Chapter M: De Lafayette to John Adams (1)
Translation.
St Germain, April 9th, 1779.
Dear Sir,
I beg leave to apply to you, in an instance where I am much concerned. The case I shall lay before you, and recommend to your care. There is an officer in Paris, whom I wish to send over to America on board the Alliance, and who I know would be of service in the American army. For that reason, besides his recommendations, I have a great regard for him. I wish the gentleman may find a passage in the frigate. Dr Franklin cannot officially send an officer, but I beg you would take him along with you, as I take upon myself the charge of presenting him to Congress. All the marks of kindness I ever met with from them, and the knowledge which the strictest friendship has given me of General Washington's sentiments, make me as certain as possible, that my officer will meet with the best reception in Philadelphia and in the army, who know I am acquainted with what may be convenient to them.
It is with a great concern, that I hear of discontents between Captain Landais and his officers, and I flatter myself, that you will again establish harmony and concord among them. I will take the opportunity of this frigate to write over to my friends in America.
The articles alluded to in your letter from Passy, I have been very busy about, but I did not meet with great success till now, and what is done is not equal to what I could wish. It is true, our circumstances are rather narrow at this moment, and I believe, that the Ministers are willing to do what they think possible, or advantageous, but we do not always agree in opinion. I hope, however, America will have more and more occasions of knowing the true attachment of this nation for her.
With great impatience I wait for your answer, that I may send the officer to Nantes. I hope you will not refuse your patronage on this occasion, and I may answer Congress will have no objection to take a gentleman whom I send them. You will, my dear Sir, in settling his passage, much oblige your humble servant,
LAFAYETTE.
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TO ARTHUR LEE.
L'Orient, June 9th, 1779.
Dear Sir,
Your favors of June the 2d and 5th are now before me; that of the 29th of March I have answered, if I ever received it, for I have answered every one I have received from you, but not having my papers at hand cannot be particular. I thank you for the manuscript and the pamphlet.
I am happy to hear from you, and from all others, so agreeable a character of the Chevalier de la Luzerne, and M. Marbois, the last of whom I have had the pleasure to see.
I wish it was in my power to do more for Mr Ford, and to take him with me, but the frigate will be so crowded, I fear it will be impossible.
The declarations of the northern powers against the right of England to stop their merchant vessels, and arming to support their rights, are important events. The displacing of Mr Paine is a disagreeable and alarming one.
It is with no small astonishment, that I learn by your letter of the 5th, that by advices from America since your last to me, your enemies are determined to impeach your attachment to our country and her cause. Your request that I would give my opinion on that subject, from the knowledge I have had of your conduct, while we acted in commission together, can meet with no objection from me. But I hope I need not inform you, that my opinion upon this point is no secret at Versailles, Paris, Nantes, or elsewhere. Enclosed is a copy of a letter I did myself the honor to write to his Excellency the Count de Vergennes some time ago, which, for anything I know, is communicated to all the Court, but the answer shows that it was received. I had my reasons then for keeping it to myself, which exist now no more. I would transcribe the whole correspondence if it was in my power, but I have not time, and it is sufficient to say, that it was conducted by his Excellency with the most obliging politeness. It is my duty now to furnish you with a copy, lest any accident may befal me, which is by no means improbable. I thought then, and am confirmed in that opinion more and more, that it was my duty to communicate my sentiments at Court, upon that very extraordinary occasion, and from regard to my own reputation, I am very glad you have given me an opportunity of furnishing you with evidence, that I did this part of my duty so far forth. The letter was written, sent to Versailles, and received by his Excellency before the arrival of the Marquis de Lafayette, his Aid-de-Camp, or Dr Winship; that is, before the news reached Passy of the new arrangement.[45] But lest that letter should not be sufficient, I shall enclose another certificate, not without a heartfelt grief, that malice should have been so daring and so barbarous, as to make either such a letter or such a certificate from me either necessary or even pardonable.[46] Your hint, that I must correct some things that are amiss, extorts from me an involuntary sigh. I shall be in a situation critical and difficult without example, my own character at stake from various quarters, and without anything to support me but truth and innocence, and you need not be informed, that these are not always sufficient. I have little expectation of doing good; God grant I may do no harm. I shall not designedly. But I suppose Congress intend to examine me as a witness, and I must tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, as far as I know it. If the task should end here, I should not be much embarrassed, but if they should proceed to demand of me opinions and judgments of men and things, as there is reason to expect they will, although I hope they will not, what will be the consequences? Upon the whole, truth must be my shield, and if the shafts of interested malice can pierce through this, they shall pierce me.
I have the honor to be, &c.
JOHN ADAMS.
FOOTNOTES:
[45] See this letter in Arthur Lee's Correspondence, Vol. II. p. 224.
[46] See as above, p. 249.
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TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.
Braintree, August 3d, 1779.
Sir,
On the 27th of February, I had the honor of writing to Congress, informing them of my intention of returning home, in consequence of the commission which superseded mine. On the first of March, I had again the honor of writing some information concerning the unprecedented interest, which the British Government are obliged to give for the loan of money for the service of the present year. On the 8th of March, I took my leave of the American Minister, and left Paris for Nantes, in expectation of there meeting the Alliance, and sailing in her for America in a few weeks. Upon my arrival at Nantes, I learned the Alliance was yet at Brest, and so embarrassed with nearly forty prisoners, who were supposed to have been concerned in a conspiracy to carry her to England, and with other difficulties, that it was uncertain when she would be ready.
The agent at Nantes at this time receiving a letter from his Excellency, Dr Franklin, desiring him to consult me about the direction of the Alliance, I thought it would expedite the public service for me to make a journey to Brest, about two hundred miles, which I undertook accordingly, and arrived at that port without loss of time. There, after an attendance of some weeks, and much negotiation with the Commandant, Intendant, and Agent, all things were prepared for the frigate to sail for Nantes, with about one hundred British prisoners, to be exchanged for a like number of American prisoners, arrived there from England in a cartel. I returned to Nantes, and the Alliance in a few days arrived in the river, the prisoners were exchanged, about sixty enlisted in the Alliance, and the rest in the Poor Richard, Captain Jones.
After accommodating all the difficulties with the British prisoners, the American prisoners, the officers and crew of the Alliance, and supplying all their necessary wants, Captain Landais, having orders to sail for America, and everything ready to proceed to sea in a few days, received unexpected orders to proceed to L'Orient, and wait there for further orders. I had the honor of a letter at the same time from his Excellency, enclosing one from the Minister of Marine, by which I learned, that the King had been graciously pleased to grant me a passage on board the frigate, which was to carry His Majesty's new Minister Plenipotentiary to the United States, that the frigate was at L'Orient, and that the Minister would be there in a few days. I went in the Alliance from Nantes to L'Orient, where after some time the frigate, the Sensible, arrived, but his Excellency, the Chevalier de la Luzerne, did not arrive until the 10th of June. On the 14th of June, and not before, I had the pleasure to be under sail, and on the 3d of August, arrived in Nantasket Roads.
I have entered into this detail of disappointments to justify myself for not returning sooner, and to shew that it was not my fault, that I was not at home in eight weeks from the first authentic information, that I had nothing further to do in France. There is nothing remaining for me to do but to settle my accounts with Congress; but as part of my accounts are in conjunction with my late colleagues, with whom I lived in the same house during my residence in Paris, I am not able to judge whether Congress will choose to receive my accounts, or to wait until the other Commissioners shall exhibit theirs, and have the whole together, under one view, so as to do equal justice to all. I am ready, however, to render all the account in my power, either jointly or separately, whenever Congress shall order it, and I shall wait their directions accordingly.
It is not in my power, having been so long from Paris, to give Congress any news of importance, except that the Brest fleet, under the Count d'Orvilliers, was at sea the beginning of June, that Admiral Arbuthnot was at Plymouth the 31st of May, and that there was a universal persuasion, arising from letters from Paris and London, that Spain had decided against the English. The Chevalier de la Luzerne will be able to give Congress satisfactory information upon this head.
I ought not to conclude this letter, without expressing my obligations to Captain Chavagne, and the other officers of the Sensible, for their civilities in the course of my passage home, and the pleasure I have had in the conversation of his Excellency, the new Minister Plenipotentiary from our august ally, and the Secretary to the embassy, Monsieur Marbois.
The Chevalier de la Luzerne is a Knight of the Order of St John of Jerusalem, of an ancient and noble family, connected by blood with many characters of principal name in the kingdom, a grandson of the celebrated Chancellor de la Moignon, a nephew of Monsieur Malesherbes, perhaps still more famous as first President of the Court of Aids and as a Minister of State, a brother to the Count de la Luzerne, and of the Bishop of Sangres, one of the three Dukes and Peers who had the honor to assist in the consecration of the King, a near relation of the Marcéhal de Broglie and the Count his brother, and of many other important personages in that country. Nor is his personal character less respectable than his connexions, as he is possessed of much useful information of all kinds, and particularly of the political system of Europe, obtained in his late embassy in Bavaria; and of the justest sentiments of the mutual interests of his country and ours, and of the utility to both of that alliance, which so happily unites them, and at the same time divested of all personal and party attachments and aversions. Congress and their constituents, I flatter myself, will have much satisfaction in his negotiations, as well as in those of the Secretary to the embassy, who was recently Secretary to the embassy in Bavaria, and who is a counsellor of the Parliament of Metz, a gentleman whose abilities, application, and disposition cannot fail to make him useful in the momentous office he sustains.
I have the honor to be, with great respect, &c.
JOHN ADAMS.
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TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.
Braintree, August 4th, 1779.
Sir,
At the close of the service on which Congress have done me the honor to send me, it may not be amiss to submit a few remarks to their consideration on the general state of affairs in Europe, as far as they relate to the interests of the United States. As the time approaches, when our relations with the most considerable States in Europe will multiply and assume a greater stability, they deserve the attention of Americans in general, but especially of those composing their supreme council.
France deserves the first place among those powers, with which our connexions will be the most intimate, and it is with pleasure I am able to assure Congress, that from the observations I have made during my residence in that Kingdom, I have the strongest reasons to believe, that their august ally, his Ministers, and nation, are possessed of the fullest persuasion of the justice of our cause, of the great importance of our independence to their interests, and the firmest resolution to preserve the faith of treaties inviolate, and to cultivate our friendship with sincerity and zeal. This is of the more consequence to us, as this power enjoys in Europe at this hour an influence, which it has not before experienced for many years.
Men are so sensible of a constant tendency in others to excesses, that a signal superiority of power never appears, without exciting jealousies and efforts to reduce it. Thus, when Spain, under Charles the Fifth and his successor, made herself dangerous, a great part of Europe united against her, assisted in severing the United Provinces from her, and by degrees greatly diminished her power. Thus, when France, under Lewis the Fourteenth, indulged the spirit of conquest too far, a great part of mankind united their forces against her, with such success as to involve her in a train of misfortunes, out of which she never emerged before the present reign. The English, in their turn, by means of their commerce and extensive settlements abroad, arose to a degree of opulence and naval power, which excited more extravagant passions in her own breast, and more tyrannical exertions of her influence, than appeared in either of the other cases. The consequence has been similar, but more remarkable. Europe seems to be more universally and sincerely united in the desire of reducing her, than they ever were in any former instance. This is the true cause why the French Court never made war with so universal a popularity among their own subjects, so general an approbation of other Courts, and such unanimous wishes among all nations for her success, as at this time.
The personal character of the King, his declared patronage of morals and economy, and the great strokes of wisdom, which have marked the commencement of his reign, the active spring which has been given to commerce by the division of the British empire, and our new connexions with his subjects; all these causes, together with the two treaties of peace, which have been lately signed under his auspices and his mediation, have given to this power a reputation, which the last reign had lost.
The first of these treaties has determined those controversies, which had for a long time divided Russia and the Porte, and the parties have been equally satisfied with the conditions of their reconciliation, a circumstance the more honorable for the French Ministry, and the Chevalier de St Priest, their Ambassador at Constantinople, as it is uncommon. The ancient confidence of the Porte in the Court of Versailles has revived, and the coolness, or rather enmity, which divided France and Russia for near twenty years, gives place to a friendship, which is at this time in all its fervor, and will probably be durable, as these powers have no interest to annoy each other, but, on the contrary, are able to assist each other in a manner the most essential.
The peace of Germany, signed at Teschin, the 13th of last May, has not equally satisfied the belligerent powers, who were on the one part the Emperor, and on the other, the King of Prussia and the Elector of Saxony his ally.
From the multitudes of writings, which have appeared before and during this war, in which the causes, the motives, and the rights of it are discussed, it appears, that in 1768, at the extinction of one of the branches of the House of Bavaria, which has been separated from its trunk for near five centuries, the House of Austria thought itself able, and priests and lawyers among their own subjects were complaisant enough to tell her, that she had a right to put herself in possession of the best part of the patrimony of the extinguished line.
The King of Prussia, to whose interest this augmentation of power would have been dangerous, has crowned an illustrious reign, by displaying all the resources of military genius and profound policy in opposition to it. While he contended in the field, France negotiated, and the work, begun by his arms, was completed by the cabinet of Versailles.
The Palatine House of Bavaria, the Duke of Deux Ponts, and particularly the Elector of Saxony, have obtained all they could reasonably demand, and the empire has preserved its balance of power in spite of its head. The King of Prussia had covered himself with glory, to which he put the finishing stroke, by not demanding any compensation for the expenses of the war. All parties have been satisfied except the Emperor, who has disordered his finances, ruined his Kingdom of Bohemia with immense fines, has not obtained any advantage over his adversary, and consequently has destroyed among his own troops the opinion they had of their superiority, and, in fine, has sustained a loss the most sensible for a young Prince just beginning to reign, the reputation of justice and moderation. It is the influence, the address, and ability of the French Minister, joined to the firmness of Russia, which have completed this work; and Lewis the Sixteenth has restored in Germany to the nation over which he reigns, that reputation which his grandfather had lost.
The merit of the Chevalier de la Luzerne, who was Ambassador in Bavaria during the transaction of this business, and that of M. Marbois, the Secretary to that embassy, in accomplishing an affair of such importance, which was rendered peculiarly delicate by the late family connexion between the Courts of Vienna and Versailles, was probably a motive for sending them now to America, a mission of no less importance and no less delicacy.
It is not probable, however, that they could have succeeded so soon, if England could have afforded subsidies to the Emperor. The Revolution in America, in which the French King has taken an earlier and a greater part than any other Sovereign in Europe, has operated so as to conciliate to him a consideration that is universal. The new Minister will give to Congress information the most precise in this respect, and touching the part which Spain is taking at this time, for which reason I shall refrain from entering into it, and content myself with observing, that all these considerations ought to induce us to cherish the alliance of France; and that every good citizen of the United States ought to endeavor to destroy the remains of those prejudices, which our ancient rulers have endeavored to inspire us with; that we have nothing to fear and much to hope from France, while we conduct ourselves with good sense and firmness, and that we cannot take too much pains to multiply the commercial relations, and strengthen the political connexions between the two nations; provided always, that we preserve prudence and resolution enough to receive implicitly no advice whatever, but to judge always for ourselves, and to guard ourselves against those principles in government, and those manners, which are so opposite to our own Constitution and to our own characters, as a young people, called by Providence to the most honorable and important of all duties, that of forming establishments for a great nation and a new world.
In the opinion of some, the power with which we shall one day have a relation the most immediate, next to that of France, is Great Britain. But it ought to be considered, that this power loses every day her consideration, and runs towards her ruin. Her riches, in which her power consisted, she has lost with us, and never can regain. With us she has lost her Mediterranean trade, her African trade, her German and Holland trade, her ally, Portugal, her ally, Russia, and her natural ally, the House of Austria; at least, as being unable to protect these as she once did, she can obtain no succor from them. In short, one branch of commerce has been lopped off after another, and one political interest sacrificed after another, She resembles the melancholy spectacle of a great wide spreading tree, that has been girded at the root. Her endeavors to regain these advantages, will continually keep alive in her breast the most malevolent passions towards us. Her envy, her jealousy, and resentment, will never leave us, while we are what we must unavoidably be, her rivals in the fisheries, in various other branches of commerce, and even in naval power. If peace should unhappily be made, leaving Canada, Nova Scotia, or the Floridas, or any of them, in her hands, jealousies and controversies will be perpetually arising. The degree, therefore, of intercourse with this nation, which will ever again take place, may justly be considered as problematical, or rather the probability is, that it will never be so great as some persons imagine; moreover, I think that every citizen in the present circumstances, who respects his country, and the engagements she has taken, ought to abstain from the foresight of a return of friendship between us and the English, and act as if it never was to be.
But it is lawful to consider, that which will probably be formed between the Hollanders and us. The similitude of manners, of religion, and in some respects of constitution, the analogy between the means by which the two republics arrived at independency, but above all the attractions of commercial interest, will infallibly draw them together. This connexion will not probably show itself, before a peace or a near prospect of peace. Too many motives of fear or interest place the Hollanders in a dependance on England, to suffer her to connect herself openly with us at present. Nevertheless, if the King of Prussia, could be induced to take us by the hand, his great influence in the United Provinces might contribute greatly to conciliate their friendship for us. Loans of money, and the operations of commercial agents or societies, will be the first threads of our connexions with this power. From the essays and inquiries of your Commissioners at Paris, it appears, that some money may be borrowed there, and from the success of several enterprises by the way of St Eustatia, it seems that the trade between the two countries is likely to increase, and possibly Congress may think it expedient to send a Minister there. If they should, it will be proper to give him a discretionary power to produce his commission or not, as he shall find it likely to succeed, to give him full powers and clear instructions concerning the borrowing of money; and the man himself above all should have consummate prudence, and a caution and discretion, that will be proof against every trial.
If Congress could find any means of paying the interest annually in Europe, commercial and pecuniary connexions would strengthen themselves from day to day, and if the fall of the credit of England should terminate in bankruptcy, the Seven United Provinces, having nothing to dissemble, would be zealous for a part of those rich benefits, which our commerce offers to the maritime powers, and by an early treaty with us secure those advantages, from which they have already discovered strong symptoms of a fear of being excluded by delays. It is scarcely necessary to observe to Congress, that Holland has lost her influence in Europe to such a degree, that there is little other regard for her remaining but that of a prodigal heir for a rich usurer, who lends him money at a high interest. The State which is poor and in debt has no political stability. Their army is very small, and their navy is less. The immense riches of individuals may possibly be in some future time the great misfortune of the nation, because the means of defence are not proportioned to the temptation which is held out for some necessitous, avaricious, and formidable neighbor to invade her.
The active commerce of Spain is very inconsiderable; of her passive commerce, we shall not fail to have a part; the vicinity of this power, her forces, her resources, ought to make us attentive to her conduct, but if we may judge of the future by the past, I should hope we had nothing to fear from it. The genius and interest of the nation incline it to repose. She cannot determine upon war but in the last extremity, and even then she sighs for peace. She is not possessed of the spirit of conquest, and we have reason to congratulate ourselves, that we have her for the nearest and principal neighbor. Her conduct towards us at this time will perhaps appear equivocal and indecisive, her determinations appear to be solely the fruit of the negotiations of the Court of Versailles. But it ought to be considered, she has not had motives so pressing as those of France to take in hand our defence. Whether she has an eye upon the Floridas, or what other terms she may expect from Congress, they are no doubt better informed than I am. To their wisdom it must be submitted to give her satisfaction, if her terms are moderate, and her offers in proportion. This conduct may conciliate her affection and shorten delays, a point of great importance, as the present moment appears to be decisive.
Portugal, under the administration of the Marquis de Pombal, broke some of the shackles by which she was held to England. But the treaty, by which a permanent friendship is established between the Crowns of Spain and Portugal, was made in 1777, an event that the English deplore as the greatest evil, next to the irrecoverable loss of the colonies, arising from this war, because they will now no longer be able to play off Portugal against Spain, in order to draw away her attention as well as her forces, as in former times. But as Portugal has not known how to deliver herself entirely from the influence of England, we shall have little to hope from her; on the other hand, such is her internal weakness, that we have absolutely nothing to fear. We shall necessarily have commerce with her, but whether she will ever have the courage to sacrifice the friendship of England for the sake of it is uncertain.
It would be useless to consider that infinite number of little sovereignties into which Germany is divided, and develope all their political interests. This task is as much beyond my knowledge as it would be useless to Congress. They will have few relations friendly or hostile with this country, excepting in two branches of commerce, that of merchandise and that of soldiers. The latter, infamous and detestable as it is, has been established between a nation, once generous, humane, and brave, and certain princes, as avaricious of money as they are prodigal of the blood of their subjects; and such is the scarcity of cash, and the avidity for it in Germany, and so little are the rights of humanity understood and respected, that sellers will probably be found as long as buyers. America will never be found in either class. The State of Germany, with which we may have commerce of an honorable kind, is the House of Austria, one of the most powerful in Europe. She possesses very few countries, however, near the sea. Ostend is the principal city, where she might have established a trade of some consequence, if the jealousy of the maritime Powers had not constantly opposed it. France, Spain, Holland, and England, have been all agreed in their opposition, and the treaty of Utrecht, ratified more than once by subsequent treaties, has so shackled this port, that it will be impossible to open a direct trade to it, without some new treaty, which possibly may not be very distant. England may possibly make a new treaty with Austria, and agree to privileges for this port, in order to draw away the advantages of the American trade from France and Spain; and in such a treaty Holland may possibly acquiesce, if not accede to it. The port of Trieste enjoys liberty without limits, and the Court of Vienna is anxious to make its commerce flourish. Situated as it is at the bottom of the Gulf of Trieste, the remotest part of the Gulf of Venice, tedious and difficult as the navigation of those seas is, we could make little use of it at any time, and none at all while this war continues.
This Court would seize with eagerness the advantages, that are presented to her by the independence of America, but an interest more powerful restrains her, and although she is certainly attentive to this revolution, there is reason to believe she will be one of the last powers to acknowledge our independence. She is so far from being rich, that she is destitute of the means of making war without subsidies, as is proved by the peace which has lately been made. She has occasion for the succors of France or of England to put in motion her numerous armies. She conceives easily, that the loss of the resources and credit of the English has disabled them to pay the enormous subsidies, which, in former times, they have poured into the Austrian coffers. She sees therefore with a secret mortification, that she shall be hereafter more at the mercy of France, who may choose her ally, and prefer at her pleasure either Austria or Prussia, while neither Vienna nor Berlin will be able, as in times past, to choose between Paris and London, since the latter has lost her past opulence and pecuniary resources. It is our duty to remark these great changes in the system of mankind, which have already happened in consequence of the American war. The alienation of Portugal from England, the peace of Germany, and that between Petersburg and Constantinople, by all which events England has lost, and France gained, such a superiority of influence and power, are owing entirely to the blind division of that policy and wealth, which the English might have still enjoyed, from the objects of their true interests and honor, to the ruinous American war.
The Court of Berlin flatters itself, that the connexions which have heretofore so long united France and Prussia will renew themselves sooner or later. This system is more rational than that which subsists at this day. The king of Prussia may then wait without anxiety the consequences of the present revolution, because it tends to increase the resources of his natural ally. The jealousy between the Emperor and the King of Prussia, and that between the Houses of Bourbon and Austria, are a natural tie between France and Prussia. The rivalry between France and Great Britain is another motive, too natural and too permanent for the former to suffer the King of Prussia to be long the ally of the latter. One of the favorite projects of Prussia, that of rendering the port of Emden a place of flourishing trade, interests him most powerfully in our independence. Silesia, one of his best provinces, has already felt the influence of it, and, sensible of the force that empires derive from commerce, he is earnestly desirous to see it introduced between America and his States; which gives ground to believe, that as Austria will be one of the last so Prussia will be one of the first to acknowledge our independence; an opinion which is rendered more probable by the answer, which was given by the Baron de Schulenburg to Mr Arthur Lee, and the influence of the King of Prussia in the United Provinces, which is greater than that of any other Power, arising from his great military force, and the vicinity of his dominions. His near relation to the Stadtholder and the Prince of Brunswick, is an additional motive to cultivate his friendship. The Electorate of Saxony, with a fruitful soil, contains a numerous and industrious people, and most of the commerce between the east and the west of Europe passes through it. The fairs of Leipsic have drawn considerable advantages for these four years from our trade. This Power will see with pleasure the moment, which shall put the last hand to our independence. The rest of Germany, excepting Hamburgh and Bremen, have no means of opening a direct commerce with us; with the latter we have no connexion at present; in the former all the commerce of Lower Germany is transacted; here we shall soon have occasion to establish an agent or consul.
Poland, depopulated by the war and a vicious government, reduced by a shameful treaty to two thirds of her ancient dominion, destitute of industry and manufactures, even of the first necessity, has no occasion for the productions of America. Dantzic sees her ancient prosperity diminish every day. There is, therefore, little probability of commerce, and less of any political connexion between that nation and us.
Russia, Sweden, and Denmark, comprehended under the denomination of the northern powers, have been thought by some to be interested in our return to the domination of Great Britain. Whether they consider themselves in this light or not, their late declarations against the right of England to interrupt their navigation, and their arming for the protection of their commerce on the ocean, and even in the English channel, are unequivocal proofs of their opinion concerning the right in our contest, and of their intentions not to interfere against us. It is very true, that the articles of commerce which they produce, are in many respects the same with those of America. Yet if we consider that we shall have occasion to purchase from them large quantities of hemp and sailcloth, and that our productions of timber, pitch, tar, and turpentine, are less profitable with us without bounties, than some other branches of labor, it is not probable that we shall lower the price of these articles in Europe so much as some conjecture, and consequently our increased demand upon those countries for several articles will be more than a compensation to them for the small loss they may sustain, by a trifling reduction in the price of those articles. It is not probable that the Courts of Petersburg, Stockholm, and Copenhagen have viewed with indifference the present revolution, if they have been apprehensive of being hurt by it in some respects, which however I think must have been a mistaken apprehension; yet the motive of humbling the pride of the English, who have endeavored to exercise their domination, even over the northern seas, and to render the Danish and Swedish flag dependent on theirs, has prevailed over all others, and they are considered in Europe as having given their testimony against the English in this war.
Italy, a country which declines every day from its ancient prosperity, offers few objects to our speculations. The privileges of the port of Leghorn, nevertheless, may render it useful to our ships, when our independence shall be acknowledged by Great Britain, if, as we once flattered ourselves, the Court of Vienna might receive an American Minister. We were equally in error respecting the Court of the Grand Duchy of Tuscany, where an Austrian prince reigns, who receives all his directions from Vienna, in such a manner that he will probably never receive any person in a public character, until the chief of his house has set him the example. The King of the two Sicilies is in the same dependence on the Court of Madrid, and we may depend upon it, he will conform himself to all it shall suggest to him. This prince has already ordered the ports of his dominions to be open to American vessels, public and private, and has ordered his Ambassador at Paris to apply to your Commissioners for a description of the American flag, that our vessels might be known, and receive no molestation upon their appearance in his harbors.
The Court of Rome, attached to ancient customs, would be one of the last to acknowledge our independence, if we were to solicit for it. But Congress will probably never send a Minister to his Holiness, who can do them no service, upon condition of receiving a Catholic Legate or Nuncio in return, or in other words, an ecclesiastical tyrant, which it is to be hoped the United States will be too wise ever to admit into their territories.
The States of the King of Sardinia are poor, and their commerce is very small. The little port of Villa Franca will probably see few American vessels, nor will there be any close relations, either commercial or political, between this prince and us.
The republic of Genoa is scarcely known at this day in Europe, but by those powers who borrow money. It is possible that some small sums might be obtained there, if Congress would fall upon means of insuring a punctual payment of interest in Europe.
Venice, heretofore so powerful, is reduced to a very inconsiderable commerce, and is in an entire state of decay.
Switzerland is another lender of money, but neither her position nor her commerce can occasion any near relation with us.
Whether there is anything in these remarks worth the trouble of reading, I shall submit to the wisdom of Congress, and subscribe myself, with the highest consideration, your most obedient and humble servant,
JOHN ADAMS.
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TO JAMES LOVELL.
Braintree, August 13th, 1779.
My Dear Sir,
Since I have had opportunity to converse a little in this country, and to read a few gazettes, I find that questions have been agitated here in the newspapers, and in private circles, as well as in Congress, concerning his Excellency, the Count de Vergennes, and Mr Arthur Lee, which seem to make it necessary that I should send the enclosed copies.[47] You can judge better than I whether it will be of any public utility to lay them before Congress. My first letter, and his Excellency's answer, I can see no objection to laying before Congress; but as the rest[48] contain little else besides mutual compliments, perhaps it will be as well to conceal them. I submit the whole, however, to your discretion, and am, with much esteem, &c.
JOHN ADAMS.
FOOTNOTES:
[47] See these letters in Arthur Lee's Correspondence, Vol. II. pp.
224, 227.
[48] See the present volume, under the dates of February 16th, 1779,
p. 294; February 21st, p. 298; February 27th, p. 299.
* * * * *
TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.
Braintree, September 10th, 1779.
Sir,
Looking over the printed journals of the 15th of last April, I find in the report of the Committee appointed to take into consideration the foreign affairs of the United States, and also the conduct of the late and present Commissioners of these States, the two following articles.
1. "That it appears to them, that Dr Franklin is Plenipotentiary for these States at the Court of France; Dr Arthur Lee, Commissioner for the Court of Spain; Mr William Lee, Commissioner for the Courts of Vienna and Berlin; Mr Ralph Izard, Commissioner for the Court of Tuscany; that Mr John Adams was appointed one of the Commissioners at the Court of France, in the place of Mr Deane, who had been appointed a joint Commissioner with Dr Franklin and Dr Arthur Lee, but that the said commission of Mr Adams is superseded by the Plenipotentiary commission to Dr Franklin.
2. "That in the course of their examination and inquiry, they find many complaints against the said Commissioners, and the political and commercial agency of Mr Deane, which complaints, with the evidence in support thereof, are herewith delivered, and to which the Committee beg leave to refer."
The word "said" in the second article, refers to the Commissioners mentioned in the first, and as my name is among them, I learn from hence, that there were some complaints against me, and that the evidence in support of them was delivered to Congress by the Committee.
I therefore pray, that I may be favored with copies of those complaints, evidences, and the names of my accusers, and the witnesses against me, that I may take such measures as may be in my power to justify myself to Congress.
I have the honor to be, &c.
JOHN ADAMS.
* * * * *
TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.
Boston, September 23d, 1779.
Sir,
I had yesterday the honor of your letter of the 7th of this month. I thank you, Sir, for your obliging congratulations on my return to my family and country.
The reason why my letters of the 27th of February, and the 1st of March, arrived so late was, that they were delivered at the time of their dates to gentlemen then bound to the seaports, who expected to sail directly for America, but were disappointed of passages, until the vessels sailed under the convoy of the Sensible.
I have not my letter book here, but I do not remember that they contained anything of much consequence, so that I suppose the inconvenience of their late arrival was not much.
You will be pleased to make my most respectful compliments to the members of Congress, and believe me, with great esteem, &c.
JOHN ADAMS.
* * * * *
TO JAMES LOVELL.
Braintree, October 17th, 1779.
My Dear Sir,
What shall I say to your favors of the 27th and 28th of September, which came by the last post? The unanimity of my election surprises me, as much as the delicacy, importance, and danger of the trust distress me. The appointment of Mr Dana to be Secretary pleases me more than my own to be Minister, Commissioner, Negotiator, call it what you will. I have communicated to him your letters in confidence, and all other material intelligence I had, and hope he will not decline, but you know the peculiarities of his situation, and if he should refuse, I hope you will not force your name out of nomination again. I did not suppose that such characters would be willing to go as Secretaries, because I did not know your plan, otherwise I should not have mentioned Mr Jennings to Mr Gerry for one to Dr Franklin. Your mastery of the language, and your indefatigability, would make you infinitely useful in any of these departments.
I rejoice that you produced my letter to the Count de Vergennes and his answer before the choice, because it contained a testimony in favor of Mr Lee, which was his due.[49] I am very much affected at his recall, because I know his merit, and, therefore, I am glad I was not placed in his stead, for suspicions would have arisen, and reflections would have been cast upon me, as having favored his removal in order to make room, which I certainly did not. I am infinitely obliged to you for those letters, and for that received the post before last, but I really tremble for your health. Let me entreat you, for the sake of our country, to take care of it. If I was to apply myself as you do, I should soon go to study politics in another sphere. Yet I am so selfish as to beg the continuance of your favors to me, and I pledge myself to you, I will not be in debt any more than may be made by the intrinsic difference in the value of the letters, which will be unavoidable.
I thank you for the extract from Mr Izard's letter. I am not a little surprised at its contents. It was written, I see, to his friend, and I suppose intended in confidence. I am fully persuaded he did not intend, that the whole should have been laid before Congress.[50] I utterly deny that I ever used to him any such language, as the indecent paragraph that closes what he says about me. Indeed, that is manifestly his own inference, and in his own words, from what he says he had heard me say, and he draws the same from what Dr Franklin and Mr Deane had said upon the same subject. I further deny that I ever _threatened_ him with the displeasure of Congress, for writing his opinion concerning these articles to Congress, or for suggesting them to the Commissioners. But to enter into all the conversations that have passed between Mr Izard and me respecting those articles, and many other points in order to give a full and fair representation of those conversations, would fill a small volume. Yet there never was any angry or rude conversation between him and me, that I can recollect. I lived with him on good terms, visited him and he me, dined with his family, and his family with me, and I ever told him, and repeated it often, that I should be always obliged to him for his advice, opinions, and sentiments upon any American subject, and that I should always give it its due weight, although I did not think myself bound to follow it any further than it seemed to me to be just. As Congress have declined giving me the charges against me by their authority, and have, upon the whole, acquitted me with so much splendor, it would look like a littleness of soul in me to make myself anxious, or give them any further trouble about it. And as I have in general so good an opinion of Mr Izard's attachment to his country, and of his honor, I shall not think myself bound to take any further notice of this fruit of his inexperience in public life, this peevish ebullition of the rashness of his temper. I have written a few other observations to Mr Gerry on the same subject. You and he will compare these with them for your private satisfaction, but be sure that they are not exposed where they will do harm to the public, to Mr Izard, or me, unnecessarily.
If I should go abroad, cannot you lend me twenty or thirty complete sets of the journals? They are much wanted in Europe. A set of them is a genteel present, and perhaps would do me and the public more service than you are aware of. If Congress, or some Committee would order it, I should be very glad.
I am, &c.
JOHN ADAMS.
FOOTNOTES:
[49] See these letters in Arthur Lee's Correspondence, Vol. II. pp.
224, 227.
[50] See Izard's Correspondence, Vol. II. p. 434.
* * * * *
TO SAMUEL HUNTINGTON, PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.
Braintree, October 19th, 1779.
Sir,
I had in Paris an opportunity of procuring information concerning the British whale fishery on the coast of Brazil, which it is proper to communicate to Congress, that if any advantage can be made of it the opportunity may not be lost.
The last year and the year before the English carried on this fishery to very great advantage, off the river Plate in South America, in the latitude of 35° south, and from thence to 40°, just on the edge of soundings, off and on, as the sailors express it, and about longitude 65° from London. They had about seventeen vessels in this fishery, which all sailed from London in the months of September and October. All the officers and men Americans from Nantucket and Cape Cod, two or three from Rhode Island, and one from Long Island. Four or five of these vessels went to Greenland, to which place they sail yearly, the last of February or the beginning of March.
The year before last, there was published in the English newspapers, a letter from the Lords of the Admiralty to Dennis de Bredt, in Coleman Street, informing him, that a convoy should be appointed to the Brazil fleet. But this I had certain information was a forgery, calculated merely to deceive American privateers, and no convoy actually went or was appointed, either last year or the year before, although the imposture was repeated both times, and will no doubt be renewed this.
For the capture or destruction of a fishery so wholly defenceless, not one of the vessels having any arms, a single frigate, or indeed a privateer of four and twenty guns, would be sufficient. The beginning of December would be the best time to proceed from Boston or Philadelphia, because the frigate would then find the whaling vessels nearly loaded. The cargoes of bone and oil are very valuable, and at least four hundred and fifty of the best kind of seamen would be taken out of the hands of the English, and might be gained into the American service. Most of the officers and men wish well to this country, and would gladly be in its service, if they could be delivered from that they are engaged in. Whenever the English men of war or privateers, have taken an American vessel, they have given to all the whalemen found among the crew, by order of government, their choice, either to go on board a man of war and fight against their country, or into the whale fishery. Such numbers have chosen the latter, as have made up the crews of seventeen vessels.
I thought it my duty to communicate this, that if so profitable a branch of commerce, and so valuable a nursery of seamen, can be taken from the English, it may be done. I prevailed with my colleagues last year to represent these facts to his Excellency, M. de Sartine, but it appears that his Majesty's service would not admit of any enterprise from France in consequence of it. Since my return I have represented them to the Council of this State, but whether anything can be done by them, after the disaster at Penobscot, I doubt. If Congress should not deem it consistent with the public service to send a frigate upon this service, nothing will be lost but the trouble of this letter.
I have the honor to congratulate your Excellency on your advancement to the chair, and to subscribe myself with great respect, &c.
JOHN ADAMS.
* * * * *
TO SAMUEL HUNTINGTON, PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.
Braintree, October 20th, 1779.
Sir,
M. Schweighauser of Nantes, who is a native of Switzerland, observing me as I was one day at his house looking with some attention upon a stamp of the heroic deed of William Tell, asked me to take a few of them to America, as a present from him, which I agreed to do with pleasure. He accordingly sent on board the frigate a box containing, as he told me, one stamp for each State, neatly framed and glazed, which he desired me to present to Congress, as a small token of his respect. The box has never been opened, but I hope the pictures are safe, and with permission of Congress I will deliver it to the Navy Board in Boston, to be by them transmitted to the delegates from the several States, or to their order.
I have the honor to be, with great respect, &c.
JOHN ADAMS.
* * * * *
TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.
Braintree, October 21st, 1779.
Sir,
So many advantages might be derived to the United States in the conduct of the war, in furnishing the army and navy, in augmenting the value, or at least in preventing the further depreciation of their currency, in lowering the prices of goods, in supplying the wants of the people, and in preventing murmurs and discontents, that I have ever thought it of very great importance, in some way or other, to procure convoys to their trade, to and from the West India Islands, and Europe.
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The Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolution, Vol. 04Chapter M: De Lafayette to John Adams (1)
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