Chapter XXV: Part 25

_Soc._ And in the same way among the Scythians a house
has no value because they have no use for a house, nor
would a Scythian set so much store on the finest house in
the world as on a leather coat, because he could use the
one and not the other. Or again, the Carthaginian coinage
is not wealth in our eyes, for we could not employ it, as we
can silver, to procure what we need, and therefore it is of no
use to us.

_Eras._ True.

[Sidenote: Wealth is useful, but other things are useful besides wealth.]

_Soc._ What is useful to us, then, is wealth, and what is
useless to us is not wealth?

But how do you mean, Socrates? said Eryxias, interrupting.
Do we not employ in our intercourse with one another 401
speech and violence (?) and various other things? These
are useful and yet they are not wealth.

_Soc._ Clearly we have not yet answered the question,
What is wealth? That wealth must be useful, to be wealth
at all,—thus much is acknowledged by every one. But what
particular thing is wealth, if not all things? Let us pursue
the argument in another way; and then we may perhaps
find what we are seeking. What is the use of wealth,
and for what purpose has the possession of riches been
invented,—in the sense, I mean, in which drugs have been
discovered for the cure of disease? Perhaps in this way we
may throw some light on the question. It appears to be clear
that whatever constitutes wealth must be useful, and that
wealth is one class of useful things; and now we have to
enquire, What is the use of those useful things which constitute
wealth? For all things probably may be said to be
useful which we use in production, just as all things which
have life are animals, but there is a special kind of animal
which we call ‘man.’ Now if any one were to ask us, What
is that of which, if we were rid, we should not want medicine
and the instruments of medicine, we might reply that this
would be the case if disease were absent from our bodies
and either never came to them at all or went away again as
soon as it appeared; and we may therefore conclude that
medicine is the science which is useful for getting rid of
disease. But if we are further asked, What is that from
which, if we were free, we should have no need of wealth?
can we give an answer? If we have none, suppose that we
restate the question thus:—If a man could live without food
or drink, and yet suffer neither hunger nor thirst, would he
want either money or anything else in order to supply his
needs?

[Sidenote: _Wealth is what is wanted:_]

_Eryx._ He would not.

[Sidenote: If the body had no wants or feelings there would be no need of money.]

_Soc._ And does not this apply in other cases? If we did
not want for the service of the body the things of which we
now stand in need, and heat and cold and the other bodily
sensations were unperceived by us, there would be no use in
this so-called wealth, if no one, that is, had any necessity for
those things which now make us wish for wealth in order
that we may satisfy the desires and needs of the body in
respect of our various wants. And therefore if the possession
of wealth is useful in ministering to our bodily wants, and
bodily wants were unknown to us, we should not need
wealth, and possibly there would be no such thing as
wealth.

_Eryx._ Clearly not.

_Soc._ Then our conclusion is, as would appear, that wealth
is what is useful to this end?

Eryxias once, more gave his assent, but the small argument
considerably troubled him.

_Soc._ And what is your opinion about another question:—Would 402
you say that the same thing can be at one time useful
and at another useless for the production of the same result?

_Eryx._ I cannot say more than that if we require the same
thing to produce the same result, then it seems to me to be
useful; if not, not.

_Soc._ Then if without the aid of fire we could make a brazen
statue, we should not want fire for that purpose; and if we
did not want it, it would be useless to us? And the argument
applies equally in other cases.

_Eryx._ Clearly.

_Soc._ And therefore conditions which are not required for
the existence of a thing are not useful for the production of it?

_Eryx._ Of course not.

[Sidenote: _and when ceasing to be wanted ceases to be wealth._]

_Soc._ And if without gold or silver or anything else which
we do not use directly for the body in the way that we do
food and drink and bedding and houses,—if without these we
could satisfy the wants of the body, they would be of no use
to us for that purpose?

_Eryx._ They would not.

_Soc._ They would no longer be regarded as wealth, because
they are useless, whereas that would be wealth which enabled
us to obtain what was useful to us?

_Eryx._ O Socrates, you will never be able to persuade me
that gold and silver and similar things are not wealth. But
I am very strongly of opinion that things which are useless
to us are not wealth, and that the money which is useful for
this purpose is of the greatest use; not that these things
are not useful towards life, if by them we can procure
wealth.

[Sidenote: The arts too are wealth, for by them the needs of life are satisfied.]

_Soc._ And how would you answer another question? There
are persons, are there not, who teach music and grammar
and other arts for pay, and thus procure those things of
which they stand in need?

_Eryx._ There are.

_Soc._ And these men by the arts which they profess, and in
exchange for them, obtain the necessities of life just as we do
by means of gold and silver?

_Eryx._ True.

_Soc._ Then if they procure by this means what they want
for the purposes of life, that art will be useful towards life?
For do we not say that silver is useful because it enables us
to supply our bodily needs?

_Eryx._ We do.

_Soc._ Then if these arts are reckoned among things useful,
the arts are wealth for the same reason as gold and silver are,
for, clearly, the possession of them gives wealth. Yet a little
while ago we found it difficult to accept the argument which
proved that the wisest are the wealthiest. But now there 403
seems no escape from this conclusion. Suppose that we
are asked, ‘Is a horse useful to everybody?’ will not our
reply be, ‘No, but only to those who know how to use a
horse?’

_Eryx._ Certainly.

[Sidenote: _Wealth is wealth when we know how to use it._]

_Soc._ And so, too, physic is not useful to every one, but
only to him who knows how to use it?

_Eryx._ True.

_Soc._ And the same is the case with everything else?

_Eryx._ Yes.

_Soc._ Then gold and silver and all the other elements
which are supposed to make up wealth are only useful to the
person who knows how to use them?

_Eryx._ Exactly.

_Soc._ And were we not saving before that it was the business
of a good man and a gentleman to know where and how
anything should be used?

_Eryx._ Yes.

[Sidenote: The good only know how to use things.]

_Soc._ The good and gentle, therefore, will alone have profit
from these things, supposing at least that they know how to
use them. But if so, to them only will they seem to be
wealth. It appears, however, that where a person is ignorant
of riding, and has horses which are useless to him, if some
one teaches him that art, he makes him also richer, for what
was before useless has now become useful to him, and in
giving him knowledge he has also conferred riches upon
him.

_Eryx._ That is the case.

_Soc._ Yet I dare be sworn that Critias will not be moved a
whit by the argument.

_Crit._ No, by heaven. I should be a madman if I were. But
why do you not finish the argument which proves that gold
and silver and other things which seem to be wealth are not
real wealth? For I have been exceedingly delighted to hear
the discourses which you have just been holding.

_Soc._ My argument, Critias (I said), appears to have given
you the same kind of pleasure which you might have derived
from some rhapsode’s recitation of Homer; for you do not
believe a word of what has been said. But come now, give
me an answer to this question. Are not certain things useful
to the builder when he is building a house?

_Crit._ They are.

[Sidenote: _The elements of wealth are infinite._]

_Soc._ And would you say that those things are useful which
are employed in house building,—stones and bricks and
beams and the like, and also the instruments with which the
builder built the house, the beams and stones which they
provided, and again the instruments by which these were
obtained?

_Crit._ It seems to me that they are all useful for building.

_Soc._ And is it not true of every art, that not only the
materials but the instruments by which we procure them and
without which the work could not go on, are useful for
that art?

_Crit._ Certainly.

_Soc._ And further, the instruments by which the instruments
are procured, and so on, going back from stage to stage _ad 404
infinitum_,—are not all these, in your opinion, necessary in
order to carry out the work?

_Crit._ We may fairly suppose such to be the case.

[Sidenote: A sophism. Gold and silver would be useless if they were not needed to obtain food: and things cannot be at one time useless, at another time useful, in the same actions.]

_Soc._ And if a man has food and drink and clothes and the
other things which are useful to the body, would he need
gold or silver or any other means by which he could procure
that which he now has?

_Crit._ I do not think so.

_Soc._ Then you consider that a man never wants any of
these things for the use of the body?

_Crit._ Certainly not.

_Soc._ And if they appear useless to this end, ought they not
always to appear useless? For we have already laid down
the principle that things cannot be at one time useful and
another time not, in the same process.

_Crit._ But in that respect your argument and mine are the
same. For you maintain if they are useful to a certain end,
they can never become useless; whereas I say that in order
to accomplish some results bad things are needed, and good
for others.

_Soc._ But can a bad thing be used to carry out a good
purpose?

_Crit._ I should say not.

_Soc._ And we call those actions good which a man does for
the sake of virtue?

_Crit._ Yes.

_Soc._ But can a man learn any kind of knowledge which is
imparted by word of mouth if he is wholly deprived of
the sense of hearing?

[Sidenote: _Good ends may be attained by bad means._]

_Crit._ Certainly not, I think.

_Soc._ And will not hearing be useful for virtue, if virtue is
taught by hearing and we use the sense of hearing in giving
instruction?

_Crit._ Yes.

[Sidenote: There are indirect means towards ends.]

_Soc._ And since medicine frees the sick man from his
disease, that art too may sometimes appear useful in the
acquisition of virtue, e. g. when hearing is procured by the
aid of medicine.

_Crit._ Very likely.

_Soc._ But if, again, we obtain by wealth the aid of medicine,
shall we not regard wealth as useful for virtue?

_Crit._ True.

_Soc._ And also the instruments by which wealth is procured?

_Crit._ Certainly.

[Sidenote: Wealth may be gained discreditably, but spent in the acquisition of virtue.]

_Soc._ Then you think that a man may gain wealth by bad
and disgraceful means, and, having obtained the aid of medicine
which enables him to acquire the power of hearing, may
use that very faculty for the acquisition of virtue?

_Crit._ Yes, I do.

_Soc._ But can that which is evil be useful for virtue?

_Crit._ No.

_Soc._ It is not therefore necessary that the means by which
we obtain what is useful for a certain object should always be
useful for the same object: for it seems that bad actions may
sometimes serve good purposes? The matter will be still 405
plainer if we look at it in this way:—If things are useful
towards the several ends for which they exist, which ends
would not come into existence without them, how would you
regard them? Can ignorance, for instance, be useful for
knowledge, or disease for health, or vice for virtue?

_Crit._ Never.

_Soc._ And yet we have already agreed—have we not?—that
there can be no knowledge where there has not previously
been ignorance, nor health where there has not been disease,
nor virtue where there has not been vice?

_Crit._ I think that we have.

[Sidenote: Difference between causes and antecedents.]

_Soc._ But then it would seem that the antecedents without
which a thing cannot exist are not necessarily useful to it.

[Sidenote: _Is he who needs most or who needs least the happier?_]

Otherwise ignorance would appear useful for knowledge,
disease for health, and vice for virtue.

Critias still showed great reluctance to accept any argument
which went to prove that all these things were useless.
I saw that it was as difficult to persuade him as (according to
the proverb) it is to boil a stone, so I said: Let us bid
‘good-bye’ to the discussion, since we cannot agree whether
these things are useful and a part of wealth or not. But
what shall we say to another question: Which is the
happier and better man,—he who requires the greatest quantity
of necessaries for body and diet, or he who requires only
the fewest and least? The answer will perhaps become more
obvious if we suppose some one, comparing the man himself
at different times, to consider whether his condition is better
when he is sick or when he is well?

_Crit._ That is not a question which needs much consideration.

[Sidenote: Health is a better condition than disease; and it needs less.]

_Soc._ Probably, I said, every one can understand that
health is a better condition than disease. But when have we
the greatest and the most various needs, when we are sick or
when we are well?

_Crit._ When we are sick.

_Soc._ And when we are in the worst state we have the
greatest and most especial need and desire of bodily
pleasures?

_Crit._ True.

[Sidenote: So he is best off who has fewest desires.]

_Soc._ And seeing that a man is best off when he is least in
need of such things, does not the same reasoning apply to
the case of any two persons, of whom one has many and
great wants and desires, and the other few and moderate?
For instance, some men are gamblers, some drunkards, and
some gluttons: and gambling and the love of drink and
greediness are all desires?

_Crit._ Certainly.

_Soc._ But desires are only the lack of something: and
those who have the greatest desires are in a worse condition
than those who have none or very slight ones?

_Crit._ Certainly I consider that those who have such 406
wants are bad, and that the greater their wants the worse
they are.

_Soc._ And do we think it possible that a thing should be
useful for a purpose unless we have need of it for that
purpose?

[Sidenote: _The richest are those who are most in want._]

_Crit._ No.

_Soc._ Then if these things are useful for supplying the
needs of the body, we must want them for that purpose?

_Crit._ That is my opinion.

_Soc._ And he to whom the greatest number of things are
useful for his purpose, will also want the greatest number of
means of accomplishing it, supposing that we necessarily feel
the want of all useful things?

_Crit._ It seems so.

_Soc._ The argument proves then that he who has great
riches has likewise need of many things for the supply of the
wants of the body; for wealth appears useful towards that
end. And the richest must be in the worst condition, since
they seem to be most in want of such things.

FOOTNOTES

[77] Cp. Rep. vi. 487.

[78] Cp. Arist. Pol. i. 9, §§ 10, 14.

Transcriber’s Notes

P. 147. ‘opinons’ changed to ‘opinions’.
P. 240. ‘Odyssee’ changed to ‘Odyssey’.
P. 256. ‘Simmais’ changed to ‘Simmias’.
P. 554. ‘Teiresias’ changed to ‘Tiresias’.
P. 560. ‘Erisastratus’ changed to ‘Erasistratus’.
P. 560. Added _Soc._ voice to paragraph.
Corrected various punctuation.
Several missing Stephanus page numbers added, by comparison with the
UK printing.