Chapter VI: Introduction (3)

_If the visionary danger of independence in our colonies is to be feared; nothing is more likely to render it substantial, than the neighbourhood of foreigners at enmity with the sovereign governments, capable of giving either_ aid[47], _or an_ asylum, _as the event shall require_. Yet against even these disadvantages, did Spain preserve almost ten provinces, merely through their want of union; which indeed could never have taken place among the others, but for causes, some of which are in our case impossible, and others it is impious to suppose possible.

The Romans well understood that policy, which teaches the security arising to the chief government from separate states among the governed; when they restored the liberties of the states of Greece (oppressed but united under Macedon) by an edict, that every state should live under its own laws. They did not even name a governor. Independence of each other, and separate interests (though among a people united by common manners, language, and I may say religion; inferior neither in wisdom, bravery, nor their love of liberty, to the Romans themselves;) was all the security the sovereigns wished for their sovereignty. It is true, they did not call themselves sovereigns; they set no value on the title; they were contented with possessing the thing. And possess it they did, even without a standing army: (what can be a stronger proof of the security of their possession?) And yet by a policy, similar to this throughout, was the Roman world subdued and held: a world composed of above an hundred languages, and sets of manners, different from those of their masters. Yet this dominion was unshakeable, till the loss of liberty and corruption of manners in the sovereign state overturned it.

_But what is the prudent policy, inculcated by the remarker to obtain this end, security of dominion over our colonies? It is_, to leave the French _in_ Canada, to "check" their growth; _for otherwise, our people may "increase infinitely from all causes[48]."_ We have already seen in what manner the French and their Indians check the growth of our colonies. It is a modest word, this _check_, for massacring men, women, and children. The writer would, if he could, hide from himself as well as from the public, the horror arising from such a proposal, by couching it in general terms: it is no wonder he thought it a "subject not fit for discussion" in his letter; though he recommends it as "a point that should be the constant object of the minister's attention!" But if Canada is restored on this principle, will not Britain be guilty of all the blood to be shed, all the murders to be committed, in order to check this dreaded growth of our own people? Will not this be telling the French in plain terms, that the horrid barbarities they perpetrate with their Indians on our colonists are agreeable to us; and that they need not apprehend the resentment of a government, with whose views they so happily concur? Will not the colonies view it in this light? Will they have reason to consider themselves any longer as subjects and children, when they find their cruel enemies hallooed upon them by the country from whence they sprung; the government that owes them protection, as it requires their obedience? Is not this the most likely means of driving them into the arms of the French, who can invite them by an offer of that security, their own government chuses not to afford them? I would not be thought to insinuate, that the remarker wants humanity. I know how little many good-natured persons are affected by the distresses of people at a distance, and whom they do not know. There are even those, who, being present, can sympathize sincerely with the grief of a lady on the sudden death of a favourite bird; and yet can read of the sinking of a city in Syria with very little concern. If it be, after all, thought necessary to check the growth of our colonies, give me leave to propose a method less cruel. It is a method of which we have an example in scripture. The murder of husbands, of wives, of brothers, sisters and children, whose pleasing society has been for some time enjoyed, affects deeply the respective surviving relations; but grief for the death of a child just born is short, and easily supported. The method I mean is that which was dictated by the Egyptian policy, when the "infinite increase" of the children of Israel was apprehended as dangerous to the state[49]. Let an act of parliament then be made, enjoining the colony midwives to stifle in the birth every third or fourth child. By this means you may keep the colonies to their present size. And if they were under the hard alternative of submitting to one or the other of these schemes for checking their growth, I dare answer for them, they would prefer the latter.

_But all this debate about the propriety or impropriety of keeping or restoring Canada_ is possibly too early. We have taken the capital indeed, but the country is yet far from being in our possession; and perhaps never will be: for if our m----rs are persuaded by such counsellors as the remarker, that the French there are "not the worst of neighbours," and that if we had conquered Canada, we ought, for our own sakes, to restore it, as a check to the growth of our colonies; I am then afraid we shall never take it. For there are many ways of avoiding the completion of the conquest, that will be less exceptionable and less odious than the giving it up.

[7. _Canada easily peopled_, without draining Great Britain _of any
of its inhabitants_.]

_The objection I have often heard, that if we had Canada we could not people it, without draining Britain of its inhabitants, is founded on ignorance of the nature of population in new countries._ When we first began to colonize in America, it was necessary to send people, and to send seed-corn; but it is not now necessary that we should furnish, for a new colony, either one or the other. The annual increment alone of our present colonies, without diminishing their numbers, or requiring a man from hence, is sufficient in ten years to fill Canada with double the number of English that it now has of French inhabitants[50]. Those who are protestants among the French will probably choose to remain under the English government; many will choose to remove, if they can be allowed to sell their lands, improvements, and effects: the rest in that thin-settled country will in less than half a century, from the crowds of English settling round and among them, be blended and incorporated with our people both in language and manners.

[8. _The merits of Guadaloupe to Great Britain_ over-valued; _yet
likely to be paid_ much dearer for, _than Canada_.]

_In Guadaloupe the case is somewhat different_; and though I am far from thinking[51] we have sugar-land enough[52], I cannot think Guadaloupe is so desirable an increase of it, as other objects the enemy would probably be infinitely more ready to part with. A country, _fully inhabited_ by any nation, is no proper possession for another of different languages, manners, and religion. It is hardly ever tenable at less expence than it is worth. But the isle of _Cayenne, and its appendix, Equinoctial-France_, having but very few inhabitants, and these therefore easily removed, would indeed be an acquisition every way suitable to our situation and desires. This would hold all that migrate from Barbadoes, the Leeward Islands, or Jamaica. It would certainly recal into an English government (in which there would be room for millions) all who have before settled or purchased in Martinico, Guadaloupe, Santa-Cruz, or St. John's; except such as know not the value of an English government, and such I am sure are not worth recalling.

But should we keep Guadaloupe, we are told it would _enable us to export 300,000_l._ in sugars_. Admit it to be true, though perhaps the amazing increase of English consumption might stop most of it here,--to whose profit is this to redound? To the profit of the French inhabitants of the island: except a small part, that should fall to the share of the English purchasers, but whose whole purchase-money must first be added to the wealth and circulation of France. I grant, however, much of this 300,000_l._ would be expended in British manufactures. Perhaps too, a few of the land-owners of Guadaloupe might dwell and spend their fortunes in Britain (though probably much fewer than of the inhabitants of North America.) I admit the advantage arising to us from these circumstances (as far as they go) in the case of Guadaloupe, as well as in that of our other West-India settlements. Yet even this consumption is little better than that of an allied nation would be, who should take our manufactures and supply us with sugar, and put us to no great expence in defending the place of growth. But though our own colonies expend among us almost the whole produce of our sugar[53], _can we, or ought we_ to promise ourselves this will be the case of Guadaloupe? One 100,000_l._ will supply them with British manufactures; and supposing we can effectually prevent the introduction of those of France (which is morally impossible in a country used to them) the other 200,000_l._ will still be spent in France, in the education of their children and support of themselves; or else be laid up there, where they will always think their home to be.

Besides this consumption of British manufactures, _much is said of the benefit we shall have from the_ situation of Guadaloupe; and we are told of a trade to the Caraccas and Spanish Main. In what respect Guadaloupe is better situated for this trade than Jamaica, or even any of our other islands, I am at a loss to guess. I believe it to be not so well situated for that of the windward coast, as Tobago and St. Lucia; which in this, as well as other respects, would be more valuable possessions, and which, I doubt not, the peace will secure to us. Nor is it nearly so well situated for that of the rest of the Spanish Main as Jamaica. As to the greater safety of our trade by the possession of Guadaloupe, experience has convinced us, that in reducing a single island, or even more, we stop the privateering business but little. Privateers still subsist, in equal if not greater numbers, and carry the vessels into Martinico, which before it was more convenient to carry into Guadaloupe. Had we all the Caribbees, it is true, they would in those parts be without shelter.

Yet, upon the whole, I suppose it to be a doubtful point, and well worth consideration, whether our obtaining possession of all the Caribbees would be more than a temporary benefit; as it would necessarily soon fill the French part of Hispaniola with French inhabitants, and thereby render it five times more valuable in time of peace, and little less than impregnable in time of war, and would probably end in a few years in the uniting the whole of that great and fertile island under a French government. It is agreed on all hands, that our conquest of St. Christopher's, and driving the French from thence, first furnished Hispaniola with skilful and substantial planters, and was consequently the first occasion of its present opulence. On the other hand, I will hazard an opinion, that valuable as the French possessions in the West Indies are, and undeniable the advantages they derive from them, there is somewhat to be weighed in the opposite scale. They cannot at present make war with England, without exposing those advantages, while divided among the numerous islands they now have, much more than they would, were they possessed of St. Domingo only; their own share of which would, if well cultivated, grow more sugar, than is now grown in all their West-India islands.

_I have before said, I do not deny the utility of the conquest, or even of our future possession of Guadaloupe, if not bought too dear._ The trade of the West Indies is one of our most valuable trades. Our possessions there deserve our greatest care and attention. So do those of North America. I shall not enter into the invidious task of comparing their due estimation. It would be a very long, and a very disagreeable one, to run through every thing material on this head. It is enough to our present point, if I have shown, that the value of North America is capable of an immense increase, by an acquisition and measures, that must necessarily have an effect the direct contrary of what we have been industriously taught to fear; and that Guadaloupe is, in point of advantage, but a very small addition to our West-India possessions; rendered many ways less valuable to us, than it is to the French, who will probably set more value upon it, than upon a country [Canada] that is much more valuable to us than to them.

There is a great deal more to be said on all the parts of these subjects; but as it would carry me into a detail, that I fear would tire the patience of my readers, and which I am not without apprehensions I have done already, I shall reserve what remains till I dare venture again on the indulgence of the public[54].

FOOTNOTES:

[17] In the year 1760, upon the prospect of a peace with France, the late Earl of Bath addressed a Letter to Two Great Men (Mr. Pitt and the Duke of Newcastle) on the terms necessary to be insisted upon in the negociation. He preferred the acquisition of Canada, to acquisitions in the West Indies. In the same year there appeared Remarks on the letter addressed to two great men, containing opposite opinions on this and other subjects. At this moment a philosopher stepped into the controversy, and wrote a pamphlet entitled, The Interest of Great Britain considered, with Regard to her Colonies, &c. The arguments he used, appear to have carried weight with them at the courts of London and Paris, for Canada was kept by the peace.

The editor thinks it necessary to add the following further explanations.--The above piece (which first came to his hands in the shape of a pamphlet, printed for Becket, 1761, 2d edit.) has none of the eight subdivisions it is now thrown into, marked out by the author. He conceived however that they might be useful, and has taken the liberty of making them, but guards it with this apology. The better to suit his purpose, the division of the paragraphs, &c. and the italics of the original, are not accurately adhered to. It was impossible for him however to alter one word in the sense, style, or disposition, of his author: this was a liberty for which he could make no apology.

In the original, the author has added his observations concerning the Increase of Mankind, Peopling of Countries, &c. [printed in the 2d Vol. of this work] and introduced it with the following note. "In confirmation of the writer's opinion concerning population, manufactures, &c. he has thought it not amiss to add an extract from a piece written some years since in America, where the facts must be well known, on which the reasonings are founded. It is entitled, Observations, &c."

With respect to the arguments used by the authors of the Letter, and of the Remarks, it is useless to repeat them here. As far as they are necessary for the understanding of Dr. Franklin, they are to be collected from his own work. B. V.

[18] Remarks, p. 6.

[19] Ibid. p. 7.

[20] Remarks, p. 7.

[21] Ibid.

[22] Remarks, p. 19.

[23] Ibid.

[24] Page 30, of the Letter, and p. 21, of the Remarks.

[25] Remarks, p. 28.

[26] A very intelligent writer of that country, Dr. Clark, in his Observations on the late and present Conduct of the French, &c. printed at Boston, 1755, says,

"The Indians in the French interest are, upon all proper opportunities, _instigated by their priests_ (who have generally the chief management of their public councils) to acts of hostility against the English, even in time of profound peace between the two crowns. Of this there are many undeniable instances: the war between the Indians and the colonies of the Massachusett's Bay and New Hampshire, in 1723, by which those colonies suffered so much damage, was begun by the instigation of the French: their supplies were from them; and there are now original letters of several Jesuits to be produced, whereby it evidently appears, that they were continually animating the Indians, when almost tired with the war, to a farther prosecution of it. The French not only excited the Indians, and supported them, but joined their own forces with them in all the late hostilities that have been committed within his majesty's province of Nova Scotia. And from an intercepted letter this year from the Jesuits at Penobscot, and from other information, it is certain, that they have been using their utmost endeavours to excite the Indians to new acts of hostility against his majesty's colony of the Massachusett's Bay; and some have been committed. The French not only excite the Indians to acts of hostility, but reward them for it, by _buying the English prisoners of them_: for the ransom of each of which they afterwards demand of us the price that is usually given for a slave in these colonies. They do this under the specious pretence of rescuing the poor prisoners from the cruelties and barbarities of the savages; but in reality to encourage them to continue their depredations, as they can by this means get more by hunting the English, than by hunting wild-beasts; and the French at the same time are thereby enabled to keep up a large body of Indians, entirely at _the expence of the English_."

[27] Remarks, p. 25.

[28] Remarks, p. 25.

[29] "Although the Indians live scattered, as a hunter's life requires, they may be collected together from almost any distance; as they can find their subsistence from their gun in their travelling. But let the number of the Indians be what it will, they are not formidable merely on account of their numbers; there are many other circumstances that give them a great advantage over the English. The English inhabitants, though numerous, are extended over a large tract of land, five hundred leagues in length on the sea shore; and although some of their trading towns are thick settled, their settlements in the country towns must be at a distance from each other: besides, that in a new country where lands are cheap, people are fond of acquiring large tracts to themselves; and therefore in the out-settlements, they must be more remote: and as the people that move out are generally poor, they sit down either where they can easiest procure land, or soonest raise a subsistence. Add to this, that the English have fixed settled habitations, the easiest and shortest passages to which the Indians, by constantly hunting in the woods, are perfectly well acquainted with; whereas the English know little or nothing of the Indian country, nor of the passages through the woods that lead to it. The Indian way of making war is by sudden attack upon exposed places; and as soon as they have done mischief, they retire, and either go home by the same or some different route, as they think safest; or go to some other place at a distance, to renew their stroke. If a sufficient party should happily be ready to pursue them, it is a great chance, whether in a country consisting of woods and swamps, which the English are not acquainted with, the enemy do not lie in ambush for them in some convenient place, and from thence destroy them. If this should not be the case, but the English should pursue them, as soon as they have gained the rivers, by means of their canoes (to the use of which they are brought up from their infancy) they presently get out of their reach: further, if a body of men were to march into their country, to the place where they are settled, they can, upon the least notice, without great disadvantage, quit their present habitation, and betake themselves to new ones." _Clark's Observations_, p. 13.

"It has been already remarked, that the tribes of the Indians, living upon the lakes and rivers that run upon the back of the English settlements in North America, are very numerous, and can furnish a great number of fighting men, all perfectly well acquainted with the use of arms as soon as capable of carrying them, as they get the whole of their subsistence from hunting; and that this army, large as it may be, can be maintained by the French without any expence. From their numbers, their situation, and the rivers that run into the English settlements, it is easy to conceive, that they can at any time make an attack upon, and constantly annoy as many of the exposed English settlements as they please, and those at any distance from each other. The effects of such incursions have been too severely felt by many of the British colonies, not to be very well known. The entire breaking up places, that had been for a considerable time settled at a great expence both of labour and money; burning the houses, destroying the flock, killing and making prisoners great numbers of the inhabitants, with all the cruel usage they meet with in their captivity, is only a part of the scene. All other places that are exposed are kept in continual terror; the lands lie waste and uncultivated, from the danger that attends those that shall presume to work upon them: besides the immense charge the governments must be at in a very ineffectual manner to defend their extended frontiers; and all this from the influence the French have had over, but comparatively, a few of the Indians. To the same or greater evils still will every one of the colonies be exposed, whenever the same influence shall be extended to the whole body of them." Ibid. p. 20.

[30] Remarks, p. 26.

[31] Douglass.

[32] Remarks, p. 25.

[33] Remarks, p. 26.

[34] This I believe is meant for Dr. Adam Smith, who seems not at this time to have printed any of his political pieces. B. V.

[35] Remarks, p. 27.

[36] Remarks, p. 50, 51.

[37] Remarks, p. 50, 51.

[38] The reason of this greater increase in America than in Europe is, that in old settled countries, all trades, farms, offices, and employments are full; and many people refrain marrying till they see an opening, in which they can settle themselves, with a reasonable prospect of maintaining a family: but in America, it being easy to obtain land, which, with moderate labour will afford subsistence and something to spare, people marry more readily and earlier in life, whence arises a numerous offspring and the swift population of those countries. It is a common error, that we cannot fill our provinces or increase the number of them, without draining this nation of its people. The increment alone of our present colonies is sufficient for both those purposes. [Written in 1760.]

[39] Viz. forty sail, none of more than forty guns.

[40] Sir C. Whitworth has the following assertion: "Each state in Germany is jealous of its neighbours; and hence, rather than facilitate the export or transit of its neighbours' products or manufactures, they have all recourse to strangers." State of Trade, p. xxiv. B. V.

[41] From New York into lake Ontario, the land-carriage of the several portages altogether, amounts to but about twenty-seven miles. From lake Ontario into lake Erie, the land-carriage at Niagara is but about twelve miles. All the lakes above Niagara communicate by navigable straits, so that no land-carriage is necessary, to go out of one into another. From Presqu'isle on lake Erie, there are but fifteen miles land-carriage, and that a good waggon-road, to Beef River, a branch of the Ohio; which brings you into a navigation of many thousand miles inland, if you take together the Ohio, the Mississippi, and all the great rivers and branches that run into them.

[42] I beg pardon for attempting to remind the reader that he must not confound the river Duna, with the river Dwina.--The fork of the Ohio is about four hundred miles distant from the sea, and the fork of the Mississippi about nine hundred: it is four hundred miles from Petersburgh to Moscow, and very considerably more than four thousand from Petersburgh to Pekin. This is enough to justify Dr. Franklin's positions in the page above, without going into farther particulars. B. V.

[43] Remarks, p. 47, 48, &c.

[44] The writer has [since] obtained accounts of the exports to North America, and the West India Islands; by which it appears, that there has been some increase of trade to those islands as well as to North America, though in a much less degree. The following extract from these accounts will show the reader at one view the amount of the exports to each, in two different terms of five years; the terms taken at ten years distance from each other, to show the increase, viz.

_First term, from 1744 to 1748, inclusive._

_Northern Colonies._ _West India Islands._

1744 £.640,114 12 4 £.796,112 17 9

1745 534,316 2 5 503,669 19 9

1746 754,945 4 3 472,994 19 7

1747 726,648 5 5 856,463 18 6

1748 830,243 16 9 734,095 15 3
--------------- ---------------
Total, £.3,486,261 1 2 Tot. £.3,363,337 10 10

Difference, 122,930 10 4
-------------
£.3,486,268 1 2

_Second term, from 1754 to 1758, inclusive._

_Northern Colonies._ _West India Islands._

1754 1,246,615 1 11 685,675 3 0

1755 1,177,848 6 10 694,667 13 3

1756 1,428,720 18 10 733,458 16 3

1757 1,727,924 2 10 776,488 0 6

1758 1,832,948 13 10 877,571 19 11
--------------- ---------------
Total, £.7,414,057 4 3 Tot. £.3,767,841 12 11

Difference, 3,646,215 11 4
---------------
£.7,414,057 4 3

In the first term, total of West India islands, 3,363,337 10 10

In the second term, ditto 3,767,841 12 11
---------------
Increase, only £.0,404,504 2 1

In the first term, total for Northern Colonies, 3,486,268 1 2

In the second term, ditto 7,414,057 4 3
---------------
Increase, £.3,927,789 3 1

By these accounts it appears, that the exports to the West India islands, and to the northern colonies, were in the first term nearly equal (the difference being only 122,936_l._ 10s. 4d.) and in the second term, the exports to those islands had only increased 404,504_l._ 2s. 1d.--Whereas the increase to the northern colonies is 3,927,789_l._ 3s. 1d. almost _four millions_.

Some part of this increased demand for English goods may be ascribed to the armies and fleets we have had both in North America and the West Indies; not so much for what is consumed by the soldiery; their clothing, stores, ammunition, &c. sent from hence on account of the government, being (as is supposed) not included in these accounts of merchandize exported; but, as the war has occasioned a great plenty of money in America, many of the inhabitants have increased their expence.

N. B. These accounts do not include any exports from Scotland to America, which are doubtless proportionally considerable; nor the exports from Ireland.

[I shall carry on this calculation where Dr. Franklin left it. For four years, from 1770 to 1773 inclusively, the same average _annual_ exports to the same ports of the West Indies is 994,463_l._, and to the same ports of the North American plantations 2,919,669_l._ But the annual averages of the first and second terms of the former were 672,668_l._ and 753,568_l._: of the latter, 697,254_l._ and 1,482,811_l._

In ten years therefore (taking the middle years of the terms) the North American trade is found to have _doubled_ the West Indian: in the next sixteen years it becomes greater by _three-fold_.--With respect to itself, the North American trade in 32 years (taking the extremes of the terms) has quadrupled; while the West Indian trade increased only one half; of which increase I apprehend Jamaica has given more than one-third, chiefly in consequence of the quiet produced by the peace with the maroon negroes.--Had the West Indian trade continued stationary, the North American trade would have quadrupled with respect to it, in 26 years; and this, notwithstanding the checks given to the latter, by their non-importation agreements and the encouragement of their own manufactures.

There has been an accession to both these trades, produced by the cessions at the treaty of Paris, not touched upon by Dr. Franklin. The average _annual_ export-trade, from 1770 to 1773 inclusively, to the ceded West India islands, amounted to 258,299_l._: to the ceded North American territory it has been 280,423_l._ See Sir Charles Whitworth's State of Trade. B. V.]

[45] _Copy of the Report of Governor Hopkins to the Board of Trade, on the Numbers of People in Rhode-Island._

In obedience to your lordships' commands, I have caused the within account to be taken by officers under oath. By it there appears to be in this colony at this time 35,939 white persons, and 4697 blacks, chiefly negroes.

In the year 1730, by order of the then lords commissioners of trade and plantations, an account was taken of the number of people in this colony, and then there appeared to be 15,302 white persons, and 2633 blacks.

Again in the year 1748, by like order, an account was taken of the number of people in this colony, by which it appears there were at that time 29,755 white persons, and 4373 blacks.

_Colony of Rhode Island, Dec. 24, 1755._
STEPHEN HOPKINS.

[46] _An Account of the Value of the Exports from England to Pensylvania, in one Year, taken at different Periods, viz._

In 1723 they amounted only to £. 15,992 19 4
1730 they were 48,592 7 5
1737 56,690 6 7
1742 75,295 3 4
1747 82,404 17 7
1752 201,666 19 11
1757 268,426 6 6

N. B. The accounts for 1758 and 1759, are not yet completed; but those acquainted with the North American trade know, that the increase in those two years has been in a still greater proportion; the last year being supposed to exceed any former year by a third; and this owing to the increased ability of the people to spend, from the greater quantities of money circulating among them by the war.

[47] The _aid_ Dr. Franklin alludes to must probably have consisted in early and full supplies of arms, officers, intelligence, and trade of export and of import, through the river St. Lawrence, on risques both public and private; in the encouragement of splendid promises and a great ally; in the passage from Canada to the back settlements, being _shut_ to the British _forces_; in the quiet of the _great body_ of Indians; in the support of emissaries and discontented citizens; in loans and subsidies to congress, in ways _profitable to France_; in a refuge to be granted them in case of defeat, in vacant lands, as settlers; in the probability of war commencing earlier between England and France, at the gulph of St. Lawrence (when the shipping taken, were _rightfully_ addressed to Frenchmen) than in the present case. All this might have happened, as soon as America's distaste of the sovereign had exceeded the fear of the foreigner; a circumstance frequently seen possible in history, and which our ministers took care should not be wanting.

This explanation would have required apology for its insertion, were not the opinion pretty common in England, that _had not the French been removed from Canada, the revolt of America never would have taken place_. Why then were the French _not left_ in Canada, at the peace of 1763? Or, since they _were not_ left there, why was the American dispute begun? Yet in one sense, perhaps this opinion is true; for _had_ the French been left in Canada, ministers would not only have _sooner_ felt, but _sooner_ have seen, the strange fatality of their plans. B. V.

[48] Remarks, p. 50, 51.

[49] And Pharoah said unto his people, behold the people of the children of Israel are more and mightier than we; come on, let us deal wisely with them, lest they multiply, and it come to pass, that when there falleth out any war, they join also unto our enemies and fight against us, and so get them up out of the land. And the king spake to the Hebrew midwives, &c. Exodus, chap. 1.

[50] In fact, there have not gone from Britain [itself] to our colonies these twenty years past to settle there, so many as ten families a year; the new settlers are either the offspring of the old, or emigrants from Germany, or the north of Ireland.

[51] Remarks, p. 30, 34.

[52] It is often said we have plenty of sugar-land still unemployed in Jamaica: but those who are well acquainted with that island know, that the remaining vacant land in it is generally situated among mountains, rocks, and gullies, that make carriage impracticable, so that no profitable use can be made of it; unless the price of sugars should so greatly increase, as to enable the planter to make very expensive roads, by blowing up rocks, erecting bridges, &c. every two or three hundred yards. [Our author was somewhat misinformed here. B. V.]

[53] Remarks, p. 47.

[54] Dr. Franklin has often been heard to say, that in writing this pamphlet he received considerable assistance from a learned friend, who was not willing to be named. B. V.

_Remarks and Facts relative to the American Paper-money._[55]

In the Report of the Board of Trade, dated Feb. 9, 1764, the following reasons are given for _restraining the emission_ of paper-bills of credit in America, as _a legal tender_.

1. "That it _carries the gold and silver out_ of the province, and so ruins the country; as _experience has shewn_, in every colony where it has been practised in any great degree.

2. "That the _merchants_ trading to America _have suffered_ and lost by it.

3. "That the restriction [of it] _has had a beneficial effect_ in New England.

4. "That every _medium of trade should have an intrinsic value_, which paper-money has not. Gold and silver are therefore the fittest for this medium, as they are an equivalent; which paper never can be.

5. "That _debtors_ in the assemblies make paper-money with _fraudulent views_.

6. "That in the middle colonies, where the credit of the paper-money has been best supported, the bills have _never kept to their nominal value_ in circulation; but have constantly depreciated to a certain degree, whenever the quantity has been increased."

To consider these reasons in their order; the first is,

1. "_That paper-money_ carries the gold and silver out _of the province, and so ruins the country; as_ experience has shewn, _in every colony where it has been practised in any great degree_."--This opinion, of its ruining the country, seems to be merely speculative, or not otherwise founded than upon misinformation in the matter of fact. The truth is, that the balance of their trade with Britain being greatly against them, the gold and silver are drawn out to pay that balance; and then the necessity of some medium of trade has induced the making of paper-money, which could _not_ be carried away. Thus, if carrying out all the gold and silver ruins a country, every colony was ruined before it made paper-money.--But, far from being ruined by it, the colonies that have made use of paper-money have been, and are all, in a thriving condition. The debt indeed to Britain has increased, because their numbers, and of course their trade, have increased; for all trade having always a proportion of debt outstanding, which is paid in its turn, while fresh debt is contracted, the proportion of debt naturally increases as the trade increases; but the improvement and increase of estates in the colonies have been in a greater proportion than their debt. New England, particularly in 1696 (about the time they began the use of paper-money) had in all its four provinces but 180 churches or congregations; in 1760 they were 530. The number of farms and buildings there is increased in proportion to the numbers of people; and the goods exported to them from England in 1750, before the restraint took place, were near five times as much as before they had paper-money. Pensylvania, before it made any paper-money, was totally stript of its gold and silver; though they had from time to time, like the neighbouring colonies, agreed to take gold and silver coins at higher nominal values, in hopes of drawing money into, and retaining it, for the internal uses of the province. During that weak practice, silver got up by degrees to 8s. 9d. per ounce, and English crowns were called six, seven, and eight-shilling pieces, long before paper-money was made. But this practice of increasing the denomination was found not to answer the end. The balance of trade carried out the gold and silver as fast as they were brought in; the merchants raising the price of their goods in proportion to the increased denomination of the money. The difficulties for want of cash were accordingly very great, the chief part of the trade being carried on by the extremely inconvenient method of barter; when in 1723 paper-money was first made there; which gave new life to business, promoted greatly the settlement of new lands (by lending small sums to beginners on easy interest, to be repaid by instalments) whereby the province has so greatly increased in inhabitants, that the export from hence thither is now more than tenfold what it then was; and by their trade with foreign colonies, they have been able to obtain great quantities of gold and silver to remit hither in return for the manufactures of this country. New York and New Jersey have also increased greatly during the same period, with the use of paper-money; so that it does not appear to be of the ruinous nature ascribed to it. And if the inhabitants of those countries are glad to have the use of paper among themselves, that they may thereby be enabled to spare, for remittances hither, the gold and silver they obtain by their commerce with foreigners; one would expect, that no objection against their parting with it could arise here, in the country that receives it.

The 2d reason is, "_That the_ merchants _trading to America have_ suffered _and lost by the paper-money_."--This may have been the case in particular instances, at particular times and places: as in South Carolina, about 58 years since; when the colony was thought in danger of being destroyed by the Indians and Spaniards; and the British merchants, in fear of losing their whole effects there, called precipitately for remittances; and the inhabitants, to get something lodged in safe countries, gave any price in paper-money for bills of exchange; whereby the paper, as compared with bills, or with produce, or other effects fit for exportation, was suddenly and greatly depreciated. The unsettled state of government for a long time in that province had also its share in depreciating its bills. But since that danger blew over, and the colony has been in the hands of the crown; their currency became fixed, and has so remained to this day. Also in New England, when much greater quantities were issued than were necessary for a medium of trade, to defray the expedition against Louisbourg; and, during the last war in Virginia and North Carolina, when great sums were issued to pay the colony troops, and the war made tobacco a poorer remittance, from the higher price of freight and insurance: in these cases, the merchants trading to those colonies may sometimes have suffered by the sudden and unforeseen rise of exchange. By slow and gradual rises, they seldom suffer; the goods being sold at proportionable prices. But war is a common calamity in all countries, and the merchants that deal with them cannot expect to avoid a share of the losses it sometimes occasions, by affecting public credit. It is hoped, however, that the profits of their subsequent commerce with those colonies may have made them some reparation. And the merchants trading to the middle colonies (New York, New Jersey, and Pensylvania) have never suffered by any rise of exchange; it having ever been a constant rule there, to consider British debts as payable in Britain, and not to be discharged but by as much paper (whatever might be the rate of exchange) as would purchase a bill for the full sterling sum. On the contrary, the merchants have been great gainers by the use of paper-money in those colonies; as it enabled them to send much greater quantities of goods, and the purchasers to pay more punctually for them. And the people there make no complaint of any injury done them by paper-money, with a legal tender; they are sensible of its benefits; and petition to have it so allowed.

The 3d reason is, "_That the_ restriction _has had a_ beneficial effect _in New England_." Particular circumstances in the New England colonies made paper-money less necessary and less convenient to them. They have great and valuable fisheries of whale and cod, by which large remittances can be made. They are four distinct governments; but having much mutual intercourse of dealings, the money of each used to pass current in all: but the whole of this common currency not being under one common direction, was not so easily kept within due bounds; the prudent reserve of one colony in its emissions being rendered useless by excess in another. The Massachusets, therefore, were not dissatisfied with the restraint, as it restrained their neighbours as well as themselves; and perhaps _they_ do not desire to have the act repealed. They have not yet felt much inconvenience from it; as they were enabled to abolish their paper-currency, by a large sum in silver from Britain to reimburse their expences in taking Louisbourg, which, with the gold brought from Portugal, by means of their fish, kept them supplied with a currency; till the late war furnished them and all America with bills of exchange; so that little cash was needed for remittance. Their fisheries too furnish them with remittance through Spain and Portugal to England; which enables them the more easily to retain gold and silver in their country. The middle colonies have not this advantage; nor have they tobacco; which in Virginia and Maryland answers the same purpose. When colonies are so different in their circumstances, a regulation, that is not inconvenient to one or a few, may be very much so to the rest. But the pay is now become so indifferent in New England, at least in some of its provinces, through the want of currency, that the trade thither is at present under great discouragement.

The 4th reason is, "_That every_ medium of trade _should have an_ intrinsic value; _which paper-money has not_. _Gold and silver are therefore the fittest for this medium, as they are an equivalent; which paper never can be."_ However fit a particular thing may be for a particular purpose; wherever that thing is not to be had, or not to be had in sufficient quantity; it becomes necessary to use something else, the fittest that can be got, in lieu of it. Gold and silver are not the produce of North America, which has no mines; and that which is brought thither cannot be kept there in sufficient quantity for a currency. Britain, an independent great state, when its inhabitants grow too fond of the expensive luxuries of foreign countries, that draw away its money, can, and frequently does, make laws to discourage or prohibit such importations; and by that means can retain its cash. The _colonies_ are dependent governments; and their people having naturally great respect for the sovereign country, and being thence immoderately fond of its modes, manufactures, and superfluities, cannot be restrained from purchasing them by any province law; because such law, if made, would immediately be repealed here, as prejudicial to the trade and interest of Britain. It seems hard therefore, to draw all, their real money from them, and then refuse them the poor privilege of using paper instead of it. Bank bills and bankers notes are daily used _here_ as a medium of trade, and in large dealings perhaps the greater part is transacted by their means; and yet _they_ have no intrinsic value, but rest on the credit of those that issue them; as paper-bills in the colonies do on the credit of the respective governments there. Their being payable in cash upon sight by the drawer is indeed a circumstance that cannot attend the colony bills; for the reasons just above-mentioned; their cash being drawn from them by the British trade; but the legal tender being substituted in its place is rather a greater advantage to the possessor; since he need not be at the trouble of going to a _particular bank_ or banker to demand the money, finding (wherever he has occasion to lay out money in the province) a person that is obliged to take the bills. So that even out of the province, the knowledge, that every man within that province is obliged to take its money, gives the bills a credit among its neighbours, nearly equal to what they have at home.

And were it not for the laws _here_, that restrain or prohibit as much as possible all losing trades, the cash of _this_ country would soon be exported: every merchant, who had occasion to remit it, would run to the bank with all its bills, that came into his hands, and take out his part of its treasure for that purpose; so that in a short time, it would be no more able to pay bills in money upon sight, than it is now in the power of a colony treasury so to do. And if government afterwards should have occasion for the credit of the bank, it must of necessity make its bills a legal tender; funding them however on taxes by which they may in time be paid off; as has been the general practice in the colonies.--At this very time, even the silver-money in England is obliged to the legal tender for part of its value; that part which is the difference between its real weight and its denomination. Great part of the shillings and sixpences now current are, by wearing, become five, ten, twenty, and some of the sixpences even fifty per cent. too light. For this difference between the _real_ and the _nominal_, you have no _intrinsic_ value; you have not so much as paper, you have nothing. It is the legal tender, with the knowledge that it can easily be repassed for the same value, that makes three-pennyworth of silver pass for sixpence. Gold and silver have undoubtedly _some_ properties that give them a fitness above paper, as a medium of exchange; particularly their _universal estimation_; especially in cases where a country has occasion to carry its money abroad, either as a stock to trade with, or to purchase _allies_ and _foreign succours_. Otherwise, that very universal estimation is an inconvenience, which paper-money is free from; since it tends to deprive a country of even the quantity of currency that should be retained as a necessary instrument of its internal commerce, and obliges it to be continually on its guard in making and executing, at a great expence, the laws that are to prevent the trade which exports it. Paper-money well funded has another great advantage over gold and silver; its lightness of carriage, and the little room that is occupied by a great sum; whereby it is capable of being more easily, and more safely, because more privately, conveyed from place to place. Gold and silver are not _intrinsically_ of equal value with iron, a metal in itself capable of many more beneficial uses to mankind. Their value rests chiefly in the estimation they happen to be in among the generality of nations, and the credit given to the opinion, that that estimation will continue. Otherwise a pound of gold would not be a real equivalent for even a bushel of wheat. Any other well-founded credit, is as much an equivalent as gold and silver; and in some cases more so, or it would not be preferred by commercial people in different countries. Not to mention again our own bank bills; Holland, which understands the value of cash as well as any people in the world, would never part with gold and silver for credit (as they do when they put it into their bank, from whence little of it is ever afterwards drawn out) if they did not think and find the credit a full equivalent.

The 5th reason is, "_That_ debtors _in the assemblies make paper-money_ with fraudulent views." This is often said by the adversaries of paper-money, and if it has been the case in any particular colony, that colony should, on proof of the fact, be duly punished. This, however, would be no reason for punishing other colonies, who have _not_ so abused their legislative powers. To deprive all the colonies of the convenience of paper-money, because it has been charged on some of them, that they have made it an instrument of fraud, is as if all the India, Bank, and other stocks and trading companies were to be abolished, because there have been, once in an age, Mississippi and South-Sea schemes and bubbles.

The 6th and last reason is, "_That in the middle colonies, where the paper-money has been best supported, the bills have_ never kept to their nominal value _in circulation; but have constantly depreciated to a certain degree, whenever the quantity has been increased_." If the rising of the value of any particular commodity wanted for exportation, is to be considered as a depreciation of the values of _whatever remains_ in the country; then the rising of silver above paper to that height of additional value, which its capability of exportation only gave it, may be called a depreciation of the paper. Even here, as bullion has been wanted or not wanted for exportation, its price has varied from 5_s._ 2_d._ to 5_s._ 8_d._ per ounce. This is near 10 per cent. But was it ever said or thought on such an occasion, that all the bank bills, and all the coined silver, and all the gold in the kingdom, were depreciated 10 per cent? Coined silver is now wanted here for change, and 1 per cent is given for it by some bankers: are gold and bank notes therefore depreciated 1 per cent.? The fact in the middle colonies is really this: on the emission of the first paper-money, a difference soon arose between that and silver; the latter having a property the former had not, a property always in demand in the colonies; to wit, its being fit for a remittance. This property having soon found its value, by the merchants bidding on one another for it, and a dollar thereby coming to be rated at 8_s._ in paper-money of New York, and 7_s._ 6_d._ in paper of Pensylvania, it has continued uniformly at those rates in both provinces now near forty years, without any variation upon new emissions; though, in Pensylvania, the paper-currency has at times increased from 15,000_l._ the first sum, to 600,000_l._ or near it. Nor has any alteration been occasioned by the paper-money, in the price of the necessaries of life, when compared with silver: they have been for the greatest part of the time no higher than before it was emitted; varying only by plenty and scarcity, or by a less or greater foreign demand. It has indeed been usual with the adversaries of a paper-currency, to call every rise of exchange with London, a depreciation of the paper: but this notion appears to be by no means just: for if the paper purchases every thing but bills of exchange, at the former rate, and these bills are not above one-tenth of what is employed in purchases; then it may be more properly and truly said, that the exchange has risen, than that the paper has depreciated. And as a proof of this, it is a certain fact, that whenever in those colonies bills of exchange have been dearer, the purchaser has been constantly obliged to give more in silver, as well as in paper, for them; the silver having gone hand in hand with the paper at the rate above-mentioned; and therefore it might as well have been said, that the silver was depreciated.

There have been several different schemes for furnishing the colonies with paper-money, that should _not_ be a legal tender, viz.

1. _To form a bank, in imitation of the bank of England, with a sufficient stock of cash_ to pay the bills on sight.

This has been often proposed, but appears impracticable, under the present circumstances of the colony-trade; which, as is said above, draws all the cash to Britain, and would soon strip the bank.