudent police, as well as by change of manners and other circumstances, often takes fresh starts of growth, after being long at a stand; and may add tenfold to the dimensions it had for ages been confined to. The mother, being of full stature, is in a few years equalled by a growing daughter: but in the case of a mother-country and her colonies, it is quite different. The growth of the children tends to increase the growth of the mother, and so the difference and superiority is longer preserved. Were the inhabitants of this island limited to their present number by any thing in nature, or by unchangeable circumstances, the equality of population between the two countries might indeed sooner come to pass: but sure experience, in those parts of the island where manufactures have been introduced, teaches us; that people increase and multiply in proportion as the means and facility of gaining a livelihood increase; and that this island, if they could be employed, is capable of supporting ten times its present number of people. In proportion, therefore, as the demand increases for the manufactures of Britain, by the increase of people in her colonies, the number of her people at home will increase; and with them, the strength as well as the wealth of the nation. For satisfaction in this point, let the reader compare in his mind the number and force of our present fleets, with our fleet in Queen Elizabeth's time[39], before we had colonies. Let him compare the ancient, with the present state of our towns on or near our western coast (Manchester, Liverpool, Kendal, Lancaster, Glasgow, and the countries round them) that trade with any manufacture for our colonies (not to mention Leeds, Halifax, Sheffield, and Birmingham,) and consider what a difference there is in the numbers of people, buildings, rents, and the value of land and of the produce of land; even if he goes back no farther than is within man's memory. Let him compare those countries with others on the same island, where manufactures have not yet extended themselves; observe the present difference, and reflect how much greater our strength may be (if numbers give strength) when our manufacturers shall occupy every part of the island where they can possibly be subsisted.

But, say the objectors, "there is a _certain distance from the sea_, in America, beyond which the expence of carriage will put a stop to the sale and consumption of your manufactures; and this, with the difficulty of making returns for them, will oblige the inhabitants to manufacture for themselves; of course, if you suffer your people to extend their settlements beyond that distance, your people become useless to you:" and this distance is limited by some to two hundred miles, by others to the Apalachian mountains.--Not to insist on a very plain truth, that no part of a dominion, from whence a government may on occasion draw supplies and aids both of men and money (though at too great a distance to be supplied with manufactures from some other part) is therefore to be deemed useless to the whole; I shall endeavour to show, that these imaginary limits of utility, even in point of commerce, are much too narrow. The inland parts of the continent of Europe are farther from the sea, than the limits of settlement proposed for America. Germany is full of tradesmen and artificers of all kinds, and the governments there are not all of them always favourable to the commerce of Britain; yet it is a well-known fact, that our manufactures find their way even into the heart of Germany. Ask the great manufacturers and merchants of the Leeds, Sheffield, Birmingham, Manchester, and Norwich goods; and they will tell you, that some of them send their riders frequently through France or Spain, and Italy, up to Vienna, and back through the middle and northern parts of Germany, to show samples of their wares, and collect orders, which they receive by almost every mail, to a vast amount. Whatever charges arise on the carriage of goods are added to the value, and all paid by the consumer. If these nations, over whom we have no government, over whose consumption we can have no influence, but what arises from the cheapness and goodness of our wares, whose trade, manufactures, or commercial connections are not subject to the control of our laws, as those of our colonies certainly are in some degree; I say, if these nations purchase and consume such quantities of our goods, notwithstanding the remoteness of their situation from the sea; how much less likely is it, that the settlers in America, who must for ages be employed in agriculture chiefly, should make cheaper for themselves the goods our manufacturers at present supply them with: even if we suppose the carriage five, six, or seven hundred miles from the sea as difficult and expensive, as the like distance into Germany: whereas in the latter, the natural distances are frequently doubled by political obstructions; I mean the intermixed territories and clashing interests of princes[40]. But when we consider, that the inland parts of America are penetrated by great navigable rivers; that there are a number of great lakes, communicating with each other, with those rivers, and with the sea, very small portages here and there excepted[41]; that the sea-coasts (if one may be allowed the expression) of those lakes only amount at least to two thousand seven hundred miles, exclusive of the rivers running into them (many of which are navigable to a great extent for boats and canoes, through vast tracts of country); how little likely is it that the expence on the carriage of our goods into those countries should prevent the use of them. If the poor Indians in those remote parts are now able to pay for the linen, woollen, and iron wares they are at present furnished with by the French and English traders (though Indians have nothing but what they get by hunting, and the goods are loaded with all the impositions fraud and knavery can contrive to inhance their value) will not industrious English farmers, hereafter settled in those countries, be much better able to pay for what shall be brought them in the way of fair commerce?

If it is asked, _What_ can such farmers raise, wherewith to pay for the manufactures they may want from us? I answer, that the inland parts of America in question are well known to be fitted for the production of hemp, flax, pot-ash, and above all, silk; the southern parts may produce olive-oil, raisins, currants, indigo, and cochineal. Not to mention horses and black cattle, which may easily be driven to the maritime markets, and at the same time assist in conveying other commodities. That the commodities first mentioned may easily, by water and land-carriage, be brought to the sea-ports from interior America, will not seem incredible, when we reflect, that _hemp_ formerly came from the Ukraine and most southern parts of Russia to Wologda, and down the Dwina to Archangel; and thence, by a perilous navigation, round the North Cape to England, and other parts of Europe. It now comes from the same country up the Dnieper, and down the Duna[42], with much land-carriage. Great part of the Russia _iron_, no high-priced commodity, is brought three hundred miles by land and water from the heart of Siberia. _Furs_ [the produce too of America] are brought to Amsterdam from all parts of Siberia, even the most remote, Kamstchatka. The same country furnishes me with another instance of extended inland commerce. It is found worth while to keep up a mercantile communication between Pekin in China, and Petersburgh. And none of these instances of inland commerce _exceed_ those of the courses by which, at several periods, _the whole trade of the East_ was carried on. Before the prosperity of the Mameluke dominion in Egypt fixed the staple for the riches of the East at Cairo and Alexandria (whither they were brought from the Red Sea) great part of those commodities were carried to the cities of Cashgar and Balk. (This gave birth to those towns, that still subsist upon the remains of their ancient opulence, amidst a people and country equally wild.) From thence those goods were carried down the Amû (the ancient Oxus) to the Caspian Sea, and up the Wolga to Astrachan; from whence they were carried over to, and down the Don, to the mouth of that river; and thence again the Venetians directly, and the Genoese and Venetians indirectly (by way of Kaffa and Trebisonde) dispersed them through the Mediterranean and some other parts of Europe. Another part of those goods was carried over-land from the Wolga to the rivers Duna and Neva; from both they were carried to the city of Wisbuy in the Baltic (so eminent for its sea-laws); and from the city of Ladoga on the Neva, we are told they were even carried by the Dwina to Archangel; and from thence round the North Cape.--If iron and hemp will bear the charge of carriage from this inland country, _other metals_ will, as well as iron; and certainly _silk_, since 3_d._ per _lb._ is not above 1 per cent on the value, and amounts to 28_l._ per ton. If the _growths_ of a country find their way out of it; the _manufactures_ of the country where they go will infallibly find their way into it.

They, who understand the economy and principles of manufactures, know, that it is impossible to establish them in places not populous: and even in those that are populous, hardly possible to establish them to the prejudices of the places _already in possession of them_. Several attempts have been made in France and Spain, countenanced by the government, to draw from us, and establish in those countries, our hard-ware and woollen manufactures; but without success. The reasons are various. A manufacture is part of a great system of commerce, which takes in conveniencies of various kinds; methods of providing materials of all sorts, machines for expediting and facilitating labour, all the channels of correspondence for vending the wares, the credit and confidence necessary to found and support this correspondence, the mutual aid of different artizans, and a thousand other particulars, which time and long experience have _gradually_ established. A part of such a system cannot support itself without the whole: and before the whole can be obtained the part perishes. Manufactures, where they are in perfection, are carried on by a multiplicity of hands, each of which is expert only in his own part; no one of them a master of the whole; and, if by any means spirited away to a foreign country, he is lost without his fellows. Then it is a matter of the extremest difficulty to persuade a complete set of workmen, skilled in all parts of a manufactory, to leave their country together, and settle in a foreign land. Some of the idle and drunken may be enticed away; but these only disappoint their employers, and serve to discourage the undertaking. If by royal munificence, and an expence that the profits of the trade alone would not bear, a complete set of good and skilful hands are collected and carried over, they find so much of the system imperfect, so many things wanting to carry on the trade to advantage, so many difficulties to overcome, and the knot of hands so easily broken by death, dissatisfaction, and desertion; that they and their employers are discouraged together, and the project vanishes into smoke. Hence it happens, that established manufactures are hardly ever lost, but by foreign conquest, or by some eminent interior fault in manners or government; a bad police oppressing and discouraging the workmen, or religious persecutions driving the sober and industrious out of the country. There is, in short, scarce a single instance in history of the contrary, where manufactures have once taken firm root. They sometimes start up in a new place; but are generally supported, like exotic plants, at more expence than they are worth for any thing but curiosity; until these new seats become the refuge of the manufacturers driven from the old ones. The conquest of Constantinople, and final reduction of the Greek empire, dispersed many curious manufacturers into different parts of Christendom. The former conquests of its provinces, had _before_ done the same. The loss of liberty in Verona, Milan, Florence, Pisa, Pistoia, and other great cities of Italy, drove the manufacturers of woollen cloths into Spain and Flanders. The latter first lost their trade and manufactures to Antwerp and the cities of Brabant; from whence, by persecution for religion, they were sent into Holland and England: [while] the civil wars, during the minority of Charles the First of Spain, which ended in the loss of the liberty of their great towns, ended too in the loss of the manufactures of Toledo, Segovia, Salamanca, Medina del campo, &c. The revocation of the _edict of Nantes_ communicated, to all the protestant part of Europe, the paper, silk, and other valuable manufacturers of France; almost peculiar at that time to that country, and till then in vain attempted elsewhere. To be convinced, that it is not soil and climate, or even freedom from taxes, that determines the residence of manufacturers, we need only turn our eyes on Holland; where a multitude of manufactures are still carried on (perhaps more than on the same extent of territory any where in Europe) and sold on terms upon which they cannot be had in any other part of the world. And this too is true of those _growths_, which, by their nature and the labour required to raise them, come the nearest to manufactures.

As to the common-place objection to the North-American settlements, that they are _in the same climate, and their produce the same as that of England_;--in the first place it is not true; it is particularly not so of the countries now likely to be added to our settlements; and of our present colonies, the products, lumber, tobacco, rice, and indigo, great articles of commerce, do not interfere with the products of England: in the next place, a man must know very little of the trade of the world, who does not know, that the greater part of it is carried on between countries whose climate differs very little. Even the trade between the different parts of these British islands is greatly superior to that between England and all the West India Islands put together.

If I have been successful in proving that a considerable commerce may and will subsist between us and our future most inland settlements in North America, notwithstanding their distance; I have more than half proved no _other inconveniency will arise_ from their distance. Many men in such a country must "know," must "think," and must "care" about the country they chiefly trade with. The juridical and other connections of government are yet a faster hold than even commercial ties, and spread, directly and indirectly, far and wide. Business to be solicited and causes depending create a great intercourse, even where private property is _not_ divided in different countries;--yet this division _will_ always subsist, where different countries are ruled by the same government. Where a man has landed property both in the mother country and a province, he will almost always live in the mother country: this, though there were no trade, is singly a sufficient gain. It is said, that Ireland pays near a million sterling annually to its absentees in England: the balance of trade from Spain, or even Portugal, is scarcely equal to this.

Let it not be said we have _no absentees_ from North America. There are many, to the writer's knowledge; and if there are at present but few of them, that distinguish themselves here by great expence, it is owing to the mediocrity of fortune among the inhabitants of the Northern colonies, and a more equal division of landed property, than in the West India islands, so that there are as yet but few large estates. But if those, who have such estates, reside upon and take care of them themselves, are they worse subjects than they would be if they lived idly in England?--Great merit is assumed for the gentlemen of the West Indies,[43] on the score of their residing and spending their money in England. I would not depreciate that merit; it is considerable; for they might, if they pleased, spend their money in France: but the difference between their spending it here and at home is not so great. What do they spend it in when they are here, but the produce and manufactures of this country;--and would they not do the same if they were at home? Is it of any great importance to the English farmer, whether the West India gentleman comes to London and eats his beef, pork, and tongues, fresh; or has them brought to him in the West Indies salted? whether he eats his English cheese and butter, or drinks his English ale, at London or in Barbadoes? Is the clothier's, or the mercer's, or the cutler's, or the toyman's profit less, for their goods being worn and consumed by the same persons residing on the other side of the ocean? Would not the profits of the merchant and mariner be rather greater, and some addition made to our navigation, ships and seamen? If the North American gentleman stays in his own country, and lives there in that degree of luxury and expence with regard to the use of British manufactures, that his fortune entitles him to; may not his example (from the imitation of superiors, so natural to mankind) spread the use of those manufactures among hundreds of families around him, and occasion a much greater demand for them, than it would do if he should remove and live in London?--However this may be, if in our views of immediate advantage, it seems preferable, that the gentlemen of large fortunes in North America should reside much in England; it is what may surely be expected, as fast as such fortunes are acquired there. Their having "colleges of their own for the education of their youth," will not prevent it: a little knowledge and learning acquired increases the appetite for more, and will make the conversation of the learned on this side the water more strongly desired. Ireland has its university likewise; yet this does not prevent the immense pecuniary benefit we receive from that kingdom. And there will always be, in the conveniencies of life, the politeness, the pleasures, the magnificence of the reigning country, many other attractions besides those of learning, to draw men of substance there, where they can (apparently at least) have the best bargain of happiness for their money.

Our _trade to the West India islands_ is undoubtedly a valuable one: but whatever is the amount of it, it _has long been at a stand_. Limited as our sugar planters are by the scantiness of territory, they cannot increase much beyond their present number; and this is an evil, as I shall show hereafter, that will be little helped by our keeping Guadaloupe.--The trade to our Northern Colonies is not only greater, but yearly increasing with the increase of people: and even in a greater proportion, as the people increase in wealth and the ability of spending, as well as in numbers.[44]--I have already said, that _our people in the northern colonies_ double in about 25 years, exclusive of the accession of strangers. That I speak within bounds, I appeal to the authentic accounts frequently required by the board of trade, and transmitted to that board by the respective governors; of which accounts I shall select one as a sample, being that from the colony of Rhode-Island;[45] a colony that of all the others receives the least addition from strangers.--For the increase of our _trade to those colonies_, I refer to the accounts frequently laid before Parliament, by the officers of the customs, and to the custom-house books: from which I have also selected one account, that of the trade from England (exclusive of Scotland) to Pensylvania[46]; a colony most remarkable for the plain frugal manner of living of its inhabitants, and the most suspected of carrying on manufactures, on account of the number of German artizans, who are known to have transplanted themselves into that country; though even these, in truth, when they come there, generally apply themselves to agriculture, as the surest support and most advantageous employment. By this account it appears, that the exports to that province have in 28 years, increased nearly in the proportion of 17 to 1; whereas the people themselves, who by other authentic accounts appear to double their numbers (the strangers who settle there included) in about 16 years, cannot in the 28 years have increased in a greater proportion than as 4 to 1. The additional demand then, and consumption of goods from England, of 13 parts in 17 more than the additional number would require, must be owing to this; that the people having by their industry mended their circumstances, are enabled to indulge themselves in finer clothes, better furniture, and a more general use of all our manufactures than heretofore.

In fact, the occasion for English goods in North America, and the inclination to have and use them, is, and must be for ages to come, much greater than the ability of the people to pay for them; they must therefore, as they now do, deny themselves many things they would otherwise chuse to have, or increase their industry to obtain them. And thus, if they should at any time manufacture some coarse article, which on account of its bulk or some other circumstance, cannot so well be brought to them from Britain; it only enables them the better to pay for finer goods, that _otherwise_ they could not indulge themselves in: so that the exports thither are not diminished by such manufacture, but rather increased. The single article of manufacture in these colonies, mentioned by the remarker, is _hats_ made in New-England. It is true, there have been, ever since the first settlement of that country, a few hatters there; drawn thither probably at first by the facility of getting beaver, while the woods were but little cleared, and there was plenty of those animals. The case is greatly altered now. The beaver skins are not now to be had in New-England, but from very remote places and at great prices. The trade is accordingly declining there; so that, far from being able to make hats in any quantity for exportation, they cannot supply their home demand; and it is well known, that some thousand dozens are sent thither yearly from London, Bristol, and Liverpool, and sold there cheaper than the inhabitants can make them of equal goodness. In fact, the colonies are so little suited for establishing of manufactures, that they are continually losing the few branches they accidentally gain. The working brasiers, cutlers, and pewterers, as well as hatters, who have happened to go over from time to time and settle in the colonies, gradually drop the working part of their business, and import their respective goods from England, whence they can have them cheaper and better than they can make them. They continue their shops indeed, in the same way of dealing; but become _sellers_ of brasiery, cutlery, pewter, hats, &c. brought from England, instead of being _makers_ of those goods.

[5. _The American colonies_ not dangerous _in their nature to Great
Britain_.]

Thus much to the apprehension of our colonies becoming useless to us. I shall next consider the other supposition, that their growth may render them _dangerous_.--Of this, I own, I have not the least conception, when I consider that we have already _fourteen separate governments_ on the maritime coast of the continent; and, if we extend our settlements, shall probably have as many more behind them on the inland side. Those we now have are not only under different governors, but have different forms of government, different laws, different interests, and some of them different religious persuasions and different manners.--Their jealousy of each other is so great, that however necessary an union of the colonies has long been, for their common defence and security against their enemies, and how sensible soever each colony has been of that necessity; yet they have never been able to effect such an union among themselves; nor even to agree in requesting the mother country to establish it for them. Nothing but the immediate command of the crown has been able to produce even the imperfect union, but lately seen there, of the forces of some colonies. If they could not agree to unite for their defence against the French and Indians, who were perpetually harassing their settlements, burning their villages, and murdering their people; can it reasonably be supposed there is any danger of their uniting against their own nation, which protects and encourages them, with which they have so many connections and ties of blood, interest and affection, and which, it is well known, they all love much more than they love one another?

In short, there are so many causes that must operate to prevent it, that I will venture to say, an union amongst them for such a purpose is not merely improbable, it is impossible. And if the union of the whole is impossible, the attempt of a part must be madness; as those colonies that did not join the rebellion would join the mother-country in suppressing it. When I say such an union is impossible, I mean, without the most grievous tyranny and oppression. People who have property in a country which they may lose, and privileges which they may endanger, are generally disposed to be quiet, and even to bear much, rather than hazard all. While the government is mild and just, while important civil and religious rights are secure, such subjects will be dutiful and obedient. The waves do not rise but when the winds blow.

What such an administration as the Duke of Alva's in the Netherlands might produce, I know not; but this I think I have a right to deem impossible. And yet there were two very manifest differences between that case, and ours; and both are in our favour. The _first_, that Spain had already united the seventeen provinces under one visible government, though the states continued independent: the _second_, that the inhabitants of those provinces were of a nation, not only different from, but utterly unlike the Spaniards. Had the Netherlands been peopled from Spain, the worst of oppression had probably not provoked them to wish a separation of government. It might, and probably would, have ruined the country; but would never have produced an independent sovereignty. In fact, neither the very worst of governments, the worst of politics in the last century, nor the total abolition of their remaining liberty, in the provinces of Spain itself, in the present, have produced any independency [in Spain] that could be supported. The same may be observed of France.

And let it not be said, that the neighbourhood of these to the seat of government has prevented a separation. While our strength at sea continues, the banks of the Ohio (in point of easy and expeditious conveyance of troops) are nearer to London, than the remote parts of France and Spain to their respective capitals; and much nearer than Connaught and Ulster were in the days of Queen Elizabeth. No body foretels the dissolution of the Russian monarchy from its extent; yet I will venture to say, the eastern parts of it are already much more inaccessible from Petersburgh, than the country on the Mississippi is from London; I mean, more men, in less time, might be conveyed the latter than the former distance. The rivers Oby, Jenesea, and Lena, do not facilitate the communication half so well by their course, nor are they half so practicable as the American rivers. To this I shall only add the observation of Machiavel, in his Prince; that a government seldom long preserves its dominion over those who are foreigners to it; who, on the other hand, fall with great ease, and continue inseparably annexed to the government of their own nation: which he proves by the fate of the English conquests in France. Yet with all these disadvantages, so difficult is it to overturn an established government, that it was not without the assistance of France and England, that the United Provinces supported themselves: which teaches us, that

[6. _The French remaining in Canada, an encouragement to
disaffections in the British Colonies_.--_If they prove a_ check,
_that check of the most barbarous nature_.]