Chapter III: Part 3

_Soc._ Had I the command of you as well as of myself,
Meno, I would not have enquired whether virtue is given by
instruction or not, until we had first ascertained ‘what it is.’
But as you think only of controlling me who am your slave,
and never of controlling yourself,—such being your notion of
freedom, I must yield to you, for you are irresistible. And
therefore I have now to enquire into the qualities of a thing of
which I do not as yet know the nature. At any rate, will you
condescend a little, and allow the question ‘Whether virtue is
given by instruction, or in any other way,’ to be argued upon
hypothesis? As the geometrician, when he is asked [7]whether 87
a certain triangle is capable of being inscribed in a certain
circle[7], will reply: ‘I cannot tell you as yet; but I will offer
a hypothesis which may assist us in forming a conclusion: If
the figure be such that [8]when you have produced a given side
of it[8], the given area of the triangle falls short by an area
[9]corresponding to the part produced[9], then one consequence
follows, and if this is impossible then some other; and therefore
I wish to assume a hypothesis before I tell you whether
this triangle is capable of being inscribed in the circle:’—that
is a geometrical hypothesis. And we too, as we know not
the nature and qualities of virtue, must ask, whether virtue is
or is not taught, under a hypothesis: as thus, if virtue is of
such a class of mental goods, will it be taught or not? Let
the first hypothesis be that virtue is or is not knowledge,—in
that case will it be taught or not? or, as we were just now
saying, ‘remembered’? For there is no use in disputing
about the name. But is virtue taught or not? or rather,
does not every one see that knowledge alone is taught?

_Men._ I agree.

_Soc._ Then if virtue is knowledge, virtue will be taught?

_Men._ Certainly.

[Sidenote: _Virtue and knowledge._]

_Soc._ Then now we have made a quick end of this question:
if virtue is of such a nature, it will be taught; and if not, not?

_Men._ Certainly.

[Sidenote: ‘Of course.’]

_Soc._ The next question is, whether virtue is knowledge or
of another species?

_Men._ Yes, that appears to be the question which comes
next in order.

[Sidenote: But is virtue knowledge?]

_Soc._ Do we not say that virtue is a good?—This is a
hypothesis which is not set aside.

_Men._ Certainly.

[Sidenote: Virtue is a good, and profitable: and all profitable things are either profitable or the reverse according as they are or are not under the guidance of knowledge.]

_Soc._ Now, if there be any sort of good which is distinct
from knowledge, virtue may be that good; but if knowledge
embraces all good, then we shall be right in thinking that
virtue is knowledge?

_Men._ True.

_Soc._ And virtue makes us good?

_Men._ Yes.

_Soc._ And if we are good, then we are profitable; for all
good things are profitable?

_Men._ Yes.

_Soc._ Then virtue is profitable?

_Men._ That is the only inference.

_Soc._ Then now let us see what are the things which
severally profit us. Health and strength, and beauty and
wealth—these, and the like of these, we call profitable?

_Men._ True.

_Soc._ And yet these things may also sometimes do us 88
harm: would you not think so?

_Men._ Yes.

_Soc._ And what is the guiding principle which makes them
profitable or the reverse? Are they not profitable when they
are rightly used, and hurtful when they are not rightly used?

_Men._ Certainly.

_Soc._ Next, let us consider the goods of the soul: they
are temperance, justice, courage, quickness of apprehension,
memory, magnanimity, and the like?

_Men._ Surely.

_Soc._ And such of these as are not knowledge, but of
another sort, are sometimes profitable and sometimes hurtful;
as, for example, courage wanting prudence, which is only
a sort of confidence? When a man has no sense he is
harmed by courage, but when he has sense he is profited?

[Sidenote: _Virtue is knowledge._]

_Men._ True.

_Soc._ And the same may be said of temperance and quickness
of apprehension; whatever things are learned or done
with sense are profitable, but when done without sense they
are hurtful?

_Men._ Very true.

_Soc._ And in general, all that the soul attempts or endures,
when under the guidance of wisdom, ends in happiness;
but when she is under the guidance of folly, in the
opposite?

_Men._ That appears to be true.

[Sidenote: And so all virtue must be a sort of wisdom or knowledge.]

_Soc._ If then virtue is a quality of the soul, and is admitted
to be profitable, it must be wisdom or prudence, since none
of the things of the soul are either profitable or hurtful in
themselves, but they are all made profitable or hurtful by
the addition of wisdom or of folly; and therefore if virtue is
profitable, virtue must be a sort of wisdom or prudence?

_Men._ I quite agree.

_Soc._ And the other goods, such as wealth and the like, of
which we were just now saying that they are sometimes good
and sometimes evil, do not they also become profitable or
hurtful, accordingly as the soul guides and uses them rightly
or wrongly; just as the things of the soul herself are benefited
when under the guidance of wisdom and harmed by folly?

_Men._ True.

_Soc._ And the wise soul guides them rightly, and the foolish
soul wrongly?

_Men._ Yes.

_Soc._ And is not this universally true of human nature?
All other things hang upon the soul, and the things of the
soul herself hang upon wisdom, if they are to be good; and 89
so wisdom is inferred to be that which profits—and virtue, as
we say, is profitable?

_Men._ Certainly.

[Sidenote: Virtue is either wholly or partly wisdom.]

_Soc._ And thus we arrive at the conclusion that virtue is
either wholly or partly wisdom?

_Men._ I think that what you are saying, Socrates, is very
true.

[Sidenote: _Can virtue be taught?_]

_Soc._ But if this is true, then the good are not by nature
good?

_Men._ I think not.

[Sidenote: If this is true, virtue must be taught; but then where are the teachers?]

_Soc._ If they had been, there would assuredly have been
discerners of characters among us who would have known
our future great men; and on their showing we should have
adopted them, and when we had got them, we should have
kept them in the citadel out of the way of harm, and set
a stamp upon them far rather than upon a piece of gold, in
order that no one might tamper with them; and when they
grew up they would have been useful to the state?

_Men._ Yes, Socrates, that would have been the right way.

_Soc._ But if the good are not by nature good, are they
made good by instruction?

_Men._ There appears to be no other alternative, Socrates.
On the supposition that virtue is knowledge, there can be no
doubt that virtue is taught.

_Soc._ Yes, indeed; but what if the supposition is erroneous?

_Men._ I certainly thought just now that we were right.

_Soc._ Yes, Meno; but a principle which has any soundness
should stand firm not only just now, but always.

_Men._ Well; and why are you so slow of heart to believe
that knowledge is virtue?

_Soc._ I will try and tell you why, Meno. I do not retract
the assertion that if virtue is knowledge it may be taught;
but I fear that I have some reason in doubting whether virtue
is knowledge: for consider now and say whether virtue,
and not only virtue but anything that is taught, must not have
teachers and disciples?

_Men._ Surely.

_Soc._ And conversely, may not the art of which neither
teachers nor disciples exist be assumed to be incapable of
being taught?

_Men._ True; but do you think that there are no teachers of
virtue?

[Sidenote: _The appeal to Anytus._]

[Sidenote: Can Anytus tell us who they are?]

_Soc._ I have certainly often enquired whether there were any,
and taken great pains to find them, and have never succeeded;
and many have assisted me in the search, and they were
the persons whom I thought the most likely to know.
Here at the moment when he is wanted we fortunately 90
have sitting by us Anytus, the very person of whom we
should make enquiry; to him then let us repair. In the
first place, he is the son of a wealthy and wise father,
Anthemion, who acquired his wealth, not by accident or gift,
like Ismenias the Theban (who has recently made himself as
rich as Polycrates), but by his own skill and industry, and
who is a well-conditioned, modest man, not insolent, or overbearing,
or annoying; moreover, this son of his has received
a good education, as the Athenian people certainly
appear to think, for they choose him to fill the highest offices.
And these are the sort of men from whom you are likely to
learn whether there are any teachers of virtue, and who they
are. Please, Anytus, to help me and your friend Meno in
answering our question, Who are the teachers? Consider
the matter thus: If we wanted Meno to be a good physician,
to whom should we send him? Should we not send him to
the physicians?

_Any._ Certainly.

_Soc._ Or if we wanted him to be a good cobbler, should we
not send him to the cobblers?

_Any._ Yes.

_Soc._ And so forth?

_Any._ Yes.

[Sidenote: The arts are taught by the professors of them. And have we not heard of those who profess to teach virtue at a fixed price?]

_Soc._ Let me trouble you with one more question. When
we say that we should be right in sending him to the physicians
if we wanted him to be a physician, do we mean that
we should be right in sending him to those who profess the
art, rather than to those who do not, and to those who
demand payment for teaching the art, and profess to teach it
to any one who will come and learn? And if these were our
reasons, should we not be right in sending him?

_Any._ Yes.

_Soc._ And might not the same be said of flute-playing, and
of the other arts? Would a man who wanted to make
another a flute-player refuse to send him to those who profess
to teach the art for money, and be plaguing other persons to
give him instruction, who are not professed teachers and who
never had a single disciple in that branch of knowledge which
he wishes him to acquire—would not such conduct be the
height of folly?

[Sidenote: _Anytus attacks, Socrates defends, the Sophists._]

_Any._ Yes, by Zeus, and of ignorance too.

_Soc._ Very good. And now you are in a position to advise 91
with me about my friend Meno. He has been telling me,
Anytus, that he desires to attain that kind of wisdom and virtue
by which men order the state or the house, and honour their
parents, and know when to receive and when to send away
citizens and strangers, as a good man should. Now, to whom
should he go in order that he may learn this virtue? Does
not the previous argument imply clearly that we should send
him to those who profess and avouch that they are the common
teachers of all Hellas, and are ready to impart instruction
to any one who likes, at a fixed price?

_Any._ Whom do you mean, Socrates?

_Soc._ You surely know, do you not, Anytus, that these are
the people whom mankind call Sophists?

[Sidenote: Anytus inveighs against the corrupting influence of the Sophists.]

_Any._ By Heracles, Socrates, forbear! I only hope that
no friend or kinsman or acquaintance of mine, whether citizen
or stranger, will ever be so mad as to allow himself to be corrupted
by them; for they are a manifest pest and corrupting
influence to those who have to do with them.

[Sidenote: Why surely they cannot really be corrupters? See what fortunes they make, and what an excellent reputation many of them bear!]

_Soc._ What, Anytus? Of all the people who profess that
they know how to do men good, do you mean to say that
these are the only ones who not only do them no good, but
positively corrupt those who are entrusted to them, and in
return for this disservice have the face to demand money?
Indeed, I cannot believe you; for I know of a single man,
Protagoras, who made more out of his craft than the illustrious
Pheidias, who created such noble works, or any ten other
statuaries. How could that be? A mender of old shoes, or
patcher up of clothes, who made the shoes or clothes worse
than he received them, could not have remained thirty days
undetected, and would very soon have starved; whereas
during more than forty years, Protagoras was corrupting all
Hellas, and sending his disciples from him worse than he
received them, and he was never found out. For, if I am not
mistaken, he was about seventy years old at his death, forty
of which were spent in the practice of his profession; and
during all that time he had a good reputation, which to this
day he retains: and not only Protagoras, but many others are
well spoken of; some who lived before him, and others who
are still living. Now, when you say that they deceived and 92
corrupted the youth, are they to be supposed to have corrupted
them consciously or unconsciously? Can those who
were deemed by many to be the wisest men of Hellas have
been out of their minds?

[Sidenote: _The rage of Anytus at the Sophists._]

[Sidenote: The wisest men in Hellas could not have been out of their minds? No:—the people who gave their money to them were out of their minds.]

_Any._ Out of their minds! No, Socrates; the young men
who gave their money to them were out of their minds, and
their relations and guardians who entrusted their youth to the
care of these men were still more out of their minds, and
most of all, the cities who allowed them to come in, and did
not drive them out, citizen and stranger alike.

_Soc._ Has any of the Sophists wronged you, Anytus?
What makes you so angry with them?

_Any._ No, indeed, neither I nor any of my belongings has
ever had, nor would I suffer them to have, anything to do
with them.

_Soc._ Then you are entirely unacquainted with them?

_Any._ And I have no wish to be acquainted.

[Sidenote: How can Anytus know that they are bad, if he does not know them at all?]

_Soc._ Then, my dear friend, how can you know whether a
thing is good or bad of which you are wholly ignorant?

_Any._ Quite well; I am sure that I know what manner of
men these are, whether I am acquainted with them or not.

[Sidenote: Then who will teach Meno virtue?]

_Soc._ You must be a diviner, Anytus, for I really cannot
make out, judging from your own words, how, if you are not
acquainted with them, you know about them. But I am not
enquiring of you who are the teachers who will corrupt Meno
(let them be, if you please, the Sophists); I only ask you to
tell him who there is in this great city who will teach him how
to become eminent in the virtues which I was just now describing.
He is the friend of your family, and you will oblige
him.

_Any._ Why do you not tell him yourself?

_Soc._ I have told him whom I supposed to be the teachers
of these things; but I learn from you that I am utterly at
fault, and I dare say that you are right. And now I wish
that you, on your part, would tell me to whom among the
Athenians he should go. Whom would you name?

[Sidenote: _The lesson taught by the example of Themistocles._]

[Sidenote: Any Athenian gentleman who has learned of a previous generation of gentlemen.]

_Any._ Why single out individuals? Any Athenian gentleman,
taken at random, if he will mind him, will do far more
good to him than the Sophists.

_Soc._ And did those gentlemen grow of themselves; and
without having been taught by any one, were they nevertheless
able to teach others that which they had never learned 93
themselves?

_Any._ I imagine that they learned of the previous generation
of gentlemen. Have there not been many good men in this city?

_Soc._ Yes, certainly, Anytus; and many good statesmen also
there always have been and there are still, in the city of
Athens. But the question is whether they were also good
teachers of their own virtue;—not whether there are, or have
been, good men in this part of the world, but whether virtue
can be taught, is the question which we have been discussing.
Now, do we mean to say that the good men of our own and of
other times knew how to impart to others that virtue which
they had themselves; or is virtue a thing incapable of being
communicated or imparted by one man to another? That is
the question which I and Meno have been arguing. Look at
the matter in your own way: Would you not admit that
Themistocles was a good man?

_Any._ Certainly; no man better.

[Sidenote: Good men may not have been good teachers. There never was a better man than Themistocles: but he did not make much of his own son.]

_Soc._ And must not he then have been a good teacher, if
any man ever was a good teacher, of his own virtue?

_Any._ Yes, certainly,—if he wanted to be so.

_Soc._ But would he not have wanted? He would, at any
rate, have desired to make his own son a good man and a
gentleman; he could not have been jealous of him, or have
intentionally abstained from imparting to him his own virtue.
Did you never hear that he made his son Cleophantus a
famous horseman; and had him taught to stand upright on
horseback and hurl a javelin, and to do many other marvellous
things; and in anything which could be learned from a master
he was well trained? Have you not heard from our elders
of him?

_Any._ I have.

_Soc._ Then no one could say that his son showed any want
of capacity?

_Any._ Very likely not.

_Soc._ But did any one, old or young, ever say in your hearing
that Cleophantus, son of Themistocles, was a wise or good
man, as his father was?

[Sidenote: _Aristides, Pericles, Thucydides the son of Melesias._]

[Sidenote: He had him taught accomplishments because there was no one to teach virtue.]

_Any._ I have certainly never heard any one say so.

_Soc._ And if virtue could have been taught, would his father
Themistocles have sought to train him in these minor accomplishments,
and allowed him who, as you must remember, was
his own son, to be no better than his neighbours in those
qualities in which he himself excelled?

_Any._ Indeed, indeed, I think not.

_Soc._ Here was a teacher of virtue whom you admit to be
among the best men of the past. Let us take another,—Aristides, 94
the son of Lysimachus: would you not acknowledge
that he was a good man?

_Any._ To be sure I should.

[Sidenote: Aristides was also a good man, and Pericles and Thucydides:—they made their sons good horsemen, and wrestlers, and the like, but they did not have them taught to be good, because virtue cannot be taught.]

_Soc._ And did not he train his son Lysimachus better than
any other Athenian in all that could be done for him by the
help of masters? But what has been the result? Is he a bit
better than any other mortal? He is an acquaintance of
yours, and you see what he is like. There is Pericles, again,
magnificent in his wisdom; and he, as you are aware, had
two sons, Paralus and Xanthippus.

_Any._ I know.

_Soc._ And you know, also, that he taught them to be unrivalled
horsemen, and had them trained in music and gymnastics
and all sorts of arts—in these respects they were on a
level with the best—and had he no wish to make good men of
them? Nay, he must have wished it. But virtue, as I suspect,
could not be taught. And that you may not suppose the
incompetent teachers to be only the meaner sort of Athenians
and few in number, remember again that Thucydides had two
sons, Melesias and Stephanus, whom, besides giving them a
good education in other things, he trained in wrestling, and
they were the best wrestlers in Athens: one of them he committed
to the care of Xanthias, and the other of Eudorus, who
had the reputation of being the most celebrated wrestlers of
that day. Do you remember them?

_Any._ I have heard of them.

_Soc._ Now, can there be a doubt that Thucydides, whose
children were taught things for which he had to spend money,
would have taught them to be good men, which would have
cost him nothing, if virtue could have been taught? Will
you reply that he was a mean man, and had not many friends
among the Athenians and allies? Nay, but he was of a great
family, and a man of influence at Athens and in all Hellas,
and, if virtue could have been taught, he would have found
out some Athenian or foreigner who would have made good
men of his sons, if he could not himself spare the time from
cares of state. Once more, I suspect, friend Anytus, that
virtue is not a thing which can be taught?

[Sidenote: _The sophists again._]

_Any._ Socrates, I think that you are too ready to speak
evil of men: and, if you will take my advice, I would recommend
you to be careful. Perhaps there is no city in which
it is not easier to do men harm than to do them good, and
this is certainly the case at Athens, as I believe that you 95
know.

[Sidenote: Anytus gives an angry warning to Socrates.]

_Soc._ O Meno, I think that Anytus is in a rage. And he
may well be in a rage, for he thinks, in the first place, that I
am defaming these gentlemen; and in the second place, he is
of opinion that he is one of them himself. But some day
he will know what is the meaning of defamation, and if he
ever does, he will forgive me. Meanwhile I will return to
you, Meno; for I suppose that there are gentlemen in your
region too?

_Men._ Certainly there are.

_Soc._ And are they willing to teach the young? and do
they profess to be teachers? and do they agree that virtue is
taught?

[Sidenote: The Thessalian gentry are not agreed about the possibility of teaching virtue.]

_Men._ No indeed, Socrates, they are anything but agreed;
you may hear them saying at one time that virtue can be
taught, and then again the reverse.

_Soc._ Can we call those teachers who do not acknowledge
the possibility of their own vocation?

_Men._ I think not, Socrates.

_Soc._ And what do you think of these Sophists, who are the
only professors? Do they seem to you to be teachers of
virtue?

[Sidenote: _The Sophists no teachers of virtue._]

[Sidenote: Gorgias professes to teach rhetoric, but laughs at those who pretend to teach virtue.]

_Men._ I often wonder, Socrates, that Gorgias is never heard
promising to teach virtue: and when he hears others promising
he only laughs at them; but he thinks that men should be
taught to speak.

_Soc._ Then do you not think that the Sophists are teachers?

_Men._ I cannot tell you, Socrates; like the rest of the world,
I am in doubt, and sometimes I think that they are teachers
and sometimes not.

_Soc._ And are you aware that not you only and other politicians
have doubts whether virtue can be taught or not, but
that Theognis the poet says the very same thing?

_Men._ Where does he say so?

[Sidenote: Theognis implies in one passage that virtue can, and in another that it cannot, be taught.]

_Soc._ In these elegiac verses[10]:—

‘Eat and drink and sit with the mighty, and make yourself
agreeable to them; for from the good you will learn what
is good, but if you mix with the bad you will lose the
intelligence which you already have.’

Do you observe that here he seems to imply that virtue can
be taught?

_Men._ Clearly.

_Soc._ But in some other verses he shifts about and
says[11]:—

‘If understanding could be created and put into a man, then
they’ [who were able to perform this feat] ‘would have
obtained great rewards.’

And again:—

‘Never would a bad son have sprung from a good sire, for 96
he would have heard the voice of instruction; but not by
teaching will you ever make a bad man into a good one.’

And this, as you may remark, is a contradiction of the other.

_Men._ Clearly.

[Sidenote: How can they be teachers who are so inconsistent with themselves?]

_Soc._ And is there anything else of which the professors are
affirmed not only not to be teachers of others, but to be ignorant
themselves, and bad at the knowledge of that which they
are professing to teach? or is there anything about which even
the acknowledged ‘gentlemen’ are sometimes saying that
‘this thing can be taught,’ and sometimes the opposite? Can
you say that they are teachers in any true sense whose ideas
are in such confusion?

_Men._ I should say, certainly not.

_Soc._ But if neither the Sophists nor the gentlemen are
teachers, clearly there can be no other teachers?

_Men._ No.

_Soc._ And if there are no teachers, neither are there disciples?

_Men._ Agreed.

[Sidenote: _Knowledge and Opinion._]

_Soc._ And we have admitted that a thing cannot be taught of
which there are neither teachers nor disciples?

_Men._ We have.

[Sidenote: If there are no teachers and no scholars, virtue cannot be taught.]

_Soc._ And there are no teachers of virtue to be found anywhere?

_Men._ There are not.

_Soc._ And if there are no teachers, neither are there scholars?

_Men._ That, I think, is true.

_Soc._ Then virtue cannot be taught?

_Men._ Not if we are right in our view. But I cannot believe,
Socrates, that there are no good men: And if there are, how
did they come into existence?

[Sidenote: But were we not mistaken in our view? There may be another guide to good action as well as knowledge.]

_Soc._ I am afraid, Meno, that you and I are not good for
much, and that Gorgias has been as poor an educator of you
as Prodicus has been of me. Certainly we shall have to
look to ourselves, and try to find some one who will help
in some way or other to improve us. This I say, because
I observe that in the previous discussion none of us remarked
that right and good action is possible to man under other
guidance than that of knowledge (ἐπιστήμη);—and indeed if
this be denied, there is no seeing how there can be any good
men at all.

_Men._ How do you mean, Socrates?

_Soc._ I mean that good men are necessarily useful or
profitable. Were we not right in admitting this? It must 97
be so.

_Men._ Yes.

_Soc._ And in supposing that they will be useful only if they
are true guides to us of action—there we were also right?

_Men._ Yes.

_Soc._ But when we said that a man cannot be a good guide
unless he have knowledge (φρόνησις), in this we were wrong.

_Men._ What do you mean by the word ‘right’?

_Soc._ I will explain. If a man knew the way to Larisa, or
anywhere else, and went to the place and led others thither,
would he not be a right and good guide?

_Men._ Certainly.

_Soc._ And a person who had a right opinion about the way,
but had never been and did not know, might be a good guide
also, might he not?

_Men._ Certainly.

_Soc._ And while he has true opinion about that which the
other knows, he will be just as good a guide if he thinks the
truth, as he who knows the truth?

_Men._ Exactly.

[Sidenote: _The images of Daedalus._]

[Sidenote: Right opinion is as good a guide to action as knowledge.]

_Soc._ Then true opinion is as good a guide to correct action
as knowledge; and that was the point which we omitted in
our speculation about the nature of virtue, when we said that
knowledge only is the guide of right action; whereas there is
also right opinion.

_Men._ True.

_Soc._ Then right opinion is not less useful than knowledge?

_Men._ The difference, Socrates, is only that he who has
knowledge will always be right; but he who has right
opinion will sometimes be right, and sometimes not.

_Soc._ What do you mean? Can he be wrong who has
right opinion, so long as he has right opinion?

_Men._ I admit the cogency of your argument, and therefore,
Socrates, I wonder that knowledge should be preferred to
right opinion—or why they should ever differ.

_Soc._ And shall I explain this wonder to you?

_Men._ Do tell me.

_Soc._ You would not wonder if you had ever observed the
images of Daedalus[12]; but perhaps you have not got them in
your country?

_Men._ What have they to do with the question?

_Soc._ Because they require to be fastened in order to keep
them, and if they are not fastened they will play truant and
run away.

_Men._ Well, what of that?

[Sidenote: _Recapitulation of the argument._]

[Sidenote: But right opinions are apt to walk away, like the images of Daedalus.]

_Soc._ I mean to say that they are not very valuable possessions
if they are at liberty, for they will walk off like
runaway slaves; but when fastened, they are of great value,
for they are really beautiful works of art. Now this is an
illustration of the nature of true opinions: while they abide 98
with us they are beautiful and fruitful, but they run away out
of the human soul, and do not remain long, and therefore
they are not of much value until they are fastened by the
tie of the cause; and this fastening of them, friend Meno,
is recollection, as you and I have agreed to call it. But
when they are bound, in the first place, they have the
nature of knowledge; and, in the second place, they are
abiding. And this is why knowledge is more honourable
and excellent than true opinion, because fastened by a chain.

_Men._ What you are saying, Socrates, seems to be very
like the truth.

_Soc._ I too speak rather in ignorance; I only conjecture.
And yet that knowledge differs from true opinion is no
matter of conjecture with me. There are not many things
which I profess to know, but this is most certainly one
of them.

_Men._ Yes, Socrates; and you are quite right in saying so.

_Soc._ And am I not also right in saying that true opinion
leading the way perfects action quite as well as knowledge?

_Men._ There again, Socrates, I think that you are right.

_Soc._ Then right opinion is not a whit inferior to knowledge,
or less useful in action; nor is the man who has right opinion
inferior to him who has knowledge?

_Men._ True.

_Soc._ And surely the good man has been acknowledged by
us to be useful?

_Men._ Yes.

_Soc._ Seeing then that men become good and useful to
states, not only because they have knowledge, but because
they have right opinion, and that neither knowledge nor
right opinion is given to man by nature or acquired by
him—(do you imagine either of them to be given by nature?

_Men._ Not I.)

_Soc._ Then if they are not given by nature, neither are the
good by nature good?

_Men._ Certainly not.

_Soc._ And nature being excluded, then came the question
whether virtue is acquired by teaching?

_Men._ Yes.

_Soc._ If virtue was wisdom [or knowledge], then, as we
thought, it was taught?

_Men._ Yes.

_Soc._ And if it was taught it was wisdom?

_Men._ Certainly.

[Sidenote: _Diviners and divine men._]

_Soc._ And if there were teachers, it might be taught; and
if there were no teachers, not?

_Men._ True.

_Soc._ But surely we acknowledged that there were no
teachers of virtue?

_Men._ Yes.

_Soc._ Then we acknowledged that it was not taught, and
was not wisdom?

_Men._ Certainly.

_Soc._ And yet we admitted that it was a good? 99

_Men._ Yes.

_Soc._ And the right guide is useful and good?

_Men._ Certainly.

[Sidenote: If virtue and knowledge cannot be taught, the only right guides of men are true opinions.]

_Soc._ And the only right guides are knowledge and true
opinion—these are the guides of man; for things which
happen by chance are not under the guidance of man: but
the guides of man are true opinion and knowledge.

_Men._ I think so too.

_Soc._ But if virtue is not taught, neither is virtue knowledge.

_Men._ Clearly not.

_Soc._ Then of two good and useful things, one, which is
knowledge, has been set aside, and cannot be supposed to
be our guide in political life.

_Men._ I think not.

_Soc._ And therefore not by any wisdom, and not because
they were wise, did Themistocles and those others of whom
Anytus spoke govern states. This was the reason why they
were unable to make others like themselves—because their
virtue was not grounded on knowledge.

_Men._ That is probably true, Socrates.

[Sidenote: Right opinion is in politics what divination is in religion; diviners, prophets, poets, statesmen, may all be truly called ‘divine men.’]

_Soc._ But if not by knowledge, the only alternative which
remains is that statesmen must have guided states by right
opinion, which is in politics what divination is in religion;
for diviners and also prophets say many things truly, but
they know not what they say.

_Men._ So I believe.

_Soc._ And may we not, Meno, truly call those men ‘divine’
who, having no understanding, yet succeed in many a grand
deed and word?

_Men._ Certainly.

[Sidenote: _The conclusion._]

_Soc._ Then we shall also be right in calling divine those
whom we were just now speaking of as diviners and prophets,
including the whole tribe of poets. Yes, and statesmen
above all may be said to be divine and illumined, being
inspired and possessed of God, in which condition they say
many grand things, not knowing what they say.

_Men._ Yes.

_Soc._ And the women too, Meno, call good men divine—do
they not? and the Spartans, when they praise a good
man, say ‘that he is a divine man.’

_Men._ And I think, Socrates, that they are right; although
very likely our friend Anytus may take offence at the word.

_Soc._ I do not care; as for Anytus, there will be another
opportunity of talking with him. To sum up our enquiry—the
result seems to be, if we are at all right in our view, that
virtue is neither natural nor acquired, but an instinct given
by God to the virtuous. Nor is the instinct accompanied 100
by reason, unless there may be supposed to be among statesmen
some one who is capable of educating statesmen. And
if there be such an one, he may be said to be among the
living what Homer says that Tiresias was among the dead,
‘he alone has understanding; but the rest are flitting shades;’
and he and his virtue in like manner will be a reality among
shadows.

_Men._ That is excellent, Socrates.

[Sidenote: Virtue comes by the gift of God.]

_Soc._ Then, Meno, the conclusion is that virtue comes to
the virtuous by the gift of God. But we shall never know
the certain truth until, before asking how virtue is given,
we enquire into the actual nature of virtue. I fear that
I must go away, but do you, now that you are persuaded
yourself, persuade our friend Anytus. And do not let him be
so exasperated; if you can conciliate him, you will have done
good service to the Athenian people.

FOOTNOTES

[1] Butler’s Analogy.

[2] Cp. _infra_ p. 12, _ad fin._

[3] Cp. Arist. Pol. i. 13, § 10.

[4] Cp. Theaet. 146 D.

[5] Cp. Aristot. Post. Anal. I. i. 6.

[6] Pindar, Frag. 98 (Boeckh).

[7] Or, whether a certain area is capable of being inscribed as a triangle in a certain circle.

[8] Or, when you apply it to the given line, i. e. the diameter of the circle (αὐτοῦ).

[9] Or, similar to the area so applied.

[10] Theog. 33 ff.

[11] Theog. 435 ff.

[12] Cp. Euthyphro 11 B.

EUTHYPHRO.

INTRODUCTION.

[Sidenote: _Euthyphro._]

[Sidenote: INTRODUCTION.]

In the Meno, Anytus had parted from Socrates with the significant words: ‘That in any city, and particularly in the city of Athens, it is easier to do men harm than to do them good’ (94 E); and Socrates was anticipating another opportunity of talking with him (99 E). In the Euthyphro, Socrates is awaiting his trial for impiety. But before the trial begins, Plato would like to put the world on their trial, and convince them of ignorance in that very matter touching which Socrates is accused. An incident which may perhaps really have occurred in the family of Euthyphro, a learned Athenian diviner and soothsayer, furnishes the occasion of the discussion.

* * * * *

[Sidenote: ANALYSIS.]

This Euthyphro and Socrates are represented as meeting in the
porch of the King Archon. (Cp. Theaet. sub fin.) Both have =Steph.= 2
legal business in hand. Socrates is defendant in a suit for impiety
which Meletus has brought against him (it is remarked by the 3
way that he is not a likely man himself to have brought a suit
against another); and Euthyphro too is plaintiff in an action for
murder, which he has brought against his own father. The latter 4
has originated in the following manner:—A poor dependant of
the family had slain one of their domestic slaves in Naxos. The
guilty person was bound and thrown into a ditch by the command
of Euthyphro’s father, who sent to the interpreters of religion
at Athens to ask what should be done with him. Before the
messenger came back the criminal had died from hunger and
exposure.

[Sidenote: _Analysis 5-9._]

This is the origin of the charge of murder which Euthyphro
brings against his father. Socrates is confident that before he
could have undertaken the responsibility of such a prosecution,
he must have been perfectly informed of the nature of piety and 5
impiety; and as he is going to be tried for impiety himself, he
thinks that he cannot do better than learn of Euthyphro (who will
be admitted by everybody, including the judges, to be an unimpeachable
authority) what piety is, and what is impiety. What
then is piety?

Euthyphro, who, in the abundance of his knowledge, is very
willing to undertake all the responsibility, replies: That piety is
doing as I do, prosecuting your father (if he is guilty) on a charge
of murder; doing as the gods do—as Zeus did to Cronos, and
Cronos to Uranus.

Socrates has a dislike to these tales of mythology, and he fancies 6
that this dislike of his may be the reason why he is charged with
impiety. ‘Are they really true?’ ‘Yes, they are;’ and Euthyphro
will gladly tell Socrates some more of them. But Socrates
would like first of all to have a more satisfactory answer to the
question, ‘What is piety?’ ‘Doing as I do, charging a father with
murder,’ may be a single instance of piety, but can hardly be
regarded as a general definition.

Euthyphro replies, that ‘Piety is what is dear to the gods, 7
and impiety is what is not dear to them.’ But may there not
be differences of opinion, as among men, so also among the
gods? Especially, about good and evil, which have no fixed
rule; and these are precisely the sort of differences which
give rise to quarrels. And therefore what may be dear to one 8
god may not be dear to another, and the same action may
be both pious and impious; e. g. your chastisement of your
father, Euthyphro, may be dear or pleasing to Zeus (who inflicted
a similar chastisement on his own father), but not
equally pleasing to Cronos or Uranus (who suffered at the
hands of their sons).

Euthyphro answers that there is no difference of opinion, either
among gods or men, as to the propriety of punishing a murderer.
Yes, rejoins Socrates, when they know him to be a murderer; but
you are assuming the point at issue. If all the circumstances of
the case are considered, are you able to show that your father 9
was guilty of murder, or that all the gods are agreed in approving
of our prosecution of him? And must you not allow that what
is hated by one god may be liked by another? Waiving this last,
however, Socrates proposes to amend the definition, and say that
‘what all the gods love is pious, and what they all hate is impious.’
To this Euthyphro agrees.

[Sidenote: _Analysis 9-15._]

Socrates proceeds to analyze the new form of the definition. 10
He shows that in other cases the act precedes the state; e. g.
the act of being carried, loved, &c. precedes the state of being
carried, loved, &c., and therefore that which is dear to the gods is
dear to the gods because it is first loved of them, not loved of
them because it is dear to them. But the pious or holy is loved
by the gods because it is pious or holy, which is equivalent to
saying, that it is loved by them because it is dear to them. Here
then appears to be a contradiction,—Euthyphro has been giving an 11
attribute or accident of piety only, and not the essence. Euthyphro
acknowledges himself that his explanations seem to walk away
or go round in a circle, like the moving figures of Daedalus,
the ancestor of Socrates, who has communicated his art to his
descendants.

Socrates, who is desirous of stimulating the indolent intelligence 12
of Euthyphro, raises the question in another manner: ‘Is all the
pious just?’ ‘Yes.’ ‘Is all the just pious?’ ‘No.’ ‘Then what
part of justice is piety?’ Euthyphro replies that piety is that
part of justice which ‘attends’ to the gods, as there is another
part of justice which ‘attends’ to men. But what is the meaning 13
of ‘attending’ to the gods? The word ‘attending,’ when applied
to dogs, horses, and men, implies that in some way they are made
better. But how do pious or holy acts make the gods any better?
Euthyphro explains that he means by pious acts, acts of service
or ministration. Yes; but the ministrations of the husbandman,
the physician, and the builder have an end. To what end do
we serve the gods, and what do we help them to accomplish? 14
Euthyphro replies, that all these difficult questions cannot be
resolved in a short time; and he would rather say simply that
piety is knowing how to please the gods in word and deed, by
prayers and sacrifices. In other words, says Socrates, piety is ‘a
science of asking and giving’—asking what we want and giving 15
what they want; in short, a mode of doing business between gods
and men. But although they are the givers of all good, how can
we give them any good in return? ‘Nay, but we give them
honour.’ Then we give them not what is beneficial, but what is
pleasing or dear to them; and this is the point which has been
already disproved.

[Sidenote: _Religion of the letter and of the spirit._]

Socrates, although weary of the subterfuges and evasions of
Euthyphro, remains unshaken in his conviction that he must know
the nature of piety, or he would never have prosecuted his old
father. He is still hoping that he will condescend to instruct him.
But Euthyphro is in a hurry and cannot stay. And Socrates’ last 16
hope of knowing the nature of piety before he is prosecuted for
impiety has disappeared. As in the Euthydemus the irony is
carried on to the end.

* * * * *

[Sidenote: INTRODUCTION.]

The Euthyphro is manifestly designed to contrast the real nature of piety and impiety with the popular conceptions of them. But when the popular conceptions of them have been overthrown, Socrates does not offer any definition of his own: as in the Laches and Lysis, he prepares the way for an answer to the question which he has raised; but true to his own character, refuses to answer himself.

Euthyphro is a religionist, and is elsewhere spoken of, if he be the same person, as the author of a philosophy of names, by whose ‘prancing steeds’ Socrates in the Cratylus is carried away (p. 396). He has the conceit and self-confidence of a Sophist; no doubt that he is right in prosecuting his father has ever entered into his mind. Like a Sophist too, he is incapable either of framing a general definition or of following the course of an argument. His wrong-headedness, one-sidedness, narrowness, positiveness, are characteristic of his priestly office. His failure to apprehend an argument may be compared to a similar defect which is observable in the rhapsode Ion. But he is not a bad man, and he is friendly to Socrates, whose familiar sign he recognizes with interest. Though unable to follow him he is very willing to be led by him, and eagerly catches at any suggestion which saves him from the trouble of thinking. Moreover he is the enemy of Meletus, who, as he says, is availing himself of the popular dislike to innovations in religion in order to injure Socrates; at the same time he is amusingly confident that he has weapons in his own armoury which would be more than a match for him. He is quite sincere in his prosecution of his father, who has accidentally been guilty of homicide, and is not wholly free from blame. To purge away the crime appears to him in the light of a duty, whoever may be the criminal.

[Sidenote: _The three definitions of piety._]

Thus begins the contrast between the religion of the letter, or of the narrow and unenlightened conscience, and the higher notion of religion which Socrates vainly endeavours to elicit from him. ‘Piety is doing as I do’ is the idea of religion which first occurs to him, and to many others who do not say what they think with equal frankness. For men are not easily persuaded that any other religion is better than their own; or that other nations, e. g. the Greeks in the time of Socrates, were equally serious in their religious beliefs and difficulties. The chief difference between us and them is, that they were slowly learning what we are in process of forgetting. Greek mythology hardly admitted of the distinction between accidental homicide and murder: that the pollution of blood was the same in both cases is also the feeling of the Athenian diviner. He had not as yet learned the lesson, which philosophy was teaching, that Homer and Hesiod, if not banished from the state, or whipped out of the assembly, as Heracleitus more rudely proposed, at any rate were not to be appealed to as authorities in religion; and he is ready to defend his conduct by the examples of the gods. These are the very tales which Socrates cannot abide; and his dislike of them, as he suspects, has branded him with the reputation of impiety. Here is one answer to the question, ‘Why Socrates was put to death,’ suggested by the way. Another is conveyed in the words, ‘The Athenians do not care about any man being thought wise until he begins to make other men wise; and then for some reason or other they are angry:’ which may be said to be the rule of popular toleration in most other countries, and not at Athens only. In the course of the argument (7 A, B) Socrates remarks that the controversial nature of morals and religion arises out of the difficulty of verifying them. There is no measure or standard to which they can be referred.

The next definition, ‘Piety is that which is loved of the gods,’ is shipwrecked on a refined distinction between the state and the act, corresponding respectively to the adjective (φίλον) and the participle (φιλούμενον), or rather perhaps to the participle and the verb (φιλούμενον and φιλεῖται). The act is prior to the state (as in Aristotle the ἐνέργεια precedes the δύναμις); and the state of being loved is preceded by the act of being loved. But piety or holiness is preceded by the act of being pious, not by the act of being loved; and therefore piety and the state of being loved are different. Through such subtleties of dialectic Socrates is working his way into a deeper region of thought and feeling. He means to say that the words ‘loved of the gods’ express an attribute only, and not the essence of piety.

[Sidenote: _Genuineness of the Dialogue._]

Then follows the third and last definition, ‘Piety is a part of justice.’ Thus far Socrates has proceeded in placing religion on a moral foundation. He is seeking to realize the harmony of religion and morality, which the great poets Æschylus, Sophocles, and Pindar had unconsciously anticipated, and which is the universal want of all men. To this the soothsayer adds the ceremonial element, ‘attending upon the gods.’ When further interrogated by Socrates as to the nature of this ‘attention to the gods,’ he replies, that piety is an affair of business, a science of giving and asking, and the like. Socrates points out the anthropomorphism of these notions. (Cp. Symp. 202 E; Rep. ii. 365 E; Statesman 290 C, D.) But when we expect him to go on and show that the true service of the gods is the service of the spirit and the cooperation with them in all things true and good, he stops short; this was a lesson which the soothsayer could not have been made to understand, and which every one must learn for himself.

There seem to be altogether three aims or interests in this little Dialogue: (1) the dialectical development of the idea of piety; (2) the antithesis of true and false religion, which is carried to a certain extent only; (3) the defence of Socrates.

[Sidenote: _Date of the Dialogue._]

The subtle connection with the Apology and the Crito; the holding back of the conclusion, as in the Charmides, Lysis, Laches, Protagoras, and other Dialogues; and deep insight into the religious world; the dramatic power and play of the two characters; the inimitable irony, are reasons for believing that the Euthyphro is a genuine Platonic writing. The spirit in which the popular representations of mythology are denounced recalls Republic II (378 ff.) The virtue of piety has been already mentioned as one of five in the Protagoras, but is not reckoned among the four cardinal virtues of Republic IV (428 ff.). The figure of Daedalus (15 C) has occurred in the Meno (97 D); that of Proteus (15 D) in the Euthydemus (288 B) and Io (541 E). The kingly science has already appeared in the Euthydemus, and will reappear in the Republic and Statesman. But neither from these nor any other indications of similarity or difference, and still less from arguments respecting the suitableness of this little work to aid Socrates at the time of his trial or the reverse, can any evidence of the date be obtained.

EUTHYPHRO.

_PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE._

SOCRATES. EUTHYPHRO.

SCENE:—The Porch of the King Archon.

[Sidenote: _Euthyphro._]

[Sidenote: Euthyphro and Socrates meet at the Porch of the King Archon. Both have legal business on hand.]

_Euthyphro._ Why have you left the Lyceum, Socrates?
and what are you doing in the Porch of the King Archon? =Steph.= 2
Surely you cannot be concerned in a suit before the King,
like myself?

_Socrates._ Not in a suit, Euthyphro; impeachment is the
word which the Athenians use.

_Euth._ What! I suppose that some one has been prosecuting
you, for I cannot believe that you are the prosecutor
of another.

_Soc._ Certainly not.

_Euth._ Then some one else has been prosecuting you?

_Soc._ Yes.

_Euth._ And who is he?

_Soc._ A young man who is little known, Euthyphro; and I
hardly know him: his name is Meletus, and he is of the deme
of Pitthis. Perhaps you may remember his appearance; he
has a beak, and long straight hair, and a beard which is ill
grown.

_Euth._ No, I do not remember him, Socrates. But what is
the charge which he brings against you?

[Sidenote: _The ways of the Athenian people._]

[Sidenote: Meletus has brought a charge against Socrates.]